JFK Case: THE CALIFANO PAPERS: JOINT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF SELECTED JCS PAPERS RE US POLICY TOWARD CUBA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00940098
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 199
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2023
• Case Number: F-2023-01516
• Publication Date: June 9, 1997

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June 9, 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW � 2nd floor � Washington, DC 20530
[phone] � Fax [phone]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
�
�Stewart P. Aly IN THIS DOCUMEIStiond James R. moore, Jr., us.A.
Associate Deputy General Counsel Information Management Officer,
Office of General Counsel DCSPER (DAPA-Da) ,
Department of Defense 300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
, 1600 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0300
Washington, DC 20301-1600
Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano's Army.
Papers under the MC Act
Gentlemen:
The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califon�. The files date
principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califon� served as Army General
Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been
deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were
recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities
related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be
equities of numerous military entities in the Califon� papers as well as equities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information
Agency, and others.
Deadlines
Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of
September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
records.' We have slated the Califizno papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997
meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a
prompt and efficient review of the Califon� papers.
'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may
be able to revisitthe schedule proposed below. _
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair � Henry F. Graff � Kermit L. Hall � William L. Joyce - Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
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� Messrs. Aly and Moore
June 9, 1997
Page 2
Preliminary Review of Califano Papers
The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: fist, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already area part of the JFK Collection;
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, the Califon� papers contain equities of
numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral
process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.' Thus, the logistical problem in
declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of. the records, but the number
�
of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason,
and for the short time-line on Which we are now operating, we believe that there is in
urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
Proposal
In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califon�
papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23,
1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califon� papers be concurrently present for
a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
equities in the records, declassify them, and simply handthern across the table to other
agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
each other and quickly to resolve questions.
Because the Califon� papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6
meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all
agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities In the records and to make
determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the
'Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days
reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other
agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked
energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same
pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before
the August deadline arrives.
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Messrs. Aly and Moore
June 9, 1997
Page 3
Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
take the responsibility for contacting all non-militiuy agencies with equities in the
records while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to
be present.
We are, of cotuse, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
have. However, because the dock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
plan that will provide all agencies with equities in the Califano papers to have an
opportunity to review and declassify their equities.
I look forward to discussing this issue with you.
Attachment
cc Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
Richard S. Werlcsman, USIA
William Leary, NSC
Carol Keeley, FBI
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JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)
Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from
1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time
was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or
letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes
contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.
Representative Topics:
(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs�the
"Cottrell Committee") meetings on future US. policy toward Cuba. These
documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings,
minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at
meetings of the ICCCA.
(2) Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the US. military in the event of
a Cuban uprising.
� (3) Psychological warfare against Cuba.
(4) Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba.
(5) Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.
�(6) Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.
(7) Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and
suggestions for possible future actions.
Apparent Equities:
Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities,
usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated
that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC,
60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small
percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.
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JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962
and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical
understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be relevant to the assassination.
Topics:
(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba.
(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
paramilitary operations against Cuba. '
(3) Cuban coup planning.
(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
(6) US. military strength levels in Vietnam.
Apparent Equities:
Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document�usually
State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it isptepared
to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence dertAssification review.
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June 9, 1997
Stewart F. My
Associate Deputy General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1600
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW � 2nd Floor � Washington, DC 20530
[phone] � Fax: [phone]
ft
OS.,ECTION TO
.L.�SSIFIC;:ZIC:N AND/OR
RELEASE OF C;A NFORMATION
.:-HrS DOCUMENT �
Mr. Edmund McBride- - � -
Chief, Information Management
Division. �
Joint Secretariat
Joint Staff �
The Pentagon, Room 2B917
Washington, DC 20318-0400
Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS
Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central-Files:
under the PK Act
Gentlemen:
The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
dPristallify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the
JCS Central Piles, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The
files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during
searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division,
Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRI3 staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that
all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical
understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of
the records, which primarily pertain to US. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam
policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of
numerous military entities in these papers, as well as equities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.
Deadlines
Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of
September 30,1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
reconis.1 We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6,1997 meeting.
'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
September 30,1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may
MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair � Henry F Graff � Kermit L. Hall � William L. Joyce � Anna K. Nelson
ExEcume �macron: David G. Marivell
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Messrs. My and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 2
The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt
and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and
Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.2
Ptsliminwy Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Pint Staff Central Files
The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, these papers contain equities of numerous .
military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard refenal process, would
be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the
records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that
will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short
time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to
make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
Proposal
In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers
of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to
schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies
with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a
declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.
2The Joint Staff's Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated
February 6,1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located�
namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund
McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this
statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for
declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB
staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute
selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.
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Messrs. My and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 3
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equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hancithem across the table to other
agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
each other and quickly to resolve questions.
Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting,
we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies �
with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If- the Joint Staff and the
Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military..-
entities to be present
We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or 'suggestions that you might
have. However, because the dock is ticidng, it is important that we promptly develop a
plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have
an opportunity to review and dpelannify their equities.
I look forward to discussing this issue with you.
Si
T. J
Gen
Aftachment
cc Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noting, State
William Leary, NSC
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JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of molds of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemrdtzer,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1%1-1964, as well as JCS central files fol1962
and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical
understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be relevant to the assassination.
Topics:
(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba.
(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
paramilitary operations against Cuba. �
(3) Cuban coup planning.
(4) � Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
(6) US. military strength levels in Vietnam.
Apparent Equities:
Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document�usually
State, OSD and/or NSC. The joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared
to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.
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Ar� WED �17:05 FAX [phone] ARM
0001
MEMORANDUM.
Miarjaahae
July 2. 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
SOO E Street NW � 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20630
[phone] � Fax: [phone]
To: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM: Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Beard
STIJECF: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS Records
1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re the�roseph
Califeno Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen
Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is
scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July
24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A.M. Monday morning, July 21, at
the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW
(at the corner ofii Street NW and 6th Street).
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
2. Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations
Archives/Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judidary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place
(Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building,
and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARM' building.
3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance Information for CA attendees to Tracy
Shycoff on our staff at fax number [phone] prior to dose-of�business on
Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your viait request that the period of the
visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to
expedite declassifiiatIon of. these documents will take more than one session to
accomplish. .
4. We look forward to working cooperatively with all of our partners in this enterprise.
0�Avo Atiumaavi John R. Tunheim, Chair � Henry F. Graff � Kermit L. Hail � William L. Joyce � Anna K. Nelson .
Executive Dammam David G. Marweli
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Confidential
18 July 1997
Memorandum For: David G Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications
1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification
session for Calif ano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records
scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following
individuals:
Charles A. Briggs SSN
IC/DCl/CSI/HRG
Kathleen Puchnick SSN
IC/DCl/CSI/HRG
Richard D. Kovar SSN
IC/DCl/CSI/HRG
CI-Eileen M. Wukitch SSN
S/DO/IMS
eMary V, Amoi3
IC/DO/IMS--
SSN
William Perkins SSN
IC/DO/IMS.
2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the
appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army
Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official
certification of the individuals' clearances will follow.
If you have any questions concerning clearances in my
absence, please contact Barbara.Standley, 7034-13-186
CL BY: 611637
CL REASON:1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-82
Confidential
J. Barry reIson
Project Officer,
CIA JFK Review
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I 08/05/97 TUE 17:24 FAX [phone] ARRB ?
MEMORANDUM
Via Facsimile
August 5, 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW � 2nd Floor � Washington, DC 20530
[phone] � Fax: [phone]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
.IN THIS DOCUMENT '
Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM: Doug Home, Assassination Records Review Board
SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS
Records
A
1. I am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification
review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled
for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference
room in our second floor offices at 600 li Street, N.W.
