DIEM REPORT (REPORT ON CIA AND U.S. GOVT INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE GENERALS' COUP FO 1 NOVEMBER 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00566276
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: October 29, 2024
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2024
• Case Number: F-2020-00663
• Publication Date: May 31, 1967

'
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276:.:..
TABLE OF C017.:ENTS
� Foreword . _
POPitiOns of prominent people in -late 1953 ii
The anti-government riots begin 1
Attacks on pagodas; imposition of martial law 2
Discussion of.UTresPonse.to-pagoda.raids 2
Comets meeting with General Don. . 3
CIA guidance on StateAelegramrealternstive leadership 3
Ricnandson's personal views re alternate leadership 3 -
Harriman informs Helms -of the substance of Deptel 243 4
reptel 243: guidance to T.nage On improving or replacing regime 4 �
Hilsman cmmment suy.:�=e'ntriz.,6,-- repte1.243 5
Marguerite Higgins oaDeptel 2.4.3 5,
Hqs points out aangPr posed by-Deptel 243; directs CIA. support � � 7'
Gen. Khanh requests assurances of U.S. support 7 �
Initial embassy meeting to discuss Dente! 24-1 . .. ..... .� � 7
Lodge presents his credentials to Diem _ 8
.Second thoughts on authorizations given Lodge in Deptel 243 . . . 8
Saigon reports instructions given CIA officers seeing the generals 9
Results of CIA approaches to the generals - 9
More second thoughts on Deptel 243 9
-Lodge amd Earkins are asked for as ister'.:= appraisal of prospects. 10
COS believes situation hasrasched.point of no return . 10
Continuing concern over poor prospects for success of coup . . . . 10 ,
Taylor cables Harkins re WasHngton's second thoughts 11.
Taylor's cable to Harkinseauses Richardson to change scenario 1')
Steps to be taken to get the coup back on, the track ,12
Discussion of where coup plAnnirg went astray/ 13
General Harkins' meeting with General Ehiem 13
Discussion of ways inwhich4e.might live with Diem regime . . . . 14 .
:. Colby's s=ary of differing positions taken .. 'IA..-- �
Richardson reports collapse of coup plot in late August .15
_Richardson's damage'assessment report 15
Press reports of CIA coup plotting . . 16
Further discussion,of ways' of Workingvith Diem' regime 16 '
Press reports of -CIA.supportef Col: Tuag's Special Forces . . . 17
David Bell warns of aid cuts ' -.- � 17
President denies charge 'that CIA makes its own policy 19
Richardson's. views on prosmects for immediate future 19
Krulak ,'A Mendenhall -eportS; optimism vs. pessimism 19
Bundy stresses need to unify LZ government posture 20
Disagreements among- colsatry team rembe...s . . 20.
Lodge estimates. sittatiozi-worsening rapidly; urges sanctions J21--,
Discussion of.stepsnecessary beforedecidirg. to cut aid � 21
State begins to. no alternative, tomor:sing with.Diem. _ 22
Waeldon's view on Vietnam; Lodge still pursuing coup effort � -.22 .
- ,
.r
:Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 600586.26.
�
� � '
Ric cc's views on need to 'aorh wi,:n Diem regime
DDR conversation with Dave Smith re to--,h1- 7;ir.ha-nr'son ousoer
Lodge changes mo:dtion; agrees oust Die= regime
DCI writes Tore that Lansdale not acceptable as. CCS.. . . .25
DCI briefing of CIA Subcommit,tee of ::use Armed Services 25
McNamara-Taylor report: can withdraw troops 'sy end of 1965 . 26
Lodge confirms his desire that Richardson be replaced 26
Richardson. desa-ts 26
27
� ,
. ,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276:,
�
PaPm
Press reports sf dissenzion in U3 micsion & CIA stati,-, 23
24
oa
24
Discussion of guidance based on Mcliamara-Iaylon report. .
Gen. :4inh requests assurances re US position on coup attempt . � 27
Dave Smith recommends we not oppose generals 'assassination plan 28
McCone instructs Smith to withdraw recommendation 28
Smith conf4--she bed dc-- :13 29
Guidante to Lodge; suspension of AID .project. loans 30.
President approves Policy or no active encouragement of coup . . � 30,
UN fact-finding mission on repression of Buddhists 30
President comments on Richardson transfer; CIA follows guidance.
Modification or policy or no coup encouragement
Ambassador's instructions re CIA contacts with generals 33 A
DCI briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee 33
The generals' plan for a coup in the week following Cot 26 . � . ^ 33
Budget Bureau officer reports Lodge charges against CIA 34
Follow-up.meetfngs between'Conein and. Gen. Boni-24 Oct 35
Bundy reservations over ha-dling of conta;:ts wILII generals 35
Lodge reports CIA Punctilious in carrying out his instructions 35
Coup plotting; US government policy; DCI's views ' 36
Lodge confirms.Conein's bona fides toGen. Lon.- .... . . � � � � 36
Last Coneir/Don meeting before the coup was la=ched . 37
Lodge gives his views on current coup plotting (29 Oct) . - . . .
Discussion of chances of success of the p)annpd coup
Bundy-to-Lodge cable giving detailed guidance re coup posture 39
Lodge says we have no power to delay or discourage a coup � 39
The White House rejects Lodge's views ' -39
Lodge thanks Washin:gton for "sagacious instruction"
Coup begins; Conein goes to JGS Eqs; takes money with him
CRITIC reporting on CfAID identifies Conein by name- �
The assassination .
Recap
_
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276.
32
32
38
114
14-0MM
.kz-A
- Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
i� :
v097-WORD
This account of CIA and U.S. Government Involvement in the.
Vietnamese generals' coup of 1 November 1963 is-drawn:from
documentary sources. Not all of the documents sl.LMarized or
quoted bear directly on the coup itoelf. We included some that
may seem irrelevant, because they illuminate the atmosphere in
which U.S. Government policy decisions were reached.
We interviewed only three people
111
41.�����
course of this
� inquiry: William Colby, Chief of FE Division at the time (and now);
John Richardson, Chief of Station during the coup plotting. uf
August 1963; and David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the time
of the Coup/assassination of November 1963.. Each assured us that
he knew of no CIA assassination schemes against Diem�other than
the role played by CIA in. maintaining contacts, by direction, with
the Vietnamese generals..
Many of the documents upon which this report is based are
.classified TOP SECRET. Since the report is being delivered
.
personally and In only one copy, we have chosen not to subject
it to the external accountability controls that are entailed ln
a TOP SECRET classification.
On the following page is a list of 11.5. Government officials
whose names are mentioned in the report, together with the positions
they held at the time.
'Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
14-MMO
-
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276:: ,
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
McGeorge Bundy"
� Dean Rusk
George W. Ball
The President
Vise President
Special Assistant to t'ne President for
National Sect:rity Affairs '
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of State
W. Averell Parriman Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Roger Hils=an Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs
Joseph A. Mendenhall, UHF Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Frederick E. Nolting Ambassador (left Saigon 16 August 1963),
henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador (arr. Saigcn 23 August 1963) .
. William C. Truehart DCM
-Robert MtNamara Secretary of Detente'
Roswell Gilpatric , Deputy Secretary of Defense.
-.Gen. Maxwell Taylor � Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Can. Victor Krulak Counterinsurgency Specialist, JCS
Mm. Harry D. Felt
Gen. Paul D. Harkins
Can. Richard G. Weede
John McCone.
