GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OCTOBER 1950 - FEBRUARY 1953 VOLUME III

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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
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• Publication Date: December 1, 1971

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CIA Historical Staff
CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
The DCI Historical Series
GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
As DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OCTOBER 1950 � FEBRUARY 1953
VOLUME III REORGANIZATION PURSUANT TO NSC 50
,sEeRtr
DCI � 1
December 1971
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'CIA Internal Use Only
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THE DCI HISTORICAL SERIES
DCI � 1
GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OCTOBER 1950 - FEBRUARY 1953
VOLUME III REORGANIZATION PURSUANT TO NSC 50
by
Ludwell Lee Montague
December 1971
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Contents
F.
-
Eat
I. The Reorganization 1
II. The Office of Intelligence Coordination � 6
III. The Office of National Estimates 13
A. The Central Reports Staff 14
B. The Failure of ORE 15
C. Five Proposals for Remedial Action 23
D. The Board of National Estimates � � ^ 37
E. The "Princeton Consultants" 50
F. The National Estimates Staff 54
G. Some Early Problems 63
IV. The Office of Research and Reports � � � � 82
A. The Creation of ORR 86
B. The Economic Intelligence Committee � 91
C. The Reorganization of ORR 95
V. The Office of Current Intelligence � � � � 101
A. Current Intelligence in CIA 102
B. Communications Intelligence in CIA . � 105
C. The Office of Special Services . . . � 110
D. The Creation of OCI 111
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E. Political Research in CIA 114
F. Bad Blood Between OCI and ONE 122
G. The Watch Committee of the IAC . . . :-136
VI. The Office of Scientific Intelligence . 141
A. The Creation of OSI and the SIC . . . . 142
B. The Military Counteroffensive 148
C. DCID-3/4 and the Scientific Estimates
Committee 154
VII. The Office of Collection and
Dissemination 160
VIII. The Office of Operations 168
A. Subordination to DDP 178
B. Subordination to the DDI 181
IX. Progress Report to the NSC .
. ��
. . 184
Appendix A: Source References 187
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General Walter Bedell Smith
As Director of Central Intelligence
October 1950 - February 1953
Volume III Reorganization Pursuant to NSC 50
I. The Reorganization
The Survey Group Report proposes a number
of major changes in the internal organiza-
tion of CIA ... . We concur in them and
in the concept of CIA upon which they are
based. However, we recognize that there
may be other methods of organization which
will accomplish the same objectives.
NSC 50
1 July 1949
In dutiful compliance with NSC 50, Admiral
Hillenkoetter submitted, in August 1949, a plan for
the integration of the Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC), the Office of Special Operations (0S0), and
the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations (00),
as recommended by the report of the NSC Survey
Group.1/* The Department of State never acted on
that proposal, which involved the amendment of NSC
* For serially numbered source references, see
Appendix A.
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10/2 in a way that would have reduced State's control
over OPC. Consequently it was never implemented.
On the other hand, Hillenkoetter's plan for the
reorganization�of the Office of Reports and Estimates
(ORE), reported to the NSC on 27 December 1949,2/ was
a transparent attempt to perpetuate the status quo
under a specious pretense of compliance.* It was
implemented, but was without any real effect.
Thus the organization of CIA in October 1950,
when General Smith relieved Admiral Hillenkoetter,
was substantially what it had been in July 1949, when
the NSC had directed a radical reorganization, although
there had been some few inconsequential changes in
nomenclature. That organization is shown in the organ-
izational chart, Figure 1, on the following page.
General Smith assured the NSC and the IAC that
he would proceed forthwith to reorganize CIA in ac-
cordance with NSC 50, except that he would not merge
OPC and OSO.** Smith looked to his Deputy, William
See pp. 27-28, below, and Volume I, pp. 97-98.
* *
See Volume II, pp. 10-11, and 21-22.
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Jackson, to prepare for his approval the specific
plans required to carry out this commitment.* The
new organizational structure that Jackson and Smith
devised is shown in the Chart-an page 5.**-
See Volume II, pp. 10-11.
** This chart, dated 19 January 1951, is of curious
interest in that it shows the DDCI in the position
later occupied by the DDI: that is, with no juris-
diction over the DDP and the DDA, but in direct com-
mand of the six "DDI Offices." William Jackson did
function as DDI while he was DDCI, 15ut was not con-
fined to that role. Allen Dulles did not function
as DDI when he became DDCI in August 1951. Thus the
chart is not a true reflection of the facts in par-
ticular.
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CIA REGULATION NO. 70
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II. The Office of Intelligence Coordination
To devise plans for the interdepartmental
coordination of intelligence activities had been from
the first an explicit function of the Director of
Central Intelligence.3/ Admiral Souers created for
that purpose a Central Planning Staff composed of
officers seconded from the several Departments ,4/
not as instructed representatives, but as men famil-
iar with Departmental interests and capabilities,
working for the DCI. Vandenberg (Wright) abolished
that Staff by reassigning its members, and then
created another based on the same principle. It was
grandiloquently styled the Interdepartmental Coor-
dinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS).5/
ICAPS was never able to'accomplish much in the
way of effective interdepartmental coordination. There
were two reasons for its failure. One was that its
members had had little or no practical experience as
intelligence officers; they did not really understand
the business. The other was the determined resistance
of the IAC and its representative Standing Committee
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to ICAPS' constant effort to assert the superior
authority and prerogative of the DCI. The energies
of ICAPS were spent in haggling with the Standing
Committee over the verbal terms of draft directives
that in the end were compromised into ambiguity or
meaninglessness. Thus frustrated in its true func-
tion, ICAPS turned instead toward giving direction
to the line offices of CIA in the name of the DCI
and supposedly in the interest of interdepartmental
coordination .6/
The NSC Survey Group noted, in 1948, that the
responsibility of the ICAPS members Whether to the
DCI or to the Departments) was ambiguous, that they
were not well qualified for their task, and that they
tended to interfere with the operations of the line
offices. It recommended that ICAPS be "reconstituted"
as a staff responsible solely to the DCI and devoted
solely to interdepartmental coordination.7/ That
recommendation excited derision in CIA, and even in
the IAC, because that was what ICAPS was already sup-
posed to be. Its only effect was to cause Hillenkoetter
to delete "Interdepartmental" from the name of ICAPS,
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making it COAPS (the DCI's personal staff for "Coor-
dination, Operations, and Policy"). That Change
enabled the same incompetent group to interfere the
more readily in the affairs of the line office t of
I
CIA -- but the sands were already running out.*
Smith and Jackson had no use whatever for ICAPS,
alias COAPS. They even refused to receive the respects
of James Reber, the newly appointed Chief of COAPS.**
For a time Jackson himself performed the functions of
COAPS, personally planning the reorganization of CIA
and discussing its terms and implications with the
members of the IAC, especially the State Department
member. Jackson even functioned personally as the
Secretary of the LAC, an incidental duty of the Chief
of COAPS.
* ICAPS became COAPS on 1 July 1950, only three
months before General Smith took office as DCI.
** Reber, 39 in 1950, was a native of Elizabethtown,
Pennsylvania, and held a Ph.D. in International Rela-
tions from the University of Chicago (1939). He
entered the Department of State in 1943 and in 1950
was Chief of the Committee Secretariat in the office
of the Secretary. State sent him to relieve Prescott
Childs as Chief of COAPS on 1 October 1950, only six
days before Smith and Jackson took office.
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In early November (after about a month in office)
Jackson summoned Reber and told him that General Smith
wished to appoint an ambassador or a general to his
position:- If Reber were to be retained, however-, how
would he propose to proceed? Reber replied that,
first, he would resign from the Department of State; the
chief of the DCI's coordinating staff should be the
DCI's own man. Second, he would request the immediate
relief of all other members of COAPS, except any whom
he might choose to retain and who might be willing to
transfer to CIA; the entire staff should be the DCI's
men. Reber managed also to suggest that in the Committee
Secretariat he had had more practical experience in
interdepartmental coordination than any ambassador or
general would be likely to have had.8/
Jackson was impressed by Reber's good sense,
right attitude, and address. He abolished COAPS on
1 December 1950, and on 13 December announced that
Reber would serve as Acting Assistant Director for
Intelligence Coordination and Secretary of the IAC.
In May 1951, General Smith struck the "Acting" from
Reber's title.
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The Office of Intelligence Coordination consisted
only of Reber and two assistants9/; it was really a
small staff section rather than a line office. Reber
took the position that working liaison and coordina-
tion with the Departmental agencies was, properly, a
function of the line offices directly concerned, rather
than of OIC.10/ With regard to problems of coordina-
tion requiring IAC action, he convened interdepartmental
ad hoc committees with himself in the chair; the Stand-
ing Committee of the IAC was abolished.11/ On these
occasions Reber followed the example of General Smith's
approach to the IAC,* recognizing that Departmental
interests were entitled to consideration and respect.
He bore in mind also Jackson's, dictum that CIA was not
required to do all the coordinating that was done, so
long as the DCI was in a position to assure himself
that it was being done well. 12/**
See Volume II, Chapter II;
** For an example of the application of this principle
in practice, General Smith deferred to the sensitivities
of the Pentagon by appointing an Army G-2 officer to be
the first Chairman of the Watch Committee (see p. 139,
below). ICAPS would have attempted to insist that the
chair belonged to CIA.
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In October 1951, Reber set forth more fully the
six principles that governed his approach to interde-
partmental coordination. He held that (short of an
appeal to the NSC) CIA must achieve such coordination
by leadership, stimulation, and persuasion, and that
the primary role and expert knowledge of the substan-
tively responsible agency must be recognized. Actual
coordination on specific problems should be decentral-
ized as far as possible to the offices and agencies
having functional responsibility, but the DCI must
retain a general supervisory role, with the ADIC as
his assistant for that purpose. In the end, the ef-
fectiveness of interdepartmental coordination would
depend on the personal relations of the intelligence
chiefs themselves, especially in the IAC. In general,
a flexible, practical attitude would be far more ef-
fective than a legalistic, doctrinaire approach.13/
That was sound doctrine. It was also the re-
verse of what the ICAPS .approach had been. In general,
it worked well -- given the entirely new DCI-IAC
relationship that General Smith had created.*
* An exceptional case is noted in Volume II, pp. 44-46.
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On 1 January 1952 the OIC was subordinated to
the DDI. Loftus Becker then superseded James Reber
as the DCI's principal assistant for interdepartmental
intelligence coordination.* Becker considered absorb-
ing the small OIC into his personal staff, but refrained
from doing so, probably in order not to diminish Reber's
standing as an Assistant Director, which was of value
in his work as an external representative and negoti-
ator.**
�.
See Volume II, pp. 90-91.
** On 1 February 1954, Richard Bissell was appointed
Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordin-
ation, and on 1 July 1954 he absorbed the DDI's respon-
sibilities for interdepartmental coordination. OIC was
then abolished, and its personnel were transferred
from the DDI to the Special Assistant.
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III. The Office of National Estimates
The other explicit function of the Director of
Central Intelligence was to
accomplish the correlation and evaluation
of intelligence relating to the national
security, and the appropriate dissemination
within the Government of the resulting
strategic and national policy intelligence.14/
That formulation, in the President's letter of 22 Jan-
uary 1946, made it clear that the intelligence to be
disseminated was the product of the DCI's correlation
and evaluation.* The passage was commonly understood
to refer only to the production of national intelli-
gence estimates. Any other production of finished
intelligence by CIG/CIA was thought to come under
another provision of the President's letter, to per-
form "services of common concern."16/ This distinc-
tion, clear in the minds of Admiral Souers and his
* In the National Security Act of 1947, this lan-
guage was changed to read "to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence."15/ The revised language was less clear
on the point in question, but there was no intent to
change the meaning. See Volume I, pp. 70-71.
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colleagues, was lost in General Vandenberg's omnibus
Office of Research and Evaluation, alias Reports and
Estimates.*
A. The Central Reports Staff
To perform this estimating function, Admiral
Souers created a Central Reports Staff (CRS) in
February 1946, based on Ludwell Montague's plan for
a "National Estimates Staff,"** with an authorized
strength of 17/ The immediate task of the CRS
was to produce an all-sufficient daily summary of
current intelligence, which was what President Truman
particularly wanted from his Central Intelligence
Group, but it was anticipated that eventually its
principal function would be the drafting of national
intelligence estimates for DCI-IAB consideration in
accordance with the Lovett Report's doctrine -- that
See Volume I, pp. 56-57.
** The change in name was probably made to conform
to the name of the Central Planning Staff and to allow
for the Staff's current intelligence function. It was
unfortunate in that it deemphasized its primary es-
timating function.
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is, in coordination with Departmental representatives,
but with a power of decision vested in the Chief, CRS,
at his level, and in the DCI at his, subject to the
notation of any dissents.*
The actual strength of the CRS never exceeded
men and girls, and it never got beyond the produc-
tion of current intelligence. It was never able to
obtain from the Departments the assignment of men of
sufficient experience and judgment to produce thought-
ful estimates.** Consequently it produced none, and
thus never set a precedent for the interdepartmental
coordination of national intelligence estimates.
B. The Failure of ORE
For Souers's concept of a small, select estimates
staff dependent on Departmental research support,
* See Volume I, pp. 28-31, 36-38, and 47-50.
Montague, who had drafted JIC 239/5 and NIA Directives
No. 1 and No. 2, was Chief of the Central Reports Staff.
** Actually, very few such men were available in the
Departments. During the War the military intelligence
agencies had been manned for the most part by reserve
officers who in 1946 were impatient to return to their
homes. Similarly, the professorial types in State (in
the former R&A Branch of OSS) were generally impatient
to return to their universities. The few qualified men
who remained were not being given away to CIG.
