FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCDE TITLE: CAESAR VI-B-57B)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00966210
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00903
• Publication Date: January 28, 1957

Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2007
28 January 1957
OCI 2090/57A
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STUDY
FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY
(1945-1956)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT�
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE
LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794,
THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN
ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
_
ikpproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Sino-Soviet Staff
Office of Current Intelligence
Reference Title: Caesar VI-B-57B
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STUDY
Factionalism in the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party
(1945-1956)
This study is a working paper. It attempt3to discover
and analyze the major cliques, factions and alignments in
the Hungarian Workers (Communist) party since 1945 in terms
of changing Soviet policy demands and the resultant con-
flict of interest with the needs of local leaders and the
country as a.whole. It is circulated to analysts of Soviet
affairs as a contribution to current interpretation of
Soviet policy. It is also designed in part to meet the
IAC requirement of 27 December 1955 for studies of faction-
alism in the Satellite Communist parties.
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
23INFA4P---
CAESAR VI-B-57a.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION: THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PRIOR TO 1945
The Bela Kun Revolution 1
Comintern Leaders of the Hungarian Party 2
Hungarian Nativist Communists 4
Shift of Soviet Tactics to the "United" and "Popular"
Front 5
"Front" Tactics in Hungary (1936-41) 7
"Popular Front" Tactics: Hungarians in the Spanish
Civil War (1936-39) 10
Moscow Direction of the Hungarian Party in World
War II (1940-45) 11
Party Activities in Hungary during World War II 13
Formation of the Hungarian Independence Front (1944) . 14
The Partisans in Rakosiis Calculations 16
FORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PARTY
The Muscovite Leadership of the Party 18
Elements in the Party 21
COERCION OF NATIVIST ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY
The Experiment with "National Communism" (1945-48) .25
The Condemnation of National Communism (1949)
27
Establishment of "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" . . 28
Destruction of National Communist Elements in the
Party (1949) 29
Approved for for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-3151C-PWET,_
Advancement of Moderate Nationalists (1948-51) ol
Elimination of Moderate Nationalists 32
THE STALINIST PARTY (1951-53)
Role of the Rakosi-Gero Clique 34
Increased Pressure on the Rakosi Leadership
(Spring-Summer 1952) 35
Rakosi Asserts his Leadership (Autumn 1952) 35
Changes in the Relative Positionsof Top Party
Leaders 36
The "Anti-Zionist" Purge: 37
Removal of Zoltan Vas as Planning Chief' 38
Alleged Rakosi-Gero Rivalry 39
THE NEW COURSE: PHASE 1
Immediate Consequences of Stalin's Death 40
Indications of Vacillation and Lack of Directives. . 40
Prelude to the Announcement of the New Course 42
The New Course 42
Announcement of the New Course 43
Rakosi's 11 July Pronouncement 45
Doctrinaire Opposition to New Course Economic
Policies 45
Strengthening Collective Leadership 46
Repercussions of the Fall of Beria 46
iHt. NEW COURSE: NAGY ASSERTS HIS LEADERSHIP (May-November 1954)
The Third Party Congress (23-30 May) 48
Emergence of a Nagy Team 49
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
3EL/144.4
Party Dissension over the Role of the Patriotic
Peoples Front 51
The "Test of Strength" (1-3 October) 1.31
Patriotic Peoples Front 53
Release of "Victims of Stalinist Oppression" 53
Status of Affairs, Autumn 1954 54
RAKOSI'S RETURN TO POWER (December 1954-January 1956)
Rakosi Takes Over 56
Condemnation of the Nagy Policies (March) 57
Party Condemnation of Nagy (April) ZS
Increasing Emphasis on Hard Domestic :(,)olicj.es.(June) 60
The Yugoslav Issue
Appearance of Revolutionary Elements: The Writers
Revolt (September-November)
61
62
Counter-Offensive of the Party (November-December)
.�
63
DISINTEGRATION OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PARTY
(22 February-24 October 1956)
Effects of the Twentieth Soviet ,
65
Dissension in the Central Committee
66
Stalinists, Liberals and Moderates
66
The Kremlin's Dilemma
67
Growing Strength of the Anti-Rakosi Opposition
38
Continued Vacillation of the Kremlin
70
Rakosi Reverts to Harsh Tactics
71
The Fall of Rakosi
72
Gero as Party Chief
72
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-515eRg4C
The Gero Policies 73
The "Moderate Nationalist" Position 74
Demands of the Nagy Faction 75
The Yugoslav Factor 76
The Eve of the Revolution 77
The Polish Example 78
Nagy and Kadar Take Over 78
POSTLUDE: DESTRUCTION OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PARTY
Initial Co-operation of Liberals and Moderates in
Support of the Revolution 80
Increasingly Revolutionary Character of the Nagy
Government 80
The "Moderates" Sabotage the Revolution 81
Fate of Nagy and his Adherents 82
Fate of the Stalinists 82
The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 83
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS KCOMMUNIST) PARTY
(1945-1956)
SUMMARY
The Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party from its inception
in 1918 figured in Soviet policy as an instrument of penetration
and, after 1944, domination in Hungary. At the height of its
power it numbered almost one million members and, under the leader-
ship of Matyas Rakosi, Hungary's "little Stalin," held control
over every aspect of Hungarian life. The party was shattered as
the result of a series of Soviet policy moves culminating in the
de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the
20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party. These measures
split the party into hostile factions and precipitated dissension
in the organization from top to bottom. The virtual destruction
of the party was completed by the Soviet armed reconquest of
Hungary in November 1956.
In violently anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Hungary, the
mission imposed on the party required that it be headed by indi-
viduals completely loyal to the Kremlin. To secure such a top
command, Moscow in past years built up a corps of carefully
trained Hungarian emigres, in large number Jewish, chosen for
suppleness, tenacity, intelligence and lack of national senti-
ments. At the close of World War II this group of "Muscovites,"
led by Matyas Rakosi, returned with Soviet armies to rule Hungary
in the interests of the Kremlin, using any tactics which appeared
necessary for the purpose within the general framework of Soviet
policies. He enlisted the support of optimists and opportunists
who believed that the welfare of the country and their own ad-
vancement might be gained by collaboration with Moscow and a
reasonable degree of socialization of the Hungarian economy and
social structure. In the course of years, .Rakosi built up a
well-integrated hierarchy of officials, chosen from nativist
Communists and collaborators, closely tied to himself personally,
buttressed by an effective security police structure and sus-
tained in the last analysis by the presence of Soviet troops in
Hungary. These individuals were given careful training to fit
them for their function of ruling Hungary in the interests of
the Kremlin.
At each major Soviet policy change, the Hungarian party
leadership was required to implement Moscow-dictated directives
which often ran counter to Hungarian national interests, re-
quired the demotion or destruction of individuals in high
mmillimIllmApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
positions and evoked the hatred of the Hungarian people.
This situation confronted the Hungarian leaders with a direct
conflict of interests. At various somentsr certain Communists
.refused to abide by .the Kremlin decisions and chose .the inter-
ests of Hungary.
In the early years of Communist rule, the conflict of inter-
ests was played down in accordance with a formula permitting a
"Hungarian road .to socialism." The reversal of this toleration
of "national Communism" following .the break between Stalin and
Tito led to the fall of leading Hungarian Communists, notably
Laszlo Rajk. But the death of Rajk was only the first step in
stamping out smouldering Hungarian resistance to ruthless Soviet-
ization now imposed on the country under the leadership of Rakosi
and his Muscovite colleagues Gero, Revai and Farkas. High-rank-
ing Social Democrats who had joined the party soon proved unreli-
able (1950) and distinguished local Communists--notably Janos
Kadar--who had attempted to co-operate following the death of
Rajk also were imprisoned. As a result.of these purges, all op-
position elements in Hungary were either in prison or terrified
into silence. The purged elements were replaced by young "hard"
Communists provided with intensive Soviet indoctrination.
Major blows were dealt to the Muscovite leaders by the
"Zionist" purges of 1952-53 and the concurrent economic crisis
that led to replacements in the Hungarian planning apparatus.
Although Rakosi managed these matters with great skill, the
purges pointed up the predominantly Jewish character of the party
leadership in a country where anti-Semitism was latent, and
emphasized the disastrous effects of accelerated industrializa-
tion and collectivization on the Hungarian economy.
The proclamation of the New Course with Imre Nagy as premier
in the summer of 1953 brought new personalities to the fore and
instituted liberalized policies in agriculture and industry at
the expense of doctrinaire Communists who had profited from
earlier economic policies. Violent opposition from 'these ele-
ments was silenced by Rakosi, apparently on Moscow's orders,
and the new policies enforced. During the summer of 1954, Nagy
emerged as a genuine leader backed by the majority of the central
committee. But Nagy's resort to extraparty mechanisms to gain
popular support and his encouragement of unrestrained criticism
of regime policies drove Rakosi to seek the support of the Krem-
lin against Nagy. Meanwhile, the liberation of Janos Kadar and
other imprisoned Communists strengthened�party moderate forces
'against the former leadership.
ii
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
In late November Rakosi returned to Hungary, after two
months in Moscow, to lay down a doctrinaire line on political
and economic issues and, following the demotion of Malenkov in
the Soviet Union, to demote Nagy and his adherents. The party
leadership however, was unable to force Nagy--sustained by a
large faction in the central committee--into submission and he
therefore remained the rallying point for the rapidly growing
opposition. The Rakosi-Gero clique renewed its emphasis on
industrialization and collectivization, in connection with plan-
ning for the Second Five-Year Plan due to begin in 1956, and
attempted to coerce its critics into submission. The group was
greatly restrained, however, by the Kremlin's current attempt
to present an appearance of moderation, particularly in its
relations with Tito of Yugoslavia. These apparently liberal
Soviet policies, however, stimulated the Hungarian opposition
into mounting demands for a "thaw" in Hungary.
In the autumn of 1955, Hungarian writers apparently backed
by a large faction in the party central committee resorted to
open defiance of Rakosi (the so-called Writers' Revolt). The
party leadership was forced to resort to coercive measures to
silence its opponents. They found it necessary to take the
long-delayed action of expelling Imre Nagy from the party as a
means of quieting criticism in the central committee.
The extreme de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev
and Mikoyan at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party
dealt a drastic blow to the Rakosi regime and encouraged his
.opponents into renewed efforts to oust him and institute liberal
ized policies. From this point.forward,.Rakosi was maintained
in power only by the Kremlin which apparently believed that his
experienced hand was needed to control the dangerous factional-
ism in the Hungarian party and contain Hungarian nationalitm en-
couraged by the Kremlin's wooing of Tito. Yet the retention of
Rakosi contrary to announced Soviet de-Stalinization measures
drove the Hungarian opposition into a frenzy. At meetings at
the Petofi Club, representatives of every sector of Hungarian
life�including army officers and former partisan and underground
fighters--demanded the removal of Rakosi. Rakosi sought in
vain to convince his opponents that he was genuinely carrying
out the correct Soviet line.
The mounting fury of the opposition, reaching a climax at
the 27 June meeting of the Petofi Club--and Rakosi's decision
to use harsh measures to bring his opponents into line--forced
the Kremlin to make a decision. Mikoyan arrived in Budapest
in mid-July, challenged Rakosi's proposals and was reportedly
sustained by Khrushchev. On 18 July, Rakosi resigned as first
secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party, giving as his reason
serious violations of the "cult of personality."
iii
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
At this point, the Kremlin might have restored unity to, the
Hungarian party by taking the bold course of rehabilitating Imre
Nagy and promoting Kadar to the head of the party. Instead,
Mikoyan approved the substitution of Gero for Rakosi. This move
appeared to threaten a return to the policies of accelerated in-
dustrialization and forced collectivization, although Gero
sketched out more moderate polities. Although Kadar and the
former Social Democrat Marosan were elevated to the, political
committee, doctrinaire elements maintained their ascendancy.
Opposition elements from the pro-Nagy and pro-Kadar factions
of the party were encouraged by these maneuvers to bargain with
the regime. Indications that the Kremlin itself was vacillating
between a crackdown on Polish nationalists and_continued encour-
agement of the "thaw" also spurred the Hungarians to take a
bolder course. On the other hand, Gero's continued stress on
doctrinaire considerations kept his opponents alive to the
.possibility of a return to harsh measures--a. possibility made
more real by increasing symptoms of a tougher Soviet policy to-
ward Yugoslavia. These varying developments combined to make
the three months prior to the October revolution a period in
which hope and fear combined to produce reckless daring among
Hungarians.
The crisis came in early October--when Gero and Kadar were
both out of the country. A mammoth demonstration staged by
Nagy adherents in connection with the reburial of Laszlo Rajk
in the national cemetery on .6 October turned into a nationalist
manifestation with distinct anti-Soviet implications directed
against the Gero regime. Mounting excitement throughout the
nation encouraged by Polish defiance of the Kremlin reached a
climax in the 23 October demonstration staged by students. When
these demonstrations turned into riots leading to the full-scale
fighting between AVM troops and the rioters (24 October), Soviet
troops intervened. The revolution had begun.
The party leadership made a desperate--but vain--effort to
maintain control of events. The central committee and political
committee were called into session on the night of 23 October.
Panicky party leaders--presumably Gero--called for Soviet aid
under the Warsaw pact. During the stormy all-night session, the
seven remaining Stalinists were replaced by two moderates and
one Nagyist, and Nagy was reinstalled as premier. The following
day (25 October), Gero was replaced by Janos Kadar. The change
in leadership came far too late to win confidence from the reh-
elS..
The moderates under Kadar and liberals led by Nagy main-
tained unity for a short period. Nagy's endorsement of increas-
ingly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet moves--culminating in the
iv
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw pact and the proclamation
of neutrality under the protection of the UN drove the so-called
"moderates" to seek refuge with Soviet troops. The newly formed
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party became the vehicle of the dis-
credited Kadar party leadership. On 4 November, Kadar announced
the formation of a new Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Govern-
ment and appealed for Soviet aid to put down "counterrevolution-
ary" forces in Hungary.
These events mark the death of the Hungarian Communist Party
as it existed for almost 40 years. Leading Stalinists arejn,the
Soviet Union,dead,or in discard. Nagy and his associates after
leaving their sanctuary in the Yugoslav embassy were seized by
Soviet troops and are now being held in Rumania. The remaining
"moderates" head a sham party--the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party--an organization of discredited functionaries from the
Rakosi regime, claiming a membership of less than 100,000 and
totally lacking in enthusiasm or sense of mission. It is the
creature of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary.
28 January 1957
INNIApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
CHAPTER I
THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
PRIOR TO 1945
1. The Bela Kun Revolution
The Hungarian Communist Party was founded on 20 November
1918 from an aggregation of former prisoners of war just re-
turned from Russia and a few Hungarian extreme leftists nomi-
nally belonging to the Social Democratic Party. The new party's
leader was Bela Kun, who had received extensive Bolshevik in-
doctrination in Russia and reportedly had been in contact with
Lenin. Among his lieutenants were Eugene Varga, Matyas Rakosi
and a number of individuals who subsequently formed the "Mus-
covite" corps of the Hungarian Communist Party leadership.
Specially trained in the Soviet Union, closely related by their
common experiences and in some cases by marriage, mainly of
Jewish origin, these Communists form a closely knit group among
whom it is difficult to detect significant differences.*: Later
evidence makes clear, however, that some of them were somewhat
more nationalist in orientation than others (e.g. Imre Nagy).
In March 1918 this group seized control of the Hungarian
government as a result of the vacillating policies of the
existing regime in the face of the economic and political
crisis resulting from WW I. They built up the party member-
ship among troops demoralized by the defeat and disintegration
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and unemployed industrial
workers of extremist tendendies They retained power for less
than six months during which the attempt to overthrow and
* From the viewpoint of later Hungarian history, the following
associates of Bela Kun are of special importance. Matyas Rakosi
(Deputy Commissar of Commerce), Gyorgy Lukacs (Deputy Commissar
for Education), Ferenc Munnich (commander of the Red garrison
in Budapest and ,a political commissar in the Red army), Imre
Nagy (reportedly Communist political boss in Somogy county in
southern Hungary), Erno Gero, Jozsef Revai, Erzsbbet:Andics.,add
her later husband Andor Berei, Lajos Bebrits, Gyula and Jozsef
Hajdu, Gyula Hay, Imre Horvath, Sandor Nogradi (in army), Bela
and Zoltan Szanto, Andras Szobek,Tibor.Dery-.and;Zoltaa Vas
(a fellow prisoner of Rakosi in Siberia). Bela Kun, Bela Szanto
and Laszlo Rudas wrote accounts of the revolution.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-
Communize Hungary's social structure resulted in a blood bath.
In August 1919, the Bela Kun regime was overcome as a result
of Allied military intervention and the organization of stable
elements within Hungary itself.
The chief result of the Communist revolution was to
alienate the Hungarian people from Communism and cause them
to support the Horthy government's policy of banning the party.
Moreover, Communist terror tactics, the attempt to collectivize
farms, and the subversion of the Social Democratic party had
made active enemies of exactly the agrarian and working class
elements which the Communists would have to win over in order
to make a successful comeback under peacetime conditions. As
a result, the number of Communists in Hungary prior to WW II
remained small, faction-ridden and conspiratorial. To most
elements of the Hungarian population, the Bela Kun regime re-
mained an example of bloody and fruitless terror imposed by
Russian agents on Hungary.
The episode nevertheless furnished Hungarian Communism
with its future leadership and taught this leadership certain
tactical lessons which were put to the test in 1945.
2. Comintern Leaders of the Hungarian Party
The interwar period is signalized by the continued attempt
of Moscow, through the Comintern, to direct the tiny, illegal
Hungarian Communist party in the interests of the Soviet Union.
The instrument of this direction was the small band of expatri-
ates left at the Kremlin's disposition by the failure of the
Bela .Kun revolution. These individuals took on Soviet citizen-
ship and received careful training in Communist theory and
methods of subversion. Several of them appear to have been
taught Soviet economic theory at the institute administered
by their compatriot, Eugene Varga.
a. Bela Kun: As chief of the Comintern's Hungarian
section, Bela Kun was the acknowledged leader of
Hungarian Communists until his elimination in 1937,
although Stalinist historians later made every
attempt to obscure his role. As a key man in the
Comintern organization--Agitprop chief prior to
1935--Kun was a friend of Zinoviev, Bukharin and
Karl Radek. From the limited evidence available,
he appears to have been a "left" Communist who
conceived of the party as a "united revolutionary
party of the working class" and paid little atten-
tion to winning the support of peasants. In
2
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-.77717.76/4+194.
Hungary, where agriculture played a major role, this
concept would later be judged a major error by Stalin-
ist critics.
b. Matyas Rakosi: Despite Kun's pre-eminence, it is
clear that Matyas Rakosi quickly became a key figure
in the Hungarian section of the Comintern. The son
of a small Jewish merchant, Rakosi, like Kun, had
served in the Austro-Hungarian army until his cap-
ture by the Russians in 1915. This marked the deci-
sive episode of his career. He received intensive
Communist indoctrination and returned to Hungary to
take a small role in the Bela Kun revolution. In
the exercise of his reponsibilities, he demonstrated
the enormous energy, driving will and absolute loyalty
to the Kremlin that qualified him for his subsequent
leadership of the Hungarian party. He went back to
Russia in 1920, reported to the Third Comintern Con-
gress on the Hungarian revolution and soon became
secretary of the Comintern's Executive Committee. ,
During his later career, he gained increasing ascend-
ancy over the squabbling factions of the Hungarian ,
party and outplayed his Comintern colleagues, hard-
driving but austere Erno Gero and Jozsef Revai,
ideologist of the group. At some time he became
identified with the opposition to Bela Kun. When and
upon what grounds remain to be ascertained from evi-
dence not presently available.
Rakosi's main quality, as it developed through
the years, was a shrewdness and flexibility that
enabled him to use people of all capabilities in the
fulfillment of Soviet purposes. The most hated man
� in Hungary during the post-WW II years, he inspired
terror by his ability to outmaneuver, confuse and
divide his enemies and effect his own ends. There
is no doubt that these qualities of Rakosi enor-
mously contributed to the establishment of Soviet
power in Hungary. There is also no doubt that the
methods which he used robbed the party of any real
basis of popular support in the country. Rakosi
never willingly surrendered one iota of actual con-
trol to a local Communist who for any reason whatever
possessed independent strength in Hungary. From the
beginning, he relied on members of his own clique to
conduct important liaison missions and selected mem-
bers of minority groups--mainly Jewish--for active
leadership in Hungary. In all these respects,
Rakosi was the close counterpart of Stalin.
3
milm=mweimApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-SE-64E,L.
c. Efforts of the Comintern to Develop the Hungarian
Party: At the instance of Bela Kun, file Comintern
made a number of efforts to develop a strong Commu-
nist movement in Hungary. Success was at best
mediocre. Three persons were sent, one after another,
to assume leadership of the disorganized and mutually
hostile factions of the illegal party--Erno Gero (1922),
Matyas Rakosi (1924) and Zoltan Szanto (about 1927). All
*ere .arreste&after:brief_periods:.of-activity.'. In 1928
Kun himself was arrested in Austria while seeking to
reorganize one dispersed faction of the party. Of
these attempts, that of Rakosi was most successful.
