FIFTEEN DCI'S FIRST 100 DAYS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00622791
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-02683
• Publication Date: April 1, 1994

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TITLE: Fifteen DCI's First 100 Days
AUTHOR: CIA History Staff
VOLUME: 38 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1994
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STUDIES 1
INTELLIGENCE
A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central
Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the
contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an
article's factual statements and interpretations.
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Taking stock
Fifteen DCIs' First 100 Days
CIA History Staff
Editor's Note: These brief sketches convey some sense
of the pace and preoccupations of 15 Directors of Cen-
tral Intelligence (DCIs) in their first 100 days. No regu-
lar cycles or predictive patterns emerge; some DCIs
eased into their jobs, while others found themselves sud-
denly reacting to wars, scandals, or investigations.
Nevertheless, DCIs Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Colby,
and Gates managed majorxhanges in CIA's structure
and mission in the 100-day span.
The History Staff in CIA's Center for the Study of Intelli-
gence originally prepared this work in January 1993 as
a background paper for the new DCI, R. James Woolsey.
Seven of the staff's historians, Nicholas Cullather, Ger-
ald Haines, Scott Koch, Mary McAulijfe, Kevin Ruffner,
Donald Steury, and Michael Warner, drafted the individ-
ual sketches, and the staff's chief J. Kenneth
McDonald, edited them into final form. A few changes
have been made in the original version for editorial
and declassification reasons. Although this is an official
CIA History Staff product, the views expressed�as in
alto! its works�are those of the authors and editor and
, do not necessarily represent those of the CIA.
RAdm. Sidney Souers, US Naval Reserve
The shape of the postwar world was still uncertain when
Sidney Souers on 23 January 1946 became the first DCI
for the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG).
A wealthy St. Louis businessman and Naval Reservist
who had impressed Navy Secretary James Forrestal,
Souers had risen to Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence
during the war. Now 53, he agreed to take on one more
task before returning to civilian life and his business
interests in Missouri. At the White House on 24 January,
President Truman read a mock proclamation and pre-
sented Souers with a black cloak and wooden dagger as
the vestments and appurtenances of his new position as
"director of centralized snooping."
Souers had helped draft the directive for the new CIG,
which was not intended to challenge the position of the
departmental intelligence services. Directed to coordi-
nate, plan, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence, and
to provide services of common concern, CIG had no
clear authority to engage in clandestine collection or
covert operations.
Souers ensured that CIG would survive his brief tenure
and begin to fulfill its mission of coordinating the US
intelligence activities. He gathered a cadre of experi-
enced and mostly military intelligence professionals
with some difficulty, because CIG was only grudgingly
staffed and funded by the Departments of State, War,
and Navy. By April he had also maneuvered success-
fully to gain responsibility for the resources of the War
Department's Strategic Services Unit, the remnants of
the substantial foreign intelligence capability the Office
of Strategic Services had built up during the war.
At Truman's request, CIG also collated the deluge of
Army, Navy, and State Department cables, dispatches,
and reports that arrived daily, and produced a compre-
hensive intelligence summary for the White House; the
first Daily Summary was delivered less than four weeks
after Souers became Director. He never managed to get
much cooperation from State, and the military services
refused even to provide CIG with information on their
own capabilities and intentions. When Souers left office
on 10 June 1946, CIG's professional and clerical per-.
sonnel numbered about 100.
Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, US Army
The CIG's inherent weaknesses had become glaring by
the time DCI Souers began thinking about who should
replace him. In Hoyt Vandenberg, the 47-year-old
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nephew of powerful Republican Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg and General Eisenhower's intelligence chief since
January, Souers saw just the man to give CIG the lead-
ership and connections it needed. President Truman's
aides persuaded Eisenhower to part with his new G-2,
and Vandenberg became the second DCI on 10 June
1946.
Vandenberg had learned the value of coordinated collec-
tion and analysis as commander of the 9th Air Force in
the European war. An ambitious officer who hoped to
head an independent Air Force, he set aside his paro-
chial service concerns and worked hard to give CIG
greater freedom from State and the military. His first
months on the job saw enormous changes in CIG. Van-
denberg campaigned to double its budget and vastly
expand its staff. Over the objections of the State Depart-
ment and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, he won for CIG
monopolies on clandestine collection and foreign coun-
terintelligence, as well as the right to conduct indepen-
dent research and analysis.
For these new roles Vandenberg in July established the
Office of Special Operations and the Office of Reports
and Estimates, and in the same month took over intelli-
gence operations in Latin America from the FBI. To
manage this growing structure, he reorganized and
strengthened the Office of the Director, subjecting it to
military staff discipline under the supervision of the
colonels he had brought along from Army G-2.
