SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE 10 JULY 2001 VISIT OF FORMER PRESIDENT CLINTON TO BUENOS AIRES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00845607
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01040
• Publication Date: July 4, 2001

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040852Z CIA 612968
TO: PRIORITY NINA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC, DIRNSA,
ANCHORY FT GEORGE G MEADE MD, SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/DSITA/SCT//,
DIA WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC,
DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC,
CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, JWAC DAHLGREN VA//J2//,
DEPT OF TREASURY, DOEHQ//IN//, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SECRET SERVICE//ID//,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//0IPR//, NRO WASHINGTON DC//0S-HCO//,
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, FAA NATIONAL HQ, USCINCSO MIAMI FL,
CDRUSARSO FT BUCHANAN PR, HQ 12AF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ,
USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA, JFIC NORFOLK VA, CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA,
COMMARFORLANT, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB,
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//.
SERIAL:
TEXT
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC).
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS S E,/'R E T--NOFORN
DIST: 4 JULY 2001
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE 10 JULY 2001 VISIT OF FORMER (b)(1)
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO BUENOS AIRES (b)(3)
DOI:
SOURCE:
SUMMARY: THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY GROUP OR
INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE DISTURBANCES OR ACTS
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE VISIT TO ARGENTINA OF FORMER PRESIDENT BILL
CLINTON. GIVEN THE HEIGHTENED ALERT WORLD-WIDE OF POTENTIAL
(b)(1)
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TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS, TWO CASES OF UNSOLVED
TERRORIST ACTIVITY HERE ASCRIBED TO HIZBALLAH WITH SUSPECTED IRANIAN
SUPPORT SHOULD BE NOTED. ARGENTINA IS ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE THERE IS: IN THE
TRI-BORDER AREA A NUMBER OF EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS; IN-COUNTRY
REPRESENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS; AND TERRORIST
GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE CONFIDENT
THERE IS NO PLANNED THREAT AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT, NOR IS THERE
INDICATION OF PLANNED VIOLENT ACTS THAT MAY IMPACT ON HIS VISIT.
UNPREDICTABLE LABOR AND SOCIAL DISTURBANCES MAY BE ORGANIZED, BUT THE
MOVEMENT OF VISITORS WILL BE PLANNED TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE
CONFRONTATIONS. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL
POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS, AND WILL SHARE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE VISIT WITH THE AERONAUTICAL
POLICE AT EZEIZA AIRPORT, THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE, AND POSSIBLY THE
PROVINCIAL POLICE. SIDE, ARGENTINA'S PRIMARY INTETTTi4PNrE
ORGANIZATION. WILL PROVIDE TNTELLTC4FNCE SUPPORT I
VIOLENT STREET
CRIME, HOTEL ROBBERIES, AND CRIMINAL/POLICE SHOOT-OUTS ARE A PROBLEM
IN BUENOS AIRES, BUT ARE MORE LIKELY TO AFFECT ADVANCE AND SUPPORT
ELEMENTS THAN THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S PARTY.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
TEXT: 1. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT (b)(1)
ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE (b)(3)
DISTURBANCES OR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE 10 JULY 2001 VISIT TO
BUENOS AIRES OF FORMER PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON. THE VISIT HAS BEEN
HIGHLY PUBLICIZED IN PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AS WELL AS THE NAME
OF THE HOTEL, WHERE THE PRESIDENT WILL BE STAYING AND HOLDING HIS
CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH WITH NO PARTICULAR EMPHASIS. BUENOS AIRES HAS
BEEN THE SCENE OF TWO BLOODY TERRORIST ATTACKS, ONE ON 18 JULY 1994
AGAINST THE ARGENTINE-ISRAELI MUTUAL ASSOCIATION (AMIA), IN WHICH 86
PEOPLE WERE KILLED, AND THE OTHER ON 17 MARCH 1992 AGAINST THE
ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WHICH 25 PEOPLE WERE KILLED; VEHICULAR BOMBS WERE
EMPLOYED IN BOTH INCIDENTS. OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE IRANIAN
EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE PROVIDED AT LEAST SOME
SUPPORT FOR THE AMIA ATTACK
ALTHOUGH HIZBALLAH CLAIMED CREDIT FOR
THE ISRAELI EMBASSY BOMBING, THERE IS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO
BACK-UP HIZBALLAH'S LINK TO THE EMBASSY BOMBING. BOTH CASES REMAIN
UNSOLVED AND ARE A POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING ISSUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT.
GIVEN THE HISTORY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA, THERE IS ALWAYS
CONCERN THAT BUENOS AIRES COULD BE THE SITE OF A THIRD ATTEMPT,
ALTHOUGH THERE IS AS OF THIS DATE NO SPECIFIC REPORTING OF ANY SUCH
PLANNING. GIVEN THE CURRENT HEIGHTENED STATE OF ALERT FOR U.S.
