CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00353067
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-00582
• Publication Date: November 25, 1959

Approved for Release: 2016/06/13 C00353067
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COPY NO. 56
OCI NO.5454/59
25 November 1959
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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Approved for Release: 2016/06/13 C00353067
Approved for Release: 2016/06/13 C00353067
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 November 1959
PART II (continued)
SINO-INDONESIAN TENSION Page 5
President Sukarno has emphasized to the Chinese Com-
munist ambassador Djakarta's firm intent, despite Peiping's
objections, to implement the decree banning alien retail-
ers in rural areas of Indonesia. Confronted with Djakar-
ta's determination, Peiping may eventually seek only to
prevent a recurrence of forced evacuations I nd to secure
fair compensation for dispossessed Chinese. (b)(3)
LAOS Page 5
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's recent talks
with Laotian officials suggest that he still favors some
type of negotiated settlement or at least some gesture by
Vientiane toward the Communist bloc which would emphasize
Laotian neutrality. The British Foreign Office also con-
tinues to incline toward negotiations between Laos and its
Communist neighbors, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd has re-
iterated in Parliament the government's desire for a neu-
tral Laos. Laotian officials, however, remain opposed to
any talks involving a gesture toward the Communist bloc.
CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT APPEARS SHORT=LIVED Page 6
The Dahanayake government's chances of surviving the
Ceylonese parliamentary session have been seriously jeop-
ardized by recent events further implicating government
officials in the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike's assas-
sination. Dahanayake, and several other cabinet ministers
face early no-confidence motions, and the prime minister
has publicly conceded that his government may soon be
ousted. Political leaders differ concerning the prefer-
able course of action in the event the government falls,
and it is not clear whether there would be a realignment
or a call for new elections.
NUCLEAR TEST CESSATION TALKS Page 8
Soviet tactics in the new technical talks on the
detection of underground tests which opened on 25 Novem-
ber will probably be aimed principally at reinforcing the
USSR's demands for a complete cessation of tests with a
control system as recommended in the 1958 Geneva experts'
report. The Soviet delegate to the political conference,
who had proposed the technical talks on 3 November,
stalled until 24 November before agreeing to a US com-
promise proposal for a directive to guide the experts.
He apparently hoped to induce the Western powers to make
further concessions which would have downgraded the im-
portance of the new US data in the technical discussions.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
iii
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved for Release: 2016/06/13 C00353067
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 November 1959
Hammarskjold plans to de-
vise an over-all economic de-
velopment scheme based on the
economic survey now being con-
ducted in Laos by his personal
representative, Sakari Tuomioja.
The proposed projects would be
financed by contributions from
UN members. Laotian officials,
however, fear this would in-
volve Laotian acceptance of
economic assistance from the
Sino-Soviet bloc, thus opening
the country to Communist agents.
Laotian Government leaders
apparently consider it essential
for internal political reasons
that the trial be held, although
they have indicated some flex-
ibility on the question of tim-
ing. A national congress will
probably convene in December
to consider ways and means of
getting around the constitution-
al difficulties posed by the
expiration of the life of the
National Assembly on 25 Decem-
ber. The government apparently
is anxious to have the trial
at least under way by then in
order to prevent pro-Communist
deputies, who are among those
to be tried, from using the con-
gress as a propaganda sounding
board.
CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT
The Dahanayake government's
chances of surviving the Ceylon-
ese parliamentary session which
began on 24 November have been
seriously jeopardized by devel-
opments which further implicate
leading officials in the late
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's
assassination. Opposition par-
ties plan to introduce no-confi-
dence motions against at least
one cabinet minister on 27 No-
The British Foreign Office
also continues to incline to-
ward negotiations between Laos
and its Communist neighbors,
and Foreign Secretary Lloyd has
reiterated in Parliament the
government's desire for a neu-
tral Laos. London's recent re-
jection of the Soviet proposal
for an international conference
on Laos may be subjected to a
more searchi
Labor party. (W(1)
(W(1)
Small-scale skirmishing
between Laotian Army elements
and Communist insurgents re-
portedly continues at widely
scattered points throughout
the country. The insurgents
presumably are concentrating
their efforts at this stage on
organizing opposition to the
goverient at the villave
level.
(b)(3)
APPEARS SHORT-LIVED
vember and against Prime Minis-
ter Dahanayake the following
week. Dahanayake has stated
that he would consider a vote
of no confidence by any govern-
ment member as applying to the
entire government and has pub-
licly conceded that his govern-
ment may soon be ousted.
Despite the lack of firm
evidence, the Ceylonese public
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 18
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 November 1959
may regard the conspiracy ru-
mors as verified by the recent
arrests of Finance Minister de
Zoysa's brother and of a form-
er cabinet minister closely
associated with a ruling party
official suspected of having
planned the assassination. The
finance minister's resignation
on 22 November may also be in-
terpreted locally as tacit ad-
mission of his indirect in-
volvement.
101. -
lowing his resignation, there-
voted to expel De Zoysa tot-
by technically depriving the
government of its one-man ma-
jority in Parliament . . Dahanayake
may temporarily retain a plu-
rality of votes against the
diverse opposition elements.
However, to defeat the no-con-
fidence motions, his govern-
ment would require both the
support of all its members, in-
cluding dissident elements and
six appointees, as well as sev-
eral opposition abstentions.
Furthermore, the ruling party's
executive committee apparently
has agreed to expel all members
who are 'close associates" of
persons arrested in connection
with the assassination case,
which could further reduce gov-
ernment ranks.
Political leaders differ
concerning the course of action
in the event the government
falls. Governor General Goone-
tilleke, who fears the govern-
ment's collapse but hopes to
avoid early elections, has
tried to sound out United Na-
tional party (UNP) leader Dud-
ley Senanayake on forming an
interim government from the
present Parliament. Senanayake,
however, apparently would favor
dissolution of Parliament and
the scheduling of new elections;
Dahanayake and Trotskyite oppo-
sition leader N. M. Perera have
publicly advocated this course.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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Page 7 of 13