When President Truman asked CIG to assess the Soviet
Union's
increasingly worrisome behavior, Vandenberg
oversaw the crash production of ORE-1, the predeces-
sor of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates. This
first Estimate of 23 July 1946 predicted that Soviet for-
eign policy would continue to be "grasping and opportu-
nistic," but also judged that Stalin still had neither the
capabilities nor the desire for all-out war with the West.
By early September, when he won the right for CIG to
have its own budget and to hire and fire its own person-
nel, Vandenberg had in principle recreated an intelli-
gence organization with all the powers�except for
covert action�of the wartime OSS. By then Vanden-
berg had also begun his campaign to place the CIG on a
firmer legal footing, an aspiration fulfilled early in his
successor's term.
RAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, US Navy
Roscoe Hillenkoetter had gained an appreciation for
intelligence and clandestine operations as naval attach�
in Vichy France in 1940-41. A 1919 Naval Academy
graduate, Hillenkoetter had been wounded at Pearl Har-
� bor and had served as Admiral Nimitzs intelligence
officer in the Pacific in 4942-43. Always a sailor at
heart, he had commanded the USS Missouri in late
1945, and he returned to command cruisers off Korea
when he left CIA in 1950. Sworn in on I May 1947, he
had been naval attach�gain in Paris when recalled to
become DCI.
As a 49-year-old newly promoted rear admiral, Hillen-
koetter kept a low profile in the first months of his ten-
ure while Congress and the executive branch hammered
out the National Security Act of 1947. He let his more
senior predecessor, Lieutenant General Vandenberg,
provide the bulk of testimony to the Congress concern-
ing the Act's proposed reorganization of the national
intelligence structure.
Hillenkoetter had plenty of foreign developments to
occupy him as the Truman administration responded
decisively to spreading Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe, and to the threat of new Communist successes
elsewhere. The Marshall Plan was announced (and
denounced by Moscow and its clients), and the mood in
Washington became grim as the administration imposed
strict new loyalty regulations and began military and
other assistance to Greece and Turkey. Hillenkoetter did
not face these new Cold War challenges full force, how-
ever, until later in his tenure.
The National Security Act of 27 July 1947 created the
Central Intelligence Agency along with a reorganized
defense structure and a National Security Council. Tru-
man gave Hillenkoetter a recess appointment in August
1947 as CIA succeeded CIG on 18 September, then
reappointed him in November for Senate confirmation
(as the new law required) in December.
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Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, US Army
Intelligence failures at the beginning of the Korean war
prompted President Truman to ask Lt. Gen. Walter
Bedell Smith to take over as DCI. His appointment on
7 October 1950 marked the Truman administration's
acceptance of the CIA as a permanent feature of the
bureaucratic landscape. As Eisenhower's chief of staff,
Smith had served as general manager of the European
theater in World War II and enjoyed an unmatched repu-
tation as an administrator. He had been Truman's
Ambassador in Moscow and was regarded in Washing-
ton as an insider of formidable talents.
The June 1950 attack on South Korea took the adminis-
tration by surprise and raised fears of a third world war.
Truman wanted a tough, effective DCI to prevent future
surprises and to wage clandestine war on the Soviet
Union and China. The administration and Congress
agreed on a massive expansion of the national security
budget that led to a threefold increase in intelligence
spending. Smith, who had just turned 55, entered office
determined to sweep aside bureaucratic obstacles to
effective intelligence gathering and covert action.
Largely following the recommendations of an early
1949 report to the NSC by a commission chaired by
Allen Dulles, Smith moved quickly to streamline proce-
dures for gathering and disseminating intelligence. Four
months after the outbreak of war, the Agency had pro-
duced no coordinated estimate of the situation in Korea.
.Smith created a new Office of National Estimates spe-
cifically dedicated to producing national estimates
under the direction of William Langer, the Harvard his-
torian who had led the Research and Analysis branch of
OSS. Langer's Board of Estimates and its staff created
procedures followed for the next two decades, and
Smith also stepped up efforts to obtain current eco-
nomic, psychological, and photo intelligence. By 1
December he had formed a Directorate for Administra-
tion, beginning a reorganization that divided Agency
operations by function into three Directorates�Admin-
istration, Plans, and Intelligence.
The CIA's expansive covert action program remained
the responsibility of Frank 'Wisner's quasi-independent
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) formed in 1948 at
the urging of George Kennan and other State Depart-
ment activists. But Smith began to bring OPC under the
DCI's control. In early January 1951 he made Allen
Dulles the first Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), to
supervise both OPC and CIA's separate espionage orga-
nization, the Office of Special Operations (0S0). It took
until January 1952 to collect all intelligence functions
under a Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI).