PERSONS AND INSTALLATIONS WORLD-WIDE, HOWEVER, OFFICIAL U.S.
INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE HISTORY OF PRIOR
TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA IN THEIR SECURITY PLANNING WHILE IN COUNTRY.
2. THE 1992 BOMBING WAS A REPRISAL FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK IN
LEBANON. THUS, ARGENTINEAN CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD
ATTACK IS USUALLY HEIGHTENED FOLLOWING VIOLENCE AGAINST HIZBALLAH OR
PALESTINIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE "SECOND INTIFADA" DRIVING THE
PRESENT STATE OF ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT ADDS CONCERN TO
SECURITY PLANNING FOR A VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES.
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3. THERE IS IN THE TEA A LARGE MUSLIM COMMUNITY,
THERE
ARE ALSO GROUPINGS OF SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, PRIMARILY THE GAMA'AT
AL-ISLAMIYAH (IG) AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS).
ALTHOUGH THE LATTER TWO HAVE YET TO CONDUCT ANY ACT OF VIOLENCE IN
THE REGION.
THE DISRUPTION
OF HIZBALLAH GROUPS IN CIUDAD DEL ESTE, PARAGUAY AND THE ARREST IN
1999 AND IMPRISONMENT IN URUGUAY OF AN IG MEMBER WHO SINCE THEN HAS
BEEN AWAITING EXTRADITION TO EGYPT ALLEGEDLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE
1997 ATTACK IN LUXOR, IN WHICH 58 TOURISTS WERE KILLED. MEMBERS OF
THESE GROUPS IN THE TEA, WHO TRAVEL FREQUENTLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST,
POTENTIALLY COULD BLAME TIM Uq FOR T1-TTS
OVERALL, THE
ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS HAS ALWAYS MADE
U.S. OFFICIALS AND INSTITUTIONS ATTRACTIVE TARGETS. THE
WELL-PUBLICIZED U.S. PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY HEIGHTEN
THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTENTION FROM THESE GROUPS. SEVERAL U.S.
EMBASSIES IN SOUTH AMERICA HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN THE TARGET OF ALLEGED
THREATS BY ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS OVER THE COURSE OF CALENDAR YEARS 2000
AND 2001. NONE OF THESE THREATS, HOWEVER, HAVE MATERIALIZED INTO AN
ACTUAL ATTACK NOR HAVE THEY BEEN PROVEN TO HAVE BEEN LEGITIMATE.
4. THERE ARE NO EXTANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERRORIST GROTIB TN
ARGENTINA WHICH WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT.
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5. IN EARLY JULY 2000, A SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
(FSLN) SPONSORED "MILITARY BRIGADE" REPORTEDLY FINISHED TRAINING IN
NICARAGUA AND MEMBERS WERE EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO SOUTH AMERICA TO
CARRY OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THE BRIGADE ALLEGEDLY WAS TRAINED
WITH FINANCING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA
(FARC). THE EFFORT PURPORTEDLY WAS PART OF A NEW FARC STRATEGY TO
"VIETNAMIZE" ITS ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
SUPPORT TO COLOMBIA. MEMBERS OF THE BRIGADE AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
IN THIS ALLEGED EFFORT INCLUDED CUBANS, PERUVIAN TUPAC AMARU
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) MEMBERS, AND MEMBERS OF OTHER GROUPS
WHICH CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ADVERSARY.
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7.
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8. ARGENTINES ARE FREE TO EXPRESS OPENLY THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS.