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General Vandenberg substituted the concept of an en-
tirely self-sufficient Office of Research and Evalu-
ation with a strength of 2,000. Vandenberg's departure,
however, arrested the growth of ORE at about
Thus ORE conformed neither to Souers's concept nor
(b)(1)
to Vandenberg's. It continued to pretend to the self- (13)(3)
sufficiency that Vandenberg had intended it to have,
but lacked the manpower and the intellectual resources
required to make good that pretension.
There were four reasons for the failure of ORE.
One was its lack of a clearly defined and generally
understood mission.18/ Another was its lack of a
pertinently experienced and forceful Assistant Direc-
tor.* A third was the generally poor quality of ORE
* In order to gain favor in the Department of State,
Vandenberg solicited the assignment of a Foreign Serv-
ice Officer to supersede Montague as ADRE. The senior (+Alit-
FSO thus obtained knew nothing of intelligence research
or estimates production and had no interest in taking
charge of ORE. Within nine months he contrived an
escape and was replaced by a State appointee who dared 6,,,t4,,tt !
not assert his authority over his Branch chiefs. They
were seconded by the several Departments and in no way
beholden to him. Montague remained in ORE as Chief of
the Intelligence Staff, 1946-47, and then as Chief,
Global Survey Group.19/
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personnel.* When ORE was recruiting toward 2,000,
any body able to reach the door was admitted, but
ORE had little more success than CRS in recruiting
men for discernment and mature judgment. And the
fourth reason for ORE's failure was the hostility
and obstructionism of the Departmental intelligence
agencies, antagonized by Vandenberg and ICAPS.
As Chief of the Intelligence Staff, ORE,**
Montague strove to carry out the original conception
of how national intelligence estimates should be
produced, but he was frustrated by Admiral Inglis.
Inglis demanded that Vandenberg make Montague stop
calling for Departmental contributions. He wanted
ORE to work for ONI by producing basic intelligence
as a "service of common concern." He did not want .
ONI to have to work for ORE. Vandenberg was delighted
* Of course there were individual exceptions to
this generalization. In 1950, ONE was well staffed
with men selected from ORE, and other ORE men made
their mark in other offices.
** The Intelligence Staff had charge of all ORE
intelligence production until July 1947.
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to comply with Inglis's demand, for Inglis was pro-
viding CIG's need for independent research capabil-
ities.20/
When Montague called for the assignment of full-
time IAB representatives to the Intelligence Staff,
in accordance with NIA Directive No. 2, Admiral Inglis
insisted that they could be only part-time "messenger
boys."*22/ These designated representatives not only
refused to occupy offices in ORE, but even refused
to meet occasionally with the Intelligence Staff to
discuss terms of reference and draft estimates. At
their insistence, ORE drafts were sent to them by
courier and, after intolerable delays, they sent
back the generally scornful and captious written
tcomments o the Departmental analysts. Thus they
functioned only as post offices between ORE and
* Montague 's idea was-that, if the IAB represent-
atives participated regularly in the work of the
Intelligence Staff, they could and would serve
also as advocates of the semi-coordinated ORE
draft estimates in their respective agencies, as
had the members of the Senior Team of the JIS with
respect to JIC estimates./
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those analysts.* Until July 1948 there was never
any joint discussion of draft estimates such as
would have made it possible to achieve mutual under-
standing and perhaps agreement.**. ORE accepted as
much, or as little, as it pleased of these working-
level comments and then sent its unilaterally re-
vised draft to the members of the IAC, separately,
for concurrence, dissent, or comment.*** Even the
acceptance of all working-level proposals did not
guarantee the concurrence of an IAC member, who
might raise issues never before mentioned. Normally
the IAC did not meet to discuss the substance of
an estimate.**** ORE either adjusted its text to
* These representatives were "policy" men without
substantive competence to discuss and judge the issues
raised by the analysts, even if they had been willing
to meet.
** The two exceptions to this statement were a
meeting with IAB representatives on ORE-1 (see Volume
I, p. 59) 23/ and the joint ad hoc committee convoked
in March 1VT8 (see Volume II, p. 26).24/ After the
adoption of DCID-3/1, 8 July 1948, such working-level
meetings were regularly held, but by that time the
attitude of mutual disregard described in this para-
graph had become firmly established.
*** This procedure had been prescribed by Admiral
Inglis (see Volume 1, p. 61).
**** It did meet for this purpose on two occasions.
In both cases the circumstances were extraordinary.
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satisfy each IAC member individually or it elected
to accept a dissent. The ADRE rarely saw the text
of an estimate until it was disseminated in print.
The DCI never did.25/
The NSC Survey Group condemned ORE for failing
to enlist the effective participation of the IAC
agencies in the production of national intelligence
estimates.26/ It was Admiral Inglis' and his colleagues
in the IAC who refused such participation when ORE
sought it. The resulting procedures for the "coor-
dination" of estimates could hardly have been more
rigid, indirect, ineffective, and frustrating to
ORE. They provided neither true independence of
action and judgment for ORE, as a national agency
free of departmental. bias, nor a true collective
effort in the national interest.
Despite these hindrances, ORE did produce, in
response to NSC requirements, some few estimates as
well considered and well coordinated as any later
produced by ONE.* Such estimates, however, were
* These estimates were produced under Montague's
direction and control as CIA member of the NSC
Staff and therefore the attorney for the NSC Staff
(footnote continued on following page)
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certainly not typical of ORE's intelligence produc-
tion.
Otr:
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,
After the Intelligence Staff was dissolved, in
July 1947, no-one exercised effective cential direc-
tion and control over the intelligence production of
ORE.* Each Branch Chief suited himself in that re-
gard. The result was a diversion of effort away from
production addressed to the level of the President
and the NSC, a standard that the Intelligence Staff
had endeavored to maintain, and into current and de-
scriptive reporting at a level more commensurate
with the limited capabilities of ORE's inexperienced
analysts. Some of this trend was responsive to new
requirements for intelligence support for OPC and
the NSRB1** but most of ORE's intelligence production
within ORE.27/ William Jackson seems not to have
been aware of them. In the report of the NSC Survey
Group he cited the work of the joint ad hoc committee
of March 1948 as the only example of a properly pre-
pared national intelligence estimate.28/
* The Assistant Director assumed the functions of the
Chief, Intelligence Staff, but did not exercise them.29/
** The National Security Resources Board, the Chair-
man of which was a statutory member of the NSC, de-
pended on ORE for the satisfaction of its extensive
requirements for intelligence support.
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was self-initiated. It included a proliferation of
duplicatory current intelligence publications intended
only for internal or, at most, for working-level dis-
tribution. These publications were said to be needed
in order to provide training for junior analysts.
They also helped morale by giving every analyst the
satisfaction of seeing his work published, regardless
of whether it was worthy of high-level consideration.
The greater part of ORE'S work came to be done for no
better reason than its own satisfaction. Moreover,
even its more serious undertakings tended increasingly
to be published as uncoordinated Intelligence Memoranda,
in order to avoid the vexations and delays of inter-
departmental coordination. These "memoranda" were
generally descriptive rather than analytical in content;
some of them ran to as many as 100 pages in length.
