SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00962939
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: April 30, 1979

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Although Brazil is not likely to accept, France appeiiii:
;Seriami ahoutoffering a complete space technology
transfer al reement that could have significant military i
. . i 1 1
,.i... pOtential.
.46p-Seemr�
SI SIMR 79-000
30 AprIl 79
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into costly serious i
iime' the:Ty a c,e
usifh
iheIgal!.0 ' belieie tr,a,` sense 0
space program
' offerI
fr
If accepted comprehen-
sive B France's, 0001d result
. .46.6 'ffIreeine :10 Brazil technology a- ; transfers of Spacei,:41,
in ve space
itio4 tr4i unlikely
'00hriolod, OP!! Although
�e, -s .utility to Tush:!
t of questionable
'eeh lOir:N6" t.11P that . t. no ,� ,to
a Brazilian
' the terms space narimiwott appeal1, French Pr,91"s!
national
withare tom'Bcompatible.desire for technological
independence
ram! perhaps could carry out an independent
, = ballisticinissile effort, derived from the French SLV '
o , , , 1
1 technology, by the late 1980s. The critical constraint I'
iOn he development of a Brazilian ballistic missile
would be the guidance-System and reentry-vehicle [ (b)(3)
technology.
ven if Brazil develops a; ballistic missile, the potential �
or development of a compatible nuclear warhead is
imited: ' I, ,, ; ; ( ,1 , , i : , � ' ' ' , i . I ' i(b) 3)
�,
."Brazil, even if it is willing to abrogate international
nuclear sideguards, still could not have sufficient
plutoniuM for a nuclear device before the mid-1980s. 'Id
� Brazil could not develop a nuclear warhead for �
ballistic missile before the late 1980s at the earliest
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roved
.Discusl
,
Proposed Agreementi ; 1
The French refer to this proposed egreemert as a spact
. technology agreement� although the !cope of the ;
technology to be transferred has not yet been defined.
As a result, there are ti,ettraber of large uncertainties
associated with its potential, impact. In particular, we
do, not know which systems and subsystems of the
; satellite and launch vehicle will eventually be Produced
,
Brazil and Which wilIbeOpplied by France: The .
\ :I fail range of iMPlicatieniiPiesentec. here is largely a
�1,,i ' result of these' broad, iiir'siiitintiCi.
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' The resulting SLV, however, will not be capable of
launching significant satellite payloads. The payload ,
capability will be limited in weight and volume to
scientific and shall applications satellites. In addition, ,
applications satellites requiring advanced sensor tech-
nology would farther increase the satellite technology �
transfer requirements
ti
The SIN program Would provide Brazil with a
significant tialiistie missile potential. A jointly up-:
graded versien:of the French Diamant-class SLV,
which is thetyPe of launch vehicle being considered,
could Provide a basis for a short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM) or possibly a medium-range ballistic missile !
(mRpm). If, in fact, French technologies and facili-
ties should come to Brazil, the French Would have little
influence thereafter on their application. Successful;
absorption Of this technology would continue to en-
hance Brazil's regional prestige. Although no immedi-
I
ate threat, this development could generate regional
anxieties in the long term. There appears to be no need
for such a complete technology package, other than i
Brazil's desire for technological independence
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Methadon', and Reglonalimpact
'1e do not etheiethatBrazil interest in tinderta -
ing a costly 'Oitee program at this time.i The outgoing .
administratioltof President Ernesto Geisel Was
scarcely ifl a position to COMMit Brazil to such a Major
effort. The new administration of Arne Figneiredo is
finding it necessary to concentrate,on 'domestic eco-
nomic and PeliticakprObleMii, and most likely will be
,
major foreiebadventure.
tiLt I
The, liovert'dneniViou14, find it diffieult to justify a
space program, ,because Brazilian policy,makers could
not Present theiPregrain as a solution to any over-
'would be viewed as al'
, .
Whelining'nititinalpreblenis..thilike the nuclear pro-
gram, which unveiled against the background of
.i
teething, Brazilian energy .crisis, a spice program !
addresses 09,Fiii,at- "'tied 'that Would,.