2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and
to open up for review two more boxes in the Califazto collection. This session will also
allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available
at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.
3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions
until they are completed.
4. Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this
October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRII in July. Our point-
of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at [phone].
5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one �
session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of
the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed Agencies which
require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these
documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.
Beano Blineenes: John R. Ttmlfelm, Chair � Henry ft Graff � Komar L. Hall � William L. Joyce � Anna K. Nelson
Oxieurnis Dunorron: David G. Mama
���
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 18, 1997
NEWS RELEASE
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW � 2nd Floor � Washington, DC 20530
[phone] � Fax: [phone]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
CONTACT: ER.EEN SULLIVAN
[phone], EX'T. 253
MK ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RELEASES MILITARY
RECORDS RELATED TO US. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64
The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing
the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified
military records froht 1962-64 that relate to US. policy toward Cuba.
"These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States
government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power
during the early 1960's," said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. "We
now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being
considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services."
The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination
of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to
uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical
context
The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to
locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being "assassination related."
The documents are from the fill.111111111111111111ho served as General Counsel to
the Secretary of the Army, the filie o outrif 411NEgr.7STaff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor
and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is
housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now
available to researchers.
Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review
Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number (202)
724-0088.
-more-
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair � Henry F. Graff � Kermit L. Hall � William L. Joyce � Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn � DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk
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The Assassination Records Review Board was established by the JFK Ad, which was
signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were
appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the US. Senate, and sworn in on April
11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify,
secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President
Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be
made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.
The Review Board consists of the following members:
Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; US. District Court judge, District of Minnesota.
Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.
Dr. Kermit L Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio
State University.
Dr. William L Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special
Collections at Princeton University.
Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American
University.
-30-
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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW � 2nd Floor � Washington, DC 20530
[phone] � Fax: [phone]
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RECORDS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 18, 1997
CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
[phone], EXT. 253
� SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM MILITARY RECORDS ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64
Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military
records that relate to US. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being
released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents
that may be of particular interest to the reader are marked by arrows in the margin on
the right side of the relevant pages.
List of Selected Documents
1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020
Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of
documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from
February 1962.
"Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba"
2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104
February 7,1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13,1962, April 10, 1962
"Northwoods" documents
3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018
May 1, 1963
"Courses of Action Related to Cuba"
4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011
December 11, 1963
Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of
Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua" .
5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010
December 19,1963
"Meeting with President on Cuba"
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair � Henry F. Graff � Kermit I.. Hall � William L. Joyce � Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn � DEPUTY DI . Thomas E. Samoluk
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6. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
January 31, 1964
"A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba"
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Cuba Selected Documents
#1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
� IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
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FROM :
TO:
TITLE:
DATE : 03/01/63
PAGES : 135
SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA
POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES
CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BLOCKADE OF CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
'CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TB OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed
actions to be used against Cuba, including operations
to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro
and potential reaction to US involvement.
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POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT
- C UB A -
1. Operation SMASHER:
a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and
commercial communications facilities in Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of
a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube,
which is available, is virtually undetectable inismtich as its effectiveness is
due to the insertion of a chemical compound In the base of the tube. The
chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.
2. Operation FREE RIDE.:
a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst
the Cuban people.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American
or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Meadco City, Caracas,
etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed With other leaflets
planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased.
The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period.
3. Operation TURN ABOUT:
a. Ob ective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that
his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are .
being made for his "remova.1".
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the
crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism
or hardware.
Reproduction of this documont 101cla
or in part is �fri.!*..11;12.t.;),�1.
pormisr.ion of the � issuinr;
Special Handling of this pa7er is requested.
Access should be limit to requiring
the information heroin in orde:- Lc-enrry out their
official duties. �
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4. -Operation DEFECTOR:
..-) ..111P -SERE- 0
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a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to
defect with equipment.
b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the
effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate
reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also
creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished
by intelligence means and promise of rewards.
5. Operation BREAK-UP:
a. Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause
aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.
b. Concept: This activity, if possibla:slimildbe aimed primarily toward the Scv:
Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would degrade confidence
in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously
affect combat capability.
6. Operation COVER-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of
Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely
a cover.
b. Concept: It should not be .revealed as to what the cover is--this should
be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK. �:�.�:�:�:�:�:�.�-�
.............
7. Operation DIRTY TRICK:
a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should
the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists �
et al Cuba.
b. Concept: This to-be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of
evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.
8. Operation FULL-UP:
a.. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the
Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.
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.b. - Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological
agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and
grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.
9. Operation PHANTOM:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that
clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT. AND JJ
bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches
and air drops have been made in other areas.
10. Operation BINGO:
a. Objective: The objective is, tcre.te an Incident which has, the..a.ppeaNa� tAc,e �
of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for
use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the
.confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and
upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction
on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper
preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning. the base
at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself
until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other
areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following
would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:
2,az
(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
(2) Word flashed to the President.
(3) President orders -counterattack to include: . � �
(a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
(b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi-
cation in Cuba.
(c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected
targets/landing areas.
(d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to
pre-selected targets.
(e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and
further interdict lines. of communication.
(f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields,
road/rail terminals, etc.
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- (g) Resupply and replacement activities.
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Properly .executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a
matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.
11. Operation GOOD TIMES:
a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by
distribution of fake photographic material.
b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro
with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the
Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most
delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as
v.P.My ration is different." Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and
then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put
even a Cozrusiie Dictator in the proper perspective With!thetuidetprivileged
masses.
12. Operation HEAT IS ON:
� a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that
certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a
detrimental tightening of security.
b. Concept: /t is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally
acquainted with many of the present CRAP pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing
all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated
Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the
Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning
to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should
help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on
routine training activities.
7.
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OPERATION: Invisible Bomb
OBJECTIVE:
1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place
in Cuba thus ma3dmizing harrassment and confusion of the Castro govern-
ment.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101
or other �Century series aircraft to create the impreshion that anti-Castro
opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be
exploited is the "sonic-boom."
3.� The "sonic-boom" can.ln.employod in several different ways such
as an individual boom at selected spots or a continuous boom and performed
at either high or low altitudes. It will cause net only apprehension but
varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the windows
on a street in Havana.
4. The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions
for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping.
The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore
it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial.
� 5. The directional aspects of the "sonic-boom" also make it feasible
for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the
Cuban land mass.
6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible
evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and
expense.
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Spacial Hendling.of this paper is requested.
Access sk.clild be limited to indt7idwls
the inforxeUsn herein. in order to carry cut -their
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eproductios of this document in r3:ole
or in part is prohibited e=espt with
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Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"
Objective:
1. To crash or force down.Cuban IvUG aircraft with an all weather
intercept capability by communications intrusion.
Concept of 'Operations:
.2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose
of determining frequency and terminology usage for practice or real GCI -
operations.
3. By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or
solid weather conditions, override Cuban.controller and have Cuban iefugee �
pilot isdue instructions.whicb-tun MG out of fuel or-towarsle.Florida,
Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, etc.
eproduction of this document in 'hole
or in purt is 7:robibited enzern aith
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Operation TRUE BLUE
1. Objective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the
CUban peop4 by communications intrusion.
Concept of Operations:
2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba . .
(Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of
overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade
Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.
