MINORITY DISSENT ON GUSTO (W/ATTACHMENT)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00823080
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02619
• Publication Date: July 13, 1959

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GUS-0347V/
13 JU1Y 1959
Notes for Mr. Bissell
Minority Dissent on GUSTO
1. In order that the A-12/KINGFISH design be attractive we must
presuppose that the BARLOCK rminr will be very close in performance to
the estimate made by ATIC and not nearly as good as estimated by OSI/SEI;
furthermore that the A-12/KINGFISH design can achieve a radnr cross-
section as low as estimated by Rodgers. On the other hnpd the
radar cross section of the FISH design is known from actual tests.
The uncertainties here lie in the ability to retain this low cross
section in going from models to real aircraft and again in BARLOCK
performance.
2. The OSI/SEI BARLOCK performance estimate is such that the
FISH design is in what might be called a 50/50 region of radar detections/
tracking. On the basis of the ATIC estimate the FISH would be practically
undetectible. By the same standards the A-12/K1NGFIsH designs fall in
this 50/50 region only on the ATIC basis; by OSI/SEI estimate these designs
are almost in the A-11, B-471 etc. category.
3. It is expected that it will be much more difficult to reach
the radar cross section in the order of one sq. meter with the A-12/
KINGFISH designs than it was to reach the smiler cross section of the
FISH design. should BARLOCK performance be closer to the OSI/SEI
estimate, or should model tests reveal inability to reduce the cross
section to a sufficiently low level, or if the progression from models
to actual aircraft involve small increases in radar cross section then
the A-12/K1NGFISH designs turn out but slightly better than A-11 in
terns of radar detection and tracking. All of this comes about because
of the very high sensitivity to small changes in cross section at these
levels of cross section.
4. The sonic boom problem remains ill defined but has been cate-
gorized as a 50/50 type of occurrence. The volumetric difference between
the FISH and A-12/KINGFISH designs is such that these latter will generate
a boom of about four times the intensity of that of the FISH. Hence the
A-12/KINGFISH sonic boom would be likely to cover a greater width and be
more complete in longitudinal track.
5. While the Soviets may believe there is little chance that the
F108 and B70 will ever become operational, so long as these programs
continue they must at least think of developing an active countermeasure
to these Mach 3, 65,000-75,000' altitude aircraft. Any such countermeasure
would probably retain a higher level of effectiveness against the Mach 3.2,
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85,000' altitudes of the A-11/12/KINGFISH than against the Mach 4,
90,000' FISH performance.
6. Discounting the paragraph above I fear the A-12/KINGFIRH
direction merely delays A-11 by three or four months. The price of
useable low radAr cross section, I fear, is operational complexity.
If this price is too high we should get on with A-11 post haste.
(b)(6)
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Gus-0346/
13 July 1959
Notes for Mr. Bissell re GUSTO additional factors bearing on decisions
reached at 8 July meeting.
1. P&W can provide M3.5 version of J-58 if decision is made in
July; total cost thru FY 1962 still $72.5 M.
1st Flt.
M 3.2 eng.
IN 3.5 eng.
A-11
A-12 KINGFISH
Jan 61 Jan 61 (all tin) May 61
July 61 July 61 July 61
Hi M 3.2 eng.
86,500
83,000
84,000
Ht, M 3.5 eng.
89,500
86,000
87,000
2. Convair people do not believe the decision to cancel B-58B is
firm. Their story is that B-58B costs were questioned by Gen. LeMay.
Gen. Mark Bradley is to be in Ft. Worth next Friday, 17 July to examine
Convair cost estimates.
Convair also supplies these estimates to modify B-58A to B-583:
Alternate 1.
Alternate 2.
Build aB-58B from a progrPmmed but unbuilt
B-58A.
Incremental cost $2.075M including $1.6M for
4 J-79-9 engines.
Modify an alreaay built B-58A to B-58B.
Incremental cost $6.02M including costs of
4 J-79-9 engines.
These costs presume airplane no. 68 (B-58B prototype) remain in program.
This airplane is priced at $39M including non-recurring tooling costs, etc.
Convair propose a third alternate, a six engine version of B-58A with
J-79-5 engines; cost increment $2.63M including engines.
3. GE J-79-9 engine program costs as best I can deduce are:
Total additional funds needed to 150 hour qualification
$50M. One half of this amount has been flInacId between Jan.
July of this year.
Production engines begin at $600,000 decreasing to $250,000
500th engine.
EUGEBE P. KIEFER
nET
and
each
(b)(6)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. James R. Killian
SUBJECT: Status of Project GUSTO
GUS-0348 /
13 July 1959
1. Since the time of reporting to you on 15 November 1959 the
Convair and Lockheed companies have continued their design study efforts
to evolve a suitable successor to the U-2 aircraft. The major features
of four possible alternate designs appear in the tabulation belay.
Designation:
mf gr :
Speed:
A-11
LAC
m 3.2
A-12 UNWISE
LAC Convair
M 3.2 m 3.2
FISH
Convair
M 4
Alt. Start Cruise:
86,500 ft.