Although Frank Wisner succeeded Dulles as DDP in
August 1951, it took until August 1952 to merge OSO
and OPC�each of which had its own culture, methods,
and pay scales�into an effective, single directorate.
Smith is remembered as one of the CIA's most effective
DCIs, a leader who defined its structure and mission. He
earned his reputation in his first months in office, when
with administration support and a strong sense of war-
time crisis, he created a role for the new Agency.
Allen Dulles
The Eisenhower administration entered office in 1953
determined to seize the initiative in the Cold War while
keeping a lid on the federal budget. The new presi-
dent's choice for DCI shared his belief that covert action
could offer an inexpensive alternative to military action
in the many peripheral areas threatened by Communist
subversion. As the head of OSS in Switzerland, Allen
Dulles had directed operations that penetrated the Ger-
man Foreign Office, contacted plotters against Hitler,
and arranged the surrender of German forces in Italy.
After returning to law practice in 1945, he retained an
intense interest in the fledgling Agency and joined
Bedell Smith in November 1950, becoming the first
DDP in early 1951 and DDCI the following August.
With Eisenhower's election, Allen Dulles, 59, moved
into Smith's chair on 26 February 1953 as his older
brother, John Foster Dulles, took over as Secretary of
State. This gave the new DCI extraordinary stature in
the administration, and Allen Dulles made the Agency
one of Eisenhower's principal policy tools. In 1953 and
1954, the CIA used covert operations to bring to power
friendly regimes in Iran and Guatemala.
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In his first 100 days, Dulles cleared the way for the
Agency's expanded covert action role. Eisenhower set
up a special commission on international operations,
which with Dulles's approval recommended a shift of
resources from the type of propaganda operations that
Bedell Smith had favored to more active, paramilitary
operations. In August 1953 the CIA helped an Iranian
Army coup overthrow premier Mohammed Mossadeq
and restore the Shah.
Although Dulles enjoyed the confidence of the adminis-
tration, he received less support from Congress. In mid-
March 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy summoned the
new DCI to appear before the Subcommittee on Investi-
gations to answer charges of subversion within the
Agency. McCarthy's list of "subversives and other mis-
fits" turned out to include only two Agency employees,
both of whom had already been investigated and
cleared. Unappeased, McCarthy raised fresh allegations
every few weeks. Fearing that a prolonged investigation
would damage security, Dulles appealed to Eisenhower
to shelter CIA from McCarthy's hail of subpoenas. The
President prevailed on the Senator to desist, and the
Agency was spared the treatment that McCarthy later
gave the Army.
Many regard Dulles's tenure as CIA's golden age. A
protective, avuncular figure, Dulles placed his personal
mark on the Agency's operations. He has been criti-
cized, however, for advocating covert action as a sim-
ple, cheap expedient�an easy alternative for
policyrnakers reluctant to expend lives and money for
American initiatives abroad. Toward the end of his term,
he had become overconfident. The hidden costs of
covert operations were exposed in the Bay of Pigs deba-
cle, and in the moral capital expended in propping up
autocratic pro-American regimes in Iran and Guatemala.
John McCone
When John A. McCone became DCI on 29 November
1961, the Agency was under a cloud from the Bay of
Pigs disaster the previous spring. John F. Kennedy
selected McCone because he was so unlike his prede-
cessor. In contrast to Allen Dulles, McCone, a wealthy
and successful West Coast engineer and businessman,
was an excellent manager. Kennedy hoped that he
could use these abilities to bring the Agency under con-
trol. McCone, 59, had no background in intelligence and
little interest in covert operations; this suited Kennedy,
who wanted no more Bay of Pigs fiascos.
McCone immediately set to work to establish the DCI's
preeminence in the Intelligence Community. To this
end he pressed the White House for a Presidential letter
of instruction (which he got on 16 January 1962),
emphasizing the DCI's role as the President's principal
foreign intelligence adviser and coordinator of the
entire US intelligence effort. Although this statement
gave the DCI authority to "coordinate and give guid-
ance" to the total intelligence effort rather than to
"coordinate and direct" as McCone requested, it was
nevertheless the first time that any DCI had been given
this authority. Throughout his tenure, McCone took a
strong but uncontentious role in the Intelligence Com-
munity.
McCone also moved quickly to reorganize the Agency.
Working with a small study group, McCone on 19 Feb-
ruary 1962 created the new Directorate of Research
(which a year later became the Directorate of Science
and Technology). Focusing on accountability, he ele-
vated the Comptroller's position, and later' that spring
moved that office as well as those of General Counsel,
Legislative Counsel, and Audit Staff into the Office of
the DCI. He also created the position of Executive
Director. Although he originally anticipated that his
DDCI (Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army) would
take over the day-to-day administration of the Agency,
McCone's own hands-on management style prevented
this.