3. The technique of communications intrusion could be exploited by pre-
taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at
station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a
Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close
monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be
injected such as:
a. "Cuba Si, Russia No." .
b. Communism exploits the masses.
c. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
e. Castro and his reign of terror.
f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
g. Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.
4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps
under control of USIA.
RIPP. Pleitij
SPecial Handling of this ps:nzr iz requested.
Access should be limited tc requirina
the information horoin in to ca..e:y their
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.2: in part is prohibited (.7::::11%.;. w;-th
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o.
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 211. D.C.
2 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General EdWard G. Lansdale, USAF,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Subject: Ideas in Support of Project
The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and
possible use in furtherance of the objectives .of the Cuba
Project. I think some of them have promise and should you
desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we
will do so.
�
H. C G
Brigadier General SA
DOD Representativ
Caribbean Survey Group
6 encls
1. Operation Smasher(2Pages) (TS)
2. Operation True Blue(1Pagp) (TSI �
3. Operation "Horn Swoggle"(1Page VS)
4 . Operation "No Love Lost" (1Page .(TS)
5. Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or
disrupt (4Pages)(TS)
6. . Operation Invisible Bomb (1Page) (TS)
SEGRET-
IFEOMEifillilli4N6-
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Operation "NO LOVE LOST"
1. Objective: To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of
radio conversations.
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2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft
in proximity of Cuba at 'periodic intervals while communication monitoring
Cuban air/ground frequencies utilised for airdrome control. Cuban refugee
pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying
for Castro. Refugee pilot would get into argument with .Castro pilots over
radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro _
pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you
Red son-of-a-gun," and call by name if appropriate.
Reproductielt this
or. la pal.
perizic nf
S?scial Handling of this ra:ser in Pr:vested.'
Aw:ess tq requiring
the inforwaticn heroin in cyder te cry out their
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1. Operation SMASHER.
1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications
facilities in Cuba.
2. Technical Requirements:
a. Detailed information on both commercial and military communi-
cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant
construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.)
location and type of repeator stations. This information is required to
construct a refined device.
b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short
circuit. This ispossible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the
tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes
a conductor; when the tube cools the matter returns to a solid non-conductive
state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.
3. Targets:
a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long
distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone
service.
b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides
radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides
radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc-
tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio
service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way
TV channels.
c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by
'MT and AT&T. providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key
West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.
d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.
e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to-
. point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational
aids. Obviously; certain commercial facilities provide service to the .military
therefore disrupting or disabling .commercial facilities will affect military
communications capabilities. Special Handling of this paper is reque.sted.
Access should be limited to ind.:.vf.dr_als requiring
the information Lerein 1:1 order to carry out their
official duties:
9
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4. Concept of Operation:
a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate
equipments. �
� b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets
either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have
access and who would receive proper remuneration.
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Cuba Selected Documents
#2
JFX ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION 'FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER i 202-10002-10104
-RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)
ORIGINATOR : ars
FROM:
TO:
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
LTE OF LAST REVIEW :
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
: NORTHWOODS
: 00/00/62
:197
: U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA .
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEAN SECURITY
PATROL POSTS
INVASION OF CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR%U; S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
UNCLASSIFIED�.
1C
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
10/07/97
JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code
Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS
recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
US military intervention.
(R) - riTrarITIMTITEcism-
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01117.�6�'.
Z08 1969/103
7 February 1962
e 2141
'NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.-
on
NORTMOODS (S)
COPY NO.
. SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
A report* on the aboyOlubjecit is submitted for considera-
tion by tho;Joint Chiefs of Staff,
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reprOdOied; on file in Joint Secretariat
JCS 1969/303
2144
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
HOFORN
Off3215 DLTIRIBUTION
APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MODKViA=SM FOR BRIGADIER GENRPAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project
Subject: Cuba Projeot..
Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
BrigGen W. 11..,Craig, USA, subj:
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62
� 1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of
the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake
and 1.ole to the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, � has
been .4oteasdned based upon the following factors:
National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during
ieeting of 9 Nay 1961.
b. Current intelligence estimates cf the situation in
O., ,:verations against the Castro regime will be covert,
at least initially.
d. Time favord the Castro government.
The tosnia military implications of Castro's Communist
gow.3rnmei.'; are as follows:
a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
� i
serious threat to its security. This increases our national
vulnerability And defense costs as forces are developed.
or shifted to meet this threat.
� b.-lt provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
base they have ever'had.for spreading Communism throughout
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the
possibility that additional Latin American countries will
come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would
demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United
StateS will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist
centre]: Of additional countries would or could result in:
ONCIASSItiiii
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
SPECIAL HAMMING REQUIRED
AURFORR
12RI1IV3MPBRATI. eir
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.(1) Increased Communist capability-for 8116
�
other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Increased .Communist capability for spreading
Communism throughout Latin America.
(3) The loss of existing and/or, potential bases,
training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources
of Strategic materials necessary to our military
capability.
(4) An increased threat to US ubage and control
of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage..
3. The.urgenoy of the requirement to remove, the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castrois constantly
increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the
Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the
hemisphere This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
courses of action within the capability of the Communists
are considered:
a. The Soviets could' establish land, sea and/Or air
bases in Cuba.'
13. The' Soviets could provide Castro. with a number of
ballistic missiles with nuolear warheads; or they could
furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the
nuclear warheads. '
4. In view of the factors set forth abOve,'the Department of
Defense holds that the 'Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security requirements. of the Western
Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly'
support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of
ousting the Communist regime and installing a government
acceptable to .the United States. While the possibility of
Communist Slat reactions in areas other than in Cuba is
recognized; it is believed that this can be accomplished without
precipitating general war, and without serious effect on
world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:
NM 2
. Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
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5 ,
owngesexAL HANDLING REQUIRED
LINZ D/STRIBUTION
If the impression is created that there is an urgent,
humanitarian requirement .to restore Order in Cuba and/or the
Unitod States is responding to an appeal for assistance from
a government . representative of the Cuban people.
::1* it is announced incident to the overt military
action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are
moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding,
free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon;
as the new government advises that they have the capability
to maintain order without further assastanoe from the OAS
nationo.
c. lf the military operation. is conducted as quickly
Iaa pcan-lble and wath sufficient force co that the Communist
baocis ability to take effective counter-meaaures in support
of the Castro regime is reduced to a manimum.
d. *27: if the Guban regime commits hostile acts against
UE forcia or property, which would serve as an incident upon
Which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable.
portione cf a, b, and c above apply.
5. The Dwartment of Defense is also prepared to covertly
provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular
movement inside Cuba, in terms Of supplies, transportation,
personnel and bases.
ONCLISSIED
3 Appendix I to
Enclosure A
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a.
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ise16'4MM*
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
UNCIASIRM
NOTE BY THE smenuals
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
SORT/MOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INOELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
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Tele'SSIMEINI
JCS 1969/321
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF.
" � � � � WAMOMOTONSACW.
. � .
. .111011311a '.3.3 March 1962 �
MENORANDUN FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE .
Subject: Justification for VS. Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
r: �
' 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Nemorandum.forthe Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to i�request of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
� 2. The Joint Chiefs of.Staff.recommend that the
proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there.
will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
3. Farther, it is assumed that a dingle agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military
and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is
recommended that this responsibility, for both overt and
-covert military operations- be assigned the Joint Chiefs of
*.Staff.
�
�
mamma
BYJCSON_ia.
ACJ
lEnclosure �
Memo for Chief of operations, Cuba Project
For the Joint Chiefs of' Staff:
R
I. L. LENNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of S
UNCLASSIFIED
� 41b
4i? .