, see to rall5i, support
1, iill'Ill!lilii'
Moreover, the'Britizilian domestic PolitiCal scene is now '
more complicated than at any time in recent years and,
at the very' leiii; decisions of such Magnitude will need
more broad-based support than before. The military ,
reginie is nsnv the role of '
nuclear program is now receiving a great deal of publi
criticism and, because of escalating cost and salmis
criticism, there is the Very real prospect that the, .'
program will be scaled down; although by no means
eliMinated. At a time when they are having to shave
the cost!of the nuclear program, Brazilian officials.,:
would find it very difficult to enter into a Major space
technology transfer pro ram that ultimately Could cos
'
More than $100 million.
; I ,
Bu6 considerations do not perinanently,ruleout
imissile program, however, since there is no question
, that its acquisition Would fit well with Brain sense o
I'national Pride mid destiny. Indeed, as is the ease with
the acquisition of the complete nuclear fuel
1,man)i view such a capability as another Of the ;1
benchmarks that Brazil must pass in its march io
Gres4 Power status. Brazil conceivably could still be
interested in a space Program, if only to avoidi
foreclosing the option of ham its Own independent
WeepOnS launch capability.
,
,
For Brazil, which faces no serious military or other
:sceurItY threat from neighboring countries the !
tar), application of nuclear and space technology '
, probably is seen as something to prepare; f)r eventnally,
on a Contingency basis, but not as a goal to pnisue on a
priority basis. While such application of sPace technOP
ogi naturally enters the think; g of Brazilian ; I
policirmakers, it doe not appe. : to be the uppermost
consideration at this time. Brazil repeatedly has
publicly disavowed any potential military apPliCatiOn
of itsinuclear program, and the Brazilians clO not H.i
, a r:to have any weapons development program
under, way. Moreover, Brazil's nuclear programfia .
already lagging well behind what was initially planned
and the Brazilians recognize that it will be a long iime
before they can even think of having a warhead.
much less one deliverable by missile. The qlso
recognize that, even with a major agreement, it would
bea long time�the late 1980s�before they could
have in indigenous missile with a nuclear warhead' '
midi for testing i
clians in 4enal deeiSleitinakingand,'While civilian .
Inputs wilinetl`rieCeisarilY be decisive, ! any Major new
undertaking to be subject to considerably more
public scrutiny and debate. Indeed; the vaunted
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If Brazil were to deCide to go ahead with an agreemint ,TeChnlesii Impact
with France it is' hillikely thit tiriythini would be
formalized before lai'l9,79. This Would give the new , ! Spice Program .
preisdent time to aSaiiii CarefilllYthe Brazilian domes- , :Brazil has had an active space program since 1961.
�! I.
'tie ccne before betii involved in the kind Of The cooperating civilian and military institutes have
CoMmitment that ht iittPlied in a illrazilian7French ::been able to develop a series of small sounding rockets.
'spate program. A OCiaiontolaCqUire sPaCe technology The technical knowledge offered by the French !Mild
,, adaptable tO militarilittaa would almost certainly draw ,.. , be new and not all could be absorbed quickly, ! � ; .
strong critidism ocil'!raiil from Argentina' and other., especially liquid-propellant booster technology and .
. ! . �10,1,4, , , , . i H
,.
Latin American ", Oriel., kis eilhally:certain, how- , ' guidance-system and satellite manufacturing technol
evOr; th this critiCia'''' Woulei have little, if any, ,' ..':c1Y. If the French moved to make the facilities and :
impact. II, ' 'I ! :. .' techniques 'available to Brazil as soon as possible, it ,
:t;
probably wo' uld still be the mid-1980s before Brazil
:Before signing a; spa teChn logyitra fer agreement,. . cottld produce an inchgenous SLV.