The Cold War was especially chilly when McCone
entered office, and Cuba under Fidel Castro was a thorn
in President Kennedy's side. As DCI-Designate
McCone was present at the November 1961 founding
of Operation MONGOOSE, an interagency effort to
destabilize the Castro regime initiated by the President
and carried out by CIA. McCone insisted on placing
MONGOOSE under a National Security Council over-
sight group, to prevent what he termed "reckless" activ-
ity.
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As DCI and former Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, McCone from the outset took an active
part in the committee of senior administration officials
that prepared policy recommendations on arms control
issues. He also took many informal steps to improve
the quality of the intelligence product and to get policy-
makers to use that product, primarily by making it use-
ful to their concerns.
VAdm. William Raborn, US Navy (Retired)
President Lyndon Johnson appointed retired VAdm.
William Raborn as DCI on 12 April 1965. Quickly con-
firmed, Raborn was sworn in on 28 April 1965. The new
DDCI was a CIA veteran, Richard Helms, who
replaced Lieutenant Generil Carter. Agency officers
regarded the new DCI warily. Although he had directed
the Navy's Polaris missile program with extraordinary
success, some thought that his technical expertise could
not compensate for a lack of intelligence or foreign
affairs experience. Others�including President
Johnson�believed that Raborn's ability to win the con-
fidence and support of Congress, amply demonstrated
in the Polaris program, would make him an effective
DCI. Fifty-nine when sworn in, Raborn was severely
tested by military and political crises during the first 100
days of his 14-month term as DCI.
Raborn's tenure began with a crisis in the Dominican
Republic, which led him to make lasting changes in the
Operations Center. He designated an analyst to screen,
evaluate, and pass significant items to him as they came
in, and he began the policy of assigning senior officers
to weekend duty in the Operations Center, whose facili-
ties were also used to get important information to key
policymakers quickly.
Raborn focused his attention on Vietnam almost as
soon as the Dominican crisis was over. In February
1965, President Johnson had ordered the bombing of
North Vietnam, and in March had landed US Marines
to protect the American airbase at Danang. The CIA's
involvement in the war was increasing, and Raborn
moved decisively to centralize his sources of intelli-
gence and analysis. In early July 1965, he created a
Vietnam Task Force and used it to support the CIA rep-
resentative�George Carver�on the National Planning
Task Force for Vietnam and to make independent rec-
ommendations to President Johnson.
The Intelligence Community's control of the overhead
reconnaissance program also preoccupied Raborn in his
first 100 days, and one of his first acts was to determine
the CIA's justification for maintaining an overhead
reconnaissance capability. Attempts to coordinate Air
Force and CIA overhead reconnaissance programs con-
tinued during his tenure and beyond, with no satisfac-
tory resolution.
Richard Helms
On 18 June 1966, President Lyndon Johnson announced
DCI William Raborn's resignation effective 30 June,
and nominated Richard Helms, Raborn's DDCI, as the
next Director. Quickly confirmed by the Senate, Helms
took the oath of office on 30 June.
An OSS veteran and an intelligence professional with
extensive experience managing clandestine collection,
Helms at 53 was-everything that Raborn was not.
Helms had a high reputation in CIA and with Congress
and the press. Skeptical of covert action, Helms had
had no part in the Bay of Pigs debacle. Many in the
Agency thought that Helms, rather than Admiral
Raborn, should have succeeded John McCone in 1965.
Helms breezed through hearings before Senator Rus-
sell's Armed Service Committee, and his unanimous
confirmation helped Russell derail an effort by Senator
Eugene McCarthy to add three members of the Foreign
Relations Committee to the existing CIA oversight com-
mittees. As part of the Agency's effort to foster good �
relations with the press, Helms wrote a letter to the St.
Louis Globe Democrat, praising its 18 July 1966 edito-
rial opposing the McCarthy proposal. Unfortunately,
the editorial had characterized Senator William Ful-
bright as "crafty" in supporting McCarthy, and Helms's
letter seemed to endorse that view. The Senate reacted
indignantly, and a surprised Helms immediately called
not only Fulbright, but Mansfield, Stennis, and other
ranking senators of both parties to apologize, and he
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later appeared before Fulbright's committee for further
mea culpas. Within days the affair was forgotten,
except by Helms, who took to heart Senator Sam
Ervin's advice, "I hope that out of this matter will come
an appreciation by the Director of CIA of the great
truth that men rarely regret saying too little."
Vietnam was the dominating intelligence issue when
Helms became DCI. President Johnson had already
made the essential decisions about the progress of the
war without consulting the CIA. The role of finished
intelligence, as Helms saw it, was to inform and not sec-
ond-guess current policy decisions. Helms recognized
that the Agency had to remain an independent, unbi-
ased source of information for the President, but he also
knew that if he continually gave the President bad
news, the Agency's analysi eventually would be
ignored. To improve the CIA's ability to handle the
increasing volume of intelligence on Vietnam, Helms in
August 1966 appointed George Carver as Special
Adviser for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) and expanded his
authority.
Helms inherited a DCI relationship with the President
that was correct but cool. John McCone had left when
President Johnson became indifferent, while Admiral
Raborn had remained an outsider as DCI. Helms did
not win Johnson's full confidence until late May 1967,
when, on short notice, CIA produced a remarkably
accurate estimate of the course and length of the Arab-
Israeli Six-Day War in June. This dramatically enhanced
the prestige of the Agency, and of its Director, who was
thereafter invariably invited to Johnson's Tuesday lunch
meetings with his closest advisers.
James Schlesinger
After his reelection in 1972, President Richard Nixon
fired Richard Helms, who had led the CIA throughout
his first term. Intent on reforming the Agency, he
appointed James Schlesinger, 43, as DCI on 21 Decem-
ber 1972. Educated as an economist at Harvard,
Schlesinger had also served as Director of Strategic
Studies at the Rand Corporation in the late 1960s. As
Assistant Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in 1970, Schlesinger had prepared an
extensive critical study of the Intelligence Community
for Nixon, which had focused on methods for improving
the quality of US intelligence. At OMB, Schlesinger had
gained a reputation as a budget cutter, and in 1971,
President Nixon had appointed him Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
Although his tenure as DCI was brief, Schlesinger took
charge of the Agency on 2 February 1973 with a man-
date for sweeping change. With Nixon's full support, he
was determined to become the real head of the Intelli-
gence Community and to clean house at CIA by elimi-
nating deadwood and cutting costs. The Vietnam cease-
fire on 27 January 1973 seemed to offer Schlesinger
and the Nixon administration a unique opportunity to
make over the CIA and the Intelligence Community, and
in his five-month term Schlesinger undertook a series
of dramatic changes.
To coordinate the activities of the departmental intelli-
gence services and to maximize his role as DCI,
Schlesinger almost immediately put a number of non-
Agency personnel on the Intelligence Community Staff.
Believing that the clandestine operator's day had passed,
Schlesinger focused his early efforts on increasing tech-
nical collection and reducing the Directorate of Plans'
personnel level. He fired or forced to resign or retire
nearly 7 percent of the CIAs total staff, predominantly
from the clandestine side of the house�whose name he
also changed from Directorate of Plans to Directorate
of Operations (DO).
Soon after Schlesinger's appointment, the Watergate
scandal exposed the Agency to charges of involvement
in that affair and in the earlier September 1971 burglary
of the Los Angeles office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The revelation of the Fielding
break-in and CIAs role in it�providing a disguise, a
camera, and recording equipment to G. Gordon Liddy,
an ex-FBI agent and member of the Watergate plumb-
ers�outraged Schlesinger. Having known nothing of
the break-in, and determined not to be blindsided again,
Schlesinger on 9 May 1973 ordered all employees to
report any CIA activities they were aware of that might
in any way appear inconsistent with CIA's charter.
Later in May the Office of the Inspector General gave
Schlesinger a 693-page list of "potential flap activities,"
which detailed Agency involvement in MHCHAOS,
mail-opening programs, the Huston Plan, MKULTRA
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and drug testing, and the training of local police. Other
revelations included details of CIA's attempts to assassi-
nate foreign leaders. This is the list that became known
as the "family jewels".
William Colby
In an 11 May 1973 Cabinet shakeup arising out of the
Watergate affair, President Nixon announced that DCI
James Schlesinger was to become Secretary of Defense
and that William Colby, a professional intelligence
officer, would be the next DCI. Then 53, Colby was a
Princeton graduate who had served in OSS and taken a
law degree from Columbia. He had joined OPC in 1950
and as a career DDP officer had served tours in Italy and
Saigon. He had been Chief of Station in Vietnam in
1960 and later as Director, Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support, he had overall responsibility for
village pacification, including the controversial PHOE-
NIX program.
Colby's swearing in as DCI was delayed until 4 Septem-
ber, evidently because of White House preoccupation
with Watergate. During the long interim between
Schlesinger's departure on 2 July and Colby's swearing
in, DDCI Vernon Walters, who was serving as Acting
DCI, tactfully permitted Colby as Executive Director to
carry forward institutional changes that Schlesinger had
set in motion.