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� MN-27242'
. � .10 April 1962
MIDSORARDUR FOR TEE SECRETARY OF =isms. s,
Subjeott Cuba ' �
�
rz-�� �
1. The joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban-
. .
prOblem eilet be solved in the near future. Further, they
see no proepeet.Of early -success in overthrowing the present
communist .regime either as a result of internal uprisings.
or omoternal4politica1, economic or psychological proesures.
Aocordingly they believe that military intervention by the
United�States will be required to overthrow the present
communist regime.
�
2. The United States cannot tolerate permmnent existence :
of a communist government in the Western. Hemisphere. The
present regime in Cuba provides communism With a base of
operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against
Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin
America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions
of the Cuban government. Continued existence or this cam-, .
muniat government increases the probability that one or
more other nations in Latin America will become communist
or communist dominated. This will greatiy increase the
problems currently facing the United States and the Organisa-
tion of American States. While considered xmlike17, it Is
.p.lazitla .for to Sine-.Soviat.Mlaz to=ablish military
baacalmedba similar to US installations around the bloc.
periphery. Eatabliehment of such bases would Increase US
.defense. coats as forces were developed or ehiftedAo meet
the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communiet bloc. �
They are provided with the opportunity to continue with
their subversive efforts in Latin Amsrica. Increasing
internal security measures by police state methods decrease
HG
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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. ibe
steady !improvement in military defenses strengthens the.
resistance which must be overcome in the event, of CS
military intervention and could lengthen the.time required
to secure control of the government and theisland. The
continuing indoctrination of the When youth creates a
growing nucleue for a communist underground after the
elimination of -the present government. This createp a
problem for the future which is steadily increasing in.
magnitude .'Ns.
. 4. The joint Chiefs of Ater believe that the United
States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without
risk of goners]. War.. The., also believe that the intervention
can accomplished rapidly enough 'to minimiste.ocmmunlit
opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces
available would assure rapid essential military control of
Cuba. Continued police action would be required.
5. In view of the Increasing military and subversive
threat to the United' States aid. the nations of the Western
Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in CUba, the Joint
.Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early
military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United
States. They also reoommend that such intervention be
undertaken as scones possible and preferably, before the
release of matpmelOuard.and Heserwa forces presently
_ OneetieedutY.
For the joint Chiefs'of Staff:
LENNITZTR
� ' Chairman
' Joint Chiefs of Staff
2
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9 Maroh 1962
� NM
COPY OF COPIES
SPROUL�DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF
On
CUBA PROJECT (TB)
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he bq furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 1.3 March 1962.
IMCWDED FROM cos
ONCIASSIFIED
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ONCIASSOili . -
. JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
woorlI �
� THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Projecti.:414.:.:.:.
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but preciise::.:.:
description . of pretextawhich they consider would
justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
PICTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision which then would lead to military. action.
3. Cognize:We has been taken of a suggested course of
aotiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. Per additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
.5. The suggested coursesof action appended to Enclosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
place the United States 41 the Position of suffering-justif-
lahl;-grievenoes. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably4affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations;
Caba-Projedt;,,ohbjeot: "Operation MONGOOSE" dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** MemorandemrfOr the Chairman, -Jeint Chiefs of Staff-, from
Chief of Natal Operations, subject:. "Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
- on file in General Craig's office.
2
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11
as yet no bilateral Mutual support agreement the USSR .
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
WarsahrPact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.
-....
CONCLUSION
� -7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactnrily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from otherageneies,.provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated;-time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the
objeetiveof justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
.8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the-Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations Cuba Project.
___.11.-This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be formarAed to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This . paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
011.1Smus
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US ICEL/TARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are'
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, -integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justificaticin for US military
. intervention 16 Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provooltion: as the basis for US mints* intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 o,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions. . Beraamment. plus deceptive actions to oonvinoe the
Cubans of imminent 'invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a.rapid_.
change from exercise EC intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
.to take place in and around Guantanamo give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a..Ineidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1), Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
.(2):::/iand friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
. to stage attack on base.
(3) 'Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
1.04,44444...inkS0
Annex to Appendix
7 to Enclosure A
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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn airoraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some' damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or.vioinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires napthalened
(11) Sink ship near harbor entranCe. Conduct funerals
for Maok-victims (maybe lieu of (10)). -
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which 'threaten the base:
o. Commence large Beale United States military operations.
3. A "EkaMmiber the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blowup a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We.00uld blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters.. we could arrange_to.oauee suehinoldent-
in .the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes 'or ships merely inveielgating the intent of
the weasel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was takep.junder attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might.
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a� helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. we could develop a Communist' Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
Annex to Appendix
8 to Enclosure A .
ONCIASSIREO
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The terror campaign could be poin . aNN an refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida. (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a.few plastic bombs in carefully chosen mete, the
arrest Of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban ' involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated. against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the. lath of June invasion or the Dominican. Republic). We
know that Castro ip backing subversive efforts clandestinely' -
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
. .
intrusions within their national air spaoe. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft *could make cane-burning raids at. night.
Soviet moo inoendiaries could be found. This 0bUld-ie.COOpled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground 'in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.'
6. Use of WIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide .
additional'irevocation. Harasement of oivil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft'
by MO type Manes would be useful as oomplementary actions..
An P-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban NIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining Or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the WIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
ONCIM 9
p n n_renrT_ neweis � � se dm
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
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7. Hijacking attempte against eivil air and surface craft
�
should appear to .continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently,-genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surfaoe craft should be eneouraged..
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to �wee the flight plan route to arose Cuba.
The passengers �oad be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin,Anwould be painted and �
numberalas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a 0/A proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a.drormr..--- '
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
Airoraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
. �
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into Eue'AUxiitary field at IWin APB where !arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When.
over Cuba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAYDAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will-beinterrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
Annex to Appendix
10 to &Closure A
ONLISSIRii
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stations in the Western Veu the US what
. �
has happened to thoialroraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incidents. �
9. It is possible to create an inoident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban NIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attaok.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. �
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Oben NIGs.
b. On One such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by NIGs and was going down. No other
calls would be made: The pilot would then fly direetly
west at extremely low altitude and lam it a'aecure base, an
Hain auxiliary. The ...aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly.storai and given a ai tail number. The
pilot who had performed the mission wider an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of buiihesi. .The pilot and aircraft, would then have
disappeared. �
o. At iireoisely the same taint that the aircraft was
presumabli shot down a submarine or small surface craft
:
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts of aircraft found.
Annex to Appendix
11. to Enclosure A
IMUSPEO .
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UNCIISSitia
ENCLOSURE 33
FACTS HEARING ON THE PROM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts. against US forces or property whioh would serve as an
incident upon which to base overt intervention.
2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to Poker an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 !larch 1962, as follows:
" - - -determination that a credible internal
revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
positive US military action."
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
12
ONCIASSIAB
Enclosure El
l.a__as.
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� 01 Cuba Selected Documents
#3
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
� IDENTIFICATION FORM
�
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10018
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/189
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : J-5
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)
DATE : 05/01/63
' PAGES : 36
SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA
REVOLT IN CUBA
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
OPLAN 312
OPLAN 316.
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
'RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
rE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS� Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs
and Joint Staff discussing courses .of action toward
Cuba.
