THE SUEZ CRISIS- -A TEST FOR THE USSR'S MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY (REFERENCE TITLE: CAESAR V-A-56)

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00966205
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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-02361
• Publication Date: January 3, 1957

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SOVIET STAFF STUDY
THE SUEZ CRISIS--A TEST FOR THE USSR'S MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY
(Reference title: CAESAR V-A -56)
Dec:ETf Eo.
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3al.e: 0 3 OCT 1978
13 s C
By: 00
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contsinA classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its trAnsmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejuclical
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
Wzo,;7/7
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Soviet Staff
Office of Current Intelligence
Reference Title: CAESAR_V-A-56
SOVIET STAFF, STUDY
The Suez Crisis- -A Test for the USSR's Middle Eastern Policy
This study is a working paper. It attempts to identify
the major premises, motivations and objectives of Soviet
policy toward the Middle East since the spring of 1955. It
is circulated to analysts of Soviet affairs as a contribution
to current interpretation of Soviet policy. This particular
study is part of a series`prepared under the general title
"Project CAESAR", designed to ensure �the systematic examina-
tion of information on the major aspects of Soviet affairs.
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THE SUEZ CRISIS--A TEST FOR THE USSR'S MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY
Since the beginning of the Soviet Union's aggressive
diplomatic offensive in the Middle East in the spring of
1955, Soviet policy has sought to combine efforts to stimu-
late and exploit anti-Western ultranationalist pressUres in
the Arab world with attempts to forestall the possibility
of Western military intervention in the area, which the
Soviet leaders probably realized would be increased by their
new pro-Arab policy. The Middle East crisis precipitated by
Nasr's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which cul-
minated in the Israeli and Anglo-French attack on Egypt con-
fronted the Soviet leaders with the choice of accepting the
incalculable risks of direct Soviet intervention on Egypt's
side or acquiescing in the rapid destruction of the Soviet-
equipped Egyptian armed forces and the Nasr regime--the
main instrument of Soviet influence in the Near East. How-
ever, subsequent events, particularly the divergence between
American and Anglo-French policy, enabled the Soviet leaders
to escape this dilemma and offered new opportunities for in-
creasing Soviet prestige-and influence in the Middle East.
Basic Motivation and Aims of ,Soviet Middle Eastern Policy
The timing and motivation of the USSR's intervention in
Middle Eastern affairs stemmed in part from the desire of
the Soviet leaders to counter the major diplomatic defeat
represented by their failure to prevent the entry of a
sovereign West Germany into the NATO alliance. The ratifica-
tion of the Paris agreements by the French National Assembly
at the end of December 1954 brought to a close Moscow's five-
year battle to block Western efforts to incorporate a re-
armed West Germany into the Western defense system. The
principal objective of the Soviet offensive in the Middle
East was to outflank the NATO alliance and strike at the
foundations of its strategic power by depriving its members
of access to the oil fields, military, naval and air lases
of the Middle East, and by cutting the vital communications
link between Europe and Asia at Suez. A corollary aiM was
to encircle the members of the "northern tier" alliance in
the Middle East and to prevent the extension of this Western-
sponsored defense system southward to include additional Arab
states.
The politico-strategic concept underlying Soviet inter-
vention in Middle Eastern affairs envisaged the emergence
of a neutral bloc of ultranationalist, anti-Western Arab
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states which, with full Soviet support, would lead to the
complete destruction of traditional Western influence and
control from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. The Soviet leaders
found a ready instrument for advancing these Aims in the
ultranationalistic t chauvinism and zenophobia which was
sweeping the Arab world. They recognized, however,-that
this policy of exploiting Arab nationalism as a means of
striking at the political, economic and military strength
of the Western powers would carry increasing risks that
the West might attempt to restore its deteriorating posi-
tion in the Middle East by forceful action. They also
realized that their new pro-Arab line would inevitably ag-
gravate the Arab-Israeli conflict and that an outbreak of
hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors would
almost certainly lead to strong Western intervention.
The USSR attempted to evade this dilemma by reassur-
ing the Israelis, on the one hand, that it entertained no
hostile intentions toward their security and interests and,
on the other hand, by counseling the Arabs to exercise
patience and restraint. ,Until Israel attacked Egypt at
the end of October 1956, the Soviet government maintained
outwardly correct diplomatic relations with Israel. Even
during the period of high tension in the Near East in
July 1956, the USSR contracted to supply Israel with 40 per-
cent of its crude oil re uirements over the next two ears.
the USSR regarded the Arab-Israeli
dispute as "quite secondary" in comparison with freeing
the Arab countries from the "imperialist yoke." At this
same time, Soviet foreign minister Shepilov, during his
tour of the Near East, was urging the Arabs to avoid rash
actions and saying that war must be avoided at all costs
to prevent Western intervention.
First Phase of Soviet Intervention in the Middle East
Moscow's search for an opportunity to mount a counter-
offensive against the West quickly focused on the Middle
East situation which had been brought to a new crisis by
two events in February 1955. The first was the sharp ag-
gravation of historical and dynastic rivalries in the
Arab world produced by the conclusion of the Turkish-Iraqi
alliance on 24 February. The second was the threat to
Colonel Nasr's position as leader of the Egyptian revo-
lutionary regime posed by the heavy Israeli attack on Egyp-
tian forces in-the 'Gaza area on 28 February.
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The turning point of the USSR's Middle Eastern policy
was marked by an abrupt shift in March 1955 toward an anti-
Israeli and pro-Arab position in Soviet propaganda. Moscow
also made an arms offer to Syria at this time--the first
offer of military aid to an Arab state.
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The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 16 April 1955
was the first formal pronouncement regarding the new orien-
tation. It firmly aligned the USSR on Egypt's side of the
dispute within the Arab world by offering Soviet support for
those governments which opposed the Turkish-,Iraqi alliance.
It pledged to "defend" their freedom and independence and
warned that the USSR would take this issue to the United
Nations if the alleged Western pressure to induce other
Arab states to join the Baghdad pact persisted.
These opening moves were followed by the first arms
offers to Egypt which began in May, initially in response
to an inquiry by Nasr, and were repeated in June. They
were accompanied by offers of economic assistance, including
an offer to assist in building the Aswan High Dam. Shepilov,
then editor in-chief of Pravda, reportedly repeated the arms
offer when he attended the Liberation Day celebration in
Cairo in the latter part of July, and renewed the Aswan
dam offer.
Soviet overtures in the spring and summer of 1955
were directed mainly at Egypt, but Saudi Arabia and Syria
received similar offers. These were the three countries
most opposed to the Baghdad pact. Egypt finally signed a
five-year arms agreement with Czechoslovakia on 21 September
1955,
Moscow Adjusts to:the Impact of the New policy
Two clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces in
early November 1955 and an Israeli raid on Syria on 11 Decem-
ber were followed by. a bitter attack on Israel by Khrushchev
in a speech to the Supreme Soviet at the end of December.
This was the first time since the Palestine armistice in
1949 that a top Soviet leader had taken such a strong public
stand against Israel. The USSR had previously maintained a
marked aloofness from the Arab-Israeli dispute. Khrushchev
charged that Israel threatened its neighbors and had pur-
sued a policy hostile to them "ever since it came into being."
He implied that Israel was a mere tool of the "imperialist
powers."
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This denunciation of Israel reflected the impact which
the first Soviet bloc arms shipments to Egypt had on the
Near Eastern balance of power. The prospect of a rapid
strengthening of Egypt's military position alarmed Israel,
exacerbated border friction, and impelled Moscow toward a
stronger and more unequivocal pro-Arab position. �
With this prospect of increasing tension in the Near
East, Moscow became concerned about possible Western moves
to halt the arms race. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement
of 13 February 1956 condemned the communiqu�ssued on
1 February at the end of Prime Minister Eden's talks with
President Eisenhower in Washington as a scheme for the
United States and Britain to dispatch troops to the Middle
East against the will of the people involved in violation of
the interests of the Soviet Union.
This statement was the first major Soviet attempt to
commit the Western powers to the proposition that any
great-power actions regarding the'Middle East must be taken
within the framework of the UN Security Council, where the
USSR could exercise its veto to block Western moves which
it opposed. The statement specifically challenged the right
of the three Western powers to act under the Tripartite Decla-
ration of 1950. This Soviet insistefice that any Arab-Istgen- 42;
crs must4-be. handled 1) -thene-dbrXtY7C6iiiiltkt
The USSR also attempted to deter the West from taking
independent action by a propaganda campaign last spring
charging the West with "trying to create clashes between
Israel and the Arab countries in order to provide a pretext
for bringing their armies into this region." This public
campaign to inhibit Western freedom of action was accompanied
by private assurances to Arab governments of firm Soviet
support in the growing tension with Israel.