In 1924, after the Comintern had pronounced the dis-
solution of the Hungarian party--the first of three
dissolutions imposed by Moscow--Rakosi arrived in
Hungary, well supplied with money and aides, channeled
through Vienna. With him came his right-hand man,
Zoltan Vas (n6 Weinberger). They joined one faction
of the disorganized party and organized the first
party congress, held secretly in Vienna in August
1925. On their return to Hungary both were arrested,
tried and sentenced to prison *here they remained
-
until 1940.
3. Hungarian Nativist Communists
The depression of the early thirties...gavesome�itpetus-tO
Communism, which may also have profited from dimming memories
of the Bela Kun revolution: A small contingent of fighting re-
cruits was added to the illegal party from among students in
Budapest and other large cities and among industrial workers.
But the Party line propounded by Bela. Kun remained essentially
impotent to draw off real strength from the two major opposi-
tion parties then active in parliament--the Social Democrats,
powerful in the growing Hungarian working class and the Inde-
pendent Smallholders, representing the cause of agrarian reform.
a. Laszlo Rajk: The outstanding Hungarian recruit of
Communism at this period was Laszlo Rajk. Neither
Jewish nor "Muscovite" but of German origin, he was
a product of Communist influence on Budapest college
students. Apparently possessed of considerable dy-
namic charm, he succeeded in collecting around him-
self a group of "Hungarian" Communists, some of them
his fellow students at Eotvos College. Expelled from
school, he appears to have joined the construction
workers union and become sufficiently active as an
organizer to have been arrested by the police. The
nature of his activities, however, is completely
4
minommApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
obscured as a result of revisions of history under-
taken by official Communist historians who first
sought to build up his reputation and then to blacken
it completely.
b, Communist Labor Leaders: A few Communist personalities
gained some stature in the labor unions during the
early thirties .'*� Malang them, Janos Xadar.was .:most:
important in terms of post-WW II politics. Of possible
Yugoslav origin, he came from Fiume to Budapest where
he became active in the steel workers union and, on
the eve of WW II, an influential leader in the under-
ground party organization. It is probable that he
gained his abiding interest in security matters at
this period. He did not, however, succeed in achieving
top party leadership.
Other prominent Communists also were active in
labor union politics, often as allies of left-wing
Social Democrats. These individuals, after the Commu-
nist take-over, would be advanced as genuine repre-
sentatives of the working class and given positions
of power in the new government.
44 Shift of Soviet Tactics to the "United" and "Popular". Front
The major shift of Soviet tactics to the "anti-fascist
peoples front" line enunciated by Dimitrov at the Seventh
Comintern congress (1935) had drastic repercussions on the
Hungarian party. According to the historian of the period,
Gyula Kallai: "It was the historical task of the Communist
parties of various countries to outline and put into practice
these general principles in conformity with the peculiar condi-
tions in their respective countries." The "letter of comrade-
ship" of January 1936 conveying the new Soviet line instructed
local leaders to abandon the long-standing concept of the small
conspiratorial party working for immediate world revolution
and to implement tactics calling for creation of a "broad
* Other Communists or crypto-Communists connected with trade
unions include the following: Antal Apro (construction workers),
Istvan Bata, Arpad Hazi, Istvan Hidas (metalworkers), Karoly
Kiss (leatherworkers), Istvan Kovacs, Istvan Kristof (leather-
workers), Jozsef Kobol (woodworkers), Jozsef Mekis (ironworkers?),
Sandor Nogradi (ironworkers), Gabor Peter, Laszlo Piros (butch-
ers),,Mihaly Zsofinyecz (foundry workers).
5
-SEC-REZ
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
-"SE�REZ
democratic national unity front" which would appeal to all ele-
ments of the population, including the peasantry. This program
represented a sharp shift to the right in theoretical terms.
a. Repercussions of the Fall of Bela Kun: Bela Kun was
a major victim of the change in tactics. He was elim-
inated from the Comintern leadership and put to death.*
All members of the Hungarian party's central commit-
tee were assumed to be guilty of Kun's heresy. The
party itself was dissolved.
These dramatic proceedings led to a crisis whose
full extent was revealed only in the course of dis-
cussions of de-Stalinization in 1956. "Leftist" Com-
munists denounced the sweeping use of "front" tactics
outlined in Moscow and called for a return to original
Communist objective, i.e. the immediate revolutionary
establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat."
In the words of Gyula Kallai, the chief historian of
the period, "some workers do not understand that the
policy of a united front does not mean the abandonment
of the class struggle, but on the contrary is the only
logical form of class struggle in a given situation."
The dissenters were denounced as "Trotskyites" by the
party leaders in Moscow.**
* Bela Kun was condemned at a 1937 meeting of the Ccmtntern
presidium presided over by Georgy Dimitrov. At this meeting
Manuilsky presented charges that Kun had sharply criticized the
Comintern direction of Hungarian party work and had attributed
this failure in part to the "weak representation of the Soviet
Communist Party in the Comintern." Unfortunately for Kun, the
Soviet party's representative was Stalin. Kun's explanation
that he meant Manuilsky was thrust aside. While Kun was led
away by NKVD men, the other delegates sat in frozen horror.
These delegates included Eugene Varga, his collaborator in the
1919 regime and rehabilitator in 1956. (Avro Tuominen, quoted
by Daniel Norman, New Statesman and Nation, 1 Sept 56)
** Stalin defined the Trotskyite deviation as: (1) considering
world revolution was necessary before Socialism could be built
in the Soviet Union; (2) denying the possibility of drawing
the peasant masses into socialist construction; (3) denying
the necessity of iron discipline in the party and allowing
freedom of factional groupings.
6
"SEGREZ.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
The full story of the consequences of the fall
of Bela Kun remains to be written. Its immediate
effect was to split off "Trotskyite" factions who
claimed to preserve the original doctrine, to strengthen
anti-Soviet elements in the party and to augment popu-
lar revulsion at Soviet policy. These divisive ef-
fects were later blurred over by party historians in
an attempt to preserve the myth of party unity.
Matyas Rakosi was fortunate enough to be in a
Hungarian prison during this period. He was thus
enabled to escape the consequences of the Stalinist
purges while acquiring the status of official martyr
of the party. In the meantime, his "heroic fortitude"
was carefully recorded for the Communist faithful by
his secretary, Zoltan Vas.
5. "Front" Tactics in Hungary (1936-41)
The late thitties:were,:theheyday:of::united frontancrpopu
lar front tactics in Hungary. The attempt to build an under-
ground party organization, combat-ready for the hoped-for seizure
of power, was postponed in favor of the broadest possible front
tactics aimed at influencing legal parties to endorse Communist
objectives. Meanwhile, Communists rebuilt their basic cells
at the lowest level for the eventual reappearance of the party.
As Kallai explains, the party needed members who were not known
to the police in the event of war.
a. Moscow Leadership: In the absence of a central organ-
ization in Hungary, direction of the party cells was
maintained from Moscow probably via Prague. During
this period, top command appears to have been exer-
cised by Jozsef Revai with the possible concurrence
of Erno Gero and Mihaly Farkas. The correct theoret-
ical line was imparted to Communists in Hungary by a
clandestine publication, apparently printed in Prague
from material furnished by Moscow.
Revai, the son of a well-to-do Jewish family and
a Communist intellectual of some reputation, was the
author of a major work on Marxism which was circulated
in Hungary prior to the war. Gero was well known
among Hungarian Communists as one of the original
underground party leaders. Energetic, austere and
fanatical, he reportedly had done organization work
in Western European Communist parties prior to his
participation in the Spanish Civil War as the Comintern
representative. His Moscow training may have included
7
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
--
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
work at Eugene Varga's institute. Unlike Revai and
Gero, Farkas apparently was not a veteran of the 1919
revolution. A Hungarian Jew born in Slovakia, Farkas
had come into the Hungarian party via the Czechoslovak
party. During the early thitties. he was .a,CommuniSt
youth organizer in Western Europe and, like Gero,
participated in the Spanish Civil War. He may have
been the party's contact man in Prague during this
period. With Rakosi, these three men--Revai, Gero
and Farkas--constituted.the top command of the Hungarian
Communist party in the WW II and post-war period.
b. "United Front" Tactics: The new tactics imposed on
Communists called for an energetic attempt to pene-
trate the Social Democratic Party in order to estab-
lish a "united front" of workers. While these tactics
failed to win support among reputable Social Democrats,
they contributed to laying the foundation for future
co-operation with left-wing socialists (notably Arpad
Szakasits) and thus the post-war subversion of the
Social Democratic party. Communists conducted a
steady attack on "right wing" socialist leaders in
an effort to divide the workers from their leaders.
They agitated for strikes. They loudly called for
opposition to Hitler. Their divisive tactics, how-
ever, brought a sharp counterattack from Social Demo-
cratic spokesmen who pointed out that Soviet-inspired
Communist tactics in Germany had largely contributed
to the victory of Hitler in 1933.
c. The Debrecen Communist Group: Communist tactics had
somewhat greater success among intellectuals and
youth. A group of young intellectuals at the Univer-
sity of Debrecen responded to Communist lures and
identified themselves with popular front tactics
aiming at the penetration of radical agrarian organ-
izations. Members of this Communist cell, led by
Gyula Kallai, were of irreproachable Hungarian stock,
some of them Protestant in background. They thus
constituted one of the few authentically Hungarian
elements in the party.* The concern of these young
men fdr_land:reform ideally. suited the party's prp-
gramA5f attempting to gain-afoothold:.in leftwiag
agrarian circles.
* The Debrecen Communist cell included, beside Kallai, Ferenc
Donath, Geza Losonczi, Szilard Ujhely and Sandor Zold.
8
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Kallai himself co-operated with the so-called "village
explorers" in forming the "March Front" of 1937 and
later worked on the Social Democratic newspaper
(Nepszava), thus personally epitomizing the "anti-
fascist popular front" approach. Kallai and other
members of his group appear to have established con-
tact with Rakosi in prison, though the channels are
not known.
d. Penetration of the National Peasant Party: Communist
backing enabled the "village explorers" to form the
National Peasant party and thus laid the groundwork
for penetration which enabled the Communists to use
the organization to undercut the Smallholders in the
post-WW II period. Certain of the agrarian leaders
(Peter Veres, Jozsef Darvas, Ferenc Erdei) collaborated
closely with the Communists in the period of WW II and
afterward became for all practical purposes Communists.
e. Period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939-41): By 1938,
the Muscovite leaders were ready to reorganize a new
party in Hungary. A new central committee was formed
and the condemnation of certain members of the old
committee apparently withdrawn the following year.
By virtue of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and
the ensuing resumption of diplomatic relations between
Hungary and the Kremlin, the Communist party gained
much greater freedom of action and even began to pub-
lish a legal periodical (Gondolat).' Communists
nevertheless still were viewed with great suspicion
by the regime: Kallai states that a number of leaders
were arrested in 1940. This period came to an end
with the Hungarian declaration of war on the Soviet
Union (27 March 1941).
Although Communists continued to achieve their
greatest success among youth and intellectuals, their
identification with the Soviet Union made them objects
of suspicion at this time. As Kallai points out,
after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact, it was
difficult for Communists to convince workers that
"Socialism and fascism are inexorable enemies!"
Moreover, the Soviet attack on Finland brought them
9
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
great unpopularity. unpopularity. It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the party, on the eve of the Hungarian
entry into the war, was a negligible factor in Hun-
garian politics and important only as a center of
subversion serving Soviet interests.
6. "Popular Front" Tactics: Hungarians in the Spanish Civil
War (1936-39)-
The Spanish Civil War constituted a special training ground
for the most enterprising Hungarian Communists during the late
thirties.. Soviet support.fdr.the.SpaniEh.Repyblican government
took the form of sponsoring the formation of an International
Brigade includingheterogenecusCommunist and "liberal" elements
from various countries. Approximately one thousand Hungarian
volunteers joined the brigade, formed the so-called "Rakosi
Battalion" and thus acquired paramilitary experience that was
of major importance during WW II. The commander of the brigade
was Ferenc Munnich, former officer in the Bela Kun army and by
now a Communist of international reputation. Both Erno Gero
and Mihaly Farkas reportedly were involved in the fighting,
Gero allegedly as special representative of the Comintern.
Among the outstanding leaders of the Hungarians was the young
Budapest youth and labor activist, Laszlo Rajk, who performed
an excellent job as political officer of the Rakosi Battalion.
In French internment camps, following the close of hostil-
ities, a number of the participants in the Spanish Civil War
were brought into close contact with representatives of Western
relief agencies, including Noel Field, and with Yugoslav mem-
bers of the International Brigade. During this period (1939-
41), the stage was set for the later tragedies of many Hun-
garian veterans. In these internment camps, Rajk and certain
other Hungarians participated in discussions of Communist
theory with Yugoslav leaders and apparently formed personal
friendships which: later marked them as potentially unreliable
in the eyes of the Kremlin.*
Not all the "Spaniards," as the Civil War veterans were
called, were involved in Western or Yugoslav contacts which
later would be judged treasonable. Some appear to have joined
* The following Spanish Civil War veterans were implicated in
the fall of Rajk and suffered death or imprisonment as a result:
Sandor Cseresnyes, Frigyes Major, Laszlo Matyas, Laszlo
Marsbhal, Karoly Rath, Mihaly Szalvay, Andras Tompe, mire Gayer.
10
576R-g-L,
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
French resistance forces (e.g. Nogradi) Ann thus escaped the
stigma of the internment camps. The alleged Comintern repre-
sentative, Erno Gero, returned immediately to the Soviet Union
and thus was available as secretary to Dimitrov or Manuilsky,
to act as mentor for the Hungarian party during the remaining
years before the advent of war.
7. Moscow Direction of the Hungarian Party in WW II (1940-45)
a Formation of the Foreign Committee of the Hungarian
Communist Party: The advent of WW II for the first
time enabled all elements of the "Muscovite" leader-
ship to gather in Moscow and following the Hungarian
declaration of war on the Soviet Union (27 June 1941)
to initiate intensive activity for Hungary's "libera-
tion.". Matyas Rakosi returned to Moscow in September
1940 in exchange for flags captured by the Russians
in their invasion of Hungary (1848). He immediately
took over top leadership of all activities. The
Foreign Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party
was. formed shortly thereafter. Thus, even prior to
Hungary's entry into the war, Communist leaders in
Moscow were preparing a program for action in post-
war Hungary.
These activities centered around the Comintern.
Rakosi, as a member of the Comintern, apparently did
not in theory hold the position of head of the Hun-
garian party but in practice he made himself respon-
sible for all details of Action and propaganda. Gero,
Farkas, Revai and Zoltan Vas worked closely with him.
Following:the dissolution of the Comintern (17 May
1943), Gero may have played a somewhat greater role
in directing propaganda aimed at Hungary.* There is
no evidence, however, that he offered an opposition
to Rakosi's leadership at any time. Instead, he
appears to have acted as Rakosi's right hand man.
* Wolfgang Leonhard, an East German party official who defected
to the Yugoslays in 1949, states that Gero at this time super-
vised propaganda issued by the National Committee for Free Ger-
many. Leonhard asserts that Gero was believed by the Germans
to occupy4a very high position in the Communist organizatiOn
which continued the work of the Comintern after its dissolution
(Die Revolution entlaesst ihre Kinder).
11
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
b. The liuth Radio: Direction of the important broad-
casts to Hungary emanating from Radio Kossuth--named
for the national hero of the Hungarian revolution of
1848--was confided to two Hungarians who are thus
marked out as nationalist-oriented, Ferenc Munnich
and Imre Nagy. Munnich enjoyed considerable prestige
among Communists throughout Europe as a result of his
leading role in the International Brigade in Spain.
Imre Nagy, like the other Muscovites, had played a
minor role in the Bela Kun episode and afterward had
worked in the illegal Communist organization of a
small provincial town (Kaposvar) prior to his emigra-
tion to the Soviet Union (about 1930). An authentic
Hungarian peasant, possessed of considerable jovial
humor, Nagy was trained in Soviet agricultural eco-
nomics at the University of Moscow and reportedly had
run a collective farm in Siberia. : Now he was brought
forward to issue propaganda whose target was .the Hun-
garian peasant and which strongly emphasized the Com-
munist intention of breaking up large estates and
giving land to the farmers.
Radio communications formed the principal link
between the Muscovite directors of the Hungarian patty
and their followers in Hungary. A daily, news commen-
tary, ideological discussions and directions for sabo-
tage operations and training were issued by this
medium. Rakosi himself spoke frequently over Radio
Kossuth and for the first time acquired a relatively
large audience in Hungary. These broadcasts emphasized
"democracy," basic "rights," nationalization of great
industrial enterprises and land reform as the future
program of the Communists in Hungary.
c. "Anti-Fascist" Indoctrination of Prisoners of War:
From the scanty and poor evidence available, it ap-
pears that the Foreign Committee concentrated on re-
cruiting likely candidates from the 65,000 Hungarian
prisoners captured in the fighting around Stalingrad.
Spanish Civil War veterans and members of minority
groups serving in labor battalions were a particular
target for the recruiters. At two "anti-Fascist"
schools, these "volunteers" were subjected to inten-
sive indoctrination and then parachuted into combat
zones or Hungary as couriers or partisan fighters.
Direction of this training was in the hands of Gero,
assisted by such fanatical Communists as Erzsebet Ardics.
12
77.;771..t1144.1,..
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
In addition to the schools for relatively low-
level prisoners, there may have been an institution
for more desirable recruits. Reports refer to a
school set up near Moscow at which Revai, Nagy, the
Varga-trained economist Istvan Friss and possibly
Eugene Varga himself taught Hungarians.
8. Party Activities. in Hungary during WW II
a. Leadership of the Underground: The whole story of
tile wartime activities of the Communists in Hungary
is clothed in mystery as a result of the editing of
historical fact by Stalinist historians intent upon
building up or denigrating key individuals in the
party, notably Laszlo Rajk. It is known that the
party went underground following Hungary's declara-
tion of war on the Soviet Union. Gyula Kallai, then
linked very closely with left-wing Social Democrats
and National Peasant Party leaders, appears to have
exercised public leadership of the party. Two indi-
viduals who died in prison (Rozsa and Schonherz) were
described as top party leaders. A group of labor
union activists, including several individuals who
came to the fore after the war (Janos Kadar, Gabor
Peter, Istvan Kovacs, Antal Apro) apparently played
a major role. The full and true story of these
events remains to be written.
Many of the tried leaders of the party spent the
war years in prison. Rajk was arrested shortly after
his return to the country in the autumn of 1941 and
remained under detention until October 1944, when
he was turned over to military authorities and trans-
ported to Germany. Nevertheless, he continued ap-
parently to maintain his connection with the resist-
ance during this period. Certain other leaders re-
mained free for a longer time and kept up liaison
with Moscow, and probably with the Yugoslav partisans
as well. Kadar, in particular, reportedly was ar-
rested in 1944 while seeking to contact the Yugoslays.
b. Front Tactics: On the surface, Communists co-
operated with the Independence Movement led by Hun-
garians who opposed the alignment of their country
13
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
with Kallai put into effect the customary
Communist tactics of supporting left-wing elements
in legal parties (Social Democrat, Independent Small-
holders and National Peasant parties) while attempting
to divide the more radical elements in these parties
from their "right-wing" leaders. These tactics led
to a catastrophe for the Communist organization it-
self early in 1942. Kallii was responsible for
pushing an apparently innocent nationalist celebration,
on 15 March, into an anti-regime demonstration which
was broken up by police. Communist plans for big May
Day demonstrations keyed to the "peace" theme were
also abortive. Police swooped down on party head-
quarters and arrested three Central Committee members
of whom two (Rozsa and Schonherz) died in prison.
Kallai himself was arrested on charges of treason but
reportedly was acquitted.
A special effort was made to infiltrate Spanish
Civil War veterans--i.e. paramilitary types--into
key points in the labor movement. In the countryside,
Communists. sought to penetrate and control the non-
political Peasants Association, using as their instru-
ment the ostensible Smallholder party member, Istvan
Dobi. These activities were closely supervised by
the Foreign Section of the party in Moscow by means
of directives broadcast over Radio Kossuth, illegal
publications and personal liaison, often by parachute
drops.
c. Dissolution of the Party: Formation of the "Peace
Party": As a result of steadily increasing police
pressure, local Communists lost heart and in June
1943 used the dissolution of the Comintern as an
excuse for dissolving the official party organization.
This move was later termed a "most serious error."
It may have marked Kallai for eventual punishment
as "an unreliable cadre." A new organization almost
immediately took the place of the disbanded party
under the name of the "Peace Party."
