WAR REPORT, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WITH ATTACHED COVER MEMOS SIGNED BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN AND SERGE PETER KARLOW (VOLUME 1)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00168776
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 267
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-02220
• Publication Date: September 5, 1947

Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
WAR REPORT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(OSS)
kSF:r
SANT T I 71-ZD COPY
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
OCT. 1996 .
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
SANITIZED COPY
Content UNCLASSIFIED
per 006687
date 26 June 1975
1
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776 _
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
PUNT= SY
II.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE SERVICE OFFICE
JULY 1949
�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
I feel that this War Report presents a well-rounded
study of tho first comprehensive organisation for intelligence
and unorthedox warfare in the history of the United States. I.
only regret that limitations of time prevented a fuller recording
of OSS operations and experience.
The importance of OSS lies not only in its role in
hastening military victory, but also in the development of the
concept of unorthodox warfare which alone constitutes a major
contribution,
� Of even farther reaching importance are the lessons
learned and the contributions made to the future of American
defense and foreign policy.
The experience of OSS showed above all how essential
it is for winning the war and keeping the peace to base. national
policy upon accurate and complete intelligence. Unorthodox war.
fare is now recognised as a vital part of our defense system.
WILLIAM j. DONOVAN'
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 000168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF VAR
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
25114 & E STREETS, N.W.
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
5 September 1947.
SUBJECT: War Report, Office of Strategic Services.
TO: Director, SSU.
The project to prepare a War Report of the activities of the Office of Strategic
Services was assigned to me by SSU Special Order 57. Following Admiral Leahy's
memorandum of 26 July 1946, the staff for the History Project was assembled and work
begun. Mr. Kermit Roosevelt was engaged as chief historian and directed the organiza-
tion and preparation of the Report. After his departure on 1 May 1947 the final phases
of editing and preparation were completed by the staff of the History Project.
The security classification of the Report is subject to determination by Joint Se-
curity Control. A glossary of certain terms and abbreviations used in the Report has
been included in Volume I.
The bulk of the source material for the Report has been assembled in the files of the
History Project and integrated into the OSS Archives, which, after 1 July 1947, were
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Group.
(Signed) Serge Peter Karlow,
(Typed) SERGE PETER KARLOW,
Executive Officer for History Project.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
1
...... ,
� TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 1
SECTION" I .
.. �
..
.. � THE COORDINATOR � OF INFORMATION�COI
��7
....
�. (11 July 1941-13 June 1942) -
�"-7
� . . .
Page
PREFACE � � � � � � � � . . . ... ....... . � .
.
1
INTRODUCTION .., ..... . . . .. .. . .� . , . . . ... . ..
.. . '�.
. 5
A. GENERAL SURVEY . . .
9
11 July .1941 ;- 31 January 1942 . . . .
9
� 1 February �13 June 1942. . . �
18
B. BRANCHES . . . . . .. . .. . ... . ...... . . � . . .
29
.
- 1. The Coordinator's Office . . .
�
29
� Personal Office
29
Executive Officer �
29
. .
Liaison Office
30
General Counsel . . �
30
Special Assistants .
30
.
Special Undertakings
30
2. Information Service�FIS
31
.Foreign
(a) Policy and Planning
33
(b) Radio News and Features Division and Radio Production Division .
36
(c) Radio Technical Division
40
(d) Pictures and Publications Division -
43
(e) Outposts Division
46
3. Research and Analysis, and Related Branches
48
(a) Research and Analysis�R&A
48
(1) Branch Chief and Board of Analysts
50
(2) Division of Special Information�DSI
52
(3) Functional Divisions �
56
. Economics Division
56
� Geographic Division
58
(i) Cartographic Section
58
(ii) Map Information Service
59
� (iii) Geographic Reports Section
59
Psychology Division
59
� (4) Central Information Divitun�CID
60
(5) The Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign
Publications--IDC
60
Intelligence�OI
61
(b) Oral.
(c) Foreign Nationalities--FN
63
. . Director's Office
65
-Ter
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
� '. 5. Services -. �� ��
Page
Field Study Division . . . . . . ...... . . . . 65
Chancery Division . . . . ....... . . 66
(d) Visual Presentation�VP . . . . . ..... . . . . 67
(e) Pictorial Records . . . . . ............ 68
(f) Field Photographic Division- � - - 69
4. Special Activities 70
(a) Secret Intelligence�SA/B . . ....... . . . . 74
(1) Geographic Desks , . . . ..... . . . . 75
(2) Training ... ; � . . ' . . . . . ..... 76
� �
(3) Reporting Board . � . . .,. . . . . 77
(4) New York Office 77
(5) Executive Office 78
.(b) Special Operations�SA/G � . � � . � . � . � .� � � � � � � 80

� � Training- � . . � � � � �� �� ^ . . .
. . . 0 80
� � � � � � � � � ..... � - � 82
� � Supply .11, .0 .0 .0 .41 .0 ��� .0 .411. . . ....
.(c) Special (Unvouchered). Funds . . � . . � � .- � ....... 84
�� �� - � � � .. � ........ � ... 85
� . � .
-
'�
Personnel - . -. � . � . � . � � . -. � � - . . . ..... . . , 87
� -Security �� - .. �� -. � . -. ��� �� � . � .. � ..... _ . � � . . . 87
-Transportation � . � . �� �� . � ...... .. . ... 89
. Reproduction-. � . �. -. ��� -. -.. �� -. -. � . � . � . � . .� .... - ... 89
: Communications � . � . -. -. �� � . � ......... 90
Couriers -. �� -. �� �� .. .. � . -. � . � .. � .... �� ... , 91
Budget and Procedures 91
C. NORTH .AFRICA �� -. �� -� �� -� -, -. � ........... 93
SECTION H
"- ...... . . . . . . . . .
THE OFFICE � OF STRATEGIC SERVICES�OSS
' (13 June 1942-1 October 1945)
A. GENERAL .SURVEY 97
13 June �23 Deceinber 1942 97
23 December 1942-27 October 1943 105
27 October 1943,27 September 1944 111
27 .September. 1944-15 August 1945 115
15 August 1945 � 1 October 1945 116
7 B. BRANCHES 121
' 1. Central Administrative Units and Technical Branches 124
(a) Central Administration 124
Director's Office 124
. . Assistant.Directors 124
. . Special Assistants and Representatives . . . � 0, 124
, . Executive Officer 127
. . Secretariat 127
--Fetp�Seccei.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
"lop-Seem&
Page
Registry.. . - . 127
Theater Officers . . . . . . .. � ; 127
General ConnsPl. � .* . . . . . 128
Inspector.. . . . .... ..... 128
. . Special Relations Office 129
. Board of _Review � 130
� - Operations and Plans Officer ... . . . . . . � .. . 130
� (b) Planning Group . . .. ; � .. . . ... 130
. (c) Personnel .. . . . . .. ' 132
.(d) Security .. . . . . 134
.(e) Technical Branches . . . . . � ..... . ^ . . . 135
. . (1) Communications .. . . . . 135
. Recruiting and Training .. . . .... . . . . . 136
Research and Development Division and Plant and Engineering
. . Division . . . . ......... . 137
. Supply, Shipping and Warehousing Division .. .. ... . 140
� Message Center.. . . . . . - . . . 141
. Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
. . Miscellaneous Projects .. . ..... . . . . . 142
(2). Special Funds .. . . . . .. ... . 143
Appropriations . . . . . . . . . ..� 144
. Organization . . . . .. . . . � . . . 145
. Domestic .. . ; . .... . ; ..... � ." . 145
� . Field Offices . . . . � - .� ; . . . . . . 146
Foreign Exchange Division . . . . . . ... . . . . 147
. Financial Intelligence . . . . . ....... . 148
Unorthodox Methods of Acquisition 150
Marked Currency . . . .... . ..... . . . 151
Agent Expenditures 152
� Financing of Resistance . . .�. .� . � . . . . 153
External Relations . . . . � . ... . . .. .. . . . 153
(3) Research and Development--R&D - 155
. Special -Devices, Weapons and Equipment . . . . . 156
Agent Authentication .. . .... ... .. - . . ' 158
(4) Medical Services . �. . . . . . . . . . ; . . 159
(5) Field Photographic . . . . . . ; ; 161
(6) .Presentation 163
2. Deputy Director�Intelligence Service ; . . . . ; . � 164
(a) Research and Analysis--R&A . ... ; . . . . . . . 165
(1) Reorganization, January 1943 . . �. ; . .... . 167
. . (2) Branch. Administration . . . . - - - - - � - - - 168
. _Supporting Divisions and Outposts . . . . . 169
Central Information . . . . � . 169
- Map Division 169
Inter-Departmental Comniittee � for the Acquisition of Foreign
� Publieations--IDC .� �. . . . . ; ; ; _� 170
. Otitposts . *. . . . ; � . .� � .. " 170
-Top-Seepit-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 000168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Page
Field Field Offices.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
(4) Regional Divisions . . . . . .... . . . . 171
Projects Committee . . . . . . . . " . . . . . 171
Regional . Divisions (Europe-Africa, Far East, USSR,. -Latin
America) . . ..... . ... . . . . . . . . 172
Current Intelligence Staff 172
(5) Source Materials 173
Government or Official Sources . . . . . ..... . . ". � 173
Overt Research Sources . . . . . .... 174
(6) Types of Studies . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Comprehensive Regional Studies and Appraisals 175
Specialized Studies 176
Studies for Foreign Policy 178
(b) Secret Intelligence�SI 179
Geographic Desks 180
� Reporting Board 182
Labor Section.. . . . . � . � � . 183
Technical Section 187
(c) Counter-Espionage�X-2 188
Organization 191
Registry 192
Personnel Procurement and Training 194
Inter-Branch Relations ..... � � � � 194
Liaison With Other Agencies 195
Special Units 195
OSS Field Security 196
--Field Operations 196
(d) Foreign Nationalities�FN 198
(e) CD�Censorship and Documents 202
Radio Intelligence Division 203
Censorship Division 204
Document Intelligence Division 204
3. Deputy Director�Psychological Warfare Operations (Strategic Services
Operations) 205
(a) Special Operations�SO 206
Organization 208
Recruiting 208
Supply and 'Training 211
(b) Morale Operations Branch�MO -211
Washington Organization 214
ETO/Med'TO ' 217
Pacific and Far East 219
Closing Months 222
(c) Operational Groups�OG 223
(d) Maritime Unit�MU 225
(e) Special Projects Office 228
(f) Field Experimental Unit . . . 230
4-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ltrItstref
Page
4. Schools and Training--S&T
231
Training
233
Assessment
238
Training Areas
241
Overseas Training
242
5. Services
243
Reproduction
245
Budget and Procedures
246
Procurement and Supply
247
6. New York and West Coast Offices
247
(a) New York Office
247
SI�
248
R&A�
250
X-2
250
FN
250
SO
251
MO
251
(b) West Coast
251
Administration
251
Training
251
Intelligence and Research
252
Specialized Activities
252
Liquidation
253
OBSERVATIONS
255
CHARTS --
Organization of OSS, 17 October 1942
122
Organization of OSS, 2 January 1943
123
Organization of OSS, 26 May 1944
125
Organization of OSS, 26 December 1944
126
Dissemination of OSS Intelligence in Washington, 12 months ending 1 April 1945.
166
WASHINGTON
EXHIBITS
"Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information",
Exhibit No.
Page
10 June 1941, prepared for the President by Donovan
W - 1
259
Proposed "Military Order Designating a Coordinator of Strategic
Information", 25 June 1941
W- 2
261
Order, 11 July 1941, "Designating a Coordinator of Information" . .
W - 3
262
Letter, 24 October 1941, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
Churchill �
W- 4
263
Memorandum No. 123, 3 January 1942, Donovan to the President . .
W - 5
264
Memorandum No. 205, 2 February 1942, Donovan to the President .
W - 6-
265
Memorandum No. 306,4 March 1942, Donovan to the President . .
W- 7
266
�
p�Seere�
I. �t
1
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�-fop-Sespat-
tehibit No. Page
Memorandum, 7 March 1942, Director of the Budget to the President . W- 8 268
Memorandum No. 483, 9 May 1942, Donovan to the President . . . W - 9 271
Memorandum No. 360,30 March 1942, Donovan to the President . . W- 10 274
Letter, 14 April 1942, Donovan to the President � W- 11 275
Memorandum, 16 May 1942, Donovan to the President W -12 277
Consolidating Executive Order, 13 June 1942, establishing OWI . W -13 279
Military Order, 13 June -1942, establishing OSS W -14 282
Organization chart of COI, 10 October 1941 W -15 283
COI Administrative Order No. 4, 12 November 1941 W- 16 284
Letter agreement, 30 July 1941, between the Librarian of Congress and
the Coordinator of Information W - 17 286
Extract from Memorandum, 17 September 1943, Donovan to Major
General W. B. Smith W -18 289
Memorandum, 5 September 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles to
the Coordinator of Information; enclosing Memorandum, 5 Sep-
tember 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles to the Chief of Staff . W -19 291
Memorandum, 10 October 1941, Donovan to the President . . . . W -20 293
Memorandum No. 94,22 December 1941, Donovan to the President . . W -21 294
Memorandum, undated, Donovan to Wallace B. Phillips W- 22 295
Report, 17 August 1942, OSS to JCS, describing organization and func-
tions of OSS W - 23 296
JCS 68, 21 June 1942, "Reorganization of Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee"
JCS 67/3,8 August 1942, "Operation of the Office of Strategic Services" -
JPWC 37/2/D, 12 October 1942, "Militarization of the Office of Strategic
Services"
JPWC 45/D, 24 October 1942, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
JPWC 45/1, 2 November 1942, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
JPWC 50,31 October 1942, "Proposed New Directives of the Joint U. S
Chiefs of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services"
JPWC 45/2, 17 November 1942, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
JIC 59/2, 19 November 1942, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
Memorandum, 20 November:
of Strategic Services"
JCS 155/4/1), 23 December 1942, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services" W -33 379
Letter, 23 December 1942, General George C. Marshall to Donovan . W -34 384
General Order No. 9, 3 January 1943 W -35 385
Executive Order 9312,9 March 1943, "Defining the Foreign Information
Activities of the Office of War Information"
JCS 155/7/1), 4 April 1943, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
.-Top-Seeref--
W - 24 330
W - 25 334
W - 26 337
W - 27 339
W - 28 341
W - 29 356
W-30 367
W-31 $74
942, jIC to JCS, "Functions of the Office
W - 32 377
W - 36 392
W-37 393
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ExitMit No. Page
JCS 170, 18 December 1042, "Office of Strategic Services�Special Op-
erations in Western Mediterranean Area"
W -38
399
JCS 166/3/D, 27 May 1943, "Office of Strategic Services�Special Opera-
tions in the Middle East"
W - 39
408
JCS 155/11/D, 27 October 1943, "Functions of the Office of Strategic
Services"
W -40
413
General Order No. 9, Revised, 26 May 1944
W -41
419
General Order No. 9, Revised, 26 December 1944
W.- 42
429
Memorandum, 18 November 1944, Donovan to the President, enclosing
draft of "Substantive Authority Necessary in Establishment of a
Central Intelligence Service"
W - 43
442
Letter, 25 August 1945, Donovan to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau
of the Budget, enclosing statement of principles which should govern
the establishment of a centralized United States foreign intelligence
W - 44
445
system
Executive Order, 20 September 1945, "Termination of the Office of
Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions"
W -45
448
Letter, 20 September 1945, President Truman to Donovan
W -46
450
Glossary
451
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Preface
This Report of the operations of the Of-
fice of Strategic Services has been prepared
at the request of Admiral 'William D. Leahy
on the behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Leahy's memorandum dated 26
July 1946 observed that there was in exist-
ence "no comprehensive official war record
of the operations of the Office of Strategic
Services in the field of intelligence research
and coordination, clandestine intelligence
procurement, counter-espionage, sabotage,
guerrilla warfare and psychological para-
military operations". During the existence
of OSS preparation of a comprehensive his-
tory had been begun. To complete it upon
the scale at which it started would have
required a large staff and many years, and
the project was discontinued upon the liqui-
dation of OSS in October 1945. According-
ly, it was directed that a small staff be as-
signed in the Strategic Services Unit to pre-
pare an official war record within the space
of approximately six months.
The terms of this assignment automati-
cally placed certain limitations upon the
nature of the Report. It could not be a de-
tailed account of every project undertaken,
every operation mounted or every adminis-
trative change made by OSS. Rather, it
must present a selection of typical or espe-
cially significant operations and activities
through which might be given an accurate
general picture of the work of the organi-
zation.
In making such a selection there was
danger that, by inclusion of a high percent-
age of spectacularly successful operations
and the neglect of many less interesting or
less successful operations, a false picture
would be given. We have sought to avoid
this danger as far as possible by a critical
commentary which places the operations
described in the context of the whole, and
by the selection of a certain number of op-
erations which indicate the failures made
by OSS.
Selection, then, was governed by two prin-
ciples: (1) that continuing security inter-
ests be not endangered, and (2) that the
incident be sufficiently important in itself
or as an illustration of the nature of OBS
activities to warrant its inclusion.
The Director of OSS and certain individ-
uals who played an important personal
role in the establishment of the Office of
the Coordinator of Information (the pred-
ecessor of OSS), are .mentioned by name
In the first part of the Washington section.
Otherwise, names have not been used in
this Report. It is recognized that the in-
clusion of names would have added a cer-
tain interest to the text. Other consider-
ations were felt to outweigh this advan-
tage. First was the matter of length; it
would have been difficult to draw the line
at which anonymity should prevail. Time
and space would have been occupied which,
In view of the limitations upon both, did
not seem justified in an official classified re-
port. There were also problems of security
to be considered. Finally, it was felt that
objectivity in tone would be better attained
by the elimination of personalities wher-
ever possible.
This Report recounts the genesis and de-
velopment of a new organization perform-
ing functions which were in many cases
foreign to American thought and experi-
ence, even to American instinct. The purr
pose of COI-OSS as originally conceived
was to conduct propaganda, collect and
analyze intelligence, and, in the event of
war, wage unorthodox warfare in support
of the armed forces. Such unorthodox
warfare would include not only propaganda
and intelligence but also sabotage, morale
Wt-mcalscatme926dagawmsamlA
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
AMIIMMOINI0111g.rr4iNtiu.--.7,7grS-eraLLM
-rop-Sesfet-
and physical subversion, guerrilla activities
and development and support of under-
ground and resistance groups.
War came five months after the new or-
ganization had been established. This nat-
urally produced a change of emphasis re-
sulting from the urgency of military needs.
The necessarily slow development of deep
cover penetration which characterizes clas-
sic peacetime intelligence methods had to
yield to rapid procurement of intelligence
of immediate use to the armed forces. In-
filtration of the enemy homeland by indi-
vidual saboteurs which might never suc-
ceed (particularly in view of the haste in
which they would have had to be planned)
was obviously less important to theater
commanders than support of resistance
groups already operating in areas where
the Allies were soon to land.
The coming of war also impressed upon
responsible officials the need for a counter-
espionage service to perform a task the na-
ture and scope of which were new to Amer-
ican history.
Propaganda, too, is subject to different
urgencies once war has begun. Propagan-
-da of ideas, in which truth should be the
weapon and conversion the objective, must
make room for "black" propaganda which,
through judicious mixture of rumor and
deception with truth as a bait, fosters dis-
unity and confusion to support military op-
erations. Half a year after Pearl Harbor
the original propaganda function of COI
was removed; the adjustment of the early
concept of the COI-OSS task to this change
was a difficult one.
Even apart from its field operations, WS
was a peculiarly complex and many-sided
organization. The modifications and adap-
tations which were necessary to meet the
varying circumstances of war�both in the-
aters of operation and at the political cen-
ter where strategy was decided�complicate
the problem of simplified exposition.
-Zoptreavet-
This Report is presented in three sec-
tions: Washington, Europe-Africa-Middle
East, and Far East.
The Washington section takes up first,
as a separate unit, the account of COI as
an executive agency, and of the events lead-
ing to its dissolution. Thereafter, the es-
tabashment of OSS and its development
under the JCS is described. The conflict
and complications which attended the defi-
nition of its functions and the general ac-
ceptance of its status form the main topic
of this section. The process of definition
was affected by both external and internal
factors, resulting in the establishment of
functional branches and the welding of
these branches into an effective whole.
Once the Washington organization had
become established and accepted, its role
was largely that of servicing its overseas
bases and its Washington "customers".
These apparently separate tasks were ac-
tually closely related. OSS could not serv-
ice such authorities as the White House,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, War and
Navy Departments, unless its outposts had
strong support from the highest U.S. au-
thorities in the field�theater commands
or embassies. Such support in turn de-
pended to a great extent upon recognition
In Washington of the value of OSS services.
The Europe-Africa-Middle East section
describes large-scale direct intelligence and
special operations from major bases in the
military theaters, and indirect penetration
from smaller bases in neutral countries.
The bulk of OSS field personnel in the
Europe-Africa Theaters was employed in
RA.Risting or working with native resistance
groups either on intelligence procurement,
sabotage or supply.
The most extensive intelligence networks
were set up in France and Italy. Partisan
forces in both countries, supplied in large
measure by OBS, and assisted by OSS per- �
Bonne', inflicted serious losses upon the
Germans and diverted forces which would
2
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
otherwise have have been used against the Allied
armies. �
The pressing requirements of theater
commands for intelligence from areas of im-
minent military operations and support to
resistance groups in those areas meant
that it was not until the Allies approached
the German borders that direct penetra-
tion of Germany was undertaken by OSS
or British services on any appreciable scale.
The basic reason for the lack of a greater
number of OSS agents operating in Ger-
many, was the refusal of the British to per-
mit American agents in late 1942 and early
1943 to be sent from England to that area.
This is understandable. British intelli-
gence was concerned with the protection of
the home front. It had perfected its coun-
ter-espionage organization so that Nazi
agents had great difficulty in penetrating
Its security. Officials did not wish to risk
the possible infiltration of agents dropped
Into Germany from England, who, through
capture or by initial purpose might dis-
close information to the enemy.
A few OSS representatives in strategic
centers conducted indirect penetrations of
Germany and produced some of the most
valuable intelligence of the war.
In many cases the theoretical conception
of OSS methods of operation was altered
by the exigencies of the situation and the
requirements of military strategy. Other
operations, however, could have served as
models of the original conception. Out-
standing examples of intelligence, sabotage
and guerrilla activities supported the land-
ings in Normandy and Southern France.
The exploitation of source "Wood" by OSS/-
Bern provided a classic example of indirect
penetration of an enemy country�except
that it might be rejected as too good to be
true.
OSS was often assisted in the develop-
ment of its own techniques by experienced
British agencies. This was especially im-
3
portant in the field of counter-espionage,
where OSS was given full information on
British operations, and siso-P-xs to techniques
and records built up through years of ob-
servation and research.
In the Far East Theaters, OSS found it-
self operating in areas where American mil-
itary forces were comparatively smalL
Supply and climate difficulties and the fact
that Occidentals were so rare in the East
made unde.rcover operations by Americans
almost entirely out of the question. The
result was that in those Theaters guerrilla
and para-military operations predominated.
Native forces were recruited, trained and
led, and OSS detachments found themselves
on occasion serving as line units.
In SF-AC, under British Command, there
were initial difficulties in undertaking stra-
tegic intelligence procurement and subver-
sion. On the contrary OSS/China was,
during the last eleven months of the war,
more completely integrated with the Amer-
ican Theater Command than any other
OSS mission had ever been. Consequently,
It was able to supply a majority of the in-
telligence received by U.S. forces in China,
train Chinese guerrilla units, operate intel-
ligence and sabotage teams behind enemy
lines, and conduct black propaganda while
at the same time meeting Washington re-
quirements for strategic information.
� � � �
The written sources, reports and adminis-
trative records upon which this Report has
been based, are assembled for the most part
In the History Project Files which are in
the OSS Archives. Bibliographic notes sup-
porting individual sections of the Report
will be found in the same files. In addition'
to the written records consulted, a number
of former key personnel of OSS were inter-
viewed in an effort to keep to a minimum
errors resulting from time and personnel
limitations. General Donovan was con-
sulted on all Os-v.-% of the preparation of
this Report, and his comments" were of,in-
valuable assistance.
--rofs-Seczat-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Zap-Seeref--
Under my general supervision, responsi-
bility for the organization of the Washing-
ton section was undertaken by Mr. Wayne
Nelson; for the Europe-Africa-Middle East
section by Mr. John C. L. Hulley; and for
the Far East section by Mr. Edmond L.
Taylor. -
Mr. S. Peter Harlow directed the final
phases of the Project. As Executive Officer,
he had assembled the staff and organized
the collection of basic files and source ma-
terials. In addition to preparing certain
drafts for the first two sections, he super-
vised the final editing of the Far East sec-
tion and, throughout, attended to the va-
riety of details necessary to assure adequate
facilities and liaisons for the work of the
Project staff.
Drafts for certain specialized activities
were prepared by several former members
of OSS. In particular, Dr. John Waldron
wrote drafts of the histories of the X-2
Branch in Washington and Europe-Africa-
Middle East. Mr. Samuel Halpern pre-
pared the draft on OSS in China.
Miss Delia T. Pleasa.nts and Migs Mary
Louise Olsson assisted Mr. Nelson on the
Washington section; Miss kiaryette A. Coxe
up
prepared portions of the Washington and
Field sections. In addition, Miss Barbara
Bronson assisted Dr. Waldron on X-2, and
Major Jane M. Tanner, WAC, and Captain
Emily L. Shek, WAC, gave assistance on the
Europe-Africa-Middle East, and the Far
East, sections respectively.
Among the former members of OSS who
served as consultants for varying periods of
time were: Messrs. Walter Lord, Edward J.
Michelson, William A. Underwood, Richard
de Roussy de Sales, Colonel William R.
Peers, and Lt Colonel William C. Wilkin-
son, Sr.
In addition to his work on the Washing-
ton section, Mr. Nelson assumed responsi-
bility for the final checking of editorial de-
tails. He was ASsisted in particular by Miss
Pleasants, Miss Coxe and Miss Mary Louise
Olsson who spent long hours checking and
proof-reading the manuscript. Special
mention should be made of the high caliber
of clerical work and the devotion to duty of
Mrs. Gladys J. Lane and Miss Charlene
Olsson.
KERMIT ROOSEVELT,
Chief, History Project
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Introduction
[ !
The The Office of Coordinator of Information
(COI) was established on 11 July 1941. It
was announced to the public as an agency
for the collection and analysis of informa-
tion and data. Actually, through COI and
Its successor, the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices (OSS), the United States was begin-
ning its first organized venture into the
fields of espionage, propaganda, subversion
and related activities under the aegis of a
centralized intelligence agency.
In themselves, these various functions
were not new. Every war in American his-
tory has produced divers examples of the
use of spies, saboteurs and propagandists.
Every major power, except the United
States, has used espionage, for example, in
peace as well as in war, for centuries. The
significance of COI/OSS was in the concept
of the relationship between these varied ac-
tivities and their combined effect as one of
the most potent weapons in modern war-
This concept evolved from two missions
performed for President Roosevelt in 1940
and 1941 by the man who guided COI/OSS
throughout its existence�William Joseph
Donovan.
In July 1940 Secretary of the Navy Knox
proposed to the President and the Secretary
of State that someone be sent to England
to study the situation, with particular ref-
erence to the work of the German fifth col-
umn in Europe. He further suggested
his friend, Donovan, as the man for this
job. Since Donovan was then in Washing-
ton, appearing before the Military Affairs
Committee of the Senate on behalf of the
Selective Service Bill, he was immediately
called to the White House where he con-
ferred with the President and the Secre-
taries of State, War and Navy. He was
asked if he would go to England to study
5
the methods and effects of Germany's fifth
column activities in Europe. In addition,
the President wished him to observe how
the British were standing up at a time when
their fortunes were at their lowest ebb and
they faced Germany alone. Donovan agreed
to undertake the mission, and other depart-
ments of the Government asked him to ob-
tain specific information on various other
subjects. �
In his varied career Donovan bad been
uniformly successful as college athlete, law-
yer and public official. As a soldier, he had
established one of the most distinguished
records of World War L He had observed
the beginnings of Fascist aggression in
Ethiopia in 1935 and the Axis tezting
ground of Spain in 1936. His wide range of
knowledge and experience eminently fitted
him for the broad mission of inquiry and
appraisal which the President desired. .
Donovan departed for England in mid-
July 1940. Though he was there for only
a few weeks, the relationships which he es-
tablished with British leaders were to be of
great significance to the future agency.
There he became convinced that the British
would hold out; that America must help,
at least in the matter of supplies; and that
fifth column activity had become a factor
of major importance in modern warfare.
These convictions served to strengthen
British confidence in him, and he was ini-
tiated into the mysteries of the British or-
ganizations which dealt with secret intelli-
gence and the various elements of unortho-
dox warfare.
He returned to America on 4 August 1940
and immediately 'reported to his friend,
Secretary Knox. A few days later he re-
ported to the President. Thereafter, thse
British sent to America in response to Don-
oven's requests a series of reports on vari-
�
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
. ,ftritrSecref�
ous phases of British experience in the new
war. �
The results of his investigations on the
subject of fifth column activities were
turned over to Edgar A. Mowrer, veteran
Chicago Daily News correspondent, who
wrote a series of articles on the subject
which appeared under the joint signatures
of Donovan and Mower. Secretary Knox
wrote an introduction for these articles and
they were disseminated throughout the
world by the three leading American news
agencies and widely distributed in pamphlet
form. It was at the instance of the Presi-
dent that Donovan's name was associated
with these articles.
In November 1940, President Roosevelt
called Donovan to Washington once more,
and asked him if he would undertake a mis-
sion to make a strategic appreciation from
an economic, political and military stand-
point of the Mediterranean area. He ac-
cepted with alacrity, for one of the concrete
Ideas which had developed in his mind was
the importance of the Mediterranean in
World War II.* In August 1940 he had
stressed particularly the necessity of some
kind of agreement with the French in order
to secure American interests in Northwest
Africa. In discussing the mission, the Pres-
ident suggested that Donovan find occasion
en route to see General Weygand and to dis-
cuss the question. However, Donovan pro-
posed that it would be better for him to pro-
ceed to southeastern Europe and the East-
ern Mediterranean first; he felt that he
*Donovan felt that many people were prone
to think of the Mediterranean as an East-West
channel for shipping. Be believed it should be
thought of primarily as a no-man's-land between
Europe and Africa, two great forces, or potential
forces, facing each other from the North. and
South. Germany controlled, either directly or
Indirectly, most of the northern "battle line" of
this front on the Continent of Europe. It was
Imperative in Donovan's view for the British�
or the British and the Americans�to control the
southern front along the Mediterranean 'shore
of Africa. -
iep
6
would be in a better position to confer with
Weygand after such an opportunity to
study the situation. He therefore suggested
that Mr. Robert D. Murphy initiate the dis-
cussions.' -
Donovan departed on 6 December 1940
for England. During the succeeding three
and a half months, he visited Gibraltar.
Malta, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Iraq, Spain and
Portugal. On 18 March 1941, he returned
to the United States. On the following day,
again accompanied by Secretary Knox, he
made the first of a series of calls at the
White House to report to the President.
He stressed three major points: First, the
gravity of the shipping problem; second,
the dangers and opportunities which the.
situation in French Northwest Africa rep-
resented for the United States; and third,
the extraordinary importance of psycholog-
ical and political elements in the war and
the necessity of making the most of these.
elements in planning and executing nation-
al policies. -
Both on thii mission and his earlier mis-
sion in 1940, Donovan had studied the man-
ner in which the Germans were exploiting.
the psychological and political elements.
They were making the fullest use of threats
and promises, of subversion and sabotage,
and of special intelligence. They sowed dis-
sension, confusion and despair among.their:
victims and aggravated any lack of -faith -
and hope. �
Yet, Donovan reported, neither America
nor Britain was lighting this new and im-
portant type of war on more than the small-
est scale. Their defenses against political
and psychological warfare were feeble, and
even such gestures as were made toward
carrying the fight to the enemy were piti-
fully inadequate. Preparation, in the field
� As a result of Donovan's attempts to stiffen
resistance in the Balkans, the French, under Ger-
man pressure, refused to permit himi to - enter
French territory and he was therefore unable to�
see General WeYSand,_ � -.-1 ' - � � '
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top�Seerel�
of irregular and unorthodox warfare was
as important as orthodox military prepared-
ness�Donovan urged upon the President
the necessity for action.
There was another situation which had
Impressed itself upon Donovan. On each
of his two missions he had been asked on
all sides to secure information. Informa-
tion was pouring into Washington from
many sources in that critical period. But
It was fragmentary, and it was not humanly
prke-sible for the men who were responsible
for formulating policy to assimilate the
growing mass of materiaL In London he
had found that there existed a central com-
mittee where much information was ana-
lyzed and available. However, the proce-
dure was cumbersome and ineffective, and
there was no central depot where all the
information on a given subject was col-
lected, analyzed and available in digestible
form.
The greatest victim of the situation in
Washington was the President himself. In
the summer of 1941 he appointed a com-
mittee of Cabinet members, consisting of
Stimson, Knox and Jackson, to consider the
Intelligence problem generally and recom-
mend a plan of action. The committee con-
sulted with Donovan and he expounded to
It his concept of an over-all intelligence
agency with propaganda and subversive at-
tributes. The committee's report to the
President recommended the establishment
of such an organization.
In early June, therefore, the President
asked Donovan to make specific proposals
for the implementation of his ideas for psy-
chological warfare and the development of
an intelligence program. Donovan pre-
pared and submitted to the White House
on 10 June 1941 a paper (rThibit W-1) en-
titled "Memorandum of Establishment of
Service of Strategic Information".
In this memorandum Donovan set forth
the relation of information to strategic
planning in total warfare. He pointed out
the inadequacy of the intelligence set-up
7
then existing and stated: "It is essential
that we set up a central enemy intelligence
organization which would itself collect
either directly or through existing depart-
ments of the government, at home and
abroad, pertinent information." Such in-
formation and data should be analyzed and
Interpreted by applying to it the experience
of "specialized trained research officials in
the relative scientific fields (including tech-
nological, economic, financial and psycho-
logical scholars)."
"But there is another element in mod-
em warfare," he continued, "and that is
the psychological attack against the moral
and spiritual defenses of a nation. In this
attack the most powerful weapon is radio."
In this type of warfare, "perfection can be
realized only by planning, and planning is
dependent upon accurate information."
The elements of physical subversion
which had been included in the recommen-
dations to the Cabinet committee, were not
specifically set forth.
The President accepted these proposals
as a basis for action and directed that an
appropriate order be drafted. The order,
however, was not to be specific as to the
functions proposed for the new agency;
both the President and Donovan agreed
that, in the delicate situation then existing,
It would be preferable to have no precise
definition appear. On 25 June 1941 an or-
der was drafted (Exhibit W-2) which would
establish the agency as the Office of Coor-
dinator of Strategic Information. This or-
der was designed to be issued by the Pres-
ident in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces and its entire tone
was military in nature.
The 25 June draft was circulated among
State, War and Navy Departments at Don-
ovan's request. It met particularly vigor-
ous opposition from the Army and Navy
on the ground that the new agency might
usurp some of their functions. Therefore
It was decided to establish COI as a part
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
of the Executive Office of the President.*
The new order (Exhibit W13) was not des-
ignated as either a military or an executive
order; it referred to Roosevelt's position as
President, as well as Commander-in-Chief,
and expressly reserved the duties of his mil-
itary and naval advisers. It deleted the
previous reference to the Army in appoint-
ing Donovan as Coordinator.
Aside from the general authorization to
collect and analyze Information and data,
the order of 11 July 1941 merely stated that
the Coordinator should "carry out, when re-
quested by the President, such supplemen-
tary activities as may facilitate the securing
of information."
Donovan asked for three guarantees:
That he should report directly to the Pres-
ident; 'that the President's secret funds
would be made available for some of the
work of COI; and that all departments of
the Government be instructed to give him
such materials as he might need. To all
of these conditions the President agreed.
The order of 11 July read as follows:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States and as Command-
er in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, It is ordered as follows:
� A contributing factor to this decision was
the necessity of securing supplies, office equip-
ment, etc. As part of the Executive Office, the
new agency could call upon the facilities of such
agencies as the Office for Emergency Manage-
ment (OEM).
8
1. There is hereby established the position of
Coordinator of Information, with authority to
collect and analyze all information and data,
which may bear upon national security; to cor-
relate such information and data, and to make
such information and data available to the Pres-
ident and to such departments and officials of
the Government as the President may determine;
and to carry out, when requested by the Presi-
dent, such supplementary activities as may fa-
cilitate the securing of information important for
national security not now available to the Gov-
ernment.
2. The several departments and agencies of the
government shall make available to the Coordi-
nator of Information all and any such informa-
tion and data relating to national security as the
Coordinator, with the approval of the President,
may from time to time request.
S. The Coordinator of Information may ap-
point such committees, consisting of appropriate
representatives of the various departments and
agencies of the Government, as he may deem
necessary to assist him in the performance of
his functions.
4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities
of the Coordinator of Information shall in any
way interfere with or impair the duties and re-
sponsibilities of the regular military and naval
advisers of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy.
5. Within the limits of such funds as may be
allocated to the Coordinator of Information by
the President, the Coordinator may employ nec-
essary personnel and make provision for the nec-
essary supplies, facilities, and services.
6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as
Coordinator of Information.
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Tiss Wimrs Roust,
11 July 1941.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop-Secret
Section 1
THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION - COI
(11 July 1941 - 13 June 1942 )
A. GENERAL SURVEY
11 July 1941 -31 January 1942
The order of 11 July was not a definitive
charter for COI. Both Donovan and the
President had agreed that it was "advisable
to have no directive in writing" for specific
functions.* Words like "military", "stra-
tegic", "intelligence", "enemy", "warfare",
"psychological", "attack", etc., which had
figured basically in Donovan's memoran-
dum of 10 June, were carefully avoided both
In the order and in the White House an-
nouncement which accompanied it.