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Brazil would try' id letiiinvWonii sPecifying itate-of- - '! ! ! I,
:the-art technologY and the transfer orris much , I: Brazil has developed a series of small solid propellant
' 11 iexpertise sislpossible i% he Brazilians it a later time ; sounding rockets : Sonda I, Sonda II, and Sonde Ill, :
i 1 !
Caine to vie%i this pki�ar French SLV technology as ,; The largest of these. the Sonda III, can carry a 50-14
'basically Obsolete eri Seecind elaSS1, they Wiiiiild probably :, paYload to about 500 km altitude. A much larger 1
,
quickly late intereS ti"Fhitheintere:i the r need for I ' sounding rocket, the Sonda IV, has been in develop-
substantive
, i . 11 .11i, . ; .., , i , , .1.1
;1.
Istdistantive And dem Strative technologY transfer I' , ment since 1975 Initially Brazil thought it might be
1 'I. . i
probably, would Prieluile 'any agreement to have ' I, ! :- able to use the Sonda IV later as the second and third
, France simply pritifede'lahnch serVices or Brazilian ! ,' Stages of an SLV. This idea apparently is t of the � .' ;1
I Satellite. Such se' 'Ci4e:re available eBeWliere and ii: 'ii . broader 'French proposal being considered
have not interested Brazil to ciateiTheBriziliana I
, , �
probably would net !'Oetilbe satisfied w'ith'a TturnIceji Although motors for Brazilian rockets are cast in I 1
i
operation" bn !gib 1041tcilities,$ne would' insist on IIi facilities in Brazil, the propellants reportedly are I
a,pioisilii, l'itti)Iiicli iSnill ahnd lithheh facilities a hired from Italy. The largest motor currently 11
, . 1 .0 1p
i
itransfer T preduced IS the first stage of the Sonda III (0.55:meter "
on their
agreeMent.iThi.iid.tgir!elo for tAY11 e,;enp�ein?cleace ha St r'l: :, 1 in diameter and 3 meters long). French-supplied
, charaCterized tier; ng and,:atitiMes, trying searCh for' ;1: technology Probably would help Brazil increase the 1
, soPhisn 6 . )
ilitce ted, ntiClet,i1,teco,iiino' ,194Y.;!trind there is even; � 11' motor diairieter to 1 meter with some increase in
ioiso !I 1
ou d a ply to space technel- � length. Brazilian roci-ets currently do not have thrhst
ogif as, Weili Illt ,' i 1101 vector centrol. The scondary-injection thrust vector !
�
7,1',11'.!'"0 1.! , ..''l ' '!' ri'i! I I. ;1, control offered by the French will be adequate for the,
, , i . ,
This Brazilian cii a 'inititn technology, tram- j 1 upixr stitg application, but Brazilian production of II 1..
.. , I 1.1
eitn. a also precittoean agreementnoW,,becatise of �"i , Sonic of 'the components may not be acquired quickly.1' I:
I Brizilts Miestienithie bilitY toiahserb this technnlogy.
.0ne ot BMA's iniiii46iibeths in the rritteh publicized i 1.. ,::1,; ,' .� I " ;!.' I �'' ' 1 -
..,! .1 , - _1
,-'; nuclear agreementW th ! ....,1.t Germ' anY.is the pro4ision .1 The like"' a liquid propellant booster�for the first r'!
;Of technical knowledge, inereli Gernian,!-manufac7 istage�would be completely new to the Brazilians1,�
., I
ii ' tired equipment: ere have been numerous indica- ',. ! They hitlye not worked with production or storage Of
i: , tit i
'tions that the BM ilian4level Oft expertiie simily is no liquid propellants, nor have they any background in
i'.4.1, � L.... .1 . � 0 !
4,.iiiiiiicient to swot ii Much cia they want at the pace !. ,' production of liquid -propellant engines. For Brazil tit ,
thy ire den ten& 1 ! , !
haVe, an indigenous liquid-roopulsion capability. a
I 1, comprehensive transfer af this technology would be
neceuary,tncLu4ig facilities for tests, productien,land
I launching I
.JupvLivI.
Si, S1MR 79-004J
:, 30 April 70 , !