9. Formation of the Hungarian Independence Front (1944)
a. Re-establishment of the Communist Party: Communist
resistance to the Germans was greatly stepped up after
the German intervention to coerce the Horthy govern-
ment on 19 March 1944. Only with the approach of
Soviet armies to Hungary's borders, however, did these
activities gain real impetus. The Communist party
14
1
mimmilmeimmumimApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
was re-formed in September and the Communist youth
organization was called into existence again. An
official newspaper edited by Ferenc Donath also made
its appearance. The new party took its place in the
Hungarian Independence Front, along with the Inde-
pendent Smallholders Party, the Social Democrats,
and the National Peasant Party. Within the Front,
Communists and left-wing Social Democrats co-
operated very closely and, in fact, on 10 October
signed an agreement looking toward eventual union of
both parties.
b. Possible Role of Laszlo Rajk: Actual leadership of
the Hungarian underground in October 1944 may have
been exercised by Laszlo Rajk, although titular leader
Gyula Kallai assumed public responsibility. Ostensibly
confined in Margit-Korut prison, Rajk allegedly secured
a-measure of liberty from Horthy's counterespionage
chief who himself belonged to the resistance. Rajk,
for example, is credited with preparing the text of
the agreement for eventual union of left-wing Social
Democrats and Communists. Much research would be
required to approximate the true story of Rajk's
activities.
c. The "Western Communists": Somewhat peripheral to these
activities but of later political importance were Hun-
garian Communist activities in Switzerland. Here a
group of left-wing students and intellectuals linked
with the Hungarian Independence Front carried on re-
sistance,activities geared into those of the Yugo-
slays. Contemporary sources reported that partici-
pants in the Bela Kun revolution (the Hajdu brothers)
were connected with this group. Their local leader,
Tibor Szonyi, achieved sufficient stature in the Com-
munist party to merit a relatively influential posi-
tion (chief of cadres) in the Hungarian party on his
return at the close of the war.
15
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
d. Resistance Fighters: Rapid organization of resist-
ance committees under the aegis of the Front pro-
gressed in the Budapest district during the late
autumn of 1944. The official Communist account*
states that sabotage units were formed under the
direction of Marton Horvath, a former Social Demo-
cratic newspaperman, Gyorgy Palffy, a Hungarian
army officer and Lajos Feher, a National Peasant
Party journalist from Debrecen. Members of the
Communist youth group--workers and intellectuals--
performed these missions. Similar units were formed
in Budapest suburbs. One unit of the auxilliary
battalions of the mobile police, organized from
leftist Jewish elements, sabotaged transport in and
out of Budapest.
10. The Partisans in Rakosi's Calculations
Rakosi apparently planned to have Hungarian partisans
operating from the Ukraine and Slovakia effect a junction
with resistance fighters in Hungary. These plans were aborted
by the direct German take-over of Hungary on 15 October and
the imposition of a Nazi-style Arrow Cross party dictatorship.
Nevertheless, during the next month underground leaders in
Budapest continued to make plans for a
* Kovacs and Florian, Champions hongrois de la liberte
contre le fascisme (1946)
16
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-Srefigz
general rising while partisan forces led by Sandor Nogradi
pressed southward from the mountains. Both schemes failed.
The diverse elements composing the Hungarian Independence
Front were, however, unable to agree on a date for a general
insurrection.
In this situation, Rakosi, in good Stalinist fashion,
exerted himself to maintain control of the Hungarian resist-
ance. He despatched an emissary, Istvan Kossa, through the
lines to reimpose Moscow's leadership on the disorganized
and demoralized Communists in Budapest.
Soviet forces at Szeged and in eastern Hungary made no
effort to reach Budapest but permitted the underground to
be crushed by the Germans and their Arrow Cross allies. Only
after heavy fighting was Budapest taken by Soviet armies the
following January. This procedure permitted the Kremlin to
avert the danger of a genuinely representative government
being set up in Budapest. Instead, the Soviet leaders forced
resistance representatives to come to Moscow to negotiate
an armistice and agree to the formation of a hand-picked
Provisional National Assembly which convened at Debrecen in
December under the guns of the Russian army. This policy
resembles in its general outlines Soviet policy toward the
Polish underground, the sacrifice of the Polish resistance
forces under General Bor-Komarowski and the establishment of
the Lublin government under complete Russian domination..
The actual military influence of the Hungarian parti-
sans and the underground resistance was minor. Nevertheless,
the partisan and resistance leadership play a key polit-
ical role in founding the new Communist regime and imposing
the Muscovite leadership and Soviet alignment on the Hun-
garians. In the immediate postwar period, moreover, partic-
ipation in resistance activities was the test for relia-
bility of Communists and Communist collaborators Which gave
the participants importance far out of proportion to their
numbers.*
* Partisan leaders who later gained prominence, beside Nogradi,
included the following: Andor Tompe, Nogradits political offi-
cer; Gyula Uszta, Pal Maleter (prominent figure in the 1956
revolution) and Istvan Dekan in northern Transylvania; Janos
Ratulovszky.and.JozsefFa2ehas in theoUSSRMihaly:'Szalxiay,
Istvan Hostas and-Laszlo ,Cseby in YugoslAvia (Kovacs and
11 Florian, Champions Hongrois de la Libert04
17
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
71Ef-144;T.
CHAPTER II
FORMATION..0F..THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS:. PARTY
1. The Muscovite Leadership of the Party
a. The Ruling Clique: The exiled Hungarian Communist
leaders--the so-called "Muscovites"--accompanied the
victorious Soviet armies into Hungary.* The contingent
of Gero, Revai, Farkas' and Imre Nagy reached the country
first, on the heels of Soviet troops arriving at Szeged
(6 November 1944). Rakosi himself came later and entered
the ruins of Budapest after its capture' by the .Soviet
army. With Zoltan Vas, these men comprise the six major
Muscovite leaders. With the top leaders came the
secondary contingent of lesser Muscovites, "anti-fascist"
trainees and partisans. Certain other high-ranking
Muscovites arrived somewhat later to take over special
assignments.
Under cover of the doctrine that all classes not
actually tainted wits fascism could work toward build-
ing socialism in Hungary, the new leaders promptly
began to implement a broad "national front" program
Aiming at building up Communist strength and subverting
existing legal. parties. As Rakosi.later described the
process, in a cynically candid address of 29 February
1952, the minority Communist party applied a ruthless
program of splitting the opposition--termed by Rakosi,
"slicing salami"--while taking step after step to set
up a "dictatorship of the proletariat" called the
Hungarian Peoplets Democragy.
On the arrival of the top Muscovite leader$ from
the Soviet Union, the local bigwig Communists found
themselves pushed into the background. The returning
* The term "Muscovite" is used to designate individuals who
spent along period of time in the Soviet Union--notably the
period of WW II--and who received special training to fit them
for a leading role in the Hungarian party. Several of these
individuals are believed to hold Soviet citizenship (Rakosi,
Gero, Farkas and others), although apparently Imre Nagy does not.
18
.37efig-W
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
group of Stalinist functionaries, instead, took over
key positions in party and government for themselves
within the framework of the Provisional Government
formed at Debrecen.* Rakosi, as secretary general,
was the undisputed leader of the party; he took- over
the key government post of deputy premier in November
1945, Gero, Rakosi's right-hand man, assumed the
Ministry of Trade and Communications, and soon demon-
strated that he intended to rule Hungary's economy and
effectively Integrate it with the Soviet economy.
Revai maintained his former role of chief party
theoretician. Farkas's activities were more compli-
cated. At'first working only as a party Official, he
was appointed, in July 1945, political undersecretary
in charge of police in the Ministry of the Interior.
As party second secretary under Rakosi, he clearly
exercised a decisive influence over security matters.
Zoltan Vas, 'a general trouble shooter specializing in
economic and' financial operations of a clandestine
sort, became mayor of Budapest and later head of the
Supreme Economic Council. Among this ruling grogp.�
Erno Gero clearly was second only to Rakosi and to
some observers during the early" days of the Soviet
occupation, he appeared more Important than Rakosi.
b. "Nationalistic". Muscovites; Among,the top Muscovites,
.Imre Nagy appears from the outset to have constituted
a special case Brought along to implement the land
reform which-was.counted on to win peasant sympathies,
he was appointed' Minister. of Agriculture in the Debre-
cen Provisional'Government and held thisgpost until
November' 1945' In drafting the measures for. land re-
distribution, he -relied on 'yOung-local Communists,
notably Ferent Donath. Nagy next was appointed to the
critically important post of Minister of the interior
in the cabinet of Premier Zoltan Tildy but held this
position only four months,' surrendering it:in February
1946 to Laszlo Rajk. Characterized at that time as a.
� "strong Hungarian nationalist," Nagy gained some popu-
larity among Communists although he-appears to have
been regarded by the general public as indistinguish-
able from the ruling clique. 'The reasons for his re-
linquishment of the Ministry have never been clarified,
* Only one local Communist.received a-post in-the Debrecen -
Government. Erik.Molnar, a very close associate of RakOsi, took
the Ministry of Social Welfare whicb".was,cOunted'on to give the .
Communists essential personnel information and provide them
with a means of awarding or withholding benefits as desired.
The all-important Ministry of the Interior was-zoafide&tWa
long-time Communist collaborator, Ferenc Eidei,(National
Peasant Party).
.19
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
7Lr,169!,,Ej:
although speculation at that time attributed it to
lack of energy or possibly lack of knowledge of local
conditions. Nagy was demoted to the relatively innocu-
ous position of speaker of the parliament. He neverthe-
less maintained his post as chief party expert on agri-
cultural questions and continued to belong to the Polit-
buro.
Several other Muscovites prominent in the first
years of the Soviet occupation apparently were marked
by a greater degree of Hungarian nationalism than was
later considered safe by the regime or for other un-
clarified reasons were denied the advancement which
they considered they had earned. In some cases, the
reasons may have been linked to the factional quarrels
of the 'twenties or 'thirties (e.g. Ferenc Munnich);
in others, ambitious individuals with good connections
in the Soviet Union (e.g. the writer Gyula Hay) were
pushed into the background by rivals more closely con-
nected with Rakosi. Since these individuals observed
Communist discipline, the character or even the exist-
of their dissension from the ruling clique did
not come to light until many years later.
Soviet Support for the Muscovite Clique: From the first
day of the Communist regime in Hungary it was apparent
that the authority of the ruling clique rested on the
,presence of Soviet armies and the emphatic assurance
of Soviet political and economic support in moments
of crisis.* Any withdrawal of Kremlin endorsement for
* Until the autumn of 194/ this meant the Soviet Element of the
Allied Control Commission headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov
and his deputy (and successor) Colonel General Sviridov. During
this period, Rakosi formed close personal ties with Voroshilov
which continued after the marshal returned to Moscow. After the
withdrawal of the Allied Control Commission, Soviet political
and economic officials--notably Soviet ambassadors beginning
with Pushkin--played an increasingly important role in advising
and shoring up the dominant Muscovites.
..;
20
Approved for for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Rakosi personally would place him at the mercy of insur-
gent forces in the party and the country as a whole.
Within certain limits, however, Rakosi clearly was
accorded a large measure of autonomy in choosing methods
and individuals to implement the prescribed over-all
policies in Hungary.
2. Elements in the Party
a. The Nativist Hard Core: The first task of the Muscovites
was to build a strong party mechanism to control the
country in the interests of the Kremlin. They started
almost from scratch. They possessed a small hard core
of Hungarian members (about 30,000) hardened in the
school of illegality and accustomed to following di-
rectives from Moscow. They could count on a strong
youth element recruited among resistance fighters,
Spanish Civil War veterans and partisans. A number of
fanatical Communists returning from German concentration
camps mustered around the party leaders. Several dy-
namic leaders who had spent the war years in Hungary
were popular among local Communists--notably Laszlo
Rajk, Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, Gabor Peter and Marton
Horvath.* Nevertheless, popular support for the Com-
munists was so small that their total popular vote in
the relatively free elections of 4 November 1945 was
only 797,000 or approximately 16.9 percent of the total.
b. The Opportunists: The broad "front" policies pursued
by Rakosi during the first years of Soviet occupation
encouraged individuals of many types to join the party.
Many Hungarians accepted the new regime as inevitable
and gave a measure of genuine co-operation in the hope
that the regime would pursue a reasonable course under
which Hungary could make a speedy recovery from the
devastation of war and Soviet looting, and resume its
place as a center of cultural and economic life in the
* In the general distribution of rewards to faithful Communists,
Rajk took over leadership of the Budapest party organization
with Kadar as his deputy, pending Rajk's appointment as minister
of the interior in March 1946. Marton Horvath, resistance
leader and reputed former Zionist, became editor of Szabad Nep
and members of the Debrecen Communist cell received imTh�p-oant
posts: Kallai and Losonc# were awarded key propaganda posi-
tions; Ferenc Donath was appointed to the Ministry of Agricul-
ture; Sandor Zold to the Ministry of Interior and Szilard Ujhely
to the Ministry of Social'Welfare. Other local Communists were
provided with seats in parliament or jobs in the party apparatus.
� � 2 1
�54f76Rega......
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
--S-EGR4U_
Danubian basin. Optimists even hoped that this re-
covery could be effected with Western financial assist-
ance, since it was clear that the war-torn Soviet
Union was in no position to furnish adequate economic
support. Other individuals hastened to join the party
as a means of continuing their careers in government,
the army or business. A large number of peasants
came in as a result of the land reform. One important
source of recruits was the plethora of low-level and
middle-level Arrow Cross members proscribed by the
other parties. As a result of these tactics, the
total-party membership rose to 150,000 by May 1945
with its major strength concentrated in Budapest.
By the time of the third Communist Party congress,
held in September and October 1946, party membership
had attained almost 653,000.
c. Left-wing Dissidents in the Party: Such extreme "front"
tactics aroused the anger of certain party extremists
who had wanted to set up a "Red Budapest" immediately
and who probably fancied that they might have profited
to a greater degree from the Soviet conquest of Hungary.
Certain unidentified older veterans of the 1919 revolu-
tion and many youthful fanatics (the "1945" youth group)
appear to have become embittered at the tortuous path
followed by Rakosi. Extreme left-wing "Trotskyite"
elements supported by factory workers also gave trouble
and were subjected to arrests in late 1945 and early
1946. Such dissension evoked sharp criticism from the
Muscovites intent on building up party strength even
at the expense of orthodox theories.
d. Social Democratic Elements: The Hungarian Workers Party:
The Social Democratic Party had long been a major target
of the Communists. Their wide influence over indus-
trial workers and in trade unions made them a dangerous
competitor, especially in view of the strong pro-Western
orientation of their most reputable leaders.* As
Rakosi said in his 1952 speech: "Our real competitors
in the ranks of industrial workers were the Social
* The Social Democrats received 17.4 percent of the total
vote in the 4 November elections i.e., one half of one percent
greater than the Communists.
22
immApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Democratic elements.... Their leaders would have wel-
comed the American or British occupation of Hungary
and their great majority hated the Soviet Union."
In this situation, the Communists stepped up
divisive tactics aimed at achieving an eventual merger
of the two parties. They forced the formation of a
"leftist bloc" including both the Social Democrats and
the National Peasant Party as an initial means of gain-
ing control. They purchased the support of certain
trade union officials of Social Democratic antecedents
by the gift of top factory management jobs. They bound
collaborating left-wing leaders so closely to Communist
policies that they were indistinguishable from party
members. By 1948 the Communists, on Kremlin orders,
were ready to effect the union of the two parties.
Subservient left-wingers--notably Szakasits and
Marosan--split the party and cajoled the rank and file
into voting a merger with the Communists to form the
Hungarian Workers Party.
The new party now possessed a membership of nearly
one million. Ostensibly a united party, Communists
maintained complete control over essential cadre af-
fairs and soon began to purge former Social Democrats
of suspected loyalty. Although Szakasits and Marosan
were provided with high positions in the united party,
they clearly were subordinate to Rakosi and his
Muscovite cohorts. The effect of the merger therefore
was to further increase unreliable elements it the
party, although it subjected them to severe Communist
discipline.
e. The Collaborators: Closely allied with the ruling
MuscoviteccliepleheadocLbyRakOsilwereaaggpupof::
collaborating members from the nominally non-Communist
National Peasant Party and a few figureheads forced
over from the Independent Smallholders by brass-knuckle
tactics of the Communists. Such collaborators were
intended to undermine support from the majority Small-
holders Party among the peasants and bourgeois elements
by giving an appearance of a genuine democratic basis
for the regime. Among these, the former "village
exploretreFerenc Erdei and Jozsef Darvas played the
most consistently important "front" roles.
f. The Security Police: In view of the diverse and
mutually hostile elements composing the party it is
apparent that security police controls would be .
23
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
extraordinarily important in the conduct of party
affairs. For these reasons, the relationship be-
tween the party leadership and the State Security
Authority (AVO and later AVH) assumes major interest.
Nominally subservient to the Ministry of the Interior
until 1949, this organization actually became the
special security arm of the party leadership against
enemies within and without the party. Peter himself,
as a longtime Hungarian Communist of Jewish origin
and underground fighter during WW II, reported, how-
ever, directly to the Central Committee or Rakosi
(and probably Farkas) on all matters of importance.*
The AYH thus acted as the key mechanism for preserv-
ing the hegemony of the Rakosi-Gero clique over the
party and country.
* Gabor Peter never attained Politburo status, although he
belonged to the Central Committee of the party.
24
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
S'E-6,AZZ
CHAPTER III
COERCION OF NATIVIST ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY
I. The Experiment with "National Communism" (1945-48)*
a. The "Hungarian Road to Socialism": For the first three
and a half years following the Soviet occupation, Hun-
garian party leaders encouraged Hungarians to believe
that their country would be allowed to pursue a "specif-
ically. Hungarian road to socialism" within the frame-
work of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union.
This doctrine, termed "national Communism", was held by
large numbers of Hungarians flocking into the party in
the post-war years. It emphasized the immediate neces-
sity.of effecting "bourgeois-democratic tasks" instead
of striving for purely Communist goals. Although this
doctrine stressed co-operation with the Soviet Union,
it tended to emphasize differences between Soviet and
Hungarian institutions. While endorsing harsh tactics
.against "enemies of the state", it asserted neverthe-
less that progress toward Communism could be achieved
without "dictatorship of the proletariat" i.e., insti-
tutionalized terror. Finally, it emphasized the im-
portance of.the peasant element in the "worker-peasant"
alliance and played down the necessity of collectivi-
zation. In effect, national Communism took the view
that the cause of Communism would best be served in
Hungary if local needs and local situations were taken*
into account.
To emphasize their encouragement of national Com-
munism, the Muscovites gave increasing prominence to
certain local leaders. Two "Hungarian" Communists
were emiltentlyjsuited:AO.,theroleolft0g.,,,repre.senta-
tive of the nativist element in the party--Laszlo
Rajk, a. "national Communist" of great ability and
determination and leader of a significant faction in
.the party, and Janos. Kadar, a native Communist whose
.moteA313.ant4ersonality And workingclass..J.backgtOund
fitted him to symbolize Hungarian nationalism without
constituting a threat to Soviet control.
* National Communism has been defined as a "regional or local
interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory, opportunistically
adapted to achieve certain strategic objectives."
25
-
�mmimmimmimmommimmiimApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
b. Laszlo Rajk: Laszlo Rajk was chosen to symbolize
these policies. Upon his return to Hungary from
a short period of internment in Germany he was al-
lowed by the Muscovites to assume leadership of
the Budapest party organization. This step was
taken by party leaders fully aware that Rajk's
two brothers both had been leading members of the
Arrow Cross party. In November 1945, Rajk was ap-
parently raised to the position of party secretary
under Party Secretary General Rakosi. Then in
March 1946 Rajk was installed in the key govern-
ment position of minister of interior, where his
main task was to weed out politically unreliable
elements in the government. As minister, he had
charge of Hungary's police and frontier forces.
Staunchly reliable to the cause of Communism--as
he interpreted it--Rajk took obvious pride, as he
stated during his 1949 trial, in the claim of Hun-
gary's "best Communist." But contemporary evidence
bears out the view that he was a nationally oriented
Communist who honestly believed it might be pos-
sible to "build a Hungarian road to Socialism" and
who challenged even strong man Rakosi on this score.
This did not mean, however, that Rajk was in any
sense a "soft" Communist. As minister, .he enforced
completely ruthless policies.
c. National Communist Elements in the Party: The
Muscovites permitted Communists of nationalist
orientation to take key places in the govern-
ment and party. Rajk,who possessed clear talents
for organizations and was obviously allowed
latitude in selecting his subordinates, installed
former Spanish Civil War comrades in impor-
tant posts in the civil police--although such
26
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
elements long ago had been liquidated in the Stalinist
purges in the Soviet Union. The nationally oriented
Tibor Szonyi, a representative of the Swiss emigration,
had charge of the party's cadre section, subject to
the supervision of more reliable Communists. Other
non-Muscovites staffed the Foreign Ministry. Impor-
tant Communists,in_the.Jsmall-Hungartan_army,a1So.
leaned toward national Communism: Inspector General
Palffy-Osterreicher, who had set up the army's mili-
tary political section (intelligence), was charged with
.this crime in 1949. In 1948 the nationalist elements
occupied a number of significant power positions and
Rajk--perhaps their leader--had his own organization
in the Ministry of the Interior.
Rajk's popular following contained diverse ele-
ments ranging from extreme left-wing industrial workers
of Budapest and other key centers of industry to former
Arrow Cross members who supported the one outstanding
non-Jewish leader of the party. He also reportedly
inspired the admiration of Communist youth and intellec-
tuals who had taken part in the resistance or served
as partisans. Peasants who had received farms under
the land reform and joined the party may also have
looked to Rajk as a possible opponent of Soviet-style
collectivization. All in all, Rajk's support in the
party roughly parallels that of Imre Nagy in 1953-56.
To non-Communist Hungarians, however, he was anathema.