Finally, most of those papers that ORE did coordinate
as national estimates were actually a m�nge of cur-
rent and descriptive reporting, with little, if any,
analytical or estimative content. 30/
The comment of the NSC Survey Group on this
situation was that ORE had conspicuously failed to
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produce national intelligence estimates and instead
had busied itself with producing "miscellaneous re-
ports and summaries which by no stretch of the imag-
ination could be considered national estimates."31/*
C. Five Proposals for Remedial Action
The situation described above still existed
when Bedell Smith and William Jackson took office
in October 1950. They were then cognizant of five
separate proposals for remedial action, made by
John Bross, William Jackson, John Magruder, Ludwell
Montague, and William Donovan (in chronological
order). These proposals were similar in most respects,
although there were significant differences among
them. All recommended the creation of a well-qualified
body to be concerned solely with the production of
national intelligence estimates. Each contributed
in some respect to the solution devised by Smith
and Jackson, the creation of the Office of National
Estimates.
* ORE held that anything that it chose to produce
was, ipeo facto, national intelligence.
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During the summer of 1948, John Bross* inves-
tigated CIA for the Eberstadt Committee** and came
to the following conclusion:
The greatest need in CIA is [for] the
establishment at a high level of a small
group of highly capable people, freed
from administrative detail, to concen-
trate upon intelligence evaluation. The
Director and his assistants have had to
devote so large a portion of their time
to administration that they have been
unable to give sufficient time to analysis
and evaluation. A small group of mature
men of the highest talents, having full
access to all information, might well be
released completely from routine and set
to thinking about intelligence only.
Many of the greatest failures in intelli-
gence have not been failures in collection,
but failures in analysing and evaluating
correctly the information available.32/***
* Bross, a New York lawyer, had been in OSS. Later
he was recruited by Wisner for OPC. From 9 September
1963 until his retirement in January 1971 he was Deputy
to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evalua-
tion (NIPE).
** The Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government ("the Hoover Commission")
established a Committee on National Security Organiza-
tion headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt. That Committee's
principal recommendation was for the creation of the
Department of Defense.
*** Bross had consulted Montague. His conception
of a small group of mature men released from admin-
istrative responsibilities and set to thinking about
the substance of intelligence was derived from Montague's
conception of the role of the Global Survey Group
within ORE. 33/
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Bross's concept was reflected in the recommenda-
tion of the Eberstadt Committee that there be estab-
lished in CIA,
at the top echelon, an evaltiatibtrbFarcr
or section composed of competent and ex-
perienced personnel who would have no
administrative responsibilities and whose
duties would be confined solely to intel-
ligence evaluation.34/
Bedell Smith had certainly read this recommenda-
tion by the Eberstadt Committee. ' It is likely that he
had read also Bross's more extended treatment of the
subject.*
The remedy proposed by William Jackson in the
report of the NSC Survey Group was similar, though
less explicit. It was premised upon a return to the
distinction understood in early 1946, between the
production of national intelligence estimates and
the performance of "services of common concern."**
Out of ORE there should be created two bodies: "a
small, high-level Estimates Division," concerned
* *
See Volume II, p. 16, and p. 38, below.
See p. 13, above.
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solely with the production and coordination of national
estimates, and a "Research and Reports Division" to
perform such research services as it might be agreed
could best be performed centrally. The remainder of
ORE's activities -- and personnel -- should be dis-
carded.35/
The text of the Survey Group's report shows that,
when Jackson proposed this "small, high-level Estimates
Division," he had in mind the "small organization of
highly qualified individuals" that Admiral Souers had
intended the Central Reports Staff to be.36/ Montague
had spent an afternoon with Jackson explaining his
"National Estimates Staff" (CRS) concept and how it
had been lost in ORE.37/
Montague was pleased, of course, when the NSC
Survey Group adopted his proposal, first made in
1946,* but he feared that the Group's emphasis on
the "collective responsibility" of the IAC would
* See p. 13, above. Since then Montague had pro-
posed the same plan three times -- in October 1946,
April 1947, and August 1947 -- without effect.38/
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7.
nullify the Lovett doctrine* and reduce national
estimates to the level of joint estimates.39/ In
approving NSC 50, however, the NSC rejected the
idea of "collective responsibility" while endorsing
the idea of "a small, high-level Estimates Division"
and a separate "Research and Reports Division."40/
The direction given by the NSC could have been
met by making the Global Survey Group of ORE the
nucleus of a "National Estimates Staff" directly
subordinate to the DCI -- which is, in simple terms,
what finally was done in November 1950.** Within
ORE it was generally supposed that that was what the
NSC Survey Group had intended. Admiral Hillenkoetter,
however, left it to ORE to decide how to comply with
the NSC's direction*** -- and ORE had no interest
in reforming itself.41/
The "organizational realignment" that the ADRE
proposed, and that IcAps and Hillenkoetter accepted
See Volume I, p. 48.
See p. 54, below.
See Volume I, pp. 97_98.
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without question, was designed to preserve ORE'S
existing structure and practices while pretending
to comply with NSC 50. Within the six regional
divisions of ORE,* the editors, whose function it
was to render into acceptable English the scribblings
of the analysts, were solemnly declared to be divi-
sionalestimates staffs" producin4 "high-level
estimates" (as well as all the other miscellaneous
publications of their divisions). The Assistant
Director's routine administrative meeting with his
Division Chiefs was declared to be the "Estimates
Production Board" (although it never considered the
substance of any estimate). Three odd elements of
ORE were declared to be the "Central Research Group"
(although these disparate elements never had a common
chief and never functioned as a group),m42/ Thus
* These divisions had previously been called branches,
as on' p. 21, above.
** They were the Map Division (a specialized research
and production unit), the NIS Division (an editing and
coordinating mechanism without research capabilities),
and the General Division (which handled special intel-
ligence).
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the prescribed words were used, but nothing whatever
was changed.*
CIA's obvious refusal to comply with the intent
of NSC 50 as regards �RE while pretending to have
done so, provoked John Magruder's staff study, alias
"the Webb proposals."** Magruder's draft NSC direc-
tive provided for the establishment in CIA (not in
ORE) of a "National Intelligence Group" to be com-
posed of a "National Estimates Staff" and a "Current
Intelligence Staff." The strength of the group was
not to exceed 100, of whom no more than 20 might be
from the departmental intelligence agencies; the
rest would be CIA employees. The chief of the group,
representing the DCI, would be advised and assisted
by full-time representatives of the members Of the
IAC. These IAC representatives would play an active
part in framing terms of reference, obtaining respon-
sive and timely departmental contributions, and
* Montague dissociated himself in writing from
any responsibility for this palpable fraud.43/
** See Volume I, pp. 101-103.
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reviewing draft estimates. The members of the IAC
would themselves participate actively in advising
the DCI on the initiation and adoption of estimates.44/
Magruder's plan would certainly have satisfied
the requirement of NSC 50 for a small estimates
office distinctly separated from any CIA research
activity. Incidentally, it was in effect a revival of
Admiral Souers's projected Central Reports Staff,
which would have had both current intelligence and
estimates branches under a chief advised by full-time
IAB representatives.45/ Thus Magruder's plan may
have been derived from NIA Directive No. 2 and CIG
Administrative Order No. 3, although Magruder was
certainly capable of devising an identical plan for
himself. Montague's plan of 1946 and Magruder's plan
of 1950 were both derived from a common source, the
known intent of JIC 239/5, JCS 1181/5, and the Presi-
dent's letter of 22 January 1946.