On 11 July, therefore, Donovan received
executive authorization to proceed with the
Implementation of his ideas, subject to the
approval of the President and the exigencies
of the general situation.
In the month which intervened between
the decision to establish COI in some form
and the issuance of the final order, Donovan
had already taken steps toward two specific
and two general problems. The specifiu
problems were the creation of a propaganda
service and a service to collect and analyze
intelligence. The general problems which
he had approached were those of organiza-
tion and arlminfstmlion.
In June Donovan had discussed the propa-
ganda question with Robert E. Sherwood,**
noted playwright, who had assisted the
� see p. 30 below.
" As stated in the Preface, it is necessary to
mention certain personnel by name only in the
COI period to clarify certain aspects of the for-
mation and early development of the agency.
9
President in preparing his speeches in the
election campaign of 1940 and had inde-
pendent entree to the White House. Sher-
wood had been associated with Donovan on
the Fight for Freedom Committee and was
attracted by his realistic appreciation of the
world situation and the steps he proposed
taking He immediately agreed to take on
the job of organizing and directing COI
propaganda functions and, when the 11
July order was issued, had been engaged
for a month in considering personnel and
plans.
The problem of collection and analysis of
Information and data was one which could
best utilize the talents of experienced
scholars. In June Donovan had discussed
with Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Con-
gress, the cooperation which might be ex-
tended by the Library in setting up a re-
search section. On 29 June MacLeish had
advised him that the Library stood ready
to render every possible P-ssfstance when
called upon.
In June also, Donovan had secured the
services of Elmo Roper, widely known for
his public opinion surveys, but perhaps
better known in the business world as an
expert on problems of organization and
management. Donovan wanted him to ad-
vise with the chiefs of various branches and
divisions which would be set up in estab-
lishing their various organizations, begin-
ning with the propaganda branch. There-
after he would return to the first branch anti
--Ter-Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
successively to the others to check up on
the manner in which they were function-
ing. Thus Donovan early sought to assure
organizational efficiency.
A third recruit who agreed to come in on
23 June was Thomas G. Early, Secretary of
the Civil Aeronautics Board. His experience
Indicated familiarity with government pro-
cedures a n d Washington personalities
which would be valuable to a new agency
seeking to find its way in the mushrooming
growth of Washington in 1941. As Execu-
tive Officer of COI (following 11 July), Early
was responsible for the administrative func-
tions of the new agency.
The first problem of policy was the de-
limitation of functions between COI and
other agencies. With only the research and
analysis function specifically set forth in
the authorizing order, additional activities
had to be separately defined by the President.
Only the few who had been initiated in
Donovan's ideas and concepts and his con-
ferences with the President and the Cabinet
committee realized the import of the phrase
"and to carry out, when requested by the
President, (such) supplementary activities."
In the realm of propaganda this was ac-
complished by letter of 14 July,* wherein
the President set forth the relative respon-
sibilities of the Office of Civilian Defense
(OCD) and COI:
Under this plan, you (F. H. La Guardia, head of
OCD) will be responsible for developing and exe-
cuting the programs necessary to sustain the
morale of our people within the national bound-
aries. Colonel Donovan will assume responsi-
bility in respect to international broadcasts re-
lating to the achievement of morale objectives
abroad.
Thus in the summer of 1941 it was de-
cided by the President that domestic and
foreign propaganda should be separate. In
view of subsequent debate on this question,
note should be taken of the different con-
cepts of the course American propaganda
should follow which perplexed the Foreign
� See History File W-7. p. 33.
10
Information Service (FIS) of COI from its
inception. "Propaganda" and "psychologi-
cal warfare" were confused in the minds of
many; the question of the definition of
"psychological warfare" became a subject
of much argument even after the organi-
zation of OSS. A contributing element to
the confusion in the use of these two terms
was the British phra.se "political warfare"
by which was meant both open, or "white",
propaganda and subversive, or "black",
propaganda.
Many people believed that American
propaganda should not be exploited at all
for subversive purposes, and conceived of it
purely as a weapon of truth in spreading
the American doctrine. Sherwood, while he
thought of propaganda primarily as a posi-
tive factor and a weapon of conversion, ac-
knowledged the desirability of also using
"black" propaganda. However, he was con-
cerned about the possibility of military
domination of propaganda and believed that
control must remain in executive or civilian
hands.
Donovan always contended that propa-
ganda was really a part of "psychological
warfare", which he believed consisted of all
means, physical as well as moral, which
could be used to break the will of the enemy
to resist. On the one hand, he saw it as
conditioning the minds of the people as a
whole; on the other, he conceived of it as a
strategic weapon for the exploitation of par-
ticular objectives, whether political or mili-
tary. He felt that in the event of the out-
break of war the military must have the
power to coordinate the propaganda re-
sources of the nation, both "black" and
"white," with military strategy. �
This difference did not become immedi-
ately apparent in the period before Pearl
Harbor. With the United States at peace,
there was no occasion to use propaganda as
a weapon of exploitation in support of mili-
tary strategy. Even in the period immedi-
ately following 7 December, the full mean-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-7- op-Secret-
in of "psychological warfare" was being de-
fined in terms of action rather than theory.
Because of the proximity to radio and
news facilities, Sherwood decieed to base
the operation 9f FIS in New York. Staffed
with a group of expert journalists and ra-
diomen, FIS moved into space at 270 Madi-
son Avenue on 1 August. A Washington
office was established shortly thereafter.
The branch to deal with the collection
and interpretation of information and data
was designated Research and Analysis
(R&A). Within COI a board of Analysts
was established as the policy body of R&A,
and, by agreement between Donovan and
MacLeish, a research group called the Di-
vision of Special Information (DSI) was set
up within the Library of Congress. DSI
was financed by COI and its activities were
subject to direction and approval by the
Board of Analysts on which military and
naval experience would be represented. It
was, however, administratively responsible
to the Library. To perform its research
functions, DSI was organized in regional
desks staffed by area specialists drawn prin-
cipally from the fields of history and po-
litical science.
Dr. James Phinney Baxter Di, himself a
well-known historian and President of Wil-
liams College, was appointed Chief of R&A
on 31 July. Within a few months the key
personnel of R&A formed an impressive ag-
gregation of experienced scholars: men of
outstanding ability in the fields of history,
political science, psychology, cartography,
economics and sociology, among others,
commanding some forty languages and dia-
lects, had been drawn from niore than
thirty-five universities. By 27 August R&A
was in operation.
Administrative problems such as space,
personnel and iinan Mal procedures had to
be gradually worked out. The first office
space secured consisted of several rooms in
the main State Department building. COI
temporarily began its activities there in
mid-July, borrowing both furniture and
clerical help from MAL By 30 July COI
obtained the use of some 32 rooms in the
Apex Building and moved there in early
August
In the first few months COI made no
affirmative moves toward engaging in un-
dercover activities. However, a small unit
was established which was to procure the
agency's first raw intelligence. Designated
the Oral Intelligence Unit (01), this activity
resulted from discussions between Donovan
and G. Edward Buxton * in early August.
On 18 August he was directed by Donovan
to set up a staff in New York for the purpose
of interviewing recent arrivals from foreign,
areas to secure first-hand information. OI
began operations in New York on 25 August.
Functioning with a small staff, skilled
in languages and interrogation, OI was soon
producing the first original intelligence se-
cured by COL The marked efficiency of
OI and the excellent reception accorded its
reports were soon noted. Buxton rapidly
became one of the chief advisors of Donovan
on all COI matters.
�
Since the great bulk of information with
which COI would work had to be secured
from other government agencies, effective
liaison was essential. On 13 August Dono-
van wrote to Secretary of the Navy Knox
requesting the temporary detachment of
James Roosevelt to COL By 23 August
Roosevelt had taken up his duties as Liaison
Officer and reported that he had already
made contact with eight important depart-
ments and that others were in progress.
The Liaison Office, established as a part of
the Office of the Coordinator, assumed vari-
vac other dnti es, such as keeping in touch
with and securing intelligence from em-
be gsles and legations; arranging for pass-
� Buxton, a New England business and news-
paper executive, had an outstanding record in
World War L He became Assistant Coordinator
In the spring of 1942; with the establishment of
OSS he became Assistant Director, in which posi-
t1on he remained until July 1945 when he resigned
because of ill health.
.4-op-Seccal_
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
'70r-Ssorsi.
ports; maintaining liaison with New York
branches; organizing a mail and tiles sec-
tion; setting up a message center; and de-
vising and maintaining a system of elctsgify-
ing and accessioning documents received
from outside government departments and
agencies.*
It was obvious that a great deal of the
effectiveness of COI's actual and contem-
plated operations would depend on liaison
with the British. In this respect the ex-
cellent relations established by Donovan
on his pre-COI minions were not only of
ftggistance in the formative stage of the
agency but were to be of even greater value
once England and America were allied in
a common war effort. William Stephenson,
British Security Coordinator in America,
who represented the several Englislk serv-
ices, was of a ggigtance to Donovan from the
beginning, particularly in the matter of
advice on problems of organizing special
operations and secret intelligence which
arose in October. He further arranged for
valuable assistance by the New York office
of SOE ** in connection with certain FLS
programs. This official cooperation was
supplemented by cordial personal relations.
To represent COI in London and to main-
tain liaison with the various British services
there, Donovan secured the services of
William D. Whitney. Whitney was a for-
mer Rhodes Scholar and New York lawyer.
He had seen service as a Major in the Brit-
ish Army early in the war and was in August
1941 Executive Assistant tow. A. Harriman,
Lend-Lease Administrator. Donovan ar-
ranged with Harriman in August, when the
latter was in Washington, to secure Whit-
ney's services. Whitney agreed to come
with COI while still in London and immecli-
� The classification and accessioning duties
were taken over by R&A some time after the
establishment of a Central Information Division
(cm) within that Branch.
** Special Operations Executive, the British
organization engaged in sabotage and subversive
warfare.
--rep-Seeret-
12
ately proceeded to make the necessary con-
tacts to pave the way for Sherwood's tip
there in early September, after which he
was to report to Washington.
With the F13 Branch and the R&A
Branch getting under Cray, there was an-
other element which was necessary to the
new. agency. This was the matter of effec-
tive presentation of intelligence secured
and analyzed. In early September, Dono-
van and Merian Cooper � discussed a Visual
Presentation Branch (VP) which would be
designed to aid the quick and clear pres-
entation of reports and data through the
development and utilization of visual tech-
niques. As a first step, there was formed
within the Coordinator's office a Business
Advisory Panel of expert consultants in rel-
evant fields of moving pictures and electron-
ics. These consultants held several meet-
tugs in which exhaustive studies were made
of possible methods of presentation and
detailed recommendations of techniques
were brought forth. In late September VP
was established as a branch under the direc-
tion of Atherton Richards," and the Busi-
ness Advisory Panel was dissolved shortly
thereafter, having fulfilled its function of
developing techniques. VP began plans for
the construction of a separate building
(Q-2) for the use of the President, in which
would be housed a display system capable
of presenting, with the techniques that had
been developed, a complete and concise pic-
ture of world conditions relating to the war.
The preparation of building plans, blue-
prints, models, etc., and debate over the ap-
propriate budget continued into 1942.
Other divisions of VP were active, how-
ever. On 13 September 1941 a Field Photo-
graphic Division (composed of a Naval Re-
� A former motion picture director then in A-2
but serving as a part-time Special Assistant to
Donovan.
� � A business executive of long experience both
In the United States and Hawaii, also expert;
enced in public affairs. He was an early June
recruit.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.40p-Secre+-
serve group of well-known Hollywood tech-
niciAns and cameramen) was assigned to
COI by Secretary Knox pursuant to the re-
quest of Donovan. This unit had the func-
tion of producing still and motion pictures
of strategic areas. VP's Graphic Section
was early engaged in the presentation as-
pects of certain R14 studies.
COI's first payroll on 18 August 1941
listed 13 employees. Many others were
by that time donating all or part of their
ttme--some were in process of transfer from
other agencies or on vacation. Salary pay-
ment in some cases was impossible until
procedure was established whereby the
Civil Service Commission would provision-
ally accept COI's estimated professional rat-
ings of new employees, and certify the same
to the Bureau of the Budget.
The whole question of Civil Service clas-
sification was a troublesome one. COI even
In those early days was an unusual organiza-
tion not fitting easily into traditional pat-
terns. In FIS was gathered a group of well-
known journalists and radiomen who were
difficult to classify according to the ordinary
standards of peacetime Washington. The
same problem existed with the prominent
scholars assembled in R&A These men had
been attracted to COI by patriotic impulse
and the interest which was attached to the
development of new techniques in propa-
ganda and intelligence.
trnvouchered funds were no solution to
this problem. The policy was early estab-
lished that wherever possible without en-
dangering security personnel were to be em-
ployed from vouchered funds on Civil Serv-
ice payrolls. While representatives of the
Civil Service Commission and the Bureau
of the Budget were of great assistance at
this time, the very nature of the problem
necessitated considerable negotiation in
order to secure appropriate classifications.
The question plagued almost every govern-
ment agency in some degree, but, as noted,
It was accentuated in the case of COL
One particularly valuable activity of
Civil Service in this early period, however,
was the personnel security check, which the
commklion accelerated to permit COI to
get under way as promptly as possible.
In early September COI secured space in
the Public Health buildings at 25th and E
Streets, N. W. Only a part of the space
In these buildings was immediately occu-
pied, but negotiations proceeded for the
other buildings�North, South, Central,
Administration�and plans for the con-
struction of Temporary Q Building on an
adjacent site also were expedited.
COI forwarded to the Bureau of the Budg-
et on 29 September its first pro forma re-
quest for funds. For the period up to 30
June 1942 an amount of $10,560,000 was re-
quested. FIS was to use 30% of this fig-
ure; Visual Presentation (including Q-2
and Field Photographic) 24.9%; R&A (in-
cluding DSI) 10%.
At the end of two and a half months COI
had three principal branches in the initial
stages of operation and preparing to ex-
pand; new branches were under discussion.
Relations with other agencies and depart-
ments of the Government, under the guid-
ance of Donovan himself and James Roose-
velt as T.inison Officer, were not troubled
at this time. Naturally, COI had not pro-
gressed far enough in its a.ctivities to pro-
voke iigorous opposition; if there was dis-
trust of COI's ultimate intentions, it was
not openly expressed in the face of White
House approval.
The defects in existing intelligence which
Donovan had pointed out in his 10 June
memorandum became speedily apparent.
For example, one of the first jobs requested
of R&A was a study of possible routes by
which Lend-Lease material could be deliv-
ered to Russia. When the results of re-
search on this subject were presented to the
Secretaries of War and Navy, the holes in
the intelligence available anywhere in the
Government, or from other sources here0
were clearly revealed. Partly as a cause-
13. --Tep-Sea-wr
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.-Tep-Seerei-
quence of this incident, and partly from
their understanding of the President's de-
sire that COI undertake secret intelligence
work, Secretaries Stimson and Knox asked
Donovan to undertake the procurement of
Information by secret means. Donovan,
however, felt that it was inappropriate to
do so until he had the request in writing.
Both 0-2 and ONI were already in the
secret intelligence field, although handi-
capped by inadequate appropriations and,
with the United States at peace, by their
official and military status. Merely plac-
ing another entrant in the intelligence field
without clear-cut authorization in writing
might have led to unnecessary friction and
handicapped effectiveness.
As early as December 1940 the other agen-
� cies engaged in intelligence had realized
the desirability of centralization. At that
time, representatives of 0-2, ON!, State De-
partment and FBI had discussed and agreed
in principle that undercover intelligence
activities should be coordinated. In view
of the difficulties which each of these agen-
cies faced, however, no definite action had
been taken. COI seemed to provide an an-
swer to the problem. Being a civilian agen-
cy and having access to secret funds as a
part of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, it seemed free of the principal handi-
caps which had beset 0-2 and ON!.
On 5 September, therefore, 0-2 with the
approval of the Chief of Staff and the Sec-
retary of War, recommended "that the
undercover intelligence service is much more
effective if under one head rather than three,
and that a civilian agency, such as the Co-
ordinator of Information, has distinct ad-
vantages over any military or naval agency
In the admiriktration of such a service."
(Exhibit W-19.) It took somewhat longer
before the Navy was in agreement. But on
10 October Donovan was able to advise the
President that by joint action of 0-2 and
ONI, approved by the Secretaries of War and
Navy, "there was consolidated under the Co-
ordinator of Information the undercover in-
14
telligence of the two services." (Exhibit
W-20.) The reasons followed those stated
In 0-2's original recommendation.
As part of this memorandum Donovan
set forth a concrete example which was a
secret intelligence plan for North Africa.
From the time of his first mission to Brit-
ain in 1940 he had grasped the importance
of the Mediterranean in the strategy of the
war. Further deliberation had led him to
recommend an economic accord on French
North Africa prior to his second mission.
The busy period of COI organization had - - �
not abated this interest. In September the
Mediterranean section of R&A was work-
ing, at Donovan's request, on studies of
North Africa. The example of North Af-
rica was to prove a basis for authorizing
COI to engage in subversion and sabotage
some two months later. More than a year
later events were to confirm Donovan's con-
stant interest in this area by creating the
first large-scale test of his concept of the
relation of the various functions of COI/
OSS and their combined application in sup-
port of military operations in modem war-
fare.
In mid-October Ma added several divi-
sions which rounded out its branch organ-
ization. These were organized along func-
tional rather than regional lines and dealt
with economics, geography and psycholo-
gy. Thus, to the knowledge and experience
of the area specialists in DSI, were added
the analyses of specialized experts in rele-
vant fields.
In mid-October the first significant con-
flict with another agency came to a minor
crisis. The two principals involved were
CIAA and the PIS branch of COL But
the matter was brought to the President's
attention by the Bureau of the Budget.
When the first request for funds was made
to the Bureau of the Budget early in Octo-
ber, the Bureau became concerned about
the proposed expansion of FIS activities,
particularly as they affected Latin Ameri-
ca. FIS contended that a coordinated ap-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.�������...
-rep-�Seafe�-
proach to the question of propaganda out-
side the continental limits of the United
States was essential, and while it had at-
tempted to work out a plan of cooperation
with CIAA, there was obviously room for
confusion. This was particularly true since
official policy lines in most casks had to
be deduced from statements of the Presi-
dent and responsible State Department offi-
cials. With material being prepared under
newsroom pressure, there was obviously in-
sufficient time to clear various items of
-propaganda with the State Department.
In any case, State Department was not
staffed to handle such clearance. Both
CIAA and FIB operated through the tech-
nical facilities of private broadcasting com-
panies, whose representatives at times pre-
ferred to go to other departments or agen-
cies for definitions of United States policy.
The method of securing the cooperation
of the private companies was another sub-
ject of difference. CIAA preferred subsi-
dies; FIB, at least in the period prior to
Pearl Harbor, believed that voluntary co-
operation prompted by patriotic impulse
would be adequate. -
These questions were presented by the
Bureau of the Budget to the President, who
advised Donovan on 15 October 1941 � that
he considered the "requirements of our pro-
gram in the Hemisphere. . . quite differ-
ent from those of our programs to Europe
and the Far East," and stated that the
former should be "handled exclusively by
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
In cooperation with the Department of
State."
Donovan responded on 21 October,* re-
iterating his belief that "the short-wave ra-
dio is an essential weapon in the obtaining
of information . . ." He enclosed a long
and well-reasoned memorandum which he
had received from Sherwood on 20 October
which set forth the FIB, Le., COI, position.
� See History Pile W-12, p. 63.
Thus, to the separation of foreign and do-
mestic propaganda, was added still another
division�Central and South America. Al-
though the President decided against COI
In this particular matter, it did not indicate
that his desire that Donovan create the ma-
chinery to carry out psychological warfare
along the lines proposed in June had abated.
However, the Bureau of the Budget began
to scrutinize even more closely COI propos-
als. The incident was significant of others
to come.
The policy of cloaking in vagueness the
true purposes of COI in the authorizing
order of 11 July was beginning to boom-
erang as operations got under way and in-
evitably COI began to come into real or
Imagined conflict with other departments
and agencies. Donovan's memorandum to
the President of 21 October remarked,
"while originally we both considered it ad-
visable to have no directive in writing, it
now seems necessary to do so to avoid mis-
understanding with other departments."
Donovan added that FIB was excellent cov-
er for contemplated activities in the fields
of secret intelligence and subversion.
In late October COI began to send per-
sonnel overseas. On 21 October the Presi-
dent authorized Donovan to dispatch a
Field Photographic mission to Iceland to
photograph strategic military bases there.
On 24 October the President authenticated'
the London COI office in a letter to Church-
ill (Exhibit W-4) : "In order to facilitate
the carrying. out of the work of the Coordi-
nator with respect to Europe and the occu-
pied countries, I have authorized Colonel
Donovan to send a small staff to London."
Whitney had been in Washington for most
of the month and on 29 October he departed
for London with two others. Additional
staff for London were being prepared and
a mission of some ten personnel arrived in
London on 8 December.
In November the Foreign Nationalities
Branch (FN) was begun to provide an addl.%
tonal source of foreign political intelligence
15 -Top-Seeret-
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top-Secret-
through study of the activities and senti-
ments of foreign nationality groups in the
United States as they might reflect atti-
tudes in foreign areas./ This service had
been in part suggested to Donovan by Sum-
ner Welles. However, as plans progressed,
opposition developed in certain quarters of
the State Department on the ground that
such activities might encroach on the pol-
icy field. Although the President approved
the establishment of the Branch on 22 De-
cember, the Bureau of the Budget withheld
Its approval until the matter was brought
to the attention of Secretary of State Hull
who approved the project in January 1942.
At the time of the consolidation of under-
cover intelligence in October, Donovan had
also set a small group to work to study the
subject of special operations. These were
to consist of various subversive activities,
Including sabotage, the functions being
roughly equivalent to those of the British
SOB. Prior to the outbreak of war, how-
ever, it was not practicable to bring up the
matter for formal authorization.
Another subject which occupied Donovan
at the time was that of guerrilla units. As
In the case of FN, which sought to turn
the possible disadvantages of our large
groups of foreign origin to our benefit for
Intelligence purposes, Donovan felt that bi-
lingual guerrilla units could be organized
to carry out harassing tactics behind enemy
lines and other operations analogous to
the British Commandos. Prior to October
he had brought this matter to the attention
of the President but had made no formal
request for authorization.
On 22 December, however, following Pearl
Harbor, Donovan recommended to the Pres-
ident that subversive activities and guer-
rilla units be considered in strategic plan-
ning. Here again the example of North
Africa was cited and the relation between
these two activities stressed. The President
directed him to take up the matter with
Prime /iffinister Churchill and "find out
�Ter-6eeret-
whom we should work with in England
toward this end." (Exhibit W-21.)
With these activities the concept of psy-
chological warfare was complete. There
would be intelligence penetration. The
fruits of the intelligence processed by re-
search and analysis would be available to
strategic planning and to the propaganda
service. Propaganda, as the "arrow of ini-
tial penetration", would become the first
phase in operations. Special operations in
the form of sabotage, fifth column work and
other types of subversion would be the next
phase. Then would come the commando
raids and the harassing guerrilla tactics
and uprisings behind the lines. With all
of these reaching a peak at H-Hour, the
softening-up process of a target territory
would be complete. Then would follow ac-
tual invasion by the armed forces.
In other nations these functions were
carried on by separate agencies. Donovan
sought to unify them and forge a new in-
strument of war. This was not easy, and
an organizational problem immediately
arose. In his planning for North Africa,
Donovan had beeia advised by Stephenson
(if, indeed, he had not learned of the sit-
uation on his previous missions to England)
of the intense rivalry between the British
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Spe-
cial Operations Executive (SOB). These
two organizations were under different Cab-
inet ranks and were subject to constant fric-
tion of one sort or another. Yet it was nec-
egsgry for COI to work together with the
British in a common war effort. To pre-
serve the advantages of unified control, and
at the same time to be in a position to co-
operate closely and in mutual confidence
with SIS and SOB, Donovan established two
separate Branches: Secret Intelligence
(SA/73) and Special Operations (SA/G).�
� The symbols indicate the respective chiefs of
the Branches: SA/B�Special Activities/Draw;
SA/G�Special Activities/Goodfellow.
16
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Zep-.Seeret--
In December the question of segregation
of the Western Hemisphere arose in some-
what different form. The President had
on 9 December ordered Donovan to coordi-
nate various North American intelligence
agencies. As Donovan undertook this work,
objections arose from the FBI which had
been made responsible in June 1940 for all
Intelligence in the Western Hemisphere.
On 23 December a Presidential Directive re-
affirmed the authority of the FBI. and Don-
� ovan was so informed. The matter caused
some discussion since the instructions to
Donovan of 9 December and the 23 Decem-
ber Directive were obviously in conflict. On
30 December the President sent a memo-
randum * to the Attorney General, Sumner
Welles, Donovan, MID and ON!:
On December 23rd, without examination, I
signed a confidential directive . . . I believe that
this directive interferes with work already being
conducted by other agencies. In view of this,
please meet together and straighten out this
whole program and let me have whatever is
necessary by way of an amended directive.
The discussion which followed culmi-
nated in a meeting at the Attorney Gen-
eral's office on 6 January 1942, wherein the
directive of 23 December 1941 was agreed
to with only minor changes; COI's repre-
sentatives might operate in the Western
Hemisphere (exclusive of the United States
Itself) only after informing FBI; but even
then they would not be allowed to operate
under cover.
Following Pearl Harbor, COI began to
cooperate more closely with the armed
forces. In view of the early opposition to
the proposed military order of 25 June (Ex-
hibit W-2) the gradual change in the at-
titude of the Army and Navy which began
even before December indicates the strides
which the agency had already made. Re-
lations between FIS and the armed forces
were, of course, not close, as some time was
to elapse before military operations reached
the stage where .propaganda could be of
� See History File W-7, p. 140.
affirmative value as a weapon against the
enemy. However, FIS was of some service
In the doomed Philippine campaign. And
Under Secretary Welles of the State Depart-
ment on 2 December had commented upon
the "splendid constructive work [of FIS]
for which we are truly grateful." * - Secret
Intelligence and special operations were in
the most preliminPry stage at the time of
Pearl Harbor. Their value was one which
could only be evident after a period of prep-
aration. R&A, however, demonstrated its
usefulness at an early period. For example,
a study of Turkish railways had proven the
validity of Donovan's contention in June
that information already existed in this
county which if subjected to expert re-
search and interpretation would produce
valuable results. In that instance the re-
gional section of DS' had produced a com-
prehensive study of Turkish railways using
as its principal source Turkish language
periodicals available in this country. There
were many other instances which formed
the basis of the comment of Under Secre-
tary Forrestal on the "real use" of the serv-
ices which R&A had rendered to the Navy
prior to 1 January, and Secretary Stim-
son's remark on 2 January 1942 that MID
"had had very fruitful contact" with R&A.
The Secretary of War's additional comment
that "0-2 is specially appreciative of the
fresh and independent outlook of your staff
of experts," ** is evidence of the manner in
which the R&A scholars approached the de-
velopment of new intelligence methods and
techniques. FN was in January just begin-
ning a program which was to find increas-
ing appreciation in the State Department
and other agencies interested in political
Intelligence. The Field Photographic Unit
of VP had several missions in the field.
By 1 February all the COI branches were
organized. SA/B, OI, FN and IDC pro-
duced raw intelligence; the Field Photo-
� See History Pile W-7, p. 129.
�� See History File p. 132.
17 0-Top-SeaFet-
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep--8eccet-
graphic and Pictorial Records Section of
VP secured and produced photographic in-
telligence. This intelligence, together with
Intelligence secured from other agencies
and departments of the Government, was
processed by R&A into comprehensive re-
ports upon desired subjects. VP Flasisted
the understanding of long and complicated
reports by various graphic techniques. FIS
waged propaganda warfare utilizing to the
extent possible the informational resources
of the other branches. SA/G was preparing
personnel and instruments of subversive
and guerrilla warfare.
Despite the value which the various
branches had in themselves demonstrated,
there had as yet arisen no opportunity to
test the full concept of their combined ap-
plication in a large military operation. On
1 January Donovan presented to General
Marshall plans for the Azores and Cape
Verde Islands. Marshall approved both
plans, subject to coordination on the Azores
with the British and on the Cape Verde
Islands with General Stilwell. Donovan's
conference with Stilwell, as reported to the
President on 3 January 1942 (Exhibit W-5),
provides an excellent exposition of the way
In which the various elements of COI were
Intended to combine into a "softening-up
process of the territory with which we had
to deal. . ." Donovan outlined three
phases:
1. A plan of short-wave penetration. This we
would work out by trying to have it reach its
climax on "M Day."
2. The ascertainment of detailed information
on particular parts of the territory that he
(Stilwell] had in mind.
3. The preliminary installation of a 'group that
would be able to strike at the moment he would
designate.
In addition, he suggested that a task
force be made up from COI personnel of
geographers, photographers, radiomen and
analysts "so that we could work with his
[Stilwell's] staff and have the psychologi-
cal and political preparation go hand-in-
hand" with the military.
Tut, Seoet
While the contemplated military opera-
tion never took place, the proposal presaged
the future work of OSS and the favorable
reception of Stilwell and Marshall to the
plan is significant in view of the later alli-
ance of OSS with the armed forces.
At the end of January the new agency
was a going concern. With the United
States at war, Donovan desired a more ac-
tive combat role. In early February he
routed to the President through Secretary
Knox a proposal for setting up an independ-
ent command which was to consist of ap-
proximately 5,000 officers and men, was to
be attached to the Navy, and whose com-
mander would report to the President
through the Secretary of the Navy. In a
memorandum to the President of 9 Feb-
ruary 1942 * Donovan indicated that he con-
sidered the work of COI organization prac-
tically complete:
Frank Knox has given me your message con-
cernLng the independent command of the air, sea
and land raiders. You know that I am grateful
for your confidence. I have been working out
some proposals so when Frank returns it can be
submitted to you.
In the meantime, I am trying to "cinch up"
everything here. The various projects are get-
ting under way. I have given a great deal of
thought to the man to come in here. It occurred
to me that you would like to have Frank McCoy
do it�but I think that is out of the question,
because he feels his age could not stand the
pressure. I want to get someone who will have
your confidence. I would like to get him in here
with me for a couple of weeks, and in the mean-
time, while we are working out the other plans I
can keep this going.
1 February-13 June 1942
The very fact that the United States was
a great power made time necessary to set
In motion the machinery of that power.
Meanwhile, the European Axis continued
victorious and America watched helplessly
as an army in the Pacific fought stubbornly
In the face of inevitable surrender.
*Bee History File W-7, p. 151.
18
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop-SecraL
This period in Washington was marked
by controversy as the Government sought
to adjust itself to a state of war. The need
for action was universally recognized, and
many in WP ghington who did not believe
they knew exactly what should be done, at
least thought they knew what someone else
should be prevented from doing. Charges
and recriminations born of frustration were
often hurled indigcriminately by men whose
patriotic impulse was unquestionable.
It was not surprising that COI was
caught in the vortex of several of the con-
troversies which raged in the capital during
this period. From the beginning of March,
It was a foregone conclusion that the agency
would be affected in some measure by an
Impending general reorganization of execu-
tive agencies. The fact that its activities
were shrouded in secrecy and were so un-
orthodox in nature created an aura of mis-
understanding. Much of the conflict was
founded on honest difference of opinion as
to the issues involved, but, perhaps not un-
naturally in the general situation, part of
the attack descended to the level of per-
sonalities.
A general survey of COI in this period
must take cognizance of the general atmos-
phere of dissension. Several controversies
must be included because they were car-
ried on at such length and on an echelon
far out of proportion to the substance of
the issues.
On 10 February 1942 Donovan began a
process of organizational self-criticism. He
established a committee headed by Roper
to examine into the efficiency of the vari-
ous branch organizations. This committee
began its labors with the F19 Branch and
on 2 March submitted certain proposals
looking toward reorganization of the
Branch, with particular reference to plan-
ning and admirdstration. The administra-
tive troubles of PIS had been acknowledged
by Sherwood and others for some time and
attempts had been made to secure an able
administrator to assist Sherwood. How-
ever, suitable personnel were not available
due to other commitments. On 18 Janu-
ary Sherwood had become alarmed "about
the suggestion of a business man on the
Planning Committee." As he put it, "It
Is all right to have rabid anti-New Dealers
or even Roosevelt-haters in the military es-
tablishments or OPM, but I don't think it
appropriate to have any participating in a
campaign which must be expressive of the
President's own philosophy." * This was in
part a reflection of the divergent views of
Donovan and Sherwood on the manner in
which propaganda should be controlled.
Sherwood and the able journalists and ra-
diomen he had gathered about him in MS
conceived of propaganda primarily as a po-
litical weapon under civilian direction.
Donovan, once a state of war existed, be-
lieved the propaganda arm, which could be
exploited as a weapon of deception and sub-
version in support of military strategy,
should be subject to military supervision
for these purposes.
This .cleavage was augmented by other
elements in Washington who had mis-
trusted the motives of COI in various fields.
In October, Donovan had stated to the Pres-
ident, in connection with the dispute with
CIAA, "While originally we both considered
It advisable to have no directive in writing,
It now seems necessary to do so to avoid
misunderstanding with the other depart-
'* But there had been no clear di-
rective.
Thus, in January the Bureau of the Budg-
et directed COI in the future to leave to
BE'W certain bomb-target studies which the
Economics Division of R&A had made at
the request of A-2. Subsequently, as A-2
persisted in its requests for COI collabora-
tion in the work, an arrangement was
worked out with the Budget Director for
continuance of the work in certain in-
stances. However, there were suggestions
19
� See History File W-Se, Tab X.
�� See History File W-I2, p. es.
�
�Top�Janet&
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop-Secret-
that the Economics Division be elirnimited.
In a memorandum to the President of 2
February Donovan said, "I spoke to you
some months ago of the fear I had that
there would be a tendency in certain quar-
ters to eliminate our Economics Section be-
cause of the seeming duplication with the
work of the Board of Economic Warfare."
(Exhtbit W-6.) He went on to distinguish
the operating functions of the two agen-
cies and referred to the fact that he had
talked with the Vice-President * and that
the latter was in agreement. BEW and
R&A were cooperating closely and effec-
tively.
The matter of BEW and the Economics
Division was not a dispute. However, it is
Indicative of the fact that COI had pro-
gressed to the point where voices were be-
ing raised in various quarters in expression
of a distrust that had long existed.
Throughout the first six months of COI's
existence, the agency had been able to op-
erate under the protection of the White
House. To Donovan's direct access to the
President had been added the informal con-
tact of James Roosevelt and Sherwood.
Following Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was
called to active duty with the Marines.
Also, differences arose between Donovan
and Sherwood.
There was, however, another reason why
opposition to COI came into the open. Fol-
lowing Pearl Harbor, White House approv-
al alone was no longer sufficient. Opera-
tional plans obviously needed to receive the
clearance of the military authorities. Don-
ovan had often stated his awareness of this.
For example, he remarked in the fall of
1941 that the military was bound to have
control in all matters as soon as war was
a fact, and that it was therefore through
the military that COI could hope to per-
form its most effective service.
As the war started and the JCS was
established, Donovan expressed to his staff
� Then Chairman of BEW.
407r8acret�
the view that an organization for unor-
thodox warfare, such as COI, should be t.
under the direction of the JCS. Sherwood
and others in FIS felt that such a move
would mean so great a limitation upon
their activity as to nullify it. Donovan,
seeing propaganda as a potential strategic
weapon of great force, felt that both it and
the other elements of COI which comprised
his concept of psychological warfare should
be under the direction of those responsible
for the conduct of the war. Affirmative
steps to effect this end were not possible,
however, until March.
While the various branches of COI had
demonstrated their individual value before
February 1942, the opportunity had not
arisen to test the essential point of Dono-
van's concept: the relation between these
various functions and their combined appli-
cation to the prosecution of the war.
In the fall of 1941 the Bureau of the Budg-
et had begun to be increasingly critical of
COI activities. For example, Budget approv-
al of FN was not forthcoming until some
two months after the President had ap-
proved it. The President had not formally
clarified the indefinite terms of the 11 July
order. Donovan attempted to explain the
expanded activities of COI in writing to the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget on 9
February 1942:
To this directive (of 11 July 1941) has been
added the responsibility of planning, initiating,
developing and executing a program of psycho-
logical and political warfare, including subver-
sive activities; of encouraging and stimulating
the support and assistance of allied nations and
people of occupied territories; and of dissemi-
nating information outside the Western Hemi-
sphere.*
But although these activities had been
added, they were undertaken by virtue of
Informal instructions. The Bureau of the
Budget found the situation confusing, and,
� See History File W-7, p. 154.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-SeGrot�
Harold D. Smith wrote to the President on
28 February:
The Coordinator's activities have developed to
such an extent that a letter or order defining the
area of activity assigned to his office is becoming
Increasingly necessary. If you believe such a defi-
nition to be desirable, I will be glad to prepare
a draft of the necessary order or letter.*
On 9 February 1042 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) held their first meeting and
It was the establishment of the JCS which
was to provide the solution to COI's prob-
lems. COI could not be assimilated into
any one arm of the services. Its activities
had to support all branches. It speedily be-
came evident that the JCS were going to
elaborate their own instruments for the
planning of psychological warfare. The
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
(JPWC) was organized on 18 March. On
23 March it agreed to develop a plan for
Korea, including the establishment of a sys-
tem of underground agents in conjunction
with COI, and on 3 April it asked the Coor-
dinator to integrate his plans for Korea
with those of the Committee. Also, on 3
April, the JPWC requested that any COI
plans for psychological warfare in China
be integrated with theirs. On 26 March,
Donovan and other key executives of COI
appeared before the JPWC in connection
with plans for North Africa, the Cape Verde
Islands and Greece. COI and the JPWC
were obviously engaged in overlapping ac-
tivities.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of the Budget be-
gan to take action looking toward reor-
ganization of various information agencies
which had sprung up. Donovan was not di-
.rectly informed of these proposals. On 4
March he wrote (Exhibit W-7) to the Presi-
dent that "rumor has come to me that the
propaganda services of the government,
both- domestic and foreign, are to be con-
solidated. . . If any suggestion has been
made to you, I would respectfully ask that
� See History File W-8a, Tab UM
21
you keep in mind certain considerations."