Gen. Marshall Carter
Richard Helms
John Richardson
David R. Smith
William Colby
CINCPAC
Cr-marApr, MAC'!
Chief of Staff, MACV
Director cf Central Intelligence
DDCI
Deputy Director for Plans
CIA Chief of Station until 5 October 1
CIA Acting CGS after 5 October 1963
Chief, FE Division
- ii -
trula.rT
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276'
it1.11*
;NP
4-00000
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
The successful .coup against the Diem regime in Zonth Vietnam,
which resulted in the deaths of Ngo Dinh Diem and.:his_brother,_Nhn,..
gan on I November 1953 at 1315 hours, Saigon tire (0015 hours,i
Washington time). -
This report on CIA.and U.S. _Government involvement in the
consists of a chronological listing of event.-, actions,and
deliberations having to do with Vietnam. The report is drawn
entAr.lv
fr 4-cumentary sources, either by quoting selectively
or by summarizing. Significant overt happenings haying bearing on
'official actionsare included in the chronology. Facts on File,
a weekly digest of world news, was used as the source for these
historical events. Also included are .a tew excerpts from Marguerite'
Higgins' book Our Vietnam Nightmare* to demonstrate the extent to
Which some once-classified information is now common knowledge�
.AU dates are in 1963.
8 ma
Mots erupted In Hue.
10 July
r_n
. sirE 53-2-63: "The Situation in South Vietnam"
"If--as is likely�Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly
-;':114-114HHMilif-X- �
-
.44arguerite Riegi...;s, Our Vietnam Nhtmare-INew,York:.HarPerHow0965
- 1 -
-='...-.Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,,�.
the commitment he. has made to the BuddhLts, dicorders will nro'nably
flare again and the chances.of a coup or assaosination attempt
against him will become -even better ... . do not . . .
the Communists ,would neCesaartly:profit if he 'aere overthrownby.some-'
Combination of his non-Communist :opponents. A nonCOmmunist successor
regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Co, but,
given continued support from the USi'could-provide reasonably effective
� leadership for the government and the war effort."
August
Current Intelligence 1.1=rnorandum (OCI No. 2319/63): "Coup
Rumors in South Vietnam"
� The coup reports and rumors which have arisen since
the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect some serious coup plotting,
but we' have no firm evidence of advanced planning by any gruup to
to overthrow the regire
South Vietnamese troops and police attacked and occupied Buddhist
pagodas .throughout the ,,country. Dien. imposed nation-wide martial. law. ,
Presidential Meeting on Vietnam CIA participants: DCI, DDP, &
C/FE. Record by C/FE.
Mr. Pall recommended that we continue to provide asylum for the
two bonzes guddhist monkg until Lodge arrives and reviews the matter.
It was agreed that official channels should not be made available for
transmitting press dispatches by American reporters in Saigon. On the
matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out
that there was no indication that Diem was not in full control.
,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,'-
,4-0000,0
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276�
21 August (continued)
CUTTent'TntellIgenceemoranduM 2341/63WCop Rumors
in South Vietnam"
"Additional reports of plotting against the Diem government
have been received. While there is no hard evidence of Imminent=
.action, the Buddhist issue continues to make the situation dangerous:".
Saigon Station's ChromoloEi of August 1963 Coup Activities
At a meeting between Coneingn officer of the CIA Saigon Statio,g
and General Don, the Latter asked for US Government assurances of
support for moves against the Diem regime.
22 August /11/
CIA Cable to Saigon MR 63334)
�"Ref Dept. telegram in process. Reftel (VhiCh Hqs. not yet seen)
states basic line to be taken and directs it be pushed at all levels.
Rilsman requested Hqs. send c=-:mnion telegram to station pointing
out that this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and
who real power is. -Pressing this line can maximize possibility of
obtaining US objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can
_substantially assist in identification of alternate or successor
leadership with necessary-drive, abilities and ambition, to incor-
porate in our overall contingency pin.nning and serve as focus of -
buildup program. figs. -will comment in further detail after seeing
message, if necessary, but passes above atEllsman's request."' '
CIA cable from Sairpm (SAIG 0208)
Chief of Station John Richardson forwards his personal views re
alternate leadership: " Recent events have made us feel
that hope for civilian government to replace Dien administration is
'Approved for Release: 2024/08/06. C0056620,--:
14-0MM
P"\
� ix
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
unrealistic. Tne oolu;ic. zes even more improbable than ever before.
Would anlear that -.Je shall have either Diem or nilitary j-,sta
View time factor have not ccorlinted this message with embassy but
we have exchanged views fully on subject matter."
JI 24 August �
Telephone call from 71a---iman to Dil/P. ?-co-d by DD/P.
Mr. Harrin called hr. Helms just before 2000 hours and
outlined to him the substance of what eventually turned out to be .
Deptel 243 to Saigon. To Helms query, Harriman confirmed that the
thrust of the telegram contained an implicit null out of American
forces and support if the Nhusi were not ousted. .Harriman said that
the message had been cleared "with Hyannisport," with the Secretary
of State, and with Mr. Gileatric.
State telegram to Saigon (Deotel 243)
The Department informs the Ambassador that the US government
cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. If
Diem is unvil1i,,7 to rid himself of Nhu, then Diem himself may have to
go. The Ambassador is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions
against Buddhists must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders
that the USG cannot'supoort a Diem
regime that includes the Nnu's and
9A3
that "we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown
central government mechanism;" (3) to make statements in Saigon removing
- -
.�
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C0056626
4-00000
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
V
rl�
the military taint'on the pagoda raids. The telegram includes the
following statement:
v
(
de give you tailed instructions as to hoc; talc operation shoa
vl
proceed, but you will also know we will hack you to the hilt Nj
on actions you tnIre to achieve our objectives."
"The Ambassador and_countre team shoel tl exam e al
possible a.Lberna-lee ieacership and make detailed plans as to how
77777771:- about Diem's --placement if this should become
\\pecesbare. You will lInderstand that we =mot from Washington
25 August
Cable from Hil.--7man to Te2ge (personal) seat via CLA 0...cnnels-
(DIR 63b54)
"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest
levels. Courses outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying
clear cut US stead is even more dangerous. It won't be easy for
you, but be assured we will beak you all the way."
(C nt: This is a good point at which to break the
narrative and innA-rt a series of excerpts from Marguerite Higgins'
book:
:"The cruriP1 act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy,
opened with a Cable. It was di-1;atched to Saigon late in the
evening of August 24, /963, a date made more significant because
it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on summer weekends
or lapses into a sconolent mood as officials desperately seek
relaxation.
"'Me telgram contained spectacular new instructions for the
U.S. embassy in Saigon. It was drawn up at a meeting called by
Under-secretary of State Averell Harriman and Roger Tinsman,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs and head of
the Vietnem task force. The President's senior advisers were, for
- 5 -
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
"The acting Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric . . .
had the cable described to him over the telephone. Mr. Gilpatric
says he was frankly surprised that such an important set of
instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not
feel that he ought to veto the telegram since . . . it had the
'approval of the President.'
"In McCone's absence, the cable was described, again
cryptically, to Richard Helms, deputy director of the CIA,
who also did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved by
the President.'"
-6-.
;
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
the most part, cut of town. C72, Director Jora McCone we- i-
CaLif0,-771'41. Defense Secretary
Searatar-,, o"O-ita D-ee P
President .enaeu, was at usaLniz, il-rt. General Thyler
says he kne.; ,acnia7 tae mee,_- it was over ^-1 tb-
tcle7ram lanr on 4=,. -e-
. . . the cable oroved historic. For the first time it
gave the signal to 'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed
a green light for the C0'.13 a:2in3t
been 30 maay years.
. . . the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the
previous philosophy of one war at a tine. It envisaged the
generals maki-g war on their own government, and with the
imolicit blessing of the United States.
"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. embassy was to
make an effo-t to ilersilade Dte ts fire his brother, release
the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other ,
democratic liberties suspended under nartial law. And if, as the
cable anticipated, Diem would not do these things, then the
embassy was to contact the Vietnamese generals and tell them that
the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.
1
u . . . the controversial August 24.cable was dispatched I
$
frcm Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized 1
to President Kennedy at the summer White House at Hyannis Port. I
1
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
� r,
\p/
25 August (coatiatd)
L/ CIA cable to Saigon (DER 63355)
"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which
however cleared at highest levels. In cirnstances believe CIA
must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek ways accomplish.
objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand
it invites Lodi-5-e final judgmaaf rnr-er in present course
of action antears to be throw-;-g away bird in 'nnr(4 bore we adequately
identified birds in bush, or songs they may slag. Thus suggest a
real search for ocurses of action whinn1at retain options in our
hands at same time as tai '-'g positive stPrd rather than waiting for
situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.)
This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least interim
period
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291)
Chief of station Richardson retorts that General Xhanh requested
an immediate meeting with Spera gn officer of the CIA Saigon Statiog.
At the meeting Khath requested assurances that the U.S. Government
would support the VietnP,mese army if it should move against the Diem
Regime.
CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296)
RinhArdson reports the results of a conference among Ambassador
Lodge, DCM Itnehart, General Earkins, General Weede, and Richardson.
The group a64. ed that giving Diem an option had no chance of success.
They accepted Deptel 243 Ljf 24 Augusg as a basic decision from
Washington sna would proceed to do their- best to carry out instructions.
Q7173:7_
2.
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Richardson gives headquarters his views on possible successor
regimes.
26 August
ON7 Staff !!_emorand=, No. 60-63, Internal OIE Working Inner,
CIA Distribution Only
"On balance, we believe the best hope for the Preservation of US
interests and attainment of US objectives in South Vietram lies in the
-f a coup d'etat by anti-Communist nationalists with
sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a
group might not prove able to salvaze the situation and, indeed, night
eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a development
would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist nationalist elements
to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors
of past years, 'months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe,
lies the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and
objectives in South Vietnam."
Ambassador Lodge presented his credentials to South Vietnamese
President Ngo Dinh Diem.
Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DDCI & DD.
Record by Da?.
ThP question was raised as to whether there had been such a
significant change in the Vietnsm situation that it really appeared
desirable to dump the Nhu's and possibly Diem himself. .Principal
points discussed were: Admiral Felt's concern over the dangers
inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that
Lodge had not seen Diem to discuss the future role of the Nhu's;
�
- 8 -
u:11.1
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
r--
-d7PE. Record by C/FE.
The President stated that a noun should not be atte=mted unless it
would be successful and asked whether we could tura back at this point.
.:�:�-a4,, �
�
- 9 -
�
. � f -�
elm
� �7 y
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
�
the meaning of the phrase "give direst support to military cc:
in Dentel 243; the .question of succession; and what would happen if the
action taken over the weekend failed. The
President asked for o,nthar
session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on
key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession.
CIA cable from Saigon, (SAI2 0304)
Richardson reports that the Ambe3sador decided that the American
official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that Coaein
would see Ehiem and that Spera roald see Ehanh. Conein and Spera weretee'�
directed to convey the substance of Deptel 243, plus this comment:
"We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming paver of
44-4
state. Entirely their own action, win or lose."
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0330)
Richardson reports the results of the Conein/Snera approaches
to the generals. In essence, Ehanh said he was not yet ready, and Khiem
�����-��444,44.
said he would have to check with
41�01022��
Ift..1�1�0�11,01�������=�.1.11)VmS.1.��������=i
27 August
--
Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA rarticipamts: DDCI, EP, &
oe
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
00000
tr-F's , �
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
r f11-1;�-�
' � .
, � ,
The President asked that the juagment of Lodge and Harkins be saught
or the prospects for victory or defeat of a eau:- A cable was drafted
asking if they still a,,-eed with their concurrences to Dentel 243.
State telegra to Saigon (Dentel 256)
"Erg-,Ination of reports to date gives considerable hone but
leaves unanswered cuestions Proceeding from the concert
outlined in D.optcl 243 as Isodified, now desire your prot interim
appraisal of present prospects 1142:nest autnori_t-� asks
....f___21-atjx;Ljksavaaco-l-aante wish to g17e
you all mosaible sunmort in best available course but Lot to insist on
any decision that developing evidence rakes it wise to modify."
28 August
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363)
Richardson reports that: "Situation here has reached taint of
no return Unless the generals are neutralized before being
able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that
they have good chance to win We all understand that th-
effetLr_rtstsucceeda.-,dtlrra_____a.Lru.
rnis e done
Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DDCI, MP, &
C/FE. Record by C/FE.
.222!..L.T=12.11,t IELI2j-red into the status of EE was
these were well worked cut. State Dene-rtzent Participants
' -
insisted that Diem and Nhu had betrayed and double-crossed us and we
had no obligations to them and that we cannot ula with Diem and nu.
- 10 -
C17:111�:"
T. V 1 .�
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
The President commented that we had been winning until August. Rolting
expressed his conviction that Diem is the on1;,, man who can run South
Vietnam in any fashion to permit a continuance of the war effort. Re
believed we should make another try to keep Diem. Harriman directly
disagreed uith him. The President directed that a telegram,be prepP,..ed
to send to Lodge and Harkins asking their view of the chances of success,
expressing concern over the unfavorable ratio of forces, Pr'i invitng
their suggestions as to how we could increase their possibilities.
The President called for anothgr in the_LIg
NSC Executive Committee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants not
identified. Record by DDP..
The President net privately with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and
McGeorge Bundy. He reported to the rest of the Committee merel: that
three telegrams were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to
Lodae frua the President, a general message from the Department to the
Ambassador, and a telegram fru= Taylor to Harkins.
Telegram �a Taylor to Harkins (JCS 3368-63)
"Important White House meeting on subject scheduled for 1200
28 August EDT, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of
operation contemplated vYT State to Seigon 24es mrapared
without DOD or JCS partici7ation. Authorities are now havino- second 60
�r1737its.-
- -
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
1- 0 00 0 0
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
"
� �
29 August
' � !
� � ,! 't
Saigon Station's chrenolgy of August 1963 cous'acti-:71ties
"At 0745 hours, Richardoon, Ssera and Conein, latter two of
whom were scheduled to contact Generals Minh and Khiem at 0315 same
morning, were shown a message from General Taylor to General Harkins stating
aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at White House and commenting
that second though.tawere begin:ling in Washington. Faced with this
information and given strictly limited time factors, Richardson
decided that the meeting with Generalls Ninli and I.:hie= should not be
i.ostponed but;,...ould make this ,L=5_, - rae,
finding ml-Egion without encouraging or discouraging General Minh, _
"When Spera and Conein returned from their meeting with Khiem
and Minh, we proceeded to Trueheart's office to make our report. The
Arbassador came in and Richardson advised him of our meeting with
General Weede, of Taylor's cable, and of the decisions which Richardson
had made as a result of the Taylor ca:Ple. Lodge was angry and
expressed the view that Richardson's decision had def,troyed the
possibilities of carrying cut a coup. Richardson expressed a firm
dissenting opinion."
welto--RSC Executive Committee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants
not identified. Record by DD?.