[R] - 1-Tem--zs�Reffttrerco--
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merits to plan end incita.2;e'r
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revolt veil conceived, 't
� by r.O.S.-10.14,4try
cubth
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4. For, discussion, ',see-
t*
Enclosure to JCS 2304016,', �
Attachment to JCS 230 /1.71 �
Attachment to JCS 2304/168
�?Or � 1 3 " 1 t7--''SENSITAESI
JCS 2304/189
(Rev. 5/13/63)
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widespread effective revoltv-.7y1fowever,;ihWistaging of a local 12
uprising as a contrived inCieni should..Wiia-"Pra1uded. 13
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8. The;Uited States.
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Connittee) for consideratipn'Ander.the provisions or '..psAm 57:4'..!� -31
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xamazt.,Bajias owsno 7-94-41401-
� . APPENDIX
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
1. fUrnose This report is in response to a request from
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desira-
bility and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. /t
includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series
of incidents aaa cause for invasion and consideration of
pertinent comments received from OINCLANT.
2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements
of .a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of
engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than
trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving
many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions
that:
a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt
will occur in the near future.
b. Any uprising without UN overt, support is likely to
be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet.
military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's.
increasingly efficient internal security operations.
c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro
communist regime will risk a direct provocation that
could be used as a pretext for US intervention.
d. Unless the United States intervenes 'militarily, the
Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its
efforts and ability to spread international communism will
increase.
e. The United States, should intervene' militarily in
Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly
(Rev. 5/13/63)
1
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perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of
invasion or (b) foment a. revolt within Cuba which would
call for US military intervention.
f. Engineered provoCation would provide greate&..adVantages
in control, timing, simplicity, and security than Would a '
fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a
widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local
uprising as a contrived incident 'shOuld not be precluded.
g. The United States should:
(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pre-
text for US military intervention in Cuba. '
(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly
phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, com-
mencing with the:Intensification of intelligence collec-
tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a frame-
work for guerrilla activity.
(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military
action to remove the Castro communiet-government.
h. Implementation of the above would involve many
agencies of the United States Government. It would appear
necessary that one governmental organization should. be
given the primary responsibility for developing such a
national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate
in the development of this national plan.
1. The bread concepts herein and the views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group
(5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of
NSAN 57.
j. CINCLANT'a concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba
while containing much merit, should be rerexamined both'
for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity
it envisages.
--vap-seeitsT--SENEKTIVE 2 Appendix
(Rev. 5/13/63)
DEUNR9
Tot s atm lir
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, b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment
of the Cuban -regime and covert and clandestine operations as '2 4
-
directed.
e.� IA�s�
c. Undertake military fiction in Cuba in accordance with
� contingently plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and.
directed by the President. /be primary.purpose of the US
military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of
the Castro communist government and to assist in the establisty,
sent of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the
United States.
20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of
aotion- in this study would involve many.agencies'of the United
states Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that
one single governmental. organization be given the primary
responsibility for developing a national plan.
21.. Peoause of the extensive military operations involved,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development
of this national ,plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt,
they should be assigned the specific responsibility for develop-
ing the-military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This
would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination
under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by .the United States were '
an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces
by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as
the DOD agent. In. this connection, CINCLANT has developed a
specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.
CINCLANT CONCEPT
22. The .CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in
Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations..
The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18
months. Supporting operations by CIA. State, and USIA will
be required.
'(Rev.
P-SECIINT 12
� (Rev. 5/23/63)
[Imp Appendix
4.44141L84FerAt1t1r
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23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA
as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development
of.inteiligenne,'the organization by State of a Free Cuban
Government (PCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and
the devdlopment of a. suitable cover plan.
24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by
CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls
for infiltrating of UN forces into Cuba for area assessment,
establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units,.
establishing escapb and evasion nets and conducting subversion.
On about 15 June 1964, UN fordes would be augmented and would
accelerate. subversive operations to create conditions favorable
for .establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for
employment of conventional forces.
25. MNCLANT'then proposed that on about 25 July mobilization
of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of
.CINCLANT.OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by �
-10-fey 0PLANr316;. about 3 Auguat 1964.. .
26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should
be noted that the. Free Cuban Government would be required to
exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's
excellent counterguerrilla ability. This time requirement appears
to be excessive, but it could be shortened.. The criteria for
United States recognition of a new government could be met in
this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:
a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the
population; and,
C. has prepared to honor international obligations.
""--Ie'P-eNeRN!GEPgSXZ1V8
(Rev. 5/13/8n)
13 �
PREISSIFIM Appendix
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27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are
approximately:
(1) Headquarters, Joint
Unconventional Warfare Task
Nome, Atlantic (JUWTFA)
(2) UW Operating Base
(3). Support Units
(4) Special Forces 1 Group Headquarter
(reinf.)
2 Companies (reinf.
. (5). Submarines 2
(6) APD 1
(7). SEAL Teams 1
(8) Air Commandos. 150 Personnel
20 Aircraft �
.4 Air Control Teams
(9) CIA Forces Internal and EXternal
assets as required by
CINCLANT.
28. CINCLANT does not have UV forces assigned at this time,
however% a nucleus JUWTFA staff is included within the CINCLANT
staff and has the capability for preparing UN plans for normal
contingencies. Planning or conducting UN operations of the
magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond
current capabilities.
29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the
activation of the JUWTFA as a separate organisation and the
assignment to it of full wartime headquarters Complement of
.48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be
required. Approval of any concept in principle or for
planning purposes, however, Would not necessitate the
(Rev. 5/13/3)
14 Appendix
V
6 Off 42 EM
.$
36 Off 482 BM
15 Off 331 gm 4
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activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT f_a.
would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate
'recommendations to. the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept' recommended, con-
cerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "As
practical, the Military Services should initially form their
Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is
considered that the creation of a "Cuban EXpeditionary Foroe"'in
anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is
a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertakon.
There appears to be no reason,. however, Why OUbans could not be
formed into small teams forme in UW activities. It is estimated
that from two to four hundred carefully aelected Cubans could be
used in this role.. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a
supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them
Into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use
by C/NCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.
31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see
JCSM-360-63,
32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS312 and 316 are adequate
to cope with the improved Minn military capability and the
presence of Soviet troops on the island. .
33. The experience of the JUWTFA during the Cuban crisis in
October 1962, indicates that the present military suPPIY System
.. �
in the COWS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and
supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations
in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equip-
ment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.
--TE0P-GEGROT- �SENSETFIN
(Rea. 5/13063)
EirrEP.1
u1'31:ti.r
15 . Appendix
0641011nnr-46.4744MMere.
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vor�useRgr - eifferPRX
34. The conceptual outline submitted. by CINCLAMT foes not.
provide an exact plan in detail for contriiing a revolt in
Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:
"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist
dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion,
unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and
finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.
b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the
process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures
require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful
revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government
favorable to US intereats.
c. An ambiguous .atmosphere during the critical phases
in its development which would not present the Soviets with
a direct. confrontation of power until events would preclude
timely action on their part to prevent our intended result
in Cuba.
d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being
dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary
intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban
Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.
e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements
in the US for political and military support without
depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success
of the plan.
f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all
US military posture, until the final decisite stages of
the plan:are ready for executien, thus reducing maldeployment
time.
g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish
the 'defeat of Castro communism.
h. .A definite time scale of events culminating in the
defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing
the groundwork for the installation of Er:government compatible
with the alms of the OAS and friendly to the DB by 1 October
1964."
20P�SERBP "SBNOIM418 Ofingififit
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#4
ORIGINATOR
FROM
TO
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ARMY
R. D. ALBRO
OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
12/11/63
11
ANTnCASTRO CUBANS
ARTIME, MANUEL
CUBAN BRIGADE
.KENNEDY, ROBERT
CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
UNCLASSIFIED
OPEN IN FULL
OPEN
10/07/97
Calif ano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding
training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recriutment efforts
of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime And Robert
Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army.