On the eve of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Britain,
the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 17 April
promising the "necessary support" for United Nations measures
to strengthen peace in the Near East. This statement again
denounced the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and warned that
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the "Soviet government considers illegal and inadmissible..0
attempts to use the Arab-Israeli conflict for interference
from without in the internal affairs of independent Arab
states or for introducing foreign troops on the territory
of the Near East."
At
the end of their talks with the British leaders, the Rus-
sians agreed to wording in the final communique which pledged
Soviet and British support for UN efforts to maintain peace
in Palestine. Soviet propaganda to the Arabs treated this
pledge as a Soviet diplomatic victory in that it induced
Britain to abandon the tdea of unilateral interference in
Near Eastern affairs.
The USSR and Nasr's Seizure of the Suez Canal
There is some circumstantial evidence that the USSR de-
liberately attempted to create a situation in which the
Western powers might decide to take the risk of withdrawing
their offers of financial assistance for the Aswan dam proj-
ect.. Since 1954, Moscow on many occasions had made known
to the Egyptian government its willingness to help Egypt
build the dam. As recently as 17 May 1956, Soviet ambassa-
dor Kiselev reportedly renewed this standing offer with the
observation that the USSR realized that the West might with-
draw its offer of assistance in view of Nasr's recognition
of Communist China the previous day. Shepilov is reported
to have elaborated: on this offer during his visit In in
mi 956.
he Soviet foreign Minister offered a $400;000';"06
sixty-year credit to build the Aswan dam.
One month later, however, Shepilov reversed his line by
publicly playing down on 14 July the importance of the Aswan
project and offering instead Soviet help for Egyptian indus-
trialization projects. Four days after the United States had
announced the withdrawal of its offer of a loan to help
finance the initial phase of the Aswan project, A. M. Ledov-
sky, counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, asked a
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State Department official whether the American decision was
not in fact based on the assumption that the USSR would not
build the dam if the United States withdrew.
The American and British announcements withdrawing their
loan offers were followed by at least three denials-by Soviet
spokesmen that the USSR had committed itself to support the
Aswan project. Moscow, however, did not close the door to
later negotiations for Soviet assistance and since that
time has reportedly renewed its assistance offer.
The USSR's first public reaction to Nasr's nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July came in the form
of Khrushchev's advice to the West to adopt a "quiet ap-
proach" to this problem, one which would soberly take into
account "the new circumstances and the spirit of the times."
Apparently anticipating a strong Western reaction, Khrush-
chev asserted that "there are no grounds for the aggrava-
tion of relations in the Mediterranean area and for the
fanning of hostility between states over the Suez Canal.�
Soviet officials evealed some
nervousness over
es ern
reactions.
The USSR's propaganda reaction to initial Western
moves was relatively moderate in tone and seemed to indi-
cate Moscow's concern to prevent the crisis from reaching
a point of Western military intervention.
� The Soviet leaders appear to have recognized immediately
that the future course of Western actions on Suez would be
largely determined by the United States position. In a con-
versation with Secretary Dulles in London before the opening
of the London conference on Suez, Shepilov said he was not
attempting to split the Western Big Three but that if dif-
ferences did exist between the United States and Britain and
France, the "United States and the USSR together might find
a way out of this crisis." Moscow was fully aware of the
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implications of the divergence between the US and its allies
on the best way to handle the Suez' issue, ThisAawatelTdssi,
which guided Soviet decisions throughout thecrisistlowas*
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London Conference August 1956
Shepilov's principal objective at London was to play for
time and to forestall the adoption of any decisions which the
West might use as a pretext for intervention. Moscow's un-
certainty regarding the measure of Western disagreement on
the question of using force to impose international control
of the canal
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The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 9 August ex-
pressed the position which the USSR adhered to at the con-
ference. It distinguished between freedom of navigation
through the canal "governed by the special convention of
1888" and the nationalization of the canal company, which
it called a "perfectly lawful action following from Egypt's
sovereign rights." It denied the competence of the London
conference to authorize "any decisions whatever" affecting
the canal.
Shepilov rejected Secretary Dulles' plan to place the
operation of the canal under an international board but
backed an Indian proposal for a consultative international
body which would not prejudice Egyptian ownership and opera-
tion,
onepliov aenounceo Tne appointment ()I -me live-nation menzies
committee to present the Western plan to Nagr but
advised the Egyptians that the committee should bt,AJUL-
teously received and told that the conference documents would
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be studied. He suggested that the period of study should be
"spun out" without replying and without official comment on
the London conference.
A Soviet-Egyptian arrangement for sending Soviet pilots
to Egypt for pilot service on the canal was worked out in
London by Shepilov and All Sabri. Moscow radio early in
September reported that Soviet ship pilots were preparing
to leave for Egypt.
The Soviet leaders apparently were well satisfied with
the outcome of the conference.
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Moscow Prepares for the Next Round
The Soviet government probably regarded the Suez Canal
Users' Association plan which Eden introduced to Parliament
on 12 September as a maneuver to force Egypt into committing
a provocation for Anglo-French military action. Eden had
warned that if Egypt interfered with SCUA, Britain and the
others concerned "will he free to take such further steps as seem
to be required either �through the UN or by other means for the
assertion of their rights."
Moscow's response to what it probably regarded as Brit-
ish and French preparations for a military showdown with
Egypt took the form of notes to London and Paris on 12 Sep-
tember which warned again that the use of force against
Egypt would carry the risk of an expanded war. The note to
the British government stressed the dangers of using force
in the atomic age, pointed out the damaging effect the use
of force would have on Western interests in the Middle East,
and appealed for a peaceful settlement of the dispute based
on the United Nations Charter.
These notes were followed by a Foreign Ministry state-
ment issued on 15 September on the eve of the Users' Associa-
tion conference in London. This statement went beyond pre-
vious pronouncements by linking for the first time any
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violation of the peace in the Near East in connection with the
Suez crisis with the USSR's own security and by officially -
calling for United Nations action. Bulganin chose the open-
ing day of the London conference to reply to questions sub-
mitted by Kingsbury Smith. He said the USSR was prepared
to take part in the conference with the leaders of _Egypt,
India, the United States, Britain and France to seek a solu-
tion to the canal problem.
In addition to its diplomatic and propaganda support,
Moscow took other concrete steps to aid Egypt. To alleviate
the acute shortage of canal pilots, it sent fourteen "volun-
teer" pilots to Cairo on 15 September. Early in September,
the USSR reportedly increased its arms shipments to Egypt
and sent more technicians.
At the UN Security Council sessions on Suez in the
first half of October, Shepilov maintained his rigid op-
position to the Western plan for international control but
appeared to welcome confidential talks between Britain,
France and Egypt as the best means of.gaining time and
limiting Western freedoe of action.
The Soviet Reaction to Israel's Attack on Egypt
The USSR's actions in the second half of October follow-
ing the UN Security Council's unanimous adoption of the six
principles of a Suez settlement suggest that the Soviet lead-
ers did not expect the outbreak of hostilities on 29 October.
By mid-October, the Russians apparently estimated that the
threat of Anglo-French military action had been almost com-
pletely removed and that the USSR, by its firm support of
Egypt's defiance of.Western demands, had considerably ex-
tended its influence and prestige throughout the Middle East
and Asia. They probably believed that the approval of the
six principles and the initiation of talks between Egypt,
Britain and France had placed Nasr in a strong position to
conduct prolonged negotiations which would sharply limit
British and French freedom to resort to force.
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Soviet propaganda, which
throughout the Security Council debate in the first half of
October had warned against Anglo-French action and alleged
American threats to use force, subsequently diminished both
in volume and violence of tone.
The initial reaction of the Soviet leaders was one of
great caution. They appeared determined to do nothing which
would commit them to any concrete action in a very confused
and fast-moving situation. According to press reports,
Khrushchev and Bulganin, attending a Kremlin reception for
the visiting Prime Minister of Afghanistan on 30 October,
told two Asian ambassadors that they were "gravely concerned"
by the Israeli attack and thought that the matter should be
immediately settled in the UN Security Council. The Soviet
delegate to the Security Council supported a United States
resolution in the 30 October meeting which called on Israel
to cease fire and withdraw to its own borders and asked all
UN members to refrain from using force in the area.
Molotov attempted to sound out American intentions by
suggesting to Ambassador Bohlen at the 30 October reception
that the United States could have prevented the Israeli
attack, adding that of course the United States had acted in
collusion with Britain and France. When Bohlen denied this,
Molotov said that Britain and France stood behind Israel
and wished to punish Nasr for nationalization of the canal.
The Soviet government was also careful to avoid making
any commitments to any specific course of action in its first
official pronouncement on 31 October. This statement merely
condemOd the three-power attack and called on the Security
Council to take "immediate steps to stop the aggressive
operations" and "ensure the immediate withdrawal of the inter-
ventionists from Egypt."
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Moscow continued to temporize and play for time by send-
ing letters calling for a
conference (4,. unv JuaLuuuus pwww.cm 1.11 attack on
Egypt and by delivering protests to Britain and France on
4 November against their closing parts of the Mediterranean
and Red Seas to commercial shipping in violation of the
1888 Convention.
The USSR also took immediate measures to avoid incidents
with Anglo-French invasion forces.
On 5 November, however, the day the first Anglo-French
forces landed in Egypt, the Russians were ready to act, con-
vinced apparently that the divergence between the United
States and Britain and France was genuine and that the Nasr
regime and its Soviet-equipped armed forces were threatened
with destruction. Bulganin sent threatening notes to Britain,
France and Israel which contained the warning that the Soviet
Union was "fully determined to crush the aggressors and re-
store peace in the East through the use of force."
This language was a piece of calculated ambiguity in-
tended to convey the impression that the USSR was making a
threat of unilateral action against Britain and France unless
they abandoned their action against Egypt. The Soviet For-
eign.Ministry press officer later issued a "clarifying"
statement that the "we" referred to "the Soviet Union and
other members of the United Nations."
The same day, Bulganin sent a proposal to President
Eisenhower for joint action by American and Soviet forces,
under UN authority, to halt the operations in Egypt. Shep-
ilov sent a letter to the president of the Security Council
setting forth a resolution embodying Bulganin's proposal.
The council, however, refused to place the resolution on
its agenda.
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surrender.
the USSR assured Egypt of support in order to
AubJ-stance and forestall any compromises or
maar b auviber, All
banri, told an American official in Cairo on 6 November
that conversations with the Russians in Moscow and Cairo
had convinced him that the USSR was prepared to "go all the
way" even if it risked World War III.
PruP49,1,KOPId
that "the n:iiiiiand ':.creditvtiStwune
USSR are already engagedIkoir4EgyptAgmbehalleAandlAhatietheo
USSR "if needed lvill-�sureiyogagemiarr against0431411tWite-i&
and France. Khrushchev, however., qualified this /statement #
by adding that "now it is the-diplomatic battle whereskill
and wisdom are needed." The Soviet party chief was en-
couraged in his bravado by the Anglo-French declaration of
a cease-fire in Egypt oi 6 November. _ _
The sequence of events, however, placed the USSR in a
position to claim that Bulganin's threatening notes had com-
pelled Britain and France to declare the cease-fire and
that it was Moscow that saved the Arab world from imnerialigt
aggression.
Post Cease-Fire Phase
The cease-fire opened a new phase in the Suez conflict
and created new opportunities for Soviet moves to win fur-
ther Arab favor. Moscow's immediate objective was to bring
about by nonmilitary means the early withdrawal of the
three-power forces from Egypt. It sought to increase pres-
sure on the British and French and to impress the Arabs by
announcing on 10 November that if the three powers did not
withdraw, the "appropriate authorities of the USSR will not
hinder the departure of Soviet citizen volunteers who wish
to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for
their independence." This was the first time since the
attack on Egypt that the USSR had publicly threatened to
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send volunteers to the Middle East unilaterally or take any
action outside the framework of joint measures with other
UN members.
The fact that the Soviet leaders waited until it was
reasonably certain that hostilities would not be renewed
suggests that they hoped to avoid having to make a decision
whether they would actually send volunteers. They probably
estimated that, short of direct Soviet intervention, there
was no way they could bring any appreciable military as-
sistance to Egypt which would decisively affect the outcome
of renewed fighting. The volunteer threat, therefore, ap-
pears to have been largely bluff designed as a propaganda
weapon to exert pressure on Britain and France. Yuri Zhukov,
an editor of Pravda, reportedly told in
early December that the threat to semi vulup�ee.m,. Lo bgyp
was a complete bluff which the USSR would not be able to use
again.
