_ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 cool 93292 DLA035 00 YEKADS DE YEKADL 6889A 0921752 ZKZK 00 ZSL DE 0 111752Z ZYH FN CIA TO WHITE HOUSE. SITUATION ROOM SSO ACSI DA SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION AFSSO USAF ,C NO DIA/ISIC JCS NIC DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER . STATE (RCI) CIA-OCI ZEN � SW AR E T SECTION ONE COUNTRY DOI SUBJECT ACQ SOURCE SECRET INFORMATInir EO s13526 rHE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Sunday, February 11, 1968 3:30 p.m. Mr. President: This is the military-political assessment of probably the best (or one of the two best) Vietnamese � Corps commanders. As in the U.S., the lower house is 0.K.; the Senate is giving trouble. OF TWO CITE SOUTH VIETNAM 11 FEBRUARY 1968 III CORPS ANALYSIS OF GOALS OF VIET CONG TEl OrFENSIVE.AND OF:THE GOVERNMENT' S HANDLING OF THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE ATTACKS - W. W. Rostow ST VIETNAM SAIGON (11 FEBRUARY 1968) SUMMARY: AS OF 11 FEBRUARY, III CORPS111111111111111111111111L WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION AND.DOBUTED THERE WOULD" BE A SECOND VIET CONG (VC) ATTACK ON SAIGON. HE FEELS VC LOSSES WERE HEAVIER THAN STATISTICS WOULD INDICATE, SINCE MANY OF THE VC WHO . � WERE LOSTA;ERE OFFICERS, CADRES AND HIGHLY TRAINED SAPPERS. HE BELIEVES THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AMONG THE ATTACKERS INDICATES VC RECRUITMENT DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS NOT GIVEN UP HIS PLAN 1.5.(e) 3.4(b)(1) 1.5c) 3.4(b)(1), 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) t5(e) 3.4(b)(1) FOR VICTORY, HE WILL HAVE TO CHANGE HIS STRATEGYAIIIIIIII IS - CONVINCED THAT THE ATTACK ON SAIGON WAS NOT A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT BUT RESULTED FROM A GENUINE VC BELIEF THAT THEY COULD TAKE OVER THE CITY AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE VC WERE CORRECT IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND THE LEADERSHIP IS DIVIDED, THEY FAILED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS COMPENSATING FACTORS; INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:I (1) DESPITE THEIR DISLIKE OF THE GVN, THE PEOPLE STILL PREFER IT TO VC: (2) TI-If MILITARY STANDS BEHIND THE GUN AND IN TIMES OF CRISIS THE, MILITARY IS UNITED. THE VC WERE ALSO MISTAKEN ABOUT THE MORALE OF ARVN,---; WHICH FOUGHT VERY WELL. IN FACT1111111FTHINKS THE FIGHTING MAY-HAVErTI''" SERVED AS TURNING POINT, SINCE.ARVN NOW KNOWS IT CAN DEFEAT THE-VC BATTLE. IS LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND IS DUBIOUS ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE NEW .TASK FORCE': . - 1-5(e) 3.4(b)(1) BECAUSE OF ITS DOMINATION BY CIVILIANS WHO, IN HIS OPINION, ALWAYS HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THINGS DONE AND ARE HOPELESSLY LOST IN A CRITT- ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO PLANS TO.TAKE STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH A THING, THINKS THE 3EST SDLUTION'TO-THE GTA 'S PROBLEMS WOULD BE TO AMEND THZ .U.;(40 CONSTITUTION TO ALLOFJ-VICE PRESIDENT KY TO SERVE ALSO AS .PRIME 1INISTER. 1.4(5)(l 111111[APPROVES OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GVN OF THE LOWER 'HOUSE SINCE THE CRISIS SE2AN BUT IS VERY CRITICAL OF THE SENATE'S ATTITUDES, INCLUDI.:._ APFROIMPOS -RaEel Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292 - Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292- - _LYS PThTEJSION O 3EING CONF=TE.NTT TO INVESTIGATE AND DETERMINE � AR:17D-FORCE3 02FNDEU PEOPLE PROPERLY. END SUV-ARY. - 1. ON 11 FEBRUARY 1_ a III CORPS WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN). HE FEELS THAT THE ENEMY MADE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO CAPTURE ' SAIGON AND THAT HIS DECISIVE DEFEAT HAS SHORTENED THE WAR BY AT LEAST SIX MONTHS AND WILL BRING AN ALLIED MILITARY VICTORY IN 1968. 2. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A SECOND ATTACK, SIMILAR TO THE FIRST, ON SAIGON, IF AN ATTACK SHOULD COME IT WILL BE ESSENTIALLY AN ATTACK BY FIRE," IN WHICH THE ENEMY WILL UTILIZE HEAVY � t1ORTARS AND ?ROCKETS BUT NO MAJOR GROUND FORCES. THE HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE ENEMY DURING THE FIRST ATTACK WILL MAKE IT 1.71DOSSIBLE FOR HIN TO MOUNT ANOTHER MJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON FOR AT LEAST THREE 70U; . POSSIBLY JOT BEFORE THE uAR ENDS. (FIELD COv:MENT.illimmiglip FEBRUARY, ALSO REPORTED THAT CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE VC WOULD LAUNCH A SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON.) 3. FEELS THAT, IN SONE RESPECTS, ENEMY LOSSES ARE EVEN HEAVIER THAN THE STATISTICS INDICATE. THE ENEMY NOT ONLY LOST OVER HALF OF HIS ATTACK FORCE, BUT SUFFERED AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS BLOW IN HEAVY LOSSES ANONG THE OFFICERS AND LEADER CADRES. A LARGE NUMBER OF SAPPERS, WHO WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REPLACE, WERE KILLED. MORALE OF ENEMY TROOPS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS DROPPED- SHARPLY DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) TO KEEP THE CADRES AND � TROOPS FRON LEARNING THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEFEAT. A. MININISAID THAT THE FACT THAT ENEMY TROOPS WHICH ATTACKED SAIGON WERE, ON THE WHOLE, VERY YOUNG AND POORLY TRAINED AND THAT MANY WERE NEW RAQLACE- . f'Er.TS UJITS DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY HAD CO'ITTED POOR TROOPS 1;HIL E HOLDING THE GOOD ONES IN RESERVE, A REPRESENTATIVE CROSS SECTION OF THE Er-1:;Y TROOPS KILLED AND CAPTURED IN THE SAIGON CAMPAIGN DOES NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THOSE CAPTURED IN OTHER MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REPL.;CENEe.TS IN VC UNITS IS SIGNIFICANT. THE VC ARE ' FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO GET INDIGENOUS, REPLACEMENTS AND ARE BECOMING MORE DEPENDENT ON NVA PERSONNEL. _ 5. SAID THAT THE ENEMY OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT GIVEN UP hib PLAN FOR VICTORY BUT WILL CHANGE ITS ' STRATEGY. THE ACTIVITY WILL BE DESIGNED TO WORSEN THE: 7LIFE OF THE PEOPLE; ESPECIALLY THE REFUGEES, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL CAUSE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS,FOR.JHE. GOVERNMENT.11111IFEXPECTS THAT_THE_ENEMY_WILL: A. MAKE A.MAJOR EFFORT TO CUTROUTES LEADING,''r INTO SAIGON IN ORDER TO DISRUPT.THE�ECONOMIC LIFEJ) THE CAPITAL. B. LAUNCH A-MAJOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE..1 _ DESIGNED TO SOW DISUNITY AMONG THE:PEOPLE:f:ESPE-CIALLY: THOSE IN THE REFUGEE CENTERS IN'THE CAPTIAL. C. POSSIBLY LAUNCH TERRORIST ATTACKS-ON T.HE 1-5(e) 3,4(bX1) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) 1.5(e) 3A03X11 300 NNNN � (7.-,�''.�1-11111111111111 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292 I.* � 3.4(b)(1) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292 /,I.L.S�EWED :1 I 1-� 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) :3 DLA037 F-7 30 00 YEKADS DE YEKADL 68898 0421752 ZKZK 00 ZSL DE 0 111752Z ZYH FM CIA TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM ,SSO ACSI DA SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION AFSSO USAF CNO DIA/ISIC JCS NIC DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER STATE (ROI) CIA-OCI ZEM SET 1.0.0 FINAL SECTION OF TWO CITE 14(fa)(1) VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN SAIGON, SUCH AS THE WATER WORKS AT THU DUO. 6. MEM SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS RE1AINii:2 TA SAIGON PROPER -IS VERY SMALL AND THAT ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE MAINLY LIMITED TO SNIPER AND POSSIBLY TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, 11111111FEELS THAT THE PRESENT CURFEW SHOULD, AND WILL, .BE EXTENDED FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH OR LONGER. 1-5(e) THE HOURS OF CURFEW WILL BE REDUCED GRADUALLY, BUT IT 140*11 WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE THE MORE LIBERAL HOURS OF THE PRE-CURFEW IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE SECURITY IS PREDOMINANT IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE AND THEY FIND IT REASSURING TO SEE SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN, SIDE-BY-SIDE, WATCHING OVER THE EMPTY STREETS AT NIGHT. 7. IS CONVINCED THAT THE VC ATTACK ON SAIGON WAS NOT SIMPLY A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT OR DESIGNED TO PRODUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ONLY HZ IS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT THE VC GENUINELY BELIEVED 1-5(0 THEY COULD TAKE OVER SAIGON AND SET UP A REVOLUTIONARY "PEOPLE'S 140*1) GOVERNT" HE HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEN A NUMBER OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND PROCLAMATIONS WHICH THIS PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT WAS TO PROMULGATE AFTER IT TOOK OVER. 11.111FEELS THE VC BASED THEIR HOPES FOR SUCCESS ON THREE IDEAS: � A. THE PEOPLE HATED THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND WOULD RISE UP AND OVERTHROW IT IF THE MEANS TO DO SO WERE AT HAND. B. GVN LEADERSHIP WAS SO SERIOUSLY DIVIDED THAT IT WOULD COLLAPSE COMPLETELY IF CONFRONTED BY A SERIOUS AND CONTINUING CRISIS. C. THE MORALE OF ARVN OFFICERS AND MEN WAS VERY LOW, AND THE TROOPS, WOULD GIVE UP OR FLEE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A DETERMINED ENEMY . FORCE. S. MINIKSAID THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF TRUTH IN THE ENEMY ANALYSIS. .,THE ENEMY'S MISTAKE WAS TO OVERLOOK A NUMBER OF COMPENSATING FACTORS, WHILE MOST PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE OR AT BEST ARE INDIFFERENT TO THE GVN, - MANY STRONGLY DISLIKE THE VC. IF COMPELLED TO MAKE A CHOICE, A MAJORITY WOULD CHOOSE THE GVN OVER THE VC. HATRED OF THE VC INVOLVES A NUMBER OF FACTORS. CATHOLICS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY COMMUNIST REGIME AND WILL TAKE ACTIVE STEPS TO AVOID ONE. ALTHOUGH THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN SAIGON MAY NOT LIKE THE GVN, THEY DO LIKE THE STANDARD OF LIVING IT PROVIDES. A CYCLO DRIVER, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY BE POOR BUT HE ENJOYS A HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING COMPARED TO THAT OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE. 9. NOTED THAT THE ENEMY ALSO ERRED IN PLACING TOO MUCH IMPOR- TANCE ON THE REPUTED FRICTION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY AND THE INCOMPETENCE OF PRIME MINISTER 1.5k0 NGUYEN VAN LOC. IN DOING SO, HE OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY 1403X1 INSTITUTION LENDS BEHIND-THE SCENES COHESIVENESS TO THE GVN APPARATUS AND THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS THE MILITARY IS ALWAYS FIRMLY UNITED. iiiMMIALSO FEELS THE ENEMY PUT TOO MUCH CRECDENCR TN FORRTr;N PRS Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292 � - Approved for Release: 2919/04/17 cool 93292 � , -- - - - - tir rinviv 1-0 iIGT(1!..- IN Th7.--ACTUAL�r. EVEJr BOTH OFFICERS AN, MEN FOUGHT WELL EVEN WHEN.FACING SUPERIOR FORCES. THAT THE RECENT VCTACKS MAY BE A TURNING POINT SINCE MORALE IS NOW HIGH AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN KNOW .t THEY CAN DEFEAT THE'ENEMYEVEN IN AN AL-OUT ATTACK. 111.1111ADDED THAT 1:sfio HE WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE. THEY 34N(1). DID NOT PANIC, THEY GAVE SURPRISINGLY GOOD COOPERATION TO THEMILITARY, AND THEY SHOWED NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN A "PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT." . 10. ALTHOUGH HE EXUDED CONFIDENCE OVER THE MILITARY SITUATION, WAS RATHER PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. HE FELT THIEU HAD NOT DISPLAYED DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP. HE HELD LITTLE HOPE FOR THE. SUCCESS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF. (JOINT GVN/U.S. TASK FORCE) BECAUSE IT WAS DOMINATED BY CIVILIANS. HE NOTED THAT MAJOR ,AA* GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, THE COMMITTEE'S CHIEF OF STAFF,. HAD ANNOUNCED HE WAS RESIGNING BECAUSE THE CIVILIANS WERE "ALL TALK AND NO ACTION."'- ADDED HE HAD BEEN ADVISED BY THANG THAT MORNING THAT THE LATTER. HAD NOT ATTENDED THAT' MORNING'S COMMITTEE MEETING. IIIIIIISAID HE HAD.: ARRANGED TO SEE THANG LATER IN THE DAY IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE HIS PROBLEMS. 