THIS IS OFTEN DONE THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS AND BLOCKADES OF STREETS
AND ROADS. 2001 HAS THUS FAR BEEN A BANNER YEAR FOR EXPRESSING
POLITICAL DISSENT AGAINST "GLOBALIZATION" AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES
AIMING TO CORRECT THE FISCAL SITUATION. THESE AUSTERITY MEASURES ARE
INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS TO THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL
LENDING INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAVE ASSISTED ARGENTINA TO AVOID FINANCIAL
DISASTER WHILE IT ATTEMPTS TO PUT ITS FISCAL HOUSE IN ORDER. MANY
POLITICAL, LABOR, AND SOCIAL LEADERS SEE THESE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AS
PREJUDICIAL TO ARGENTINE SOCIETY AND AS AN INDICATION THE GOVERNMENT
IS BOWING DOWN TO "GLOBALIZATION" FORCES. IN EARLY APRIL 2001 THERE
WERE MASSIVE, MOSTLY PEACEFUL PROTESTS AGAINST THE SIXTH FTAA
MINISTERIAL HELD IN BUENOS AIRES. LABOR, STUDENT, AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATED. THERE WAS SOME VIOLENCE DURING THE LAST
DAY OF THE MEETING, AGAIN SPURRED BY A SMALL GROUP OF YOUTH WHO
INFILTRATED THE PEACEFUL PROTEST. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN FEWER
DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY IN 2001 THAN IN THE PREVIOUS
YEAR, THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS LED TO SOME EXTREME BEHAVIOR
AMONG ARGENTINE PROTESTERS. THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEVEN THOUSAND
JOBS IF THE NATIONAL FLAG AIRLINE, "AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS," OWNED BY
THE SPANISH, LED TO PEACEFUL PROTEST IN JUNE WHICH DEGENERATED INTO
VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. DURING THE WEEK OF 11 JUNE,
SECURITY FORCES RESTRICTED ACCESS TO EZEIZA, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE PROTESTERS. IN ONE SPECIFIC
AND DANGEROUS EVENT REPORTED BY "LA NACION" 13 JUNE, PROTESTERS
BLOCKED THE PRIMARY RUNWAY TRYING TO PREVENT AEROLINEAS AND OTHER
AIRLINES FROM COMING IN AND DEPARTING. ON 20 APRIL, A FEDERAL JUDGE
ORDERED AEROLINEAS TO RESUME FLYING ITS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE AND
ENJOINED IT FROM FIRING ITS EMPLOYEES, BUT A SMALL CONTINGENT OF
AEROLINEAS EMPLOYEES MAINTAIN A SMALL PROTEST BEACHHEAD IN EZEIZA
AIRPORT'S ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES BUILDING IN FRONT OF THE
AEROLINEAS/IBERIA COUNTERS. IT IS NOT LIKELY THESE FEW PROTESTERS,
HEAVILY GUARDED BY AUTHORITIES, WOULD IMPEDE THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S
PASSAGE THROUGH THE AIRPORT, BUT BECAUSE THE SPANISH HOLDER OF THE
AIRLINE HAS TACITLY DECIDED TO SELL IT, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT
THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S PARTY MAY ENCOUNTER ROADBLOCKS COMING FROM OR
GOING TO THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, THE SECURITY FORCES CLOSELY MONITOR
PROTESTS AND STRIKES, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THE U.S. EMBASSY
OR VISITORS, AND WILL REROUTE MOTORCADES OF VISITING OFFICIALS WHEN
NECESSARY TO AVOID CONTACT WITH DEMONSTRATIONS. WITH THE ABOVE
POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS, THERE ARE NO OTHER INDICATIONS ANY GROUP PLANS
TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT PURPOSELY THREATEN, EMBARRASS, OR
(b)(1)
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IMPEDE FORMER PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT.
9. PRESIDENT FERNANDO ((DE LA RUA)) VISITED WITH THEN PRESIDENT
CLINTON IN THE U.S. IN JUNE 2000. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT IS
RELATED TO ACTIVITIES OF DE LA RUA'S SON, FERNANDO, WHOSE EDUCATIONAL
ENDEAVOR IS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PROJECT. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA THAT THE VISIT GO OFF SMOOTHLY. DE LA
RUA ALSO MET 19 APRIL 2001 WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. THE VISIT HELPED
PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE COOPERATION THE MISSION RECEIVES FROM THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST BILATERAL
RELATIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL ARE ON TRACK.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
10. THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RULING ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT
AND THE PERONIST JUSTICIALIST PARTY (PJ), THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY
TO DE LA RUA, WHO WAS ELECTED BY AN ALLIANCE OF THE OCR AND THE
'FRONT FOR A COUNTRY IN SOLIDARITY' (FREPASO). THERE IS
DISSATISFACTION IN THE PJ FOR WHAT SOME SEE AS THE POLITICAL
IMPRISONMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENT CARLOS SAUL ((MENEM)) ON CHARGES HE
FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND WAS THE LEADER OF AN ILLICIT ASSOCIATION
WHICH SENT ARMS ILLEGALLY TO CROATIA AND ECUADOR, WHILE UNITED
NATIONS SANCTIONS WERE IN PLACE, DURING THE EARLY TO MID-19905.
MOREOVER, DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF THE MINORITY FREPASO ELEMENT OF THE
ALLIANCE CAN BE VOCAL IN THEIR CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICIES. HOWEVER,
WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY FOR ANY VIOLENT ACT TO EMANATE FROM THE FORMAL
POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA. THE VISIT MAY, HOWEVER, PROVIDE
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISSATISFIED GROUPS AND SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS POLITICAL
PARTIES ALLIED WITH DISSIDENT LABOR UNIONS TO PROTEST BILATERAL TRADE
ISSUES, THE IMF, EXTERNAL DEBT ISSUES, AND, POSSIBLY, ARGENTINA'S
HUMAN RIGHTS VOTE AGAINST CUBA AT THE UNCHR IN GENEVA.
11. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL
POLICE (AFP) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS AND BEARS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF HIGH LEVEL FOREIGN OFFICIALS
(INCLUDING FORMER HEADS-OF-STATE). THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE
PERSONAL SECURITY OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF
BUENOS AIRES. IN BUENOS AIRES, THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF SECURITY
FOR VIP MOVEMENTS, LODGINGS, AND ALL SITES WHERE ACTIVITIES WILL TAKE
PLACE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT. THE AFP WILL HAVE AT ITS
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DISPOSAL ALL ITS RESOURCES, TO INCLUDE AN EXPLOSIVES BRIGADE,
U.S.-TRAINED CANINE TEAMS, A SPECIAL SUPPORT SWAT GROUP (THE GEOF
UNIT -- "GUPOS ESPECIALFS OPERACTONES FEDERALES"1 AND AN ATR
nuAnRnm
THE AERONAUTICAL POLICE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF AIRPLANE
SECURITY AT EZEIZA AIRPORT AND ALL OTHER AIRPORT FACILITIES UTILIZED,
LUGGAGE SECURITY, AND ANTI-EXPLOSIVE CONTROLS. THE BUENOS AIRES
PROVINCIAL POLICE WILL AUGMENT MOTORCADE MOVEMENTS FROM EZEIZA TO THE
CAPITAL AS NEEDED.
12. A MAJOR ISSUE IN TODAY'S ARGENTINA IS INSECURITY DUE TO
INCREASED CRIME. DAILY THERE ARE INCIDENCES OF "EXPRESS" BANK AND
PERSONAL ROBBERIES, FEDERAL POLICEMEN KILLED-- 32 SINCE JANUARY
2001--AND A SMALL BUT WORRISOME INCREASE IN VIOLENCE ACROSS THE
BOARD. CITIZENS ARE SO UPSET WITH THE LACK OF SECURITY THEY FAVOR
GIVING POLICE ADDITIONAL POWERS EVEN IF THAT MEANS RESTRICTING
PERSONAL LIBERTIES. ON 21 JUNE, FOR EXAMPLE, A LOCAL NEWSPAPER
PUBLISHED A CHRONOGRAM OF 12 HOURS OF VIOLENCE WHICH LEFT NINE DEAD
AS A RESULT OF FIREFIGHTS IN THE CAPITAL CITY. ON 17 JUNE THERE WAS
A SOCIAL UPRISING IN SALTA PROVINCE, IN NORTHWESTERN ARGENTINA. THE
ROOT OF THE PROBLEM WAS AN ATTEMPT BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO OPEN UP
A ROADBLOCK ON A NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTE WHICH CONNECTS BUENOS
AIRES WITH BOLIVIA AND PROTECT AN OIL REFINERY STORAGE FACILITY WHICH
HOUSES FIVE MILLION LITTERS OF PETROLEUM TN THE TOWN OF GENERAL
MOSCONI IN SALTA. THE STANDOFF
BEGAN WITH A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN GN AND PROTESTERS IN THE TOWN OF
GENERAL MOSCONI, RESULTING IN 24 GN ENLISTED PERSONNEL INJURED, TWO
CRITICALLY, AND TWO BYSTANDERS KILLED. WHILE THE SITUATION HAS
CALMED DOWN, THE STANDOFF CONTINUES. VISITORS MAY FIND THEMSELVES IN
THE MIDDLE OR BECOME VICTIMS OF ARMED ASSAULTS, AGGRAVATED ROBBERIES,
AND CRIMINAL SHOOT-OUTS WITH THE POLICE; INCIDENTS OF ARMED INVASIONS
OF BANKS, RESTAURANTS, SHOPS, AND RESIDENCES BY CRIMINAL GROUPS OCCUR
WITH FREQUENCY. SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS AND DEPENDENTS RECENTLY
HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF MOSTLY NON-VIOLENT PERSONAL CRIME. ADVANCE AND
SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR THE VISIT SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS FACT, AS A
VISITING U.S. SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEAM WAS MUGGED BY A GROUP OF
THIEVES ON THE "FLORIDA" PEDESTRIAN SHOPPING STREET SOME YEARS AGO,
AND THE ROOMS OF A U.S. DELEGATION IN BUENOS AIRES FOR A UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE WERE ROBBED OF CASH, JEWELRY, AND LAPTOP
COMPUTERS. THE OFFICIAL PARTY ITSELF SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY
CRIMINAL ELEMENTS GIVEN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BY ARGENTINE
AUTHORITIES. WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS NORMAL
VIGILANCE AND COMMON SENSE REQUIRED WHEN TRAVELING TO ANY LARGE CITY.
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ACQ:
DISSEM:
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
SENT TO
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, SOCCOM.
WARNING: REP CLASSSECRET--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
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