He went on to restate the case for separa-
tion of domestic and foreign propaganda
upon which the President had decided at
the outset. He referred to the differences
In aims, purposes and methods in the two
fields:
Now that we are at war, foreign propaganda
must be employed as a weapon of war. It must
march with events. It is primarily an attack
weapon. It must be Identified with specific stra-
tegic movements often having within it the
flavor of subversion. To dO this kind of work
effectively it must be allied with the military
services. It must be to a degree informed as to
possible movements. The more closely it is knit
with the intelligence and the physically sub-
versive activities of the Artily and the Navy the
more effective it can be.
He then stated concisely the concept upon
which the alliance of propaganda to the
other activities of COI was based:
In point of fact, the use Of propaganda is the
arrow of initial penetration in conditioning and
preparing the people and the territory in which
Invasion is contemplated. It is the first
step � then Fifth Colufnn work, then militarized
raiders (or 'Commandos'), and then the invading
divisions.
He cogently referred to the possible ef-
fect of domestic politics upon foreign prop-
aganda if the rumored consolidation were
to take place. By compromising or destroy-
ing the necessary security, such a tie-up
"would impair, the effectiveness of psycho-
logical warfare as a weapon and would
be likely to expose our plans and our meth-
ods to the enemy." He concluded:
Several months ago you felt the necessity to
fix an arbitrury line between domestic propa-
ganda and foreign psychological warfare. That
has been done. By the separation we have kept
ourselves free from domestic issues and have been
able to carry out the military purpose and func-
tion of our work.
On 7 March (Exhibit W-8) the Director
of the Budget submitted. to the President
a memorandum proposing a reorganization
of war information services. He accompa-
nied his memorandum with a proposed 2z-
,-Zop-Secrot-'
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ecutive Order which would consolidate into
an Office of War Information the OFF, the
Division of Information of the OEM, the
Office of the Coordinator of Government
Films, the Motion Picture, Press and Radio
Divisions cf CIAA, and the PIS Branch of
COI. The Budget Director's memorandum
concluded:
The general concept of the proposed plan has
been discussed fully with Lowell Mellett, Robert
Sherwood, Archibald MacLeLsh, and Wayne Coy.
The provisions of the Executive Order have been
cleared with Sherwood, MaeLeish, and Coy as well
as with Judge R.osenman, all of whom are in
approval. We also discussed the Order with Nel-
son Rockefeller who, though he feels that it is
preferable to continue the operation of the Latin
American information work in his office, recog-
nizes the need for the type of coordination pro-
vided by the Order. He is willing to cooperate
under any arrangement agreed upon.
This proposal began a period of contro-
versy which was not resolved for some three
months. Both the CIAA and COI objected
strenuously to the removal of certain of
their functions.
Donovan sought to impress upon the
President the relationship and unity of the
four principal branches of COL On 16
March he wrote * that SA/B "through its
agents in various countries outside the
Western Hemisphere, especially enemy
countries, obtaing information not ordinar-
ily obtained by other agencies of the gov-
ermnent;" that R8r.A analyzed and evaluat-
ed such information and also "secret and
confidential documents furnished by the
State, War, Navy, and other departments."
R&A studies and conclusions were "made
available for the use of the service arms
of the government and also for the affirma-
tive units" of COI; PIS, the propaganda
arm, which worked closely with State, War
and Navy, and "by radio, pamphlet, leaflet,
posters, advertising and other means, car-
ries the fight to the enemy and, in turn,
through its monitoring service and listen-
See History File W-8a, Tab VV.
big outposts, obtains information concern-
ing the enemy;" and SA/G which worked
closely with the Army and the Navy to carry
out subversive warfare in enemy countries.
Donovan concluded:
It may be interesting to note that, to perform
the above functions, the British government has
some six different organizations, each of which
Is larger than our one organization.
I think It is safe to say that by having these
closely allied operations tied together as one
weapon under an order signed by the President
as Commander-in-Chief, there has been obtained
an Economy of Force, a vital principle in warfare.
In March the COI came under attack
from another quarter. It was charged that
Donovan had undercover agents operating
In Mexico in contravention of the Presi-
dent's Directive of 23 December 1941 that
COI should not operate in the Western
Hemisphere. The charge was baseless, but
it created an incident which was carried to
the President intermittently for some two
months.
r- The circumstances out of which this ac-
cusation grew were explained by Wallace
Phillips * in a memorandum of 11 March: ��
In connection with his work in establishing
an undercover intelligence service for ONI,
Phillips had placed certain agents in Merl-
e.� to Investigate Japanese penetration, par-
ticularly along the west coast of Mexico
and on the peninsula of Lower California.
Both FBI and the State Department had
been informed of these activities. When
Phillips transferred to COI in October, be
had for approidmately a month and a halt
a dual capacity. He was winding up his
ONI activities and at the same time carry-
ing on his work for COL Apparently FBI
believed that the Navy undercover activities
In Mexico were being continued by COL
State Department took a part in the ensu-
ing conflict.
On 27 April, while he was recuperating
In New York from the effects of an auto-
* See "Special Activities" below.
"See History Pile W-7, p. 159.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top Saw al
mobile accident, Donovan wrote a memo-
randum � to the President which indicates
the degree of acrimony which the situation
had brought about:
He (Frank Knox) told me that the by now well
worn lie had been retailed to you that I had or
have some ninety representatives or observers of
my organization in Latin America. This has been
made to assert that I have gone into a field which
you have not allocated to me. This story is Just
as untrue as the others. Welles wrote me about
it, and I attach that letter, together with my
reply. You should know me well enough to know
that I do adhere strictly to my orders and make
no attempt to encroach upon the Jurisdiction of
anyone else. . . . I have no representatives in
that section of the world and never have had, and
all those concerned must know that to be true. I
know that you will recognize that my anger is
Justified at such deliberate and continued false-
hoods.
The matter was further aggravated, how-
ever, by a misunderstanding which arose
In connection with the dispatch by SA/B
of a courier to Mexico City, which had been
cleared with the FBI liaison in New York.
Donovan's memorandum to the President
of 9 May (Exhibit W-9) was conclusive on
the subject:
Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter
from the Undersecretary of State and the mem-
orandum attached.
It is a pity that Mr. Berle could not have been
better informed before burdening Mr. Welles with
the kind of gossip contained in the latter's letter
to you. I only hope that the German Army will
melt away as rapidly as my alleged force of ninety
agents in Mexico melts under investigation.
It appears that the only evidence offered to
support the ninety-men legend is a reference to a
purported statement by an unnamed "high offi-
cial" in the COL If such an absurd remark was
ever made by anyone associated with me, I should
be glad to know the identity of such person, be-
cause, whatever his motive, he would no longer
have any usefulness here.
It is made to appear in the Berle memorandum
that we had certain men operating in Mexico and
that prior to April 1st of this year ON! "took
over" from us. This is not the fact. What really
happened is that for some months before Rep-
'See History File W-8a, Tab YT.
tember, 1941, ONI had been conducting a special
Intelligence service under a civilian director
named Wallace B Phillips. As an integral part
of this service there was a small unit consisting
of four men (two of whom were Coleman and
Thompson referred to here) in Mexico. I under-
stand that FBI was fully advised of the existence
of this service. When, after consultation with
Mr. Hoover, I complied with the request of the
Army and Navy to conduct special intelligence
for them, the then director of Naval Intelligence,
Captain Kirk, asked me to take Mr. Phillips into
our organization. I agreed. However, when
Phillips came with us he continued to act as
director of special intelligence for ON!, until De-
cember 1, 1941, when he was relieved from his
duty with the Navy officially. ONI had not at
that time made arrangements for the handling
of these men, and asked Phillips to continue to
direct them until the Navy could make arrange-
ments to relieve him of that responsibility. We
permitted Mr. Phillips to act in this capacity for
the Navy as an accommodation and to preserve
their existing source of information. These men
did not report to the COI, nor did we direct their
activities.
. . . With reference to Mr. Donald Downes,
whose presence in Mexico City is interpreted by
Mr. Welles as proof that we were dealing in Latin
American activities, the reason for Mr. Downes'
presence in Mexico City, after clearance by the
FBI, is fully set forth in the following mem-
orandum to me from Mr. Allen W. Dulles of our
New York office, who handled the matter:
"With regard to his (Downes'] trip to Mexico,
the situation is as follows:
"Some weeks ago we ascertained that a group
of Spanish Republicans in Mexico had certain
information, particularly lists of names, which
we were anxious to secure in order to complete
certain reports on which we were working. It
seemed unwise to bust these lists to the mails.
The disclosure of the names would, we felt, not
only impair the usefulness of the individuals but
also imperil their lives. It was, therefore, neces-
sary to have a messenger who could go to Mexico
and bring back the information.
"Accordingly, we facilitated his trip to Mexico
City . . . jaaving previously conferred with the
FBI's liaison man with us. I subsequently ascer-
tained that this FBI man made a full and accu-
rate report to Washington. . . .
"This matter seemed to me to be of such a
routine character that I did not consult with you
before Downes left New York. I may add that
Downes acted solely as a messenger and had no
authority to hold himself out as a representatrie
of COI or to take any action whatsoever other
T1' ccFe�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
than to secure the desired papers and bring them
back to the United States."
The action taken by Mr. Dulles was entirely
consonant with the understanding that I had
with the FBI, as appears from the following ex-
tract from my letter to Mr. Biddle of January
10th, a copy of which was sent to you, to On
and to 0-2, as well as to Mr. Berle and the Secre-
tary of State:
"It is apparent that our active participation in
the war may mean the use of South America as a
clearing house for enemy activities in other areas
of the world. Occasion may thus arise where we
will be compelled to pursue inquiries in South
America affecting other parts of the world. Of
course, we would not undertake such inquiries
without first informing your Department, and I
am assured by Mr. Hoover that there would be no
difficulty in working out such an arrangement...1_I
In March proposals were made that COI
be made a supporting agency of the JCS, a
move that was in accord with Donovan's
original view. It will be remembered that
when COI was first proposed in the summer
of 1941 a military order had been drawn
and was modified at the instance of the
Army and Navy. In the spring of 1942,
however, their position was reversed. On
30 March, Donovan sent a memorandum
(Exhibit W-10) to the President urging the
Issuance of an order which the JCS had
submitted which would place COI under
them as a supporting agency. Donovan
stated:
I hope you will approve the order. It exactly
conforms to your original directive to me, both in
name and function�but which was finally mod-
ified at the instance of the Army and Navy. The
present proposal comes at their instance. The
services now seem to have confidence in our
organization and feel that we have in motion
certain instrumentalities of war useful to them.
For these reasons, and in order more closely to
Integrate with the armed forces the various ele-
ments that we have been developing, they recom-
mend the signing of the order. . . .
I am glad to concur in the recommendation of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because I believe this is
a sensible and necessary step toward the most
effective use of all modern war weapons.
Two weeks later Donovan again urged
that the military order be issued and reit-
"IV-Secret�
erated his belief that foreign propaganda
should be closely knit "with the intelligence
and the physically subversive activities of
the Army and the Navy." His memoran-
dum (Exhibit W-11) to the President con-
tinued:
Due to your continued support and confidence,
we have been able to set up for you an instrument
of modern warfare, which, if left unimpaired, will
mean for you a weapon of combined operations
which will be able to stand against any idmilar
weapon of the Axis. In doing this we have not
usurped the functions or encroached upon the
domain of the Army, Navy or State Department.
I am sure you believe that I have no such inten-
tion. But I feel it is now my duty respectfully
to urge that this weapon which has been so care-
fully prepared over the last eight months, which
has already begun to demonstrate its usefulness,
and which has won the respect of some who were
skeptical at the outset, shall not be disturbed at
home before it shall ever be put to Its really
crucial work abroad.
Still the President did not take action
either on the proposed consolidation of in-
formation services or on the order allying
COI with JCS. On 16 May Donovan again
took up the appeal and suggested a com-
promise solution (Exhibit W-12) :
I talked with Sam Rosenman today and found
him, as always, impartial, unprejudiced and open
to conviction. I gave my opinion that the trans-
fer at this time would be a serious impairment
of the whole war effort; that the foreign radio
service was not set up with us as something sep-
arate, but there was such an interplay of func-
tions among all our units that to rip this out now
would tear the tissue of our whole organization;
and further that, in fulfillment of my duty to the
President, I should not let this be done without
swinging a red lantern. . . .
As he expressed it, the single question was a
choice between two courses � one, to have our
radio propaganda service, as distinct from our
political warfare and subversive services, made
part of a general information agency; or, second,
to have it remain as It Is now and to effect close
liaison with the domestic information agency. I
accepted this as the question, but suggested that
at best this question could not be decided without
further proof. That as a means of establishing
the proof the following be done:
1. That a domestic integrated information serv-4.
ice should be set up to see if it would work. That
14
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
dep-Searei�
this domestic agency should be given power and
control over the various units, rather than be
compelled to rely on persuasion.
2. That a period of three months should be
given to see how this experiment worked out.
S. That a close liaison should be established
between the domestic radio and our own, so that
there should be the fullest interchange of support
and of joint action.
4. That at the end of three months a new look
be given to see the result.
Among other reasons for this suggestion were
the following:
(a) That at most this was an experiment For
the purposes of this action I was willing to con-
cede that it was a question of fact as to which is
the best method.
(b) As Sam epitomized my view, it was that the
proposal being untried, "the burden of proof was
on the proponents."
(c) That to try to do the whole thing at once,
before it could be seen whether the domestic
propaganda service could stand upon its own feet
after consolidatir,n, might jeopardize the ulti-
mate success of any arrangement
(d) That to permit our machine to remain as
It is for the next three months would jeopardize
nothing, and if at the end of three months it
should be decided to make the change no harm
would have been done.
(e) But if the change were to be made now, in
the process of which our whole organization
would be upset, and then within three months it
was found to be a mistake, irreparable injury
would have been done.
I tried to make clear that while my conviction
Is that under the present set-up we had created
a weapon for you that should not be impaired,
nevertheless I wanted to go to the fullest extent
In examining any proposal that Sam felt would
be more effective. For that reason only I made
the above suggestions.
In view of the differences of opinion that exist,
such an experimental period carried on with good
faith would be able to satisfy you as to what
course should be followed.
One other thing I stressed with him. That Is
the proposed order submitted to you by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. We discussed that for the mo-
ment a simple order in lien of that should be
Issued. It might follow the lines of the enclosed
draft. This would designate us as a supporting
agency, and nothing more. It would, however,
answer the basic question, and would leave the
other questions to be determined later. At this
moment there are many things which the Joint
Chiefs of Staff wish to put through. The delay
Is hindering aggressive action on our part. These
could be put through almost at once if the Chiefs
of Staff knew that the fundamental question had
been decided. I have talked with General
William B. Smith, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and he has said such an order would be
acceptable "in order to relieve the log jam."
During these months of discussion as to
the disposition of COI, the agency was con-
tinuing its efforts. Propaganda under PIS
had developed to a point never before
reached in our history. By radio, pam-
phlets, pictures and other means, Ameri-
ca's meggne was dispatched to the world
and efforts were made to counteract simi-
lar enemy activities. R&A was receiving
more and more requests for work from 0-2,
ONI and A-2. The plans for Q-2 were pro-
gressing, when on 11 May the JCS asked
that erection of the building be postponed.*
FN had already found a place in the field
of political intelligence reporting. SA/G
had several missions ready for dispatch and
SA/B had approximately thirty agents in
the field and many other projects in course
of preparation.
The Roper committee had surveyed sev-
eral branches in the spring of 1942 and
minor organizational changes were effected
in conformance with its recommendations.
On 1 April Whitney, Chief of the London
office, resigned. The reason for his resig-
nation was a fundamental disagreement,'
albeit an impersonal one, with Donovan con-
cerning the expansion of COI activities and
the degree to which they should be inte-
grated with their British opposite numbers.
Donovan had always maintained that inde-
pendence must be preserved, particularly
In the field of secret intelligence, not only
for reasons of security of sources but in
order that various services could provide a
check on reports received. However, in the
case of Special Operationc, he believed that
25
� The JCS had in April requested that some of
the techniques of VP which had been developed
for Q-2 be adapted to the preparation of two
presentation rooms in their own building. This,
project was being executed in May.
..lepp- Secret
11
i4
t
1
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
it was was possible actively to collaborate with
SOE if separate unit command were pre-
served.
On 1 April the COI Service Command had
been activated by War Department order.
Training areas were set up with station com-
plement assigned by the armed services.
However, the necessary military authoriza-
tion for the organization of guerrilla units
was not forthcoming and activities in this
regard were delayed.
From 12 May to 16 May hear� ings were
held at the Bureau of. the Budget on esti-
mates for the approaching fiscal year. It
was anticipated that COI would thereafter
go before the House of Representatives De-
ficiency Appropriations Committee.*
By June, in addition to the organization
In Washington which was manned by some
2,000 personnel, field bases had been estab-
lished in London, Chungking and Cairo;
EIS had some 63 representatives through-
out the world; a clandestine radio network
In North Africa serviced some 15 secret in-
telligence and subversive agents there; SA/G
missions had been dispatched to Burma and
Tibet, and others were in Anal stages of
preparation; SA/B's agents were established
In key spots throughout the world.
On 8 June, having learned that the de-
cision to separate PIS from COI had been
reached, Donovan addressed one further
message** to the President If the FIS
was to be included in a new agency, he
proposed that "at the same time there be
Issued an order covering our relationship
with the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In our last conversation I understood you
to be of the opinion that whether the foreign
information was to be with us or not, you
wished me to report both to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and to you."
� These plans were modified when COI became
OSS and the agency continued to be financed
from the emergency funds of the President for
the next fiscal year.
�� See History File W-12, pp. 115-116.
-26
The 8 June memorandum continued:
I recognize that it would be necessary for us to
establish a close liaison with a foreign informa-
tion service, if that is to be separated, in order
that our handling of political and psychological
warfare and subversive activities for the Chiefs
of Staff will not come in conflict with the dis-
tribution of public information abroad. While we
would have to use the mediums and control of
the foreign information service, of course the
purpose and method would be entirely different
In carrying out our activities.
It is curious to note that at the very moment
when the British are beginning to come to cen-
tralization of the various activities we already
have under one tent, we have many theorists who,
because of a false logic, are seeking to break up
our own efficient centralization. The separation
of our foreign service is the beginning, and I do
hope, for the sake of the war effort, you will not
permit it to go farther. I say this frankly be-
cause you know that if you feel my usefulness
here is ended you have only to tell me so. I know
very well that with the assistance of men of
brains and character who have been with me, we
have built up a real wartime service for you. I
would not want to see it broken up without call-
ing it to your attention.
Having made this final statement, he as-
sured the President, "Whatever your deci-
sion Is, we will implement it loyally and
efficiently."
The decision had been made; there was
nothing to be done but await the announce-
ment of its terms: Donovan proceeded to
London with Goodfellow and Bruce to nego-
tiate the special operations agreements with
SOE which were to have such an important
effect upon the future of SA/G.
While he was there, the much-debated
and long-awaited order consolidating the �
Information services of the Government was
Issued on 13 June 1942. By Executive Or-
der of that date (Exhibit W-13) the Office
of War Information was established along
the lines proposed by the Bureau of the
Budget in March. To the new agency was
assigned the EIS Branch of COL CIAA
was not disturbed.
Simultaneously with the Executive Or-.
der, there was issued a Military Order (Ex-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
p-Seeret-
hibit W-14) which established the Office
of Strategic Services, comprising all of
COI except FIS, under the jurisdiction
of JCS. Donovan was appointed Director
of OSS.
The period of uncertainty as to the dis-
position of COI by the President gave way
to a new period of uncertainty as to the
future of OSS under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Seeret-
B. BRANCHES
1. The Coordinator's Office � �
The executive branch of the COI was the
Coordinator's Office, which, in addition to
his personal office and staff, comprised the
Liaison Office, the Executive Office, the Gen-
eral Counsel, and certain Special Assistants.
As various branches of COI were in the
preliminAry stages, however, they were
sometimes for brief periods attached to the
Coordinator's office. Thus in October 1941
when undercover intelligence and special
operations were being started, they were
designated Special Activities�K and L
Funds, and appeared on organization charts
(e.g., Exhibit W-15) as an appendage of
Donovan's office. Also, certain special un-
dertakings were included within this office
at various times.
This method of starting various branches
had the definite advantage of giving the
Coordinator close control in the formative
stage. � Also this system was necessary after
October 1941 when the approval of the
President did not suffice to allow a branch
to start its operations. There was some-
times a lag of some two or three months
before Budget approval could be obtained.
Thus the various activities attached to the
Coordinator's Office did not remain con-
stant. The Special Assistants quite often
were asked to explore the possibilities of
various proposals, some of which developed
Into branches.
The Coordinator's Office may be discussed
In terms of his personal office, the Liaison
Office, the General Counsel and the Execu-
tive Office. Special Undertakings will indi-
cate some other activities which were be-
gun in the Coordinator's Office and either
dropped after a short period of time, trans-
ferred to other agencies or developed into
Independent branches.
Personal Office. The Coordinator kept
close control over the organization and not
only personally guided it but took an active
part in its development. Probably no other
agency of the Government has been so
much the work of one man. Certainly,
COI/OSS reflected in no small measure the
variety of experience and catholicity of in-
terest of its chief.
No member of COI, however minor his
duties, went overseas without a personal in-
terview with Donovan. No report or sur-
vey was produced in COI that did not re-
ceive his personal examination. The daily
staff meetings served as a clearing house
for intra-organization problems and to as-
sure unity on policy questions. By the
spring of 1942 the� daily cables alone
amounted to some fifty to one hundred.
Each of these received his prompt scrutiny,
and action where appropriate. The fre-
quent memoranda to the President during
the COI period were, of course, personally
prepared.
In addition, there were relaticm with
other agencies and departments of the Gov-
ernment which required the Coordinator's
attention, as well as questions involving
parallel services of other United Nations.
By the spring of 1942, when there were
three major offices in New York and it was
necegAPry for Donovan to spend some time
there each week, an Assistant Coordinator
was needed. G. Edward Buxton, who had
organized and directed the Oral Intelli-
gence Unit in New York, was called to
Washington to fill this post. He became
second in command to Donovan, a post
which he filled until July 1945, when illness
caused his resignation.
Executive Officer. The Executive Officer
supervised the various administratile
branches which are described in Services
-Fep-Secref�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
below. Shortly Shortly after OSS was organized,
services were reorganized into a separate
branch and the Executive Office became
more military in nature.
Liaison Office. The Liaison Office was es-
tablished to make contact with outside
agencies and departments of the Govern-
ment from which COI was to secure infor-
mation. The first Liaison Officer was James
Roosevelt, son of the President. In the
early stages of COI the Liaison Office as-
sumed many other functions. It estab-
lished a Message Center, a Mail and Files
Section, and procedure for accessioning and
registry of documents. The Liaison Office
also organized a Transportation Section.
Problems were constantly arising in con-
nection with FIS personnel overseas. Ar-
rangements for passports for SA/B and
SA/G personnel which would preserve the
necessary security also proved troublesome.
The controversies which sometimes arose
due to misunderstanding of SA/B's pur-
poses and methods on the part of the State
Department came to rest in the Liaison Of-
fice. Most of SA/B's agents used State De-
partment pouch and cable. The Liaison
Office worked out arrangements with State
Department to permit COI personnel to
communicate with Washington headquar-
ters. In the case of pouch material this was
handled directly by the Liaison Officer; in
the case of cable material it was handled
by the Message Center, which was incor-
porated in the Liaison Office until the or-
ganization of a Communications Branch in
November 1942.
General Counsel. The General Counsel
dealt with the legal problems of COI and
acted as advisor to Donovan and the sev-
eral branches on such matters. It will be
noted in connection with the accounts of
branches that there were many occasions
where it was found necessary to organize
cover corporations. Also the matter of con-
tracts, not only for materiel, but for serv-
ices of undercover personnel, required a
great deal of attention by legal experts.
�TvirSetret�
30
The Office of the General Colinqpi gave
constant attention to the problems of Spe-
cial Funds.
Special Assistants. From time to time,
men with special qualifications were ap-
pointed as Special Assistants to the Coordi-
nator to carry out particular projects. Cer-
tain of these projects led to the creation
of important units and divisions.
One of the Special Assistants, for exam-
ple, developed various functional ap-
proaches to secret intelligence�counter-
intelligence and the use of labor and insur-
ance sources�working in close collaboration
with SA/B yet retaining, during the explor-
atory period, direction in the Coordinator's
Office. Later, under OSS, these activities
led to the creation of the Counter-Espio-
nage Branch and the Labor Section of the
Secret Intelligence Branch. Others of the
Special Assistants worked on over-all prob-
lems in connection with psychological war-
fare, and, in the OSS period, became mem-
bers of the Supporting Committee and rep-
resented the agency in the OSS period on
JCS committees.
Special Undertakings. It has been noted
that SA/B and SA/G began as "Special Ac-
tivities" in the Coordinator's Office. This
was true also of FN in its early stages of
protracted negotiations with the Bureau of
the Midget
One of the earliest Special Undertakings
was the Business Advisory Panel. Under
the direction of Meilen Cooper the services
of expert consultants were secured to de-
velop techniques for assisting the presenta-
tion of information and data by visual
methods. These consultants included ex-
perts in the fields of moving pictures, elec-
tronics, telephone and telegraph, and
others. Upon the organization of Visual
Presentation and upon the call to active
duty with the Air Force of Meria.n Cooper,
the Business Advisory Panel was dissolved.
The results of its studies were utilized in
the plans of the VP Branch. -
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
In July as a result of discussions between
Donovan and Elmo Roper, a Defense Mo-
rale Analysis Unit was established in the
Coordinator's Office to secure information
on the state of the public's mind on matters
which had to do with defense morale.
Roper secured the services of Dr. George
Gallup and others as advisors, and assem-
bled a full-time staff. He also made ar-
rangements for the National Opinion Re-
search Center at Denver to do field work
In connection with the project. On 24 Oc-
tober 1941 the Office of Facts and Figures
(OFF) was established. Since the func-
tions of the Defense Morale Analists Unit
obviously came within the purview of that
agency, Donovan transferred the unit to
OFF and made Roper's services 'available
on a loan basis to complete the organization
of the work.
In November 1941 there was established
In the Coordinator's Office a Field Psycho-
analytic Unit. This Unit was designed to
achieve a comprehensive conception of the
psychology culminating in the Nazi regime
by psychoanalytic studies of (1) conditions
In pre-Nazi Germany, (2) Nazi writings and
early speeches, and (3) patients in this
country with strong Nazi or Fascist tenden-
cies. In addition, the Unit was to make a
psychoanalytic evaluation of all informa-
tion reaching COI concerning conditions in
Germany and also to correspond with ref-
ugees and enlist the cooperation of psycho-
analysts in neutral countries. It was
thought that the Unit would be of great
assistance to FIS, not only in the matter of
suggestions for radio broadcast material,
but in printed propaganda. The Unit was
activated as a part of the Coordinator's Of-
fice but was almost immediately transferred
to OFF as a result of objections raised by
.the Bureau of the Budget.
2. Foreign Information Service--FIS
The first branch of COI to get into ac-
tual operation was FIS, which was charged
� -Top-Searot-
with the preparation and dissemination of
propaganda in the Eastern Hemisphere.
Since the days of the Revolution, when
Benjamin Franklin represented the new re-
public at the French court, the United
States had conducted sporadic and limited
propaganda activities abroad through its
diplomatic agents. During World War I
the Creel Committee on Public Information
directed the first organized American war-
time propaganda, but the war came to an
end before the Committee had developed a
full-fledged psychological warfare program.
For World War II, the United States Gov-
ernment had been more forehanded. By
the time COI was established, Nelson Rocke-
feller's organization, later CIAA, was al-
ready active in propaganda to Central and
South America, and OCD had been desig-
nated to handle domestic information prob-
lems. To FIS remained the task of direct-
ing propaganda toward potential allies and
enemies across the Atlantic and Pacific.
Donovan asked Robert E. Sherwood to or-
ganize and direct this work in June 1941.
Thus, plans for the propaganda branch
were well advanced and key personnel had
already been approached by 11 July; on 30
July space was leased at 270 Madison
Avenue, New York City; the first members
of the staff moved in a few days later.
FIS went through several organizational
phases, the names of divisions were changed,
and new divisions were added as need for
them became evident. It is intended here
to give only a brief general account of F13
arkrifnfAtration.
As first proposed by Sherwood, propa-
ganda operations would be concluded by a
Communications Division, composed of a
Board of Strategy, a Program Production
Section, a News Section, a Technical Radio
Section, and a section concerned with other
means of communication.
The Board of Strategy, as Sherwood then
conceived it, was to be an advisory board of
prominent journalists. The Program Pro-
duction Section would include actors and
31 �Zop-Seeret--
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
musicians as well as newsmen, and the
whole Division would operate as far as pos-
sible on an informal volunteer basis. Sher-
wood expected to rely heavily on free talent
and on the assistance which CIAA and the
private broadcasting companies, in coopera-
tion with BBC, would give. Prior to Pearl
Harbor, Sherwood opposed the practice of
subsidizing private companies, a procedure
that CIAA had adopted through its contracts
with CBS and NBC for Latin American
programs. He was also opposed to govern-
ment programming on these facilities. So
long as the United States was at peace, he
felt it best to leave the job of presenting the
American viewpoint to Eur9pe and Asia in
private hands, and to rely on the patriotic
cooperation of the broadcasting companies
and other necessary talent.
As actually established by administrative
order of 5 August 1941, the Communications
Division differed somewhat from this earlier
conception. Provision was made for a
Board of Strategy to review proposed poli-
cies and actions of the Division and to assist
it in the interpretation, from a strategical
standpoint, of information received from
the foreign field. The three sections estab-
lished by the order differed from the form
earlier suggested by Sherwood. There was
a News Room to maintain current informa-
tion on foreign and domestic developments
as reported by radio and press, a Programs
Unit to originate and develop radio pro-
grams to be presented by the private broad-
casting companies, and a Translators Unit
to provide bilingual translators and lan-
guage reviewers.* By October, these activi-
ties had been elevated to branch status as
the Radio News Branch, with News and Non-
News Divisions, each having a Washington
and a New York section.
On 12 November 1941 Sherwood was des-
ignated by administrative order (Exhibit
� Later a technical radio section and a section
to concern itself with other means of communi-
cation, both included in the original plans, were
added.
32
W-16) Deputy Coordinator and Administra-
tor of FIS, which would comprise a News
Division, a Radio Division and a Publica-
tions Division. The News Division was to
supplement the regular news service avail-
able to short-wave stations with information
of particular significance or with regular
news reports specially pointed for European
or Asiatic listeners. It received news from
all the press associations, collected back-
ground material on government activities,
and summarized the reports of foreign
broadcasts monitored by FCC, CBS and
NBC. The Radio Division had charge of
scheduling foreign short-wave broadcasts,
and operating the network of land-lines
which tied in with the privately-owned
short-wave transmitters. The Publications
Division would prepare and arrange for the
dissemination of leaflets, pamphlets, books,
picture magazines and the like, presenting
American strength and American inten-
tions to European, African and Asiatic audi-
ences.
After Pearl Harbor, F1S came to the con-
clusion that voluntary cooperation on the
part of broadcasters was not an adequate
basis for the operation of United States
propaganda. The chief objectives of pri-
vate broadcasters were technical experimen-
tation and the development of prestige for
the radio equipment which they manufac-
tured. Even with full reliance upon the
patriotism of the broadcasters this could
not lead to a satisfactory, coordinated pro-
gram
Two months after Pearl Harbor, the issue
of more effective government coordination
was raised by the presentation of a budget
request for $15,000,000 to buy time on the
existing short-wave stations, to develop ad-
ditional short-wave facilities in this country
and abroad, to buy short-wave receiving sets
for distribution in foreign countries, and
for other purposes. 21ction on this request
was deferred until the establishment of
ovn, but F1S, using other funds, did lease
time from three stations and started con-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top Secret
struction of a new short-wave station on
the West Coast. At this time a Facilities
Division was set up to cope with network
and traffic arrangements, re-broadcasting
operations, communications between the
United States and COI outposts, di�gemina-
ton of Morse code reports to foreign news-
papers and resistance movements, provision
of studios and recording facilities, and other
radio engineering problems.
In the spring of 1942 a reorganization
plan was proposed according to which the
Pictures and Publications and Outposts Di-
visions were to be detached from FIS. Sher-
wood's strong objections, and the imminent
reorganization of government information
services, prevented the implementation of
the program.
(a) POLICY AND PLANNING
One of the difficulties which beset FIS in
undertaking a task new to American policy
arose from lack of agreement on the defini-
tion of that task. Was the job "propaganda"
or (after Pearl Harbor) "psychological war-
fare", and what precisely was meant by
either term? Questions of definition af-
fected to some extent operations and policies
within COI, but far more important was the
effect of these questions upon COI's relations
with other agencies. Upon definition de-
pended the source of control, and this was
the issue upon which FIS and COI split.
Should the military or a civilian agency di-
rect American propaganda/psychological
warfare? And�a secondary issue�if ci-
vilian, which civilian? How close direction
should the State Department exercise?
"Propaganda", although a controversial
word to those who would determine whether
It must be evil or may be good, can be
taken for present purposes to mean the use
of ideological appeals and news manipula-
tion to advance national policy. That
covers a broad field, one in which the State
Department and, during wartime, the
armed forces are vitally concerned. But it
Is not as inclusive as "psychological war-
fare".
This, according to the definition later ap-
proved by the Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee,* is "the integrated use of all
means, moral and physical,�other than
those of recognized military operations, but
including the psychological exploitation of
the result of those recognized military ac-
tions,�which tend to destroy the will of the
enemy to achieve victory and to damage his
political and economic capacity to do so;
which tend to deprive the enemy of the sup-
port, figgistance, or sympathy of his allies or
associates or of neutrals. . . or which tend
to maintain, increase or create the will to
victory of our own people and allies and to
maintain, increase or acquire the support,
assistance and sympathy of neutrals."
Thus, psychological warfare would include,
for example, in addition to propaganda,
sabotage, guerrilla activities, bribery, black-
mail, pARAKsination, preclusive buying and
blockade controls other than those of a
strictly naval character.
On the surface, FIS had been established
to inform peoples outside the Western Hemi-
sphere about the United States�to impress
upon them the justice and desirability of
democracy's aims, the power of American
production (and, after Pearl Harbor, of the
American war effort), and to support with
all the weapons of publicity United States
foreign policy. In other words, COI, and
specifically FIS, was openly given the job
of conducting American propaganda to half
the world.
At the same time, the President, Donovan
and other officials were thinking in terms
of psychological warfare geared most closely
with military and intelligence ta-cirs Al-
though he thought it necessary generally
to condition the minds of foreign peoples
to democracy, Donovan was less concerned
with preaching "the American way of life"
than with the business of disrupting the
33
� See History File W-17, pp. 5-6.
�
�Toix-SaccaL
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�ToFrSwat�
enemy as an adjunct to military operations.
He saw propaganda as "a reconnaissance in
force," "the arrow of initial penetration
. . . in preparing . . . the territory in
which invasion is contemplated. It is the
first step�then Fifth Column work, then
militarized raiders (or 'Commandos'), and
then the invading divisions." (Exhibit
W-7) Once the United States became in-
volved in war, Donovan felt that COI should
become the agency to integrate and, where-
ever possible, actually conduct psychologi-
cal warfare in all its phases under the im-
mediate direction of the Chiefs of Staff.
The propaganda of FIS was to be one
weapon in this warfare; it was also to serve
as a cover under which more secret phases
of the war could be conducted.
However, Sherwood and many of the other
top men in FIS did not agree with Donovan's
views. To some of them, the use of "black"
propaganda by the United States in any
form was inadmissible. Others, including
Sherwood himself, felt that while The Voice
of America should adhere strictly to the
truth, "black" operations should be carried
on. The issue of "black" versus "white",
while it did exist, was not therefore an Im-
portant factor in bringing on the reorgan-
ization which finally separated F15 from the
remainder of COI. The question of control
was fundamental. Here, too, opinion in
FIS was not united on every point. Some
FIS officials were willing to accept direction
from the State Department, but many
others strongly opposed State Department
policy. (This conflict continued with in-
creasing heat after the creation of OWL)
Most of the top FIS officials were agreed,
however, on opposition to military control.
The war against the Lids was to them a war
of ideologies, and psychological warfare was
basically political rather than military in
nature. Moreover, they were strong sup-.
porters of President Roosevelt's domestic
policies, and looked on Donovan, and mili-
tary men in general, as "reactionaries" who
-414,-Seara0�
could not be trusted to carry out a truly
democratic political war.