John Magruder had been a stroqg advocate of
JIC 239/5. He was probably responsible for Robert
Lovett's exposition of the doctrine that the DCI
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should have the deciding voice in the IAC.* He was
not an enemy of the DCI's prerogative -- rather the
contrary -- but he was outraged by the contumacy of
CIA as represented by ORE, ICAPS, and Hillenkoetter.
That outrage no doubt affected the tone and style of
his original staff study. The "corrected copy"
(from which the preceding paragraph is derived) was
probably truer to his essential thought. He was
making an earnest effort to obtain for the depart-
mental agencies an effective voice in national in-
telligence estimates, but also to ensure that they
made an effective contribution to such estimates --
which they had not been doing. Because he sought
an active role for the departmental agencies, he was
denounced by CIA as an advocate of the "board of
directors" concept46/ -- which he certainly was not.
Such was the state of mutual sensitivity and incom-
prehension that �existed between CIA and the depart-
mental agencies when General Smith.took office.
In late August 1950, Lawrence Houston presented
both versions of Magruder's staff study to General
* See Volume I, pp. 41-42 and 48.
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Smith as evidence of a current effort on the part
of State and Defense to impose-their will on the DCI,
curbing his independence of judgment.47/ On 3 Octo-
ber Jackson recommended Magruder's "corrected" version
to Smith as "sound."48/ Smith adopted the essential
substance of Magruder's proposal, though with impor-
tant variations.
One of William Jackson's first acts as DDCI was
to call on DeForest Van Slyck for a plan for an office
of estimates. Van Slyck was a personal friend of
Jackson. He was also Montague's deputy as Chief of
the Global Survey Group, ORE. He invited the partic-
ipation of Theodore Babbitt, ADRE, as a matter of
courtesy, and of Montague, because he knew that Montague
already had a plan in mind.
What Jackson got on 10 October 1950 was the
sixth edition of Montague's plan of 1946 for a "Na-
tional Estimates Staff." As such, this plan was
essentially identical with Magruder's, but it went
into greater organizational and procedural detail.
In particular, Montague elaborated every procedural
step in the production of a national intelligence
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estimate, from the perception of an NSC Staff re-
quirement through final adoption by the DCI with the
advice and concurrence (or dissent) of the members
of the IAC. And Montague set forth explicitly the
Lovett doctrine,* as Magruder had not.49/
Furthermore, Montague warned Jackson that in
the circumstances of 1950 this plan could not be made
effective unless and until positive action was taken
to ensure the satisfaction of four prior conditions,
to wit:
(1) Action to make sure of the avail-
ability of research support from the de-
partmental agencies adequate as to both
timeliness and content. "This condition
cannot be met at present."
(2) The establishment of a research
office in CIA capable of providing like
support in fields of "common concern"
(scientific, economic, geographical).
(3) The recruitment of requisite sen-
ior personnel. "The contemplated Office
cannot be adequately manned with personnel
now in CIA."
(4) Thorough indoctrination of the
IAC agencies in the new cooperative con-
cept and a new start in relations with
them. "This plan will not work except
on a basis of mutual confidence and coop-
eration in the national interest."50/
* See Volume I, p. 48.
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Montague's plan provided the basis for the
procedure adopted by the LAC on 20 October* and for
the initial organization of the National Estimates
Staff** -- but not for the Board of National Estimates.
His conditions were met during the next few months,
except the first, which was only half met. The de-
partmental agencies became willing to render research
support, but the doubtful reliability of their con-
tributions remained a continuing problem.
On 13 October 1950, William Donovan urged upon
Bedell Smith, apparently not for the first time, the
importance of establishing in CIA an "Evaluation Group"
composed of men of "experience and imagination and
constructive intellect." Donovan suggested that 'the
group might consist of a mature scholar (e.g., William
Langer), a strategist familiar with the uses and
capabilities of all of the various military services,
a scientist with current knowledge of new inventions,
and two or three broad-gauged men of affairs. (No
* *
See Volume II, pp.34-35.
See pp. 54-56, below.
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professional intelligence officers need apply.) A
"working committee" familiar with "the skills of
research and analysis" would "collate the informa-
tion" for submission to the Group, but "final evalua-
tion" would be the group's responsibility. To im-
pose that duty on the analysts would be "like a
cashier being his own auditor."51/*
Donovan conceived of this "Evaluation Group"
as being at the apex of a CIA "R&A Branch" obviously
analogous to the R&A Branch in OSS -- or to a properly
manned and competent ORE! It should be remembered
that William Donovan never had any use whatever for
the interdepartmental coordination of estimates --
in contrast to William Jackson, for whom such coor-
dination was the primary consideration.
* In August 1941, when Donovan established the
Research and Analysis Branch, COI (later OSS), he
put it under the direction of a collegial body of
eminent scholars called the Board of Analysts. He
probably intended this board to review and pprove
the intelligence production of R&A, but itInever,
functioned in that wayv.52/ Donovan's proposal of
13 October 1950 may have been a modified revival
of his original idea of such a board.
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In arguing for the "collective responsibility"
of the IAC, Jackson contended that no one man could
bear sole responsibility for a national intelligence
estimate. Bedell Smith could and did accept such
personal responsibility -- but he may have seen in
Donovan's proposal a way to obtain for himself the
reassurance of the collective judgment of a highly
qualified group independent of the IAC, free of
departmental bias or other institutional predilec-
tions,* and dedicated solely to the service of the
DCI in his role as the deciding voice in national
estimates.** Bedell Smith never imposed his personal
view on any estimate, but on one notable occasion he
did adopt, as his personal position, the position
recommended to him by his board, in preference to
the majority view of the IAC:53/***
* Such as, for example, a predilection in favor
of information collected by OSO, or of the findings
of OSI's research.
** Smith can have had no other reason to create the
Board of National Estimates. The interdepartmental
coordination of opinion contemplated by Jackson could
have been accomplished without it. The creation of the
board implied the exercise of independent judgment by
the DCI.
*** See pp. 74-75, below.
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D. The Board of National Estimates
At his first formal meeting with the IAC, held
on 20 October 1950, General Smith announced that, at
the earliest practicable date, he would establish in
CIA an Office of National Estimates. In his jud=ment
(and intention) that office would become "the heart
of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the national
intelligence machinery."54/ It would include a "panel"
of 5 or 6 outstanding men. Smith was trying to get
Admiral Leslie Stevens* to head the panel and General
Clarence Huebner** to be a member of it, possibly the
head if Stevens were not available.55/***
* Stevens was then Deputy Director of the Joint
Staff for Subsidiary Plans, a position that he proved
to be unwilling to leave. Smith had known him as
Naval Attache in Moscow.
** At the time of his retirement in 1950, Huebner
was the commanding general of all US forces in Europe.
Smith had known him as the forceful combat commander
of the 1st Division and V Corps.
*** Jackson omitted any reference to this "panel" in
his official minutes of that meeting -- which suggests
that he did not want to emphasize the idea to the mem-
bers of the IAC. Smith's statement was recorded, how-
ever, in Colonel Howze's notes for General Bolling.
Howze seems to have been more impressed by the names
of Stevens and Huebner than by the significance of the
creation of such a "panel."
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The "panel" was, of course, the Board of Nation-
al Estimates. Smith's announcement regarding it on
20 October evidently reflected his adoption of the
recommendation in Donovan's letter of 13 October.*
But when Jackson explained the idea to Montague a
few days later, he used the language of Bross's re-
port to the Eberstadt Committee in 1948,** Montague
was struck by that because it was also the language
of his own description of an ideal Global Survey Group,
written in 1947. Thus the idea of the Board of Na-
tional Estimates was derived from both Donovan and
Bross.
It was this idea that made the Office of Nation-
al Estimates significantly different from, and superior
to, any organization that had yet been devised for
the production of intelligence estimates for use at
the highest level of government. Indeed, more than
20 years later, the Board of National Estimates, as
a group of experienced senior officers freed from all
* The number of members specified (5 or 6) was iden-
tical with the number suggested by Donovan.
** See p. 25, above.
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administrative responsibilities, distractions, and
biases, in order to concentrate on the substance of
intelligence, is still (1971) unique in all the world.
On 20 October 1950, General Smith had Leslie
Stevens or else Clarence Huebner in mind to head this
board, but in the event it was William Langer who was
appointed to be Assistant Director *for National Es-
timates and Chairman of the Board of National Estimates.*
Before 20 October, Smith had been interested in ob-
taining Langer's services in some unspecified capacity,
presumably in ONE; Donovan's letter of 13 October had
been prompted by a telephonic inquiry from Smith re-
garding Langer.56/ Who, then, had proposed Langer to
Smith? Donovan evidently had not, although he heartily
seconded the nomination. Neither had William Jackson,
who had a different idea.** It might have been Allen
Dulles or Park Armstrong.
* Stevens was unwilling to accept the position.
Huebner would come only as a consultant. That status
was then deemed necessary in order to protect his
military retired pay and perquisites.
* *
See p. 42, below.
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Langer, 54 in 1950, was a native of Boston
and a Ph.D. of Harvard University (1923). Since
1936 he had been Coolidge Professor of History at
Harvard. He was a member of the Board of Analysts,
COI, 1941-42, and Director of the Research and Anal-
ysis Branch, OSS, 1942-46.* For two months in 1946
he was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
and the State Department member of the Intelligence
Advisory Board.
Langer was embarrassed by Smith's invitation
to come to CIA. He had just returned to Harvard
after a nine-year absence**; he was unwilling to
ask for further leave. Smith, however, appealed
directly to the President of the University, stress-
ing, no doubt, the state of national emergency and
the possible imminence of World War III.***
* Including seven months after R&A's transfer to
State.
** Since 1946, he had been working on The Challenge
of Isolation and The Undeclared War for the Council on
Foreign Relations.
*** This appeal had been used by President Truman to
persuade Smith himself to become DCI. Smith used it
to persuade several reluctant men to come to his aid
at CIA. See Volume II, pp. 7 and 10.
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Grudgingly, Langer was granted leave for one more
year.57/ He took office on 8 November. The estab-
lishment of ONE was formally announced on 13 November.
Until 22 November, however, Montague remained in
charge of the production of national intelligence
estimates. 58/
Bedell Smith took a great personal interest in
the Board of National Estimates, selecting its members
himself with care. (They were to be the counsellors
on whom he would rely in his lonely responsibility
for the substance of national estimates.) He fre-
quently consulted their judgment, apart from their
formal submission of estimates, and he probed to
discover whether any significant divergence of opinion
existed among them, concealed by their consensus.59/
In addition to Huebner and Langer, three other
men were designated from the beginning to be members
of the Board of National Estimates. They were Sherman
Kent, Ludwell Montague, and DeForest Van Slyck.
Montague and Van Slyck were already on deck. Kent
was in Washington as a consultant as early as 20
November,60/ but his obligations to Yale University
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prevented him from accepting a full-time appointment
until 12 January 1951.
Kent, 47 in 1950, was a native of Chicago, a
Ph.D. of Yale University, and Professor of History
at Yale. He had been a section and division chief
under Langer in the R&A Branch of OSS, and Langer's
deputy and successor as Director of intelligence
research in State. During the fall of 1946, he was
a member of the faculty at the National War College.
During the first nine months of 1947 he wrote Stra-
tegic Intelligence, as a Guggenheim Fellow.61/
There is reason to believe that Kent had been
Jackson's choice to be Assistant Director for National
Estimates, but that Jackson's intention had been
temporarily frustrated by Smith's appointment of
Langer. Jackson never approved of Langer.62/ He
esteemed Kent as an outstanding authority on intel-
ligence.*63/ When Kent reported for full-time duty,
* They became acquainted in 1949, when Jackson reviewed
Strategic Intelligence for the New York Times. Jackson
opened that book with prejudice, expecting nothing much
from a professor and less from one who had served in OSS.
He was agreeably surprised and greatly impressed. There-
after Jackson excepted Kent from his generally poor opin-
ion of professors.
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A.
in January, he was made Deputy Assistant Director
with Jackson's promise of the eventual succession./
Kent did succeed Langer as Assistant Director, on
3 January 1952.*
Ludwell Montague, 43 in 1950, was a native of
Richmond, a graduate of the Virginia Military Insti-
tute, and a Ph.D. of Duke University. He had been
Assistant Professor of History at V.M.I. when called
to active duty in Army G-2 in 1940. He was the
first Secretary of the US JIC, 1941-43, and senior
Army member of the JIS, 1943-45; Assistant Director,
CIG, in 1946; and Chief of the Intelligence Staff,
ORE, 1946-47, and of the Global Survey Group, ORE,
1947-50. He had also been CIA member of the NSC
Staff, 1947-50.65/
Concurrently with his appointment to the board,
Montague was continued as the CIA member of the NSC
* Kent held that office for 16 years, until his re-
tirement on 1 January 1968. Langer became one of
the "Princeton Consultants" (see pp. 50-51, below).
