PUEBLO SITREP NO. 14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00928316
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-00887
• Publication Date: January 28, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Pueblo Sitrep No. 14
(As of 0700 EST)
1. There is still no hint of Pyongyang's con-
ditions for the release of the ship and crew.
2. Pyongyang, in an editorial in the official
Nodong Sinmun, reiterated on 28 January its rejection
of UN consideration of the Pueblo case.
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7. Boris Batrayev, a KGB officer with the So-
viet Embassy in New Delhi, has supplied more material
\--there to cover Premier Kqfygin's visit
On 27 January,
Batrayev suggested that Pyongyang may wish to swap
the Pueblo and its men for North Koreans charged
with terrorism in South Korea. He hinted that So-
viet efforts to persuade Pyongyang to release the
ship in return for an admission of guilt and perhaps
payment of a fine had been unsuccessful.
8. Batrayev implied strongly in his second
conversation that despite a hands-off
posture which Moscow must maintain toward the prob-
lem in public, the USSR is interested in working be-
hind the scenes to resolve it. He said Moscow was
gathering information on the crisis and was interested
in finding out from the US and North Korea what each
wanted and what each would give up to achieve a
peaceful settlement.
9. Batrayev apparently also is the source of
news reports to the effect that Kosygin told Indian
Prime Minister Gandhi that the Pueblo incident
could have been a "genuine mistake,"--without say-
ing on whose part--and that the dispute is a "routine
matter." �There is no other reporting to support or
confirm Batrayev's assertions.
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10. Peking's first commentary on the Pueblo
situation, in broadcasts on 28 January, stated that
it was watching developments "closely." Referring
to US contingency measures, it declared that US
"war provocations" would not cow the Korean people.
11. Soviet Naval surveillance of the US Task
Group in the Sea of Japancontinued as of 3:00 AM EST.
The Kildin class Missile Destroyer #983 is reported
at a range of 11.5 miles from the Task Group. Al-
though it is not mentioned in the report, the intel-
ligence collector Gidrolog probably remains in the
general vicinity of the Task Group.
12. On 27 January, a Soviet naval aircraft
probably an AN-12 based at Nikolaevka,flew from the
Vladivostok area in the Soviet Far East to Pyongyang.
It is unusual for such Pacific Fleet aircraft to be
used for international flights and the flight was
possibly related to the Pueblo incident. It may
have been bringing Soviet personnel to examine the
Pueblo and whatever equipment was not destroyed.
The aircraft returned to Nikolaevka on 28 January.
13. The North Korean Air Force has deployed 10
possible 11-28 light bombers from Uiju airfield in
Northwest North Korea to Sunan airfield North of
Pyongyang and to Sondong-Ni airfield approximately
35 miles North of Wonsan. In addition, the North
Korean Air Force continues to maintain a high state
of readiness. Patrol activity is still heavy,
particularly in the Wonsan area, extending some 30
miles into the Sea of Japan.
14. Three USAF squadrons, a total of 43 fighters
and fighter-bombers, are due to arrive in South Korea
between 28 and 30 January.
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