'� Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 (7' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable EO � . RouTull 3526 , 3. 3>2) IN 64394 PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES STATE/MR DIA NM CC/M C ( SECO ER JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIAMMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS MOCOMO(XXXXXXXXMOVAXXX0( DIN EXO This T3 Tmatedebritaine itn4onweg affecting the Natio fense of the IT States within trizejOening of the Sec tiperge Laws, mud.. tau a. SIK the n or revelation o ch In any an uriautho Is prohibi alI111111111111�1111111111111111111111111111111w THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. 060636.z CITE 11111111--- 1 304 DIST 6 MARCH 1968 3.4(b)(1) COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM D 0 I 111111111111111111. �� LBj LIBRARY Tyles:datory ReviewSuE1J-E C T � PRESIDENT THIEU 'S CONCERN OVER ATTEMPTS fiIse 1\74-34111----0� r.)ocurnent UNDERMINE HIS POSITION; -ANALYSIS OF THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE A CO - VIETNAM, SAIGON 11111111111.111 SOUR CE � - 4 FIELD NO. . � s Sum MARY: pkE,SIDENT:ZiTCIE-Ua:ISairR.0 CTS-Lna-OVE-r-IICCA:T-z4ELDE-SCR:1--1�D A S.*AT-TEM S -PO IT I 0-N A S....PRE SI.HZmNAKED; � V I CE--,11RE-LDENZL-Mizz AT-ISO N L OLICED.1 RE-CRL OA N-IAILDLIOVERS5A-S nOSERI=Eki:IYE:rLM Al-DE;i7-AS-N IS'':i5E-TR ACLU R.tHI EW/ D E_S R J. T'D F FE tl-SYVEA:?-0--R I. 6 IN AT NG� FR OM -WEAKNESS- :..-zmXHSFA/CTLit-R1716-!if:T57-dAIV-==iti:LPSYCR-01.20GtCAL _ . ... � - .V1 CTD.RY.:SINCE.-...IHEYaREALIZEHEY-C AN NO Y-31/AR-.�-: S...IHRE.AE13-441Ez-NIE-XT-z.EZ � 0111.1111111111111111111111.111111.111M APPROvoc RV RELEASE Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 1-5(c) 3.4(b)(1) 1.5(c) 3.4(11)(1) i-5(c) 3.4(b)(I) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 Ckil 64394 .� . S1 RET 111.111111111111111111=11111111�1111111. � ineatim0 � (dissent ecrntro14) � � 4... . _ . M 0.NT HS-1A AND WILL �P13.,PAAT3.1.-.Y_ L--AIINCH7-1-THE7:NEXT,IiP,HASE.,7.07-F7 fifE77-.0-FFEN,S.I,VE IN.-M.AX-:-;ORs.:JUNE'-�:BEFORET.HE,-,-AMERICAN,;_pRESIDENTIAL-:-140MINATIONS'i � IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THIEU SAID THAT HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO ANTI�COMMUNIST FRONT 'GROUPS, BUT HE THINKS IT. IS BETTER FOR THE GOVERNMENT � NOT TO BECOME �INVOLVED IN -SUPPORTING THEM. END SUMMARY. 1. �. PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU SAID THAT 1.50) � PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES 1.504 3.4(6)(1) HIS MAJOR PROBLEM AT THE PRESENT TIME IS A PERSONAL ONE WHICH INVOLVES ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE HIS �POWER AND PRESTIGE AS PRESIDENT. .THIEU NAMED VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE NGUYEN .NGOC LOAN AND CHIEF OF THE OVERSEAS SECURITY SERVICE MAI DEN AS THE INSTIGATORS OF THIS EFFORT. THIEU FEELS THAT HE HAS BEEN BACKED INTO A CORNER, AND ALTHOUGH HE IS GENERALLY FAIR AND GENTLE TO ALL .PEOPLE,:HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE SOME ACTION'TO ASSERT- HIMSELF AGAINST SUCH DETRACTORS. -ALL THIEU WANTS IS TO BE A zoop PRESIDENL-FoR..YEEEL74OVICthiis OR EVEN' THESE FIRST FIVE MONTgS, IF HE DOES NOT SURVIVE THE PRESENT FIGHTING,' TgOUGH .. _ . _ . � � � . HE-'HAS- NO .FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. � . . . ' � -;.1.644* � 3.4(b)(1) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149� - _ . � 64394 � tc sifteation) � fdissern ccrntrots) � � � PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES 2. THIEU *REFERRED TO THE 1 MARCH LOWER HOUSES VOTE AGAINST GRANTING HIM SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DECREE POWERS WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE OPPOSITION INCLUDED THE KY/LOAN CONTROLLED DEMOCRATIC BLOC. THIEU CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE BLOC VOTED � . AGAINST HIM UNLESS IT WAS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS HIM AS PRESIDENT SINCE KY HAD ASKED TO ORGANIZE THIS BLOC TO .OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES RUN..BY.MAI DEN CONTINUE TO EMBARRASS THIEU AND HIS ADMINISTRATION AND ARE OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH TI-!IS OBJECTIVE. sIN.ADDITION, �LOAN. AND HIS GROUP ARE TRYING TO MAKE NGUYEWVAN LOC APPEAR AS AN INEFFECTIVE PRIME MINISTER �� IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THIEU. THIEU STATED THAT IT SHOULD,-'BE REMEMBERED THAT LOC WAS NOT HIS CHOICE BUT WAS FORCED ON HIM BY THE GENERALS, INCLUDING KY. THERE IS ALSO AN ORGANIZED EFFORT..LED 131." LOAN AND POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY KY TO PLACE CORRUPT MEN IN-SENIOR.GOVERNMENT POSTS, 'INCLUDING PROVINCE CHIEFS, SO THAT THESE CORRUPT APPOINTEES MAY BE dITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIEU'S INEFFECTIVENESS. 3, THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE MOBILIZATION OF 125,000 � . ADDITIONAL: SOLDIERS IS MANDATORY IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS 4i0t&T �� .