He resigned that position in 1963, when he perceived
that there might be a conflict of interest between
it and his position as a member of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
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Staff. That had the advantage of keeping the board
directly informed of the intelligence requirements
of the NSC. Montague's particular concern was to
ensure that national intelligence estimates were
responsive to such requirements. Having just dis-
tinguished himself before General Smith by produc-
ing ORE 58-50 overnight and six fully coordinated
NIE's in four weeks,* he became very impatient of
the tendency of his academic colleagues to indulge
in self-gratifying talk when decision and action were
required. They considered their discussions of the
profound issues of War and Peace to be more important
than the immediate needs of the NSC, which they re-
garded with disdain as merely bureaucratic.66/**
Van Slyck, 52 in 1950, was a native of New
York City and a Ph.D. of Yale University. After
nine years as a member of the Yale history faculty,
he quit the academic world in 1929 to seek his
fortune in investment banking. Eventually he became
See Volume II, pp. 27-29 and 36-38.
** See pp. 58 and 76-77, below. Montague remained
a member of the Board for 20 years, until his re-
tirement on 31 July 1970.
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a partner in Fahnestock & Company, in charge of
economic research. From May 1942 to July 1945, he
served in A-2, at one time as chief of current
intelligence, ultimately as a Far East specialist
and estimator. During the last three months of
his military service, July-September 1945, he was
an executive assistant to the Commanding General,
AAF, concerned with demobilization plans.
After these wartime experiences, Van Slyck
found it hard to settle down to humdrum investment
banking. In March 1946, Kingman Douglass, then DDCI,
persuaded him to come to CIG. Thereafter he served
as Montague's deputy, generally minding the store in
CIG/CIA while Montague went off to the NSC Staff and
elsewhere. Jackson is likely to have selected Van
Slyck for the board, not as an experienced intelli-
gence officer, but as one whom he had known in New
York as a "man of affairs."* He made an outstanding
contribution as a remarkably perceptive critic of
other men's drafts. He was particularly concerned
* See p. 51, below.
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1011PO4,
to distinguish between what was reasonably well sup-
ported by evidence and what was mere surmise.67/*
Lieutenant General Clarence Huebner, 62 in
1950, reported for duty on 19 December, as a consult-
ant.** He was a native of Kansas who had enlisted
as a private soldier in 1910, had been commissioned
in 1916, and had proved himself to be a forceful
combat commander on D-day in Normandy. Personally
esteemed by his colleagues, he had little to con-
tribute to their discussions, but was useful in
other ways. As a distinguished soldier, he enjoyed
the confidence of the JCS as well as the DCI; he
had privileged access to US military information
that would otherwise have been inaccessible to the
Board.*** And if any IAC representatives from the.
Pentagon ever got out of hand, a growl from General
* Van Slyck remained a member of the Board for 10
years, until his retirement on 29 October 1960.
** During General Smith's time, all of the military
members of the Board were in this status, as was then
deemed to be necessary in order to protect their re-
tired pay and perquisites.
* * *
See Volume V, pp. 36_37.
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Huebner was sufficient to restore good order and
military discipline.68/*
Calvin Hoover, 53 in 1950, was the sixth mem-
ber of the Board to report in, on 20 December. A
native of Illinois and a Ph.D. of the University of
Wisconsin, he had been Professor of Economics at
Duke University since 1927. He had served with
Langer in the R&A Branch, OSS, 1941-44, and after
that with the US Group, Control Council, Germany,
in 1945. During 1948 he was Chief of Economic In-
telligence for the Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion in Europe. As a distinguished student of Soviet
as well as German affairs, Hoover had a substantial
contribution to make, but he remained a member of
the Board for only eight months.**
The seventh member to arrive, on 8 January
1951, was Maxwell Foster, a Boston lawyer esteemed
* Huebner remained a member of the Board until
30 June 1954, when he was 66.
** Hoover resigned on 31 August 1951, but then be-
came one of the "Princeton Consultants" (see p. 50,
below). He resigned that position in December 1969,
when he was 72.
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by Jackson as a skillful drafter, and also, no doubt,
as a practical "man of affairs," He soon came to
resent what he regarded as Langer's tendency to over-
ride his colleagues, himself in particular,69/ and
resigned on 30 June 1951, after less than six months.
Raymond Sontag, 53 in 1950, was the eighth
member of the Board to report for duty, on 16 Janu-
ary 1951. He was a native of Chicago, a Ph.D. of
the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor of
History at the University of California at Berkeley.*
He was a specialist in German foreign relations,
particularly Nazi-Soviet relations. During 1946-49
he had been Chief of the German War Documents Project
in the Department of State.
Sontag was magisterial in his coordination of
national intelligence estimates. He conducted the
meeting with the IAC representatives as though it
were a seminar and the representatives his students.
Any of them who attempted to stick to his Departmental
brief was made to look like an idiot. Having
* He had been a member of the history faculty at
Princeton, 1924-41.
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thus led all to concur in his own conclusions, Sontag
then went before the LAC as their spokesman -- and
let no ignorant major general dare to quibble with
the agreed conclusions of the substantive experts!
General Smith must have inwardly enjoyed watching
Sontag overawe his IAC colleagues. He never lifted
a �finger to protect them from the Professor.*
When Sherman Kent became Assistant Director,
in January 1952, Sontag was made his Deputy.**
Sontag's appointment completed the original
Board of National Estimates. In contrast to Donovan's
prescription (one scholar, one strategist, one
scientist, two or three "men of affairs"), Smith's
original Board consisted of four eminent professors,
one distinguished combat commander, one lawyer, and
two men experienced in the interdepartmental coor-
dination of intelligence estimates. It should also
* The author imitated Sontag's IAC technique with
some success until Allen Dulles became DCI and put
him down.70/
** Sontag resigned from the Board on 20 June 1953,
but then became one of the "Princeton Consultants,"
a position that he still holds (1971).
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be noted that five of the eight held doctorates in
history, excellent training for the exercise of
critical judgment on the basis of incomplete evidence.
The six other men whom Smith subsequently ap-
pointed to the Board were Lieutenant General William
Morris (April 1952 to August 1952), Vice Admiral
Bernard Bieri (June 1951 to May 1953), Ambassador
Nelson Johnson (December 1951 to June 1953), Dr.
Edgar Hoover (January 1952 to June 1954), James Cooley
(August 1952 to May 1970), and Lieutenant General
Harold Bull (October 1952 to December 1957).
Because some of these fourteen men replaced
others, the total number of Board members present
at any one time during the Smith period never ex-
ceeded eleven. Ihe number was ten at the time of
General Smith's departure, in February 1953.
E. The "Princeton Consultants"
Smith and Jackson had no confidence in the
judgment of intelligence analysts, whether in CIA
or in the Departmental agencies. Jackson regarded
them all as bureaucrats out of touch with reality.
He shared Donovan's conception that a board composed
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of "men of affairs" was needed to subject the findings
of the analysts to the test of credibility in the
light of practical experience. When he realized
that the Board of National Estimates was being filled
up with professors (the sort of people Langer knew),
he was disgusted. In his estimation professors were
even more out of touch with reality than were intel-
ligence analysts! 71/
When Smith and Jackson found it impossible to
recruit for the Board "men of great prestige with
practical experience,"* they conceived of creating
another body of such men, who, while not available
for full-time service, might be willing to meet
occasionally to give counsel on the most
and difficult estimative problems. This
Board" would meet in Princeton.72/** It
known as "the Princeton Consultants."
important
"Consulting
came to be
* These are Jackson's words for what Donovan meant
by "men of affairs."
