A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMANDER BUCHER'S STATEMENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00575872
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02412
• Publication Date: January 29, 1968

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29 January 1968
�A:Psychological ' and ' Political Analysis' of
Commander' Bucher's Statements
Psychological An
1. All of Commander Bucher's Naval service records
have been reviewed. These include his fitness re-
ports, background investigative reports and medical
records. We have also had the opportunity of inter-
viewing a Naval officer in the Washington area who
was Subject's commanding officer, immediately prior
to Subject's assignment to the Pueblo. We have also
listened to the tapes of his purported confession.
2. We believe we have acquired a reasonable under-
standing of Subject as a person. Some judgements
about his reactions can be stated with conviction.
Others which are based on inferences must be con-
sidered more speculative.
3. Nothing in the data reviewed raises any ques-
tions about the Subject's loyalty. The statement
alleged to have been written by Subject in North
Korea after his capture is inconsistent with any-
thing he might have composed voluntarily. Nothing
suggests that he would sign a prepared statement
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voluntarily or under slight duress. Nothing in-
dicates that Subject could have been brought to
the point of utter capitulation in a brief period
of time even under intense psychological coercion
by his captors.
4. The question then is whether in a relatively
short period of time he could have been brought to
the point of signing a "confession" written in
something like the terms published by the North
Korean Government. We understand that technical
analysis of the taped "confession" indicates that
it probably is Subject's voice but that the tape
has been spliced repeatedly. Although we have
no information about his treatment after capture,
in order to answer this question, and understanding of
his personality make-up is needed. On the basis
of the following analysis of his background and
personality, we believe it is possible that he
could have been brought to the point of signing
some kind of document, which later could be ex-
ploited, without his realizing its significance.
5. Subject is 40 years old, married, and the father
of two boys. When he was three his mother died in
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an accident. Although his father and grandmother were
both alive, for reasons unclear he entered Boy's Town.
when he was 14 (1941), where he was twice elected
president of his class and was captain of the football
team. However, his scholastic record was not outstand-
ing. Upon graduation from high school he enlisted
in the Navy and served three years. In order to
qualify for OCS he enrolled in the University of
Nebraska and earned a degree in education. Although
he reported to one officer that he had a master's
degree in paleontology, his Navy officer's records
do not support this.
6. His early performance in the Navy was only
average. He was about two or three years older
than most of his rank. During his early years
in the Navy he was consistently described as an
active, highly motivated young man who was eager
to perform well but who needed somewhat more super-
vision than officers of his rank. It is also evi-
dent that he had a strong inclination to become too
involved with his men. He was given his weakest
ratings on factors relating to military bearing,
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cooperativeness and personal conduct of his affairs.
In general his overall ratings placed him in the
lower half of officers of his age and rank.
7. His primary duty was with the submarine service
and he obviously desired to become a submarine skipper.
There are indications that he felt he would not be
selected for such a post. He was quite disappointed
when he was not given a submarine command and was de-
tailed to the Pueblo instead.
8. It was when he was given his first command that
some signs of strain became evident. He worked very
hard in getting the Pueblo ready for sea. Indeed he
pushed so hard that he was criticized for being too
demanding with the civilians outfitting the ship.
During this period he became involved in a security
investigation after being arrested for gambling. One
informant indicated his belief that Subject had been
drinking on duty. No administrative action resulted
from this investigation.
9. From this material we are able to draw certain
inferences, but we wish to underscore that they are
only inferences.
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a. Subject is quite amenable to direction and
control. He probably is an excellent execu-
tive officer or operations officer. Although
highly motivated to command he is capable of
becoming confused and perhaps inefficient when
forced to operate without direction and to
render independent judgements. It should be
emphasized that this was his first command,
and that he was seized early in a cruise with
a new ship engaged in a relatively new type of
operation with which the Navy itself has little
depth of experience. Whatever briefing he
might have had about harassment and what to
do about it, he was uncertain of what actions
were appropriate in these particular circum-
stances.
b. He has a low threshold for humiliation. His
feelings are easily hurt and he would be in-
clined under such pressure to become depressed
and discouraged. He is the kind of person
who would not know just how to react when
badgered or pushed around.
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c. He is the kind of person who is genuinely
interested in the welfare of his men and
may indeed overidentify with them. Conse-
quently he is more than usually susceptible
to threats made against his men.
10. We do not have any information which would al-
low us to evaluate whether drugs or hypnosis were
used. What pictures we have seen suggest a de-
pressed, discouraged, and humiliated person more
than a drugged or hypnotized one. We doubt that
hypnosis could have been used effectively with
this man in the short period involved. We cannot
discount the possibility of drugs. On this subject,
however, we have no basis for rendering an opinion.
Taking our limited evidence, we can only conclude
that the combination of the newness of his command,
the type of operations in which he was engaged
and his psychological make-up could result in his
behaving in a manner which could be exploited by
his captors, particularly over an extended period
of time.
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Political Analysis
11. Pyongyang's propaganda exploitation of
the seizure of the Pueblo has consisted primarily
of two alleged statements made by Commander Bucher.