In theory, FIS planning and policy were
based upon guidance from the State Depart-
ment on matters affecting national foreign
policy, upon intelligence and basic informa-
tion it received from its Outposts Division
and R&A, and upon the studies or special
knowledges of its own staff. The top au-
thority within FIS was the Planning Board,
whose members drafted Basic Plans for
propaganda strategy in various countries
or target areas. In the preparation of these
plans the drafting officers, who in each case
had considerable first-hand knowledge of the
country with which they were concerned,
could draw also upon such COI sources as
DI, the publications procured by 1DC, and
studies issued by FN, as well as materials
and advice received from the British, the
State Department, the War and Wavy De-
partments, the Department of Justice, the
BEW, and representatives of the Free
French and of various governments-in-exile.
The Basic Plans, although they varied
somewhat in form, consisted usually of five
principal parts: Propaganda Objectives,
Policy Goals, Appreciation, Political Objec-
tives and Themes. Broadly speaking, the
Propaganda Objectives were to convince the
people of the target area that the United
Nations were going to win the war, that
such a victory was to their advantage (al-
though not necessarily to their govern-
ment's advantage), that it would pay off to
assist the United Nations, and that the
United Nations understood and sympathized
with their particular points of view. A
section on Policy Goals consisted of a state-
ment of American war and peace aims for
the target area and was based primarily on
public statements by government officials
and on legislation (such as the Lend-Lease
Act) passed by Congress and approved by
the President. The Appreciation, a brief
description of the more salient characteris-
tics of the people in the target area from the
standpoint of propaganda, usually included
34
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
T Sec. et
an estimate of the military situation, a study
of the relevant factors in the national econ-
omy, references to historical, religious, edu-
cational and other social characteristics,
and reports on popular fictions and atti-
tudes which would affect the conduct of
American propaganda. The Political Ob-
jectives specified what propaganda should
be designed to accomplish�what the United
States wanted the target people or its gov-
ernment to do. The Basic Plans also in-
cluded a listing of the central themes or
fundamental arguments of American propa-
ganda.
Originally it was contemplated that the
men who prepared the Basic Plans would
also be the men responsible for executing
them. It was soon found, however, that
the two blsicx could not be performed by one
person, that formulation of policy was a
full-time job, as was the carrying out of
policy. During the COI period, however,
PIS was unable to solve satisfactorily the
problem of correlating planning and policy
effectively with operations. This was due
to a number of factors, some of which were
beyond the control of FIS. The Radio Di-
visions, for instance, were obliged from the
very nature of their work, to operate twenty-
four hours a day on a minute-to-minute
basis. The State Department and R&A, to
mention only two of the sources to which
FIS theoretically could look for guidance,
were not set up to operate on such a basis.
If the FIS output was to be controlled in
conformance to policy, policy in turn must
be clearly formulated�not out of a vacuum
but in accordance with official foreign
policy, military strategy and the best in-
telligence available to the Government. In
other words, FTS policy directives would
have to be cleared, at the very least, by
State, War and Navy Departments. The
machinery by which this could be done did
not exist, and its establishment was not an
easy task. Moreover, 0-2, ONI, State and
other sources of secret material were always
reluctant to allow to FIS access to such ma-
terial even for background or guidance in
long-range planning. As a result, FIS plans
were all too often based on wholly inade-
quate intelligence.
Another factor which made FIS plstnning
generally ineffectual was the split of PIS
between Washington, where in theory policy
was to be made, and New York, where opera-
tions were directed. The arguments in
favor of centering operations in New York
were difficult to overcome�broadcasting
and other communications facilities cen-
tered there, as. did the talent on which FIS
propaganda depended. But the separation
did make the gulf between operations and
planning practically unbridgeable. Many
of the members of the Planning Board,
which met in Washington, had their offices
In New York and their visits to Washington
grew less and less frequent. They were
operating men who felt perfectly capable
of proceeding without Washington inter-
ference. The suspicion developed in Wash-
ington that it was desire for freedom from
supervision, rather than communications
facilities, that kept most of PIS in New York.
A strong recommendation by the Executive
Officer that FIS operations be transferred
to Washington was in part a reflection of
this feeling, and was met by vigorous op-
position from Sherwood.
In May of 1942 the Chairman of the Plan-
ning Board resigned (transferring to an-
other branch of COI), stating in his letter
of resignation that "the organizational set-
up and procedure now contemplated (for
FIS policy direction) is not viable and will
lead to unnecessary misunderstanding and
friction." His specific complaints cen-
tered upon the New York/Washington split,
and he suggested that, if "some members
of the Planning Board in New York wish to
interest themselves primarily in opera-
tions," they might meet regularly in New
York as an "Operations Planning Group.:
� See History File W-12. pp. 26-27.
�fu e Seeref�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop--Seeret�
In the last days of COI the Planning
Board collapsed completely. The mechan-
ics of determining propaganda policy and
directing operations to conform to that
policy had not been found, either within
FIS or, more important, outside of COI.
It could hardly be expected that FIS could
conform to national policy when it had no
practicable method of determining from
those authorized to formulate that policy
what it actually was. The problem was one
that continued to plague OWI through most
of its existence.
(b) RADIO NEWS AND FEATURES
DIVISION AND RADIO PRODUC-
TION DIVISION
The Radio News and Features Division op-
erated news rooms in New York, Washington
and San Francisco, monitored American
short-wave broadcasts, analyzed enemy
propaganda, processed news for radio broad-
casts and for Morse transmission to various
parts of the world, and prepared radio fea-
ture material.
The Division was established in August
1941 and functioned originally as a supplier
of material, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
to the United States commercial short-wave
stations: Three NBC stations in New York
(RCAC, WNBI and WRCA); two CBS sta-
tions in New York (WCAB and WCBX);
Westinghouse Station WBOS in Boston;
World-Wide Broadcasting Foundation's
WRUL in Boston; two General Electric sta-
tions, WGEH and WGEC, in Schenectady;
Crosley station WLWO in Cincinnati and
General Electric's EGEI in San Francisco.
The material supplied by FIS at this time
consisted largely of background information
on news originating from Europe and re-
ceived by CBS in New York. For example,
If CBS monitored news of bread rationing in
France, FIS would supplement that report
by a Department of Agriculture statement
pointing out that France was a self-suffi-
cient country, and that rationing was the
�Tep-SeaFel�
fruit of German occupation. Thus political
significance was given to factual news by a
classic device of psychological warfare,
which was accepted even by those who re-
acted most strongly against other propa-
ganda techniques. The private stations
which received straight news material from
the press services welcomed this kind of con-
tribution from COI and made increasing use
of such items.
FIS also urged upon commercial stations
the desirability of broadcasting American
reactions to world events. Hitherto private
stations had virtually ignored American
newspaper Comments and reported only re-
actions from foreign countries. -
The Radio Production Division developed
out of the Foreign Language Division which
had been organized earlier as a result of re-
quests received from the private stations
for scripts written in foreign languages. On
13 October 1941 the first foreign language
script, in Czech, was teletyped to General
Electric in Schenectady. General Electric
asked � for more and, by the middle of No-
vember 1941, the Division had desks work-
ing on German, French, Italian, Spanish
and Portuguese, Czechoslovakian, Swedish,
Danish, Norwegian, Finnish, Greek, Turk-
ish, Dutch and Malayan, Polish, Chinese
Mandarin and Cantonese. These desks
were assisted by a prominent staff of re-
gional experts, translators and multi-lin-
gual monitors. Translation a csiAance was
also obtained from Shortwave Research
Inc., a private corporation established by
COI in October 1941 to (1) try out foreign
language writers before hiring them, (2)
use part-time talent which was difficult
under Civil Service, and (3) use aliens, an
Impossibility under Civil Service.
Soon after the creation of the Foreign
Language Division, FIS began to analyze
the contents of German broadcasts moni-
tored by CBS and FCC. These propaganda
analyses were issued weekly prior to Pearl
Harbor, after which they were issued every.
day. They were calculated to help the
33
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Foreign Language Division counteract
enemy propaganda lines, and though they
were in some respects a duplication of the
analyses prepared by FCC, they were faster,
more pointed, and suggested propaganda
treatment, particularly in connection with
the contradictions between different enemy
programs. Moreover, they were distributed
to radio commentators who did not have
access to the Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service analyses. �
Originally, the COI offices at 270 Madison
Avenue were not equipped for transmission.
When the actual broadcasts began, they
were transmitted from a truck belonging to
CBS, and relayed over the various private
stations whose network FIS was using. By
the end of 1941, a few transmitters had been
leased and COI began to broadcast from
Madison Avenue and from new studios
which it had rented at 224 West 57th Street
(which later became the main New York
office of OWI). In early 1942 the Division
Initiated a multiple voice technique * in its
short-wave broadcasts to Germany. This
technique was soon imitated by the British
and later by the Germans.
The recruitment of personnel for these
programs presented a major problem. The
Division required men with first-hand
knowledge of the areas to which they were
broadcasting and it wanted the principal
voice of each program to have an American
accent so that the programs would not be
labelled by their listeners as "refugee" pro-
ductions. But at the same time, it wanted
other voices which would have the precise
inflection which its listeners would find
most natural. For example, it sought to
avoid using an Austrian accent in a broad-
cast to Germany; for Italy, it sought a
Roman accent with a touch of Florentine,
and so on. For each man who was hired,
hundreds were tried out and rejected. The
stringent requirements resulted in the em-
� This technique had been used by the Russians
against the Germans in the fall of 1941.
37
ployment of a heterogeneous and very tem-
peramental crew. Novelists, journalists,
surrealist painters and others of a highly
artistic temperament were sought. In spite
of the feeling that refugees should not be
used too much, the lack of linguistically-
qualified Americans meant that many of
the "voices" turned out to have come but
recently from foreign parts. At first, a vio-
lent factionalism grew up and its reverbera-
tions were recorded in the press. However,
after this noisy beginning, the Division set-
tled down to produce. Starting with fif-
teen-minute programs six hours daily, by
June of 1942 FIS was on the Plr twenty-four
hours a day in twenty-seven different lan-
guages and dialects.
The outstanding program of FIS was the
Voice of America which went on the air for
the first time, in German, on 5 February
1942. Three weeks later, the program went
out in French, Spanish and Italian, each
language desk giving to the master news
and commentary the particular slant ap-
propriate to the target country. The Voice
of America was confident, calm, and largely
factual. It described Prime Minister
Churchill's visits to the United States, told
the stories of General MacArthur, of Colonel
Chennault and the Flying Tigers, and of
Stilwell's forces. It reported conferences of
Allied Theater Commands in London and
Chungking. It described the vast opera-
tions of Lend-Lease, emphasis'. ng their re-
ciprocal aspect. It quoted Axis statements
which events had proved false.
FIS was quick to turn AxLs, news items
against the enemy. In the spring of 1942,
for example, Voelkischer Beobachter re-
ported that extra trains had been busy for
three months providing disinfecting equip-
ment for the troops in Rits-sia ; FIS pointed
to this as corroboration of its previous warn-
ings that the war on the eastern front was
stirring up a typhus epidemic.. �
In its propaganda, FIS teed to influence
particular groups. It aimed programs,
specifically at women, at armies of occupa-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.-74P-sec.fer
tion, and at professional groups such as
physicians, professors and priests. It tried
to play on its listeners' fears, courage, ideal-
ism andgreed, and on their special interests.
This required constant attention to precise
phraseology; for example, in Italian broad-
casts FLS was careful to refer to "Mussolini%
Empire" rather than the "Italian Empire";
reference to Italian military losses was ac-
companied by an explanation that they
were not due to inferior native qualities of
Italian soldiers, but rather to lack of faith
In the Axis cause, bad Fascist strategy, or
Insufficient equipment. Broadcasts to the
Far East never referred to Inner Mongolia,
Outer Mongolia or Manchuria, recognizing
that the Chinese like to think of them as
Chinese provinces rather than separate po-
litical units. .
In capitalizing upon the differences and
antagonisms of Axis partners, F1S told the
Germans that they were handicapped by
weak and quarrelsome allies in Europe and
by an aloof, if not actually hostile, ally in
Asia. It told the Italians that Germany
and Japan were at best indifferent to Italian
interests. It told the Japanese that the
Germans and Italians disliked, despised and
distrusted the Japanese, that the basic in-
terests of European and Asiatic Axis part-
ners were hopelessly conflicting and that
the European partners were too weak to be
of much help to Japan anyhow. This last
argument did not look impressive early in
1942, but FIS tried to give it substance by
insisting that a juncture of Japanese and
German and Italian forces in the Middle
East during 1942 was essential for Axis
victory�and that such a juncture could
not be effected.
This FIB technique of committing the
enemy to an impossible or unlikely goal was
frequently employed at a time when the
Axis was winning victory after victory.
Since actual Allied victories in the immedi-
ate future could not be predicted, the best
that could be done was to secure "moral
victories" deriving from the Axis failure to
--rop-Seered-
clinch its triumph. "If no major German
offensive develops, point out that Hitler
must launch one this summer, and every
day that goes by diminishes his chances,"
ran a French Directive for the first half of
June. "If the real German offensive does
come, commit the Germans to total anni-
hiliation of the Red Army before winter as
the only objective of any value." � Simi-
larly, in the eastern theater, FLS, having
committed Japan to the conquest of Aus-
tralia, stated that the Japanese had suffered
a major and probably fatal check when
they were stopped at that continent's ap-
proaches.
� This technique, a purely defensive one,
must obviously be founded upon the best
possible intelligence if it is not to defeat
Its own purpose. F18 occasionally used it
under circumstances where it proved a
boomerang�as, for example, in connection
with Rommel's offensive in the spring of
1942."
The converse of this technique was never
to commit United States or Allied forces to
the capture of any enemy position. Mac-
Arthur's stand in Bataan, for example, was
given full dramatic play, but FLS was care-
ful not to give the impression that there was
any hope of indefinite resistance or of
rescue.***
Several special propaganda undertakings
of FIS deserve mention. An early one was
In connection with the Philippine campaign.
On the evening of 28 December 1941, a rep-
reseritative of 0-2 brought to Donovan's
office a cablegram from General Mac-
Arthur urging immediate and positive ac-
tion to restore Philippine morale. Twenty-
four hours later, Donovan reported to the
President that FIS bad: (1) Obtained and
broaticast official White House assurances
38
� See History File W-13, Chapter XIII, p. 2.
� � This unfortunate episode is described in His-
tory File W-I3, Chapter xra, p. 2.
� � � However, President Quezon complained that
COI broadcasts over XOEI did give the Impres-
sion that aid was coming during early January.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
to the Filipinos that the United States was
fighting for their freedom and would estab-
lish their independence, that its Navy was
neither destroyed nor in hiding, and that
continued resistance to the Japanese would
be worthwhile to them; (2) hired as repre-
sentative in the Philippines an NBC opera-
tive, and arranged to get FIS programs to
Manila for rebroadcast. (KGEI, then the
only short-wave station on the West Coast,
had no land-line to RCAC for point-to-point
transmission to Manila. But it did have a
land-line to NBC which in turn had one to
RCAC. NBC engineers agreed to patch the
line across their master control board.)
Therefore, all six Philippine home sta-
tions and the six Philippine short-wave sta-
tions were broadcasting the President's
statement two and one-half hours after he
had made it, and Manila newspapers, re-
ceiving the text from the new PIS repre-
sentative, rushed out with extras.
By the time Donovan reported to the
President, arrangements had been made for
each of the twelve Philippine stations to
rebroadcast eight FIS programs daily. In
addition, the six short-wave stations were
to take, as a starter, one half-hour program
In Japanese, one quarter-hour in Mandarin
and one quarter-hour in Cantonese.
- As the Japanese gained ground in the
Philippines and lines of communication
began to be cut, FIS arranged for rebroad-
casts from Batavia and Singapore. Late in
January, MacArthur asked for entertain-
ment broadcasts to bolster the morale of
his troops, and PIS put on programs featur-
ing Jack Benny, Bing Crosby, Bob Hope,
Fred Allen, and Eddie Cantor. It continued
to send out hopeful news, but the reaction
to this was mixed. The Navy Department
requested that it be cut;* MacArthur re-
quested that it be increased. The truth was
that the facts did not permit saying the
� This may have been purely on communica-
tions grounds.
things that the men in the Philippines
wanted to hear. - � -
Donovan was under no illusion that FIS,
in its Philippines broadcasts, was acting as
a spearhead of penetration, but there was
nothing that could be done about it. "The
greatest difficulty in broadcasting any en-
couragement is the lack of events," he wrote
Wilkinson on 19 February! "It is easy
to have good propaganda when you are
getting the breaks. It is hard when you
are not. . . . It is for that reason that we
would be very grateful to have [news of]
even minor naval events which we could ex-
ploit."
� The kinds of entertainment broadcasts
for American troops initially directed to the
Philippines were subsequently developed
into special PIS programs for all American
troops stationed abroad. These included
general news and features, sports news,
humor, popular music and original stories
by writers such as John Steinbeck, Russell
Crouse and Rex Stout. Eventually these
Programs were taken over by Army Special
Services which credited PIS with having
performed in this field work "of the greatest
porsible value." *10
PIS news and features activity led not
only to the reporting of news but occasion-
ally to its creation. In the winter of 1942
when the situation in Russia looked ex-
tremely serious, Ta.ss, the Soviet news
agency, asked whether an official American
message to the Soviet forces could be ob-
tained for Red Army Day, 22 February.
PIS requested such a message from Mac-
Arthur, who responded with a glowing trib-
ute to "the courageous Russian Army" and
Its "smashing counter-attack which is driv-
ing the enemy back to his own land." -He
further stated: "The scale and grandeur of
this effort mark it as the greatest military
achievement in .all history." *** Disgemi-
� See History File W-12, p. 48.
� � See History File W-12, p. 49.
" � See History File W-12, p. 50.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seerel-
nated throughout the world, this message
probably did much to correct the prevail-
ingly bearish opinion about Soviet military
strength and to improve Soviet-United
States relations.
The difficulties that COI sometimes en-
countered in trying to follow official foreign
policy are illustrated by the special radio
campaign against Laval in the spring of
1942. At this time Germany was putting
pressure on Vichy to set up a collaboration-
ist cabinet with Laval as virtual dictator.
FIS sought to discredit the policy of collab-
oration by identifying it with Laval's per-
son, which was described unflatteringly in
speeches, articles, slogans and songs. A
directive of 28 March stated : � "Hatred of
Laval is so general in France that there is
no risk of alienating any sympathies if we
attack him violently . . . make it quite
clear that the Lavalization of France means
a break in diplomatic relations between
France and America and loss of all American
sympathy for France unless the French
people do their best to resist it by force."
For more than two weeks the Voice of
America harped on this theme. Although
the State Department had authorized, and
In some cases requested, these threats, the
appointment of Laval as Premier on 15 April
was followed by a State Department request
that FIS stop its attacks. This left Ameri-
can propaganda in an embarrassing situa-
tion. FIS was obliged to halt its warnings
of early action Lind to do the best it could
by taking a long-range view in a new direc-
tive:** "It is vitally important for us that
there should be a clean psychological break
In France. . . . If we appear to be accept-
ing the Laval regime they (the French) will
tell themselves that after all, it may be bad
but it is not the end of everything. If, how-
ever, they see that America considers it a
total capitulation and looks upon France
as an occupied country with a Quisling gov-
ernment, then they will know that the
� See History File W-12, p. 51.
�� See History File W-12, p. 52.
-I-
situation is really serious. If, for tactical
reasons, it is found desirable to maintain
diplomatic relations with Vichy for a while
longer, it is more important than ever that
we should make our position absolutely
clear in our broadcasts. . . ."
By June 1942, when FIS was separated
from COI and became part of OWL, its for-
eign radio operated twenty-four hours a day
with a change of program every fifteen
minutes. As early as March it was sending
out a midnight newscast, a sunrise news-
cast, a Finnish-Swedish newscast and a
daily Leopoldville mestgage; the Voice of
America was spreading its gospel in Ger-
man, French, Italian, Finnish and English;
a special feature script "United America
Fights" was being broadcast in English,
French, Danish, German, Itniistn, Portu-
guese, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish; Turk-
ish and Egyptian-Arabic programs were
being produced six days a week; propaganda
analysis reports Were being issued two or
three times a day; and news reports were
being cabled regularly (in most cases once
or twice a day) to Chungking, Australia,
Stockholm and Cairo (via London), Iceland
and Greenland, Switzerland and Leopold-
ville.
(c) RADIO TECHNICAL DIVISION
During most of the COI period, actual pro-
duction of the material that the Radio News
and Features and Radio Production Divi-
sions prepared and collected was dependent
upon the cooperation of the private broad-
casters, since FIS had no transmitters of its
own for a substantial period. The private
broadcasters themselves had a total short-
wave wattage less than that of Poland and
only one-tenth that of Great Britain.
At the inception of COI the programs
that went out over American short wave
were completely uncoordinated and did not
reflect a consistent American viewpoint
CBS and NBC had short-wave transmitters
and small staffs who broadcasted for brief
periods in English, French, Arabic, Germat
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ii
Portuguese and Spanish. General Electric
and Westinghouse had short-wave trans-
mitters, but the only programming done by
either was General Electric's broadcasts
from the West Coast in English. Dutch and
French. World-Wide Broadcasting Com-
pany (WRUL) broadcasted in Dutch, Dan-
ish, ^rench, Polish, Yugoslav, German and
Arabic, using exiles as announcers. Some
private broadcasters allowed governments-
in-exile to broadcast special pleas presented
by speakers who were not always identified.
Prior to the establishment of COI, the
companies engaging in foreign language
broadcasts, although not following any cen-
tralized policy, had made their own contacts
In the Government so as not to go too far
afield. This voluntary and haphazard
system did not prevent speakers on the
American radio from talking with the voice
of Greek Monarchists, France Forever, and
other special interest foreign groups rather
than with the Voice of America. One of the
most important problems COI had in the
field of radio was the coordination of those
different voices. This was particularly diffi-
cult because the private companies feared
that intrusion in their foreign broadcasts
might constitute an opening wedge for gov-
ernment ownership of their domestic fa-
cilities.
On 10 July 1941, the day before COI was
officially established, Sherwood wrote a
memorandum � to Donovan summing up
this situation:
Shortwave radio is a vital strategic weapon,
political and military in character. Its use must
be directed by the coordinated intelligence of all
services and departments. The right programs
must be directed from the right stations to the
right regions at the right hours, with emphasis
on the fact that the USA is speaking to the world
with unanimitr.
Furthermore, all private companies doing for-
eign shortwave broadcasting should follow the
policy of the one official agency. . . . It is be-
lieved that the few private companies will volun-
tarily cooperate on this. . . .
� See History File W-8c, Tab B.
41
-fop-Seeret-
COI, in an effort to secure such coopera-
tion, arranged meetings with the private
broadcasters where it was agreed that FIB
should supply them with background infor-
mation relevant to the news. Such infor-
mation was labelled: 'Tor your information
or for broadcast if desired." .5 In August
1941, the private companies appointed
Stanley P. Richardson Coordinator of In-
ternational Broadcasting, to act as a kind
of arbiter of FIS radio material. Thereto-
fore, NBC, CBS and WRUL might all be
broadcasting in French at the same time;
Richardson, with the assistance of FIS, was
to draw up schedules which would assure a
regular pattern of broadcasts. Richardson
also had the right to censor PIS material.
The cooperation of the private broad-
casters was not too easily obtained, even in
this limited form of government coordina-
tion. Donovan took an active part in the
negotiaticns and was finally able to win
the reluctant broadcasters to his plans.
Nevertheless, from COI's point of view, the
arrangement was by no means perfect since
It left FIS subordinate to Richardson.
Moreover, Richardson, although cooperative
In spirit, viewed the FIS contributions with
extreme caution if not actual suspicion, and
on several occasions went directly to the
State Department for directives on COI ma-
teriaL� �
Richardson also adhered to a number of
arbitrary newspaper rules which hampered
the work of FI8 as a government agency.
One of these was that information should
not be reported without indicating a source.
The State Department might, for example,
Inform PIS that it had information suggest-
ing that the Hungarians were about to place
seventeen divisions under German com-
mand, at the same time forbidding FIS to
quote the Department on the matter. If
FIS then prepared a script calculated to
� See History File W-12, p. 3.
� This situation was corrected, however, after
Donovan brought it to the attention of Uncle;
Secretary Welles.
�Top-Socret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
discourage such a move, Richardson, on be-
half of the licensees, would bar it on the
grounds that no source was given for the
Information. In order to get around such
rulings, the FIS developed a number of
private sources who were willing to have
Information attributed to them.
During the fall of 1941, the private com-
panies made increasing use of FIS back-
ground material. Presently, this material
began to assume the form of actual broad-
casts. The licensees gradually acquired the
habit of calling on FIS for guidance on gov-
ernment policy, and COI's suggestions be-
gan to be characterized by a certain firm-
ness. �
By that time all but two of the privately
owned short-wave transmitters were tied
together by a system of land-lines, for which
COI paid the costs. This so-called "Bronze"
network made it possible for the stations
to benefit mutually from the language skills
of their respective staffs. The Radio Di-
vision also arranged for the purchase by the
British through Lend-Lease funds of a
medium-wave transmitter, and for the re-
broadcast of United States programs by a
British short-wave transmitter and sema-
phore.
After Pearl Harbor, the need for central-
ization became acute. On 7 December 1941,
all six private companid operating short-
wave transmitters agreed with FIB to broad-
cast no news originating from sources
other than the major press associations and
F13 or CIAA without checking such ma-
terial with FIS before it was broadcast. On
11 December, Sherwood called a meeting
with the representatives of the private com-
panies to discuss further controls This
meeting indicated that the private compa-
nies were not convinced of the desirability
of government control of short-wave broad-
casting.
� On 27 January 1942, Donovan requested
authority from the President to negotiate
with the short-wave broadcasting companies
for the leasing of all time on all existing
�Tep-Seeref--
42
International transmitters. He undertook
to cooperate with the CIAA in the alloca-
tion of time to South America. He further
requested authority to contract for the
building of twenty or thirty additional
transmitters which would increase the total
broadcasting power of the United States
from approximately 500,000 watts to ap-
proximately 2,500,000 watts. The Presi-
dent approved these requests but the Bureau
of the Budget would not grant the neces-
sary funds. COI was obliged to content it-
self with making suggestions for the im-
provement of station facilities already in
operation.
Although the Government did not lease
all American transmitters until late in 1942,
FIS immediately after Pearl Harbor bought
a 100-kilowatt transmitter from General �
Electric in Schenectady. This was shipped
to San Francisco for use in broadcasts to
the Far East. It was badly needed, because
of the eleven international short-wave
broadcasting transmitters in operation in
the United States at that time, ten were
located east of the Mississippi and were con-
cerned primarily with Europe and Central
and South America.
Another PIS achievement in the radio
operational field was taking over the most
powerful foreign transmitter in the coun-
try�WLWO, a Crosley-owned citation in
Cincinnati. Beginning 10 March 1942,
PIS provided WLWO with all its programs
daily from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m., and subse-
quently it took over all WLWO program-
ming from 1 a.m. until 5 p.m. FIS also
furnished Scandinavian broadcasters to
WBOS in Boston for the hours between 2
p.m. and 5 p.m. In accordance with a sug-
gestion from FIS, V7BOS changed its direc-
tional antennae so as to give it a powerful
signal throughout Scandinavia, Eastern
Europe and the Middle East, including
India.
In general, however, short-wave radio dur-
ing the FIS period was inadequate as a
mass propaganda weapon. This was nor
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ve, Secret--
the fault of PIS but was due to the fact
that short-wave sets had always been costly
and spare parts and repairs for them became
practically unobtainable in wartime. More-
over, in most of the areas America wanted
to reach, the possession of short-wave sets
was forbidden. Consequently, it was clearly
Important to obtain an outlet for American
programs from some more effective base.
Sherwood and other FIS executives found
the British authorities eager to encourage
an official American radio voice directed at
European countries. A few weeks after
Pearl Harbor, FIS had successfully con-
cluded negotiations in London for three
daily medium-wave broadcasts of fifteen
minutes each in Italian, French and Ger-
man. A ten-minute broadcast in English
was soon added. Making use of BBC trans-
mitters, these programs were first produced
by recording in the United States and
shipped by Air Express. Later they were
piped over by telephone and recorded.
Eventually, they were sent by radio and
rebeamed.
By mid-April, the London schedule of
FIS had been expanded to a total of eight
hours and fifteen minutes in five languages
every week, and the British were offering an
additional twelve hours weekly whenever
FIS could supply programs.
In addition to these re-broadcasts, ma-
terial for broadcast was sent out by cable
and radio-telephone and telegraph to four-
teen points in Europe, Africa and the Middle
and Far East. Radio reports in Morse code
at a low rate of speed suitable for dictation
were directed at individual listeners, par-
ticularly at members of the various anti-
Axis undergrounds in occupied countries
who were thus able to spread the news by
word of mouth and underground publica-
tions. Of all the short-wave broadcasting
beamed at Europe from this country, it
seems likely that these were the most
useful. _ -. � �
(d) PICTURES AND PUBLICATIONS
DIVISION �
The Pictures and Publications Division of
PIS was established 2 October 1941. Its
responsibility was to spread American
propaganda through booklets, pamphlets,
leaflets, posters, paintings, cartoons, books,
magazines, newsreels, "personal" letters,
stickers, labels, phonograph records, films
and photographs. It printed its rePgsage
on everything from paper cups, notebooks,
cards, blotters and paper matches, to fold-
ers of needles and thread, and packages of
soap, chocolate and vitamin tablets. Al-
together it operated in some eighteen lan-
guages�Afrikaans, Arabic, Chinese, Danish,
Finnish, French, German, Hebrew, Italian,
Japanese, Norwegian, Persian, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish and
various Filipino dialects.
The Division's most important service was
the photographic one. In Spain, for ex-
ample, in the course of six months, COI was
able to effect an almost complete substitu-
tion of American pictures for Axis pictures
previously shown.
Having neither facilities nor money for
Its own pictures and news agency, it bought
from such private agencies as Wide World,
and arranged for the widest possible show-
ing in foreign countries of Hollywood fea-
tures, such as "Gone With The Wind". It
urged the producers to release pictures even
In cases where they could only be paid in
frozen funds. It assembled and distributed
political "shorts" and arranged to have
special prints of standard commercial news-
reels synchronized with comments in the
appropriate foreign languages. In May
1942 COI was able to persuade the six Ameri-
can newsreel companies to form the "United
Newsreel Corporation" to produce newsreels
for foreign distribution for the duration of
the war. The calibre of the newsreels pro-
duced can be judged from the fact that the
British protested that they were being
pushed entirely out of the field in Sweden,
� .-Fop-,Seere#-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-4ap-Secrot-
and that when the first newsreel was dis-
tributed in Switzerland people waited in line
for. more than two blocks to see it. The
newsreels were also extremely successful in
China, and, after they had been shown by
our Embassy in Moscow for some time, ar-
rangements were made to have them shown
all over Rncmig
In the field of "still" photographs, the
Division made some itself, but bought most
of its supply, from the Associated Press
Acme, INP and various government sources.
These pictures were sent either by radio-
photo or in diplomatic pouch by a special
mat to practically every neutral and Allied
country in Europe. Since air transporta-
tion was very tight, lightweight paper prints
were obtained and tiny pictures as well as
special mats were sent by diplomatic pouch.
As posters, FIS used both paintings and
photographs, but posters proved to be one
of the less successful vehicles. They could
hardly be displayed in Axis or occupied
countries and FIS was not to operate in
the American field. Almost half of the
million-odd posters produced by FIS were
destined for China, but never reached there
because of the closing of the Burma Road.
Comic cartoons ridiculing the Axis were
also produced, as was a serious cartoon book-
let on the life of President Roosevelt. The
latter was a great success in Turkey where
It was so well received that circulation of
Turkish newspapers fell off during its sale.
One pictorial form of FIS propaganda
was especially effective in areas such as the
Arabic and Chinese speaking lands where
Illiteracy is prevalent and motion picture fa-
cilities rare. This was the slide film pro-
jector. Slide films were made up on such
subjects as the American Army, American
agriculture or great American naval vic-
tories. The projector could throw the pic-
ture on a small screen or even on a blank
wall, and the showing was accompanied by
a comments.ry in the local dialect. Other
distributional techniques utilized, and some-
times pioneered, by the Division included
plastic printing plates, a twelve-ounce
mimeograph machine and a twenty-pound,
hand-operated printing press. - � - -
The foregoing vehicles for propaganda
were more useful in neutral and Allied ter-
ritories than elsewhere. To penetrate
enemy and occupied territory, FIS prepared
small, light devices which could be smug-
gled over frontiers, dropped from planes and
easily concealed. In this category were
cards, stickers, folders, leaflets, pamphlets
and booklets. FIS booklets, of which more
than 8,600,000 were produced during the
COI period, ranged from one in Japanese
commiserating with the Japanese soldier
on his unhappy condition because of his
lack of anything like Special Services, to
"The Nazi War Against the Catholic
Church," a scholarly, factual document
bound in black imitation Bible leather and
printed in many languages, which was pub-
lished under the sponsorship and imprint of
the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
Anti-Nazi Japanese pamphlets were pre-
pared by FIS before Pearl Harbor. By 20
December, a four-page folder in Japanese
was ready for dissemination. Subsequent-
ly, a Japanese translation was made of the
President's last-minute appeal to Hirohito.
Leaflets for the Philippines in three colors
were flown out in February.
Altogether, FIS printed over 28,000,000
copies of Japanese leaflets, but not all of
these were actually distributed. The leaf-
lets contained attacks on the Emperor and
emphasized the power of America and the
destructive effects of bombing. They went
In heavily for historical references and puns,
to which the Japanese are addicted. One
was called "The Falling Flowers of Yedo"
(Yedo refers to old Tokyo and "Falling
Flowers" to fires, hence, incendiary bombs) ;
one side of the leaflet showed a picture
of Tokyo after the great earthquake of
1923, the other showed a picture of Liibeck
after the bombing raid of 28-29 March 1942.
"This is what happened to a city of steel.
44
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
and concrete," the text ran, "What will
happen to your cities of paper and wood?"
One of the first problems to be solved in
this field was to find Japanese type, of
which there was only a limited amount in
this country. F18 was able to secure the
only Japanese type on the Eastern Sea-
board. It turned out that the only set of
matrices in the Western Hemisphere for
casting Japanese type was about to be sold
as junk in Seattle, and the Chief of the
Division, realizing that the Army and Navy,
as well as FIB, would be needing Japanese
type in increasing amounts, purchased
these matrices for $7,500 even though he
was not able to get proper authority to do
so. The purchase was eventually approved
and arrangements were made with the Har-
vard Language Institute for storage and
operation there.
The Division's Japanese program com-
prised about fifty leaflets and booklets.
Some of these went by air but most of them
had to go by slower means. Many hun-
dreds of thousands were shipped to India
by boat.
In preparing its Japanese pamphlets, FIS
received considerable assistance from Brit-
ish SOE. As early as October 1941, SOE
suggested some of the themes for FIS post-
ers illustrating American naval and air
strength. SOE also provided Japanese
translations for the captions. British as-
sistance not only improved the calibre of
the translations but also prevented FLS
from making a number of errors. The first
twelve American leaflets in the Japanese
language were largely their work. In all,
the text and translation of some forty-one
different Japanese propaganda leaflets
were prepared by the Japanese section of
SOE/New York in collaboration both with
the COI and, later, the OWL One of these
produced startling effects on Guadalcanal,
where, for the first time in any war, Japa-
nese troops, including officers, were induced
to surrender by prornisAs of good treatment
from the enemy. .
145
In the European Theater, the first FIB
leaflet, contRining a message from America
to the French people and a picture of the
Statue of Liberty, was dropped on France
by the RAF in January 1942. Negotiations
with the RAF had begun about a week after
Pearl Harbor. They were carried on with-
out any reference to State or War Depart-
ments since Sherwood feared that it would
take months to get their decision. News
that the first leaflets had been dropped was
released from the White House.
By June 1942 FIB reported to Donovan
that PWE had prepared for them five Ameri-
can leaflets which had been dropped by the
RAF. Other leaflets "which to all practical
Intents and purposes have been American"
bad also been dropped by the RAF and in
some cases distributed through subversive
channels. FIB urged that the time had
come to make careful preparations for its
own production of leaflets in England, and
particularly for their distribution by Ameri-
can aircraft. As early as 14 January 1942
Donovan had written a memorandum on
this latter point to the President. The
President referred him to General Arnold
who agreed in recommending that our first
bombing nog-dons in force should carry
leaflets. He stated, however, that this
would not become practicable until early
summer. It was not until after the dissolu-
tion of COI that American leaflets were dis-
tributed over Europe by American planes.
In addition to pictures, pamphlets and
leaflets, the Division operated through
books, magazines and news and personal
letters. Its book section helped foreign
publishers obtain rights to American
books and sent copies of useful American
propaganda volumes to Sweden, Brazza-
ville and Cairo, but it never accomplished
very much. This was attributed to diffi-
culties with authors' rights, unfortunate
selection of personnel and to the bulk in-
volved in shipping books.
In the magazine field, the Division went
En Guardia, published in Spanish and Por-
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
tuguese by 'CLTA, .to Spain and Portugal_
It also distributed or helped distribute Na- -
tional Geographic, Reader's Digest, Life,
Saturday Evening Post, Newsweek and
Time. Occasionally, it sent abroad single
Issues of a magazine because of a particular
article, such as "Foundations of Peace", by
Vice-President Wallace, in the January 1942
Issue of the Atlantic Monthly. According
to the State Department, this article was
reprinted in the French edition of the local
newspaper in Tangier and made a deep im-
pression on influential French persons.