The consensus was that Harkins should confirm to the generals that
the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the
US government. There was agreeinent that better informaticm was needed
on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was
militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was
' drafted for Presidential approval.
12
_
-
'.1
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
fv,";'!^ry�
' , �
30 August
ro= Prestdetal Meetinw- on Viet". CIA narticinants: Drci
D;;?, & C/1-L. Reccrd ny C/,C.
Risk referred to recent cable traffic enri said that he was not
even sure when we were deali*IgHwith Cr what they were
Mclie-ara pointed out there was some auestion whether the generalc ever
did have a plan. Bundy said he had re-read the earlier traffic qnri
noted that they never said they did. Gen. Carter said he believed that
the general's coup was not likely at this stage and that in another
week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the
Buddhist temples. aua.suggested we consider Pdoitional contingencies
before the group and whether the assumption that Nhu is impossible is
well founded.
31 August
� Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities
� "General Fpirkins was authorized to meet with Khiem to give
Kbiem assurances of' USG hackim Khiem showed a reluctance to talk
and suggested that Harkins meet with aneral Minh. Khiem commented
that Minh had called off the plarming and was working on other methods
which Khiem would not describe. Xhiem f'rther stated that the genersls
were not ready as they did not have enough forces under their-control.
Harkins decided not to give Khiem assurances which he had been authorized
to impart. Lodge approved Harkins' decisio, on 31 August after Harkins
reported.
-13-
� CI v
U:11.1
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
'
31 AuRu.st (continued)
Vice ?residential etir-* on Viet-ran. CJ.4. participants: DCCT,
EDP, ?cc'ordby
Ruck au7,-ested we loch at precisely what in the Vietnam
situation r-Pde us thinL, of a coup- and what might be done to improve
conditions in Vietnam v.-liarra suggested the first requirement was
reestablishment of cc'-7-nulication between Lodge and EAr:zins. Rusk
directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon rvIking suggestions
as to what we might ash the GVN to do.
Chiefi FE, who participated in the meetings of late August.
In a ce=orandum for Waiter Elder provided this s.1---7pry of
differ-Inz 7)ositio-
"In the discussions during the past week, the position of the
Department of State, led by "Aall, Harrimqn, and Hilsnan, was that the
Dien-Hhu government had double-crossed the US Government because of
the attack on the pagodas and that US obligations to the government
were no longer valid. Further, that a government so discredited could
not conduct successfully the war in Vietnam er.11 would prove an
undesirable liability to the US Government elsewhere in Asia. Because of
these moral, military and Political conclusions, the Department
recommended that it mist give all support to a group of generals who .
allegedly were disaffected to the point that a clear indication of US
-action was the only i-7---edient lacking for them to push over a discredited,
unpopular and weak Diem government.
"The position of the Department of Defense was that while it
deplored the sensational aspects of the Buddhist situation, if
nonetheless felt that an effort should be continued to deal with Diem
and try to bring about a compromise, and at the same time to keep in
touch with the generals and support the COM) efforts, if this proved to
be the only alternative left. This was essentially the view of Genera/
Harkins and of Ambessdor bolting. This was considered by the Department
of State to be a foot-dragging and weak position.
�
. . .
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
"The President viewed the State Departnent's Position with
consider.-ible reserve 'cut was willing to explore the coup idea further.
He and the Attorney General (as well as CIO were aosarently arpalled
at the speed with which the State decision was reached on Saturday
afternoon, 24 Auoist, and felt that =ore thought, orslys4s and
preparation should have preceded the instruction to Lodge."
31 AJgust (continued)
�qmenaccaomanaLem....�.=,......sowa,
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499)
. . Generals did not feel
ready and did not have sufficient bliPace of forces There
is little doubt that GYI aware US role and may have considerable
e...........am������������C�13��������������
2 September
�
CIA cable from Snigon (SAIG 0523)
Richardson cabled a Oprptge assessment. fie concluded that Diem and
the Nhu's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the generals to
attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentnlity of this encourage-
ment. He judged there was an even possibility that all rnjor prograns
could go forward as-in the pact. He listall as a major dilemma the:
Station's future relationships with Col. Tung. He noted his dissatis-
faction with Tung as a GVIT liaison vehicle thraivh which to .conduct FM
programs, but noted that the GVII had offered no alternative. Unless we
were willin to discontisue our NVN, LAWS border, and cross-border progrqrsz
we must continue to work with TurEL.
r...111Y
U
Approved for Release: 2024!08!05C00566276
--�
14-M00-
: Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,:-
. . .
2 September (continued)
- The Tines of Vietnam published 'charges that the CIA vas plotting
and financing a coup and was giving asylum to the chief anti-Diem
Buddhist leader.-: Thestory was :picked up and widely played by the
New York Daily .Thews ,the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other
prominent newspapers.
6 September ke to,
Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DDP & C/FE.
Record by DDP & C/FE.
Rusk stressed the immediate need for direct contact between Lodge
..and Diem. Bundy pointed out the necessity of advising Lodge cot to
have a real. show-down with Diem over Mu at this forthcoming meeting,
asmne of Lodge's cables indicated he was headed very much in this �
� direction. Rusk agreed to do this. The President agreed with the
desirability of silencing Madam Blau but expressed some doubt that
.14buts participation was as fatal as State seemed to say it was. EU&
- commented thatthecountryteam had stated its feeling that Rhu must go,
to which the President replied: that they may have been operating undPr
directives received from here.
_
�. .�..,� .
'Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276'::
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
Wire services .and prom4-4,n` newspapers carried a story that the-,
Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on 21 August were still
being paid secretly -by CIA.: This story was attributed to a h;ghly -
reliable source in. Washington and. gave details of support to Col.
Tung in the aunt of $3 million Plinmally, and a payment of $250
thousand' on 3 September. The story was datelined in Washington and
in Manila.
� David Bell warned in a television interview that the US Congress
might cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem governnent
changed its policies.
(Comment: The U.S. Government publicly confirmed on
. 8 October 1963 that aid had already been cut, -quietly and -
over a period of same months.' Bill Colbzwrocko Richar4nn,
and Dave Smith each told us that the public announcement of
reduction was p7annPd with that in mind. It nay be that the
record. The nearest tmn3 to it is in the record of a Presidential
meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
4-00660:
Approved for Release 2024/0.8/05 C00566276,,
of AID, what specific actionS Phillips wo-ild recomMend ,and he
suggested "cutting aid.to Colonel.Tnng-which would:-be 74ewed
. � .
by theGenerals with. much:enthusiaSM and as an indication of
. a vigorous Americaa position." In general, though, aid cuts
were discussed in terms-of bringing pressure on Diem U6 make
necded changes in his regime. However planned or however
looked upon by the U.S. administration, it is clear that the
�...Vietnamese generals considered the official confirmation of
aid cuts 83 a clear token of U.S. support of their coup plan414v,,,
Spera and Conein met-with Generals Minh end /Chi= on 29 August.
The following are excerpts from the cabled report of the
meeting (SAIG 0406):
"If USA now really ready take different position, generals
want firm evidence to that effect Queried as
to what we can da-to show we mean business, Minis flatly
stated, stop economic aid to force Nhu.to show his hand.