83,000 84,00o
90,000
Range:
4,100 n.mi.
3,940 4,070
3,900
Gross Weight:
94,500 lbs.
110,000 101,000
38,300
Length:
106 ft.
100' 78'
47,
Wing Span:
56 ft.
56' 52'
37'
Power Plant:
2-J580
2-J58A/B 2-J58A/B
2-Ramjets
2-J85
1st Flight:
Jan 1961
Jan 61 (metal) MaY 61
Jan 61
May 61 (radar
matls.)
2. The A-11 design by Lockheed represents an attempt to obtain
the highest level of aerodynamic performance without recourse to opera-
tional complexity beyond conventional aerial refuelling Pna is uncompro-
mised by unusual features intended to minimize detection by radar. This
design is backed by about two months of study and low speed wind tunnel
tests only.
3. The A-12 and KINGFISH designs are of most recent vintage. These
designs attempt to retain operating simplicity in addition to incorporating
features to minimize their radar echo. Only a few radar model tests at
70 mc. have been accomplished on the ElNGFISH version in the short time
since these designs were started. Hence the estimates of aerodynamic
performance smn other characteristics have not as yet been substantiated
by tests and detailed study. There is very little difference between
these two designs at the present time.
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4. The FISH proposal represents the design approach recommended
in the 15 November report to you. This design is a modification of the
original SUPER HUSTLER concept. The aircraft is carried aloft and
accelerated to supersonic speed by a B-58 mother craft.
5. Wind tunnel model tests have demonstrated the validity of the
estimated aerodynamic characteristics. However, the more powerful
engines scheduled for the B-58B series aircraft are needed for accelera-
tion. Structural testing has established confidence in the materiels
of construction. Radar testing including a full scale model has
established that the aircraft should have an exceedingly small rannr
echo at frequencies near 70 megacycles, 600 megacycles, and S-Band.
While it would be desirable to further reduce the radar cross section
the amounts and extents of the higher-thpp-desired rarlar echos are
relatively small.
6. The ability of the Soviets to detect and track overflying air-
craft by radar depends upon the extent and ability of the rarlar network
in addition to the nature of the echo. The most potent radar expected
in the Soviet network during the next few years is the S-band BARLOCK.
Using estimates made by the Air Force ATIC of the BARLOCK radar it could
be said that the FISH design, at the level of radar echo shown in full
scale model tests, would be almost never detected or tracked. However,
on the basis of more stringent estimates of BARLOCK performance by CIA
it must be said that the radar echo from the FISH aircraft would be such
as to indicate detection of something on Soviet mum scopes particularly
after the first few exposures. The low echo level and high speed of the
FISH aircraft would enable only sporadic and disconnected tracking.
7. No radar testing has been accomplished as yet at S-Band fre-
quencies on the A-12 or KINGFISH designs. It has been estimated however
that, while the radar echo of these two designs might not be reduced to
the same level as that of the FISH, it could be made sufficiently low so
as to make radar tracking extremely difficult.
8. The presence of any of the four proposed aircraft would be
disclosed to an airborne infra-red detection system should the Soviets
develop this manner of surveillance against intruders.
9. Although a body of theory exists to describe the sonic boom
phenomena the practical data available are quite meager and not well
related. Aircraft such as these proposed are estimated to cause some
form of sonic boom at irregular intervals along perhaps half the ground
track. Due to smaller size the FISH proposal is expected to generate a
less intense sonic boom than the other three designs,
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10. All four of these aircraft are estimated to have sufficient
range to reach 01 Sib-Soviet territory. The A-11, A-12, and KINGFISH
designs could operate from a single base in the U.S. with rendezvous re-
fuellings outbound and inbound from KC-135 tankers based in Alaska and
Greenland. A third rendezvous refuelling would be needed with a tanker
based in North Africa for the deepest penetrations. The FISH aircraft
would require bases in Alaska and either Greenland or England and buddy
refuelling of the B-58 mother from a KC-135 on longest missions. Lnnding
facilities for the FISH and for a cargo aircraft for retrieval would be
needed at three locations near Soviet territory or the FISH could be towed to
home base by a KC-135 as in a prolonged rendezvous aerial refuelling.
11. In recent days the continuance by the Air Force of the
B-58B airplane program and that of the 3-79-9 engine has become quite
unlikely. Since the B-58B aircraft is needed to accelerate the FISH
to supersonic speed in order to launch,the cancellation of the B-58B
together with the operational complexity of the FISH proposal lead to
the conclusion that further consideration of the FISH is unwarranted.
Similarly, due to the conventionnily high radar echo expected from the
A-11 design further consideration of this proposal is unwarranted.
12. Approximately three to four months of testing and study may be
needed to establish the same level of confidence in the estimates of
radar echo, aerodynamic performance, and other characteristics of the
A-11 or KINGFISH designs as is now held in the case of the FISH proposal.
It is recommended that approval be given to undertake the necessary tests
and detailed study at an estimated cost of $1,750,000. Because of the
similarity of designs this additional work would be undertaken with
but one and not both of the contractors now in this program.
RICHARD N. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
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