2. The Condemnation of National Communism (1948)
The break bet*een Tito and Stalin in the spring of 1948
inevitably produced drastic repercussions on Hungary. The
increasing independence of Tito and his evident popularity
among some Satellite Communists obviously had caused mounting'
concern to the Kremlin. From the Soviet viewpoint, the turn-
ing point may have come with Tito's visit to Budapest in
December,1947--following a triumphal tour of other Satellite
capitals--where he received a tumultuous welcome.
The communiqu�ssued by the Cominform on 28 June con-
demning Tito, made clear that the Soviet path to socialism
was henceforth to serve as a model for 111 the Satellites
including Hungary. "Class struggle" was to be intensified.
The alleged Yugoslav over-reliance on the peasantry as one
� 27
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
"pillar of the state" was repudiated. The Yugoslav practice
of subordinating, in appearance at least, the party to the
Peoples' Front was expressly condemned. The role of the party
was to be emphasized. All departures from Soviet party usages
and procedures were castigated as "arrogance" or "nationalism."
This communiqu�as a shattering blow to hopes of moderate
Communists that Hungarian national interests and not the rigid
imitation- of the Soviet Union might form the basis of the new
order in Hungary. The condemnation of Tito marked as politi-
cally unreliable all the Hungarian party leaders associated
with national Communism. Rajk himself went to Moscow, probably
in May, presumably to defend himself against such charges. He
did not attend the Cominform meeting in June that expelled the
Yugoslav party: the Hungarian representatives were three Mus-
covites--Rakosi, Farkas. and Gero.
The beginning of the end for Rajk started on 4 August when,
following a reported visit to Budapest from Soviet party leader
Zhdanov, he was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior
to the less strategic post of tinister of foreign Affairs. Al-
though he temporarily retained his Politburo and Orgburo member-
ships, the conclusive character of his fall was evident.
3. Establishment of "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"
The condemnation of national Communism was followed by a
sharp turn to the left in ideological terms and the imposition
of a full-dress Stalinist type dictatorship with Rakosi as
little Stalin. "Reactionary elements in the party"--i.e.,
moderates--received a sharp warning to fall into line from the
trial of Cardinal Mindszenty in February 1949. On 1 February,
a new Communist-controlled Peoples' Independence Front was
formed to maintain the pretext of a democratic system, followed
by Communist-style elections and the proclamation of a Hun-
garian Peoples Democracy. In theoretical terms, this meant
that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" had begun and
Hungary now was to "build the foundations of socialism" along
purely Soviet lines.
Ideological Czar Revai stated the facts of Communist
domination with complete frankness in the party's theoretical
journal of March-April 1949. The Communist party, although a
minority party in parliament and government, guided and con-
trolled the country by virtue of its decisive control of the
police and the presence of Soviet troops, always ready to
support party officials. He appealed to party members not to
be squeamish about the use of force: "We must clearly realize
that periods may come in our evolution when the chief function
28
SECRZ, T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
of the dictatorship of the proletariat will consist of exercising
force against enemies from within and from without."
Revai's unvarnished warning to party members reportedly
caused consternation among optimists in the party who still
hoped that the term "peoples democracy" might include at least
some elements of Western democracy, However, there was little
they could do, Just to make the situation unmistakably clear,
a mounting propaganda. campaign called for "vigilance" against
Yugoslavia, the West and internal enemies.
4. Destruction of National Communist Elements in the Party (1949)
a The Rajk Trial: The regime now moved to eliminate the
national Communists from the government and party. A
wave of arrests culminated with the detention of Rajk,
Inspector General Palffy-Osterreicher, Police Colonel
Bela. Korondy, party cadre chief Tibor Szonyi, his deputy
Andras Szalai, Pal Justus of the Hungarian Radio and
Lazar Brankov, former counsellor of the Yugoslav lega-
tion. In mid-June Rajk was expelled from the party as
a "spy of foreign imperialist powers and Trotskyist
agent." One-third of the party was purged.
On 16 September Rajk and his associates were brought
to trial for treason, espionage and "activities cal-
culated to overthrow the democratic state order." They
were charged with plotting with Yugoslav and Western
intelligence agencies to organize a conspiracy of party,
police and army groups to split the party, murder the
Muscovite leaders and seize power in the interests of
Tito and the "American imperialists." The prosecution
sought to show that this conspiracy had been organized
behind the back of party and government officials and
without the knowledge of Soviet authorities. Anti-
Zionist aspects of the trial were played up as were the
alleged contacts of Rajk with Noel Field. ."Evidence"
produced in the Rajk trial boiled down to the fact that
any contact with erstwhile friends of the Soviet Union
constituted treason when Soviet policy was reversed.
In this sense, Rajk was the scapegoat for the Bloc's
condemnation of Tito.
All the major figures in the Rajk trial were put
to death. The less important principals (Pal Justus
and Lazar Brankov) survived under sentence of life
imprisonment. A number of middle-level party and
government officials, however, spent long years in
prison but re-emerged during the New Course.
29
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
b. High-Level
Party Line:
Muscovites,
versely by
destroyed,
constitute
control.
Muscovites Adversely Affected by the New
The group of "moderate" nationalist
Including Imre Nagy, was affected ad-
the shift in Soviet policy but was not
presumably because its members did not
a basic threat to Communist and Soviet
Imre Nagy was dropped from the Politburo in 1949
as the defender of individual farming. As Rakosi re-
vealed at the party Central Leadership meeting of 14
April 1955, Nagy was then accused of "right-wing op-
portunistic" views, convicted of "anti-Marxist", "anti
party behavior" and eliminated from the Politburo
(though not from the Central Committee.) By 1951
Nagy was able, however, to work his way back to the
Politburo. It is probable that Nagy, as the only
one of the original top six Muscovites who enjoyed
any popularity in Hungary, was too useful to be
sacrificied at this time and had to be saved for future
employment in the event of a change in Soviet policies.
A "Muscovite" Spanish Civil War veteran, General
of Police Ferenc Munnich, was caught in the backwash
of the break with Tito, Munnich, who had held the
important job of chief of Budapest police forces under
Rajk, was suddenly.assigned as minister to Finland and
later transferred to Sofia. He remained in the latter
relatively insignificant position until 1954, when he
was given the key post of ambassador to Moscow by Imre
Nagy.
Another high-level Muscovite adversely affected
by the repudiation of national Communism was the philos-
opher Gyorgy Lukacs. In the scathing criticism by
Revai in the winter of 1950, Lukacs was made to sym-
bolize."liberal", Western-oriented Communist intellec-
tuals who believed in a "third road to socialism" and
"underestimated" Soviet culture. Revai demanded that
all writers conform to Soviet usages and follow party
dictation.
30
"f-E-C-12.EZ
iimillommommommilommimmimApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
5. Advancement of "Moderate Nationalists" (1948-51)
a. The Moderate Nationalist Leaders: The ruling Muscovite
clique sought to maintain a pretense of nationalist
orientation and build a base of support in the party
by promoting leaders of the moderate nationalist group
to replace Rajk and the national Communists. This ex-
pedient achieved a degree of success in the 1948-50
period but came to an end with the deterioration of
international relations resulting from the Korean War.
The group chosen to represent this policy included
Kadar, Kallai and other members of the Debrecen Com-
munist group and the former Social Democrats Szakasits
and Marosan. These individuals appear to have been
rather closely connected with Jozsef Revai who exer-
cised a marked influence during this period.
Kadar took over Rajk's place as minister of Interior
(August 1948) and thus assumed the position of leader
of the tdderates. Like Rajk neither Jewish nor Musco-
vite, his presence in this critical ministry was in-
tended to serve as a front to conceal rapid Sovietization
of Hungary. Apparently leaning toward a "hard" lipe '
based on the industrial proletariat, Kadar appears to
have gone along with the program of rapid industriali-
zation under the new Five Year Plan. In fact, his
ministry soon lost even nominal control of the AVH dur-
ing 1949-50, although some semblance of authority -was
reserved to Kadar personally. There is no evidence
that he opposed Sovietization; in fact, his presence
at the November 1949 meeting of the Cominform in Budapest
indicates that he supported the condemnation of national
Communism.
Gyula Kallai was also called upon to play an in-
creasing public role in maintaining the pretense of
nativist representation. He took over the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs following Rajk's removal on the eve of
his trial (June 1949). In this position, he was effec-
tively barred from taking any independent initiative by
the presence of the Muscovite Andor Berei as his first
deputy. Other native Communists advanced during the
course of 1948-49 found themselves in a similar situa-
tion.
b. Sovietization: The rapid and nearly complete Sovieti-
zation of Hungary was proceeding under cover of these
moves. This in turn strengthened the position of the
31
"Sref+gZ.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
"Srti4gZ,
Rakosi clique. Rakosi as party secretary general and
deputy premier directed over-all policies. Gero's hold
over the country's economic life was strengthened by
his assumption of the position of chief of the newly
established Peoples Economic Council. Revai, appointed
hinister of peoples aulture in June 1949, supervised
intellectual life and indoctrination. Mihaly Farkas
took over a new sphere of responsibility in September
1948, when he became Minister of defense. His earlier
involvement in security matters presumably gave him
special qualifications for replacing "security risks"
in the armed forces. His military qualifications were
less evident; he had fought in the Spanish Civil War
but lacked formal military training.
Economic Sovietization contributed greatly to pro-
viding adherents of the Rakosi clique with jobs and
influence. Rapid plant expansion took place by virtue'
of the plans prepared by Gero. The new enterprises
were stamping grounds of minor Muscovites and asso-
ciates of the ruling group. Party activities were
stepped up throughout the economy in an effort to induce
workers to produce more and endure the regime. This
again provided adherents of Rakosi with positions.
6. Elimination of Moderate Nationalists
The advent of the Five Year Plan in 1950, the sharp stepping
up of planned industrial output targets in the winter of 1951
and the mounting "class .warfare" on the land resulting from
forced collectivization of the peasantry appear to have led to
the purge of the moderate nationalist group. Such individuals
were gradually eliminated from all positions of power during
1950 and 1951. Even an obedient Communist tool like Kadar,ap-
parently could not be trusted to implement Soviet directives
correctly.
The dreary series of purges opened with clean-ups in the
army and the AVH. The last remaining high-level nativist offi-
cers including General Laszlo Solyom, Chief of Staff, were re-
moved from the army in the summer of 1950. Next, certain AVE
officials who had participated in the collection of evidence
for the Rajk trial were eliminated. During this purge, Farkas
succeeded in gaining greater influence by installing his son
as chief of the department of foreign intelligence (including
operations in Yugoslavia). Political reliability became the
secret of success in the army and the security service.
In the autumn of 1950, the purge extended to the Social
Democrats. Even such stalking horses for the Communists as
' 32
--Ste144-1..
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
ECRLT
Arpad Szakasits and Gyorgy Marosan disappeared into prison
under a barrage of charges by Rakosi that they had been in com-
munication with British, American and Yugoslav espionage or-
ganizations. No doubt their availability as collaborators had
been seriously impaired by the imposition of Soviet work norms
and methods on Hungarian workers, although there is no avail-
able evidence to show that they opposed these measures. The
removal of the Social Democrats--except faceless collaborators--
was accompanied by the Sovietization of the labor unions to give
full control to the regime.
The pretense of moderate nationalist representation in the
party and government continued for a few more months. When
Kadar resigned as Minister of Interior in July 1950,* he was
replaced by la-,iteiaber,.. bf: the -Debrecen:gi'031P";_.,SandcitI)ZOld.�
over, at this point Imre Nagy returned to the government as
minister of food, presumably because his talents could be put
to good use in this sector;
The second Hungarian Workers Party Congress (February-March
1951) marked the end of the last show of a broadly-based party.
Rakosi and his Muscovite colleagues held the stage, calling for
a vast speed-up in industrialization to meet with Soviet demands
resulting from the Korean war. This appears to have been the
last blow to the willingness of doctrinaires to draw upon
moderate support. In the spring of 1951, one after another,
the old-time Hungarian Communist labor and intellectualist ele-
ments disappeared into prison. By the end of the year, Kadar,
Kallai, Zold, Losonczy, and Donath were in prison. Only Istvan
Kovacs held out as an ostensible nativist representative in the
Politburo.
The elimination of the moderates evoked widespread hostile
reactions among the populace and in the party itself. The dis-
appearance of Kadar instantly provoked violent indignation
within the party. Trials of the purgees were held in secret
for fear that ublicit would lead to a schism in the party.
According when Kadar was (b)(1)
believed to have been executed, large numbers of threatening (b)(3)
letters were addressed to party functionaries by individuals
who signed themselves "Kadar Guard."
* Kadar ostensibly was relieved at this time to accomplish
"other important work"; Istvan Kovacs was concurrently relieved
of his position as secretary of the Greater Budapest party or-
ganization for the same purpose. It has been speculated that
both men took part in the purge of the Social Democrats.
33
"ttr"-ER-g.Z... �
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
CHAPTER IV
THE STALINIST PARTY
(1951-1953)
1. Rule of the Rakosi-Gero Clique
With the elimination of the remaining moderate nationalists,
Rakosi ruled Hungary with the aid of a small band of Muscovites,
among whom Gero was clearly pre-eminent, and a rising group of
young "hard" Communist careerists of pronounced Soviet orienta-
tion and a minimum of Hungarian national sentiments.* The Hun-
garian Workers Party with its adjunct the AVH ran the Hungarian
state--but the party in effect was the inner clique of Musco-
vites.
Industrial enterprises of the country, labor unions and ag-
riculture were firmly under control of the party overlords.
Such young fanatics as Istvan Hidas and Andras Hegedus were
pulled into the central committee during 1950 and 1951 and
rapidly promoted with a view to taking over top party leader-
ship of heavy industry and agriculture. Another newcomer, Ar-
pad Hazi, a Gero proteg and former chief of the economic se-
curity agency (State Control Center), was appointed minister of
interior in April 1951.
* The Rakosi-Gero clique includes the following individuals and
their special fields of interest (underlined names are indivi-
duals identified on 14 November by the central executive of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party as adherents of. the "harmful
policy of the Rakosi clique"): Erzsebet Andics (ideology;
women), Antal Apro (labor), Andor Berei (5Z5Taic planning and
foreign affairs), Mihaly Farkas (gEFEFIty, military and
Youth�:..aftair.54. "*StSrall.�:71.,iSS � (e.CP11.0144 Ina.tteraf _....Erno..
cro.(07ter4,a11-e00452014U,41,x.egi..04.) ;At11041.::gaziecDTIPTEkic
and cis;1i. police functions), Andras Hegedus (agriculture),
Istvan Hidas (heavy industry), Marton Horvath (director of
Szabad Nep), Karoly Kiss (cadre and foreign affairs), Jozsef
Kobol (abor problems), Istvan Kossa (industry, � general trouble
shooter), Istvan Kovacs (party cadre matters), Istvan Kristof
(labor), Erik Molnar (foreign. affairs, law and justice), Sandor
Nogradi (military political affairs), Gyorgy Non (ideology and
justice), Karoly Olt (finance), Laszlo Piros Ts7curity), Jozsef
Revai.(ideology), Bela Szalai (planning), Bela Veg, Zoltan, Vas,
Mihaly Zsofinyecz, Lajos Acs (party cadre affailgT and Istvan
Bata (army). Certain of TEJse individuals (Apro, Kiss, Kobol,
ari-a�Kristof) represent somewhat more moderate tendencies.
SP6-144�1
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
The party Lau taken over control of youth and regimented it
in the Hungarian Youth Association (DISZ). Proteges of Rakosi--
e.g., Bela Szalai and Gyorgy Non--dominated the organization in
the interests of the ruling clique. Factionalism among the some
659,000 members was ruthlessly suppressed by continued indoc-
trination and para-military training on the Soviet model.
In the party, no opposition was permitted. Chief representa-
tives of opposing tendencies were dead or in prison; rank and
file opponents were reduced to silence. Rakosi, boasting of the
success of his "salami slicing" methods, might better have
described them as the destruction of every element which gave
any popularity to the regime. It was only too plain to all Hun-
garians that Rakosi's assertion was brutally true that Communist
power rested in the last analysis on the presence of Soviet
troops.
2. Increased Pressure on the Rakosi Leadership (Spring-Summer
1952)
Despite the success of these control measures, from the
early spring of 1952, Rakosi clearly was under sharp pressure
as a result of the general deterioration of the country's eco-
nomic position culminating in the disastrous crop failure of
1952. Although his rigid dictatorship based on absolute control
of the party and the AVH continued to function as before, the
appearance of anti-Semitic pressures in the Bloc (e.g., the fall
of Ana Pauker in Rumania) threatened to encourage latent anti-
Semitism in the Hungarian party as well as the nation as a whole.
3. Rakosi Asserts his Leadership. (Autumn 1952)
Signs appeared early in 1952 that Rakosi might be under a
cloud but by autumn he clearly was in full control of the situa-
tion. He assumed the premiership on 14 August, and took a
series of steps intended to enhance his own personal standing,
strengthen the top party leadership, purge "Zionist" elements
in the AVE and improve the country's planning apparatus. His
"salami tactics" speech of 29 February,received favorable com-
ment, after long delay, in the party theoretical journal of
June-July. The fact that this comment was written by Istvan
Friss, generally looked on as liaison man with the Kremlin, was
interpreted as signifying that Rakosi's ruthless methods re-
ceived full Soviet approval. Reinforced by this endorsement,
Rakosi gave enthusiastic encouragement to-the "cult of personal-
ity'' in Hungary.
. 35
"YEE-144-1.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
4. Changes in the Relative Positions of the Top Party Leadership
Personnel shifts during the late autumn of 1952 had the ef-
fect of bringing forward an inner group of top leaders as the
supreme heads of the governMent and party. This group included
the Muscovites Rakosi, Gero, Revai and Nagy--but not Mihaly
Farkas or Zoltan Vas--and a group of local "hard" Communists
(Hidas, Hegedus, Istvan'Kovacs, Arpad Hazi and Karoly Kiss),
most of whom were of non-Jewish background. An eight-man com-
mittee appointed on 23 October to consider the report on the
applications of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
(CPSU) included Rakosi, Gero, Revai, Nagy, Hegedus, Hidas,
Kovacs and Hazi. The inner cabinet of five deputy premiers
appointed on 15 November included Gero, Hidas, Nagy, Kiss and
Hozi, presumably representing respectively over-all direction
of industry, heavy industry, agriculture, foreign affairs and
police and security affairs.
a. Up- grading of Imre Nagy: The re-emergence of Imre Nagy
in the top echelon of the government and of the party
pointed up the change in the relative standings of the
hierarchy. His increased stature was emphasized by his
being chosen to deliver the main address in honor of the
Bolshevik revolution (6 November). The speech itself
followed the usual Stalinist pattern, stressing state-
ments made by Stalin, Malenkov, Bulganin and Rakosi at
the party congress. Nagy's re-emergence suggests that
the critical problems of Hungarian agriculture were
under consideration but does not clarify the positions
taken by the various policy makers either in the Soviet
Union or in Hungary. Nagy himself had been a proponent
of individual farming in 1945 but in more recent years
had been identified with the harsh crop-collection
methods applied during the 1952 drought. His attitude
toward the forced-draft collectivization instituted
during the fall of 1952 is not known.
b. Status of Mihaly Farkas: The omission of Mihaly Farkas
from the top party and government bodies appointed dur-
ing the autumn is striking. His failure to be appointed
deputy premier meant that no representative of the De-
fense Ministry was included at this level. It is true
that Farkas several days later was awarded the consola-
tion title of General of the Army and that he continued
to hold his position as minister of defense and polit-
buro member until the following summer.
36
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-wSfeRIgrri:-
5. The "Anti-%ionist" Purge
The Hungarian counterpart of the Soviet doctors' plot was
a thoroughgoing purge of Jewish elements in the AVH, Justice
Ministry and, to a lesser degree, the Foreign Ministry. This
purge appears to have been staged by Rakosi and Farkas in an
effort to support the anti-Zionist campaign in the Soviet
Union.
The Jewish leadership in Hungary was particularly vulnerable
to charges of collaboration with "Zionist" agencies. Unlike the
other Satellites, Hungary had never completely halted the opera-
tions of the Jewish welfare organization, the American Joint
Distribution Committee (known as Joint). Since the agreement
with Joint was made by Zoltan Vas with the concurrence of
Rakosi, and since Rakosi also assumed final responsibility
for security police operations, any purge of "Zionist" elements
in Hungary threatened to involve the very top of the .hierarchy.
Farkas, moreover, was also deeply implicated in security police
misdeeds. His son was chief of the important foreign intelli-
gence department of the AVH and Farkas long had played a key
supervisory role for the party.
The sequence of events as narrated by'
shows that the purge began before Christmas 1952, when Rakosi
reportedly authorized the arrest of Gabor Peter, chief of the
AVH, and other high officials. These orders were executed by
Farkas and his son shortly after Christmas. Young Farkas an-
nounced, at a meeting of AVH division chiefs held on 13 January
1953, that the arrests had been effected on the basis of evi-
dence supplied by the party which had kept the arrestees under
surveillance for some 18 months prior to their actual arrest.