(RI - cIbN 1 b-ltry&-T-R
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.ACSIrCE
prominent
Puerto
�
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20310
� 'Or' AR�
Am Ha. J0881111 ammo. GENERAL Comm
it�Ougees LEL Nicar.agug
4-����
11.
11
DEC 19et3
..
� k. '
19 No 63,'�obtrie'iinbilitiiiii''Ogiieati
Soper! 42870006563, 9 Aug 63 Subject:
Vii..0011 Wait Nicaragua 00. fro; URABM,Nicarague
;if* t 42870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subjects �
141es (11), from WORM, Nicaragua
d. �fismary of isformetton, 1 Nov 63, 112th IN= Op. Subject:
Cuban Officer Trainiag Broistass (1)
�
e. tor Record, ACSI4E, 19 Nov 63, Subject:
Cuban Brigade lisolpir (U)
2. (
that.
indica
'refisioietir c
geffeccical 1a .prepared at the request of your 'nice, advised
agIqggeg�vithin the U. S. Mabasay there, revealed no
17,;.NcRhail.- 040613. .usicaeore4, the former
4111,01vad� In Che.txataitieg 'of Cuban
. - . .
. 3, (0) . 4*.r1gg:ibo-OPOir inquiry, the. =AEU. Managua called attention
to, two intelligaocOrepOggif�Me.hed furnished(referenceil lb. and It above)
reporting Rtcuugua grew covalent on the visit of exiled Cuban refugge
leader* Di. Manuel mix lluesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Seep:res, Dr. Nenuel
Aaruala DE %WM. Pc. Trravataco rsexampsz Pin, Dr. Laureano SAIXSZA, Dr. �
OriaaGe� PNENXIS4.04; ..-419311, and Roberto RODRICRIBZ to Nicaragua
during July and Augiat1963. The 1111A104A's comment on the newspaper
speculations and remota cosnietning this visit was that he "does not have
any f ira information er Indicators that anti-Castro forces jure being trained
in Nicaragua."
111RIT171117101TME
EINASSIFIED BY ARMY
'24g.2.321-884i � 4-6-
....HRSITETERMEErittridENRIS-RiVettle.�
DECIASS1FICATION ACTIVITY �0014;ZRADED Al 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
AU1OMAT1D1LLy DECLASsiTIED
� V90 3 DOD DIR 5200.1n
DATE' 75'
Anoroved for Release: 2023/08/21 C00940098
10000 Approved for Release: 2023/08/21 CO0940098
�
4EORLT
ACCD�Ci
SUILNOTS
.11 DEC 1953
Training of Cuban itsfugeoe In Nicaragua (N)
IL from the .A. C. of Co. 0.4., focirtikerny .tepi�telp
:sessew, , 0
. �iiiiii ' ill NIcataitosi. .'A copy .Cf 'this
referines is incioged for your infornation. CONARC, Fourth Aney and 3rd
Amer *nre.been. directed to continue .to report on the alleged :waiting
,,,f0PtImpt4401mh,�. , .-
;-;* �
- ---- �� � ':,:v.4.:;-f',.::54".*:. :--"-..... -' . .� � � ��� - �
. .14...30 toieieneei la. reports information iecikitaal h.*. lieibbied.
� , 14.1,..thaiel"Pitier.dalaat ihrigade ameba. 2nd I.t.40iio Bat: . . Gotbasta,
.... .p.2320001.401,1* invited by tad Lt. Ineido OLIO: aernittiederd in..
. ;4:4404:iikille 24:00: to :obit washiostooi.). go on is Nov 63 to .
4"'"�.',,,,,.:4.'-';',Itt. Aluidttorney.ilen .
IOU. thit'APLe2, t!, - r,
_ .-.40.1..
......-,,f,t, -.,..*.!Ni- . ..' .6:01Viingita tr:...:''
:Mit Reneeilye but 414 to that be had net with Lt. owl. the.eetuat
Puri*" of the etlog is net kaoen. A copy of roterence Is. is inclosed.:
� for yOntni.h. - ,. att.--Itsbest Kennedy did confer es,17.1ion, 03 with
nees..4taberte'din.scuis ake'robottotereif.:**46624 4tite
�POPP 801-Iguss1 wis SuOtas ;top snitittuitteutert.......
sitiosted to. left with Kr. 'Robert' War:4 'Osildifiei-- 21 or �-5. .. �
22 1202. There is no Indication that ft. Volebird :modest RiBiRib
was present. . -
6. (C) This office bats no informative whether KO.' Neenedy is aware
of ARTINNIe alleged recruiting activity. The lamination in paragraphs 3
through 5 above. end the inclocoree hereto, are furnished in the event
that they way boot, sane pertinente to your inquiry regerding Colonel
McPhail. reference is. above.
80
Oh L. Cl4fri r. JVlj
-
'#!��� '1W 1e3
g SEC ?EC'
ifECE1AEP
:Wkittiffite�iiteTtet-
,iiitiONE-ItIfteE6-10464,1008-111/9terfr
N. D.Aibro.*K-AS
Coloant� as
Director of Foreign intelligence
iT
444
--.
.
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�
4t � ;:g."����
. pa/manual) et .12 YU,: entity/
NAT AUTOMATICALti' OECLASSIFIL
� DQO OIR 5200.10
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : EARLE G. WHEELER
TO :
TITLE : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963
DATE : 12/19/63
PAGES : '
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATIONS, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
E OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97
DPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with
President on Cuba. 1 Document.
R
-
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����
19 December 1963
1.4E1.13fLANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBT2CT: Meeting with President .on Cuba. 1100 hrs. 19 Dec 1963
1. The following persons were present at the meeting:
. White House. The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy.
Mr. Smith
State. Mr. Thompson
� Mr. Ball
Mr... Johnson
Maitiii
Mr: Crimmins
Defense: N'r. Gilpatric
Mr. Vance
General Wheeler
CIA: General Carter
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. Helms
Treasury: Mr. Dillon
USIA: Wr Wilson
2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations
covering the following areas:
a. Collection� of-intelligence.
b. Propaganda activities.
c. Economic denial actions.
d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.
e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.
. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.
�.(CLUOE0 FROM iai0MATIC REGRADING
1./01) 5200.!1. �10.-: :qv APPI.Y
ifiet
SENSITIVE
� �
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. . . . . .'.'.�.�
3. a. The President was moot interested in economic 'denial . .
'actioris. He was informed that talk.s would be undertaken in the � � � � � � '
.�.�.�.-...�..
imme:liate future with representatives of the Canadian and British ...�.....�.�.�.�
governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials
C.anaclian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms
iit�rwine active in this area, as well as a number of essentially
firms located in a number of foreign countries. No
_�:.putable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact,
:-.a.vc bry:ta)leinful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging
this traffic. Apparently. State regards the Canadian, the British
and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President _
�iirecto.d that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governments
al firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice. �
b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated� that exploitation
of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. ,While there
are disaffected Cuban military men iii important posts, they have not,
to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group.
Ilowevz.br, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to
overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported
by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success. :�:�:�:�:�:�:�:-:�:�
c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the
.%resident expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at
this time for two reasons:
(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various
e.otions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and
(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new
administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably
the success of our efforta to achieve further reductions in Soviet military
personnel in Cuba.
�
4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache
..;iscovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of
::he OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of
tiieir survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that
the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the
survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further informa-
tion ref;arcling propaganda activities directed againot the Venezuelan
government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report
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to the OAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort
is devcted to ascertaining the mazirburn that the OAS is prepared
to do as a result of the Venezuela .7-flair. They are hopeful that the
GAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it is
t;.o t1y to expect a complete break in economic.and travel relations
betwec:n OAS countries and Cuba.
. 1. There was some discussion of further actionti we might
take to increase pressures and harrassiro..!nts at an appropriate time.
Among other iterr.o mentioned were. the effect of low level reconnaissance
flighto from time to tithe and the dksirr.bility of. executing such flights
at intervals to traintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the
President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express � .
a.pprovel.. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which
must be 'regarded. I think, as being an important orientation session. �
P4z.t.ed IL:AO G. Wheeler
EARLE G. WHEELER
General. United States Army
Chief of Staff
,:�DPIT:f; TO: �
Chairman, JCS if
c3A7 /13
rNO 4,
czk,:c
Director Jt Staff (Attn: SACSA)
Army General Counsel 47
tvr..2 fr-ose-
4,:e? ervo
Trp-t
11811681f1iii
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JCS
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA
01/31/64
58
POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
COUP IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
UNCLASSIFIED
OPEN IN FULL
OPEN
10/07/97
JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, JCS
regarding contingency plans in the event of a coup in
Cuba.
(R) -
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E=6:123313:trr
-1/6 MDR �MEM Or PAR
WAMPUM U. D.C.
ONION
EM-161-64
31 January 1964
MEMCIRANDUM FOR TAE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC
Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)
1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above,
whiachas been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Depart-. ......���
Merit ot Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency'. .�.�.'. .......
,..�.'.�.������
�
2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, If;� �
supported by the United States., achieve LIE national objectives by the ..�
� elimination of the.communist.Tegime and establishment of a. Cuban �;�:�.
government acceptable tb the United States. .
3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible
manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support
to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 316. Conditions under which military
intervention at a level LESS than thht of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken
are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 89.70,
.13TG0701552 March 1963.
4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a eeparate contingency plan
to support a coup in Cuba within the context ciT conditions described in
the attachment hereto.
Attachment
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: .
M. J. I ELIDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary
UMW
GROUP 1.
EXCLUDED FROM. AUTOMATIC .
DOWNGRADING 'AND DECLASSIFICATIoN
Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of I page, Series A
I
� Akc.,, :
SYSTEVIATICtilY REVIEWED ""r
BY Ic:Soi
ofifzianott CONTINUER
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'DEPARTMENT OF tHE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
ORIBIAB
�rawer_
DEC i966
.M.EXPAJOIDUACTO.*.p...00*;40;-:- 4O1lsiT 'CHEWS OF STAFF
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SUBJECT: � A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)
Reference: jCSM 807-63,41.Subjact as above, dated October 21,
196
. Enclosenere*.lthere..ikreeeopies. of the plan. on the above
subject whichhair.heen;Prepalediointly one restricted basis. by
rePx�801ta#rs:s of apa,rnts p1 OFP30..Strate.e#d�-.P,efeet.sein coordina-
tion �
revised to reflect generiThrtinifiiiiiiiin of the -.Teint Chiefs of Staff
contained in reference, .Provideee�COneeptual basis for US response �
to a Cuban military cOoP andhas- beenapproved by the Secretaries
of State:and, Defenseendthe Director,. central Intelligence Agency as
a baels.for appropriate detailed planiting:.: Mr. McGeorge Bundy has
been .advised. of the�-faregeixig and requested te..inform the President
of the existence of the plan�on-a suitable occasion. It is anticipated
that the Secretaries of 'State and Defense may-subsequently be
requested .to brief the President onite outline.
In accordance with:the- recommendations contained in paragraph.
8c, page 22 of the plan, it Is requested that. current CINCLANT plans
be revised as necessary.to reflect the concept of military operations
described .in.the plan and.that you�advise.me when this has been accom-
plished.
;11:.*c�PX.4441.,..44.04-40.fi14_ AZ .1:4 the plan,
. .
repre sentativig.of thii:044iftill;le.telligeeee Agency in coordination with
representatiVe0 of the State and-Defense � will. develop a
plan. for the introduction � of the. "Special Team's into Cuba which will
subsequently be C.irculated.for .appropriate action and further detailed
plannin.g by agencies concerned.
** Appendix to EncloSure B to
* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205- \am.g......
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1 trru�i\lal .
JCS �230A/205.-_-.2::--- �
Enclosurel3
As Stated
cyp)
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INSS
A CONTINGENCY PIAN.FOR A COUP IN CUBA
1. Problem. To.provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in
Cuba in order to assure that up intervention, if undertaken, results in -
replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United
States;
2. Assumptions,
a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous
contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting
certain specified conditions feeeParagraph 2.d. below), their revolt
will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1)
below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met.
Thus, the coup could be triggered, in one of two ways: The leaders, in
secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence
and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming
US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or,
less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet 'probable
criteria for US support, initiate the coup Without consulting with or
obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish it Provisional Govern-
ment, hoping that the US will intervene.
b. If the US had prior knowledgeofthe coup, up to forty-eight
hours would be 'required after initiation of the action to introduce into
Cuba and receive reports from :a "special team" which would obtain in-
formation to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the
US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required. .
SYSTEMATICALLYRg OCTIOLD
.
BY JCS ON ' " 1989
This document contains 22 pages.
Copy NO. of copies. -
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
Series .
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C. US intervention would be based on: 111CIASSIFIED
(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government
set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action.
wouldmt await formal OAS approval), or
(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had
started without prior US concurrence, if the us determined that the in-
surgents net generally the criteria for support, or
� . (3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.
d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable,
recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon,the.situation exist-
ent at the time:
� (1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order
to survive.
(2) Be prepared to establish -a Provisional Government, however
rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to
provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if
Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).
(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
(4) Seize. and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably
including ,Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support
and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.
e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-
..�.�.�.
fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below. � � � � � . . . . .
. . . .
(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale. �
invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-
introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation
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which could be used as a pretext for such action. INCIPSSIFIED
. (2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage un-
organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too
easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of
any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US
aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a
planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban
military forces.
(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces,
either itactical formations or troops manning air defense installations,.
would result in immediate implementation of �PLANS 312 and 316.
3. Sequence- of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this
paper is based on the following general sequence of events:
a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to
and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval
would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time.
(In theevent that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge,
the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special
team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering in-
formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible
for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit
forces needed to sustain it.)
b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on
a pre-arrangedlasis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the
US would:
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(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special teem" to. obtain information'.' �
which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents.
team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would
make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start
of the coup if the US hid prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if
not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-
four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be
possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents! plans. In any event,
American
reliable reports from trained! observers in Cuba would be of great value
to making a.decision to .intervene in order that the US would not commit
its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to
the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and.
expand it. (The special team, augmentedas appropriate by CINCLANT,
would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern-
ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately
to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made
to intervene.) .
(2) Order forces needed to establish. an air and sea blockade
of' Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the
blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the
implementation of CINCLABT �PLANS 312 and 316.
c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in-
telligence assessment including the special team's report, would be
made to the President. This would be the critical, decision because,
Once-made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,
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the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac-
tions would include:
(1) The assumption by CIMCLANT of command of all military
and para-military operations in Cuba.
(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel.for%the
purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison
with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support
by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the U0 delayed public an-
nouncement of the decision to support the coup, -this assistance would
be provided in such a manner as to-miniMiZe VUbliC knowledge of active
US involvement in Cuba.
