LAR: MEXICO: DWINDLING PROSPECTS FOR THE RIGHT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00332191
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02576
• Publication Date: June 17, 1988

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ALA LAR 88-013
17 June 1988
copy 385
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Latin America
Review (u)
17 June 1988
Page
Articles
Mexico: Dwindling Prospects for the Right
The campaigns of two opposition parties to the right of the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party are losing ground as the national
election approaches, and the potential for significant electoral gains is
slight.
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Latin America
Review (u)
Articles
Mexico: Dwimlliospects
for the Right
The campaigns of two opposition parties to the right of
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party are losing
ground as the national election approaches, and the
potential for significant electoral gains is slight) The
National Action Party (PAN) and the Mexican
Democratic Party (PDM) have failed to galvanize then
essentially regionally based strength into nationwide
constituencies during their campaigns. Because of
continued erosion of support in both parties, the right's
political influence is likely to be seriously weakened
after the election.
PAN�No Longer the Only Alternative
The National Action Party's political appeal has
declined since the latest regional elections in 1986
despite sustained party membership and the nomination
of an engaging and poised presidential candidate. Voters
previously attracted to the National Action Party as the
only viable alternative to the ruling party are being
increasingly siphoned away by the candidacy of the
center-left's Cuauhtetnoc Cardenas.2
previous electoral majorities in
northern border areas�such as Chihuahua State where
the PAN following is traditionally strong�were more a
result of disaffection with and opposition to the ruling
party than a commitment to the PANs political
platform.
aouthier Exaggerating His Popularity
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The initial success of the government's anti-inflation
program is contributing to the PAN's woes by
undermining the right's traditional ability to score
political points through its attacks on government
economic mismanagement. Available statistics indicate
the inflation rate has dropped from a monthly rate of
more than 15 percent at the beginning of the year to less
than 2 percent in May. The PAN still maintains that the
plan is doomed to failure. As a result, the PAN's
continued public criticism of the program and
skepticism that the government can maintain its
momentum are undermining the patty's credibility.
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Moreover, the PAN has not been able to generate
support for demonstrations against government electoral
fraud and corruption. In a recent protest over alleged
vote fraud in Coahuila State, the PAN could draw no
more than half the number of activists that the ruling
party drew to counter the protest, according to press
reports. Failure to demonstrate grassroots enthusiasm
continues to undermine the PAN's credibility as the
chief architect of opposition resistance to government
fraud and, in our judgment, has further spurred the
erosion of the party's support base.
In addition to its problems appealing to the electorate on
political issues, the emergence of a faction within PAN
advocating stronger protest tactics has split the party's
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leadership and damaged its ability to mount a unified
campaign. Under Manuel Clouthicr, the PAN has opted
for more confrontational but nonviolent campaign
tactics. A more moderate element within PAN, however,
retains much of its previous strength and has limited
support for Clouthier's tactics,
This split appears to have prevented party
moderates, who resented the nomination of Clouthier
from the outset, from making wholehearted efforts in
some important states such as Jalisco.
PDM--A Church-Oriented Message
The Mexican Democratic Party has relied almost
exclusively on its appeal to conservative Catholics and
has been unable to broaden its narrow constituency. The
PDM grew out of the Catholic Synarchist movement of
the 1930s and was formally organized in 1972 to
counter what it perceived as anticlerical attitudes
prevailing in the ruling party.
the PDM has been able to attract significant
strength only in a few isolated regions. It has not
increased its official registration--despite the party's
clever marketing of its symbol, a red rooster--during this
campaign, and it faces declining popularity even in its
strongholds of Jalisco and Guanajuato States. Finally,
the party's uncharismatic presidential candidate,
Gumersindo Magana, has been unable to capture more
than 1 percent of voters sampled in recent national polls
according to press reports.
the PDM has no more than 10,000 followers
national and relies on a core of only 1,000 activists.
The PDM's main campaign theme has been criticism of
corruption in the government, and its limited platform is
not likely to produce a serious electoral threat to the
ruling party. the PDM's
platform has recurrent but amorphous themes of
protection of the family, greater respect for private
education, and support of free enterprise. While many of
the PDM's tenets are closely aligned with conservative
values exploited by the PAN, the two are unlikely to
merge because of the divergence in the social and
economic backgrounds of their key constituencies; the
Reverse Blank
PAN attracts mostly educated middle and upper class
followers while the PDM appears to be distinctly lower
middle class.
Outlook
Because the right perceives it is not likely to improve its
political position before the July election, it plans to
concentrate on monitoring electoral procedures to
counter fraud by the ruling party. The PAN has vowed to
provide poll watchers for every polling booth, but, given
its declining ability to turn out activists, it is unlikely to
achieve this goal. The right is more likely to join with
other opposition parties in their poll-watching if it
believes that its own civil disobedience campaign is
faltering.
Nevertheless, the PAN and the PDM so far have not
demonstrated the ability to mobilize their constituents,
and their political influence probably will continue to
decline. Moreover, if the populist candidacy of
Cardenas succeeds in drawing away most of the protest
vote, the actual vote count almost certainly will place
PAN third in the presidential race. Because of the right's
failure to expand its membership in rural areas and the
nomination of some lackluster local candidates, its
legislative seats also are likely to decline in this
election. Despite the government's concern over the
rising popularity of Cardenas, which may prompt it to
artificially throw part of the opposition vote to the right,
the PAN and PDM are likely to emerge from the
election seriously weakened.
This article is Secret
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