1111111.1VELT THAT ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE - THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AS DEPUTY TO KY, WHO CHAIRS THE COMMITTEE. VIEN COULD THEN ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE MILITARY WHICH, IN LJIEW,_JS THE, ONLY GRUP EQUIPPED TO GET A JOB DONE IN A HURRY. CIVILIANS,NIMIMMISAID, HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING THINGS DONE AT ANY TINE AND ARE HOPELESSLY LOST IN A CRISIS. AS AN ILLUSTRATION, NOTED THAT SINCE XE HAD SUPPLIES OF A NUMBER OF COMMODITIES IN LONG AND HE HAD TELEPHONED THE HEAD OF THE GVN SUPPLY DIRECTORATE AND OFFERED TO MAKE THESE SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE PEOPLE. IN 'REPLY, THE.DIRECTOR GENERAL HAD GIVEN WTM NUMBEROUS EXCUSES AS TO WHY .HE WAS UNABLE TO PICK UP AND USE THE FOODSTUFFS. 11111110AID.HE HAD 3.403)(1) THEN CALLED THE DIRECTOR OFARVN COMMISSARIES, WHO IMMEDIATELY MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING THE SUPPLIES TO SAIGON. 1. IIIIIIIINDICATED HE:FELT THE ANSWER TO THE PRESENT DILEMMA IS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMNIT THE VICE PRESIDENT TO SERVE CONCUR- RENTLY AS PRIME MINISTER. WHAT. IS NEEDED IS TO CONCENTRATE GOVERNMENT POWERS IN THE HANDS OF ONE MAN WHO CAN GIVE ORDERS AND -CUT THROUGH THE .EXISTING MAZE OF REDTAPE. THUS, REMOVAL OF LOC WOULD NOT BE SUFF- ICIENT IN ITSELF. SINCE THERE WOULD STILL BE DIVIDED AUTHORITY. 13(0 SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY MAN--THANG OR VIEN, 14(b)(1) FOR EXAMPLE--AAS PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE AN ANSWER. THE NEED IS FOR UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP AND, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COULD BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY. VESTING POWERS IN KY. 111111WMPHASIZED HE. DID NOT PLAN TO TAKE STEPS TO BRING ABOUT THIS CHANGE. HE SAID HE KN VIEW AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERALY NGUYEN NGOC LOAN ALSO FAVORED THIS SOLUTION. 12. XPRESSED APPROVAL OF THE ATTITUDE OF THELOWER HOUSE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE VC TET OFFENSIVE, BUTHE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF MANY SENATORS. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY THE SENATE'S PRETENSIONS TO HAVING SUFFICIENT COMPETENCE AND KNOW- LEDGE TO INVESTIGATE THE VC ATTACK AND DETERMINE IF THE ARMED FORCES HAD DONE A GOOD JOB IN DEFENDING THE PEOPLE. HIS .SUBORDINATE 1-5(ci 34(b1111}- � OFFICERS, CONTINUED, FEEL THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD THEM AN UNQUALIFIED EXPRESSION OF THANKS. .INSTEAD, THE SENATE APPEARS,' TO BE SAYING THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAVE ITS THANKS AS LONGAS....T_HE..frl''Ir. -FIGHTING CONTINUES BUT THAT AS SOON AS THE:CRISIS-SUBSIDESITA;ILL444C _CHARGE INCOMPETENCE ON7THE.PART_OF MANY,ARCED.,FORCESLEADERa4KHANGY SINGLED OUT SENATORS.TRAN.VAN-DONiTON-JHATDINH.44.ANDTRAN?:NGOOvNHUA : FOR PARTICULAR CRITICISM,: ADDEDTHATLTHILEr.�HEIHIMSLF,4ES,::SUR7 PRISED BY THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO:LAUNCH-SUCH-WIDESPRffADC00-RDINATED: ATTACKS, .IT WAS NOT,TRUE-THAT:THE,ATTACKON,SAIGONWASSURPRISE:.i' IT HAD BEEN KNOWN THAT SUCH AN ATTACK.WAB-POSSIBLEANDNUMBER.OF,gt,, -.STEPS TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY'S ACCESS TO SAIGON HAD BEEN TAKEN SEVERAL. ,DAYS BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN. . . 13. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR,:' POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GNERAL WESTMORELAND, GNERAL ABRAMS, _- AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIRFORCE (GENERAL MOMYER) DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC FACAF 900 111111111-- � -11-.1:'1 � . .. " ' Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO0193292 1.5e). 3.4(b)(1)

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III CORPS (DELETED) ANALYSIS OF GOALS OF VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE ATTACKS