Farkas informed his colleagues that Peter had carried on a con-
spiracy within the AVH, was an American agent and had been an
informer under the Horthy regime.*
The purge was revealed to the public in a barrage of anti-
Zionist and anti-Western propaganda published in comment on the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Peter's arrest was rumored to have (b)(3)
redOitiiFB�dapest in the presence of Rakosi and
Farkas and two high Defense Ministry officials, Sandor Nogradi
and Geza Revesz. If confirmed, this suggests that the military-
political clique in control of the ministry was deeply involved
in purging its old enemy, the AVH.
37
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 201,9/98/.02 C00966210
Soviet doctors' plot. On 15 January, Szabad Nep announced that
in Hungary "the danger and possibility of hosTire undermining
work is much greater" than in the Soviet Union. Newspapers de-
clared that a "Zionist plot" had been unearthed, centering in
the American Joint Distribution Committee and supported by Ameri-
can, British and Israeli intelligence organizations. The ar-
rests of several leaders of the Jewish community, including
the brother-in-law of Zoltan Vas,were disclosed. Finally, on
8 January, the removal of minister of justice Gyula Decsi was
announced. In the meantime, both Peter and Vas had disappeared
from the public view.
A new leadership replaced the Gabor Peter clique in the AVE.
Laszlo Piros, former chief of the border guard and reputed pro-
tege of Gero, became acting commander. An alternate member of
the politburo and Moscow-trained partisan fighter in World War
II, Piros fulfilled two major requirements: he represented the
young "hard" party leadership and he was not apparently Jewish.
6. Removal of Zoltan Vas as Planning Chief
The possible ramifications of the alleged Zionist plot can-
not be suggested without reference to the reported struggle
between Zoltan Vas and Erno Gero to fix responsibility for the
economic crisis which was reducing Hungary to bankruptcy. .The
tip-off was given by Gero in his November report to the central
committee of the party. At that time, Gero sharply attacked
the State Planning Office directed by Vas for poor work--although
Gero himself, as economic czar, obviously bore final responsi-
bility.
The precise economic doctrines espoused by the two men are
not known. Vas, as chief of the Supreme Economic Council until
June 1949 had been associated with a number of shady deals cal-
culated to turn a quick forint to save the financially hard
pressed regime. Gero, as chief of the Peoples Economic Council
established in 1949 appeared to follow more orthodox methods of
industrialization. Vas, an opportunist of many skills and
amazing political agility, probably was personally antipathetic
to the rigidly puritanical Gero. Vas, moreover, was personally
vulnerable: he had been closely related to several high-level
defectors and was directly involved in the security police purge
through his connection with the Joint agreement.
Information on the possible backing of Gero by individuals
in Moscow is scanty.
states that Gero called on Eugene Varga
for support. Varga allegedly came to Budapest and underwrote
Gero's policies. This support emboldened Gero to continue his
38
7f6F6g4...
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
attack on Vas. report that Vas was dismissed
from the Planning Office after Gero forced him to admit to
"gaping indolence" in the discharge of his duties. He was
replaced by Ferenc Herceg, an obscure functionary in the
Planning Office.
Vas probably was saved from severe punishment by the inter-
vention of Rakosi and the death of Stalin. Although the report
that Rakosi appealed to Suslov to save Vas from trial has not
been confirmed, it is possible that Rakosi used this channel to
save his old friend from involvement in the purge of Beria ele-
ments in Hungary.* As a result, Vas' punishment was limited to
dismissal from the Planning Office and banishment to the Komlo
hard coal mines as director, presumably for the purpose of
purging himself of guilt by demonstrating his merits as a good
Communist manager. Although his elimination from the politburo
was not immediately revealed, it was clear that his career as a
top government and party official was at an end.
7. Alleged Rakosi-Gero Rivalry
It would be an attractive hypothesis to speculate that the
dismissal of Vas and the security police purge were reflections
of an alleged rivalry between Gero and Rakosi for top position
in Hungary. During the winter and spring of 1953 individuals
who had been particularly associated with Gero--Piros, Hazi and
the new planning chief Herceg--were in the ascendant, while
individuals who had been closely associated with Rakosi--notably
Vas--were under a cloud. There is, however) no firm evidence to
substantiate this contention. It is more likely that Rakosi, in
order to cope with the desperate economic situation, sacrificed
his friend Vas as he had jettisoned a long line of earlier
proteges. All evidence points to Rakosi and Gero working very
closely together to set up a system which would satisfy Soviet
requirements and ensure the continued tenure of power by their
own clique.
* Vas was also said to be a personal friend of Soviet Marshal
Voroshilov and his wife.
39
""'S-EC-ALI
��=1=m1Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
5E771"EwIL
CHAPTER V
THE NEW COURSE: PHASE 1
(March 1953-April 1954)
1. Immediate Consequences of Stalin's Death
a. Status of the Ruling Clique: The abrupt announcement on
6 March that the old despot was dead gave a breathing
space to the Rakosi clique. Rakosi went to Stalin's
funeral, attended by a new protege, Rudolf Foldvari, who
appeared out of the blue at this juncture. The con-
tinued high position of Imre Nagy in the government was
confirmed when he was chosen to deliver the principal
memorial address in parliament (8 March). Gero's posi-
tion appeared unchanged. In short, the Rakosi clique
gave every evidence of being in full control of develop-
ments.
b. Partial Reversal of the "Zionist Plot": The immediate
reaction to Stalin's death was the partial reversal of
the Hungarian "Zionist Plot." The party press on 10
March reported that a doctor at the AVE hospital had
been arrested for illegal use of "truth" drugs on pris-
oners. and noted that two other doctors had been sus-
pended at the same time. One of the latter had recently
written a denunciation of the arrestees in the Soviet
doctorS! plot. Later evidence identified the drugged
patient as a close associate of Gabor Peter. Neverthe-
less, Peter was not released.
Six days later, the elusive Zoltan Vas was parti-
ally rehabilitated. He appeared at the opening of
parliament, smiling broadly and arm-in-arm with two old
friends. It appeared that certain members of the Rakosi
clique had been saved by the opportune death of Stalin.
2. Indications of Vacillation and Lack of Directives
The three months following Stalin's death form a period of
confusion and conflicting "hard" and "soft" tendencies in Hun-
gary. Although proponents of the "hard" course appeared to
hold the upper hand, representatives of a new "soft" approach
began to raise their heads. This confused situation clearly
indicated an absence of firm directives from Moscow and the
consequent insecure position of Rakosi.
49
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
a. Rakosi and "Proletarian internationalism": The initial
propaganda line of the new era was set by Rakosi in an
article in Pravda (11 March), while he was still in
Moscow, entitled "The invincible Stalinist banner of
proletarian internationalism." Rakosi presented the
orthodox themes of Stalin worship, imitation of the
Soviet Union and denunciation of imperialism. There
was no hint of softer policies to come.
The choice of Arpad Hazi, who was popularly credited
with carrying out the anti-Zionist purge, to deliver the
4 April "Liberation Day" address also marked a victory
for the doctrinaires:� The .speech. gave,evidence_of'last'l
minute preparation--it was based almost entirely on a
very "hard" article just published in the Cominform
journal by Szabad Nep editor Marton Horvath. Campaign
speeches prior to TEi 17 May elections likewise bore the
stamp of the doctrinaires:� Theclearestevidence,:of-
the continued domination of orthodox emphasis on heavy
industry was presented in Rakosi's revelation of plans
for the second Five Year Plan due to begin in 1955.
Other articles and pronouncements bore a similar imprint.
b. Possible First Evidence of the "Thaw": The first sign
of the "thaw" appears to be an article of 11 April by
Laszlo Hay, first deputy minister of foreign trade,
emphasizing the satisfaction of the "constantly increas-
ing material and cultural requirements of the whole
society." In a discussion of Stalin's Economic Problems
of Socialism, Hay underlined the theme that the party
had the primary duty of "caring for men," increasing
"the well-being and education of the people" and supply-
ing "ever-increasing quantities of consumers goods" to
the people. Various other themes later identified with
the New Course were voiced by Hay in this article.*
* Hay himself was identified with the ruling Rakosi clique but
as deputy foreign trade minister had stood somewhat out of the
main line of "Stalinist" policies. During World War II, Hay
had served in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade under Mikoyan
and, in the spring of 1952 had attended.the Menscdw:Jnter.,!':_.!:
national Economic Conference. His emergence as harbinger of
the New Course in Hungary assumes special interest in this con-
text.
"STLQfig-T-
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
3. Prelude to the Announcement of the New Course
Immediate antecedents of the announcement of the New Course
included a reported major purge of the judiciary and State Pros-
ecutors Office (early June), a visit by Rakosi accompanied by
Farkas to Moscow (early June), a counterpart trip of Voroshilov
to Budapest (19 June) and the sudden appearance of a campaign
of letters of complaint addressed by workers to the party. These
developments may have been accelerated by the East German rebel-
lion of 17 June and the Czech riots at Plzen at the end of May.
Although evidence is lacking, these developments suggest that the
party leaders may have received the nod. from Moscow to go ahead
with a program of conciliating the masses.
On 21 June, the New Course was directly foreshadowed in a
Szabad Nep article which asserted: "We realize that the stand-
5.7a-37 Ming must be constantly raised. We have received a
lesson from the people. In Hungary...neglect of the workers'
interests is apt to seriously weaken the ties between the Party
and the masses."
4. The New Course
a. The Program: The New Course, announced abruptly between
the end of June and 4 July, was designed to unify and
revitalize the party through the formula voiced by Imre
Nagy calling for the creation of a genuine popular Com-
munism and encouragement to the national pride of Hun-
garians. The counterpart of this political program was
a more popular system of economics aimediat giving
better support to private farming in order to augment
production and providing more consumer goods for the
needs of the people. In the new terminology, the devils
were "burocracy," "excessive industrialization" and
"mechanical imitation of the Soviet Union;" the magic
words were "collective leadership," "socialist legality,"
and "unity."
b. Rakosi and Nagy: The New Course was dominated by two
personalities, Matyas Rakosi and /mre Nagy. Rakosi,
the old master of Communist tactics, at the beginning
obviously felt sure that he could control the country's
evolution toward a period of greater relaxation, through
42
ffig-1
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
--Sr�2144.1.
his complete domination of the party network, and thus
retire into the background without surrender of essen-
tial positions. The repeated endorsement given his
leadership by Marshal Voroshilov and Suslov suggests
that the Soviet party leadership approved of his ap-
proach to the problem of effecting the transition from
the Stalin regime to a new and as yet undefined era.
Imre Nagy, in July 1953, was the least known of the
major Muscovites who arrived in Hungary with the Soviet
armies. In the popular mind, his identification with
the land reform had been somewhat compromised by his harsh
tactics as crop control minister. Nevertheless, he
alone among the original top Muscovites enjoyed suffi-
cient popularity to enable him to announce a program of
incentive measures intended to regain goodwill and in-
crease production in Hungary. Moreover, as a-Soviet-
trained agricultural expert, he had stature to undertake
a program designed to expand Hungary's agricultural pro-
duction. He had given evidence of genuine leadership
qualities in 1945; at other periods he had demonstrated
his ability to perform an assignment competently.
From Rakosi's viewpoint, Nagy at this time probably
appeared to be personally weak and therefore well fitted
to be a tool of the party leadership. Still suffering
from the stigma of the 1949 censure, Nagy might be ex-
pected to show docility to party direction. The increas-
ing self-confidence and authority which marked Nagy's
career after the summer of 1954 probably came as a sur-
prise to Rakosi.-
5. Announcement of the New Course
The New Course was revealed in Hungary in two steps,--the
party reorganization of 27-28 June and the government reshuffle
of 2-4 July. At a meeting of the central committee,, following
a visit by Rakosi to Moscow, outwardly drastic changes in the
top party leadership were announced. Thirteen top-level polit-
buro members were dropped, including three of the original six
43
"SEERE.L.
=1.1Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-51f�114g-1
top Muscovites (Farkas, Revai, Vas) and the body--now called
the political committee--was reduced to nine full members and
two alternates. The orgburo was abolished, while the secre-
tariat was completely recast. Rakosi retained his leadership
as party first secretary, with two rather obscure young men as
secretaries. By these moves, the political committee was re-
duced to a hard core "collective leadership" while the setre-
tariat, with expanded policy-making powers, was the docile
instrument of Rakosi.
On 4 July, Imre Nagy, as premier, spelled out the elements
of the New Course. Concurrent changes in the government were
announced to streamline the governmental machinery. Assignments
to the new cabinet underlined the continued control of the
Rakosi clique, although Rakosi himself was replaced by Nagy.
Two deputy premiers were named--Gero and Hegedus. Gero took
the key post of minister of interior. Several young Moscow-
oriented men assumed important ministries, notably Hegedus
as minister of agriculture and Bela Szalai as chief of the State
Planning Office. Revai left the Ministry of Peoples Culture
but dominant control continued to be exercised by a protegd
of Rakosi, Gyorgy Non.
a. Status of Farkas: Mihaly Farkas was dropped from the
Politburo and lost his post as minister of defense.
His lack of military training probably disqualified
him for retention of the defense post where he was re-
placed by an officer with better qualifications. His
past association with security police matters may also
have constituted a serious liability in an epoch when
the Kremlin sought to show its repudiation of security
policy tyranny by the dramatic purging of Beria and
his associates. Doubtless he owed his restoration to
high position to Rakosi. In any case, he was appointed
secretary of the central committee on 16 August.
b.
Gero as Minister of Interior: The appointment of No.
2-party leader Gero as minister of interior and the
concurrent incorporation of the AVH within the minis-
try reflected the obvious concern of the ruling clique
over retaining the closest possible control of th
security police. According to (W(1 )
the move was a victory for the AVH itself, since it (b)(3)
was enabled in this manner to establish control over
the regular police, and to strengthen its own position
within the government. The acting chief of the
44
31E-C-REZ
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
AVH, Laszlo Piros, became first deputy minister of
Interior and later replaced Gero as minister. The
continued_exceptional jurisdiction..of_the AVH
cases of anti-regime activity was assured by assigning
to them, investigations of cases involving treason,
espionage and "other especially dangerous anti-state
criminal activity."
6. Rakosi's 11 July Pronouncement
Repercussions among middle and low level party leaders con-
fronted with these developments were immediate and shattering.
These functionaries obviously were unprepared for the sudden
shift in tactics and apparent goals announced by Nagy. They
were not sure whether there had been a real change in the party
leadership itself. Officials in the countryside, faced with
the unauthorized exodus of farmers from collectives, sometimes
fled to the city. The demoralization of the party officials con-
stituted the first serious blow to the party's hold on Hungary
following Stalin's death.
In this situation, Rakosi took the rostrum on 11 July to
reassure officials that the new policies were genuine but that
basic Communist doctrines would not be sacrificed. He also
asserted that high party officials eliminated from the Polit-
buro and governmental posts had not been purged but merely re-
assigned to other duties. He betrayed a doctrinaire_.attitUde
on agricultural politics. "The kulak," he declared, "remains
a kulak.... The leopard cannot change his spots."
Rakosi's move had two consequences. It clearly showed that
only the old_master himself at this juncture was able to command
the allegiance of the party machinery which he and his Musco-
vite associates had brought into being. Upon the general public,
however, the address produced an immediate dampening effect.
Nevertheless, even Rakosi's partial endorsement of the new
policies had the effect in the long run of convincing the pub-
lic that certain genuine benefits and a real relaxation of
tension were in prospect.
7. Doctrinaire Opposition to New Course Economic Policies.
The basic lines of doctrinal opposition to New Course eco-
nomic policies became clear in October. At the meeting of the
party central committee, "left-wing" critics apparently
championed the view that only orthodox Communist remedies--
stepped-up industrialization and coercion--could cure Hungary's
basic economic ailment, low productivity. A more moderate
group appeared to believe that concessions along New Course
45
SrefiErZ.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
lines were a necessary temporary expedient to regain control
of the situation prior to the inauguration of the Second Five
Year Plan. At this meeting, Rakosi supported the Nagy policies.
a. Extreme Doctrinaries: The spokesman for this group ap-
pears to have been Istvan Friss, a "mysterious hunch-
back" who long had acted as economic liaison man with
Moscow. This group was subjected to sharp criticism
by the central committee resolution published on 6
November for "lack of understanding, adherence to the
old and accustomed way and even opposition." Singled
out for special criticism were the State Planning Of-
fice, the Ministries of Heavy Industry, of Foundry
and Machine Industry and the planning and financial
section of the central committee--i.e.,Friss.
b. Moderate Doctrinaires: During the first months of the
New Course Gero identified himself with a moderately
critical attitude toward the Nagy policies, in line with
Rakosi's position. It became apparent, however, that
the sacrifice of orthodox industrialization policies
to the necessity of building up the agricultural sector
and gaining popular goodwill was basically antipathetic
to Gero. Nevertheless, in his Lenin Day address (Jan-
uary 1954), Gero performed self-criticism for past
"exaggerated policy of socialist industrialization" at
the expense of the standard of living of workers. He
endorsed Nagy's policies, although with certain reserva-
tions. For example, he declared: "Every socialist
country must support the peasants to the full--and small
farmers as long as they remain small farmers."
8. Strengthening "Collective Leadership"
During the autumn of 1953, warnings that "collective leader-
ship" must be strengthened became increasingly frequent. These
warnings reached a crescendo in January on the eve of elections
for delegates to the Third Party Congress due to meet in the
spring. The official party newspaper during this period ur-
gently instructed party members to unseat the "little kings"
and "burocrats" who had domineered over the party and robbed
members of initiative.
9. The Repercussions of the Beria Case
Rakosi managed with his old skill the domestic repercussions
of the Soviet announcement of Beria's execution. On 13 March,
46
"Srt-R-R-T.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Hungarian authorities authorities released the news that Gabor Peter had
received a sentence of life imprisonment for "crimes against
the people and state," while other former security police
officials also had been given heavy sentences. Lesser individ-
uals involved in the "Zionist plot" were given shorter prison
terms for such minor offenses as black-market operations. Some
were released. The liquidation of Soviet holdings in Hungary
also passed off without incident. Outwardly at least, it ap-
peared that Hungary might be throwing off the onus of "Stalin-
ism" without serious political repercussions.
47
-17e-RgT..
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW COURSE: PHASE 2: NAGY ASSERTS LEADERSHIP
(May-November 1954)
1. The Third Party Congress (24-30 May)
At the third congress of the Hungarian Workers Party, Rakosi,
clearly appeared to dominate the party. Just home from a visit
to Moscow with Nagy and Gero, Rakosi appeared in company with
his old friend Voroshilov who acted as Saviet representative at
the congress. Voroshilov's speech sharply underlined the neces-
sity of collective leadership, avoided personal endorsement of
either Rakosi or Nagy, and emphasized Hungarian national tradi-
tions, including "traditional" Hungarian-Soviet friendship.
Rakosi's five-hour address Was marked by emphatic declara-
tions that new course tendencies would continue under the Second
Five-Year Plan due to start in 1956 in co-ordination with the
other bloc countries. His stern warnings against "right-wing
opportunistic" excesses, however, reveal that party leaders were
seriously alarmed at evidence of relaxation of discipline coming
to light in the party and nation. He emphasized the necessity
of "iron discipline" and declared: "The correct policy of our
party must be defended against both left-wing and right-wing
dangers and distortions.... We must take a stand everywhere
against the spirit of impermissible liberalism and forbearance,
which prevails in many places in our party and government." He
disclosed that the very large number of withdrawals from col-
lective farms was causing concern to the regime and made clear
that collectivization would continue: "Not for a moment can we
forget that this unavoidably is the road to build socialism in
the countryside." He also revealed that a new Peoples Front
was to be formed in the near future.
Gero's report on industrial problems was even more pessi-
mistic in tone than Rakosi's address, marking him clearly as
the leader of the doctrinaire--though reasonable-critics of
the new course. He emphasized that the country's economic prob-
lems were ntst being solved by the new measures but were even
growing. He dwelt on declining productivity and rising produc-
tion costs. His gloomy evaluation was echoed by his young
"hard" disciple, Istvan Hidas.
Lure Nagy, in his address to the congress, reflected greater
authority than had previously been noted by observers. In his
48
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
3rLQfilcZ.
report on governmental policies, he laid major emphasis on the
necessary separation of government and party, stressed the role
of local government organs and demanded much closer contact
between party and government functionaries and the masses of
the people. It was evident that he interpreted his mission as
calling for the establishment of popular confidence in the re-
gime, although in a completely "Leninist" sense. The vehicle
for gaining this popularity was to be the new Peoples Front,
"that broad and all-inclusive mass movement, the backbone of
which is the worker-peasant alliance...." This definition ob-
viously differed from the concept of Rakosi which remained that
of a party functionary.
Certain organizational changes were made at the congress
which had the effect of strengthening collective leadership.
The political committee was reduced to seven full members and
two alternates.* The secretariat was stripped of its policy-
making powers, in theory at least, and under the revised party
statutes became an administrative body.** Subsequent evidence
suggests that elections to the central committee by the congress
made it more responsive to the leadership of Imre Nagy.