The suspension of aid did not force Diem and Nhu to mend their
Thways, but it did create an atmosphere that made it easier for
�
-�
the generals to assemble the military support needed for a
�
'Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
14-0MM
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,
10 Se2tember
' In an inter-new by Huntley and Briskley:::Lfxtgiagua_kn_WLL.L:''
the charge that CIA makes its own policy.
CIA cable from7Saigon (SAIG,0760)
"Am incli,,Pd to feel general officers will seek evolutionary
accommodation with Dien (if he permits them to do so) unless overall
situation clearly deteriorates, there is breakdown of civil order or
governmental mar.-nirery, or unless war effort begins to go backward
seriously . Despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21
August, am incliued to believe we should be able resume successful
prosecution of war in military and civil sections - Do not
align myself with the view that USG should suspend aid
0�.27esidentia1 M_e=gza.�1.211s.Ltz_ CIA participants: DCI & C/FE.
'Record by CIFE.
Gen. Krulak reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions
were that the war is going ahead at an impressive pace and that the
Viet Cong war will be won if current US military and sociologioS1'
programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who
accompanied Krulak, expressed the view that there was a complete break- .
down of the Saigon *civilian government and the security situation in
. the provinces had. deteriorated. The President asked whether the two
gentlemen had visited the same countg. Rusk suggested that 1,..he focus
be on what happenedlin July and August that reversed the optimistic
jud-ents in May and June. Mr. McCone talked from a personal telegram
be had received from Richardson recommending against any cut in
- 19 -
--;-Approved for Release: 2024/08/06 C00566276::
0000
Approved for: Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276-,
10 September (continued)
,lacig_gligittee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA oarticipants:
DOI: 57 CM.
..12..11tre3sed the need to unify t:1.e. VS Government posture, to
coordinate press guidance, and to control outgoing messages to Saigon.
He emphasized the importance of foLlowir.g. the President's guidance on
this delicate Vietnam problem, despite intensely differing views as to
what should be done, how, the risks,_ minimum objectives, and the facts.
'Mora:mars stated that his position was vigorously against throwing out
this government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared
to exist. Mr. McCone commented that the problem was not so much the
existence of an alternative as how to put one into power. Bundy
_summarized the President's position as one in which.we-must-express
our reservations as to the mistakes end misdeeds of Diem but not be
in a position where we cannot deal with him further.
:11 September
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG:0797) I
Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on
a six-page suumary cable to answer a cable from the Department requesting
views. The team was unable to agree even on the first three page S of
the summary. Weede and Richardson dissented on the basis that the draft
- Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276:4!'l
n'?4.
4-ONM
PCI
-7 �
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 CO0566276
'
summary was too sweeping and too necative, coac1011c definitively
about the country- as a-whole on-an-inadeqatebasis of data; He said:
"In 'some wnys we seem to have reached the point in official American_
cammunity%that, if you think we can win with present government, you
are pimply not-ruaning in right :direction with majority." '
State telegram from Saigon (No. 478) L6 4.3
"My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is: (a) that
it is Worsening rapidlY; (b) that the time has arrived for the US
to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the
existing government-and the installation of another; and (o)'-that '
intensive study should be given by the best brains in the government -
to all the details, procedures, and vari9nts in connection with the
suspension of aid."
Presidential'Meeting on Vietnam- CIA' participants: DCI & C/FE.
cora by CM.
' McNamara pointed out that Lodge has had little contact with Diem
and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed
that we should move cautiously, that we Should talk seriously to Diem
and that Lodge shoUldbe.urged to visit the countryside to obtains
�
,.more realistic view...of the effects of suspending aid. IMr. McCone also
suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation.
In a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully ttudied
the detailed effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared
by kinsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studied.
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276-,
Xr'�
11-0MM -
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276;
!rfl ri�.11 A/
Uilt- I
The President asked DOD ai.d. CIA to analyze the Hilaman paper. Ee
also asked that a telegraM�be Sent to Lodge asking him to try to �
reduce the press leakage in Saigon and to establish some real contact
with Diem. Any current planafor aid .negotiations should be stalled,
and the President said he should be well informed of any steps taken
. .
in this context--such as the incident involving CIA payment to
Col. Tuz.g last week.
11 September (continued)
� NSC Executive Committee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants:
DCI &.C/FE. Record by C/FE.
Rusk said he believed that we were not likel, to -achieve an
independent Vietnam unless we-could eliminate Nhu. At the mmne time
he vas not willing to say that Diem should go, as he no alternative.,
Rusk commented that we should work through Lodge on Diem to take over
' the real leadership and become the real president. Mt. McCone suggested
also the desirability of negotiating with Nhu. Bundy read off a C/A
suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.
,
13 SeDtember.")
� CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG c90)
Huntington Sheldon, who visited Saigon, reported his views on the
. . .
� _ � � � . �
situation in Vietnam. fie included as part Of his report the substance
- 22 -
��C',
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276..
SiP
14-0000g,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
u,.
of a discussion with DCM Trueheart: "The AMbassador is considering .
charging MAC7 with mkir.g..--"-oe.ch- to- SVN milltary, be-mr.tioned- Can.
Don, to attempt sti.aila"te early coup action with appropriate US
assurances. / inquired had Ambassador rc such proposal to Washington
and was told this was within Lod-e's nuthorit-."
15 September
Neil Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements
of the US missian in Vietnam were so badly divided that Washington
had intervened. He said: "The only civilian official still strongly
In favor of going along with the Ngo fr-frily regime is the Chief of
the Central Intelligence Agency here." On the same day, David
HeIberstam stated that high US civilian officials in Saigon were
making an all-Out effort to convince. Washington thatthe,Military_
and political situation is deteriorating. Re said that "the Chief of'�
.the Central IntooligrnP0 Agency favors ail-out support for the present
regime but that a3iost-ail other members ofials staff are embittered
�
over the raids on the pagodas. They also feel their Chief's close
association with Dhu, while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence
gathering.
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276 :1
�
a-1.4
14:0MM .
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276.
16 Sepzember
CIA cah4.1:e7 ..rod.Saigon (SAIG 0922)
. Richardson replied to Wasbinzton's request for his.judgment on
the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was
teen.in.the course of constructing an agreed plan. Ee cabled:
'We must go on trying to win war with current administration
for as long as it persists in power le should not attempt
publicly to achieve oajectives with respect to GIN When probability
of attainment is virtually nil We cannot covertly tinker
with or engineer a coup unless general situation is reasonably
propiUtious and if we are unable to establish necessary working
contacts with Vietnamese leaders willing and Abl.. to do the Job
with necessary means ' Agree we should carefully explore
and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed
to pressure Diem, within context of persuaaing him, to take steps
needed. These measures would be more effective if they are limited
to practical and achievable objectives
17 September
Memorandum for the Record mrenared by DDP
"Smith . . . discussed with= . . . reports that Lodge wanted
to get rid of Mr. John Richardson Mikf. Dunn . . . had
. told Conein . . . that Lodge was going 'to get rid of Richardson'.
On one ochasion Dunn asked Conein, 'Do you think that Dave
Smith can run the station for a temporary period while a new Station
Chief is being sent cut here?'"
19 September
Lcdge to the President: State telegram from Saigon (To. 544)
"I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present
-; r 11171;1 V .
3- � i.t.10 Lt141.1
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
�
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 6005662-76,-.