Pictures and Publications also prepared
one issue of a proposed magazine for foreign
distribution called Victory. On 26 May
1942 the COI Committee on Organization
presented to Donovan an adverse report on
this project, and the magazine was not is-
sued during the existence of COL
On 11 March 1942 the Division distributed
its first cabled weekly newsletter. This was
intended to provide a background to the
news. It included material not likely to
be covered either in commercial or State
Department cables and was sent to the
American Embassy in Madrid and the Lega-
tions in Lisbon, Bern and Stockholm. Sub-
sequently Cairo, Teheran, London and Dub-
lin were added. The news letter also re-
ceived secondary dissemination by American
diplomatic missions. The Madrid news
letter, for example, was mailed to ten thou-
sand addresses every week.
By May, specialized news letters directed
at professional groups were under way.
Of these, a medical letter was the most suc-
cessful. It was largely devoid of aggres-
sive propaganda, and was intended to serve
as a constant reminder of the intellectual
capacity and humanitarian spirit of the
American people. A doctor in Sweden who
received a copy wrote that it was the first
decent thing that had happened to him in
four years. To many American-educated
Chinese doctors it brought almost the first
working knowledge of such new medical de-
velopments as the sulpha drugs. It had a
46
wide circulation and influence in the Arab
countries and penetrated also into enemy-
occupied territories.
In the field of personal letters, Pictures
and Publications sought to spread rumors
which did not necessarily bear close relation
to the truth. In the spring of 1942 it ar-
ranged with American and British censor-
ship authorities to clear such letters, but
Its program in this field was never fully
developed.
(e) THE OUTPOSTS DIVISION
The Outposts Division was established in
the spring of 1942 to undertake the collection
overseas of propaganda intelligence, to wage
psychological warfare in the field and to pro-
vide assistance to the Special Services
Branch of the War Department in keeping
up the morale of American forces stationed
abroad.
Propaganda intelligence consisted of in-
formation about the strengths and weak-
nesses of the peoples against whom propa-
ganda was to be directed, their sus-
ceptibilities and prejudices of which propa-
ganda should take account, and the reac-
tions to American propaganda already being
directed at them. It consisted also of de-
tailed information on the channels and
media through which propaganda might
reach these peoples.
Outposts representatives were also � to
carry on field propaganda activities. Some
of the material they were to disseminate
arrived in finished form, ready for use. Some
arrived in semi-finished form and some had
to be prepared and produced, as well as dis-
seminated, by the Outposts representatives
themselves. Pictures, pamphlets, posters
and leaflets�all the various products of
the Pictures and Publications Division�
might be involved. Whenever possible,
short-wave radio programs from the United
States had to be re-broadcast on medium-
wave to reach a larger audience. Material
received on microfilm had to be reproduced
in form suitable for circulation. Printing,
equipment had to be dispatched, set up and
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-To,.. S.,:t
operated. Channels of distribution had to
be opened and editors persuaded to use FIB
materials.
Assistance to the Special Services Branch,
first provided by PIS through the radio news
and feature programs for American soldiers,
was extensive. In many cases Outposts
representatives were the only men avail-
able in the field who could arrange radio
programs, obtain reading matter and or-
ganize other means of entertaining the
troops. The Outposts Division subsidized
local radio stations or purchased time from
them for the re-broadcast of American pro-
grams. (This phase of its work was par-
ticularly important in Hawaii, Alaska, Ice-
land and Australia.) Another aspect of the
Division's work for Special Services was its
effort to persuade local populations to ac-
cept the American occupation of their coun-
tries. This occasionally aroused misgiv-
ings in the State Department, but PIS was
able to overcome the Department's opposi-
tion by pointing to specific requests from
Special Services. (One example was the
sending of Outposts men to Australia de-
spite original State Department objections.)
In connection with these three functions,
the Outposts Division assisted the Radio
Technical Division in the distribution of
radio receiving sets and played a part in the
recruiting, training and supervising of per-
sonnel for overseas service.
The first foreign outpost of PIS was in
London, where an office was established in
October 1941. Administratively, however,
the London office was handled independ-
ently of the Outposts Division. The next
major outpost,* established in Chungldng
before the creation of the Outposts Division,
came under its direction later. In August
1941, Brigadier General John Magruder**
� One MS man had been sent to Iceland in the
fall of 1941. �
� � General Magruder joined OSS in the sum-
mer of 1942. In January 1943 he became Deputy
Director�Intelligence Service (see Section II-B-1
below). In July 1945 he was also appointed an
Assistant Director.
vent to Chungking as Chief of the Military
Mission to China. Before he left, Donovan
had suggested to him that he have an offi-
cer or journalist attached to his mission to
handle COI work. Although nothing was
done at the time, after Pearl Harbor and
a spate of anti-American propaganda from
the Japanese in China, General Magruder
radioed the War Department recommend-
ing that Donovan's suggestion be recon-
sidered. He also recommended that a
group of counter-propagandists be attached
to the Embassy in China, suggesting the ap-
pointment of F. M. Fisher, United Press
correspondent in China, as their chief.
Magruder's message was received at 11:30
p.m. on 17 December 1941. By 6:00 p.m.
the following day, Fisher had been trans-
ferred from the United Press to COI as
Chungking Director of PIS; FLS had set up
a Fax East Desk in Washington and was
preparing to file a two-thousand word news
report daily to Fisher; COI had established
a $10,000 credit for Fisher to draw upon for
counter-propaganda activity; and arrange-
ments had been made with RCA for direct
transmission of material to Chungking
from San Francisco. The first report went
out on 19 December. Subsequently, a
weekly service of microfilmed current maga-
zine and newspaper material was added.
Some months later an outpost was set
up in India more or less by accident. Late
In January 1942 Robert Aura Smith, a
veteran Far East correspondent, was sent
by ship to join Fisher in Chungking. The
fall of Rangoon occurred while Smith was
en route, and he was instructed by cable to
explore the possibility of an Indian service.
Smith started the New Delhi outpost in
April. He had brought with him two thou-
sand pounds of printing equipment and
paper and arranged for cable wireless serv-
ice. His first step was to begin a Voice of
America radio program. By that time there
was already a sizable contingent of Ameri-
can troops in India and, in cooperation with
the Government of India, Smith made tht
47
�rep-Secret
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
_
.-rep
first American motion picture there�"Our
American Allies". His news service was well
received by the Indian papers. Be ar-
ranged a special file of news for American
troops.
Smith was obliged to recruit his staff lo-
cally, since the State Department would not
sanction the sending of any Outposts men
to India, and his own presence there led to
many difficulties between PIS and the De-
partment. State had approved Smith for
Chungking but not for New Delhi, and held
that his presence and activities in India
were wholly unauthorized. One result of
these difficulties was to encourage PIS to
set up its own cipher system so that It was
no longer dependent on State for the clear-
ance of its cables.
By June 1942 outposts had been estab-
lished in Lisbon, Stockholm, Bern, Brazza-
ville, Capetown, Cairo, Ankara, Honolulu
and Reykjavik, and personnel were await-
ing transportation for posts in Beirut, Can-
berra, Madrid and Pretoria.
Chiefs of the rriggions were usually as-
signed as assistants to the American ambas-
sadors or ministers at the respective out-
posts, and freedom of action depended
largely upon the attitude of the appropriate
State Department representative and their
ability to maintain good relations with him.
This naturally varied in the different areas.
In Cairo, for example, the Minister was ex-
tremely helpful to F13, but in Turkey re-
lations were extremely bad with the Ambas-
sador. In Lisbon, after the Portuguese had
refused visas to the two men COI selected
for the post, the Minister to Portugal desig-
nated his own press attache to perform the
duties of an FLS field representative. FIS
never succeeded in establishing either an
official or unofficial Russian outpost, al-
though Donovan made repeated efforts to
do so.
Transportation was always one of the Di-
vision's serious problems. Men sometimes
waited around for fourteen weeks before
they could get off. As of 8 May 1942, FIS
--fop-Secret-
48
had fewer than sixty representatives, ana-
lysts and teem-Ileum; in the field, though
many more were ready and waiting to go.
As a Division, Outposts never became a full-
fledged propaganda organization until after
the 13 June reorganization, but it did, never-
theless, get started in spite of many ob-
stacles. �
3. Research and Analysis, and Related
Branches
(a) RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS�
R&A
The President's order of 11 July 1941 (Ex-
hibit W-3) authorized COI "to collect and
analyze all information and data, which
may bear upon the national security" and
"to correlate such information and data."
R&A was thus the only Branch of COI whose
function was explicitly provided for in the
order. �
The research and analysis function was
basic to Donovan's conception of an over-
all intelligence agency. His legal experi-
ence bad demonstrated the value of econo-
mists and other research men in the prepa-
ration of briefs and legislative studies. He
had learned, too, that in such work one can-
not rely upon the second best. These les-
sons, he felt, should be applied to the field
of intelligence; the services of other coun-
tries had traditionally followed the secret
police and political informer pattern, where-
as he wished to emphasize the importance
of a sound intellectual foundation. There-
fore, Donovan's memorandum of 10 June
(Exhibit W-1) specified that use be made
of the experience and knowledge of "special-
ized trained research officials in the relative
scientific fields (including technological,
economic, financial and psychological
scholars)."
Even before the order creating COI on 11
July, Donovan discussed with Archibald
MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, his idea
of R.&A and its relation to intelligence, as.
well as problems of personnel and organ-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Socre4-
ization. On 29 June, MacLeish informed
Donovan that the new intelligence service
could rely upon the full cooperation of the
Library.
At Donovan's request, MacLeish balled a
meeting of men in a position to know of
qualified scholars possessing the interest
and the competence to form a research
group. On 28 July a meeting was arranged,
attended by members of the Library staff
and representatives of the National Ar-
chives, the American Council of Learned
Societies, the Social Science Research Coun-
cil, and leading social scientists from several
universities. Recommendations as to key
personnel, administration, and organization
were submitted to Donovan the following
day. On SO July, MacLeish approved a
letter addressed to him by Donovan setting
forth terms of agreement between COI and
the Library (Exhibit W-17).
The search for personnel of high quality
began immediately. The MacLeish com-
mittee's recommendations were followed in-
sofar as possible. Among those secured
was Dr. James P. Baxter III, President of
Williams College, who accepted the post of
Chief of R&A on 31 July. Academic com-
petence was at first the only yardstick in
the selection of other personneL As ex-
perience demonstrated the value of adapt-
ability and afirniniRtrative acumen, however,
these qualities were increasingly stressed.
By the end of October, the key personnel
secured for the Branch formed an impres-
sive aggregation: men of outstanding
ability in their respective fields, command-
ing nearly forty languages and dialects,
were recruited from more than thirty-five
universities.
A Board of Analysts was formed in early
August, both to serve as a panel of experts
for the Coordinator, and to give general
direction to the work of R&A. The mem-
� The head of R&A originally had the title
"Director," but during OSS was known as "Chief."
The latter title will be employed throughout this
account for the purpose of clarity.
bership included, in addition to Baxter, an
historian, an economist, a sociologist, and
a diplomat.
The Division of Special Information (DSI)
was established in the Library of Congress
pursuant to the agreement between Dono-
van and martpich To serve as director of
research, and also as a member of the Board
of Analysts, Donovan selected Dr. William
L. Langer, Coolidge Professor of History at
Harvard University.
DSI, which began operations toward the
end of August, was organized in a number
of regional sections responsible for basic
research on their respective areas.
A Central Information Division (ClD)
was established in early September, to
handle central filing, registry, and editing
of reports. It was headed by a librarian
and editor of wide experience. Donovan
took a particular personal interest in CID
because his legal experience had impressed
upon him the great value of cross-indexing
when dealing with masses of material in
long and difficult trials. His observation
of government intelligence agencies led
him to think that one reason high officials
did not have adequate information on which
to base policy was that intelligence, once
obtained, often was filed and never could be
found again. Donovan was determined
that COI should have the most up-to-date,
efficient filing system possible.
In mid-October, three functional divi-
sions�Economic, Geographic and Psycho-
logical�were established and recruiting to
staff them began. The placing of the func-
tional divisions directly under the Board of
Analysts in R&A rather than in or associ-
ated with DSI in the Library of Congress
was not an indication that DSI operations
had been unsatisfactory. Rather, it was
felt that the functional divisions would be
so little dependent upon the facilities of the
Library that the complications arising from
divided responsibility would not be justified
by any advantage that could be gained.
Both Donovan and MacLeish had antici-
49
---Top-Sscref.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Toriseraf�
pated the possibility of a separate function-
al set-uo in their original agreement, which
recognized the experimental nature of the
arrangement and specified that future de-
velopments would be at the Coordinator's
discretion.
This separation of functional divisions
from the Library of Congress, hence from
the regional sections of DSI, had certain
obvious advantages for those divisions, par-
ticularly the Economics Division. How-
ever, it led inevitably to jurisdictional con-
flicts between functional and regional re-
sponsibilities which were not resolved until
some time after the creation of OSS. Such
conflicts were perhaps unavoidable in set-
ting up an organization like R&A. Similar
conflicts have constantly plagued not only
Intelligence agencies but other government
departments. In R&A relations were par-
ticularly strained between the Economics
Division and DSI, especially the Eastern
European Section. Questions constantly
arose, such as whether a study of the Soviet
wheat crop was within the province of the
appropriate regional section or of the Eco-
nomics Division. The Psychology Division,
being less well staffed and hence in no po-
sition to be as aggressive as were the econ-
omists, caused less difficulty. The Chief of
the Geographic Division was himself largely
convinced of the desirability of the regional
approach and later was instrumental in the
reorganization of R&A along predominantly
regional lines. (See R&A in Section II be-
(1) BRANCH CHIEF AND BOARD OF
ANALYSTS
The Branch Chief functioned as the R&A
executive and also sat as Chairman of the
Board of Analysts, which was established as
the ultimate authority for the processing,
analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
In addition to Baxter and other members
of the Board with academic backgrounds,
men with military, naval and State Depart-
ment experience were included. Major
-Teirr-Saref-
General Frank McCoy (Ret.) and Com:-
mander F. C. Denebrink USN were to gear
the production of the Branch to the require-
ments of the Army and Navy. Mr. John
Wiley, formerly the U.S. Minister to the
Baltic states, advised on the needs of the
State Department. The Board began to
function informally on 2 August 1941; in
September it established the practice of
holding daily meetings.
At these meetings major questions of
Branch policy were decided. The Board de-
voted much of its time to discussion, criti-
cism and direction of the work of the Branch.
A number of meetings were devoted to inter-
views with specialists returning from over-
seas, and to estimates, for presentation to
Donovan, of changes in the strategic situa-
tion. As the production of R&A increased,
the Board changed its emphasis to concen-
trate largely on discussion of finished reports
and those in preparation. Matters of ad-
ministration were the responsibility of the
office of the Branch Chief; however, ques-
tions of administrative policy were occasion-
ally dealt with by the Board of Analysts.
At a later stage of R&A the Board of An-
alysts might have been able to perform more
valuable service in the role originally con-
templated, as an over-all directing and plan-
ning body. However, while the Branch was
In process of formation, preparing for pro-
duction but not yet in full operation, there
was not sufficient scope for direction and
planning to keep the Analysts busy. More-
over, individual members of the Board be-
came engrossed in other directions. Wiley
became Chief of FN,* Langer was busy with
the work of DSI, and other members became
similarly occupied. The Board never fully
served the purpose for which it was intro-
duced.**
The problems of the Branch Chief, aside
from his duties as Chairman of the Board of
50
� See "Foreign Nationalities," Section (c) be-
low. _
�� See account of R&A under OSS, Section X
below.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Analysts, fell into three categories: (1) Es-
tablishing and maintaining contacts with
other agencies of the Government; (2) main-
taining liaison and establishing working re-
lationships with the other COI branches; and
(3) dealing with internal problems of R&A,
both substantive problems of research and
analysis and administrative problems.
It was the normal function of 12,..-A to
maintain its own relations with outside agen-
cies once formal contact had been made by
the COI Liaison Officer. At the working
level, of course, an individual analyst dealt
frequently with his counterpart in other
agencies. Nevertheless, it was necessary for
an official high in the Branch hierarchy to
take part in both the preliminary and in
many of the final negotiations. Such liaison
was normally performed by the Branch
Chief.
He also represented the Branch at Dono-
van's staff meetings. Recognizing the im-
portance of close working relations with
other COI branches, he undertook the
greater part of this liaison, working to im-
prove the flow of information and the proper
servicing of other branches by R&A.
No sviministrative section of R&A was as-
tablished under COI. In the first place,
since the Board of Analysts was a policy
body only, the bulk of the personnel was in
DSI under the administrative direction of
the Library of Congress. Secondly, CID and
the functional divisions were organized on a
compartmentalized basis with individual ad-
ministrative problems, and it was thought
that such general problems as might arise
could be cared for adequately by the office of
the Branch Chief.
Certain problems, such as inadequate al-
lotment of Civil Service positions and un-
satisfactory classifications, were probably
common to all agencies, as they were to other
branches of COL Many of the problems of
an administrative nature during COI arose
from the lack of governmental, administra-
tive or executive experience of the key per-
sonnel of the Branch. The research and
51
�Zap�Sacral�
academic backgrounds of R&A personnel did
not immediately fit smoothly into long-estab-
lished government procedures. Indeed, the
basis of COI was to free intelligence from
inflexible procedures and methods. Dealing
with the problems, real or imagined, of such
men was not a job for an administrative sub-
altern. The principle was to adjust regula-
tions so that they would be free to apply their
energies, knowledge and experience to intel-
ligence material and techniques. This was
a qm-si-diplomatic task which the Branch
Chief endeavored to perform.
The reception accorded R&A reports early
demonstrated the validity of Donovan's
whole conception of R&A_ Under Secretary
Forrestal remarked on 19 December 1941'
that certain reports "have already been of
real use to the Navy"; Secretary Stimson on
2 January 1942 expressed his appreciation of
the "very fruitful contact" between MID and
R&A and his understanding that arrange-
ments were being made for the cooperative
handling of certain new projects. He con-
tinued, "0-2 is especially appreciative of the
fresh and independent outlook of your staff
of experts." �
A small staff was assembled in the early
fall of 1941 which was responsible for assem-
bling, summarizing and promptly dissemi-
nating incoming intelligence of political,
economic or military significance bearing on
the current situation. This group was at-
tached to the Board of Analysts. Its first
product, The War This Week (classified Se-
cret), was given a limited circulation out-
side the agency after 11 December 1941.
Thereafter it appeared weekly, with a wide
distribution list both within and outside
COL The aim of The War This Week was to
present promptly a current intelligence pic-
ture, interpreted in the light of continuing
research of the regional and functional sec-
tions, supplemented by special studies and
printed appendices.
� See History File W-7. p. 132.
�
�-TOp�ero045001--
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Zep--freeref-
(2) DIVISION OF SPECIAL INFORMA-
TION�DSI
By the. original letter agreement be-
tween Donovan and MacLeish (Exhibit
W-17) , provision had been made for the es-
tablishment in the Library of a Division of
Special Information for which COI would
provide funds. DSI was to be administra-
tively responsible to the Library. Its studies
and reports, however, were to be subject to
final review by a Board of Analysts to be es-
tablished in COI, and its activities were to be
directed by a Research Director appointed by
Donovan from among the membership of the
Board.
The agreement further provided that DSI
should be organized in such regional and
functional units as Donovan might approve.
Eight regional sections were specifically pro-
vided for:.
The British Empire Section, covering the
United Kingdom, the self-governing domin-
ions (excluding the Union of South Africa,
which fell within the jurisdiction of the Med-
iterranean/Africa Section), India and the
dependencies.
The Western Europe Section, responsible
for the Low Countries, France and the Iber-
ian Peninsula.
The Central Europe Section, concerned
with the Greater Reich, Italy, Slovalda, Po-
land and Hungary.
The Eastern Europe Section, covering the
USSR, Finland, the Baltic states and the
Balkans, including Greece.
The Mediterranean Section, renamed the
Africa Section in May 1942, which focussed
upon North Africa but was eventually re-
sponsible for all of Africa except Egypt, as
well as the Atlantic islands
The Near East Section, covering the Arab
countries, Turkey and Iran.
The Far East Section, covering Japan and
Japanese-occupied areas, China, the Philip-
pines, and Netherlands East Indies.
The Latin America Section, including Cen-
tral and South America.
The agreement recognized that changes
might have to be made in the light of experi-
ence, and that it might later be advisable to
absorb into COI some of the personnel and
functions initially established in the Li-
brary.*
The original staff of these sections con-
sisted chiefly of historians. Langer himself
was a specialist in the diplomatic history of
modern Europe. Of the eight section heads
five were historians, one a political scientist,
one an economist and one a geographer.
Naturally, in recruiting their own staffs,
they thought first of men with whose work
they were personally folmiliar, colleagues or
former students, usually in the same general
field.
Ideally, the regional sections of DSI should
have included geographic and economic
specialists as well as historians. That Amer-
ican universities could offer few economists
and geographers who had centered their
studies on one region. Thus the pattern of
academic life was carried over into R&A; the
historians had to struggle with unfamiliar
problems in a familiar land, the functional
divisions with familiar problems in unfa-
miliar lands. This led to gradually develop-
ing jurisdictional conflicts which were not
settled until more than a year later.**
Other agencies besides COI were making
the same discovery about area specialists,
and historians in certain fields�notably
Russia and the Far East�were hard to find,
even as early as 1941. Later, as draft board
calls increased and R&.A had difficulty get-
ting commissions and military slots, it was
hard to keep those already recruited, for
other branches of the service could often
make better offers. However, in spite of ob-
stacles, DSI came close to meeting the stand-
ards established in the Donovan-MacLeish
agreement�that the sections be composed
52
� As it developed, Del, after the establishment
of OSS, was wholly withdrawn from the Library.
�� See account of RAA under WS in Section g
below.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
of men having "the highest degree of com-
petence provided by American scholarship."
�
The staff was to apply the techniques of
academic research to the service of a wide
variety of clients. DSI customers included
the War and Navy Departments, the State
Department, the Office of Export Controls
(later BEW), the OFF and the other
branches of COI, particularly FIS. A num-
ber of DSI reports went directly to the White
House. After Pearl Harbor, the principal
emphasis was upon work for G-2 and ONI,
particularly in connection with the prepara-
tion of certain sections of approximately 120
long-range Strategic Surveys, which were be-
gun during COI at the request of MM.
The research techniques used by DSI were
new only in their application to intelligence.
Academic research is the result of extremely
careful, thorough examination and evalua-
tion of all possible sources; it is largely a
matter of common sense, patience, judgment
and familiarity with all types of sources.
The most important function that DSI had
to perform during the COI period was to
build a sound body of background material
through use of the resources of the Library
of Congress and staff contacts with other
libraries, universities, scholars and technical
experts. The full results of this preliminary
work were not apparent until later. Even
during its earliest stages, however, individual
DSI reports proved the validity of Donovan's
contention (stated in his 10 June memoran-
dum to the President), "that information
already existed in the United States which,
if gathered together and studied in detail by
carefully trained minds, with a knowledge
both of the related languages and tech-
niques, would yield valuable and often de-
cisive results." (Exhibit W-1)
Fuller discussion of the sources utilized
and the types of studies undertaken by DSI
will be found in the discussion of R&A under
53
OSS in Section IL* In Washington and
elsewhere DSI tapped between 80 and 100
large collections of source materials which
had not theretofore been used by govern-
ment agencies. These included the embas-
sies and consulates of friendly countries,
confiscated German and Italian reference
material, university libraries, specialized
collections, the files and accumulated data
of industrial concerns and of other govern-
ment agencies. Foreign periodicals and
other publications already received by differ-
ent groups or organizations within the
United States were utilized to the full. Gaps
in such collections, however, were found to
exist.
. Lack of fresh material particularly handi-
capped the Far East Section, for example,
from the outset. Few of the more valuable
published sources were finding their way into
the United States, and those which did ar-
rive were frequently diverted before reaching
addresses here. In addition, after Pearl
Harbor, a great deal of material was being
destroyed in the process of re-locating citi-
zens of Japanese extraction. An extensive
search was made for basic material on the
Far East in libraries, Japanese book stores,
business firms and banks throughout Amer-
ica. The yield was rewarding but by no
means complete. To expand its coverage,
the Far East Section sent a representative to
Chungking to organize the collection and
forwarding of materials. Similar experi-
ences, of the Central Europe Section in par-
ticular, were important factors in the forma-
tion of the Interdepartmental Committee for
the Acquisition of Foreign Publications
([DC) in which COI played a major part.**
The types of studies produced by R&A
varied from short-term or "spot" reports (of
� Because the reorganization of II&A in Janu-
ary 1943 absorbed the functional divisions within
broad regional units, more attention is given in
this section of the report to the functional divi-
sions, and the regional studies are taken up in
more detail in Section IL�
�� See account of MC In (5) below.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seere.�
������1.
which the greater proportion was for PIS)
to extremely thorough basic studies, such as
the reports on Soviet synthetic rubber pro-
duction, Lend-Lease routes into Russia, the
Strategic Surveys and the ONI Monographs.
This wide range was the result of a number
of causes. Before Pearl Harbor R&A lacked
a definite focus. Its list of customers, its
relations with those customers and the rela-
tive priorities which would be assigned to
each were by no means established. After
Pearl Harbor the natural development of
work focussed on pre-invasion studies. Of
such studies the most time-consuming and
probably the most important were the MIS
Strategic Surveys. Of the usual seven sec-
tions, R&A prepared in full sections 3 (Popu-
lation and Social Conditions), 4 (Political)
and 5 (Economic).
In the preparation of the Strategic Sur-
veys, some sections of DSI were at first handi-
capped by the reluctance of 0-2 and ONI
to allow free access to materials essential to
thorough study of the areas to the coverage
of which DSI had been asked to contribute.
This was not uniformly the case; the East-
ern Europe Section, for example, had very
good relations with MIS from the beginning
and, although these relations were occasion-
ally clouded by top-level controversies be-
tween COI/OSS and 0-2, the Section was in
general shown anything it requested to see.
As experience proved the worth of the new
agency, relations, particularly at the work-
ing level, improved.
The nature of the work of individual sec-
tions within DSI varied inevitably according
to the status of the countries with which
they were concerned.
Those that were concerned with potential,
and, after Pearl Harbor, actual enemies (e.g.,
the Central Europe and Far East Sections)
devoted themselves not only to Strategic
Surveys and capabilities studies but also to
analyses of enemy organizations.
The Far East Section, for example, under-
took detailed studies on the economic struc-
ture of Japan, the economic factors in Jap-
-Tep-Epeere.-
anese expansion, and problems resulting
from economic pressures on Japan. These
were prepared for the President's Special
Advisor on Far Eastern Affairs. The Cen-
tral Europe Section, in addition to surveys
covering Germany, Bohemia, Moravia, Po-
land, Slovakia and Hungary, prepared an
analysis of the SS, SD and the Wehrmacht,
and produced also a three-volume handbook
on Nazi Germany, which had been specifi-
cally requested by OFF. PIS was always
desirous for information on enemy countries,
particularly biographic material on im-
portant but, in the United States, little-
known enemy figures.
The Far East Section undertook, in addi-
tion to the sections of Strategic Surveys as-
signed to it, the revision of the Navy's Con-
fidential Sailing Directions * for the Japa-
nese mandated islands, at the request of
ONL
Early in 1942; A-2 requested assistance
from the Far East Section on Japanese tar-
get evaluation. This was in preparation, it
developed, for General Doolittle's raid of 18
April 1942 on the home islands of Japan.
The Far East Section worked on this problem
in cooperation with the Economics Division,
and the assignment was the beginning of the
target selection work which later became one
of R&A's major services to the military.
Other studies related to invasion plans were
the estimates of enemy capabilities in par-
ticular areas. These were largely the work
of the Economics Division, but DSI made the
major contribution to some, notably a report
on German capabilities in North Africa, pre-
pared by the Mediterranean Section in col-
laboration with the economists. DSI also
cooperated with the Psychology Division in
preparing Soldier's Guides.
Enemy-occupied lands and other likely
battlegrounds were a second category. In
this field the armed services were also the
chief customers, but State, PIS and other
civilian agencies were almost equally con-
� These were later known as the ONI Moro-
graPh&
54
if
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
cerned. Aside from the Strategic Surveys
(such as those on Iberia) and capabilities
studies, there were a number of large-scale
undertakings. Especially notable were:
A study of Turkish railroads requested by
MIS. For the preparation of this study, DSI
drew not only upon the incomplete and in-
conclusive classified intelligence sources,
but, by tapping Turkish language publica-
tions available in the United States, includ-
ing technical journals, was able to present
an unusually comprehensive and accurate
picture.
A study of trans-Africa supply routes,
undertaken at a time when it appeared that
they would be essential to support the Brit-
ish Desert Forces at Alamein. In the prepa-
ration of this report 01 rendered valuable
sssigtance. Information on roads and
travel conditions in Western Equatorial
Africa was almost completely lacking in
American intelligence files during early
1942. OI arranged interviews with return-
ing missionaries and traders. The files of
American companies with business interests
in the area were studied, and the Mediter-
ranean Section was thus able to accumulate
much recent information, maps, photo-
graphs of roads, and the like. The question
had been raised before the JCS as to whether
the Congo River might be used as a link in
the trans-Africa supply chain Latest data
on its navigability, on changes in currents
and rapids, and on the conditions of roads
and railroads about the rapids was assem-
bled. Railroad equipment firms supplied
extensive information on the condition and
equipment of the Belgian Congo railroads
both from their files and from the reports of
their employees who had worked on build-
ing or expanding the railroads.
The Eastern Europe Section was con-
cerned not only with the most important
battlefield of the period but with the capa-
bilities and intentions of an ally whose fu-
ture course of action and strength was per-
haps the major imponderable in the world
strategic picture.
55
A study of Lines of Communication Be-
tween the United States and the Russo-Ger-
man War Zone, requested in August 1941,
was completed in October. The problem of
determining the most practicable Lend-
Lease routes to Russia made this study of
great importance and urgency, although its
completion was handicapped by the lack of
adequate information. Subsequently, a
much-expanded study on the northern,
southern and eastern supply routes, includ-
ing climatic conditions, harbors, overland
routes, total tonnage capacity, etc., was is-
sued.
A suggestion by the Section in December
1941 that a study of the Soviet synthetic rub-
ber industry might provide information of
value to the United States in dealing with
the natural rubber shortage in this country
led to a series of reports. The information
collected in the United States had appar-
ently never been gathered together before,
and the revelation contained in the report
of May 1942 that the total production of
synthetic rubber in the USSR in 1938 was
five times that of Germany, contributed to
the decision to dispatch a mission to Russia
from the Office of the Rubber Director.
The Section completed in March 1942 a
study on occupied areas of Russia which
appraised industrial resources and transport
before German invasion and scorching, and
the degree of German exploitation after the
invasion. This was the first of a series
which developed into an exhaustive capabili-
ties study of the USSR. Succeeding studies
became more comprehensive as techniques
were developed for exploiting published ma-
terials from Russia and for developing sta-
tistical and allied methods of extrapolating
available material. A later report, entitled
The Strength of Russia, completed in April,
contained estimates of Soviet industrial and
agricultural manpower, agricultural and
food problems, basic industries, war mate-
riel and transportation_
The first R&A studies on Lend-Lease
routes made clear to the Secretaries of War
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
and Navy Navy the inadequacy of the information
available in Washington. This realization
was instrumental in the request of War and
Navy in the fall of 1941 that the undercover
intelligence work of 0-2 and ONI be con-
solidated under COI, which led to the cre-
ation of SA/B.*
Primary emphasis was placed on Magma,
although the Section also had jurisdiction
over research on other countries of Eastern
Europe. Frequently, the urgency of assign-
ments on the USSR required that experts
on other countries be diverted to these high
priority jobs. Studies were also completed,
however, on Finland, Bulgaria, Esthonia,
Yugoslavia, Ruraarda and Greece. Most of
the latter studies constituted the COI sec-
tions of the Strategic Surveys for those coun-
tries and areas.
Studies on the British Empire differed in
approach from those undertaken on the
Soviet Union. There was naturally a far
freer flow of information between the British
and ourselves, than with the Soviet Union.
Over-all studies on British capabilities and
future intentions were not therefore of com-
parable importance. The British Empire
Section therefore concentrated chiefly on
the trouble spots in the British Empire.
Studies were undertaken on Eire and North
Ireland, the routes and terrain of the Bur-
mese border areas, and the significance of the
Mohammedan-Hindu conflict in Indian af-
fairs.
Finally, DSI was concerned with one part
of the world, Latin America, from which the
war was physically remote. Nonetheless, it
was important to know the attitudes of Latin
American countries toward the war, the ex-
tent of Axis penetration of Latin America,
and its use as a base for Axis psychological
warfare and espionage.
Following the President's directive to
Donovan to coordinate North American in-
telligence, the Latin America Section dis-
patched two representatives to Mexico in
� See "Special Activities" in 4 below.
�Tep-Seepet�
mid-December 1941 to make an on-the-spot
appraisaL They were recalled after five
days when the FBI questioned whether the
directive did not conflict with a previous di-
rective placing all Western YiPmlsphere in-
telligence under its jurisdiction.* The FBI
being upheld, no further field representa-
tives were sent. In their short stay, how-
ever, these representatives collected valu-
able information on many subjects, includ-
ing the Sinarquista movement and the Mexi-
can labor movement (predicting that the
latter would be a strong pro-United Nations
force in Mexico).
Thereafter, the Section received consider-
able support and interest from 0-2 as the re-
sult of its work on the Strategic Surveys and
daily situation reports.
(3) FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS
These units were established to handle in-
telligence studies on subjects which lent
themselves to a functional rather than a re-
gional approach.
Economics Division. This Division was es-
tablished in October 1941. Its position was
a strong one from the beginning, both within
the Branch and vis-a-vis other agencies.
This was due, in part, to the fact that Dr.
Edward S. Mason, himself an outstanding
economist and an original member of the
Board of Analysts, took a particular interest
in the Division. By October 1941 he was
able to benefit by the early experience of
DSI, as well as to appreciate the special tech-
niques of the economists and to capitalize
on their competence. Subsequently, his
close association with the SIC was also of
great value.
The Division was divided into the follow-
ing sections: Agriculture and Standard of
Living, Military Supplies, Labor Supply, and
Industrial Resources. At a later date other
sections were added, but the original sections
produced the most important work of the
� See "Survey". p. 34 above.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Although the economists were not spe-
cifically restricted to problems incident to
the European war, they concentrated on that
theater for the most part. At a later date,
however, they expanded their sphere of in-
terest to the USSR and the Far East.
The first study undertaken, compiled with
the full cooperation of all sections of the Di-
vision, dealt with The German Military and
Economic - Position. The conclusions
reached were interesting, not only because
they appear in retrospect to have been quite
accurate, but because in several instances
they were in direct conflict with the prevail-
ing opinion in high intelligence quarters.
For example, at a time when it was generally
believed that an acute enemy food shortage
was to be expected in the near future, the
Division maintained that the food supply
would not become so tight as to affect the
course of the German war. In fact, when
predictions of imminent shortages were most
firmly advanced, the Division predicted cor-
rectly that, on the contrary, an increase in
the basic ration was imminent Arma-
ments and strategic materials, especially oil,
were likewise generally regarded as likely to
prove a limiting factor in Germany's ability
to prosecute the war; the R&A economists
thought otherwise.
� The Division's Labor Supply Section took
the position, which later proved to be cor-
rect, that there was and would be an in-
creasingly critical bottleneck in the Axis
manpower situation. The report started
with the prpnist. that the publication of
officers' obituaries was a deep-seated point
of German social custom. The analysts
used a representative sample of German
newspapers to compute the average number
of obituaries printed by each paper per is-
sue per month. To compensate for missing
Issues, link relatives were constructed of the
monthly averages, where there were avail-
able continuous two-month runs. The link
relatives were, in turn, chained to an index
of all papers, using one month as a base,
and corrected by adjustment for months in
which no coverage was available. This
sample total was then grouped according to
the four daily circultion units into which
all German newspapers fall, making it pos-
sible to establish a relationship between cir-
culation covered by the sample and that of
all German newspapers. The over-all cir-
culation of each of the four groups was di-
vided by its component in the sample and
multiplied by the number of officer deaths.
From this sum was subtracted a figure for
non-battle deaths, which was obtained by
applying an annual war-time non-battle
death rate to the average officer strength.
The ratio of enlisted men to non-commis-
sioned officers was established through
tables of organization and other means. The
battle death ratio of officers to other soldiers
was computed on the basis of World War I
data, to yield a figure by which the estimated
officer deaths could be multiplied. By this
means figures were obtained for all battle
deaths.
On the basis of German experience in the
last war, a relation between killed, missing,
and the unfit for further service was derived.
These figures, plus the number of prisoners
of war (known by direct intelligence and
through official Allied reports), furnished
� total estimates of permanent battle lckesPe
In the German army.
This technique proved to be so successful
that it came to be accepted by the J1C and
all other American intelligence agencies.
Results of studies on enemy oil supply
likewise differed from opinions then prevail-
ing. The British Hartley Committee be-
lieved the German oil situation to be critical,
whereas the TIC subcommittee on enemy
oil, on which R&A had a representative, took
the position that the German oil supply was
more than adequate.
By the spring of 1942, with much of the
work completed on preliminary studies, at-
tention was turned to the future enemy po-
sition and capabilities and an attempt was
made to establish the basic pattern of 'the
enemy economic position. Within three
57
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-icop-Saczet�
months, the Division had begun to assemble
the Sinnmary of Strategic Information, a
compilation of reports on the fundamental
position of Axis Europe on food, strategic ma-
terials, armaments and manpower. A con-
tinuous effort was made to keep the Sum-
mary up to date, and periodic revaluations
were made for the JIC.