Under Presidential pressure, Colby initiated major
changes in the intelligence estimates process during his
first few months as DCI. On 7 September, Colby sent
Nixon an ambitious set of proposed DCI objectives to
improve the intelligence product. Colby's most signifi-
cant innovation was to abolish the Office and Board of
National Estimates and to establish the National Intelli-
gence Officer (MO) system under George Carver. In
his first three months as DCI, Colby also established an
Office of Political Research (OPR) to provide in-depth
intelligence support to top-level decisionmakers, revital-
ized the US Intelligence Board's Watch Committee to
increase its strategic warning capabilities, created
"Alert Memorandums" for key policymakers, and
ordered postmortems prepared on the Intelligence Com-
munity's performance in various crises.
Overseas, Colby faced a series of unexpected crises as
soon as he took office. His tenure began with a major
intelligence failure, when CIA and the Intelligence
Community failed to warn US policymakers before the
outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. The
CIA and Intelligence Community also failed to warn of
the ensuing oil crisis brought on by OPEC. Once the
Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel began, however, CIA
and the Intelligence Community provided valuable sup-
port to White House crisis management.
Colby's first major problem�less than a week after he
became DCI�stemmed from Congressional and press
allegations that CIA was deeply involved in the mili-
tary coup that had just caused the overthrow and death
of Chilean President Salvador Allende. Chile left a long
shadow on CIA and the investigations that came later in
Colby's tenure.
George Bush
Although on 2 November 1975 President Ford asked
William Colby to resign, he soon had to ask him to
remain temporarily until his designated successor,
George Bush, could return from his Beijing post as US
envoy to the People's Republic of China. Bush did not
actually succeed Colby as DCI until 30 January 1976.
A former Texas Republican Congressman, Chairman of
the Republican National Committee before going to
China, and twice an unsuccessful contender for appoint-
ment as Vice President to succeed first Agnew and then
Ford, Bush at 51 was the first clearly partisan political
figure to be appointed DCI.
The CIA had been buffeted about by investigations and
revelations during the Colby period, and President Ford
relied on Bush to keep the CIA out of the news and to
improve employee morale. On 2 February 1976, Bush
told employees that he wanted to work with the
Agency's professionals to solve its problems. This step
was intended to reassure CIA that he would work within
the current system and make no radical changes with-
out consulting the Agency's senior managers.
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Much of Bush's work in the first months centered
around the investigations that had started during Colby's
tenure. The Church committee released its six-volume
report on 23 April 1976, while the Village Voice had
printed a leaked copy of the classified Pike committee
report on 12 February 1976. Both reports' critical
reviews of CIA's performance further eroded CIA
morale.
On 18 February 1976, President Ford issued Executive
Order No. 11905, which established policy guidelines
and restrictions for individual intelligence agencies, and
clarified intelligence authorities and responsibilities. The
new order, a direct result of the Rockefeller Commis-
sion and Congressional investigations, was at least
partly intended to forestall or preempt Congressional
legislative action. Bush was given�90 days to imple-
ment the new order, which called for a major reorgani-
zation of the Intelligence Community and firmly stated
that intelligence activities could not be directed against
US citizens.
Recognizing that Congressional support was crucial for
.CIA, Bush worked closely with Congress as both the
'Senate and House moved to establish permanent intelli-
gence oversight committees. He quietly installed new
leadership in CIA's Directorates, implemented the new
Executive order, and began to overhaul intelligence pro-
duction to give it more depth and expertise. In April he
selected a CIA career professional, E. Henry Knoche,
to become DDCI when General Vernon Walters retired
in July.
In spite of his brief tenure�a few days short of a year�
Bush is remembered as one of CIA's most popular
DCIs. Taking care not to politicize the DCI's position,
Bush improved employee morale, strengthened CIA's
standing after a wrenching period of scandals, and suc-
cessfully began CIA's post-investigation reforms.
Adm. Stansfield Turner, US Navy (Retired)
When newly elected President Carter called him to the
White House in early February 1977, Adm. Stansfield
Turner, then commander of NATO's Southern Flank in
Naples, thought he might be offered appointment as
DCI. At this suggestion his deputy observed, "Stan, the
President is your classmate and friend; he wouldn't do
that to you." He did, and Turner accepted, although he
regretted the end of his military career. Turner, 53, was
sworn in as 12th DCI on 9 March 1977. President Carter
had rejected George Bush's offer to remain DCI for a
few months to demonstrate that it was not a political or
policy position that had to change with a new adminis-
tration; Bush left CIA on 20 January. In the face of stiff
Congressional opposition, however, Carter's original
nominee, Theodore C. Sorenson, had with some bitter-
ness withdrawn his name. After this setback, it was nat-
ural for Carter to look for a nonpolitical senior military
officer who could be quickly confirmed for the post.
In retrospect, Turner recalls that his attitude toward
CIA was strongly influenced by the experience of his
first 100 days. In that period he permitted the courts to
examine CIA evidence which led to the convictions of
Christopher J. Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee in the
spring of 1977. This case convinced him that CIA had
severe security problems in managing its contractors.
Similarly, his discovery (on information from Washing-
ton Post reporter Bob Woodward) that former CIA
officer Edmund Wilson, who worked for Libyan Presi-
dent Qaddafi, had contacts inside CIA raised doubts
about the DO's probity and security (although Turner
trusted his DDO, Bill Wells). By summer CIA had
unearthed and turned over to Congress more informa-
tion about CIA's massive drug testing programs of the
1950s and 1960s, which again put CIA into the head-
lines.
Turner's most disturbing discovery was the harsh ques-
tioning and illegal imprisonment that the Agency's
Counterintelligence Staff had imposed for several years
on Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. This convinced him
that CIA could be a dangerous organization if not kept
closely accountable to the DCI, the President, and the
Congress.
Turner soon found that he did not have a close working
relationship with DDCI Knoche, whom Bush had
appointed the previous year. By summer, when he
asked Knoche to leave, Turner had become convinced
that the Agency's culture was an obstacle to the reforms
that CIA needed.
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William Casey
At 67 the oldest incumbent of the office, DCI William
Casey arrived at CIA with intelligence experience that
dated from a distinguished OSS record in World War II
to PFIAB service under President Ford. A man of pow-
erful intellect and great energy, Casey was an unrecon-
structed Cold Warrior with a penchant for action and a
fascination with covert operations. He had made a lot
of money in tax publications and as an entrepreneur, and
had served under Nixon and Ford�often amid consider-
able controversy�as Chairman of the SEC, Under Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs, and President of
the Export-Import Bank. His principal claim to his new
appointment, however, was his extraordinarily effective
service as manager of Ronald Reagan's victorious 1980
campaign.
Reagan loyalists and conservatives who dominated the
new administration's CIA transition team produced a
report that roundly condemned both the Agency's meth-
ods and record. In its most extreme form, this report
warned the future DCI against attempts to co-opt him,
called for CIA's division into several new bodies, and
proposed to fire everyone in CIA above the grade of
GS-14 as complicit with the failed Carter-Turner poli-
cies. Although Casey may have had some sympathy
with the report's rhetoric, he entirely rejected its recom-
mendations. Casey believed in centralized intelligence
and expected to preside over an intact CIA. Moreover,
he recognized that in an Agency still reeling from the
crises of the 1970s, the transition team's drastic mea-
sures would only destroy what morale remained. He
thus persuaded Reagan to give him a free hand to revi-
talize both the operational and analytical sides of the
agency.
In fact, Casey was highly critical of past Agency perfor-
mance, whose vision of the Soviet Union in particular
he felt had been far too benign. Convinced that the
sources of Soviet behavior were both revolutionary and
deeply rooted in the Russian psyche, Casey was deter-
mined to incorporate these factors into Agency report-
ing. His goal was to make Agency analysis more
"policy relevant." In the long run Casey's reforms prob-
ably did significantly improve the intelligence product;
he was less likely to attempt to influence the substance
of analysis than to focus on what one DI manager
called "tone and balance." Although this worried many
analysts, their concern was tempered with the realiza-
tion that the new DCI brought with him enhanced influ-
ence and prestige for the Agency.
Except for difficult and contentious confirmation hear-
ings, none of the political crises that were to haunt
Casey as DCI surfaced during the first 100 days. Yet if
this period was uneventful, it did little to reassure Con-
gress. Uncomfortable in his dealings on the Hill, Casey
performed unevenly in front of Congressional commit-
tees and tended to rely on Presidential support. Three
months into his tenure, however, William Casey's most
memorable decisions as DCI still lay ahead.
William Webster
When William Webster took office as 14th DCI on 26
May 1987, it was evident that his predecessor's efforts
to revitalize the CIA had succeeded. Webster inherited
an Agency with greatly expanded covert operational
capabilities and an analytical apparatus of notably
enhanced prestige and credibility. It was also in trouble,
beset by charges of illegal activity arising out of the
Iran-Contra scandal. Moreover, Webster's DDCI, Robert
Gates, whom the inexperienced DCI required for analyt-
ical support and expertise, was himself suspected of
being at least implicitly involved in the Iran-Contra
affair.
Webster's brief was to bring the CIA's credibility with
Congress and the public to the same high level it now
enjoyed in the national security community. A former
Federal judge, Webster had successfully played a similar
role as Director of the FBI, and his appointment prom-
ised a lower profile for the DCI in the future. His task
was made easier by the Tower Commission Report �
which, while not uncritical of the CIA, made it clear that
the Iran-Contra affair was a National Security Council
initiative and that the Agency as an institution�as
opposed to the actions of specific individuals�was not
involved.
In his first 100 days, Webster worked hard to emphasize
CIA's accountability before the public and the Con-
gress. Where Casey had looked for a free hand in his
management of the Agency, Webster pursued a policy
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DCIs
that clearly recognized the CIA's subordination to
national policy. Apart from strengthening ties to Con-
gress, Webster tightened up the internal review process,
defining rigorous standards by which covert action
would be judged for competence, practicality, and con-
sistency with American foreign policy and values.
Webster's tenure began in a period of great uncertainty
in establishing overall intelligence objectives. By 1987
it was clear that the decline of the Soviet Union as a
world power was irreversible, and its continuation as a
single entity was beginning to come into question. The
twin problems of terrorism and international drug
enforcement already posed problems that transcended
the normal lines of Intelligence Community organiza-
tion. Moreover, in Webster's first 100 days the Iran-Iraq
war demanded an intelligence collection and evaluation
effort that drew expertise from virtually every office in
the Directorates of Intelligence and Operations.
These three sets of intelligence problems�the USSR,
terrorism and counternarcotics, and the Iran-Iraq war�
provided models for the interdisciplinary task forces or
centers that were to proliferate under Webster and, later,
Gates. At the same time, the advent of a new era of
arms control raised questions of treaty verification that
had not been dealt with seriously for nearly a decade.
Webster's first 100 days set the tenor of the remainder of
his term as DCI. Navigating cautiously in a complex
world dominated by long-service professionals, his
style of management was detached and his role in gov-
ernment a conciliatory one.
Robert Gates
Robert Gates, the first DCI from CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, entered office on 6 November 1991 at age
48 with the future of the Agency and his own profes-
sional integrity in question. Both factors helped account
for the intensity with which he approached his first 100
days as DCI.
The failed coup of August 1991 had led to the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the Soviet empire,
and the end of the Cold War. With the sudden demise of
the CIA's chief target, the Agency unexpectedly found
itself searching for a new role. This urgent situation
was exacerbated by the rocky state of the US economy,
which produced growing demands to reduce the burden
of military and intelligence establishments.
Following Casey's resignation in 1987, President
Reagan had nominated Gates as DCI, but questions
about his role as Casey's DDCI in the Iran-Contra affair
forced Gates to withdraw his nomination. Four years
later, President Bush again nominated Gates, to succeed
William Webster. This time, Gates faced charges that he
had politicized intelligence estimates to conform more
closely to his own world views and to those of the
Republican President he had served. After committing
himself to unbiased and objective intelligence analysis,
and to a more forward-looking and open CIA, Gates
received the Senate's confirmation. Now, he had to live
up to his promises.
Gates recognized the diverse new problems that the
Intelligence Community had to address, from foreign
technology development and high-technology transfers
to world environmental concerns. Keenly aware that
US security objectives had changed dramatically, he
knew that the CIA needed to prove itself to an American
public that now questioned both its necessity and its
highly secretive culture. Thus, in his first 100 days as
DCI, he quickly assessed future intelligence priorities
and needs, identified available resources, and recom-
mended organizational changes as well as new budget
and legislative proposals.
To improve performance he established a multitude of
Intelligence Community and CIA task forces. These
included interagency task forces on imagery, human
intelligence collection, and National Intelligence Esti-
mates, as well as on coordination of various activities
within the Intelligence Community and the restructur-
ing of its staff. Gates set up CIA task forces to expand
human intelligence capabilities, improve support for
military operations, provide near-real-time intelligence
to senior policymakers, and raise the quality of intelli-
gence publications. He also announced CIA task forces
to improve internal communication, increase openness,
and address concerns about real or perceived politicized
intelligence.
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DC's
By February 1992, Gates had already made many
restructuring changes aimed at carrying out his task
forces' recommendations, as in replacing the Office of
Soviet Analysis with a new Office of Slavic and Eur-
asian Analysis. With an eye toward better relations with
Congress and the American people, he announced a
precedent-breaking openness policy for CIA, which pro-
vided more accessibility to the media and public,
increased contacts with academia, and a markedly more
liberal declassification standard for CIA records of his-
torical significance.
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