,
governme s apr itan4 that we should,
. .erefore, do whatere--J.;.. nn =eastirelndirg such
an eventuali,Y
N, -RrAnk-1.44eet10 opportunity at all
for su-csantive cha-r,s:"
Personal letter from McConff to Lode;
"I was toll by Dean Rusk that you had proposed that General
. Lansdale replace Richardson as Chief of Station
I wish to emphasize that the Agency w111 reorient the Saigon Station
.,in any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including
. the Station Chief, can be replaced Lansdale would not be
acceptable to the orgRazation or to -e . . . . If the
decision is. to abandonn11 ipe or workin,, with the reatme then.
Richardsonp.bao . . . We have np current
resulting estimate in hsnri which would lead us to
the conclusion that the present regime can be disposed of, or that
-; there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is
not however to say that a coup might not occur even before you
- receive this letter
�
23 Sentember
DCI briefing of CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services
The Director said. there did not appear to be any cohesive
, military group capable of ousting the Diem regime, and further that
.there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime that
was capable of running the governe3ent. :A new regime probably 'would be
no better. Consequently, the Agency was urging a cautious, slow
approach to the problem.
.Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,,:f
Approved for Release: 2024/08./05 C00566276
2 October
Report of McThmara-Taylor mission to Vietnnm
The President on 21 September had directed-General Taylor and
Secretary McNamara to proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the
situation. Their trip lasted from 24 September to 2 October. This
was the report in which McNamara recommended that a program be
established to train VietT,qmese so that essential functions performed
by US military personnel could be carried out by Vietnamese by the
end of 1965. He thought it would then be possible to withdraw the
bulk of US personnel.
. 3 October
Personal letter from Lodge to McCona
I agree with what I understand McNamara has said
to you. The time has come for a new face. But, I also think of
Richardson as a devoted and
4 October '
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 1397)
RI In sum, it is clear that Lodge wants a change in
Chief of Station Departin8, Saigon 1820 hours 5 October
(Comment: Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters
request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon
possible.
"Upon Richardson's departure, his deputy, David R. Smith, became
Acting Chief of Station."
- 96 -
p�T �
�
,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
-000:p
Approved for Release: 2024108105C00566276
. . ;.
5 Octoter
,Presilential !!.eeting cn Vietnam. CIA narticip.dt: DCI only.
Record by LCI. . -
7be Meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject
of Deptel 534 fi.ee later entry of 5 Octeuej. DCI said it was
opinion of CIA (litth the-exceptianof:Colby, C/FE) that fiddlimg
the
with the Commodity Import Program as a political lever. would be much
more. likely to create an economic crisis undermining the war. effort
than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cooperative attitude, because
it would seriously, affect the confidence and plAnnins of the Vietnamese
business community and quickly engender inflationary measures among
the population at large of a more serious nature.
It.vas the consensus of the meeting that same meaninful
- political movements bad to be made, but exactly what they should.
be lia3 not .determined.
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 1445)
In a meeting with Conein (approved y the Ambassador on?
October), General Minh requested a statement of the bZ position with
respect to a change in the GVN:in the.. near future.. He said be did ,
1.4 . not expect USG support ofa,coup,effort, but did need USG assurances
that the USG would not try. to thwart his plans, � He outlined three .
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276 '
1 4- 0 M M
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00866276
possible plans for the accomnlishnent of t'ne change of government:
(a) asnassination of Ngo Dinh nu anlail.4ia2-2.1.i.t
Dien in office. (b) encirclement of Saigon by various military units;
and (c) direct confrontation betveen military units involved in the
coup and. loyalist military units in Saigon.
5 October (continued)
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG f4.7)
Dave Smith, the Acting COS, cabled that he had discussed this
latest ConeLVIlinh meeting with Ambassador Lodge and DCA Truehart.
Smith renorted that he had recommended to Ambassador 11.11ILL 'We
vneawma
do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot,
since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon
or a protracted struggle with could rip the army and the countr4
���������
/0.�������& ...1����������������1011.rn
asiulder."
(Comment: Smith's recommendation to Lodge on assassination
drew a prompt tesponse from headquarters. The two entries that
follow interrupt the chronology. They are Put here to complete
the story on this s ificant episode.)
CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 7661_ of 6 October)
. . . McCon.- directs that you withdraw recommendation
to AmbassPdor5oncessation p1.27under cCone
-instructions, as ye cannot be in position actively condoning such
course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefor."
- 28 -
re -
J
�
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
,14-000M
'Approved for Release 2024/08/05 C00566276 ,
� � .
CIA cable from Saigon WIG 1463 of 7 Cctober)
�Action taken as di 4- In addition, since DCM
Y.Trueheart was a so present when original recommendation as
:made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at.McCone's
instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
Lodge commented that he ahares McCone's
,
..Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
4-ONM
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276-;.
5 October (continued)
State cable to Saigon (Deptel No. 53)
The Department cabled guidance to the Ambassador resulting from
NSC consideration of the 2 October McNamara-Taylor report. .These points
were included: (1). Existing susrension or new commitments under
the AID Commodity Import Program will be maintained. (2) PL 4-80
(condensed milk) will be handled on a month-to-month basis but will -
not be suspended.- (3) AID Project Loans will be "suspended for review."
(4) Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"
toward GVN.
,-t7&t
White House cable to Saigon (CAP 635:2721 ,
" . . . President today approved recommendation that no initiative
should noir be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup.
There should, however, be urgent covert effort with closest security
under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts
with possible alternative leadership as and when it appears
8 October
The UN General Assembly agreed to send a fact-finding mission.
to South Vietnam to investigate charges of government oppression of
Buddhists.
�
� �
. � ' ' -
-
� --Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
�
4-000M
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276.;
(Ccmment: The fact-finding-group left New York 21-October
and arrived in Saigon on the 24th.- It first net with Ngo
Mu and then visited the Xa Lot pagoda, considered the command
post'of the: Buddhist protest -movement, where it found only two
:monks and South Vietnamese secretpolicemen. A plAnnd visit
to the An Quang pagoda was barred by the Diem government. The
mission did manage to visit An Quang on 27 October and
interviewed Thich. Tinh Keit in the presence of a nmmber of
-secret police. The 1 November generals' coup interrupted the
mission's work, and it left South Viet= on 3 November.
(The UN General Assembly accepted without vote on 13 -
December a decision to discontinue investigation of alleged
-rePression'ofBiddhists in South Vietnam Assembly President
Rodriguez said Rloahtst oppression by the-governmntimul-- -
ceased to be an issue since the ouster of the Diem government.
-(The fact-finding-commission had issued its report on
. U. December. :It arrived at no conclusions but merely detailed'
testimony taken during itsprobe.),.
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276 "
14-CONC:.
rpr.
,
Release: 2024/08/08 C00566276
President's news conference
/S44.
"I know that the transfer of Mr. John RiohardSon, who is a very
dedicated.public_servant,.has led to surmises, but I can assure you .
flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but .
has operated under close control of the Director of Central.
Intelligence operating under the�with the cooperation of the
National Security Council and under my instructions."
CIA cable to Saigon - Eyes Only for Ambassador (DIR 7'4228) :
While we do not Irian to stimulate coup, we also do
not wish to leave impression that US would thwart a rhango. of
government or deny economic and. military assis,lance to a new regime
if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military'
effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improviz_gs working
relations with US." The cable urges thnt the contact with Minh
press for"detailed infoimation.clearly indicating_that.Minh's plans
offer a high prbspect of success."