An interesting example of R&A techniques
was provided by another long study, the
analysis of the German supply program on
the Eastern Front. This report exemplified
the use of the deductive method when inade-
quate intelligence material made the induc-
tive method impractical. There was first
prepared a specific study of the Russian rail
lines on the Eastern Front. Then a specific
examination was made of German supply re-
quirements, taking into consideration the
nature of operations and the size of the force
engaged. Complicated estimates were
needed in order to calculate, on the basis of
very meager information, the approximate
amounts of ammunition, food, petroleum
products and engineering equipment which
the German divisions would expend on the
Eastern Front at varying degrees of inten-
sity of fighting. These figures were reached
by a study of British experience in the Libyan
campaign and from special studies of the
War Department. Thereupon, comparisons
were made of the estimated capacity of the
rail lines with the estimate of German re-
quirements. The conclusion was reached
that transport would not be a major factor
limiting German military operations against
Russia in 1942.
In May 1942 an International Trade and
Shipping Section was established. This
Section, which concentrated largely on Ger-
man submarine production and activity, en-
countered difficulty throughout the COI pe-
riod in obtaining information essential to
Its work from the Navy Department.
Despite the fact that the major emphasis
was on European economic problems, atten-
tion was soon turned to problems connected
with the USSR and the Far East. Among
--App-SeePet� se
the topics covered were brief studies on Japa-
nese steel, oil, and non-ferrous metals, as
well as appreciations of the Russian, Japa-
nese and Chinese food situation.
Geographic Division. In the fall of 1941,
an Advisory Committee, composed of geog-
raphers from other government agencies,
was formed to consider the establishment of
a Geographic Division. This Committee, to-
gether with the future chief of the proposed
division and administrative officers of COI,
recommended the divisional organization
which it considered would be of maximum
value in integrating its activities with the
programs of other agencies.
The Division was established in three sec-
tions: Cartographic, Geographic Reports
and Map Information. The first two sec-
tions were established in October and No-
vember 1941, and the Map Information Sec-
tion in February 1942.
(i) The Cartographic Section was estab-
lished in October 1941 to prepare such maps
as might be required by COI. At first the
Section confined itself to fulfilling requests
and found it was devoting itself largely to
spot jobs, such as preparing presentation
materials for Donovan and illustrative
sketch maps for COI reports. Gradually,
however, it was recognized that there was a
serious gap in the governmental organiza-
tion for the production of "specialty" car-
tography. Emphasis was therefore placed
on the desirability of producing maps which
were in their own right intelligence docu-
ments rather than simple illustrative maps.
In order most effectively to further this
trend, it was decided that compilation and
construction work should be separated and,
as a result, two sections were set up, known
as the Compilation and the Construction
Units. The latter Unit included drafting
personnel, a Composing Shop and a Design
Unit.
The varied types of maps produced in the
Cartography Section reveal the scope of its
Interests and capacities: economic (industry
and manufacture), agriculture and land
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
1
L
ci
utilization, fishing, natural resources, min-
ing, lumber, oil, shipping, public utilities,
political (ofirninistration and movements),
strategic, communications, transportation
(land routes, water routes, airlines, airfields,
facilities, roads, railroads) � terrain and
beach maps, climate and weather, popula-
tion (distribution and density, ethnic, reli-
gious, distribution of dicenges), ports and
town plans, operational (bombing objec-
tives), historical, base maps, informational
maps (Soldier's Handbooks).
(ii) Map Information Section. The Map
Information Section was established in Feb-
ruary 1942.
In order to meet the needs of other units
of COI most effectively the Map Information
Section undertook to; (1) Evaluate pub-
lished maps; (2) inventory maps available
In the United States; and (3) procure hither-
to unlisted published maps from all possible
sources. During the COI period the Sec-
tion could not become a full-scale collection
agency, but it did arrange to receive all new
maps from the Library of Congress, Depart-
ment of State, Army War College, the Hydro-
graphic Office, CIAA and BEW. Microfilm
copies of the maps of the Army War College
and the American Geographical Society were
also obtained.
The entire question of procurement of
maps from outside sources was a difficult
one because, prior to the establishment of
the Section, individuals or units throughout
COI had been accustomed to procuring nec-
essary maps on their own initiative. The
matter was finally regularized by an order
from Donovan requiring that all map pro-
curement should be handled through this
Section.
(iii) Geographic Reports Section. 'This
Section was organized in November 1941 to
handle the preparation of geographic re-
ports. As late as March 1942, however, the
pressure of work of an entirely cartographic
nature was so great that the Reports Section
devoted some two-thirds of its time to com-
piling maps.
.-Tey- Sett.,
Geographic reports work was, however,
begun and attention was given to the collec-
tion and organization of topographic intel-
ligence. A precise definition of the scope of
this work, differentiating it from that of the
regional sections of DS'I, was difficult to for-
mulate. In theory, the Reports Section
dealt with such matters as transport routes,
urban features and telecommunications, in-
dustrial location and local resources, cli-
mate, weather, vegetation, terrain, hydrog-
raphy and ports. In practice, such studies
were frequently undertaken by the regional
sections of DSL
Despite these problems, geographic re-
search of importance was completed, includ-
ing monographs on the Pacific Islands for
ONI, sections of the Soldier's Guides, articles
for The War This Week, and a volume on the
ports of South Africa.
Psychology Division. This Division was or-
ganized in September 1941 and staffed by
experts drawn from the fields of psychology,
sociology and social anthropology. Its pur-
pose was to assist in long-range prOpaganda
planning by supplying background material
and current information, and otherwise to
apply the specialized experience, knowledge
and techniques of its expert staff to intelli-
gence problems.
In assisting the long-range plan.ning of
propaganda by FM, the Division was handi-
capped by two external factors. The first
was the controversy between PIS and RSA
(PIS and OI had similar differences at one
time) over the use of classified material in
radio broadcasts. This controversy is dis-
cussed elsewhere. However, the Psychology
Division, as a part of FAA, was naturally af-
fected in its relations with PIS. The second
complication grew out of the failure of the
Government to authorize an official policy
line to be followed by propaganda agencies,
such as the CIAA and the PIS Branch of COL
PIS was geared to press-room methods and
propaganda planning was subject to the
doctrine of expediency. PIS established its
own research section to deal with immediate
59
.�fcsp�Seeret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
problems. In In this situation the long-range
studies which the Psychology Division made
on such subjects as social attitudes, morale
of various groups in foreign countries, do-
mestic and foreign propaganda to which
such groups were exposed, and the morale
and attitudes of foreign armed forces were
of little avail. In the latter days of COI the
situation was further complicated by the
events leading up to the reorganization of 13
June 1942.
In the course of preparing psychological
studies of foreign countries, a request was
received from the Special Services Division
of the War Department for assistance in pre-
paring Soldier's Guides. The result was a
series of handbooks on foreign countries,
their peoples, customs, etc., where American
forces might serve. The Soldier's Guides
were prepared by the Psychology Division in
cooperation with the Geographic Division
and DSL
(4) CENTRAL INFORMATION DIVI-
SION�CID
CID was established in September 1941
primarily to acquire, house, catalogue, and
distribute the documents and records neces-
sary for the work of R&A. In addition, a
unit was created to edit FUITA reports for style,
uniformity and readability, and a group of
experts was assembled to abstract docu-
ments and prepare preliminary reports for
the convenience of analysts in the other di-
visions of the Branch. The last two func-
tions were removed from CID by February
1942 since it was decided they required the
attention of specialized analysts.
The Division included the following sec-
tions: The Index Section (later Document
Analysis) , the Service Unit (later Accessions
and Document Control Sections) and the
Intercepts Unit (later Censorship Mate-
rials). The last-named section was not es-
tablished until April 1942.
The accessioning functions of the COI
Liaison Office were taken over by CID in mid-
December 1941. Certain liaison functions,
--Tep-Seer40�
primarily for CID but frequently assuming
Branch proportions, were also undertaken.
It was contemplated that this Division might
act as a central archives for the whole
agency, but this became impossible during
the COI period due to the fact that several
branches were still in the organizational
stage.
(5) THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COM-
MITTEE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF FOR-
EIGN PUBLICATIONS�IDC
After the outbreak of war in the Far
East and Europe the peacetime flow of for-
eign periodicals and publications to the
United States virtually ceased, and there was
no adequate system of distribution of those
few publications that did slip through to the
government agencies interested in receiving
them. To COI, particularly R&A, as well as
to a number of other agencies, this was aSeri-
ous loss.
As a result of this situation, representa-
tives of several government agencies and de-
partments met informally, at the invitation
of R&A, to discuss methods of obtaining and
circulating these publications. These rep-
resentatives decided that they could oper-
ate most efficiently if they pooled their re-
sources. Accordingly, in the fall of 1941 an
Informal committee was set up, which later
recommended that an organization be cre-
ated to undertake the acquisition and dis-
tribution of such publications. It was felt
that such an organization must have the
support and backing of one agency with the
staff, funds, authority and security neces-
sary to such an operation. Donovan was
asked in December if he would be willing to
provide the requisite support and services.
He agreed and secured the approval of the
President on 22 December 1941.
1DC included representatives of COI,
State, War, Navy, the Library of Congress,
Treasury, Commerce, Interior, OFF, BEW,
and, later, OSRD and CIAA. The Chairman
was selected from the R&A Branch of COI,,
which assumed administrative responsibil-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top S�mvI
fly. In matters of policy IDC was independ-
ent, having separate funds.
At first IDC was concerned only with the
procurement and distribution of publica-
tions. Although it was able to make ar-
rangements with the State Department for
the cooperation of various embassies and
consulates, it soon became clear that effi-
cient operations could be hoped for only if
IDC dispatched representatives to make ar-
rangements and decisions in the field on
questions of reproduction, clearance and
shipping. Eventually representatives were
sent to Geneva, Stockholm, Lisbon, London,
Cairo, Istanbul, New Delhi and Chungking
to expedite the flow of material to the
United States.
The first ten months of MA's development
should properly be regarded as a preparatory
phase, despite the work of definite value
which was accomplished. The internal
structure of the Branch, the focus of its at-
tention, its sources and customers, its tech-
niques and methods of operation, its place
within the agency and the Government at
large were still to be finally determined as
experience was gained.
During the COI period the duality of func-
tional and regional divisions was subject to
some discussion. It seemed impossible to
establish a line of demarcation which would
clearly establish the respective jurisdictions,
but since each approach produced valuable
results, the problem did not come to a head
under COL A reorganization of the Branch
took place later under MS.
Most significant in the development of
R&A was the gradual change in the type of
reports undertaken. At first, numerous
widely unrelated and "spot" reports were
prepared. However, the long-range type of
report, such as the Strategic Surveys for MIS
and the ONI Monographs, became the main
focus of attention in early 1942.
61
(b) ORAL INTELLIGENCE�OI
OI was established on 18 August 1941 as a
part of the Coordinator's Office, with a direc-
tive "to obtain from willing sources, or as
voluntarily offered, information of potential
strategic value in the foreign field by in-
formal interviews with individuals person-
ally possessing such information".* It was
shortly thereafter given the status of an in-
dependent unit. Headquarters were estab-
lished in New York where refugees from
Europe were arriving steadily in 1941-42.
The original aim was to canvass the New
York area systematically for existing sources
of information. The influx of new arrivals
was so great, however, that, in order to reach
the most recent sources, it became necessary
to lit OI into the operational pattern of ex-
isting traveller control agencies. Among
the established intelligence agencies, ONI,
MID and the FBI had neither the budget
nor the necessary staff of specialists for more
than occasional general interviews, chiefly
for security purposes. Military and Naval
Intelligence headquarters in New York were
contacted, as well as the regional offices of
FBI, Corps G-2, Immigration and Naturali-
zation and the New York port authorities. It
was explained that 0I's directive differed
from routine ONI and MID interrogations in
its volunteer civilian basis and in the degree
of detail sought, and regular exchanges of
summaries of all interview reports between
the interested intelligence bureaus were pro-
posed. As a result, on 9 September, OI was
Invited to join the weekly Foreign Intelli-
gence Group meetings, held in the Office of
the Area Controller. These expanded later
to include MID, ONI, FBI, two branches of
BEW, Postal Censorship, Navy Cable Censor
and OL
A small staff of six "field representatives"
was recruited, which included a former U. S.
attorney, a newspaper and labor relations
man, a public opinion analyst from Roper's
"Fortune" Poll staff, and three linguists, two
� See History File W-10.
�
-fop-Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
of whom whom were fluent in French and German
and one in Hungarian and Slavic languages.
Two members of the staff had done extensive
research on the problems of foreign refugees
In America. The staff remained small and
administration was correspondingly simple.
In the interests of smutty, the OI office, orig-
inally located in the Madison Avenue office
of FIS, moved to separate quarters, at 21
East 40th Street, in December 1941.
Interviewing began in September. Staff
members decided among themselves the gen-
eral fields of specialization since it developed
that better and more detailed information
could be gathered if the interviewer himself
was familiar with the subjects or places
known to the interviewee. Although the
majority of new arrivals came from unoccu-
pied France, so many of them had been in
occupied France, Germany or Poland shortly
before that it was necessary to see as many
of them as possible.
It was agreed with ONI and MID that OI
personnel would not board ships, because
this would duplicate Navy boarding officers'
activities and also because conditions on
shipboard at docking time were not condu-
cive to interviews of the extent and detail
that OI required. Instead, interviews were
arranged either by letter or telephone, or by
Introductions secured through contacts in
the United States with whom the arrivals
were acquainted.
Each approach was carefully made; the
form letters explained that COI "was cre-
ated by Executive Order to obtain general
Information concerning countries affected
by the war" and was seeking "only informa-
tion given voluntarily".* The staff had ac-
cess to the meager information provided by
the passenger manifests of vessels arriving
In New York as soon as these were received
at the Immigration and Naturalization Of-
fice. With these, and copies of the ONI
boarding officers' reports, it became possible
In time to pick out most persons who bad
� See History Pile W-10.
--Top-Secoot,
62
valuable information to offer. Inevitably,
however, many opportunities were missed be-
cause of incorrect addresses or because the
Individuals left the New York area before the
01 staff could contact them. Access in ad-
vance to State Department information on
file with the Visa Division in Washington
might have greatly reduced the numbers of
such lost opportunities.
The British Security Coordination Office
used OI as its first point of contact with COI
and also as the medium for the exchange of
secret intelligence data, as part of the close
cooperation between Donovan and Stephen-
son. Copies of many OI interview reports
were passed to the British, and British inter-
rogation, censorship and intercept material,
as well as official secret intelligence data, was
received and passed to Washington head-
quarters.
Offices of other foreign intelligence serv-
ices, particularly the Poles, Czechs and Nor-
wegisris, also used CI to pass official confi-
dential material to the attention of Ameri-
can intelligence authorities. OI not only
fostered these liaisons but expanded them to
Include MID, ONI and FBI as recipients.
Further sources of information were devel-
oped among such official or semi-official
agencies as information services, trade mis-
sions, "Free" groups (Free Denmark, Free
French) , relief societies and seamen's aid in-
stitutions. These contacts were subse-
quently turned over to SA/B and SA/G.
Numerous among the recent arrivals were
persons sponsored by foreign nationality
groups, refugee societies, or by individuals
in this country active in national or religious
minority affairs. Frequently, advance in-
formation was supplied on the arrival of
well-informed persons from areas of inter-
est, and introductions arranged after arrivaL
From contacts acquired through such con-
nections, several were selected as of possible
use to other sections of COI. A number of
key staff and field men for COI was recruited
In this manner. Liaisons with foreign no-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Sesfef-
tionality groups were later turned over to
FN.
The head offices of trading, shipping,
banking, insurance and manufacturing con-
cerns, as well as missionary, educational and
relief organi7P tions, were contacted. Sev-
eral regularly sent their returning field men
to OI for interrogation, and opened their
files for any information of interest on for-
eign areas. Certain of these contacts subse-
quently proved valuable to the work of SA/B,
though their immediate value was to R&A.
Much of the data for the R&A study of North
African railroads came from the files of
American locomotive or equipment firms, or
from recent arrivals, some of whom had been
sent by the Vichy French to forced labor on
various lines including the abortive "Trans-
Sahara" railroad.
Few report evaluations were ever received
except from FIS and from the British. FIS
wished to know European reactions to Amer-
ican propaganda broadcasts and they were
also interested in the techniques and effects
of enemy propaganda abroad. The inter-
views showed that very few Europeans heard
American short-wave broadcasts. A variety
of propaganda ideas and suggestions were
volunteered and acknowledged as helpful by
FIS. The British frequently submitted spe-
cific questionnaires or requests for specific
interviews and were quick to express appre-
ciation and praise for answers received.
By the time of Pearl Harbor specific intel-
ligence directives were being received from
the Board of Analysts and close liaison ex-
isted between the staff members of R&A and
OL
Re-interviewing of individual well-in-
formed sources was begun in the spring of
1942 as specific requests for intelligence were
received. Some sources were further inter-
rogated in person by representatives of R&A
and other Washington branches. By sum-
mer, a list of persons with specific informa-
tion on particular regions or subjects was
started. This activity proved of such value
that a separate unit, the Survey of Foreign
Experts (SFE),* was established in August
under the direction of an OI staff member to
develop a roster of sources by region and sub-
ject and perform highly detailed interroga-
tions as requested.
Detailed maps and photographs were used
by the interviewers to aid in obtaining de-
tails and to refresh the memories of sources.
In addition, sources were canvassed for re-
cent snapshots, road maps and guidebooks
which might be of use to R&A. Also, cloth-
ing, ration and identity cards, and any con-
sumers' goods from enemy or enemy-occu-
pied countries, were passed to Washington
to assist in the preparation of agents for mis-
sions abroad.
The liquidation of OI was started shortly
after 13 June. The number of arrivals in
New York had begun to drop except for ex-
change ships, while the interrogation staffs
of ONI and MID, expanded after Pearl Har-
bor, were in a position to conduct general
interrogations in New York.
For a short period under OSS, 01 concen-
trated entirely on intensive supplementary
Interviews requested by other branches and
on maintaining its liaison activities. The
creation of SFE, using OI personnel and ex-
perience, effected a necessary crystolii7a tion
of the re-interviewing program and also
closed another gap in the program by estab-
lishing a San Francisco office to cover the
West Coast. Most of the remainder of OI
was absorbed either by SA/B or in the estab-
lishment of a New York office for R&A.
After having conducted some 2,000 formal
Interrogations and initiated important con-
tacts for all parts of OSS, OI was officially
dissolved in September 1942.
(c) FOREIGN NATIONALITIES�FN
The Foreign Nationalities Branch was es-
tablished to provide an additional source of
foreign political intelligence through study
of activities and sentiments in the United
States reflecting the situation abroad, as re-
� See New York Mee, Section LI below.
a
Tvp at-
LOOM.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Icaosat�
vealed through contact with influential po-
litical refugees and leaders of foreign nation-
ality groups, and by scanning of the foreign
language press.
Donovan realized the necessity for this
service in the fall of 1941. He then con-
ceived it not only as a source of foreign in-
telligence but also as a gauge of the fifth col-
umn threat to the United States. Since the
Special Defense Unit of the Department of
Justice was already examining the foreign
language press for indications of subversive
activities, Donovan suggested to the Attor-
ney General on 26 September that COI pro-
vide supplementary funds for the expansion
of this work to obtain the additional infor-
mation desired.* Before this suggestion
could be put into effect, however, the De-
partment of State proposed that COI survey
the foreign language press for political in-
telligence as a complement to the Depart-
ment of Justice scanning. The COI treat-
ment would include special study of foreign
language groups, which State Department
did not wish to undertake for reasons of pru-
dence and practicability.
It was at first contemplated that the Radio
News Branch and R&A would be able to sup-
ply the State Department with such infor-
mation. However, it developed that the
work was so extensive and complex as to ne-
cessitate the creation of a new branch.
Early in November, therefore, Donovan
asked Mr. John C. Wiley to investigate and
make recommendations for the organization
of such a branch. Wiley, United States Min-
ister to Latvia and Esthonia, was loaned to
COI in August and became a member of the
Board of Analysts. He secured as his assist-
ant Mr. DeWitt Clinton Poole, a former con-
sular and diplomatic official of long experi-
ence, who previously had been at Princeton
University as Director of the School of Public
Affairs and a member of the Institute for
Advanced Studies.
After consultation with the State Depart-
ment, the Special Defense Unit and the FBI,
� See History File W-28, Tab A.
..Toga-SeeFef-
Wiley prepared recommendations for the
new branch which were circulated among
the Board of Analysts on 14 November.
These differed in only two important re-
spects from those later approved by the Bu-
reau of the Budget: proposals to conduct
public opinion polls and monitor the domes-
tic foreign language radio were deleted, in
view of the fact that the OFF, formed on 24
October, and the FCC were already perform-
ing these functions and could supply the
necessary information to COL
Wiley's memorandum, as revised and am-
plified by Poole, became the charter for FN.'
It pointed out the special character of the
United States population, sections of which
had living ties with every other considerable
population in the world. The size of the
foreign language press, which included some
1,700 newspapers in 51 languages, was cited
as an indication of the persistence of those
ties. Furthermore, since the United States
was the most powerful single political unit
In the world and American opinion played
such a decisive role in many foreign situa-
tions, this country had become a busy thea-
ter of foreign political activity and intrigue.
Since it was impossible to appraise ade-
quately American interest in foreign politi-
cal situations without study of possible re-
percussions in the United States, it was
planned that studies of conditions at home
and abroad proceed simultaneously. The
State Department desired that the COI per-
sonnel to handle the studies be experi-
enced in diplomacy and buniliar with suite
Department requirements.
It was therefore recommended that FN be
established to enable the Government, and
particularly the Department of State, to
analyze political conditions outside the
United States in the light of their reflections
here. This was to be accomplished in two
ways: (1) By maintaining contact with cer-
tain individuals of foreign origin, including
those arriving from abroad with the inten-
tion of influencing American opinion ad
See History File W-23, Tab F.
64
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
"Tap Sec, al
government policy in the field of foreign
affairs; and (2) by collecting information
pertaining to foreign affairs on the senti-
ments, activities and cross-currents within
foreign nationality groups in this country
and on the characters of their leaders, press
and radio. Subversive activities were de-
clared to be outside FM's sphere.
Since political information gathered by
FN would be valuable to other branches of
COI, principally FLS in preparing short-
wave broadcasts for beaming abroad, part
of the new Branch's assignment was to fol-
low up contacts after the original interviews.
On 22 December, the President approved
the establishment of the Branch on the ba-
sis indict; ted, and COI proceeded to the prep-
aration of precise estimates for the Bureau
of the Budget. Since no precedent existed,
certain interdepartmental adjustments were
necessary before Budget approval could be
secured.
One point of opposition was that the con-
templated scanning of the foreign language
press seemed to duplicate the work being
carried on by the Department of Justice.
The Wiley-Poole recommendations had al-
ready suggested that FN should seek ft-ssist-
ance in such work from other agencies al-
-ready thus engaged. The recommendation
noted at the same time that the nature and
purpose of FN differed essentially from that
of the Department of Justice, which con-
sisted merely in translation and summary, to
uncover subversive activities in the United
States. FM's purpose, on the other hand,
was to secure foreign intelligence through
study and analysis, a service not available
elsewhere in the Government. The solution
came with the establishment, at no cost to
the Government, of a network of volunteer
readers at universities throughout the coun-
try who were highly qualified to read and
analyze the foreign language press from the
standpoint of foreign relations.
Another problem was the opposition which
had developed in certain State Department
quarters out of the fear that FN might en-
croach on the policy field. Secretary Hull's
approval on 12 January* effectively settled
the question. The Bureau of the Budget
thereafter approved the FN estimates on 27
January.
The Branch remained small throughout
the COI period, hence its organization was
simple and entailed a minimum of adminil,..
tmtive problems. The Director's office per-
formed the executive and supervisory func-
tions; the main body of work was carried on
by two divisions�Field Study and Chancery.
Director's Office. Wiley was responsible
for general supervision of the Branch, his
membership on the Board of Analysts of
B&A and the Planning Board of FIS contrib-
uting greatly to close cooperation with other
COI branches. Poole was the operating di-
rector: he had immediate supervision of FN
activities and maintained liaison with the
New York offices of COI. Wiley and Poole
together had the responsibility for certain
of FN's more important contacts among for-
eign leaders and for maintaining liaison with
other United States Government depart-
ments and agencies.
Field Study Division.. This Division ob-
tained the raw intelligence necessary for the
Branch reports through direct contact with
foreign groups and individuals and through
study and analysis of the foreign language
press. Field representatives, occasionally
ft-ssisted by special experts, kept up the con-
tacts. Volunteer helpers at "academic out-
posts" took on the press scanning; their
numbers increased rapidly, so that by March
1942 they included small groups of outstand-
ing scholars at Princeton, Harvard and the
Universities of Minnesota and Wisconsin, in
addition to a special group at Albany."
� See History File W-27, p. 15.
�� The Bureau of the Budget was so impressed
by the economy of this system of operation that
In March it inquired whether all press srsinning
In the United States might not be organized on
a IthnilAr basis. It was decided, however, that the
Department of Justice could not rely on volull-
teers for the gathering of prosecutional data.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top
Chancery Division. This Division com-
prised four geographic desks: Slavic, Latin,
German and Miscolaneous. It collected all
material received (including supplemental
information from other government agen-
cies) and had responsibility for the process-
ing, preparation and dissemination of all re-
ports. In addition, it maintained complete
files of all information that came into the
Branch to be used for special studies re-
quested on short notice.
Special consultants comprised an impor-
tant source of information. These included,
for example, an outstanding Yugoslav jour-
nalist and a German refugee acquainted
with leading figures of the German refugee
groups in this country. They worked on a
part-time basis and were paid in terms of
services rendered.
Wiley and Poole personally maintained
contacts with such outstanding foreign po-
litical personalities as Count Czemin, Count
Sforza, Mr. Papaneck and similar leaders.
Other Branch representatives kept in close
touch with all the various foreign groups and
individuals who comprised a considerable
proportion of the total United States popu-
lation. This contact work was carried
on outside Washington, notably New York,
both for security reasons and because in an
unofficial atmosphere it was found that the
subject was more inclined to speak freely.
Production of processed intelligence be-
gan in January and FN products soon in-
cluded periodic reports on the views of prom-
inent foreign political personalities and
analyses of the views of segments of the for-
eign language press. For example, one of
the early reports prepared by an FN consult-
ant was a comprehensive editorial survey of
military, naval and air installations in
Greece. It received a commendation from
the Chief of 0-2.
By March FN was supplying information
regularly to the State Department, OFF,
ON!, and the Special Defense Unit and
FBI of the Department of Justice. The
State Department was the principal cus-
--Tep-Seeret�
tomer for rzi reports and Poole regularly at-
tended meetings of an Interdepartmental
Committee on Foreign Nationalities Prob-
lems, which was set up by Assistant Secre-
tary Berle to serve as a medium for the ex-
change of information among interested
agencies. Donovan wrote to Secretary Hull
on 6 April* outlining FN's progress and stat-
ing that its work was primarily oriented to
the needs of State Department. Relations
with other agencies were smooth; the origi-
nal fear of duplication with the work of the
Department of Justice soon disappeared.
On 18 March J. Edgar Hoover wrote Donovan
that he felt much information of value could
be exchanged between FN and FBI, and
stated that the latter agency would be avail-
able for any information which might be re-
quired.**
Within COI, activities were closely coordi-
nated with R&A, FIS and OI, and W was
especially valuable to the new SA/B and
SA/G Branches in suggesting potential
agent and staff personnel from its contacts
among individuals of foreign origin.
When COI dissolved in June 1942, the For-
eign Nationalities Branch had been organ-
ized for approximately four months; its total
personnel consisted of 35 full-time workers
and 50 volunteer helpers. A steady stream.
of raw intelligence data flowed from its field
representatives into the Chancery Division
in Washington, where it was processed into
regular and special reports on the political
activity of more than 30 foreign nationality
groups. The Branch had precise informa-
tion on each group�its leaders, its political
activities and its various publications. This
data was used not only for spot reports but
also for detailed basic reports on various po-
litical situations.
During May 1942 FN distributed 594 mem-
oranda, letters and reports, received 923, and
Interviewed 344 persons. By June, 92 mem-
oranda and reports had been prepared and
distributed and comprehensive basic reports
� See History File W-28, Tab N.
�� See History File W-27, p. 26.
66
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-4op-Secret-
on the Greeks, Austrians, Bulgarians and
Italians were ready for printing and distribu-
tion.
FN represented a new field of political
study and reportage, which by June 1942 had
demonstrated its value to outside agencies
of the Government.
(d) VISUAL PRESENTATION�VP
The Visual Presentation Branch was set
up to aid in quick and clear presentation of
reports and data through the development
and utiJiya tion of visual techniques.
In early September Donovan and Ather-
ton Richards discussed such a branch pri-
marily as an aid to the President and other
high officials concerned with the formula-
tion of policy in studying the various ele-
ments pertinent to national defense. Ac-
cordingly, VP was established in late Sep-
tember. Its main functions were the for-
mulation of techniques of visual presenta-
tion, the erection of a presentation building
for the use of the President, and the prepa-
ration of displays to be used therein. Presi-
dential approval was obtained on 7 Novem-
ber and Budget approval on 8 December.
The Branch was organized in three main
divisions: (1) The Reports Division, respon-
sible for the illustration of reports, which
was composed of a Graphics Section, special-
izing in graphs and charts, and a Pictorial
Records Section, which assembled pictorial
data on areas of strategic importance; (2)
the Presentation Division, responsible for
the development of techniques to be used in
the new building, which was composed of
sections corresponding to the types of infor-
mation to be presented� the Resources De-
piction Section, the Current Information
Section, and the Statistical Reports Section;
and (3) the Field Photographic Division,
which was assigned the task of photograph-
ing designated subjects in the field.*
� In view of the subsequent development of Pic-
torial Records and Field Photographic as inde-
ppendent units, they are discussed separately
below.
67
Under COI the main efforts of the staff
were devoted to plans for the construction
of the new building, designated Q-2. Rich-
ards, together with Merl= Cooper, a former
motion picture director then in A-2 but serv-
ing part time as Special Assistant to Dono-
van, worked out the original plans. These
provided for a building composed of a main
display room and twelve theater rooms, in
which could be presented at any hour a com-
plete display of world conditions relating to
the war. According to the Branch's first
budget estimates of 29 September, an official
presentation of this sort for the President
could be made in a matter of minutes, where-
as if the same information and data were pre-
sented in written or verbal form it might
take months to PAM-inflate. The country's
best engineers and industrial designers were
enlisted to work on the plans.
As they evolved finally, the plans for Q-2
called for a windowless two-story building
containing two semi-circular auditoriums, a
motion picture theater, and twelve category
rooms. The main auditorium was designed
to exhibit strategic information, allowing
simultaneous and flexible presentation of the
various data involved in one subject: one-
half of the room was designed to contain a
series of semi-transparent screens, on which
to project information from both the front
and the back by a number of projectors and
epidiascopes (machines which could project
directly from an opaque surface, such as a
map or the page of a book) ; the other half
of the room was designed for the exhibition
of any type of statistical information on
charts made of adjustable panels of light.
Current events were to be presented in the
other auditorium, by means of specially-con-
structed maps, television where possible, and
also specially developed devices to reproduce
on a screen the animated simulation of tac-
tics employed in a battle fought a few hours
earlier. The pictures were to be supported
by terrain models and various three-dimen-
sional displays. The category rooms were
present in graphic form the main facts re-
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�
-fop-Secret-
lating to twelve broad economies, including
oil, coal, communications, transportation,
etc. R&A, ONI, OPM, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and other authoritative
. sources were to provide the technical data
for the displays.
Blueprints and scale models for Q-2 were
completed in April and came to the attention
of the JCS, who requested that some of the
devices be Installed in their own building.
A maximum of the special plans and facili-
ties developed for Q-2 was adapted for use in
situation and conference rooms for the JCS.
The latter were so strongly impressed with
the potentialities of these rooms that they
requested that Q-2 be located next to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff building. On 11
May 1942 the JCS requested that the erection
of Q-2 be postponed, pending completion of
plans for the JCS rooms. In June it was de-
cided that the rooms would suffice to meet
the President's requirements. Accordingly,
the JCS ordered the termination of plans for
Q-2. On 27 June Donovan informed the
Public Buildings Commissioner that the
building would not be erected, but, since the
plans were near completion, he asked that
they be finished and held for possible future
use.
The Presentation Division had begun ac-
tual construction of the rooms for the JCS in
June; the Categories Section had collected a
great deal of basic information for the cate-
gories rooms from other government agen-
cies and private concerns.
By June, the Graphics Section of the Re-
ports Division Was well established and had
produced a number of map and chart pres-
entations for the Army and Navy and other
COI branches, including diagrams of Rus-
sian supply routes, sirnilnr studies of the
Burma Road and routes to Alaska, and pic-
torial evaluations of the supply requirements
of Germany.
With the end of COI in June 1942, the
Visual Presentation Branch was broken up;
the Presentation Division and the Pictorial
Records Section became separate divisions
--Tep-Seeret-
of R&A, part of the Grr.phics Section was
turned over to OWI, and the Field Photo-
graphic Division became an independent
unit of OS&
(e) PICTORIAL RECORDS
Pictorial Records originated as a section
of the Visual Presentation Branch. It was
established to assemble and make available .
photographs, films and other pictorial rec-
ords from commercial, governmental, for-
eign, personal, and other sources, depicting
areas and subjects of strategic importance.
As originally planned in November 1941,
the Section was to serve two purposes: It
would provide pictorial information of stra-
tegic value and at the same time would as-
sist VP in the preparation of visual presen-
tations. As a result of its early work in col-
lecting information for the Army and Navy,
it soon became the central collection point
for pictorial data. Its secondary function
for Visual Presentation was never realized.
Pictorial Records was precluded from the
motion picture field and it addressed itself
exclusively to the collection of "still" pic-
torial data. Sources contacted to carry out
the assignment included American film com-
panies owning various types of films on for-
eign countries, a large number of American
tourists and explorers who had penetrated
almost every part of the globe, the archives
of the government departments, and the
film units which existed in many universi-
ties. Pictorial Records personnel comprised
research editors, research technicians, li-
brarians, and photographers, working prin-
cipally in Washington and New York.
On 19 February, at a meeting in which the
Army, Navy and Air Force were represented,
an official list of priorities was given Pic-
torial Records. It was agreed that 0-2 and
ONI would furnish Pictorial Records with
advisors to pAsigt in recognition of the type
of data desired.
By June 1942 Pictorial Records personnel
numbered approximately twenty. By that
time, requests for information from tire
68
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Army and Navy had increased to such an ex-
tent that budget estimates for the next year
called for additional personnel totalling
eighty-six. During the COI period, Pictorial
Records assembled and catalogued an enor-
mous number of photographs and Simi . for
example, in April 1942, 40,000 feet of film
were received, of which 30,000 feet were stud-
ied and marked for duplication; over 12,000
still pictures were received, of which 2,600
were catalogued and 2,500 were copied. The
Section performed special services on re-
quest, such as supplying to the Navy Bureau
of Aeronautics a list of 410 motion pictures
of special interest.
With the end of COI, Pictorial Records be-
came for a short period a separate branch
of OSS. By August 1943, however, it was
made a division of R&A.
(f) FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC DIVI-
SION
The Field Photographic Division of the
Visual Presentation Branch was established
to produce motion and still picture reports
of strategic areas in various parts of the
world.
In September 1941 Merian Cooper sug-
gested to Donovan that such a division was
necessary to prepare films on strategic in-
formation for the President. He stated that
there was informally organized in California
a Naval Reserve unit of the best Hollywood
technicians, who had begun training on
their own initiative and had been awaiting
call to active duty for 18 months. Donovan
sent a request to Secretary Knox, and the
unit was called to active duty on 13 Septem-
ber.* Numbering ten officers and twenty-
one enlisted men, it was immediately as-
signed to COI. The group began promptly
to assemble equipment, recruit additional
personnel, and set up its organization within
VP.
On 21 October, Donovan informed the
President that the Meld Photographic Divi-
� See History File W-7, p. 108.
sion was ready to prepare for him any films
he might require, and suggested confidential
or secret films on strategic areas which the
President had not seen, such as Iceland,
where American forces had landed on 7 July.
On the same day President Roosevelt re-
plied: "Having directed you to organize a
Photographic Presentation group, I hereby
authorize you to send it to Iceland."
By 19 December, approximately three
months after call to active duty, Field Photo-
graphic had two camera groups in Iceland,
two in Panama photographing military in-
stallations, and five with the first Atlantic
convoy.
Due to the confidential nature of the films
It was necessary to establish a laboratory
where they could be processed under condi-
tions of strict security. Facilities to meet
this need were obtained in the South Agri-
culture Building pursuant to an agreement
with the Department of Agriculture effec-
tive 18 December.** Since this laboratory
was the only one available secure enough to
process highly classified films on short no-
tice, various departments of the Army, Navy
and Marine Corps began to entrust the proc-
essing of such films to Field Photographic.
Following the outbreak of war, the Divi-
sion began to carry out War and Navy De-
partment requests, in addition to requests
made by the President Emphasis was
shifted from pictures of areas of potential
interest to pictures of intelligence character-
istics which could be used as a visual aid in
the conduct of the war.
On 10 January the Secretary of the Na'slr
requested Field Photographic to prepare an
historical documentation of the Pearl Har-
bor attack, and on 29 January a large con-
tingent of men left Washington to begin
work on this project.
By 13 June, the Field Photographic Divi-
sion had a total of approximately 130 naval
personneL Films had been completed on
Panama, Iceland, the first Atlantic convoy,
� See History File W-7, p. 108.
** See History File Tab A.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Martinique and and Guadeloupe, and work on
the Pearl Harbor film was in progress. In
addition, the repair of the U.S.S. Kearney
had been photographed as an incident of the
Iceland mission. The Navy's Bureau of
Ships found the resultant film particularly
useful for training purposes. The Marti-
nique film, an aerial reconnalqr,ance of the
coastline and of military installations on
the Island, was highly commended by the
Marine Corps amphibious force at Quantico,
which subsequently requested several other
prPject-s.
