VC/NVN STRATEGY FOR THE TET GENERAL OFFENSIVE.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00758622
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 26, 1968

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COUNTRY
SUBJECT '
: NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) .
SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
LAOS, AND CAMBODIA ,
4 VC/NVN Strategy tor the TET
General Offensive.
DATE OF INFO : January 1968
DATE OF INFO 16 February 1968 (I - P)
OF ACQUISITION : DANANG, QUANG NAM
NIC REPORT NO : 198/68
NIC CASE NO : FET
DATE OF REPORT: 26*/68
NO. OF PAGES : 3
REFERENCE : NIO Report
199/68(PIR)
� This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 16 February
1968 in DANANG City, QUANG NAM Province, SVN. Source is not available at
the NIC for further exploitation.
,
SUMMARY
Realizing that the strategy employed by General NGUYEN CHI THANH had failed,
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CONFIDENTIAL
NIC REPORT NO : 198/68
Page 2
GenerillTANH was recalled to NVN and a new strategy was formulated. Factors
Considered in planning this new strategy were the loose coordination between
Allied forces and GVN forces and the use of GVN troops in the rural reconstruc-
tion program. The strategy would limit attacks on rural areas and the holding
of such,areas by the VC. A general offensive would be launched against the
cities to force the GVN forces to withdraw from the rural areas, leaving these
areas to the VC. If the city offensive failed, the VC would retreat and
surround the cities to exhaust the economy of SVN. U.S. forces would be
decoyed into the KHE SANH area. Simultaneously with a demand for a coalition
government in SVN, NVN would launch an o4fensive in either the KONTUM-PLEIKU
or SAIGON areas.
During 1967 the VC acted as though they were weakening in order to
Mislead the GVN/Allies. In reality, men and weapons were moved into SVN
in a considerable quantity during 1967. The VC predicted that in the
summer: of 1968 the U.S. would increase its strength in SVN, and wanted to
increase their own strength first. The VC also planned to put full pressure
on the U.S. during 1968 because of the U.S. presidential elections.
2.
� General NGUYEN CHI THANH had been
� recalled to NVN because of the failure of his strategy. General THOM
was later reported as having died in NVN. HO PHUOC quoted General VO
NGUYEN GIAP as saying that "The SVN battlefield must be re-considered,
� because General THOTH had made a mistake in applying the strategy of
occupying rural areas $ establishing organizations in these areas, and
trying to had these liberated areas. This strategy resulted in our
troops being eliminated by GVN troops and B-52 bombers". In addition,
delegations from communist China North Korea and Cuba had visited the
SVN battlefield, and upon returning to NVN had reported unfavorably on
the situation there.
General GIAP had also said, "Prior to
negotiations, there must be an acid test". In planning the new strategy
forSVN, the following factors were considered:
a. ,IThe coordination between Allied and GVN troops was loose. Allied
-,1,troops only tried to protect their bases. The KOREAN actions of -
wanton killing caused the people to lose confidence in the allied
troops.
, � �
GVN troops were employed scatteredly in the rural reconstruction
program, and could therefore be easily separated and destroyed.
The U.S. would not employ infantry troops to reinforce the GVN
troops but would only provide air and artillery support.
4. Based on the above factors and General THANHIs failure, the following
-
s. . three phase strategy was set up:
PHASE 1: Attacks on, and the protection of rural areas, would be limited.
At an opportune time, a general offensive against the cities of SVN would
be made. Only one half of the forces would be committed, and then only
using local combat experienced units, except in important cities like
SAIGON and HUE. The general offensive would cause the GVN troops to pull
back to protect the cities, leaving the rural areas to the liberation troops.
In this way the VC planned to achieve a complete victory in the rural areas
withOut the necessity of fighting in these areas.
�
CONFIENTIAL - KIN
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NIC REPORT NO: 198/68
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E2: ,If .the general offensive against the cities and townships were
to Tail, the liberation troops would retreat and surroundthe cities and
townships in order to create an intense and serious situation and to
exhaust the economy. Because of the lack of rural area resources in the
cities, and inadequate food assistance, the SVN piastre would be devalued.
At the same time the VC would use decoy tactics to lure as many U.S.
troops as possible to protect the KHE SANH area to weaken U.S. strength
in other areas.
,,,Because of the pressures generated by phase 2, the VC felt that
-SVN would accept a coalition government with the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). Simultaneously with the demand for a
coalition government, NVN would launch a decisive battle to provide
political support to the NFLVN component in the coalition government.
This decisive battle would eil,herlake place in the KONTUM/PLEIKU Area
or in the area around SAIGON. was positive about the above two
locations because during the indoctrination about the "Entire Regional
Battle," (CHIEN TRUONG TOAN CUC) given by Colonel VO THU, during the
November/December 1967 period, Colonel THU made the following comments,
"The SAIGON area battle (actually the BINH LONG, PHUOC LONG, PHUOC TUY,
BIEN HOA, TAY NINH, and GIA DINH Province areas) will be an important
battefield because the supply route from CAMBODIA is feasible, and is '
adjacent to SAIGON City. In confronting strong U.S. and GVN forces there,
the VC can easily win prestige with a decisive battle. If the VC chooses
B..3, they will only fight in KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces because of the
strong U.S./GVN forces in those areas, and because the NVN High Command
can easily supply this area through the LAOTIAN/VIETNAMESE border".
In order to carry out the new strategy, all activites in the southern
Part of LAOS would incretst so that most WA regular units could infil-
trate. SVN. Only coastal defense units, AAA units, and units guarding
important installation would remain in NVN. All forces would be used to
attack and to lure U.S. troops to KHE SANH and away from the decisive
bettle areas, emphasized that in the past the VC/NVA troops had
fought against U.S. troops, but according to the new suprise attack
strategy, they would try not to fight against U.S. troops, but only to
btseige and hod them in defensive positions at their bases.
HO PHUOC said during December 1967, that the U.S. Government had asked
tht GVN to accept a coalition government with the NFLVN and NVN, but that
the GVN had refused. The U.S. wants to bring the war to an honorable end
during 1968. In addition, NVN has captured almost 1,000 U.S. pilots,
and the U.S. wants to reso;ve this problem with NVN; thus SVN is eventually
concerned. Both the U.S. and NVN realize that neither side can win the
war. Therefore, they both want a coalition goventment to end the war.
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