** The basic idea was to get away from the bureaucrat-
ic atmosphere of Washington. Since "men of affairs"
would, of course, come from the Northeast, Princeton
would be a convenient midpoint. Besides, Princeton
is a pleasant place and Jackson had a home there.
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1
F.
What Jackson meant by "men of great prestige
with practical experience" is indicated by the names
of the first three men chosen for this group: Van-
nevar Bush, George Kennan, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong./*
The other original members of the Princeton group
were Alexander Standish, a partner in J. H. Whitney
& Company, Barklie Henry, a director of various corp-
orations, and Burton Fahs, director of humanities
for the Rockefeller Foundation.74/ The first two
were evidently Jackson's friends, the third Langer's.**
Jackson intended these consultants to exercise,
in relation to the Board of National Estimates, the
corrective authority that the Board had been intended
to exercise in relation to the intelligence analysts.
Their knowledgeable comments would set the professors
* Bush, 60, had been a professor, at M.I.T., but was
also a practical scientist, an inventor. He had been
Chairman of the Research and Development Board in the
Department of Defense and in 1950 was President of the
Carnegie Institution in Washington. Kennan, 46, was an
outstanding Foreign Service officer and a specialist in
Soviet and German affairs; he had been Minister-Counsel-
lor in Moscow while General Smith was Ambassador. In
1950 he was at the Institute for Advanced Study at
Princeton. Armstrong, 63, had long been a close col-
laborator with Allen Dulles in the Council on Foreign
Relations and was Editor of Foreign Affairs.
* *
Fahs had been Chief of the Far East Division, R&A
Branch, OSS, under Langer.
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straight; their concurrence would give prestige and
authority to national intelligence estimates. Langer
had a different view of the relationship. He saw
these consultants as eminent men whose views were
certainly worthy of respectful consideration, but
they were not responsible to anyone for the substance
of national intelligence estimates; The Board of
National Estimates was responsible, and should there-
fore exercise final judgment, subject only to the
responsibility and consequent authority of the DCI.75/
Ironically, the consultants came to value the
information that they obtained from ONE more highly
than ONE valued the advice that it obtained from
them. The ultimate irony, in view of Jackson's
preconceptions, is that the Board of National Es-
timates is now (1971) composed predominantly of
professional intelligence officers, former analysts,
while the consultants are, for the most part, pro-
fessors.*
* The intelligence professionalism of CIA today
(1971) is far superior to anything known in 1950.
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t.
The Naticnal Esti7.ates Staff
All of the Office of National Estimates below
the level of the Board came eventually to be known
as the National Estimates Staff.
Langer was authorized to draft from ORE anyone
he wanted for ONE. He began, on 15 November, by
taking a complete unit, the Global Survey Division,
which was then composed of Ludwell Montague, DeForest
Van Slyck, Ray Cline, Paul Sorel, Willard Matthias,
and George Jackson.76/ Montague and Van Slyck be-
came members of the Board; Borel became Langer's
Executive Officer.* Soon afterward Langer drafted
additional men and women from ORE. They had
been recommended to him individually by Montague,
Van Slyck, Cline, and Jack Smith** as the persons
in ORE who were best suited to ONE's requirements.
* Borel subsequently became DADNE for administra-
tion (1952), a member of the Board (1956), Assistant
Director, Central Reference (1957), Assistant DDI
(1963), Director, Intelligence Support Services (1966),
Special Advisor to the DDI (1967), and Director,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (1969).
** Smith had been Chief of the Publications Division,
ORE. He subsequently became a member of the Board
(1957), Assistant Director, Current Intelligence (1962),
and Deputy Director, Intelligence (1966).
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In the circumstances of that time, a call to ONE
was regarded in ORE as an invitation
Ark.77/
to enter Noah's
By 29 November 1950
there were
(b)(1)
people in (b)(3)
(b)(1)
ONE
including four Board mem-(b)(3)
bers.*
An eventual strength
of 70 was then contem-
plated.78/
Montague's plan for an "Office of Estimates""
provided for a current intelligence division, five
regional divisions, and a general division. The
first would edit and publish the CIA Daily Summary,
maintain secure custody of specially sensitive mate-
rials, and operate a CIA situation room and after-
hours watch.*** The regional divisions would be
composed of area specialists who would follow the
* Langer, Kent (as a consultant), Montague, and
Van Slyck.
* *
See p. 32, above.
*** These had been functions of the Publications
Division in ORE. The current intelligence function
was included in ONE in order to assure the estimators
of access to sensitive current information, partic-
ularly the highest-level State Department cables,
and also to ensure that current reporting would be
guided by estimative judgment.
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301. Ibid., IV, 3-4, as corrected by LouiseDavison
with regard to the number of the NIA Directive.
302. Ibid., IV, 4-5.
303. Ibid., IV, 6-7.
304. Louise Dickey Davison, Draft history, "The
t,
Office of 0 erations: Overt Collection,
1946-1965," DDI Historical Series, DCS-
Appendix A:1
t
305. G Administrative 0 er No. 22, 17 Oct 46,
!/HC-300, item A-10.
306. Jackson and Claussen, Organizational Nietory
(133, above), IV, 11.
307. Lawrence White to Ludwell Montague, Nov 70.
re
308. A. B. Darli g's interview wi Kingman Douglass,
28 May 52, HS/HC-800, Vol. I.
309. A. B. Darli 's interview wit Richard Helms,
10 Nov 52, s/HC-800,.Vo1. II.
310. Walter Pforzheimer to Ludwell Montague, 1 Jul 71.
311. Author's comment.
312. Davison, op. cit. (304, above), Appendix A.
313. Louise Davison to Ludwell Montague, 10 Mar 71.
314. Ibid. Mrs. Davison's source was George Carey.
315. Dulles, Jackson, and Correa, Report to the NSC
(7, above), pp. 93-105.
316. Louise Davison (313, above).
317. Memo from the Acting ADO (John M. Sterling)
to the DCI, "Dulles Committee report con
the Office of Operations " 14 Feb 49, Exec-
.')utive Registry, File 13.
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318. NSC 50 (40, above), pp. 8-10.
319. Ibid.
320. SC-M-1, 18 Dec 50 (10, above, Envelope 1).
321. Jackson and Claussen, Organizational History
(133, above), IV, 48-51.
322. Ibid., IV, 55.
323. Ibid.
324. Ibid., IV, 62.
325. Ibid., IV, 64-65.
326. DDI Diary, 10-14 and 31 Jan, 1, 8, and 10-12
Feb 52 (121, above).
327. Minutes, Director's Meeting, 11 Jun 51 (211,
above).
328. Ibid., 22 Apr 52.
329. W. B. Smith, Report to the NSC (113, above).
330. William Jackson to Ludwell Montague (62,
above), para. 10.
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