With the end of COI, Field Photographic
was separated from VP and became an inde-
pendent unit of MS.
4. Special Activities
On 10 October 1941 there was established
In the Coordinator's office a section desig-
nated "Special Activities�K and L Funds."
This section was destined to handle the work
of COI in connection with espionage, sub-
� versive activities (including sabotage) and
guerrilla units. .
Donovan's basic concept, evolved from his
experience extending back to World War I
and particularly his observation of wars
from 1935 through 1940, had envisaged a
"softening-up" process to pave the way for
the regular armed forces, consisting broadly
of three phases: First, secret intelligence in-
filtration and preparation; second, sabotage
and subversive harassing tactics; and third,
resistance groups and guerrilla or com-
mando operations.* While he conceived
these as separate and distinct functions re-
quiring different techniques and training,
he saw them as related and interdependent,
each preparing for and rmigting the others
as successive phases of a continuing process.
Even before his appointment as Coordinator
of Information he had urged these ideas
often and cogently in speeches to select offi-
* This concept is here limited to "Special Activ-
ities" only; propaganda was, of course, a basic
factor in Donovan's view.
.-Tep-Sefref-
cial groups, in personal conference and in
memoranda.
The general pattern of this concept was
Included as part of the idea for a permanent
over-all intelligence agency expounded by
Donovan to a committee of Cabinet members
appointed by the President in the summer
of 1941. As a result, the committee recom-
mended that an agency be set up to secure
Information by secret means and also to or-
ganize "morale and physical subversion".
(Exhibit W-18) It was after the submission
of this recommendation that the COI was
established on 11 July 1941 by the Presi-
dent's order which authorized the Coordi-
nator to carry out, when requested by the
President, "such supplementary activities as
may facilitate the securing of information
Important for national security not now
available to the Government."
Nevertheless, Donovan did not immedi-
ately undertake the organization of under-
cover intelligence or subversive activities.
Both Army and Navy were already in the
secret intelligence field, albeit handicapped
by inadequate appropriations and, with the
United States at peace, by their official and
military status. (State Department, in the
field to a lesser extent, was subject to the
same handicaps; FBI was concerned exclu-
sively with the Western Hemisphere.) Mere-
ly to place another entrant in the intelli-
gence field might have led to unnecpn.e.,qry
friction which would have handicapped ef-
fectiveness. There was no agency of the
Government concerned with subversive ac-
tivities, but this subject, by its very nature,
had to be approached with the greatest de-
gree of circumspection even within our own
Government in the summer and fall of 1941.
� It should be noted that the phrase "supple-
mentary activities" was more than a cover for the
"Special Activities" here under consideration. It
was inserted at the instance of Donovan to meet
any situation that might arise. He realized that
the evolution of the organization might neces-
sarily be subject to wide ramifications the exact
nature and extent of which would be impossible*
of precise definition at that early stage.
70
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�..-/op-Sacraf-
For the first two months Donovan proceeded
with the organization of the other, more
overt, work of COI, awaiting the turn of
events to clear the way for "Special Activi-
ties".
It was the secret int0Iligence situation
which was first resolved. As early as De-
cember 1940, representatives of 0-2, ONI,
State Department and FBI had discussed
and agreed in principle on the desirability of
consolidating undercover intelligence activi-
ties under one head. In view of the difficul-
ties which each of these agencies faced,
however, no definite action had been taken
and the matter was left in abeyance. The
establishment of COI seemed to provide an
answer to the problem. Since it was a civil-
ian agency with access to secret funds as a
part of the Executive Office of the President,
It seemed free from the principal handicaps
which had beset ONI and 0-2. The War and
Navy Departments initiated discussions in
August and September 1941 looking toward
consolidation of undercover intelligence
under COI, and on 6 September the War De-
partment recommended the consolidation.
(Exhibit W-19) The Navy followed suit in
early October.' On 10 October Donovan ad-
vised the President of the consolidation and
the reasons therefor (Exhibit W-20) :
By Joint action of the Military and Naval In-
telligence Services there was consolidated under
the Coordinator of Information the undercover
Intelligence of the two services. In their mem-
orandum the reasons stated for the action are:
1. That such a service is much more effective
under one head rather than three, and
2. A civilian agency has distinct advantages
over any military or naval agency in the admin-
istration of such a service.
This consolidation has been approved by the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.
COI was therefore in a position to consider
what form the secret intelligence organiza-
tion should take. But even as study of this
A contributing factor to the services' decision
was the lack of information on Lend-Lease mutes
to Russia which became apparent in connection
with the R&A studies in September. (See RSTA,
3 (a) above.)
subject proceeded, an actual problem in the
field was being met. Donovan's 10 October
memorandum to the President continued:
As a concrete illustration of what can be done,
we are now pluming to deal with a very present
problem in North Africa by setting up at once a
wireless station in Tangier and having stationed
there an assistant Naval or Military Attache who
can unify the activities of the Vice-Consuls in
North Africa and stimulate efforts in the selection
of local agents of information.
The North African situation, on which ac-
tion was being taken concurrently with the
formation of the Washington organization
In the last three months of 1941, had a pro-
found effect on the Special Activities set:up.
In the first place, North Africa was a perfect
target for Donovan's concept. If we were
eventually to invade, not only intelligence
penetration, but subversive action, organiza-
tion of resistance groups and guerrilla or
commando activities would be of obvious and
Inestimable value. Conversely, if the Ger-
mans occupied French North Africa (a very
real possibility right up to D-Day in Novem-
ber 1942) , in the words of a memorandum
(Exhibit W-21) from Donovan to the Presi-
dent on 22 December 1941, "the need of sow-
ing the dragon's teeth" should be recognized.
From an intelligence standpoint, French
North Africa was a unique situation in which
to develop an independent American net-
work, the British having been denied official
status there in 1940 following the French
Armistice and attacks on Mers-el-Sebir and
Dakar. From the standpoint of subversive
activities, it was an early opportunity to col-
laborate with SOE which was operating in
Tangier. The situation in North Africa is
more fully discussed in Section C below in
connection with the early Washington prep-
arations,* but mention is made here to point
up three factors which influenced the devel-
opment of Special Activities by COI: First,
the North African situation proved an urgent
and ea qily understandable example to dem-
� See also the account of TORCH in .Europe!
Africa Section.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
onstrate the relation between intelligence
and subversive action; second, COI plans for
North Africa, as developed by Donovan in
late 1941 and approved by. the President, be-
came the original charter for special opera-
tions; and third, North Africa was an early
practical example in the field of the necessity
for division between secret intelligence and
special operations in working with the two
completely separate British organizations�
ISIS and SOB."
In December 1941 Donovan sent to the
President an account of the development of
the British Commandos, following this on 22
December 1941 with a memorandum (Ex-
hibit W-21) suggesting that subversive ac-
tivities and guerrilla units be considered in
strategic planing. Here, again, the North
African situation was used as an immediate
and pressing example, and the relation be-
tween subversive action, resistance groilps
and guerrilla units was stressed. Specifi-
cally, this memorandum recommended:
1. That as an essential part of any strategic
plan, there be recognized the need of sowing the
dragon's teeth in those territories from which
we must withdraw and in which the enemy will
place his army; for example, the Azores or North
Africa. That the aid of native chiefs be ob-
tained, the loyalty of the inhabitants be culti-
vated; Fifth columnists organized and placed,
demolition material cached; and guerrilla bands
of bold and daring men organized and installed.
2. That there be organized now, in the United
States, a guerrilla corps, independent and sepa-
rate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a
maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit
This force should, of course, be created along dis-
ciplined military lines, analogous to the British
Commando principle, a statement of which I sent
you recently.
The President replied on the following day,
"I want you to take this up with Mr. Church-
ill [who was then staying at the White
House] and find out whom we should work
with in England toward this end." ***
� See SA/G below.
so British Secret Intelligence Service and Spe-
cial Operations Executive.
� " See History File W-7. p. 135.
1 The first personnel secured by Donovan to
organize Special Activities were drawn from
G-2 and ONL Two of them, Mr. Wallace
B. Phillips and Lieutenant Colonel Robert
A. Solborg, were assigned to COI and took
up their duties in mid-October. A third,
Major (later Colonel) M. Preston Goodfel-
low, was not formally assigned to the organ-
ization until after the formation of OSS in
June 1942, but � became G-2 liaison officer
with the agency in August 1941 and contrib-
uted greatly to the organization and devel-
opment of the Special Operations Branch.
Phillips was a civilian who had been en-
gaged in December 1940 as a Special Assist-
ant to the Director of ONI to develop an
undercover intelligence service. Phillips
moved to COI offices on or about 15 October
1941, his transfer being formalized by letter
of Captain T. S. Wilkinson to Colonel Dono-
van on 15 December 1941. With him, Phil-
lips brought some 13 agents,* all under State
Department cover, who had been dispatched
primarily to secure naval intelligence. Phil-
lips was to head up undercover intelligence
activities and was asked to prepare his rec-
ommendations as to the form of organiza-
tion to handle this work.
Donovan, at Goodfellow's suggestion, se-
cured the services of a 0-2 officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Robert A. Solborg, to study the sub-
ject of SpAristl Operations and to make rec-
ommendations as to the form of organiza-
tion for these activities. Solborg, who had
had experience in the summer of 1941 as an
Intelligence agent under civilian cover in
North Africa, reported to COI as Chief of
Operations of Special Activities on 9 October
1941. He departed for England later that
month to study SOB methods and organiza-
tion.
Goodfellow, who had been 0-2 liaison of-
ficer with COI since August, was particularly
helpful in this period in connection with
10.
� This figure does not include the twelve control
officers in North Africa who were originally sent
out under joint 0-2�State Departnent�ONI.
auspices. See *North Africa," Section C below.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
plans for Special Operations. He had long
advocated experimentation in unconven-
tional methods of warfare and was naturally
attracted by Donovan's ideas for subversive
activities and the organization of guerrilla
units. I
"rrequestion of the separation of Secret
Intelligence and Special" Operations organi-
zationally was the subject of some misunder-
standing in this early period on the part of
both Phillips and Solborg. On 21 October
1941, before he left for England, the latter
recommended that the two be combined un-
der a single branch chief. At about the
same time Phillips made a similar proposal.
Donovan, however, realized that, while a
high degree of cooperation, even collabora-
tion at some stages, should exist between the
two activities, administrative separation was
a practical necessity. As he wrote to Phil-
lips in an undated memorandum, probably
written in late October or early November
1941, "I have gone over your memorandum.
The set-up you have does not conform in all
respects to what I have in mind. . . . I
want you to be in charge of Intelligence as
distinct from Operations. The Operations
I will have headed up separately. The func-
tions are distinct." (Exhibit W-22) He
went on, however, to state that intelligence
agents in a given territory must be prepared
to act under the operations officer in some
contingencies.
The outbreak of war on 7 December 1941
stepped up the pressure on the whole of COI
and made immediate decision of the organi-
zational question imperative. A state of
wax also made it clear that neither function
could be adequately performed on a small,
one-man basis. Further, the preparations
for subversive activities and guerrilla units,
which had been necessarily most circum-
spect even within our own Government be-
fore Pearl Harbor, could be approached more
directly thereafter. Goodfellow had already
been of great assistance in getting these
preparations under way.
� See History File W-11, Tab S.
The determining factor, however, in the
decision to split Special Activities into Secret
Intelligence and Special Operations, each
having branch status, was the necessity of
Immediate cooperation with the British in a
common war effort: Their SIS and SOB
were completely separate organizations un-
der different cabinet ministers. In the
course of discussions with Stephenson in
connection with the plan for North Africa,
Donovan had been apprised of the high de-
gree of rivalry and, on occasion, jealousy,
between the two British agencies. Conse-
quently, he realized that it would be imprac-
ticable to have one branch of COI to deal
with both SOB and SIS. To meet this polit-
ical necessity, and at the same time pre-
serve the advantages of unified control and
direction, Donovan separated Special Activi-
ties into a Secret Intelligence Branch and a
Special Operations Branch in December.,
Mr. (later Colonel) David K. E. Bruce was
appointed Chief of the Secret Intelligence
Branch, designated SA/B (Special Activi-
ties/Bruce). .
Solborg returned from England in early
January 1942 and his memorandum of 13
January, recommending a completely sepa-
rate Special Operations Branch, clearly
showed the effects of his training and study
with SOE.� A week later, however, he wrote
a memorandum in which he again proposed
that the two functions be combined under
one head. Such a combination was impos-
sible in the situation then existing. On 23
January 1942 Goodfellow agreed to take on
temporarily, in addition to his liaison duties,
the job of organizing and directing the Spe-
cial Operations Branch, which was there-
after designated SA/G (Special Activities/
Goodfellow).
The independent organization and devel-
opment of SA/B and SA/G under COI are
discussed in (a) and (b) below. The Spe-
cial (Unvouchered) Funds Division is dis-
cussed in (c). The latter serviced both
SA/B and SA/G and, in view of the unique
� See History File W-Sa, Tab W.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
_
nature of its services and its subsequent de-
velopment, It is treated independently.
(a) SECRET INTELLIGENCE--SA/B
The purpose of SA/B was to create for the
United States an independent service to ob-
tain information outside the Western Hemi-
sphere by secret means, principally through
undercover agents. Such a service was an
essential part of the intelligence agency pro-
posed by Donovan in June 1941 as a peace-
time function. Its relation to the other ele-
ments of Special Activities was one applica-
tion of this function in time of war. The
outbreak of wax complicated its normal task
of establishing a system of intelligence cov-
erage by making necessary penetration of
enemy and enemy-occupied territory and
preparation in other areas for the event of
either Allied or enemy occupation or affilia-
tion.
There was no American precedent for this
undertaking. Personnel had to be found
and trained and an organization established;
at the same time immediate operations to
get agents into the field were nececgary. As
was the case with so much of COI, action was
coincident with organization.
At a stage of the war when our armies had
not achieved footholds abroad, the objec-
tives of intelligence operations fell into two
categories: (1) Establishment of agents in
neutral territories to report on local condi-
tions and Axis activity and also to penetrate
adjacent enemy and enemy-occupied terri-
tory through native contacts and subagents;
and (2) establishment of bases in friendly
territories, e.g., England, Egypt, China, from
which penetration of enemy and enemy-oc-
cupied territory could be organized and di-
rected.
Donovan's memorandum to the President
of 10 October (Exhibit W-20) had stressed
three basic requirements for the secret in-
telligence service:
(1) Cover�the ostensible reason for the
agent's presence in a given area under the
cloak of which his intelligence work can be
performed.
(2) Security�of activities in the field,
which makes it necessary in certain cases
that the agent have official status.
(3) Communications�access to diplo-
matic pouch and other established facilities.
Also the secret use of radio to establish a
line of communications which will endure
after the severance of diplomatic relations.
These objectives and requirements had a
major influence on the selection of personnel
and the type of organization established.
In the selection of both staff and agent
personnel the basic requirements were, of
course, experience abroad and knowledge of
foreign lands and language. A majority of
the key men first selected to Finist Bruce had
diplomatic and/or commercial experience
abroad. Since these men had wide ac-
quaintance among Americans who had
worked or resided in foreign countries, addi-
tional staff and agent personnel were re-
cruited through such contacts. In addition,
their intimate knowledge of foreign coun-
tries and the nature of American diplomatic
and commercial activities in those countries
facilitated the development of intelligence
plans.
Organizationally, it was possible to set up
the Branch without waiting for the develop-
ment of new devices or the establishment of
machinery for the illegal reproduction of
documents. The principal asset of a secret
agent is ingenuity. The only devices he
should carry in a neutral country are those .
natural to his cover. The rapid procure-
ment of authentic credentials to support
cover was dependent only upon the coopera-
tion of our own authorities.
In the early profusion of ideas, system was
necessary. Procedure was established in
January whereby all ideas for intelligence
operations were formulated into projects to
facilitate approval, coordination and con-
troL The few agents who had been in the
field under Phillips, primarily for naval in-
telligence, were incorporated into this sys-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Tkrp
tern and and their purposes redefined. Projects
were kept in three categories: "Approved and
In operation", "approved and in prepara-
tion" and "formulated but not yet ap-
proved". Donovan's approval was required
for all projects prior to implementation.
Bruce directed the activities of SA/B. He
was assisted by a Production Officer, who
coordinated the activities of the operating
sections (Geographic Desks) and supervised
recruiting and training, and an Executive
Officer who supervised the administrative
sections. Staff meetings of the principal
Branch officers oversaw general policy; an
office in New York assisted all sections of
the Branch on matters requiring attention
there; and a Reporting Board was responsi-
ble for the evaluation and dis-sPrnination of
Intelligence received.
The organization and functions of the
principal components of SA/B were as fol-
lows:
(1) GEOGRAPHIC DESKS
These Desks were the operating sections
and the empha-sis of the entire Branch or-
ganization was on facilitating their activi-
ties. They were established in the first few
months of 1942 as rapidly as qualified per-
sonnel could be found. By May there were
nine Geographic Desks organized on a re-
gional basis�Western Europe, Central Eu-
rope, Northern Europe, British Empire, Italy,
Eastern Europe, Africa, Near East and Far
East�each consisting of from one to eight
country sections.
The Desks formulated intelligence proj-
ects which passed through the Production
Officer to Bruce for approval. Thereupon
they went to Donovan and, if he approved,
were returned to the respective originating
Desks for implementation_
The principal cover used was State De-
partment or other government agency; com-
mercial or professional cover was employed
to a lesser extent. However, any usual or
logical reason for the presence of the agent
In a given area was potential cover. Occa-
75
sionally, the background of the recruit sug-
gested the cover and the project. On other
occasions, the project was first devised and
appropriate agents subsequently recruited.
Recruiting agent personnel was a major
problem. A recruiting section serviced both
SA/B and SA/G; COI branches�OI and FN,
for example�suggested possible recruits;
also, SA/B staff members drew on personal
contacts for agent materiaL In each case,
however, final approval of the recruit was
the responsibility of the Desk concerned.
Once employed, the recruit went to the
Training Section for a period of training.
During that time the Desk maintained close
liaison with both the instructors and the re-
cruit. The regional experts who staffed the
Desks studied field conditions closely and
were responsible for operational briefing of
agents.
The Desk arranged for the agent's trans-
portation and passport through the COI
Liaison Office where such procedure was
feasible. In some cases, however, consid-
erations of cover and security made it advis-
able for the agent to arrange these matters
himself, or for the Desk to handle them
through private channels.
Once the agent was in the field, the Desk
was his sole point of contact in Washington
on all matters, such as approving and expe-
diting the forwarding of funds and supplies
and the recruitment, briefing and dispatch
of additional personnel.
These matters were handled with the ut-
most discretion to protect the agent's cover
In the United States and prevent revelation
of his connection with COL They were
handled through the COI Liaison Office
when State Department was the cover.
When other cover was used, discreet arrange-
ments were made by personal contact with
a reliable individual in the business firm or
other organization concerned. The Desk
also handled personal matters for the agent
In cases where the security of the project
might be involved.
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�
Twt,
It was realized from the start that in the
secret intelligence field, where the keys to
the agent's success are such intangibles as
energy, discretion, loyalty and, above all,
Ingenuity, the human factor is of prime im-
portance. Although the organization as a
whole necessarily grew to impersonal pro-
portions, there was a continuing effort to
maintain a close feeling of mutual under-
standing and friendship between the agent
In the field and the Desk man at home.
All intelligence, requested and reported,
was routed through the Desk. During COI's
existence, when the volume of agent intelli-
gence was comparatively smau and there
were no intervening units of command, the
Desk was also responsible for the evaluation
and dissemination of intelligence received
from its agents.
(2) TRAINING
In late December 1941 the problem of or-
ganizing and directing a training program
for intelligence agents was assigned to an
R&A psychologist. He had not had any pre-
vious experience in undercover intelligence
work (few Americans had) , but immediately
set about surveying the subject and prepar-
ing a program.
Actual training began in mid-January
when the training director gave individual
coaching to a single recruit from the West-
ern 'European Desk. In early February
there were four students and indications of
greater numbers in succeeding months. Ad-
ditional training personnel was assigned in
March and two rooms in Q Building were
made available.
The training director attended the SOE
intelligence school in Canada in April (as
did other training staff members later) and
made arrangements to secure not only copies
of their training lecture courses, but the ad-
visory services of one of their experts. Also,
arrangements were made in May for SA/B
recruits to attend the more military SA/G
schools in cases where such training seemed
desirable.
4ep-Seere4,
76
In April, negotiations were concluded to
lease a 100-acre estate about 20 miles from
Washington, where, on 5 May 1942, the SA/B
training school (RTU-11) opened with a
class of eight. RTU-11, or "The Farm", as
It was generally called, was capable of hous-
ing approximately 15 students. Cover was
provided by the story that it was a headquar-
ters for a small group of army officers and
men testing new devices and equipment.
The regular period of training was four
weeks, but shorter concentrated courses were
given to individual students whenever neces-
sary. Students resided at "The Farm" dur-
ing training and classes were conducted in
an informal civilian atmosphere. Students
went under assumed names, and were not
permitted to discuss their prospective plans
or assignments with one another.
One of the most important subjects stud-
ied was the cipher system. A system was de-
vised so that each cipher, though individual,
could be memorized. Mastery of this cipher
made it unnecessary for the agent to carry
with him any incriminating evidence of his
real activity. Students also mastered other
cipher systems of an entirely different type
which could be adapted to use by sub-agents
In the field without endangering the secur-
ity of the main system. The technique of
writing letters which appeared ordinary but
concealed an enciphered message ("inno-
cent texts") was also practiced.
Other subjects studied included the tech-
niques of Security; Cover; Counter-Intelli-
gence; General Communications; Recruit-
ing, Organization and Handling of Agents;
Police Methods and Interrogation; Report-
ing; Recognition and Identification (mate-
riel and order of battle) ; Small Arms; Close
Combat; Concealment (of objects); Bribery;
Lying; Photography; and Elementary Field-
craft and Sketching. The methods of train-
ing included lectures, study of specially pre-
pared handbooks and relevant printed mate-
rial, field and laboratory exercises, motion
pictures, and observation trips to such cen-
ters as Aberdeen, Norfolk and Bolling Field.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
_rop:sicrer
In the summer of 1942, specialists from
other branches of COI (principally R&A and
Special Funds) began to visit "The Farm"
regularly to lecture on ways to improve
agent intelligence for their respective pur-
poses. Field problems involving undercover
trips to nearby cities, such as Philadelphia
and Baltimore, were also added to the
courses.
At the end of the training period an evalu-
ation of the student's aptitudes and conduct
during training was prepared for his Desk.
(3) REPORTING BOARD
The genesis of the Reporting Board was
a memorandum of 27 March 1942 to Bruce �
from certain of his assistants suggesting the
desirability of supervising and channeling
all outgoing material. On 7 April Bruce
Issued a branch directive pointing out that
Intelligence received by SA/B would prob-
ably consist of reports from its oWn agents
and reports obtained from secret services of
other nations.* To be responsible for eval-
uating and disseminating the latter, he des-
ignated a Reporting Board of three mem-
bers. The Board was augmented by the
appointment of an Executive Secretary later
in the month.
In setting up procedure for the evaluation
of intelligence, the Reporting Board adopted
the British letter and number system and
so informed State Department, ON/, 0-2,
A-2, BEW and the R&A Branch of COI on
� 23 May 1942. These American agencies and
departments agreed to conform to the sys-
tem shortly thereafter.
Reproduction and distribution methods
were set up with a view to later expansion.
In addition, certain corollary services were
organized which proved of great value to the
Desks. On 6 May 1942 a Reference Room
was established to collect and make available
existing operational information. It ac-
quired a pool of area specialists which, in
� See History File W-55, "Reporting Board,"
p.6.
addition to services directly rendered to op-
erating staffs, soon became a valuable source
of personnel upon which the Desks could
draw for experts already indoctrinated in
SA/B procedures. Within the Reference
Room were also established a Geographic
Index of Persons and a Press Survey which
proved of value to other divisions. The Ref-
erence Room also reviewed and circulated to
interested SA/B personnel abstracts and
catalogues of information procured from the
researches of R&A and other government
agencies.
From the standpoint of the Reporting
Board the COI period was principally one of
"getting set". The evaluation procedure,
established in the spring of 1942, remained
in effect throughout the war; methods of re-
production and rapid distribution also
proved adequate to the expansion which
later demands required.
(4) NEW YORK OFFICE
In February 1942 the New York Office was
established in the International Building at
630 Fifth Avenue. Its purpose was prima-
rily recruiting and liaison with parallel serv-
ices in United Nations. It was also avail-
able for special inquiries through civilian
channels. The New York Office maintained
close liaison with the other divisions of SA/B
in Washington, as well as with certain other
branches, such as OI and FN.
The value and importance of services that
the New York Office could render caused
rapid expansion throughout the COI period,
so that by 13 June its total personnel num-
bered 46 of the SA/B total of 179. SA/G es-
tablished a representative there in April.
International labor and maritime contacts
first developed by the New York Office re-
sulted in the establishment of a Labor Unit
there in the Spring of 1942. This unit later
became the Labor Desk, an important func-
tional division of SI under OSS. Tha.
"George Project" also developed out of ac-
--Tep-SeeFe0-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
&Top-Secret--
tivities initiated in the New York Office un-
der COL*
(5) EXECUTIVE OFFICE
This office handled administrative prob-
lems including supply, registry, office man-
agement, personnel, cable, mail and special
services. Certain sections set up for SA/B
and SA/G jointly also serviced SA/B through
the Executive Office: Special Funds, Secur-
ity, Communications and Recruiting.
Operations were effected while the organi-
zation was developing. By the end of April
1942, SA/B had 15 representatives in the
field and the Production Officer reported a
total of 34 projects approved and in prepara-
tion.
By 15 June 46 projects were in operation
or preparation; a total of 27 agents was in
the field.
Four representatives, stationed in London,
Cairo and Chungking, were engaged in es-
tablishing field bases in those cities. Nine
agents** were operating in the Near East.
There were agents in Sweden, Switzerland,
Portugal and Spain. Four agents were in
West Africa, one in South Africa and an ad-
ditional intelligence agent had been dis-
patched as a member of the TORCH team in
North Africa.
Projects were approved and in preparation
(some merely awaiting transportation or
passports) to send additional agents to the
areas mentioned above, and also to place
agents in Greece, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia
and France. Additional projects were in
process of formulation, covering certain por-
tions of the above countries and, in addition,
India, Ceylon and Ettirnomio
Cover was not limited to government or
commercial representation. A glance at a
few of the projects in operation or prepara-
tion in June indicates the diversity of talent,
ingenuity and effort of SA/B in developing
"secret means" of information outside the
� See New York Office in Section II below.
�� Including certain personnel under govern-
ment cover in Cairo.
-rop-Seeret�
Western Hemisphere :2.tT�
eln American woman
traveling in Kashmir"; "two teachers in Ka-
bul""an American resident of Jerusalem";
representative of American universities
�Enterested in the excavation of Antioch"; "a
field representative of the American Museum
of Natural History in the Belgian Congo"
�certain Thisgionaries in West Africa";2:two
dentists having Near East experience will
conduct a survey of dental needs in Iraq at
the request of the American Dental Associa-
tion and the Office of the Surgeon General".j,
� Relations were excellent with parallel serv-
ices of other nations. As early as April, ne-
gotiations were concluded with the Czecho-
slovak intelligence service to receive their
reports.* By 15 June, negotiations were
well under way for regular receipt of the
reports of other services, such as the French,
Polish, Dutch, Yugoslav and Greek, and
some reports were already being received.
Relations with the British were character-
ized by the same good feeling and mutual
assistance which existed throughout the
various branches and divisions of COL �
Dealings with secret services of other na-
tions never reached the stage of collabora-
tion, however. Strict regard was had to the
concept of independence in secret intelli-
gence which Donovan had emphasized from
the beginning.
Initially, 0-2 and ONI viewed SA/B with
some distrust. This was due in part to lack
of assurance that COI security was adequate,
and, in part, to doubt that civilian agents
�
would have sufficient technical knowledge
and background to make their observations
reliable and valuable for military and naval
purposes. The resolution of the security
question came with the establishment of the
COI Security Division. The second point
of doubt was not resolved until later. Both
older services began to acquire confidence in
SA/B, however, as the volume of its intelli-
gence increased and they had an opportu-
� This service had remained independent after
Munich and had an effective network in Europe
and the Near East.
78
Ap
roved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-I-up
nity to check and evaluate it. It was found
that a great deal of the agent information
was secured through sub-agents recruited in
the field who possessed the requisite tech-
nical experience. In addition, the develop-
ment of SA/B training increasingly stressed
the preparation of recruits to report on mat-
ters of military and naval interest. In a re-
port prepared for the Bureau of the Budget
on 4 August 1942, SA/B stated: "Agents
about to be sent into the field are furnished
with a list of concrete objectives suggested
by representatives of 0-2 and �NV*
Of course, during the COI period SA/B was
not as close to the military and naval serv-
ices as it later became when OSS was placed
under JCS. Also, in this early period rela-
tions were not complicated by the problem
of military command in the field, since thea-
ters of operation were not functioning.
Relations with FBI were satisfactory at
the working level, and the respective fields
of operation were clearly defined.
Other government agencies and depart-
ments, such as Interior, Treasury and Cen-
sorship, were cooperative, rendering particu-
larly useful assistance in training matters.
Relations with State Department were
somewhat closer and hence subject to more
friction. As indicated above, SA/B was
largely dependent upon State Department
for three essentials of operation: cover, cre-
dentials and communications. The number
of agents put into the field under State De-
partment cover shows that assistance was
given. And in most areas in the field rela-
tions with the Department's personnel were
cordial and cooperative. There were inci-
dents, however, both in Washington and in
the field, which were symptomatic of mis-
understanding of the nature of SA/B's work
and distrust of its operations. The Ameri-
can minister in Stockholm ** complained of
COI activities there as early as April; the
Ambassador to Spain complained of COI ac-
� See History File W-54, p. 34.
� � He later became a strong supporter of OSS.
See "Stockholm" in Europe-Africa section.
tivities there in May; an agent was recalled
from Syria in May on charges voiced by the
American Consul General; delay in securing
passports caused the eancerintion in June of
a projmt to send two agents to Vichy Prance;
on 15 June a project was postponed indefi-
nitely because State Department revoked its
agreement to appoint the agent as assistant
to the Consul General at Baghdad.
The above represent only a few of the in-
cidents illustrative of SA/B's difficulties
with State Department which occurred dur-
ing and subsequent to the COI period. Many
were of minor significance in themselves.
They are indicative, however, of a contro-
versy which goes to the essence of secret in-
telligence operations both in peace and war.
A secret intelligence service must find ac-
ceptance and understanding on the part of
its own government, it must have access to
established channels of communication, and
It must have passport privileges. Donovan
made this clear in his memorandum to the
President on 10 October 1941 and restated it
many times thereafter. The traditional in-
difference, or aversion, of the United States
to secret intelligence may explain the fact
that all the handicaps which beset SA/B, and
later SI, were not of the enemy's contriving.
During the COI period, however, only a
few of the "difficulties and vi'lc&tudes of this
organization in finding acceptance of its
services by those who needed it most"* be-
came apparent.
The transition from COI and SA/B to OSS
and SI did not materially change the nature
of the organization or arrest its progress.
SA/B began with only the nersssity for im-
mediate action; there were no guiding prece-
dents, no tools, no reservoir of experienced
personnel and no organization. An organi-
zation was established, operations effected
and techniques developed which came to
fruition later. The 50 intelligence reports
distributed to 0-2 and ONI in May 1942 are
� Exhibit W-18.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop &sere
mainly significant in contrast to the 3,000
distributed in the same month of 1943.
13 June 1942 marked only a change of
symbols in the process of development of a
secret intelligence service.
(b) SPECIAL OPERATIONS--SA/G
The purpose of SA/G was to organize and
execute morale and physical subversion, in-
cluding sabotage, fifth column activities and
guerrilla warfare.
As noted above in Special Activities, Dono-
van had the subject of Special Operations
under consideration as early as 10 October
1941. In that connection, one officer was
sent to England in November to study the
organization and methods of SOE. The
first formal expression of SA/G objectives,
however, was contained in a memorandum
to the President of 22 December (Exhibit
W-21). To the factors of sabotage, fifth col-
umn activities and other forms of subversive
action, this memorandum added two types
of guerrilla warfare: (1) The establishment
and support of small bands of local origin
under definite leaders, and (2) the forma-
tion in the United States of guerrilla forces
military in nature.
SA/G was thus faced with the problem of
setting up recruiting, training and supply
facilities suitable for adaptation to the needs
of guerrilla units at such time as appropriate
military authorization and allotments could
be secured.
Subversive action can serve both a political
and a military purpose. In the case of SA/G,
however, peacetime preparation was impos-
sible and its principal efforts were therefore
directed from the beginning toward unortho-
dox warfare in support of military opera-
tions. Unlike SA/B, which during the COI
period was placing agents in neutral terri-
tories to report directly. to Washington,
SA/G was to operate in support of local area
commands. Consequently, the Washington
headquarters did not have direct operational
�Tep-Seopet-
control over its missions in the field,* and
its principal function was a servicing one in
the general categories of recruiting, training
and supply.
The organization and administration of
the Branch was along military lines and its
first personnel were drawn from the armed
services, principally the Army.
Training. The SA/G training program
was created primarily for the instruction of
agent personnel recruited for infiltration
Into enemy and enemy-occupied territory,
either as individual saboteurs and fifth col-
wnnists or to organize and direct locally-
recruited guerrilla bands or chains of indi-
vidual sub-agents. The program was fur-
ther designed to permit such agents to effect
arrangements to supply local resistance
groups. However, it was considered that
the same basic training would be necessary
for militarized guerrilla units recruited in
the United States and facilities were secured
with a view to future expansion to meet the
needs of such guerrilla units.
Following a survey of potential sites for
training establishments, Goodfellow selected
four areas near Washington as suitable from
the standpoint of security, housing and ter-
rain. Since these areas had been the sites
of CCC camps or summer recreational proj-
ects of the National Park Service, no new
construction was required initially. The
areas, procured through arrangement with
the Department of the Interior, were secured
for the duration of the war:
Area A-5,000 acres of wooded terrain located
five miles west of Quantico, Virginia.
Area B-9,000 acres of mountainous terrain
situated in the Catoctin Area, some
twenty miles north of Frederick,
Maryland.
Area C-4,000 acres of wooded terrain adl a-
cent to Area A, five miles west of
Quantico.
Area D-1,400 acres of wooded terrain on the
Potomac River across from Quantico.
� Except for certain representatives sent to neu-
tral countries, such as Portugal and Vichs
Prance, for survey purposes.
80
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
On 17 February 1942 Donovan requested
rAnnnis-cioned and enlisted personnel from
the War Department to operate the prospec-
tive schools and to serve as instructors and
station complements Secretary Stimson
replied on 23 February that the Personnel
Division had been instructed to make the
requested personnel immediately available
to COI.** Pursuant to this authority, the
Coordinator of Information Service Com-
mand was activated on 1 April 1942 with
Goodfellow as Commanding Officer and
Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams in
charge of the Training Unit (Exhibit W-23).
Williams, formerly director of the New York
Bureau of Narcotics, had transferred from
the War Department to COI in the late fall
of 1941 Following training with SOB in
Canada., he began preparations for a training
program for subversive agents and for acti-
vation of guerrilla units.
The following training program was
evolved:
Preliminary School (two weeks) �elementary
instruction in demolitions, weapons, close com-
bat, silent killing, physical conditioning and
iieldcraft.
Basic School (two weeks) �further and more
advanced training in the above subjects and the
techniques of sabotage; practical exercise in
raids, attacks and sabotage.
Advanced Training School (two weeks) �in-
struction in undercover work in a foreign country
with particular reference to cover, organizing na-
tins, and the conduct of passive resistance and
sabotage of enemy activitles.� � �
Parachute School (one week)�five parachute
jumps and practice in disposing of the evidence
of such landing. Also practice in receiving sup-
plies by parachute and disposing of same.
Maritime School (one week) �instruction and
practice in landing from submarine and surface
craft on hostile shores in darkness and returning
to such vessels after completion of mission.
Practice in receiving supplies by means of under-
� See History rile W-11a, Tab NN.
� � See History File Tab 00.
� .� Much of the curriculum in this school was
similar, if more elemental, to corresponding
"cover" and "agent organization" courses at "The
Farm," SA/B training area.
81
water containers. Special instruction for stu-
dents who might be concerned with vessel sabo-
tage.
Industrial Sabotage School�special instruction
of a technical nature for students to be assigned
to sabotage in factories or industrial establish-
ments.
Localized Social School�sabotage and guerrilla
warfare being only possible with the active co-
operation or at least the tacit approval of the
nearby populace, agents were instructed in ele-
mentary principles of social control and their
applicability to control the local population.
While the areas were tieing placed in con-
dition to receive trainees and the station
complements were in process of transfer
from the Army, arrangements were made for
staff and agent personnel to attend the Brit-
ish SOB school in Canada. Ttds was a tem-
porary arrangement to expedite SA/G's im-
mediate operations.
Early in April 1942 the basic school was
opened at Area B and the advanced school
at Area A. Within two weeks communica-
tions training began at Area C. No official
communications branch existed at that time
and the organization of the area was in-
formal, courses including Morse Code, Se-
cret Cipher and Clandestine Radio Tech-
niques.*
In late April a maritime school was estab-
lished at Area D. It was under the direction
of a British naval officer, experienced in the
specialized methods of clandestine Infiltra-
tion and exffitration by sea, who had been
loaned to COI by the Royal Navy in Febru-
ary. Instructors and station complement
comprised personnel made available by the
Navy Department.