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a has no i igeinou satellite development��
� capability. It has developed sounding rocket IrSiyloa
Including simil'itelenietrceliiiickages, However,
order, for Brazil 'to be able to Prodinie its own Satellite
all phiseii4t4iiai6 development Would have to bel;r.
1; acquired, infeh: as basic design techniques, test and tit'
production 4Ciiiiiel4I'and'teChnologies for Production
of the bask fchi4onants. Forlexperimentalhi simple:
scientific satellites, these technologies could 'be a ',I
sorbed within years!. Fizii; Satellites of greeter
, _
complexity, no real Brazilian expertise coma be
,
!:.deve loped in lessthan five tn:10 years
emll; the SLVand satellite technology offered by ;!
ranee probably could be absorbed in: five, to '10 years.:
he technology for solid-propellant motors and liquid
pioPellantiand!iiquid-propellant engines Could be
absorbed without major difficulty. However, produc-
"� tion Of:some:PeOialiied,COniponenti.Will require 'r
1 ,
Icontioued French assistance.; This is particularly the
ilcase with thelgindance-syitein and Satellite teChnol
� ,I,OgY;'Where editiPOneatS renire precision' manufactitr4 ,
; . i
;
mg techniques not aireany present n brazil.,
Historically, such techniques have not been rapidly.
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assimilated in any Country i
,
:1Brazil has no ballistic missile capability at this time. It
has developed itl;geries of small artillery rockets based ! ''
ori its own sounding rockets. The e design and Production
, 'of the artillery rockets are caiiriediOut by the same
.Hillpi ,,
institutes that handle the soundo4 rockets.
i il,,q, � ., i 1 , 11 Ai!, 1 il ,'1. �.t.i' I ,,
1 ' ;,' �,,ii, . ' !:
The 'greatestr cern' from the USpolicy viewpoint is i
.
'the Possibility that Brazil Mignt,tieglyen the capability,
, to develop develoP a ballistici,inii4iiiellis i result, of the space
agreement.Tni possibility does e iiii!aithoUgh some
other critical 0.61tiOlogi6-Hthnie applicable to weap-
ons ilia only�would have to be acquired or developed. ,
'The propulsion system of the SLV would have direct :
, .,, . 1, , 1.1 1 ., ., i! .1,.,,..
application to 111,0811mm missile. IfIthe guidance system'
'were to be i'iidciiiciii in firlizA it iSo would have some:
direct application. Technologies fin. reentry-vehicle I
design and materials would still needio;be developed.' !
' There is also a iltaiii'ibiti4', that tfie structure of the SLV
would heed to be Vviodifiiid!iillbrdeit to itecept the likely
increase in payload weight. 1 ,
,
�
�PaylOad-Range Curve for Possible �
Brazilian ,SLV Derived Missile System'
'
i I j
, 1,000 ;2,000 3,000 4,0001 5,000;
t Range (km) ; I
Tor .a theoretical three-stage. 50,000-kg SLV capable '
of placing a 300-kg payload into a 700-km circular orbit.
The upgraded Diaman�-class SLV could be a basis for
the development of a ballistic missile. The figure
depicts the range and Payload estimates for a theoreti-
cal missile sy%tenn based on an SLV capable of placing
a 300-kg sateilite into a 706-km circular orbit. '
-.However, beyond the development of a warhead that
.Would!fit the weight and .,olutine constraints, Brazil;
would, as ai already noted, have to (1) develop a suitable
reentry Vehicle, (2) possibly make significant modifi-
;:.catinni to the SLV structure to support the increased
payload weight, and (3) acquire or develop a suitable
,guidance system. Any indigenously produced Missile ;
could not be available before the late 198
i
The
propulsion system of the proposed SLV, including
its propellant, could be suitable for a ballistic missile..