(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team
to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has
not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order
to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS.
As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce
publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by meana of an air and sea blockade
to become effective at (time, date). The Justification for this unilateral,
interim action mould be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution -2 of the Punta
del Bata meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC es-
tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as yell as to insure that
support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually,
the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air
Force, encourage Indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a
warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below).
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(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por-
tions or all ofCINCLANT MARS 312 and 316.
d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for
help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support
the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or
responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support
for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the
Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the
other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon-
naissance units, thereby providing visible evidence, to. insurgents
that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-ittervention
while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support'.
At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re-
quired for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announc-
ing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate
overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility
that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be suffi-
cient to bring down the Castro-regime, if the coup carried with it a
significant element of the Cuban armed forces.. Hovever, it is probable
that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as
required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would iM-
plement portions or all of CIBCLANT MANS 312 and 316, as required.
4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.
a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveil-
lance network, both internally and with respect tot he air and sea
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ECIAL -HANDLING
. .01FACE CW THE SECRETARY CW DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
13 MIlitcHA.9.95EDJECTION TO
DECLASSiFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROMTS DOCUMENT
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera-
tions, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation
MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but
precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider would provide justification for US military
intervention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for-
warded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning
purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar sub-
missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be
used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The
individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-
case basis.
3. This plan ,� incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such .a plan would enable a
logical build-up of incidents to be combined with, other
seemingly unrelated events to 'camouflage the ultimate
objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban
rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed
at other countries as well as the United States. The plan
would also properly integrate and time phase the courses
of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the
execution of this plan would be to 'place the United States
in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances
from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to
develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace
in the Western Hemisphere.
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the
Cuban problem. Therefore, the. plan should be so time-
phased that projects' would be operable within the next few
months.
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� 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the
plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-
signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Enclosure
Pretexts to Justify
Military Intervention
in Cuba
2
Iced
ILLLAN H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
-4E-Cilf-T-4P-EM HANDLING AM-
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JP -SECRET-1i SPECIAL HANKIE) dilifititt
MENORAH= FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subject: Justification for US Military intervention
in Cuba (TS)
�
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as a preliiinary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is aseumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can then be considered on a case-by-ease basis.
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
� developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to oamouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and �
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well as the United States. The plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.
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. 4. Time is an important faCtor.inresolution'of.the Cuban
Problem.. TherOfore, the plan should be so tithe-phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months. .
' 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is Overt military
intervention, it is-e�Ommended that primary responsibility
far developing military and pare-military aspects of the plan
for path overt and covert military operations be assigned the
Joint Chiefs Of Staff.
Enclosure
Pretexts to: Justify Military Intervention
in Cuba
2
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ENCLOSURE
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary.
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together With similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point Of departure for the development
of a single, integrated,. time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projeots within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate.
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 o,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Caen
reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow d rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A serieS of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance Of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):.
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
. (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the bane; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into bane.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for monk-victims (may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
a. Commence large soale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add oredibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evaouate" remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida oities and even in Washington.
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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aireraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominidan Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type airoraft by US pilots @Quid provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the RIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
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7. Hijacking attempts against aril sir and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Conourrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the� United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan� route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numberelas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a C/A proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil airoraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attaok by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the inoident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban NIOs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exeroise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban NI0s.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by NIGs and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The
pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.
0. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts ef aircraft found.
.7.
�:5".� � :AO
SrZ: �
111? MAHIMING--NORIRN--
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9 March 1962 COPY OF COPIES
SPECTE7DISTRIEBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ,.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
'JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA PROJECT(TS)
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.
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JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretextswhieh they consider would provide
justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision which then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of
aotiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
.5. The suggested coursesof action appended to Enclosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
plaoe the United States in the position of suffering justif-
iable grievenoes. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably,affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, sUbjeot: "Operation MQN000:EV, dated .
5 March .1962, on file in General Craig's office. -
** Memorandum for the Chairman, joint Chiefs of Staff, from
Chief of Navel Operations, subject:' "Instances to .
Provoke Military Actions, in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
on file in. General Craig's office.
�
2
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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.
CONCLUSION
7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions 'should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the
objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
b. This paper NOT be.forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be /orwarded to US ,officers assigned
.�
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
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DRAT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered
M
the attached .
Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which.
responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide justificiatibil
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable
for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be
similar sUbmissions.from other agencies and that these inputs
will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.
Individual projects can then be Considered on a case-by-case
�baSis. _ -
C 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military and
para-military aspects .of the basic plan. It is. recommended
that this responsibility ;or 1).012.,01rerk.a10.5,044,PMY
operatiomsbe assigned the :Toint Chiefs vA.Iptaff.
f-
�
* Memorandum for Gen .Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba
- Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March
1962, on file in Gen Craig's office
4 EnolOsure A
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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA. PROJECT
Subjeot: Justification for US Military intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretests which the Joint Chiefs Of Staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can than be oonsidered on a case-by-case basis. , x�//1)
. 3. This!glan, incorporating projeots selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to toms all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
4
US military intervention. Such a plan wold enable a logioal
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
to'
countries as well as the United States. The plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United State0 in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.
Appendix to
5 Enclosure A
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4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban
problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months.
5. Inassuoh as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan
. .
for both Overt and covert military operations be assigned the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6
appendix to
Enclosure A �
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
-PRETEXTS TO JUSTIIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point or departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seam desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US mints* intervention in Cuba
-
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke CO=
reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans .of imminent Invasion would be emphasized.. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid �
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2.'A series of-well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamoiaglve genuine
appearance of being done by hOstile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio..
� (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
� (3). Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
�
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
Annex to Appendix
7 to Enclosure A
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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture. militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
(11) Sink ship rear harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mook-viotims (may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana, or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely inveifigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Caen ' involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the. 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft Could make cane-burning raids at. night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beaoh.'
6. Use of NIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by NIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-66 'properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban NIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact.. The primary drawback to this suggestion
Appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining Or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the NIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
Annex to Appendix
9 to Enclosure A
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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface Graft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
oonvinoingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to arose Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-sohaduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Hglin ARS. would be painted and
nunkemeies an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will le schedOled to allow a rendezvous south of
I.
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-oarrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Bain APB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its origins), status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the airaraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
Annex to Appendix
10 . to BhOlosure A
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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the us what
has happened to the airorafb instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
Appear that Communist Cuban Dads have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.'
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airmraftwill be dispatched
in trail from Homestead APB, Florida, to. the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. r
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
� frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the When coast; however, they would be
required to carry live exmamition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban Mo.
b. On One such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would 'fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban /eland this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by NIOs and was going down. No other
calls would be made The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Hglin auxiliary.. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a nisi tail number. The
pilot who bad performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared-
0. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse P-101 parts, parachute, etc.-, at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead. would have a true story as far an
they knew. Search ships .and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts ef aircraft found.
Annex to Appendix
to Hbolosure A
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3,41
ENCLOSURE B
PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated.'
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba (lambs
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon which to base overt intervention.
.2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:
II .. .. - determination that a credible internal
revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
� 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
to develop a Caen "provocation" as justification for
�, ' positive US military action." .
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop 'justification
for DS 'military intervention in Cuba.
.1* /CS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
12 ......,,
I-i
� Enclosure B
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TOP .SECRET
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
P. J. BLOUlN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduoed herewith; on file in JoiZa::::::::at
EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321 2165
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