(Comment: William Colbm.is the originator of this cable,
and it was released by a Cable.Secretariat;Duty-Officer by
direction of Colby. The text states that these "additional
general thoughts" had been discussed with the PreAdent and
that the cable had been cleared with "10E11 officials in White
House, State, Defense and CIA.")
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 CO0566276
tV1.11
4MPV
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
10 October
Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup"
The Ambassador instructed CIA not to initiate contact with
Generals Minh or Don, but if the generals initiate contact, such
contacts were authorized. In the coiirse.of meetings with Minh or Don,
assurances were to be given as specified in DM 74228 of 9 October.
DCI �briefir.g of Senate Foreign Relations Colmaittee,
could say positively would be an improvement over Diem. Therefore
. "We have not seen a successor government in the wings that wei41.41-40:01....-.
. .
it has been our Counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwise
a situation might flare up which might result in something of a' .
civil war, and the Communists would cal* out the victor merely by
sitting on the sidelines."
� 23 October
Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup"
-
At a meeting with. Conein requested by General Don, Don said
.........__________Lsuacxjait4d_za_trectliegenerals} stage a coup within a week
.following 26 October. Conein, under instructions, passed the substance
of DIR 74228 to Don. � Don promised he would seek permission of the coup
coramittee to give Conein their political plan for the Ambassador's
eyes only.
"Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276 -`
11-00000
1'7:4
prw-..4TVA...7. � ��
,
24 October
Y=morandum for the Record prepared by the Execiltive Director
fcllowing a meeting with Kenneth Hansen, Bureau of the Bud.get
At Eansenh initial meeting with Lodge, Lodge made these ch3rges:
(1) CIA was improperly dealing with lihU; (2) CIA was reluctant to
turn over to the military its operations among the hill tribes;
.(3) CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddhists and
was caught by surprise; (4) Richardson had a palatial mansion and
entertained government officials there; (5) The CIA Station was WO r
].are and too visible; (6) CIA acted on its own initiative without �
coordination and without any control from either the Ambassador or
Washington.
Hansen. said he later reported to Lodge that he thought Lodge's
charges were erroneous. He- said he was convinced that everything -
CIA had done in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated
with and carried out under the directions of the Pnbassador, and had
been carried out with both good judgment and a high quality of
performance.
Hansen noted that at the time of his first meeting with Lodge,
Lodge had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doing.
took place a few days later.
(
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05
TTn
.Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese GenerelsCown
Conein'held tiro meetings with General Don on 24 October."
military would not thwart any coup plans. Don said the coup plans
were complete; that the necessary military units were available; and
, that the coup would -occur no later than 2 November. In the second
meeting, Don said the Coup committee iefUsed to turn over the political
plan but authorized Don to outline its substance, which he did,
7 � Tr.,. -,� .. r. There
my be.danger Nhu attempting entrapment through Don's approaches to
Conein Feel Quite strongly that LodgeanlEarkins shout
stand back from azrumn-ezzenhiel ilvolvement Z.t...=1.5"
wise to maintain close control over meetingsbetween Don and _. /7, ed
6melaa::_, 1A�
frcla LIAM
ray instructions.- -It=e_4pea,24.;01-.14;i6=aced_tosianeeti ..,..e.2.....--..
reneral Don and Conein wno has carried out my oxders ,_n_elich -
instance explicitly
Pr_esidentialtfeeting on Vietnam. CIA narticinant: DCI
Record by DCI.
�
_
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276'
14,000'
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C005166276!--
The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to
consider: (1) recent ac:;ons in SVJ with respect to coup planning
and qualifications of the individuals retorting; and (2) our policy
in SVN,as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the
� le,
/
government prior to the return_of Lcdge, for consultations. The DCI
,.. - itto stated his views in detail. In essence) he held: (1) Don night befhir-
* 4414"
managed by Nhu; (2) CIA has no control and therefore could assume
little responsibility; (3) Don could have a coup in the ripking and
could pull it off; (4) We are h.R.Oling a delicate situation .in a
non-professional manner; ..;:5) Successful coup would lead to confusion
because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) Cne coup would
be Yellowed by *another and the war might be lost during period of.
� political confusion; (7) Civilians capable of running SVN could not
.be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8)
Cannot discuss important political issues with Diem because, of the
policy of "correct, cool attitude;" (9) We either have to work with
and Rhu or we have to take aggressive steps. to 'remove them, and
�
It is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better.
28 October
Saigon Station's "History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup
General Don asked Lodge if Conein was sneaking for the Ambassador.
.Z.
�::-f--3,:.-1,...-;.;-�:,::.i.a.Z7i-riz::-i-it.i.,---._-.. - - ..:,.:,:, -j....I..'..,.....'.f..., ......:-.7:...,,, 7 .--,,'
,!.;.,:-..1-�, .7,4 .rf rat , --, ;',-'� :1- z-Tt7.-.--..-i�, v:..z1.-
. . .. . . . .
. :4111
f. ft.
24.1Plarl, uP-
.:Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276... �
-
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276,
IA
Lodge replied in the.affirnntive. Don told the AcLassador that the
US Government should not interfere with or try to stimulate a co,.;p: �
The Ambassador agreed with Don.
28 October (continued)
Saigon Station's "History of the Vintnamese Generals' Co,.. e
Conein net with General Don for the last tire before the coup,
vas launched. Don confirmed that he had talked with the AmbasSador who
had vouched for Conein. Don Stated he was leaving on 29 OmtdOer to
7
coordinate final plans. Don requested Conein to remain at home -
beginning 30 October�until further notice. Don repeated that the
Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but when::
pressed on his previous commitment to make them available La hours in
advance, Don said that possibly the plans could only be made available
four hours in advance. Don said nothing would be happening within the
_ next 48.hours and that, if there was a good reason for the Ambassador .
to change his planned 31 October deoarture, the Ambassador would be
informed in tine to make his own decision.
J.,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/65 C00566276-
4- 0 0 d0
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276)-
7,1
29 October
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2040) '
In an eyes only cable seat via CIA-channels, Lodge gives his
views on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it Would appear
taat a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent . , and that
no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of
informing Diem and-Nhu Although there have been no requests
to date by the generals for material or financial support, we must
aaticipate,that Such request maybe forthcoming
� Presidential Mee - _rn CIA participants: DCI, DDP,
C FE. Record by DDP & C/FE.
' It was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, Harkins,
Trueheart, and David Saith act as a committee to direct any coup
operation. _Dar countered with the view that Smith should not be
involved in such a policy-mnkin3 function, although he would be in .
a position to provide technical advice to HarlBs and_Trueheart as
well as carry out their instructions in the operational field. The
President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in
: favor of the coup, we Should discourage its launching. l The Attornv
General felt the US was risking too much based on flimsy evidence.
The DCI stated his view that even a succeSsful coup would create a
period of interregnum and confusion which might only be salved. by
_a second or third coup.
,
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276.,
t�-;
4e'vo.'
�
B=d1LIo_Iodza.;__n chances of action with or without
our approval now no sigrificant that we should urgently consider our
attitude and contingency plena Believe our attitude to
coup group can still have decisive effect on its decision �
We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable /1/1.4
Conein should express to Don that we do not find presently revealed
plmls-give clear prospect of quick. results We badly need,
some corroborative evidence whether Minh and. others directly and,
completely involved highest auT.hnrit7 dez11eci+
understood that after your depar=re Earkins should participate in-
superdsioa of all coup contacts and that in event a coup begins,
he become bead of country team
CIA cable from Saigon (SAM 2063'.