� Although it might be desirable to have an
:.all-solid-
propellant system for greater mobility and storability,
the combining of liquid- and solid-propellant stageS.,
could still Still Provide a viable missile. However, the
liquid-
propellant stage would make the missile less Mobile,
create some additional storage problems, and imPede
the missile system reaction time:
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' Excluding the Warhead, the,guidance-system techrivl-
� dgy probably is the most critical. The type and quality
of the guidance system have a direct impact iinnact on the '
tacchiacy and reliability Of An VieaPed aytiterril. A,
,command guidance system, while suitable for SLVs, is
not desirable for a ballistic missile, because of its
- susceptibility to in et-retch e.iiInertial systems, how- '
everire applicable to both Therefore, any weapons '
: peteritial that the future SINI,ItnightthaVewilf, be
'dire4tly affected by the tipelind quality Of guidance
� system made available by the French.
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�
Nuclear ,WeaponsI,Poteniial
Brazil has very little indigenous nuclear
Comprising only basic research at several ',research
it
, centers: In particular, Brazil has no capability to
Produce the Essilelmateriati*iential for nuclear'
Weapons, Or to construct fissile material prod"ct.na
1' facilities. The comprehensive, nuclear agreement which
, Brazil signed with West Germany in June 1975 &mid
give Brazil such capabilities the accord includes '
Plants both for uranium enrichment and for spent-fuel
ti
reprocessing.
i I
� , :! 4 ' 11.!
C 'enrichment Plant has been the subject of heated,
debate in Brazil, because of the cost and because ,
Brazilian scientists feel that Brazil is a guinea Pig for
the unproven pecker jet-nozzle enrichment terChnol,
(Jo.' The plans now call for construction of only a
small series of enrichers�not enough to 'Produce even
reactor fnel4by11.98Z",la d!Of a small commercial
plant by 1989. The Con'iM6ic;ial plant, 'even if it is built,H
� will be under strict safeguards and could not he Used to ti
produce weapon-gradenia14iai*Ithoni 'inajni. Plant
modification or batch ieeeling Of material, either of . I
� which would he an obviohs, abrogation Of iaternaticinal
� safeguards. It may be possible for Eiruil to design and i
build an independent jet-nozzle plant by the late
, 1980s; but any such facility built before 1994'llsio be
� covered by international aafeguards, and the difficulty
�of hidi a such a facility would diacouralia clandestine
:project
; 'The Becker jet-nozzle enrichment process, which 'S 'to besupp ied
� by West Germany, ' viable bei;aneconomica process for uranium
enrichment ' I ,1
�
'}
A pilot spent-fuel reprocessing plant is now scheduled
for completion in 1984, with a larger plant probably to
come in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Thus far,
however, not even a site has been chosen for the pilot
plant. Nor is it at all certain that West Germany ever
will deliver the Plant. If the plant should indeed be
built, it would take several months to produce suffi-
cient plutonium fora nuclear device, even if the entire
output of the plant were diverted to such an effort.
Such diversion, {again, would be an clovious abrogation
of safeguards. If Brazil were willing to accept the
consequences of such abrogation, it possibly cou d have
enouah plutonium for a nuclear device by 1985
We have no reason to believe that Brazil presently has .
a nuclear weapons design program. However, despite
its lack ofinucleari experience, there is little doubt that
Brazil has the basic technical ability to design a simple:
implosionidevice, if a decision is made to do so, and to .
manhfactUre it if and when plutonium becomes
available.1Development of the device into a weapon in :!
the 500- to 1,000-kg class suitable for delivery by a
ballistic missile would he a much more demanding
task but not necessarily beyond Brazil's capabilities.i
iWe are net no in a position to offer realistic estimates ,
as to how long such development might take. Given the
fissile material sithation of Brazil, it is clear that a
usefiil weapon could not be available before the late
1980s at the earliest. We very much doubt that Brazil .
would undertake development and deployment of ;
im losionwea n'a without at least one nuclear test.21
,
The task of developing weapon would be greatly simplified and
the test requirement possibly obviated if Brazil could pursue gun-
assembly designs. Such designs are pointless for Brazil, however, is
long as highly enriched uranium is not available there in uantit ---a
condition not likely to obtain for the foreseeable future
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