INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATED ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00574967
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2020
• Case Number: F-2014-02257
• Publication Date: July 1, 1999

DIRECTOR O CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRApprOVed for Release: 2020/08/03 C00574967
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DI CTIVE 7/3
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE C MUNITY
RELATED ACTIVITIES (U)
(Effective 01 July 1999)
1. REFERENCES.
a) (U) DCID 5/1, "Espionage and Counterintelligence ivities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
b) (U) NSCID 5, "U.S. Espionage and Counterintell ence Activities Abroad," 19 Dec 1984
c) (U) NSCID 6, "Signals Intelligence," 17 Feb e72
d) (U) NSD 42, "National Policy for the Sec rity of National Security Telecommunications
and Information Systems," 05 Jul 1990
e) (U) Presidential Decision Directive/SC-63 (PDD-63), "Critical Infrastructure Protection,"
22 May 1998
f) (U) Memorandum of Agreeme ion Oversight Board for Private Sector Relationships, 05
Jun 1998
g) (U) Charter of the Nation Special Communications Working Group (NSCWG), 07 Jan
1997
h) (U) Memorandum of/Agreement concerning Deconfliction of Computer Network
Operations (CNO), Olhul 1999
i) (U) Charter of th Bilateral Information Operations Steering Group (BIOSG), 14 Apr 1998
j) (U) DCID 5/ "Intelligence Disclosure Policy," 30 Jun 1998
k) (U) Natio 1 Security Act (NSA) of 1947, as amended
1) (U) Titl 10, U.S. Code (Armed Forces)
m) (U) OA Between DoD and the IC Regarding the Information Operations Technology
Center (IOTC), 04 Mar 1997
n) (U) Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the Information Operations Technology Center
(IOTC), 04 Mar 1997
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o) (U) Title 50, U.S. Code
2. PURPOSE.
(U) This directive sets forth the responsibilities of Intelligence Community (IC) components in t conduct
and coordination of:
� (U) Information Operations (JO),
� (U) Intelligence and related support to JO, and
� (U//52e15) Deconfliction of specific computer network operations (CNO) co ucted by National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies.
3. AUTHORITIES.
(SIAN?) This DCID does not affect the authorities, responsibilities, and r trictions relating to components
of the IC and the Department of Defense (DoD) that are set out in exis)fig statutes, executive orders, and
policy directives such as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), Itional Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCIDs), and other DCIDs, in particular the requirem ts under reference (a) for coordination
of espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad. This DC clarifies the DCI authorities under which
IC elements may carry out computer network attack (CNA) a computer network exploitation (CNE)
using NFIP funds.
4. DEFINITIONS.
A. (U/T.,0140) The definition of information operati, ns (I0) is: "Actions taken to affect adversary
information and information systems while defen tng one's own information and information systems."
B. (UHEOWIT Information Operations is an integrating strategy. Although still evolving, the fundamental
concept of JO is to integrate different activipes to affect decision making processes, information systems,
and supporting information infrastructures4 achieve specific objectives, as well as to protect and defend
friendly information and information inyastructures. IC JO-related activities include CNE and other
supporting intelligence activities.
5. DISCUSSION.
A. (UHF.C*115). The concept of)nformation Operations (JO) emerged against the backdrop of the explosive
growth of information technojggy. JO has made use of electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations
(PSYOP), military deceptiol, operational security (OPSEC), and physical destruction. The rapid spread of
computers and computer *works has led to their inclusion as instruments for attacking and influencing
information infrastructu
B. (U//F-015.0) Comp 1 ter network operations (CNO) comprises computer network exploitation (CNE) --
denoting a broad r. ge of intelligence collection activity; computer network attack (CNA) -- denoting
attacks on compu r systems and networks; and computer network defense (CND) -- denoting actions taken
to protect U.S. c:mputer systems and networks and possibly those of allies and coalition partners. CNE is
an intelligenc ollection activity and, while not viewed as an integral pillar of DoD JO doctrine, it is
recognized as an 10-related activity that requires deconfliction with JO. There are interdependencies and
relationships among CNE, CNA, CND, and other IC activities in support of JO which may require
mechanisms to ensure proper deconfliction or coordination among those NFIP funded IC elements that
engage in these activities.
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C. (15//F.Gt70) IC JO activities include conducting, with proper authorization, covert action, including
CNA. IC elements authorized to conduct CNA under DCI authorities in peacetime will be specified b a
Presidential Finding.
D. (W/E01165.IC JO-related activities include:
� (U) Collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating foreign intelligence and c nterintelligence
on JO.
� OConducting CNE, in accordance with the authorities described in referenc (b) and (c).
� (U) Supporting other U.S. government organizations in the conduct of their missions.
� (U) Ensuring effective warning and defense against JO.
� (U) Performing computer network defense (CND) activities commensur e with established legal
statutes or the technical direction provided by NSA/CSS, as specified reference (d), or the
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), as set forth in refe ence (e).
6. DECONFLICTION.
A. (U) While this DCID does not address every contingency, JO an JO-related activities specified in
paragraphs 6.0 and 6.D shall be deconflicted and mutually supp ing. Deconfliction mechanisms shall be
established to guarantee compatibility within areas of commo oncern.
B. (U) To support the establishment of deconfliction proceises, it is important to initially identify the
applicable authority for an action so that activities can be conducted within an appropriate legal context
and oversight requirements can be satisfied. The nature/and the context of an activity will determine the
applicable legal authority for the activity (i.e., the au14rity under which an activity is conducted). The
following guidelines shall apply:
1) (U) The criterion for identifying the a licable authority for a proposed activity shall be the
"primary purpose" of the activity. For e ample, if the "primary purpose" of an activity is
foreign intelligence (H) collection, Fyollection authorities shall prevail, notwithstanding the
fact that the activity may have other urposes.
2) (U) The nature and context of/ he activity, and not the U.S. Government entity that conducts
it, shall determine the applicabAauthority.
C. (YS DIP) The Oversight Bogrd for Private Sector Relationships (reference f) and the National (b)(3)
Special Communications Worki /g Group (NSCWG) (reference g) exist to deconflict JO-related industrial
relations and special communi ations, respectively. They shall be expanded to include new membership as
appropriate.
D. �,S4414*-3 CNA/E Deconjliction process. CIA and NSA will jointly manage, as an IC service of common
concern, an Interagency Target Register (ITR) to deconflict IC CNA and CNE operations. IC elements
conducting CNA or C operations under DCI authorities shall deconflict their operations within the ITR
structure according t TR procedures and appropriate access negotiated with the principal signatories to
the MOA cited in rs erence (h). The IC recognizes a need to establish procedures for deconflicting CNE
activities with ot r appropriate U.S. agencies.
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7. IMPLEMENTATION.
SjSaitir Except where covered by existing policies, IC JO-related responsibilities are lis d below.
A. (U) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Manage nt (DDCl/CM)
shall:
1) (U) Serve as the IC focal point for JO strategic planning and p icy
coordination within the IC and with the Bilateral Information .erations Steering
Group (BIOSG) (per reference i).
2) (U) Represent IC organizations that are not already re r. esented on the BIOSG.
3) (U) Provide administrative and staff support to the ecretariat of the BIOSG
(per reference i).
4) (U) Oversee implementation of this DCID.
B (U) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intellig nce and Research (I&R) shall:
1) (U) Support the Chiefs of Mission in t en- review of the implications of
contemplated JO for foreign affairs and iplomatic relations pursuant to reference
(a).
2) (U) Pursuant to reference (j), rev ew the implications of contemplated sharing
of intelligence on foreign JO pro ams with allies or other foreign entities.
C. (U) The National Intelligence Off / ers (NI0s) for Warning and for Science & Technology
shall jointly provide the DCI and otj1�IC elements with appropriate strategic warning against
JO.
D. (U) Consistent with the Nati nal Security Act of 1947 (reference k), the DCI has assigned
the following tasks, which, pu,suant to 10 USC 113 (reference 1), the Secretary of Defense has
directed the DoD componen listed below to execute.
1) (U) The Directo , National Security Agency/Chief Central Security Service
(DIRNSA/CCSS
i. Integrate CNA, CNE, and CND tools, techniques, and
techno ogy into the SIGINT and INFOSEC communities.
) Train, equip, and organize the U.S. Cryptologic System to
su eport the CNE, CNA, and CND requirements needs of its
customers.
iii.(U) Provide JO-related military targeting support.
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iv. (81 Provide intelligence gain/loss assessments in response to
CINC JO targeting.
v. (81 Develop and support analytic modeling and simulation
techniques to support CNA/CNE efforts.
2) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (D/DIA) shall:
i. (U) Ensure that DIA is postured to support the full ra e of JO
activities, both offensive and defensive, including psy ological
operations, military deception, electronic warfare, c puter network
operations, operations security, and physical dest hon.
(U) Train and equip the Defense HUMINT &vice (DHS) to
support the JO requirements of its customers.
iii.(U) Provide 10-related military targetii support.
iv. (U) Perform all-source analysis, pr uction, dissemination, and
provision of military and military-rel ted intelligence on foreign
information infrastructures and for gn information threats for the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chief of Staff, other defense
components, and, as appropriate/non-defense agencies.
v. reshitcr3 Pursuant to existin ,DoD directives, instructions and other
guidance, conduct Human F ctors intelligence support for the full
range of JO.
vi. (U) Pursuant to DoD1fequirements, provide strategic indications
and warning for 10.
vii.(U) Provide polit cal-military assessments in response to CINC 10
targeting.