Bucher's first statement was a "confession" broad-
cast on 24 January. His second statement, broad-
cast two days later, was described as an interview
by the North Korean press. This "interview,"
except for a few additions, closely follows the
first statement. The statements attributed to
Commander Bucher are for the most part straight
recitals of Communist propaganda and were obviously
dictated by Pyongyang. As such, however, they do
indicate some aspects of the position Pyongyang
now appears to be taking in regard to the Pueblo's
capture.
12. The most obvious intent of the statements
has been to establish the credibility of the North
Korean version of the Pueblo's capture. Bucher's
statement that the Pueblo had deliberately "deeply
intruded into the coastal waters" of North Korea
at the time of its capture is highlighted.
13. After making this point, Bucher's state-
ments. give detailed and somewhat lurid accounts of
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the Pueblo's recent "provocative" activities.
Bucher was alleged to have confessed that the
Pueblo had also violated the waters of "Peoples
China and other socialist countries," and in fact
had entered North Korean waters after performing
"espionage assignments along the Soviet Union's
maritime province." (The North Koreans perhaps
hoped that such a charge would make it difficult
for China and the Soviet Union to withhold full
public support for their position. The Pueblo
had in fact gone directly from Japan to its sta-
tion along the North Korean coast.)
14. In his statements, Bucher labeled the
Pueblo's mission as a "plain act of aggression"
and stated that the ship operated under the guise
of an oceanographic research vessel. He allegedly
stated that the Pueblo's mission was laid on by
the CIA and that he and his men were tempted to
undertake their mission by CIA "dollars and honor."
The two civilians on board the ship were described
as "special espionage agents who are conducting
military espionage missions" as well as "other im-
portant, special assignments."
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15. Such statements can be viewed largely as
a predictable propaganda attempt to publicize and
discredit US intelligence-gathering operations.
They also plainly indicate Pyongyang's concern to
publicize the case it rightly or wrongly feels it
has for the retention of the Pueblo and its crew.
Bucher's statements clearly indicate that Pyong-
yang feels itself in a position to bargain with
the US concerning the Pueblo. In line with this,
a 28 January editorial in the authoritative North
Korean newspaper Nodong Sinmun depicts the Pueblo
incident as."a new flagrant trampling on the
Korean armistice agreement." This strongly im-
plies that Pyongyang sees the final disposition
of the Pueblo and its crew as a subject of nego-
tiation--no doubt lengthy--at Panmunjom.
16. The second Bucher statement, unlike the
first one, draws a connection between the capture
of the Pueblo and the war in Vietnam. Commander
Bucher allegedly stated that the Pueblo's mission
against North Korea was in preparation for "a
new war of aggression in Asia" and added that the
US "regards Korea and Vietnam as two fronts" of
the war.
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17. It is interesting to note that Bucher's
second statement, issued after Pyongyang had had
additional time to reflect upon the public posi-
tion it wished to adopt, stressed a.connection with
Vietnam. Whatever the degree of premeditation in-
volved in the capture of the Pueblo, Pyongyang now
apparently sees its seizure of our ship as a way
to support Hanoi by placing diversionary pressure
on the US. North Korean propaganda in recent months
has been increasingly concerned with linking "US
imperialism" in Vietnam and South Korea. Pyong-
yang, it would appear, now sees its possession of
the. Pueblo and its crew as a golden opportunity to
intensify this 'propaganda line--a factor militating
against an early release of the crew.
18. Another indication that Pyongyang probably
desires to retain the Pueblo and its crew for as
long as feasible is Commander Bucher's statement
that he and his crew "should be punished in accord-
ance with the criminal law" of North Korea. A day
earlier, Nodong Sinmun likewise stated that members
of the crew were "criminals" who must "be dealt
with by law" and receive "due punishment." It
seems quite possible, however, that the crew will
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not be brought to trial. The first Bucher state-
ment concludes with a plea for leniency. In the second
statement he is allowed to make a plea for the crew's
release. Pyongyang has left open the option of re-
leasing the crew at any time.
19. In the last incident involving the North
Korean capture of US military personnel, two heli-
copter pilots downed in North Korea in May 1963 were
not released until after a year of negotiation at
Panmunjom. During this time Pyongyang ignored a
variety of nonmilitary pressures and attempted to
pin charges of espionage and "criminal intent" on
the fliers. They were, in fact, successful in ex-
tracting an apology from the US.
20. Commander Bucher's statements indicate that
the North Koreans would prefer to handle the Pueblo
case in a similar manner. It seems clear that they
presently have no intention of simply releasing
the Pueblo and its crew upon demand. Probably mo-
tivated by a desire to drag out the incident and
inflict the maximum amount of pressure and embarrass-
ment upon the US, they seem intent on building a
strong propaganda case against the crew, as crimi-
nals punishable by North Korean law. Although
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Pyongyang has carefully and obviously provided for
an eventual release of the crew, its propaganda
statements indicate that North Korea will press for
at least an implicit US admission of guilt before
taking such action.
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