The volunteer threat was followed by another round of
notes on 15 November deklanding that Egypt be indemnified by
Britain, France and Israel for material losses. The notes
made clear that the USSR believes the UN Emergency Force
will be unnecessary after the withdrawal of fnrpian fnrncaa
By the end of November, Moscow had turned its primary
attention to Syria, where it suspected that the Western pow-
ers, along with Turkey and Iraq, were preparing to intervene
to overthrow the present leftist regime in Damascus. A
strong Soviet propaganda build-up designed to deter Western
intervention was accompanied by confidential warnings,
apparently intended to reach Western governments, that if
Turkey should attack Syria, the USSR would immediately
attack Turkey, which would mean the beginning of World War
Moscow backed these diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers
by concluding its first direct arms agreement with Syria
the end of November. This deal will include jet aircraft and
antiaircraft guns. Moscow agreed, moreover, to supply Syria
with 160 Soviet training personnel but was not willing to
provide technicians "to fight with the equipment" as requested
by Syria.
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Future Policy in Middle East
The outcome of the three-power action against Egypt has
probably increased the Soviet leaders' confidence that they
can proceed vigorously to exploit the Middle East situation
without undue risk. They are moving ahead with a re-equipment
program for Egypt's armed forces which may go beyond replace-
ment of lost equipment. The Cairo government has provided
the Soviet military attach�ith an estimate of future mili-
tary aid requirements.
The USSR will probably seek to make increasing use of
Syria as an important instrument of its anti-West, anti-
Israel policy. The first shipment of Soviet military equip-
ment to Syria under the November arms agreement arrived in
the port of Latakia on 13 December on a Soviet freighter and
included at least ten aircraft. Recent bloc activities in
the Middle East have included arrangements for additional
arms shipments to Yemen and for the arrival of Soviet and
Czech advisers in that country.
While proceeding with these lines of action, Moscow
probably will seek to gain'credit for easing tensions and
forestalling further fighting in this area. It moved to
ease Western suspicions of Soviet intentions by issuing a
statement on 8 December withdrawing the implied threat of
10 November to send volunteers to fight in Egypt.
Moscow appears to have a strong interest in encouraging
a continuation of Arab-Israeli tensions as the principal
lever of its Middle East policy. It will seek to exploit
these tensions and Arab hostility toward Britain and France
to block Western efforts to bring about an early settlement
of the Palestine problem. Soviet representatives at the
United Nations, according j have been
constantly urging the Arabs to insist on the most favorable
terms for a Palestine settlement. Moscow may press the
Arabs to adopt an uncompromising position on partition lines
and refugees based on the 1947 United Nations resolutions.
The Russians probably will also urge Egypt to demand
terms for a Suez settlement even more favorable than those
outlined in the UN Security Council's six principles.
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Moscow can be expected to demand the immediate-withdrawal
of the UN Emergency Force from Egypt as soon as the three-
power evacuation is completed. Soviet propaganda has been
charging that the "imperialists" are attempting to use these
troops to impose international control on Suez and a general
Palestine settlement on the Arab states.
All of these various lines of action will serve the fun-
damental Soviet aims of widening the cleavage between the
Arab world and the West and drawing Egypt, Syria and even-
tually other Arab states into a position of growing dependence
on the USSR.
With the precipitate decline of British and French influ-
ence in the Middle East, the USSR recognizes that the United
States will be its only,serious rival in the future struggle
for power in this area. The Soviet leaders probably believe
that a strong anti-Israeli line will be one of their most
effective weapons in this competition. They probably cal-
culate that a threatening Soviet posture toward Israel will
compel the United States to.take up a position as defender
and guarantor of Israel against hostile Communist and Arab
pressures. This position, in the Soviet view, would make it
increasingly difficult for any Arab government, no matter how
well disposed toward the United States, to be identified with
American aims and interests in the Middle East. Moscow has
already encouraged a belief among the Arabs that it favors
the eventual elimination of Israel. Izvestia published an
article on 29 November entitled "The Road to Suicide" which
declared that "the hatred of the Eastern peoples for Israel
aroused by her brigand attack on Egypt is so great that. ..it
raises the question about the very existence of Israel as a
state."
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