SOLDIER (FURTHER DESIGNATION UNKNOWN)

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00758610
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 5, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758610
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CONFIDENTIAL KIN
INTERROO TION REPORT
THIS REPORT IS THE Agsum OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED
BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6:
6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO
DATE AND PLACE
OF ACQUISITION :
: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
unknown
Soldier,
er designation
29 January 1 February 1968
5 February 1968 (H.- P)
SAIGON, Vietnam
NIC REPORT N?:- 233/68
NIC CASE NO FET
DATE OF REPORT: 5/3/68
NO. OF PAGES : 3
REFERENCE : None
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 5 February 1968
in SAIGON City, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further
exploitation.
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n. 1 Di alu ORT NO : 233/68
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quartering in LOC VINH, TRANG BANG District, TAY NINH
Province, underwent training in preparation for attacking cities from
October 1967 to January 1968. Although studies were couched in general
terms and no city was identified as the object of attack, the team was
told to take advantage of city topography while attacking. The team
members learned that infantry should be utilized in attacking houses,
using such weapons as grenades, AKA rifles and B401s. They studied a
two to three-page document on attacking cities. Team 2, in particular,
practided house attacks. Team members learned to crawl to the door of
a house to toss a grenade inside; to fire an AKA rifle inside after
throwing the grenade and observe signs of life; and to enter the house
if no one inside was left alive. If the house were a two-story one,
the team learned that two team members must fire upstairs from the
outside of the house while the others penetrated the house and tried
to rush the stairs. They were told to first attack the front of the .
house first, and if the house had several entranc4s to attack them also.
The largest door was considered the easiest to attack.
On the'evening.of 29 January Team
began'tw.move.
consisti of 14 men led by
The
other eight had left with on 29 January. The group was informed
the evening before that it was going to celebrate TET in Saigon; it was
not advised that there would be a battle there. Source's group was led
to a house on LE VAN DUYET Street at 1300 hours, 30 January. They
remained there until 1900 hours and cleaned weapons cached there. No
one in the group carried a weapon into Saigon. The GVN police had
already arrested occupants of the house; the house was in the name of
CHU BAX. Since no one was there to receive the infiltrators, their
guide remained there and cooked for them. At 2100 hours, the team was
led to THAN QUY CAP Street where Team Chief told the soldiers
to prepare their weapons. were already in place
at-,TRAN QUY CAP; the three team members,
whe joined them there were assigned the task of cleaning weapons already
stored there which they did until the middle of the night. (Source was
later told that the GVN police knew about this house because one of his
*Fades led them to it. This was revealed to Source by his VN interro.
gator.) The team assembled with weapons and remained in the house until
0230, 31 January, when the other 8 team members arrived in a vehicle
, driven by At 0230 they studied a sand table of Independence
Palace to learn its topography; Source claims that his group was told
to attack the Palace only 15 minutes (0245) before they actually
commenced, at which time they received the order to attack the Palace
ih'full strength (14 men) and defend it to the lastmanwhen Allied forces
tried to drive them out. They were told to expect no reserves or
reinforcements. The team was not advised of fighting in other cities or
even of other attacks taking place in the capital region. The soldiers
did not expect support from the local populace and did not receive it at
a4Y time. Although afraid of dying, the members of the team were
determined to successfully attack the Palace to show that no place in
SaigorZwas safe from the VC. This fact alone, according to
would make the attack a success.
The team went in three vehicles from TRAN QUY CAP-to the attacking
site, drove one car; ' team member drove one, and
drove the other. The 14-man team opened fire on the Palace at
0300, 31 January 1968, and continued fighting until the afternoon of 1
February. Source, and eight other team members with-
drew at 0800 hours, 31 January to the corner of NGUYEN DU and THU KHOA
HUAN Streets where they remained until 1800 hours. One team member was
killed there. The team first stayed in a large building on the corner
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it NIC REPORT NO : 233/68
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then crossed the roof to another house next door where they remained
on the roof until 1 Feb when i 'litary Police discovered them at
Inasmuch as they had
rue e o g to the last man, they rationalized their
surrender by deciding that orders no longer pertained since they were
not ins1ae the Palace grounds. They were afraid, hungry, and had
received no moral or material support from the people in the house who
were on the ground floor. At the time of surrender Source had an AKA
and one magazine (30 rounds); other team members had AKA weapons and
magazine rounds.
.The 14-man team was equipped with the following material after its
'arrival in Saigon: eight kilo charge TNT; seven kilo charge TNT; four
hand grenades for each man; 14 AK submachine guns (one for eadh team
member); 120 rounds (four magazines) for each man; three B40 rockets
,(30 rounds total); two Colts, 12 MM, and three magazines (about 7/8
rounds per magazine); two small gasoline drums containing C4 substance.
Source believed that the attack on the Palace would be successful
because it was a surprise attack. Although he believes that he failed
personally, he nevertheless feels that the fighting was necessary
because it was his duty to resist the United States. Most of the people
who comprised his 14-man team were about 20 years old; the team leader
was over 30, and one man was over 40. Source felt that younger men were
better suited for this type of mission.
6. The team was compartmentalized and did not know about the movement of
� other troop units. Source claims that the team did not know the identity
of other targets in Saigon or the number of troops attacking them. The
other section of the L had been sent on an unknown mission
to an unknown locatidh,
TeamLIa1so received political training at LOC VINH prior to the TET
attack on Saigon. They studied a one-page political docutent, high
echelon resolutions, and the following subjects: (a) the United Statest
position in SVN, including world public opinion about United States
actions; active opposition of other countries to United States agression
in SVN; opposition of the allies of the United States to escalation of
the war; United States citizens who had relatives in SVN; urban struggle
and anti-American demonstrations in SVN; failure of the United States
Army to master the battlefield and VC victories.
(Interrogator's Comment: Source was initially very uncooperative. He
did not want to disclose the fact that he studied English for three
months. He refused to disclose fully oldpunit designations or past
unit activities, especially those of Team l Through repetitive
questioning and prodding, the interrogator was able to extract the above
information from Source.)
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