2. Emergence of a "Nagy Team"
The first significant appointment indicating that Nagy was
beginning to build up a special governmental team to implement
his policies occurred prior to the congress. On 27 March, Nagy
appointed Zoltan Szanto to head a newly instituted information
bureau reporting directly to the Council of Ministers.*** The
new bureau was at least nominally independent of the Ministry of
People's Culture. Szanto's deputy, appointed somewhat later,
was Miklos Vasarhelyi, a leading journalist who later took an
important role in the so-called Writers Revolt. It seems
possible that the information office was one of the connecting
links between Nagy, as head of the government, and the group
of young Communist intellectuals who were pushing for reform
at a rate faster than the party leadership desired.
Full members were: Rakosi, Gero, Nagy, Farkas, Apro,
Hidas, Hegedus, Acs and Szalai; candidate members were Bata
and Mekis.
** Rakosi and Farkas were the only well-known members of the
secretariat. Other members were Acs, Veg and Matolcsi.
*** Szanto was subsequently elected to the party's central
leadership at the third party congress. A brother-in-law of
Jozsef Revai, he was ambassador to Yugoslavia prior to 1949.
After the break with Tito, Szanto was appointed minister to
Paris where he remained until his appointment to the information
office.
49
NolimeimmimmimmiwiiiimmApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
A second Muscovite who rose to high position during the
Nagy era was Ferenc Munnich, Nagy's former colleague on Radio
Kossuth during World War II. On 1 September, Munnich was
chosen to serve as Hungarian ambassador to Moscow, thus achiev-
ing for the first time a rank commensurate with the reputation
he had enjoyed in earlier years as a leading Hungarian Com-
munist. The fact that both Szanto and Munnich, both Spanish
Civil War veterans and "old Bolsheviks," would presumably be
acceptable to Tito may have played a part in motivating these
appointments.
A third Muscovite who seems to have prospered during the
Nagy era was Laszlo Hay, long-time deputy minister of foreign
trade who on 6 July was advanced to full minister. It will be
recalled that Hay's article of 11 April 1953 was one of the
earliest public appearances of new course doctrine on consumers
goods and welfare of workers.
Other individuals who now or later were closely identified
with the implementation of the Nagy policies were hib son-in-
law Ferenc Janosi and several younger Communists including Geza
Losonczi and Ferenc Donath. Jinosi occupied the position of
first deputy minister of people's culture for the period 1951
to 1955, with the exception of a short interval between March
and July 1953 when he was apparently replaced by Rakosi's
protege Gyorgy Non. Losonczi and Donath had been closely
associated with Nagy in the immediate post-war period during
the implementation of the land reform and popular front policies.
Two of Rakosi's former closest associates were linked with
the Nagy regime--Mihaly Farkas and Zoltan Vas. Farkas appears
to have been seeking to bolster his own position,- exceedingly
50
771Tti94;1.....
miNiiimeApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
3L,C71-A.L.
shaky as a result of mounting attacks throughout the bloc on
past security police misdeeds. Zoltan Vas, opportunist and
scapegoat for economic failures under the First Five-Year Plan,
apparently also sought to work his way back to a position of
power by supporting Nagy. From March 1954 he was attached to
the Council of Ministers in an undefined economic capacity.
3. Party Dissension over Role of Patriotic People's Front
The first evidence that Nagy, in an effort to win popular
support for the regime and implement new course policies, would
attempt to circumvent Rakosi's directives appears in party dis-
cussions leading to the formation in August of the Patriotic
People's Front (PPF). It is also possible that Nagy was able
to exert greater influence on Szabad Nep during the summer.
Observers noted that this newsTiTer--begin to show signs of con-
siderably freer criticism of conditions in Hungary.
As envisaged by Rakosi at the party congress, the front
was designed to be another means of regimenting the public, org-
anized in Communist-controlled mass organizations, for the pur-
pose of endorsing the government policies in the local govern-
ment elections scheduled for 28 November. According to Rakosi's
report to the central committee on 14 April 1955, Nagy from the
outset disagreed with the party leadership on the composition
and functioning of the PPE. Nagy, who was not present at the
party meeting, had contended that the front must be formed by
individuals and not mass organizations. Rakosi rejected this
proposal on grounds that the PPF would become a "political org-
anization," i.e., a rival of the party itself. The matter
appears to have been left in this form for consideration by
the forthcoming central committee meeting.
4. The "Test of Strength" (1-3 October)
The meeting of the central committee on 1-3 October was,
in Nagy's phrase, the "test of strength" between new course
adherents and their critics. An open clash apparently occurred
when the latter demanded that curbs be placed on the purchasing
power of peasants in order to halt inflation. Nagy countered
with strong arguments that the confidence of the peasants must
not be destroyed by such measures if the regime hoped to increase
agricultural production. Instead, their confidence must be
51
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 000966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
IL .177t1.4.
retained by augmenting the supply of consumers goods. He sharply
condemned the defenders of accelerated industrialization and
charged such policies "undermined" the worker-peasant alliance.
He further charged: "The faults of our economic policy" and
"mistakes in party leadership" had the same root: "one-man"
leadership. This address, published in Szabad Nep on 20 October,
was the clearest statement to date of Nairg-WETYIne.
Nagy was able to carry the majority of the central committee
along with him, apparently over the head of Rakosi. The commit-
tee resolved to continue New Course policies and condemned "re-
sistance fostered by ideologically unsubstantiated and mistaken
conceptions which mean to solve our difficulties by a curtailment
of purchasing power--that is, by lowering the standard of living
of workers and peasants." The resolution further excoriated
the "resistance, ..fostered by those who regard certain measures
aiming at the development of agriculture...as a one-sided peasant
policy." It called upon the political committee to formulate
"within this year" a detailed program for the application of new
course policies. This resolution was published in Szabad Nep,
three weeks after the meeting on 22 October.
All the top party figures--except RalDsi--now published en-
dorsements of the central committee resolution, emphasizing dif-
ferent facets of the doctrine. Farkas, speaking to university
activists on 28 October, condemned "mechanical imitation of the
experience of the Soviet Union" and made the point: "In our
country the building of socialism proceeds in an international
context entirely different from that of the USSR....:_What was:cor-
rect in the Soviet Union had proved wrong in our country, in a
historically totally different situation." Zoltan Vas, in
Szabad Nep on 27 October, laid himself open for future criticism
by Efiviatizing as "irrational" the concept--dear to doctrin-
aires--of Hungary as "a land of iron and steel " and ridiculing
the great Stalin City (Sztalinvaros) show project. Erno Gero,
who more than any other individual was responsible for "old
course" policies, had the task of reaffirming the decisions of
the central committee. He declared: "Those who stand in the
way of party policy must be swept aside"
As a direct, warning to "left-wing sectarians," Istvan Friss
was relieved of' his functions as chief of the party's economic
and financial department and relegated to an honorary post.
Simultaneously, a ministerial reshuffle placed Bela Szalai,
former planning chief, at the head of the Ministry of Light
Industry with the mission of stepping up consumers goods pro-
duction. On the other hand, the appointment of Andor Berei,
an old-time associate of Gero, to replace Szalai as chief of
the planning office was not reassuring to new course proponents.
Moreover, Erik Molnar, Rakosi's long-time tool, now took over
the Ministry of Justice.
52
millmlionomipproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
This central committee meeting marks the high point of
Nagy's control of the party. But the departure of party leader
Rakosi for Moscow, either during or immediately after the cen-
tral committee meeting, was a clear warning that he was ex-
ceedingly concerned over exaggerated new course tendencies and
was consulting with friends in the Kremlin.
5. Patriotic People's Front
The two-month period during which Rakosi remained in Mos-
cow was the high point of the Nagy era. In Rakosi's absence,
Nagy remade the PPF to conform with his own interpretation--
i.e., to embody "the poetic concept of the people's sovereignty"
and, if possible, reawaken the genuine communist enthusiasm of
the postwar period. Szabad Nep set the tone in a 10 October
editorial denouncing "left--ving narrowmindedness, factionalism"
and calling for party domination of the new organization. Nagy
induced the central committee to elect the author Pal Szabo as
president of the PPF and, as secretary general, his own son-in-
law, Ferenc Janosi. Nagy also induced the politburo to adopt
as the official PPF organ, not Szabad Nep, but the unaffiliated
newspaper Magyar Nemzet. The ogi-e-EYIVIT-non-Communist editors
of this newspaper were kept at the helm.
By these steps Nagy provided himself with a political org-
anization and newspaper independent to some degree of Rakosi's
control. From its first congress (23-24 October), the PPF
strongly emphasized "Hungarian" themes that drew support from
young party intellectuals and provided a forum for ambitious
newcomers in the countryside. Intended--as its president, Pal
Szabo, phrased it--to "deliver the country from indifference,
apathy and strife," the PPF afforded a platform for opposition
forces who had been barred from free expression by the strangle-
hold of the Rakosi clique on intellectual life.
6. Release of "Victims of Stalinist Oppression"
Following the central committee meeting of 1-3 October,
Istvan Kovacs revealed that the regime had begun to release
Communists "unjustly" Imprisoned on the basis of evidence fal-
sified by former AVH chief Gabor Peter and his associates.
This move, intended to restore initiative and unity to the
party, came as a result of Soviet pressure on the Rakosi re-
gime. The releases may also have been designed to facilitate
the resumption of friendly relations with Yugoslavia.
Members of the nativist group arrested in 1951 were the
first to reappear. Janos Kadar was reportedly liberated in
53
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
September and was immediately appointed to head a district party
organization in Budapest. Gyula Kallai was freed about the same
time. Other party moderates were released concurrently. The
institution of the PPF gave a mechanism where their services
could be utilized pending their full rehabilitation by the party.
Both Kadar and Kallai were elected members of the PPF council at
its October congress.
Other political prisoners were liberated later in the autumn,
including Noel and Herta Field -lormer-SociAlDemocratsiiho,Gypy
Marosan.ancievenright-wing socialists who had opposed fusion with
the Communists were released in coming months in a move to evoke
favorable comment from foreign socialists who had long agitated
for the releases.
The liberation of large numbers of arrestees, many of them
not completely rehabilitated, meant that many embittered, fearful
men had been given a measure of freedom which might be withdrawn
at any time by a change of policy. For this reason, any future
indications that the regime intended to revert to harsh coercive
tactics might drive certain of these individuals to join with any
resistance forces which might be available. But, more immediately
important for the Rakosi leadership, the move greatly reinforced
opposition forces within the party and pointed up the incongruity
of continued retention of power by men who, like Rakosi and Far-
kas, were identified with the avowedly unjust punishment of
former party leaders like Janos Kadar.
7. Status of Affairs, Autumn 1954
Foreigners noted during the summer and fall of 1954 a change
for the better in the well-being and self-confidence of Hungar-
ians. Economic conditions were somewhat improved and consumers
goods were more available. Peasants enjoyed a real increase in
their standard of living. These improvements were accompanied
by a growing popular willingness to criticise the regime and
demand changes in the Communist system--or even a completely new
system. Leaders of-the PPF echoed these criticisms. Taking
their cue from the far-reaching castigation of past and current
mistakes embodied in the central committee's October resolution,
these orators and writers touched on all aspects of the national
life.
Nagy's opponents manifested growing concern over the un-
stable economic situation in the country, rising unemployment
resulting from economy measures, continued low labor productiv-
ity and the growing independence of private peasants who ap-
peared to be reaping the harvest of the new course. The Com-
munist managerial class, uneasy at the possibility that
54
imiummimimiimApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
SEC�RE
de-emphasis on heavy industry would threaten its empire, sabo-
taged measures for converting to consumers �goods production.
Spokesmen for this class even suggested that implementation of
the new course policies would require a complete transformation
of the whole Communist economic system (e.g., radio statement
by Pal Rubinyi, a functionary in the Ministry of Internal Trade,
2 November). These fears were exacerbated by alarm at the
political tendencies of new course proponents--Nagy's increasing
reliance on the PPF at the expense of the party and sharpening
criticism of past mistakes. Orthodox Communists feared that
encouragement of criticism would spark popular hatred of Com-
munism and set off an explosion. To some Communists, their re-
gime appeared to be in danger.
Stinging criticism of the youth organization, DISZ, by PPF
president Pal Szabo on 14 November and more moderate criticism
by Farkas on 28 October, appear to have been the last straw.
Minister of People's Culture Darvas, an old Rakosi puppet, on
21 November delivered a resounding rebuke in the columns of
Szabad Nep. Charging that public criticism stimulated by the
new course was overstepping all bounds, he denounced "anarch-
istic views" in the cultural field and declared: "We will be
guilty...unless we oppose the petty bourgeois practice of over-
statement, criticism, demagogy, undermining of confidence, de-
nunciation of our past achievements, petty bourgeois revisionism
and the destruction of the faith and confidence of our people."
55
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
CHAPTER VII
VII
RAKOSI'S RETURN TO POWER
(December 1954-January 1956)
1. Rakosi Takes Over
Rakosi reintervened decisively to check growing criticism
encouraged by the PPF. Returning from Moscow on 27 November
with a strong Soviet endorsement, Rakosi on 3 December delivered
a slashing onslaught on critics of the Communist youth organiza-
tion. "The party repudiates most sharply the attacks against
DISZ which," he declared, "under the pretext of real failures of
the organization, tend toward the elimination of DISZ and the
weakening of the party itself." The party clearly was exceed-
ingly reluctant to surrender one iota of control over the youth
organization and looked on proposals for reform as directed
against the party itself.
At a special commemorative meeting of the Hungarian parlia-
ment held in Debrecen on 22 December, Rakosi made his return to
the helm even more apparent. He delivered a typically "hard"
address, demanding strengthened discipline in all sectors of
national life, greater emphasis on industrialization and increased
stress on collectivization. It was clear to all observers that
Rakosi had openly taken charge.
Doctrinaire elements in the party who had remained rela-
tively neutral in recent months were encouraged by Rakosi's en-
dorsement by the Kremlin--which had been communicated to the
party--to take a stronger line against New Course tendencies.
Nevertheless, it remained to be determined how far the reversal
would involve changes in economic and political policies or
how many individuals would be demoted. Party leaders at all
levels showed major confusion in this situation.
The return to orthodox Communist emphasis on heavy industry
was announced by Szabad Nep in its New Year's Day editorial.
Rakosi spelled ouT-We-new line on 23 January, in a speech to
miners. He declared that "the vigorous program of industriali-
zation" would be followed during the Second Five-Year Plan due
to begin in 1956. These pronouncements resembled statements
made by Khrushchev during December and January.
- 56
77tefth'"...T.
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
JLa
2. Condemnation of the Nagy Policies (March)
The demotion of Malenkov was announced on 6 February; two
days later Molotov referred to "serious shortcomings" in the
Satellites. These Soviet moves were immediately followed in
Hungary by measures against Nagy and his adherents. Nagy's
son-in-law Janosi was replaced as first deputy minister of
people's culture on 19 February by Rakosi's special protege
Gyorgy Non. On the 20th, it was announced that Nagy was ill
with coronary thrombosis. From this point until the autumn
of 1956 Nagy remained out of power.
Soviet endorsement of the forthcoming condemnation of Nagy
took the unusual form of a warning article published in the
Cominform journal on 25 February, two weeks before the meeting
of the Hungarian central committee which pronounced the verdict
on the Nagy policies. This article blasted Hungarian policies
implemented during the preceding eight months and sharply criti-
cized Szabad Nep for its attitude during this period. At ap-
proximately the�same time, Cominform chief Suslov spent some
ten days in Hungary making a thorough study of the political
situation. He then threw his powerful support to Rakosi, al-
though reportedly counseling him to use moderation in dealing
with the popular premier.
Condemnation of the Nagy policies by the central committee
followed on 9 March. This "March Resolution," in the name of
party "unity" and "discipline," condemned the following policies:
(1) sacrifice of heavy industry, which "also worked against ag-
riculture, light industry and defense:" (2) excessive encour-
agement given to free peasants at the expense of collectives;
(3) measures, taken in connection with the PPF, aimed at dimin-
ishing the party's importance and giving control of local gov-
ernment organs to the PPF committee. The resolution castigated
nationalism and "chauvinism" as "among the most dangerous mani-
festations," and declared that a "merciless" battle must be
waged on both tendencies. The resolution also criticized Nagy
personally for: (1) supporting anti-Marxist views in his
speeches and actions; (2) encouraging "petty bourgeois" ele-
ments to step up their activity against the party; (3) attempt-
ing to ignore the leadership of the working class; and (4)
leading the working class into error by demagogic promises.
The March Resolution, however, did not reject the party resolu-
tion of June 1953 instituting the New Course and reiterated
policies of moderation.
Another charge reportedly levelled against Nagy was dis-
crimination against the AVH. This accusation apparently was
not publicized.
57
7,71
mimiApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
The reference to nationalism was spelled out in an 8 April
editorial in Szabad Nep, which revealed that the condemnation
was actually CliTe-Eted against the doctrine of "national Commu-
nism." The editorial asserted: "If we analyze the rightist
views, we clearly see that they are aimed, willy-nilly, at mak-
ing the party deviate from the road followed by the Soviet
Union�and at making Hungary follow another, the specifically
Hungarian, road that was supposed to lead to socialism." This
blast may have been directed at Farkas as well as Nagy.
Public Soviet endorsement of Rakosi was given by Marshal
Voroshilov on 4 April at the Liberation Day ceremonies. Voro-
shilov transmitted the express approval of the Soviet central
committee for measures taken by the Hungarian party to correct
"errors" in the economy and socialist structure of Hungary.
3. Party Condemnation of Nagy (April)
Party disciplining of the principal figures of the Nagy
regime followed on 14 April at the meeting of the political
committee. Nagy was expelled from the political committee,
the central committee, "and every other function with which
he was entrusted by the party." Farkas was expelled from
the political committee and the secretariat but "entrusted
with other party work." Doubtless the leniency shown to
Nagy and Farkas was a reflection of the current Soviet policy
which required the greatest possible appearance of moderation
be shown by Hungarian leaders.
The report of the central committee, published on 18
April, declared that Nagy had "turned against the party's
policy, the teachings of Marxism and Leninism and the inter-
ests of the people." His activities, it asserted, "aimed
at the bastion of socialism--the leading role of the working
class and the party, the development of heavy industry and
the socialist reorganization of agriculture." Nagy's devia-
tion of 1949 was cited as proof of his long-standing unre-
58
iiiiApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
liability., He excoriated for failing to learn from his'
faults: PIn fact, during the. last 201 months,'he aggravated
these faults until they became .a whole coherent system and'
caused great damage to his country.- .
Nagy was replaced by the Rakosi protege, Andras Hegedus, as
premier on 18 April. Hegedus' nomination presumably signified
the continued priority of agriculture, since he was an agricul-
tural expert. As a product of the Hungarian youth organization,
he presumably would be popular among younger party members.
Finally, as a newcomer, Hegedus was free of the onus of the Rajk
case. Soviet wooing of Tito gave the last point importance.
a Nagy's Defiance to the Central Committee: Nagy's flat
refusal to appear before the political committee, on
grounds that as head of the government he could not
be removed by the party, suggests that he felt confident
of support within the party for himself and his policies.
Rakosi's continued failure to force Nagy to do penance
may indicate that the party leadership was unwilling to
sacrifice the former premier, who had become a symbol
of "national Communism." As Rakosi explained, he hoped
Nagy might "turn back" and try to make good "the im-
measurable damage he caused to our party, people's demo-
cracy and our building of socialism." Nagy's continued
defiance, however, encouraged his supporters to continue
their resistance.
b. The Condemnation of Farkas and Vas: The condemnation of
Farkas, on grounds that "for a long time" he had been
the "chief backer" of Nagy, had drastic implications
for the Rakosi clique. Farkas had connections with
leading.Hungarian army circles.. . His son, Vladimir
Farkas, a leading AVH official, was related by marriage
with high-ranking Muscovites and on friendly terms with
important officials. The fall of Farkas,. therefore, al-
though he was temporarily saved from its worst conse-
quences by Rakosi, threatened to implicate other very
59
"SEefeErT-...
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
-
prominent
prominent individuals.
Zoltan Vas was also involved in the fall of Nagy.
He was deprived of his special position in the council
of ministers and demoted to deputy minister of foreign
trade. The conclusive nature of his condemnation was
shown by the statement in the April issue of .the party
theoretical journal which asserted that Vas' castiga-
tion of Five-Year-Plan show projects reflected the "in-
fluence of the class enemy and capitalistic circles
which are trying to weaken the popular base of the re-
gime by slander."
c. Continued Stron Position of Munnich and Szanto: Neither
Ferenc Munnich-nor:Zoltan Szanto was injured by the fall
of Nagy. Munnich continued to be ambassador:to Moscow,
while Szanto was uppointea minister to Warsaw in June.
Both men thus played important roles in lin1in hungary
with the Kremlin and Poland. Both men reappeared in
Hungary on the eve ol the revolution in 1956.
4. Increasing Emphasis on "Hard" Domestic Policies (June)
During the spring of 1955, Hungarian domestic policies took
on an increasingly "hard" look, although party leaders made a
show of continuing moderation. The apparatus of economic coer-
cion was somewhat strengthened when in August the State Control
Office was raised to the status of ministry with Arpad Hazi as
minister. Moreover, economic policies unveiled by the regime at
the June meeting of the central committee implied the return of
intensified industrialization and collectivization under the
Second Five-Year Plan due to begin in 1956.
Erno Gero now openly supported these policies, although he
attempted to maintain his "moderate doctrinaire" attitude. In
a 12 June article in Szabad Nep commenting on the recent central
committee meeting, he declara-that socialist industrialization,
better work by collectives and state farms and improved opera-
tion of machine tractor stations must be the means of "convinc-
ing several hundred thousand peasant families" to join-collectives.
He conceded that this would bring intensified pressure on
"kulaks," i.e,, the peasantry as a whole. "Agricultural pro-
duction can be raised substantially," he declared, "only if we
attain in the next few years a change in the socialist reorgani-
zation of agriculture as well. Imre Nagy and in general the
rightist deviationists started from the assumption that we
either build socialism in the villages,- in which case agricul-
tural production could not be raised, or we raise agricultural
production and yields and then it woura-be impossible to build
60
mimmiumimimimiApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
*-71-4
socialism in the villages." Gero thus decisively ranged himself
on the side of the enemies of Nagy's agricultural policies.
This approach to Hungary's grave economic problems satisfied
no one. Proponents of New Course policies were alarmed by the
implications of the return to collectivization and industriali-
zation while leaders of the Communist managerial class whose
careers and advancement depended on expanding industry were dis-
affected by the failure to speed up the return to a stronger
emphasis on heavy industry. The cleavage in top party circles
therefore remained acute.
5. The Yugoslav Issue
The Soviet rapprochement with Tito became a major factor in
Hungarian political life by the summer of 1955. Since Tito was
widely envied in Hungary as a successful rebel against Kremlin
controls, his courting by the Kremlin leaders exacerbated con-
fusion and dissension already rampant in the Hungarian party as
a result of the fall of Nagy and the general hardening of the
domestic line which appeared in sharp contrast to Soviet assur-
ances to the Yugoslays. The pilgrimage of Khrushchev and his
colleagues to Yugoslavia in May brought this confusion to a high
pitch. It afforded the highest possible affirmation that the
doctrine of "separate roads to socialism" was again respectable
as regards Yugoslavia.
The Hungarian party leaders were aware of their dilemma but
clearly hoped to accommodate themselves to the new Soviet
policies. The Rajk case now became a major stumbling block.
It would be exceedingly difficult for Rakosi to do public pen-
ance for the death of. Rajk without seriously damaging his
authority. It became unmistakably clear, however, that nothing
less than such a public repudiation would satisfy Tito. The
Hungarian tactic of blaming the whole affair on Gabor Peter--
following the Soviet line on Beria--was not satisfactory.
President Tito spelled out his demands in a 27 July speech.
He charged that "certain men in neighboring countries...especi-
ally Hungary" were not pleased with the improvement in Soviet-
Yugoslav relations and "were intriguing under cover" against
Yugoslavia. Such men, he declared, who had sentenced "innocent
men" to death,'were afraid to admit their mistakes and follow
a new path. "These Men," Tito concluded, "will inevitably fall
into their own political traps!"
61
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
LI
It soon became evident that the Hungarians were under
strong Soviet pressure to improve relations, although at the
moment only economic rapprochement was demanded. The Hungar-
ian party instituted special meetings to explain Soviet policy
on Yugoslavia to party activists and blame the 1948 break on
Gabor Peter. Without fanfare, however, the party concurrently
released minor victims of the Rajk trial.
Tito's intransigence unquestionably strengthened the in-
itiative of anti-Rakosi elements in Hungary who genuinely be-
lievedin the possibility of national Communism and hoped for
the reinstitution of the Nagy leadership.
6. Appearance of Revolutionary Elements: The Writers Revolt
(September-November)
The full impact of the harsher policies designed to crush
Nagy supporters fell on Hungarian intellectuals, especially the
young Communist journalists and writers who looked for increased
liberalization in Hungary as a result of the apparently more
tolerant attitude of the Kremlin. From early spring onwards,
the regime sought to convince the writers that they should fall
into line and specifically support the party. When persuasion
failed leading journalists were dismissed from Szabad Nep; books
were banned; the party cracked down on the Writers' Uniar in an
attempt to intimidate potentially rebellious elements.
The actual starting point of the so-called Writers'Revolt
appears to have been an article published by Gyula Hay in the
10 September issue of Irodalmi Ujsag, organ of the Writers'
Union, delcaring that excessive bureaucratic restraints were
destroying Hungarian literature as an art. The next number
of the journal carried an article by Laszlo Benjamin criticiz-
ing Jozsef Darvas, minister of people's culture. The issue
was suppressed by the authorities.
The regime's attempt to discipline the writers provoked
an outburst. At a meeting of the Writers' Association, appar-
ently held on 10 November, spokesmen of the party (Marton Hor-
vath and Erzsebet Andics) were shouted down. A group of writers
presented a draft memorandum attacking the "necessity and right"
of the party to direct literature.- The resolution--or
62
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Releaser 2E6708/02 C00966210
resolutions--took the basic position that acts of the Hungarian
central committee conflicted with party policy and were "in
direct contradiction" with the "broadminded approach to cul-
tural work practiced by the Soviet Union." The only means by
which "wrong views" could be defeated, creative cultural work
developed and socialism advanced would be establishment of a
"free, sincere, healthy and democratic atmosphere imbued with
the spirit of popular democracy."
7. Counteroffensive of the Party (November-December)
In the face of the writers and their widespread popular
support, the party leadership apparently carried out its counter-
offensive with great caution. Although the party central com-
mittee adopted a resolution condemning the writers, it was pub-
lished only after a long delay in the 10 December issue of the
writers journal, Irodalmi Ujsag, no doubt as a result of mounting
dissension within the committee. It strongly appears that the
Rakosi-dominated wing of the committee found it necessary to break
the resistance of the pro-Nagy faction before steps could be taken
to discipline the writers. Rakosi apparently resolved to give a
drastic lesson to opposition elements by finally cracking down on
Nagy himself. At a special session of the central committee con-
vened on 3 December, Nagy was expelled from the party. Thus,
after eight months delay, the disciplinary action which should
logically have been taken in April was carried through. But the
long delay and the semi-clandestine character of the move robbed
it of much of its impact.
The Rakosi-Gero leadership of the party now initiated a
campaign to daunt the opposition. On 6 December, party bigwig
63
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Istvan Kovacs addressed a meeting of Budapest party activists
with threats against the insurgents. He denounced leaders of
the Writers' Revolt by name and declared that the writers'
memorandum was an "anti-party" maneuver designed to encourage
opposition to the party among the general public.
On 10 December the central committee resolution was finally
published in Irodalmi Ujsag. This sweeping condemnation stig-
matized the "greater part" of recent literature on the peasantry
as antisocialist ("schematist"), declared it was "political" in
character, and scathingly denounced the individuals who had
signed the writers' memorandum. "This memorandum," it declared,
"is an attack against the party and state leadership. It casts
doubt on the right of the central committee to remove rightist
opportunists from the board of editors of its own central news-
paper.... This memorandum is in fact an anti-party program....
At the present time rightist opportunism manifests itself in the
most dangerous, most undisguised and most organized form in the
field of literary life.... The central committee most emphatic-
ably condemns this rightist factionalism...."*
in consequence of the party decision, several leading jour-
nalists were eNpelled from the party. This move marked the
open break between intellectuals backing Imre Nay and the party.
It also had the effect of forming a group of "outcasts" ready to
resort to strong measures to secure assurance of their freedom
and livelihood.
* The following individuals were condemned by name: Tibor
Dery, Zoltan Zelk, Tamas Aczel, Gyula Hay and Tibor Meray.
64
77St. er4g-7-
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Relea-s-e:-Tof 97-0-8/02 C00966210
CHAPTER VIII
DISINTEGRATION CF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PARTY
(22 February - 24 October 1956)
1. Effects of the 20th Soviet Party
The dramatic revelation of the decanonization of Stalin by
Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the 20th party congress vastly
sparked dissension in the Hungarian Workers Party.* It encour-
aged opponents of Rakosi in the central committee to step up
their attacks and gave heart to supporters of Imre Nagy. It
stimulated Hungarian party members at all levels to demand drastic
changes in the regime at a greatly accelerated speed. Simul-
taneously emphasis on a "variety of roads to socialism" encouraged
nationalists to hope that there would be a genuine understanding
of Hungary's problems and traditions in the forthcoming period.
Rakosi was clearly guilty of the crimes charged by Khrushchev
against Stalin. He had encouraged the "cult of personality." He
had condemned good Communists and Spanish Civil War veterans by
the use of fabricated evidence, notably Laszlo Rajk. He had pro-
tected those who tortured "innocent men,- notably the Farkases.
He had supported the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform and,
with Farkas, had led the chorus of denunciation Against him.
Rakosi's continued presence at the head of the Hungarian party
therefore contradicted the new Soviet party line and constituted
a ban to resumption of party relations with Yugoslavia--and Tito
made clear that he considered men like Rakosi a barrier. That
Rakosi had done these things in response to Soviet orders only
involved him further in the guilt of Stalin and "Beria." The
rapid elimination of Rakosi from power therefore constituted a
test case of the genuineness of the reform policies promised
by Khrushchev.
The revelations of the 20th party congress split the Hun-
garian party from top to bottom. The denigration of Stalin
caused despair among party members of doctrinaire tendencies.
Some reportedly even threatened to leave the party because
"the negation of Stalin means the negation of Communism." On
the other hand, the congress declaration produced jubilation
among the supporters of Imre Nagy.
* Hungarian delegates to the congress were Rakosi, Szalai and
Kovacs.
65
36feALE-..it
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Other measures taken in connection with the 20th party con-
gress gave further encouragement to Rakosi's enemies. The formal
rehabilitation of Bela Kun, effected by Eugene Varga in Pravda
on 21 February, heartened "old Bolsheviks" long under a cloud
(e.g. Gyorgy Lukacs) to take more active roles in opposing the
Rakosi regime. Encouragement by the congress of far-reaching
criticism and self-criticism spurred malcontents to use every
avaialble medium to denounce the regime and notably sanctioned
the scathing criticism voiced at the Petofi Club, the meeting
place of the opposition.
2. Dissension in the Central Committee
Reflections of this factionalism emerged sharply at the
12-13 March meeting of the central committee following the con-
gress. Rakosi, backed by his proteges in the secretariat, a few
central committee members (e.g. Marton Horvath, Erzsebet Andics)
and in general by Gero, was the target of attacks calling for
the punishment of Mihaly and Vladimir Farkas as "Stalinists."
Imre Nagy allegedly appeared before the committee to request
rehabilitation and attack the "cult of personality." Although
Nagy's request was rejected after heated debate, factionalism
in the governing body of the party now was rampant.
3. Stalinists, Liberals and Moderates
The basic line of cleavage lay between Rakosi, representing
"Stalinism," and Imre Nagy, representing "liberalism," i.e. na-
tionalist tendencies which remained Communist but judging from
Nagy's willingness to resort to extreme conciliatory expedients,
might go very far to the right indeed. Between these extremes
was the group of rehabilitated Communists. headed by Janbs Nadar.
Nagy's claims for full rehabilitation were apparently sup-
ported by a large faction--possibly the majority--of the central
committee, probably because they realized the tremendous popular
enthusiasm for Nagy must be satisfied. There is little doubt,
however, that leading party elements were greatly alarmed at the
extremely "liberal" character of Nagy's own personal following.
These included the "outcast" young writers recently disciplined
for challenging party control (e.g. Tibor Dery, Tibor Tardos,
Miklos Vasarhelyi*)and certain partially rehabilitated intel-
lectuals.who supported his cultural and agrarian policies,
* Vasarhelyi reportedly was expelled from the party prior to
the CPSU congress for charging Rakosi with responsibility for
the Rajk case.
66
mmii.....pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210.
Coza '1,03oncz1 ii.0 nonath.rThe*i.ervoz.:o th"eir-
allia'ace to Nagywas probablylaurzmeatad by their exposed.
in the eveit,�of-a'retilrn to haTsh.Jcoprelvepolicies.
Outside the central committee was the important group of
rehabilitated moderate nationalists (Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai,
Gyorgy Marosan) who had very strong support within the central
committee. Kadar, a bitter personal enemy of Rakosi, as yet
held only the relatively minor post of party secretary for Pest
county and apparently was ambitious for advancement. His can-
didacy may have been backed by Jozsef Revai, who had been closely
associated with this group in the 1948-51 period.
The majority of the party's political committee (Acs, Hegedus,
Szalai, Hidas, Bata, Mekis, Kovacs and Piros) supported Rakosi
pending orders from Moscow, although they personally opposed
Rakosi's continued tenure of power. Most of these individuals
owed their careers to Rakosi but they were prepared to overthrow
him at a moment's notice.
4. The Kremlin's Dilemma
The balance of power clearly lay in the hand of the Kremlin.
The Soviet directors of Hungary's fate, however, were caught in
a dilemma. Moscow believed that only an experienced hand like
Rakosi's could control the dangerous factionalism rampant in the
Hungarian party and contain explosive nationalist tendencies
encouraged by the current Soviet rapprochement with Tito. Yet
the continued retention of Rakosi conflicted with the de-
Stalinization pronouncements of the 20th Soviet Party Congress,
exacerbated dissension .in the Hungarian party and further
undermined the prestige of the party among the Hungarian public.
A major stumbling block to the Kremlin appears to have
been the absence of a suitable successor to Rakosi. The instal-
lation of Imre Nagy, whose policies had been formally condemned,
would amount to a Soviet capitulation before the demands of
Hungarian public opinion--a procedure contrary to the whole
conception of Soviet-Satellite relations. As the crisis within
the Hungarian party grew worse, Janos Kadar may have been desig-
nated as eventual replacement for Rakosi. He had the advantage
of typifying a policy based on the industrial working class and
he was still, as in 1948, manageable by the Kremlin. The moment
when he could assume this post appeared to be far off, since he
had not yet been readmitted to any top governing body of the
party.
67
lateklg-T.
immilimmumommiiimmmApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
C-112,
In this situation, the "collective" leadership in Moscow
continued to support Rakosi by public endorsements while post-
poning the question of an eventual successor. Such vacillation
only stimulated the opposition to Rakosi into more vehement de-
mands for his ouster.
5. Growing Strength of the Anti-Rakosi Opposition
To most Hungarians, the elimination of Rakosi would have
been one guarantee that the Kremlin really intended to put an
end to the oppressive Stalinist system and allow genuine "relaxa-
tion" in Hungary. The opposition therefore concentrated on de-
mands for the repudiation of Rakosi. It was further encouraged
by the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of 20 June asserting
that "the roads of Socialist development are different in differ-
ent countries and conditions" to believe that the Kremlin might
really permit more liberal policies in Hungary.
During the spring, the opposition led by the writers
broadened to include intellectuals, students, ex-partisans and
numerous military officers. Intensified government economy
measures resulting in the dismissal of many government officials
also contributed to throwing these individuals into the pro-Nagy
opposition centered in the Petofi Club.
a. Rakosi Seeks to Conform with the Soviet Congress Line:
Confronted with mounting demands for his removal,
Rakosi sought to convince the opposition that he was
in fact complying with the directives of the Soviet
congress. His report to the central committee's March
meeting reflects this attempt to tailor the general
line of policy, which continued to be on the March
resolution of 1955 while encouraging greater freedom
of criticism and stepping up the rehabilitation of
imprisoned individuals. The effect of this partial
"thaw" was considerably marred by his repeated admoni-
tions that Communist discipline must be maintained.
On 27 March, Rakosi fell in line with Soviet
policies toward Yugoslavia by publicly rehabilitating
Laszlo Rajk and performing self-criticism for his
exedution. The effect of this move was undercut by
an assertion made in Szabad Nep the same day that
because Hungary was in a transitional state between
capitalism and socialism the "class enemy" in Hungary
was stronger than in the Soviet Union and repressive
measures against regime enemies were necessary.
68
NEINNImiliApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
b. The Second Writers Revolt: Rakosi's failure to imple-
ment a bold program based on what optimistic Hungarian
party members believed was the program of the 20th
party congress evoked heightened opposition among mem-
bers of the Writers Club who spearheaded the opposition.
The writers organ Irodalmi Ujsag promptly retorted on
24 March with an attack on "dogmatisms closely con-
nected with the cult of personality" and political
control based on "pretensions of infallibility by party
and state organizations." New recruits began to join
the insurgent writers during March and April. Their
attitude was well expressed by Tibor Tardos in a 7 April
article in Irodalmi Ujsag. Referring to his own past
acquiescence in crimes committed in the name of party
discipline, he wrote:
Yet the time came when we had discarded respect
for human life...and had sacrificed it to our
faith 5n Commun1sm7. We, who sometime long
ago in our youth had sworn by the tremendous
power of thought, now stood with crystal-clear
hearts but with empty heads,. like amphorae in
the glass cabinet of a museum, And these am-
phorae nodded their consent to everything.
c. Rakosi Attempts to Answer His Critics: Rakosi sought
to answer his critics by convincing them that he him-
self had thoroughly reformed, that the genuine policies
of the Soviet congress were being carried out under
his direction and by demonstrating the need for Commu-
nist discipline. It nevertheless remained clear that
Rakosi remained a Stalinist in economic theory and
predisposition to authoritarian methods. .This emerges
clearly in his major address of the spring, made to
Budapest party activists on 18 May. Rakosi declared
that no fewer than 9,000 persons had been amnestied
since the preceding November and criminal proceedings
had been quashed against 11,000 others. He performed
humiliating self-criticism. He promised that coercion
would be played down. But he nettled his audience by
reverting to self-justification and demands for "disci-
pline." It was now apparent to most observers that
Rakosi had outlived his usefulness.
d. The Petofi Club: In this situation, the decisive
center of organized opposition to Rakosi became the
Petofi Club in Budapest. From the end of May, meetings
organized under the sponsorship of the youth organiza-
tion (DIU) were transformed by party dissidents into
69
milApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
full-scale demonstrations against Rakosi during which
representatives of many sectors of Hungarian society
scathingly attacked the major evils of the past years
and even unearthed party quarrels of the thirties.
This freedom of debate was encouraged by Szabad Nep
which as late as the third week in June. characterized
the Petofi Club as a "valuable forum."
The Rajk affair was a favorite stick to beat the
regime. For example, one dissident charged: "In 1949
Rakosi said Rajk was a Titoist; in 1955 he said he was
a provocateur; this year he calls him comrade." At
another meeting, Mrs. Julia Rajk, widow of the national
Communist, evoked tremendous applause from a capacity
audience which included many military officers,with
bitter charges that her husband had been murdered and
demands for punishment of his murderers.
By the end of June, attacks on Rakosi at Petofi
Club meetings reached a climax with shouts: "Down with
the skin-haired fathead!"
e. Attack on Soviet Party Disciplining of Writers: The
increasing self-assurance and radicalism of insurgent
writers finally reached the stage of attacking the sup-
pression of creative thought by authorities of the CPSU.
In early June, in answer to an article by a Soviet
writer printed in Irodalmi Ujsag, organ of the Writers
Club, some twenty Hungarian writers drafted a reply
challenging the right of the party to dictate themes.
Their attitude toward the Hungarian regime was even
more violent. By the end of June the Writers Associa-
tion refused even to conduct discussions with Hungarian
party officials until the central Committee resolution
of December 1955 had been withdrawn.
7. Continued Vacillation by the Kremlin
The Kremlin still vacillated on the problem of party leader-
ship in Hungary. In early June ex-Cominform chief.M. A. Suslov
made a week-long visit to Budapest, ostensibly on vacation, to
survey the situation. During this visit, he held private con-
versations with Imre Nagy and Janos Kadar. But when Suslov left
Hungary without making any overt move, the evidence that the
Kremlin might be considering a successor to Rakosi stimulated
the opposition into renewed vehemence.
Two weeks later (23 June), Rakosi, and probably Gero and
Hegedus went to Moscow for undisclosed reasons, following Tito's
70
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
triumphant visit to Moscow. Kadar was also said to be in the
Soviet capital at this time. It appeared that the Kremlin
still considered Rakosi indispensable.
Rakosi Reverts to Harsh Tactics
Developments in the Satellites reached fever-heat in the
last week in June. In Poland, the Poznan riots of 28 June
coincided almost exactly with the most extreme anti-regime
demonstrations at the Petofi Club in Hungary. As reported by
Politika in Belgrade, this 27 June demonstration lasted nine
hours, during which the full extent of party and popular hos-
tility to the regime became apparent to the participants and
to the regime. The government spokesmen, Marton Horvath and
Zoltan Vas were shouted down when they attempted to defend
Rakosi's policies. As a climax, the demonstrators shouted:
"Down with the regime: Long live Imre Nagy!"
This demonstration evoked immediate repressive measures
by the regime. Rakosi called A special session of the central
committee on 30 June and forced through a harsh resolution--
reportedly seen by only a few members--denouncing "anti-party
manifestations" at the Petofi Club and calling on the party
central control commission to expel the ringleaders of the
opposition, Tibor Tardos and Tibor Dery. The following day
Szabad Nep published the central committee resolution and
launched a campaign against "right-wing deviation," raised the
cry of "vigilance" and denounced the Petofi Club as a hotbed
of dissension. "These debates were attended not only by honest
people who love the party," Szabad Nep editorialized on 3 July,
"but by individuals who oppose the party.... Opportunist,
harmful and anti-party views were expressed by those who still
maintain close and sympathetic contact with Imre Nagy, who has
been expelled from the party because of his anti-Marxist views,
his hostility to the party and his factionalism."