�� ......�� -� a �� Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 � � - 1.5M � 3.4(b)(� � (c3rCation) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 (7? 64394 PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES Nissans controls) 1$0) 3.4(b)(1) ' OF THE VIET CONG (VC) THREAT OVER THE . NEXT' .FEW MONTHS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE A FORM AL U.S. AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THESE ADDITIONAL TROOPS BEFORE ^ TAKING POSITIVE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT MOBILIZATION. 4. THIE(J ASCRIBED THE VC TET OFFENSIVE TO S . . � REALIZATION THAT MASSIVE - AMERICAN MILITARYINTERVENTION IN :VIETNAM HAS 114,E.7;?.�Ti-P6ssIBLEFOR: THE "COMMUNISTS TO WIN A . IL ITAR Y 'VICTOR Y. - THUS, THE TET OFFENSIVE IS AN EXPRESSION ; OF WEAKNESS. IT HAD AS ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE PUTTING THE - � - . , . . �_._ � � -NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF.SOUTH.VIETNAM INTO A �:STRONG POSITION..tV_PREPARATION FOR THE INESCAPABLE DAY WHEN . . �� - � NEGOTIATIONS MUST BEGIN. IN FACT, THE-VC-ARE SO_WEAK THEY _ COULD NOT AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY OF NEXT YEAR'S TEl UNTIL THEY ATTACK. 5. THE TET OFFENSIVE REPRESENTS A LAST J)ITCH MILITARY � - EFFORT ' WHICH CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THE VC WERE. FAILING ON ALL OTHER FRONTS. THE VC ATTACKED THE CITIES IN ORDER TO CREATE, . MAXIMUM 'PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. A FEW ROCKET OR MORTAR ROUNDS . CAUSE MINOR DAMAGE BUT CREATE A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WHEREAS 50 HAMLETS TAKEN OVER BY' THE VC COULD PA SS .LARGELY ��. ...��. � .� _ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 :sfe) - 3.4(b)(1) v�-� : Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 . 64394 � -E-T 411111.111=11111111111111111111111111111011111111 s(cl fleaticrn) (dtssem eantrolsi � 11111111111111111111111111111111 PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) UNNOTICED BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THIEU CITED THE VC ORDER TO TAKE AND HOLD THE CITIES FOR 48 HOURS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE VC REALIZED THEIR WEAKNESS. !Th 6. THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE VC WILL LAUNCH THE NEXT PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE IN MAY OF JUNE BECAUSE THE VC 1, REALIZE THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS FOR THE MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. 7. THIEU IS IN FAVOR .OF A UNITED ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT GROUP. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO REASON WHY HE SHOULD BE OPPOSED TO FRONT GROUPS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THEY ARE ORGANIZED IN SUPPORT OF HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THIEU DOES NOT THINK THAT THE .GOVERNMENT SHOULD OFFER ITS SUPPORT TO � THESE FRONT GROUPS SINCE THE MEMBERS WOULD ASSUME THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO EXPLOIT THEM AND WOULD RESIGN CAUSING THE � � DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FRONT. THIEU BELIEVES THAT IT IS BETTER , � FOR HIM TO CONTINUE SEEING SELECTED POLITICAL AND. RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND TRYING TO PERSUADE THEM TO COOPERATE IN. BRINGING.L. THEIR FOLLOWERS INTO A UNITED FRONT GROUP WHICH WILL OPPOSE COMMUNISM AND OFFER ITS SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THIEU 4 o' 4 7 . _ . . Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 � . . 1.50) 3.4(b)(1) �� Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 64394 (ciassi cation) . 111111"41.1""1111111111111.( ism's. controls) � � � � PAGE.� 6 OF 6 PAGES 1.50) 3.4(b)(1) : SAID THAT EVENTUALLY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FRONT GROUPS MAY FORM THE BASIS FOR A POLITICAL PARTY ALTHOUGH THIS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP WITHIN THE NEAR -FUTURE. THIEU . � � � � . . ADDED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF FRONT GROUPS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VIETNAM OVER THE YEARS AND FEW HAVE EAD ANY REAL COHESION OR BEEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN BROADENING -THEIR POLITICAL BASE. B. FIELD DISSEM : STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR MR. ZORTHIAN ) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER , CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) nY --7TH AIR FORCE. CGENERAL MOM YER ONLY CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC .PACAF - - REPORT CLASS SE 1.11.11111111.11111111.111111.110�1.1 _ .. � � .1 �. _ .***. Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210149 -1-1444 3.4(b)(1) .� � _ .......

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PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONCERN OVER ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE HIS POSITION; ANALYSIS OF THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE