SOVIET CIRCULAR TELEGRAM ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00925102
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00655
• Publication Date: February 9, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/01/22 C00925102
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� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
� ROUTINE
IN
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STATE/I N R DIA NMCC/MC SECO E F JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC MC NSA 500 ON CRS
Me: Fels ocs XXX Vir.X YX
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This material contains information affectIng the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 13, U.S.C.
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACHFRey
SECRET
MVP.I
gathadadrrem7mic
d.oca
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
COUNTRY USSR/NORTH KOREA
DOI UP TO 30 JANUARY 1968
SUBJECT SOVIET CIRCULAR TELEGRAM ON THE PUEBLO
INCIDENT
ACQ
(EARLY FEBRUARY 19-68)
CITE
01ST 9 FEBRUARY 1968
FIELD NO.
1. ON ABOUT 30 JANUARY 1968 THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS SENT OUT A CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO INFORM SOVIET AMBASSADORS
ABOUT THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THIS TELEGRAM STATED THAT THE VESSEL HAD
BEEN SEIZED BY NORTH KOREA AND THAT ON 23 JANUARY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR
IN MOSCOW HAD REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE
VESSEL. THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS A SOVEREIGN STATE
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AND THAT THE USSR COULD NOT RENDER ANY ASSISTANCE.
5 2. THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO SAY THAT A FEW DAYS LATER PRESIDENT
4
3 JOHNSON SENT A LETTER ON THE MATTER TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. THIS LETTER
� SECRET
(classiftcatiolt)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
(dfssem ccmtrob) BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/22 C00925102
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� SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUNu,
(classification) (dissent controls) USE OL
ALSO REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN GETTING �THE VESSEL RELEASED.
THE USSR FORWARDED THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER TO THE NORTH KOREANS
AND ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING SEIZURE OF THE VESSEL. THE NORTH KOREANS DID NOT PROVIDE
THIS INFORMATION, SO SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCIDENT HAD TO BE BASED
ON INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.
3. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE MATTER AS OUTLINED IN THE
TELEGRAM IS TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT IN THE UN SECURITY
Illo'COUNCIL. IF rT IS DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE WILL SPEAK ALONG THE LINE OF UNMASKING U.S. POLICY IN
KOREA, SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA IN EVERY RESPECT. THIS IS THE SAME
POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS.
4.
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DISSEM: NONE.
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4,- SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGIi0JN
;classification.) (disscrn controls) USE ON
A pproved for Release: 2019/01/22 C00925102