Rakosi appears to have been trapped between the growing
violence of the opposition and Kremlin directives to maintain
a show of moderation. In this dilemma, he returned to Moscow
about 7 July. He returned to Budapest with the obvious inten-
tion of implementing very strong measures to cope with unrest.
Possibly he received encouragement for a harsher policy from
the authoritative Pravda editorial of 16 July which reaffirmed
the "unshakable solidarity of the socialist camp," attacked
the idea of national Communism, condemned the Petofi Club
demonstrations and appeared to throw Soviet support behind
leaders who wished to reimpose discipline on insurgents.
71
immomminsiiiikpproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
9. The Fall of Rakosi
The drastic measures envisaged by Rakosi to crush opposi-
tion apparently alarmed the Kremlin, which dispatched Mikoyan
to Hungary to investigate the situation. Mikoyan reportedly
arrived on 14 July, rejected Rakosi's proposal for the arrest
of some 400 persons, including some forty writers and possibly
Imre Nagy, and apparently was sustained in his verdict by
Khrushchev. It strongly appears that Rakosi was forced to
resign as party chief when his plans for coping with the opposi-
tion were rejected. Rakosi's subsequent references to his
guilt of "cult of personality" suggests that Mikoyan may have
lectured him on the subject during his visit to Budapest.
At the meeting of the central committee (18-21 July),
Rakosi resigned as first secretary of the Hungarian Workers
Party. In his letter of resignation, he confessed: "The bulk
and effect of mistakes in the fields of personality cult and
socialist legality were greater than I thought...and the harm
done to our party in consequence of these mistakes was much
more serious than I thought originally."
After thirty-six years as a major leader of the Hungarian
Communist party, Rakosi--evidently a broken man--departed for
the Soviet Union.
10. Gero as Party Chief
At this juncture, the Kremlin by a bold strike--the full
rehabilitation of Imre Nagy and the promotion of Janos Kadar
to leadership of the party--might have saved the scraps of
predtige still remaining to the Hungarian party and convinced
the Hungarian people that a genuine de-Stalinization program
was in sight. Instead, Mikoyan designated Gero as first secre-
tary of the Hungarian party. By this move, which outraged the
liberals and dissatisfied the moderates, he perpetuated the
schism in the party leadership and laid the groundwork for
revolution. Gero, the right-hand man of Rakosi in past years
was known as a tactless though hard driving doctrinaire with
little sympathy for Hungarian national aspirations.
72
Approved for for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
7L"-t-1-494-1.
An important place was nevertheless given to the moderate
element. Janos Kadar, Gyorgy Marosan, and Karoly Kiss were
admitted to the political committee and Gyula Kallai was elected
to the central committee. The balance of power remained with
Stalinists, however. The appointment of Jozsef Revai, well-
known as spokesman for the dictatorship of the proletariat,
also appeared to stregthen the Stalinist faction, although
Revai had past connections with the Kadar group.
Gero nevertheless set out to give the appearance of greater
liberalization without relaxation of vigilance. Warning that
"it would be a very grave mistake if we failed to draw the
necessary conclusions from the provocation in Poznan in our
own country," he assured the party in his 18 July speech ac-
cepting the post of first secretary that a "large-scale process
of democratization" would take place in Hungary.*
11. The Gero Policies
In line with this promise, the party leadership began to
implement a policy of picemeal de-Stalinization. The central
committee approved the disgrace of Mihaly Farkas and set in
motion changes in the defense establishment. Farkas was reduced
to the rank of private. Other high political officers were
replaced at this time. It appeared that the new central com-
mittee was intent upon implementing de-Stalinization measures
at a much faster rate than heretofore--and probably at a faster
rate than its nominal leader, Gero.
The regime also took steps to cope with the long-unsolved
problems of the Hungarian economy or at least to institute a
general examination of the economic policies of Hungary prior
* The following were full members of the new politburo: Revai,
Kadar, Kiss, Morosan, Acs, Hidas, Hegedus, Szalai, Istvan Kovacs,
Apro; and alternate members: Bata and Mekis. All except Kadar,
Marosan, Revai and Kiss had belonged to the previous political
committee under Rakosi.
73
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
to the unveiling of the long-defe,cred Second. Five Year Plan.
There were no indications, however, that Gero himself had
evolved economic policies which could answer the crying needs
of the people.
In an effort to restore "unity" in the central committee
and regain the support of the insurgent intellectualist elements,
the party leadership directed overtures toward the "outcast"
writers and the Nagy wing of the party. A central committee
resolution published on 30 July took the initial step by
promising concessions. In comment on this resolution, Szabad
Nep editor Marton Horvath on 12 August admitted: "Never before
in�the history of the Hungarian party have the intellectuals
shown such unanimity in opposing the party's management." By
blaming this situation to a large degree on Rakosi's misdeeds,
the party left the door open to the rehabilitation of the "out-
casts." It remained to be seen whether the attempt to make
Rakosi the scapegoat for past evils would be any more success-
ful than Rakosi's own effort to foist the blame on Gabor Peter.
Indications that party leaders were prepared to bargain
had the consequence of encouraging the appetite of the opposi-
tion and thus forcing the regime to go beyond its original
intentions. Moreover, indications that the Kremlin itself was
vacillating between a crackdown on Polish insurgents and con-
tinued encouragement of the "thaw!' spurred the Hungarians to
take a bolder course. On the other hand, Gero's continued
stress on doctrinaire considerations kept his opponents alive
to the possibility that a return to harsh measures might occur
at any time, while increasing symptoms of tougher Soviet poli-
cies toward Yugoslavia made tbem fear such a reversal might be
fast approaching. These developments combined to make the
next three months a period in which hope and fear combined to
produce reckless daring among the leaders of the Hungarian
opposition.
12. ' The "Moderate Nationalist" Position
Janos Kadar, during the three months before the revolu-
tion, came to the front as the representative of Communist
middle-of-the-road tendencies. Free of the taint of "Stalinism,"
he stood between the fundamentally doctrinaire position of Gero
and the "liberal" stand of the Nagy adherents. This position
appears to have been endorsed by the Kremlin, judging from the
reported remark of the Soviet ambassador that he "liked Kadar
very much," and the allegation that Mikoyan had given his
support to Kadar. In his first major political speech, made
to miners in the north Hungarian industrial area on 12 August,
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Kadar supported the line that Rakosi's crimes had caused the
exaggeration of New Course tendencies, but he appeared to take
a slightly more liberal view of the internal Hungarian prob-
lems than Gero. Significantly, he asserted: "You must not be
afraid of listening to the opinions expressed by non-party
workers and the PPF and of hearing from lime to time views
which are neither Marxist nor Communist." As a sign of his
increasing stature in the party, Kadar was chosen to head the
delegation sent to represent Hungary at the congress of the
Chinese Communist party.*
To support the more moderate line, Gyorgy Marosan also took
a prominent role during the pre-revolutionary period. As a
former left-wing Social Democrat, Marosan was counted on to
exercise influence over the dangerously antagonized industrial
working class. This line was spelled out by Marosan in Szabad
Nep on 19 August when he declared: "Life has belied the erron-
eous view which holds that there are irreconcilable differences
between Socialists and Communists."
13. Demands of the Nagy Faction
The strong pro-Nagy element spearheaded by liberal writers
now revealed that its goals were full rehabilitation of Nagy
and liberals who had supported him. They also demanded--and
received--full freedom of debate in the Petofi Club. Their
further objectives of political and economic liberalization
and participation in the government became apparent with the
passage of time. Taken in the context of Nagy's known opinions
* He left Budapest about 9 September and returned one month
later. Zoltan Szanto and Istvan Hidas accompanied him. All
three thus were absent from Hungary during the critical per-
iod of September and early October.
75
Nim=mmisliApproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
On 6 October, a startling outburst of nationalist senti-
ments occurred when, under government auspices, the remains of
Laszlo Rajk were solemnly reinterred in the national cemetery.
The ceremony turned into a mammoth demonstration for Imre Nagy.
This occurred on a holiday commemorating the execution of Hun-
garian generals as a result of the Russian invasion to crush
the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49. The dangerous implications
of such a demonstration must have been fully apparent to those
who staged it.
Budapest newspapers linked the demonstration with the con-
tinued tenure of power by Stalinists, i.e. Gero and his associates.
The trade union organ spelled out the warning: "History and
the people have already held a retrial. At this trial, those
who caused their death are accused."
From this point forward, the party ceased to be important;
the Hungarian nation took over command of events.
16. The Polish Example
The successful defiance by the Poles of the Soviet Commu-
nists stirred the rising flames of Hungarian nationalism. The
purge of Hilary Mine, the counterpart of Erno Gero as economic
czar during the Stalinist period, evoked the following comment
from the Budapest trade union newspaper Nepszava: "Our Polish
comrades do not hesitate to draw the necessary conclusions with-
out regard to persons involved, in removing obstacles to democ-
ratization." The bold challenge by Gomulka to Khrushchev on
19 October set the example for the Nagy faction in Hungary and
led directly to the national demonstration of 23 October which
sparked the revolution.
17. Nagy and Kadar Take Over
The climax followed rapidly. On 23 October, a student
demonstration honoring the Poles for their successful resistance
to the Kremlin developed into a full-scale nationalist manifesta-
tion which demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the restora-
tion of Imre Nagy to the premiership, a new government, free
elections and the return of the multi-party system of govern-
ment. Rioting broke out and continued into the following day.
Fighting began when AVH troops fired on the demonstrators and
Soviet troops stationed in Budapest entered into action to sup-
port the security forces. The revolution had begun.
78
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210 _
on the relative place of agriculture and heavy industry in the
economy and demands for full intellectual freedom voiced by
his adherents, the Nagy program by mid-September implicitly
called into question basic Communist doctrines and ties with
the Soviet Union.
It appears probable, nevertheless, that moderate elements
in the central committee were giving strong support to Nagy's
bid for leadership in the government, and that, in fact, a
coalition of moderates and liberals had come into existence.
The common interest of both factions lay in their demand for
political and economic policies suitable for Hungary, even at
the expense of weakening ties with the Soviet Union.
14. The Yugoslav Factor
The rapprochement of the Hungarian party with the Yugoslav
Communists, promised by Gero in his 18 July speech, hung fire
until mid-October.* It is true that the letter of apology for
"slanders" against Tito was by far the strongest sent by any Bloc
* The central committee resolution published on 23 July de-
fined the question of permitted variations in socialism in an
ambiguous fashion that would cover all eventualities:
Under specific Hungarian conditions of building socialism,
the party...does not lose sight for a moment of the fact
that it is ceaselessly strengthening the unity of the so-
cialist camp, its relations with the Soviet Union, the
countries of the socialist camp and socialist working
class movements throughout the world. For this reason,
the party once again intensified the struggle against
manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism and anti-
Semitism... The party is strengthening its ties with
the CPSU because both the CPSU and the HWP hold identical
views on every ideological question--in the assessment of
the international situation and the perspectives of so-
cialism.
76
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
party., Moreover,.the_appointment of Ferenc_Munnich, ex-ambassador
to the Soviet Union, as ambassador to Yugoslavia on 4
August placed in Belgrade an individual of sufficient stature
and past connections with Tito to handle the delicate relations.
Nonetheless, the actual meeting of leaders of the Hungarian
regime with Tito was long delayed. The cooling of Soviet-Yugoslav
relations, reflected in the 3 September circular letter from the
CPSU central committee to Satellite parties acted as a damper
to closer rapprochement. This circular warned the Satellite
central committees against adopting Yugoslav practices and
instead, instructed them to look to the Soviet party for their
example. Thereafter, the dramatic conversations of Khrushchev
and Tito at Brioni and Yalta gave impetus to Hungarian elements
favoring increased liberalization.
Resumption of relations became closely tied to the rehabilita-
tion of Imre Nagy, a symbol of genuine liberalization of Commu-
nist practices. Negotiations on both subjects appear to have
been conducted by Gero at conferences with Tito and Khrushchev
at Yalta (1 October).* When the Hungarian delegation led by
Gero and including Kadar, Kovacs, Apro and Hegedus finally left
for Belgrade on 14 October, Nagy's readmission to the party was
announced simultaneously in Budapest. At this point, however,
the question of Yugoslav relations was secondary to dramatic
internal developments in Hungary.
15. The Eve of the Revolution
Decisive steps to de-Stalinize the Hungarian regime were
taken in early October. while Gero and other top party leaders
were absent in the Soviet Union. These included the rehabilita-
tion of Imre Nagy, forecast in his defiant letter of 4 October
to the central committee announcing that he submitted to party
discipline but refused to make a further statement until full
and free discussion was permitted. On the same day, Istvan
Kovacs threatened to remove all individuals who would not adjust
to the liberalized party line. Concurrently high-level changes
were effected in the Ministry of Defense. The following day,
Vladimir Farkas was arrested.
* Note that Gero left for the Soviet Union on 8 September and
remained there for one month. He therefore was absent from
Hungary during the critical period.
77
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Confronted with this crisis, the party central committee
and politburo were called into hasty session on the night of
23-24 October. Panicky party leaders--presumably Gero--appealed
for Soviet aid against the revolutionaries on the basis of the
Warsaw pact. During the stormy all-night session seven Stalinists
were thrown out of the political committee (Hidas, Mekis, Kovacs,
Revai, Acs, Bata and Piros) and replaced by two moderates (Szanto
and Kobol) and one Nagyist, Losonczi. In the early morning hours,
Nagy was chosen premier. The following day--25 October--with
the fighting mounting in violencel-Erno Gero was deposed as party
first secretary and Janos Kadar elected in his place. The change
in leadership came far too late to affect events. The revolu-
tion_ continued in spite of the party leadership.
�
L. ..31% �
mi�ii..1=111.11..1.=ikpproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
POSTLUDE
DESTRUCTION OF THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS PARTY
(23 October - 4 November 1956).
The Hungarian national revolution of 23 October-4 November
destroyed the hard core leadership and subordinate organiza-
tion of the Hungarian Workers Party, physically destroyed the
old state security apparatus and proclaimed a neutralized Hun-
gary independent of Moscow. The rising was national in character,
anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, although Communist formations
and discipline contributed to its initial success. Many parti-
sans and underground fighters who had aided Soviet armies in
World War II (e.g. Colonel Pal Maleter and Major General Kovacs)
took arms against the Soviet troops. The cadres of the youth
organization formed the revolutionary committees of youth that
bore the brunt of the fighting.
1. Initial Co-operation of Liberals and Moderates in Support
of Revolution
The party leaders attempted in vain to control events.
At first, the moderates and liberals of the Hungarian party
worked together for reform and against the Stalinists. The
revolutionary coalition in the central committee on 26 October
called for the formation of a new government on the basis of
"the broadest national foundations" which would initiate nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union to settle the future relation-
ship of the two countries. The resolution further called for
the withdrawal of Soviet troops after the restoration of order.
It underlined the intention of the central committee and govern-
ment to defend the people's democracy, i.e., the Communist
regime, and it asserted that opponents of the regime would be
"annihilated without mercy."
In line with this policy, a seven-man committee was set
up to form.a.new party--the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party--
which would stand for "national independence and friendship
with all countries." This joint committee included Nagy and
his two closest adherents, Losonczi and Donath, the,old Bolsheviks"
Gyorgy Lukacs and Zoltan Szanto and, representing the moderates).
Kadar.
2. Increasingly Revolutionary Character of Nagy Government
In the new government of 27 October, Nagy again held the
premiership. The "moderate" Ferenc Munnich, former ambassador
to Yugoslavia, took over the critical post of minister of
interior, thus symbolizing the union of the remaining wings
of the party.
80
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: -(:)--1970-8702 C00966210
Nagy fm the outset took a more extreme position than the
moderates. On 28 October he declared that the bloody fighting
between revolutionaries and Soviet and AVH forces was due to
"mistakes and crimes" of the past ten years, and denied that
counterrevolutionary elements were behind the insurrection. He
acquiesced in the destruction of the one-party system of govern-
ment, the reformation of long-dissolved "bourgeois" parties and,
on 3 November, the organization of a cabinet in which there
were only two Communists--himself and his adherent Geza
Losonczi. He assented to the suspension of collectivization
(28 October) and abolition of the crop collection system (30
October). He promised free elections, the formation of workers'
management councils which had been set up throughout Hungary.
He permitted the revolutionary reorganization of the Defense
Ministry and the Appointment of revolutionaries (Maleter and
Kovacs) and ex-prisoners (e.g., Bela Kiraly) to top military
posts. On 1 November, presumably under the influence of extreme
revolutionaries and faced with the build-up of Soviet armies,
Nagy took the extreme step of proclaiming Hungary's withdrawal
from the Warsaw pact and asking for the neutralization of Hun-
gary under the protection of the United Nations. In an appeal
to all Hungarians, he declared that the people of Hungary
"desire the consolidation and further development of the achieve-
ments of the national revolution without joining any power blocs."
3. The "Moderates" Sabotage the Revolution
The "moderate nationalists" went along with the revolution
up to 2 November despite obvious misgivings. Kadar had repeatedly
warned against the rise of "counterrevolutionary elements," and
other moderates echoed his fears. The threat to Communism and
the Soviet alliance implicit in Nagy's increasingly revolutionary
moves led to their betrayal of the revolution. Possibly under
the influence of a second visit by Mikoyan and Suslov on 1 Novem-
ber, Kadar and Munnich took steps to form a new government.
On 4 November, under protection of Soviet troops holding
the important railroad junetion of Szolnok, Kadar announced the
formation of a "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government"
which included Ferenc Munnich as minister of the oombined'Ae:
fense and security forces and Gyprgy Marosan as ministercif
state. Several discredited "moderates" filled. the remaining.
posts in the small cabinet (Imre Horvath, Istvan Kossa, -Antal
Apro, Imre Dogei and Sandor Ronal). This government appealed
for Soviet aid against the revolution, thus giving the legal
pretense for the Soviet reconquest of Hungary.
81
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
3T7t1A-AZ.
4. Fate of Nagy and His Adherents
As Soviet armies moved into action on 4 November, Nagy
broadcast a despairing appeal for aid "to the Hungarian people
and the world." As Hungarians fought advancing Russian tanks,
Nagy and his closest associates fled to the Yugoslav embassy
for protection. The were later surrendered by the Yugoslays
on the basis of an agreement with the Kadar government calling
for their safety (21 November). Soviet troops violated the
understanding and carried Nagy and members of the group off to
Rumania where they presumably remain pending future Soviet
action.*
Soviet forces fought their way into Budapest against
desperate resistance; "complete liquidation of the counter-
revolution was under way."
5. Fate of the Stalinists
Of the former top Muscovites, Rakosi and Gero are believed
to be in the Soviet Union. The Kadar regime has stigmatized
them as "infamous leaders" and the trade-union newspaper has
called for their trial for "crimes committed against the Hun-
garian people." Their fate will depend on the Kremlin. Mihaly
and Vladimir Farkas and "many high-ranking officers of the AVH"
are in prison with Gabor Peter and Gyula Decsi while prepara-
tions for their trial are being made. Former high-level mem-
bers of the Rakosi-Gero clique who, like Rudolf Foldvari, sup-
ported the revolution are now termed "political chameleons and
careerists." Twelve high-ranking members of the clique were
* The following individuals took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy
and left it under terms of the 21 November agreement: Imre
Nagy, Geza Losonczi, Ferenc Janosi, Ferenc Donath, Sandor
Haraszti, Szilard Ujhely, Miklos Vasarhelyi, Julia (Mrs. Laszlo)
Rajk, Janos Szilagy and Gyorgy Fazekas. The following also
took temporary refuge there and are presumably covered by the
same agreement: Zoltan Szanto, Gyorgy Lukacs, Zoltan Vas, Peter
Erdes and Ferenc Nador. The communique of the Yugoslav State
Secretariat for Foreign Affairs stated that members of Nagy's
government first approached the Yugoslays on 2 November.
52
0.7,1
pproved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210
formally deprived of their positions by the government.* Lesser
individuals have been ordered to return to the occupations they
held before their rise in the party.
6. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
The present Hungarian Socialist Workers Party headed by
Kadar represents the last fragments of the center group of the
old Hungarian Workers Party which once numbered one million
members and now claims less than one hundred thousand. Its
leadership is composed of individuals who like Kadar were im-
prisoned by Rakosi or like Munnich were in the background
during the Stalinist era. Its second-level leadership consists
of a few hold-overs left alive and in the country by the back-
wash of de-Stalinization and revolution. Completely discredited
by its resort to violence against Hungarian workers which it
ostensibly represents, the party of Kadar and Munnich, torn by
dissension, will be condemned to act as the Kremlin dictates.
Kadar thus finds himself in the same position as Rakosi--a
dictator dependent upon Soviet troops for support--but without
the carefully trained Muscovite subordinates or well-integrated
party machine of Rakosi and completely without the optimism
that surrounded the early days of Communist domination of
Hungary.
* The Stalinists dismissed were: Erzsebet Andics, Lajos Acs,
Istvan Bata, Andor Berei, Andras Hegedus, Istvan Hidas, Erno
Gero, Istvan Kovacs, Bela Szalai, Laszlo Piros, Bela Veg and
Gyorgy Non.
83
Approved for Release: 2019/08/02 C00966210