DD/P STAFF MEETING MINUTES-11 MAY 1961
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
00741081
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
March 9, 2023
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2021
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2014-00454
Publication Date:
May 11, 1961
File:
Attachment | Size |
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DDP STAFF MEETING MINUTES[15890148].pdf | 79.85 KB |
Body:
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DD/P STAFF MEETING MINUTES - 11 May 1961
PRESENT: yr. Bissell
vi4r.
?Ir. Tweedy
REVIEWER: 006810
y. Helms
vICir. Lloyd !*r. Bross
Bross
loUr. Maury
Mr. Aurelt-v
L..dr. Gottlieb
. George
r. Roosevelt'
V&r. Stewart
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fr.
Mr. Parrott
Timm
r. Harvey
Oar.
vtr.
vMr.
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Turner
1/Ur. T-Tunt
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L. Special Meeting on Personnel. Mr. Bissell said he
desired to have an Executive Session concerning the surplus personnel
program, on 18 May 1961. In addition to the normal Executive Session
attendants, those Panel members who would not otherwise be represented
at an Executive Session would be invited to attend.
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Z. Cuban Aftermath. Mr. Bissell said he had seen a draft of
General Taylor's report. Mr. Bissell said this report was, in his view,
objective but somewhat rambling. The report attempts to deal with the
Long standing subject of how to bring all pieces of Government machinery
to bear on situations such as Cuba. Mr. Bissell said he thought this subject
matter would be very much up for discussion in the apxt few weeks._ Although
there wilt be an emphasis on paramilitary matters, the discussion will not
be limited to them.
Mr. Bissell raised the question of whether it would be
useful for him to summarize the lessons to be learned from the Cuban
operation at a meeting of Branch chiefs. It was decided that such a
discussion should be postponed for a time.
3. Presidential Task Force on Iran. Mr. Critchfield discussed
in some detail his participation in a Presidential Task Force on Iran. Mr.
Critchfield gave the impression that this particular Task Force was in such a
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41W
COisLFIDENTIAL
hurry it was in danger of running into itself. The estimative machinery
of the intelligence community was summarily dispensed with and the
Task Force broke into sub-Task forces whose jobs were simultaneously
to estimate and to plan for contingencies.
Mr. Bissell said he had had a somewhat similar experience
with the Cuban Task Force formed after the Cuban operation. Mr. Bissell
said he could draw some conclusions from these experiences:
a. Estimating should be done by estimators.
b. Agency field representatives called home to participate
in Task Forces should remain physically and organizationally
within the Agency and not be detailed to other departments.
c. Mr. Bissell would like to see all papers other than
estimative before they are cast in concrete.
d. There should be no covert annexes to Task Force
reports. (Covert annexes in this sense are tentative plans
for covert action.)
Somewhat allied with the above discussion, Mr. Bissell
mentioned that there was a strong move afoot to merge Joe Scott's office
in State with that of Roger Hilsman.
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Assistant to the DD/P
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