Lodge's reply: a dO-nUltrIk_WP howe thP orIWZ-i2
delay or discouvf7-5-Zouo. _Don Las made it clear many times that;
this is a Vietnamese_aalt>i- I believe we should continue
our present position of keeping bands off but continue to monitor
and press for more detailed information. CAS has been analyzing
forces for same time and it is their estimate that the generals have
probably figured their Chances pretty closely It does
not seem sensible to have the military in Charge of a matter which
� Is so profoundly political as a change of government
ji.E.IsLgaguasts.from the meneralsis�
at the last_tgmeent with whidh to 117,7 riff rett,t1tial onoolsition_ Th'
The extent tha tjs can be possed disareetly. Iljeve
snould fuzglah_them. . . If we were convinced :that the
'---was going to fail, we would of Course do everything- we could
stop it. Gen. Ea�-kir% has read this and does not concur."
CIA cable to Saigon (ma 794o7)
-------.
63598:
coup
to
We do not accept as ::a basis for US policy
that we have no Dower to delay or discourage a coup We
� cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only
conviction of certain failure justifies inter7ention US
authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either
side. . . . . . " The White House repeats its instructions on
command of the country team after Lodge leaves.
-39-
,
"Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
.Amoveciforease:2024/08/05 00056627
-.%
30 Oztober (continued)
CIA cable from Soi.7..,r. (IG 20914)
Cable from Loci,ze its eatiret7): "ThInfor your rzgacious
instrurtioa.best of m, ability.
The coup began at 1315 hours, Saigon time, which is equivalent
to 0015 hours, Washington time, 1 November. The following account,
is drawn from several sources: the Saigon Station's history of the
coup and various Cables.-
At 1315 hours, the Aide de Camp to General Don came to Conain's
house, told him that the COUD was in progress, and said that General �
: Mon wanted Conein at Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters. The
- aide also asked Conein to bring with him as much money as Conein
could readily lay hands upon. The station had stored five million.
plasters (about $68,00o at the official rate) in a safe in'Conein's,,
�
'house against such a'contingency. Conein took three million with
him. General Don used the money to reward opposition military units
who joined the coup grou;I:rOm 2 November, General Don informed-
Conein that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed
during the coup. Conein gave General Don an additional 1,750,000
piasters. One bundle or 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found
' -
- 4o -
00000
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
later in Conein's safe. The passing of theae funds is obviously.
a very sensitive natter. Dave Smith reported by cable on 25 November
1963 that the disbursement had not yet been. discussed with the
Ambassador. The files do not show whether the Ambassador was
ever told. In a State cable from Sa47oa of 24 April 1964, Lodge
reports a meeting he had that day with Geaeral Minh. It reads in
part:
"Ile then said: 'I want to ask you a question about a money
matter. Mist Conein ever give General Don money for the November I
coup?'
"r said: 'Definitely not. Had he done such a ting, I
would certain:1,y have known it.'"
We asked Dave Smith about this, and he said he thought that the
Ambassador had eventually been told that the money had been passed.
We can neither confirm nor refute from the record.
r------
Thus, Conein went to JGS headquarters and remained at the
_...
command post throughout the struggle.. Before leaving his home,
Conein alerted the station by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters,
.Conein was told by General Don that Don had tried unsuccessfully to
reach Conein earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that
Conein's telephone was out of order. Conein was told that he was to .
keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA
officer on the scene and in intimate contact with the coup principals,
Vr171;"7
14;i1.1.2:V act
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
14-00000
�
pproved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
� #4.1,
. the station wacini3ie;tb's.reper-t. almost minute-by-minute progress of
... - '
. _
_
�
'
Thetect that Conein was at JOS headquarters is weI ll known in
official circles. 'On 2& October, headquarters had cabled the station:
"In future do not repeat not put message "re COMO plots or rumors in
CRITIC enanrpi. Rather you should slug them IMISDIAM NII-BIION FOR
BRENT." As a consequence, the first cabled retorts from the station
came in as regular C/A cables and were put onto the CRITIC netwOrk
/The at headquarters. Vft. first cable was received at headquarters
'
at 0117 hours, Washington tine, and ,was filed on the CRITIC network,
at 0159: At 02564aours,,fo1lOwing receipt ofIthe.sixth non-CRITIC
cable, headquarters instructed the station to put the coup reporting
-- on the CRITIC network at the station. Sometime during the day of
1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time
stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the station against including.
the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. Conein is identified r�
by name And as being at JOS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,
seven of Which werelut into the CRITIC channel, without the name
being deleted, here at headquarters:A,
! �
At 1030 hours 2 November (in Saigon) the Saigon radio announced
that both Diem and Nhu had committed suicide by tse-Ang poison. 'Later
in the day General Minh said that Diem and Nhu escaped from Gia Long
-42-
. .
.4kr""ia.,�'� *e
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
I-00000
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
�ti-.7.17""
Palace shortly after 0700 hours on 2 November by a tunnel unl.-714
to the generals. They left the tunnel in the dock area and went too,.;?:,
a Catholic church in Cholon vhere they took poison. They were
disCovered at the church at 1030 hours.
We do not have a truly reliable account of the circumstances
of their deaths, but they certainly were not by suicide.. According
to one of Conein's reports, Diem called General Don at 0650 hours .
2 November and offered to surrender unconditionAlly. General Minh
immediately ordered all telephones removed-fram roams in their'JGS:
command post area. This cut off all communication with the, outside
except for radios under Minh's control..
Om 16 November 1963 a field-grade officer of the JGS,who was
deeply involved in the coup and whose reliability the station could
not judge (nor did it name him); gave a-station officer two photographs
of the bodies of Diem and Mar, which he claimed he had taken at the
request of General Kim. The photographs show that the deaths wore
rytaciody.- The'saurce gave the following account of the deaths:
The officer was present when the Military BevoltrUonary
Committee debated the ultimate disposition -of the brothers,
accompanied the force .that apprehended them, and witnessed: the
events immediately after their deaths. Re was not present in
the 14-4.13 armored personnel carrier at the time of the deaths.
A lengthy arg=ent took place on the night of 1-2 November
as to the ultimate disposition of Diem and Nhu, with most of the
generals favoring their execution. The ultimate decision was
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C00566276
the morni^- of 2 November, the Committee received a �
phone call from a casual informant telling where Dien and
Nhu could be found. A force .-s dispatched to apprehend
them. ghis appears to coaflictwith Conein's report that the
phones had been Dulled out" Shortly after 10:00.a.4., Diem
and Hhu entered the personnel Carrier with Nhung.
Upon arrival at the JGS headTmrters, Diem and plau were
dead. Nhu had been stabbed 21 times in the back with a carbine
bayonet and shot five times. Diem had been shot twice in the -
chest. Knung leaped from the M-113 with the bayonet in haal
and proudly displayed it to all observers. His arms were
soaked with blood. ffrom the photos, it looks as if Diem and.
Nhu had their haads tied behind their backs...7.
a. CA was not in favor of the decision tonbandonAhe
*Diem regime, but faithfully carried out instructions.
b. CIA officers Conein and Spera vere the contacts vithAh
amp generals, but only as approved and under instructions.
c. A CIA officer, Comein, was at the generals' command_
post throughout the fighting.
d. Coneih furnished General Don about $65,000 to buy off
-opposition military units while the coup was in progress.
. CIA had no hand in the assassinations and had no
--1!rn
01,:tiiE 1 71: r
s-.Approved for Release: 2024/08/06 C00668276,'