3) (U) The Director, N ional Imagery and Mapping Agency (D/NIMA) shall:
i. (U) Conduct imagery and geospatial analysis to identify critical
foreign info ation infrastructures and assess their
interdepend cies.
(U) In artnership with other IC elements, provide targeting
support o 10. This includes identifying physical targets, developing
targeti packages and preparing combat assessments.
iii.(U With approved tasking, help identify vulnerabilities to key
U.S nfrastructures (CONUS and OCONUS) in order to contribute to
effective defensive JO practices.
iv. (U) Provide other imagery and geospatial information support to
IC and DoD JO efforts in a timely and effective manner.
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v. (U) Ensure JO requirements are included in any delineation and
assessment of future requirements.
5) (U) The Director of the Information 0 erations Technology Center (D/IOTC)
shall execute responsibilities in accord ce with references (m) and (n).
E. (U) The Director, Federal Bureau of In estigation (D/1-13I) shall:
1) (U) Provide available, releasa e information and operational support that may
assist in the planning or execu on of an JO activity by IC and DoD.
2) (U) Assist other agencies14l assessing the risks of planned JO activities to the
U.S. information infrastru ure.
3) (U) Keep the U.S. p ate sector and Government at all levels informed of
threats to the U.S. inf ation infrastructure that may arise from JO activities
without divulging U . plans or intentions.
4) (U) Develop a cf deploy tools to reduce the risk of penetration, corruption, and
disruption of c ical U.S. information systems and networks.
5) (U) Invest ate JO intrusions and attacks against information networks and
systems in t e United States.
F. (U) All IC E ment Heads shall:
1) (U) rovide the DDCl/CM with the information required to assist the DCI in
impl enting this directive.
2)8 Cooperate closely with the IOTC to ensure consistency between the CNA
and dual purpose (CNE) techniques contained in the Toolbox and any other
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developing or employed capabilities.
3) (U) Take reasonable steps to protect their own systems from hostile CNA and
CNE.
8. REVIEW.
(U) The DDCl/CM shall coordinate the IC's annual review of this DCID for currency completeness.
3ot
XBITELLIGENCE TE
APPEND! A
1 Definitions of Terms se / d in this Directive
Computer Network Attack (CNA): (U) Operatio s to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
information resident in computers and computer iletworks, or the computers and networks themselves.
Computer Network Defense (CND): (U) Eff&rts to defend against the CNO of others, especially that
directed against U.S. and allied computers a d networks.
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE. : (U) Intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather
data from target or adversary automate/Information systems (AIS) or networks.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Computer Network 0 Crations (CNO): (U) CNE, CNA, and CND collectively.
Covert Action: (U) efer to Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, Title V (50 U.S.C.
413-413b) (referen s k and o) and related legislation. [Related legislation includes the 1991 Intelligence
Authorization Ac nd 102d Congress Report SENATE First Session 102-85 and House Conference Report
102-166.] Secti 503 refers to covert action as, ". . . an activity or activities of the United States
Government t nfluence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
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(U) . . . activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence,
traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or
maintain the security of United States Government programs, or administrative
activities;
. . . traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such
activities; . . . traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United St es
Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activiti ; or.
. activities to provide routine support to the overt activities . . . of other nited
States Government agencies abroad." (Special Activities is a euphe t, sm for
covert action; as such it is redundant to include it here.)
Deception: (U) Those measures designed to mislead an adversary by ma Dulation, distortion, or
falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial t ,his interests.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Electronic Warfare: (U) The use of electromagnetic and,�rected energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack an adversary.
Human Factors: (U) The psychological, cultural, beriavioral, and other human attributes that influence
decision making, the flow of information, and the terpretation of information by individuals or groups at
any level in a state or organization.
Information Operations (I0): (U) Actions en to affect adversary information and information systems
while defending one's own information and nformation systems.
Information System: (U) The organizatIOns, personnel, and components that collect, process, store,
transmit, display, disseminate and act linformation.
Operations Security (OPSEC): ( "A process of identifying critical information and subsequently
analyzing friendly actions attend t to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions
that can be observed by advers /intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems
might obtain that could be inte reted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful
to adversaries; c. Select and ecute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the
vulnerabilities of friendly tions to adversary exploitation.
Physical Destruction: ) Referred to in Joint military doctrine as one of the core disciplines of JO. Note:
Not all physical destruction is 10 nor related to it. Physical destruction can be used to further tactical,
operational, and/or s ategic JO objectives. Examples include destroying command and control facilities,
communications li /s, and components supplying energy to power communications.
Psychological perations: (U) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to
foreign audie es to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign gov ments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations or
PSY0Ps is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
Special Communications: (U//e11) The relay of U.S. government or allied signals from or into areas
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typically characterized by an intense counterintelligence or operational security environmentTnsuallrin
support of covert or clandestine intelligence or military operations, orsengifive overseas law enforcement
activities.
ToP
OFORNiau
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