All the SA/G areas were ran along military
lines. As early as February 1942 the com-
mander of the COI Training Unit recom-
mended that all SA/G operatives be milita-
rized, not only because of the control factor
involved, but because "this will eirninP te the
� Upon the establishment of a Communications
Branch in November 1942 all training at the Area
was placed under that Branch and it remained in
SO (the branch designation of SAM followinl;
0ct3ber 1942) only for purposes of ariminictastion.
�ferp-fieefe#-�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top Sf
tremendously involved problems which will
arise in connection with dependents, acci-
dents, sickness, incarceration in foreign pris-
ons, benefits to dependents in case of death,
etc." Consequently a table of organiza-
tion covering some 2,000 enlisted grades was
prepared."
Recruiting. Effective efforts to recruit for
the projected guerrilla units were stymied in
the COI period due to the lack of a War De-
partment allotment. However, agent re-
cruiting proceeded and the majority of those
recruited in the first four months of 1942
were in the field by the end of May.
A Recruiting Section serviced both SA/B
and SA/G. Potential agents secured
through this Section were evaluated in terms
of the type of work for which they were best
fitted and assigned accordingly. OI and
FN made substantial contributions in sup-
plying contacts to secure foreign-language
personnel, FN being particularly valuable in
this regard because of its extensive contacts
with foreign nationality groups in the United
States. SA/G recruiting officers combed
Army and Navy centers for qualified men
willing to volunteer for hazardous service be-
hind enemy lines.*** Also, as in the case of
SA/B, many recruits were secured through
the personal contacts of the original staff
members. Personnel were first evaluated
from the standpoint of their ability to work
as individuals or as members of small,
tightly-organized units. Those in the latter
category were placed in holding areas and
given elementary training pending authori-
zation of tables of organization for guerrilla
units; those who showed the requisite quail-
� See History File W-60, p. 6.
� � This T/O was intended to include the guer-
rilla units which Donovan had requested and
which the President and the War Department
had indicated would be authorized. For an ac-
count of the difficulties in securing approval of
this allotment, see Section II A below, and also
section on Operational Groups in 31 B.
�� This source was more fully exploited later
when the agency came under the aegis of the
JCS.
ties of leadership, initiative and ingenuity
were given basic and advanced training and
dispatched to the field.
The fundamental requirements were
knowledge of a foreign language, and, if pos-
sible, experience in foreign areas. Since the
nature of SA/G activities was such as to re-
quire a much greater emphasis upon physi-
cal conditioning than was necessary with
respect to SA/B agents, personnel for special
operations were generally of a lower age level
and more physically fit than those selected
for SA/B. There were many exceptions,
however, and SA/G recruited from all types.
A noted anthropologist, a businegqingn, an
explorer, a high-pressure salesman, a profes-
sional football player, a former Treasury
agent and an adventurer-author were only a
few of the many Americans trained in the
arts of sabotage and subversion and dis-
patched as agents under COL
Supply. SA/G was obliged to supply its
first fragRions from sources outside COI, e.g.,
from SOE in North Africa and from Stilwell's
theater command in Burma. At the same
time, however, the Branch began prepara-
tion of its own facilities for research, devel-
opment and procurement of the demolitions
devices and other special materiel essential
to special operations.
One of the first sections established by
SA/G was the Technical Development Sec-
tion. SOE made available the services of
two British experts, whose knowledge of
80E's devices and operational experience
made them of particular value. SA/G
placed a representative in the New York
office of SA/B in March 1942. He performed
certain recruiting duties, but his major func-
tion was in connection with negotiations for
the manufacture of special weapons and
other devices.
Standard weapons and equipment were
not essential until the training schools
opened in April, when procedures were estab-
lished to secure them from the appropriate
branches of the armed forces.
82
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
,,�������
--Tep-Seeret-
The materials necessary to the production
of special weapons and equipment were gen-
erally priority items, and a board was estab-
lished within COI to facilitate issuance of
the requisite priorities. Among the mate-
riars first secured were potassium chlorate,
lead shot, micro-switches, shaft assemblies,
spring coshes, battery cups with primer, am-
poules of sulphuric acid for cigarettes, rub-
ber sleeves for use in time pencils, and the
like.
The Technical Development Section began
research and development on special opera-
tions gadgets.* It also did research and
assisted in the further development of many
devices previously conceived or used by SOE.
In this, as in other phases of COI's work,
SOB was particularly cooperative. Various
types of booby traps, limpets, "train toys",
knockout drops and poisons (K and L pills),
incendiary leaves and abrasive tablets for
sabotage of machinery constituted only a
few of the items necegastry to the subversive
agent.
External factors complicated the develop-
ment of the various forms of subversive ac-
tion begun under SA/G. There were no
i1izlc methods in this field. Each form of
subversive action�morale subversion, sabo-
tage, guerrilla bands, either locally organ-
ized or infiltrated, maritime activities **�
depended for their method and form of or-
ganization upon the local field situation.
Further, the authorization of these activi-
ties and the extent to which they could be
executed depended upon acceptance of
Donovan's concept of psychological warfare
and authorization to prosecute it in support
of orthodox military operations.
Guerrilla activities were not authorized
during the COI period; maritime activities
� Research and development work was taken
over by the R&D Branch upon its organization in
October 1942. See account of R&D in Section II
13 below.
� � It will be seen in Section II that each of
these elements of subversion became a major
branch of OBS.
were limited to training in methods of infil-
tration and exaltration; in this period the
development of morale subversion was not
recognized as the major function which ft
later became under MO.
Missions were prepared and dispatched to
the field, however. Some of these groups
not only performed valuable service before
13 June, but their operations became notable
landmarks in COI/OSS history later in the
war.
In December 1941 two agents were re-
cruited and trained by SOB in Canada for
dispatch to North Africa. They arrived
there under State Department cover in May
and rendered valuable service in the prepara-
tion for TORCH and in subsequent Mediter-
ranean operations. SA/G serviced the COI
representatives, including the vice-con-
suls,* and all reports from that area were
specially handled through Goodfellow's of-
fice until the late summer of 1942, when
Donovan personally supervised MS activi-
ties in the final stages of the operation, to
which all branches contributed.
The original members of Detachment
101** were recruited, trained and dis-
patched to Burma prior to June 1942. The
leader of this detachment had been a Treas-
ury agent operating on the Mexican border
before he was commissioned In the Army.
He was subsequently assigned to COI, and
he and Goodfellow conceived a plan to send
an operational rnfsgion to the Far East to
assist General StilwelL Following Dono-
van's approval and the requisite negotia-
tions with the military authorities both in
Washington and the theater, the rniesion
departed in May.
Two professional explorers were dis-
patched on a scouting trip across Tibet from
India to China in another early SA/G mis-
sion. Goodfellow and Donovan recognized
the potential value of this reconnaicsance as
an attempt to discover an additional land
� See account of North Africa in C below.
� � See account of Detachment 101 in Far Bast
Section.
--Tep-Seeret-
Ap roved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
route to China, at a time when the Japanese
advance threatened the principal existing
road.*
The preparation of "Expedition 90" was
also begun under COI. Its purpose was,
among other things, to survey the potentiali-
ties of the Near East in aiding the Allied
prosecution of the war. - Discussions were
held on a high echelon and recruiting and
procurement of supplies began.**
SA/G also sent representatives to neutral
territory to survey the possibilities of sub-
versive action in the event of a change in
status. One such representative was dis-
patched to Portugal in the spring of 1942;
he was recalled following the North African
invasion when the military threat of the
Iberian Peninsula diminished. Another
representative was dispatched to Vichy
France under State Department cover in the
summer of 1942 to lay the groundwork for
future special operations in the event that
diplomatic relations were severed and the
Germans occupied Vichy France. Unfor-
tunately, prior to his departure a State De-
partment representative informed the Vichy
Ambassador in Washington that he was ac-
tually going to France for COI/OSS. With
cover thus violated, his usefulness was so
curtailed that the monthly report of the
Special Operations Branch in October 1942
stated: "It is not believed that this repre-
sentative can be of any real service to the
organization by reason of the fact that his
association with us was disclosed prior to de-
parture. He should be recalled and another
� The letter which these representatives car-
ried from President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama
at Lhasa was the first such document exchanged
between these two heads of State.
� � Due to difficulties arising in part out of the
separation of Fliti and COI and the establish-
ment of OWI as an independent executive
agency, "Expedition 90" was postponed and sub-
jected to protracted discussion during the sum-
mer and fall of 1942. As finally dispatched, it
was under State Department and did not con-
form to the original plan. The materiel and
personnel which had been secured were used in
other OSS operations.
chief representative substituted." By that
time a replacement was impossible, since
Vichy France was occupied by the Germans
Immediately after the North African inva-
sion on 7 November. -
A representative of SA/G was sent to Cairo
In the spring of 1942 to prepare for activities
from that base. However, since METO was
a British theater, definite plans had to await
the conclusion of firm agreements with SOE
and the establishment of an over-all COIl-
088 in Cairo.
Between the fall of 1941 and June 1942
several SA/G representatives visited London
for varying periods, for both training and
negotiations. It was essential to work out
some form of collaboration between SOE and
SA/G. Unlike the field of secret intelli-
gence, where absolute independence in op-
eration was advantageous, duplication in
special operations would have resulted in
confusion and chaos. Therefore, the ques-
tion of defining terms of cooperation and
collaboration between SA/G and SOE was
of the essence. In early June 1942 Donovan
and Goodfellow departed for London to ne-
gotiate with SOE the special operations
agreements which were to have such an im-
portant influence on the future of the
Branch.
These negotiations were in progress in
London on 13 June 1942 when COI became
OS&
84
(c) SPECIAL(UNVOUCHERED)
FUNDS
Special funds are moneys, for which no
voucher is submitted to the General Ac-
counting Office, to be employed in instances
where the use of vouchered funds would di-
vulge information prejudicial to the public
Interest, and where the services or materials
necessary could not be purchased with
vouchered funds or acquired from military,
naval or other government services for se-
curity reasons.
� See History Piles, SO Progress Report, Octobers
1942.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top�Secret.
It was obvious from the beginning that
such funds would be a prerequisite to the
secret and confidential activities of COL
Naturally, the branches which had the
greatest need for special funds were those
engaged in secret intelligence and morale
and physical subversion.
The first allocation of special funds
($100,000) was made by the President in
September 1941, and on 10 October 1941 the
handling of special funds was included or-
ganizationally in the Coordinator's office un-
der Special Activities in a section designated
"IC and L Funds".� Since special funds
were to be used almost exclusively for Special
Activities, it was not, until the SA/B and
SA/G Branches were formally established
that the Special Funds Division was set
up in January 1942 to service both branches.
A man with long and varied experience
In the banking field became Chief of the
Division.**
During the COI period the greater part of
the work of the Division concerned expendi-
tures made in the United States. Such mat-
ters as establishing the SA/B "Farm",
which was undercover; establishing and op-
erating various cover corporations, such as
FBQ; and payment of salaries of certain
personnel not openly employed by COI came
within the purview of Special Funds. Dur-
ing the period when the New York office of
SA/B was exclusively for that Branch and
SA/G, it also had to be operated with special
funds, due to the secret nature of the ac-
tivities carried on there. In addition there
were certain recruiting offices in New York
which were operated on special funds, due to
the fact that security was essential, both for
the protection of agent recruits accepted and
for the protection of the agency's security in
the case of those who were rejected.
� The letters "K" and "L" were arbitrarily
chosen; they have no significance.
� � From 19 January 1942, when he entered on
duty with COI, until the dissolution of OSS, he
directed the Special Funds Division in COI and,
later, the Special Funds Branch of MS.
85
As SAID agents were dispatched to neutral
countries they presented a dual problem to
Special Funds. One aspect was domestic,
involving the payment of allotments to fam-
ilies in America with due regard to preserv-
ing the security of the agent. The second
aspect, which was to develop into one of the
most important of Special Funds' responsi-
bilities, was that of transmitting the appro-
priate foreign currencies to the agents over-
see&
In connection with the latter problem, the
basic obstacle was the fact that practically
all nations in wartime established stringent
regulations with regard to financial trans-
actions. It soon became obvious that it
would be necessary to employ various devices
to get money into the many countries in
which COI was operating, since the initial
supplies carried by agents would not satisfy
operational needs for long periods. It was
early suggested that Special Funds officers
be dispatched to certain neutral countries
where COI began extensive operations, but
the demands for agent representation were
Increasing and adequate agent covers were
scarce.
Operations in enemy and enemy-occupied
territories, the sealing off of neutral coun-
tries (e.g., Switzerland) and large opera-
tional field bases did not become realities un-
der COL They were clearly in prospect,
however, and plans were being made to meet
the problems which these conditions would
entail once the agency's status was settled.
5. Services
As the a riminidrative branches of COI
were established to meet the expanding
needs of the agency, they were grouped un-
der the Executive Officer.
During July and August, while the organ-
ization was being set up, and before the es-
tablishment of regular channels, administra-
tive matters involving officialg of other agen-
cies were handled informally and on a per;
sonal hstgig Liaison officers from the Bu-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
reau of the Budget, in particular, were help-
ful in advising on such matters as how to
approach the Public Buildings Arirninixtra-
tion, the General Accounting Office, and the
Civil Service Commission on problems of
space, procurement, and personnel, respec-
tively.
By the middle of September the number
of COI personnel reached a total of approxi-
mately 150. An Administrative Order is-
sued 11 September appointed an Executive
Officer, with authority to coordinate and
exercise full responsibility in all fiscal, or-
ganizational and Administrative matters.
The same order appointed a Budget and
Planning Officer, a Business Officer and a
Personnel Officer to carry out these functions
under the jurisdiction of the Executive Of-
ficer. The work of the Budget and Planning
Office was divided between a Budget Section
and a Planning and Procedures Section. In
the Business Office, which was responsible
for purchase requisitions, payrolls and other
vouchers and obligation documents, were
established a Fiscal Section and a Service
Operations Section. The Personnel Office
was divided into Employment, Classification
and Appointment Sections.
As the organization grew, other services
developed under the jurisdiction of the Ex-
ecutive Officer, including the Administrative
Section of the New York office, the Repro-
duction Section, and the courier service.
The first security regulations were issued on
20 October. Certain services functions, in-
cluding the Transportation Office, the Mail
and Files Section and the Message Center,
were set up initially under the COI Liaison
Officer because of the immediacy of their
dealings with other agencies.
On 15 December the Business Office was
transferred to the Budget and Planning Of-
fice, and on 12 January the Executive Office
was reorganized into two Divisions: Budget
and Finance, and Personnel. In addition to
yispAi, organizational and Afiministrative
functions, the Executive Officer had author-
ity over communications, equipment and
i-fep-freeret�
personnel, transportation, and security.
The Budget and Finance Division had re-
sponsibility for all budget and finance, ac-
counting, audit and certification of all types
of vouchers, travel authorization, stilrninis-
trative service operations, including pur-
chase and supply, contracts, priorities,
maintenance and communication, repro-
duction and mail and files functions. The
Personnel Division had responsibility, in
addition to the ordinary phases of personnel
administration, for a stenographic pool, an
emergency room, and the supervision of
employee morale activities.
The functions of the more important serv-
ices sections are discussed separately below.
Space. One of the first problems was to
obtain office space for a rapidly-growing
agency at a time when most government
agencies were expanding and no new facili-
ties were available. In early July 1941, COI
was allotted a modest total of 725 square
feet in the State Department On 30 July
1941, 32 rooms were obtained in the Apex
Building, but these, too, were only a stop-
gap for the expanding staff. By 5 Septem-
ber space was obtained at 25th and E Streets,"
N.W. in buildings previously occupied by the
National Institute of Health, and by the end
of the month COI employees occupied space
in the Administration, South and North
Buildings. Before the end of the year, it
became necessary to secure two buildings in
the Naval Hospital grounds and to begin
construction of Temporary Que Building.
PIS obtained space in New York at 270 Madi-
son Avenue; the Field Photographic Division
secured laboratory facilities in the South
Agriculture Building. A San Francisco of-
fice was established in the middle of Febru-
ary 1942.
On 13 June COI in New York had several
floors at 270 Madison Avenue (FLS), half a
floor at 21 East 40th Street (OI), and one
floor at 630 Fifth Avenue (SA/B). COI of-
fices in Washington were concentrated in
the group of buildings mentioned above al
25th and E Streets, N.W.
.86
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Xop-Soccot�
Personnel. The Personnel Division was re-
sponsible for cooperating with the various
COI staff officials to secure qualified person-
nel from all available sources, to effect their
appointments in accordance with regula-
tions of the Civil Service Commission, and to
establish equitable salary rates in accord-
ance with law. To facilitate handling of the
great volume of detail required in this work,
the Division was organized in three major
sections:
(1) The Employment Section was re-
sponsible for hiring the best-qualified per-
sonnel available�a duty rendered difficult
not only because of the personnel shortage
but also because of COI demands for persons
with special qualifications not covered by
Civil Service Regulations. As the agency
increased in size, a Civil Service Commission
representative was delegated to work with
this Section to approve the qualifications of
prospective employees and to initiate char-
acter investigations. In addition to regular
duties pertaining to the recruiting of person-
nel, this Section maintained a stenographic
training and placement pool and supervised
employee morale activities.
(2) The Classification Section insured the
proper CIA ssification of personnel within the
framework of the Classification Act of 1923,
by maintaining liaison with the Civil Serv-
ice commission and by conducting periodic
surveys of COI personnel to make the neces-
sary adjustments resulting from reorganiza-
tion and growth. This Section also worked
closely with the Planning and Procedures
Office in reorgani2Ing various other sections
of the agency.
(3) The Appointment Section was re-
sponsible for the maintenance of complete
personnel records on all employees, includ-
ing those detailed from the Army, Navy, Ma-
rine Corps and other agencies, but exclud-
ing those paid from unvouchered funds.
' The burden placed on the Personnel Divi-
sion is indicated by the fact that total COI
personnel increased from approximately 100,
when the Division was established in Sep-
tember 1941, to 2320 as of 13 June 1942.
Security. From the beginning, the secu-
rity problem was one of COI's prime con-
cerns, although a separate branch to han-
dle security matters was not organized un-
til March 1942. Prior to that time, re-
sponsibility was delegated to branch heads,
and regulations varied according to the de-
gree of secrecy required in the work of the
respective branches. There was no basic
pattern for security procedures, and prob-
lems were met as they presented themselves.
From the first, guards were supplied by the
Public Buildings Administration. Build-
ing passes were assigned on 16 August 1941
and, after 2 September, identification badges
were worn. As of 26 September the Intelli-
gence Unit of the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue tested the telephones of key COI officials
for evidences of wire-tapping. Initially, the
security check on new personnel constituted
simply the fact that the COI staff suggested
and vouched for them. By August the Civil
Service Commission provided a security
check for personnel, but this check was
rarely available before the individual en-
tered on duty. The security of classified
documents was regulated by appropriate re-
strictions on their circulation. All secret
and confidential material was kept in safes
and transferred from place to place under
lock and key by couriers; collections of con-
fidential trash were made periodically.
Experienced members of the armed serv-
ices stssisted in security matters, particu-
larly with regard to cryptographic security.
From time to time non-COI military officers
Inspected COI physical security. The
branches which required the greatest protec-
tion, SA/B, SA/G and OI, had close associa-
tion with British services through which
they gained the benefit of British experience
In security matters.
The first formal security regulations were
Issued by the Executive Officer on 20 Octo-
ber 1941, and served to clarify existing meas-
ures and to delegate responsibility officially.
87 �Top-SecrAtf-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tep-Seeref�
The Public Buildings Adrninintration was re-
sponsible for the protection of COI build-
ings, the Business Office for issuance of
badges, and branch heads for the indoctri-
nation of personnel and the security of docu-
ments. This division of responsibility illus-
trated the fact that, while COI considered
security important, at this stage it was
looked upon largely as a by-product. With
the outbreak of war, the security picture
changed. One day after Pearl Harbor it was
directed that all incoming employees be
checked by the FBI before enrollment in
COI. Donovan appointed an experienced
naval officer, already attached to COI in a
liaison capacity, as the first Security Officer.
A new set of security regulations was issued
on 20 December. It specified stricter proce-
dures for identification of employees and
visitors, the movement of property and docu-
ments, the handling of classified material,
and the security of offices, buildings and
grounds. Employees were advised of special
precautions which should be taken to safe-
guard security while away from the office.
Despite the appointment of a Security Of-
ficer, security continued to be essentially a
branch concern until February 1942 when
Donovan established a COI Security Office.
The office was staffed by Army and Navy of-
ficers and a series of orders designed to
tighten security, both internally and ex-
ternally, was issued. At about that time it
became apparent that the FBI would not be
able to continue security checks of COI per-
sonnel because of the growing pressure of
other work and increasing commitments to
other agencies.
A thorough investigation of incoming per-
sonnel became imperative as actual opera-
tions got underway, especially as the various
types of work to be done in COI required
many different types of personnel, and there
was danger of selection on the basis of tech-
nical qualifications, without consideration of
background and character. Civil Service
checks could be used for Civil Service person-
nel, but the two important operating
.,�Top-Socpait�
branches, SA/B and BA/C) were using mili-
tary personnel and personnel paid from un-
vouchered funds almost exclusively, and it
was particularly essential that there be no
question of their loyalty.
The Security Office therefore organized a
COI investigative system. All applicants
for positions were thereafter required to sub-
mit a detailed personal history statement, on
the basis of which they were checked as to
suitability for employment. The office con-
sulted information existing in other govern-
ment agencies and engaged the Hooper-
Holmes Credit Bureau to perform investiga-
tions. Subsequently, special investigators
were hired from various private agencies
throughout the country to do special work
that. required the direct supervision of the
Security Officer, for example, investigating
refugees with no references in this country,
and maintaining a check on certain em-
ployees already hired.
By the end of March, 63 investigations
were completed; the number reached 345 in
the following month. Some opposition to
the security methods was encountered in the
SA/G Branch, since the investigations re-
quired 30 to 45 days and delayed recruiting,
but this objection became academic due to
the delay in military authorization for guer-
rilla units.
The Security Office also dealt with the
problem of physical security and issued
regulations concerning communications,
transportation, receptionists, messengers
and escorts. In April, special directions
were issued for Que Building, where the
greatest precautions were necessary. Be-
cause of the extreme secrecy required by the
work of SA/B, its personnel was segregated
from other branches in Que Building, and
the office space kept separate by means of
special badges. At the same time, a series
of security indoctrination lectures by repre-
sentatives of British Security Coordination
was instituted.
On 20 May the Security Office was officially,
established by Adrninictrative Order. With
88
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�
this strengthening of authority a new series
of directives was issued covering all phases
of security. By the end of the COI period
the Security Office was firmly established.
As new problems were presented, each
Branch for its own security was given a high
degree of autonomy so that if one segment
became infected, this infection could not
affect the entire organization. The setting
up of a Counter-espionage unit abroad
known as X-2, further protected the per-
sonnel abroad from enemy infiltration.
Finally, an Assessment School was estab-
lished, staffed with a group of psychologists
and psychiatrists who assessed the merits
of men and women who were assigned to
work in foreign theaters.
Transportation. The Transportation Of-
fice was established formally in December
1941 as part of the Liaison Office. The Liai-
son Officer had in the preceding months as-
sumed the duties pertaining to travel ar-
rangements since these required lial8on with
many government agencies. Following
Pearl Harbor, a separate office was necAsnary
to meet the increased demands for personnel
overseas.
Several men, experienced in travel agen-
cies in New York, were engaged to set up ap-
propriate procedures. These procedures
amounted to some fifty steps, from securing
draft board permits and arranging for pass-
ports, physical examinations, and pay, to
advice on clothing and personal equipment
Each overseas prospect became an individual
problem the importance of which had to be
Impressed on the shipping company or air-
line to secure transportation.
All arrangements were undertaken with
strictest secrecy. Enemy counter-intelli-
gence in America was so active that on one
occasion four men intended for Lisbon had
to be re-routed at the last minute, when it de-
veloped that the enemy knew their names
and their time of departure. The subma-
rine menace reached its peak in early 1942,
and personnel going to the Middle East were
routed around the Cape of Good Hope on a
hip requiring three months. Even plane
trips to Europe usually required three weeks.
Other duties of the Transportation Office
Included arranging for pouch facilities and
shipping personal belongings overseas. Do-
mestic travel was another problem.. To
meet the heavy demand for air travel, an ap-
proved air priority certificate was obtained
to enable personnel to use commercial air
lines. Since COI was closely associated with
the British Security Office, the COI Trans-
-portation Office also handled domestic pri-
orities for the British; the latter recipro-
cated by supplying space, when possible, on
British planes going overseas.
The Transportation Office contributed to
COI's intelligence fund by obtaining from
travel bureaus volumes of maps, time-tables
and descriptive booklets which dealt with re-
mote regions of the world. A "World Digest
of Travel" was begun in March 1942 to serve
as a general fact-finding guide to all the
countries of the world and their principal
cities and ports. The Digest was completed
in the OSS period and proved of continuing
value. Various OSS branches used it, as
well as other government agencies; it was
used by the White House in connection with
the President's trip to Casablanca in Janu-
ary 1943.
Reproduction. COI farmed out its dupli-
cation work to other government agencies
until the establishment in September 1941
of a Duplicating Section within the Service
Operations Section of the Business Office.
The Section was set up to do mimeographing
and printing work for other COI branches,
and within a few months began to do photo-
stat and photography work as well. Its size
Increased rapidly to meet the expanding
needs of COI, but it encountered difficulties
In securing personnel, space and equipment.
In April 1942, the JCS needed a secure
place for reproduction work, and since the
Section had demonstrated its inability,
through lack of facilities, to complete an im-
portant Navy job, Donovan asked Goodf21-
low to improve reproduction facilities to in-
89
-fop-Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.44*--Seeriet�
sure sufficient security and efficiency to han-
dle JCS assignments. Goodfellow recruited
the chief of the 0-2 cartographic and repro-
duction sections to head a combined COI and
0-2 reproduction unit. A number of army
personnel were brought in, and thereafter
personnel were predominantly military to
meet the requirements of 0-2 and the JCS.
Stricter security measures were inaugurated,
as well as a system of production record and
controL
By 13 June, almost the whole of the South
Building basement was allotted to reproduc-
tion operations, and a night shift was estab-
lished to maintain steady production.
Communications. During the COI period
the several branches explored and developed
various phases of communications. A Com-
munications Branch was not formally estab-
lished until late in 1942.* "Mainline" com-
munications between principal bases were
the responsibility of the Message Center,
under the Liaison Officer's jurisdiction, as
were communications with agents in neu-
tral territories.
Since there was no precedent in the United
States for the establishment of a clandestine
communications organization, the advice of
British services was enlisted, both for "main-
line" and agent communications. In Sep-
tember 1941 COI commissioned an FCC en-
gineer to study British secret communica-
tions problems in London. In October, the
chief of communications for SLS prepared a
detailed report for Donovan on all aspects
of clandestine communications, and ar-
ranged to make available to COI for consul-
tation the Chief of the Communications Di-
vision of the British Security Coordination
In America.
The Message Center was the only com-
munications function set up adequately
during COL It was as completely segre-
gated as possible to meet the requirements
of cryptographic security. As early as July
1941 COI obtained the services of a cipher
� See "Communications," in Section 11-11, below.
--Tep-Seefe�-
expert from the Coast Guard to set up an
independent code room and message center.
In September 1941 the first overseas office
was established in the, American Embassy in
London. A message center was established
there, and by 13 June 1942 traffic to Wash-
ington had reached a total of 300 to 400 mes-
sages a month.
Preparations for a communications net-
work in the Far East were begun in April
1942. At that time two enlisted men were
recruited from the Signal Corps to explore
the communications equipment needs of De-
tachment 101 then preparing to leave for
Burma. On 28 May, organized and reason-
ably well-equipped, the Detachment left the
United States.
An SA/G project which later became a re-
sponsibility of the Communications Branch
was "FBQ."* This consisted of foreign ra-
dio monitoring operations on the East and
West Coasts of the United States. Goodfel-
low conceived the idea in March 1942 and as-
signed an MIS officer to investigate the feasi-
bility of such operations to obtain intelli-
gence. His investigations resulted in the
purchase of sites in Long Island and Cali-
fornia. "FBQ" was the name of the cover
corporation to administer the project FCC
suggested the possibility of duplication, but
since FBQ was to monitor not only foreign
broadcasts but also signals transmitted by
COI offices and agents abroad, it was decided
that its functions were distinct from those
of the FCC.
By May 1942 a station was set up at Bell-
more, Long Island, to perform limited opera-
tions, including monitoring clandestine
broadcasts not covered by the FCC. Con-
struction of the West Coast station at Re-
seda, California, was under way at that time
but operations were not begun until late
summer.
FBQ disseminated to COI branches and
MIS preliminary basic information on for-
� See account of CD Branch in Section U-13-3. �
below.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Top-Secret-
eign stations all over the world, and sup-
plied R&A with intercepts. Its full possi-
bilities were not realized until the OSS pe-
riod, however.
Planning for another COI project, "Africa
101", began in May 1942. It was designed
to protect the Liberian Task Force from ene-
my espionage by means of radio monitoring,
direction-finding and intelligence report-
Couriers. In December 1941 a courier serv-
ice was established by the Executive Officer.
This service handled the transmission of
classified documents in Washington and be-
tween the various New York offices and
Washington headquarters. It was planned
that this service would expand to cover for-
eign areas as the overseas bases of COI were
established, and for this reason, personnel of
very high calibre was recruited. However,
permission for international courier opera-
tions never materialized. When COI be-
came OSS the original courier personnel
were absorbed by various operating branches
and a domestic courier service continued in
the OSS period, first under the Registry and
later as an adjunct to the Services Branch.
Budget and Procedures. During the first
two months of COI, financial plans were dis-
cussed informally with officials of the Bu-
reau of the Budget, who assisted COI in es-
tablishing budgetary procedures. COI re-
ceived its first allocation on 25 July wheit
President Roosevelt instructed the Treasury
to make available to COI from his emergency
funds a total of $350,000 plus $100,000 to be
used for DSI at the Library of Congress.
On 2 September 1941 a Budget and Plan-
ning Officer was appointed and the Budget
Section and Planning and Procedures Sec-
tion were organized. On 3 September Presi-
dent Roosevelt allotted to COI $100,000 for
unvouchered expenditures, the first "special
funds." Control of these funds was not
within the Budget Section's jurisdiction.
� This project is described in the accounts of
Communications and CD In Sections TI-B-1 and
31-13-2 below.
On 29 September the first formal request,
based on branch estimates of existing and
planned operations for the fiscal year ending
30 June 1942, was submitted to the Bureau
of the Budget The total was $11,690,168,
including unvouchered funds. Deductions
for lapses, funds for DSI and for allotments
already received brought the total down to
$10,010,000. As between the principal
branches, the allocation was as follows: 30%
for P13,25% for VP, and 10% for R&A.
The Bureau of the Budget did not finally
approve these estimates, but continued to
make emergency allotments to allow opera-
tions to proceed almost on a month-to-month
basis. This procrastination was due prin-
cipally to the fact that COI activities were
unprecedented in the United States Govern-
ment, and therefore of special concern to
normally cautious Budget officials. The do-
mestic political situation, particularly in the
period before Pearl Harbor, made it difficult
to demonstrate the need for clandestine ac-
tivities, and, in view of the security factor,
the nature of certain COI confidential activi-
ties could not be revealed to outside officials.
COI never solved the difficulties arising from
security considerations; in many cases fail-
ure to get the funds requested resulted in the
slowing down of operations and postpone-
ment of planned activities. In several in-
stances the President intervened so that new
branelles could begin operations.
Allocations of $75,000 and $600,000 in Oc-
tober for normal activities and $900,000 on
1 November for confidential activities kept
the agency operating until 8 December,
when $3,162,786 was provided on the basis of
the September estimates.
In January the Planning and Procedures
Section was placed directly under the Exec-
utive Officer, and the Budget Section be-
came part of the Budget and Finance Divi-
sion. However, they continued to work
closely together in developing budget esti-
mate&
Soon after the submission of the initial �
estimates, the Budget Section began a series
91 -rep-Seere.-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-7*--Sarerst-
of supplemental estimates to cover new ac-
tivities. By February 1942, the COI pro-
gram had expanded to such a degree and
changed so radically that the Budget Section
planned to present a formal request to Con-
gress for a deficiency appropriation, and es-
timates were prepared for the period from 1
February through 30 JUne. These were
never submitted to Congress, but served in-
stead as the basis for additional allocations
from the President's emergency funds in the
amount of $12,713,256, including $5,000,000
unvouchered funds, to operate the agency
through 30 June. The Bureau of the Budg-
et had deferred action on $15,000,000 re-
quested for FIS and approved allocation of
approximately two-thirds of the remainder
requested. At this time, the Director of the
Budget suggested to the President that COI
activities be re-defined in view of the extent
of their development.
.--Tep-Secrat-
92
In the spring of 1942 the Bureau of the
Budget announced plans to submit COI esti-
mates to Congress for the fiscal year 1943-
1 July 1942 through 30 June 1943. Extensive
hearings were held with the branches over a
period of two months. Estimates were re-
vised downward twice at Donovan's request
before requests for a total of $50,000,000 were
submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. With
the establishment of OSS on 13 June, these
estimates were nullified.
COI received from the President's emer-
gency funds a total, vouchered and unvouch-
ered, of $19,001,042. Approximately 36%
of this amount was for SA/B and SA/G, 32%
for F1S, 11% for VP, 4% for R&A, less than
1% each for FR and OI, and 10% for various
administrative activities. Approximately
5% consisted of budgetary reserves and
other amounts not available for apportion-
ment.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
C. NORTH AFRICA
North Africa � was a constantly recurring
theme in the history of COL On 10 October
1941 Donovan presented to the President a
plan for undercover intelligence there as "a
concrete illustration of what can be done".
Again, on 22 December, he cited North Africa
In stressing the importance of subversive ac-
tion, local resistance and guerrilla-com-
mando units to strategic planning. In the
spring of 1942 it was used once more in urg-
ing that COI be made a supporting agency of
the JCS, and the latter body made North
Africa the subject of its first directive to
Donovan, while he was still Coordinator of
Information, in March 1942.
� COI operations in North Africa were neces-
sarily effected with a view to the possibility
of either Allied or Axis occupation. Much
of the time it seemed probable that the Axis
would act first. Certainly, in the duel of
intrigue which took place there in 1941-1942,
the obvious advantages were on the side of
the experienced German and Italian repre-
sentatives and their Vichy satellites.
The presence of German and Italian com-
missions at key points in French North Af-
rica was a condition of the Armistice in
1940�an advantage that was strengthened
by the wave of anti-British feeling which fol- �
lowed the attacks on Mers-el-Kebir (Oran)
and Dakar later that year. The Axis posi-
tion was even more enhanced when the at-
tacks resulted in the severance of diplomatic
relations with Vichy and the consequent
ejection of the British from the area. The
net result was Axis monopoly in the intelli-
gence and propaganda fields.
� The Europe-Africa Section contains a detailed
account of COI/OSS participation in Operation
rancH. Certain aspects of the COI preparation
for the North African invasion are set forth here,
however, because of their importance to the
agency in Washington.
America, by continuing relations with
Vichy, maintained consular representation,
and in French Morocco enjoyed extra-terri-
torial rights under its treaty with the Sultan
(such rights had been abandoned by the
British after World War I). However, the
United States was not at war. There was
awareness in many quarters that something
should be done, but there was no clear plan.
. The conclusion of the Weygand-Murphy
Accord in February 1941 was the first step.
Under the terms of this Accord the United
States agreed to send certain essential mate-
rials and supplies to North Africa on condi-
tion that they be used there and not re-
shipped to continental Europe where they
might benefit the Axis. Significantly, it was
understood that the United States would
send to French North Africa certain officials
to see that this proviso was not disregarded
or evaded.
In the spring of 1941, therefore, twelve
control officers were selected by G-2, State
Department and ONI. It had been decided
to use these men also to secure information,
and each department briefed the men it had
selected in the type of intelligence it desired.
The officers were recruited from all walks of
life, principally for their knowledge of the
French language and their experience
abroad. Most of them had seen service in
World War I; several had served with the
French Army prior to the entry of the United
States into that conflict.
93
The control officers were dispatched in the
summer of 1941 to be stationed, ostensibly
as regular vice-consuls, in Casablanca, Al-
giers, Oran, Tunis and Rabat. The career
officers already in these cities did not know
their real purpose, however, and the new
group was actually responsible to Robert D.
Murphy in Algiers.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
North Africa Africa thus presented a unique op-
portunity for the United States in the field
of intelligence, fifth column, subversive
propaganda and related activities. Until
COI was organized, however, there was no
agency prepared to exploit the situation and
no unified plan for future action.
Donovan had long been conscious of the
opportunity and the challenge inherent in
the North African situation. When he was
asked to consolidate the undercover intelli-
gence of G-2, ONI and COI in October 1941,
therefore, he had a definite plan prepared.
It was, as he reported to the President, to
station a COI representative at Tangier who
could "unify the activities of the vice-con-
suls" and "stimulate" their efforts (Exhibit
W-20). The representative would have offi-
cial status for the security of his activities,
and a clandestine radio network would be
established which could continue to operate
In the event of a break in diplomatic rela-
tions; the use of diplomatic pouch and cable
was set forth as essential to effective com-
munications.
It was not feasible, in the pre-Pearl Har-
bor domestic situation, to be more explicit
� regarding the subversive attributes of the
plan. Those aspects became apparent later.
Colonel William A. Eddy USMCR was se-
lected to fill the important post at Tangier.
Donovan had heard of him in Cairo where he
had served as Naval Attache. Eddy had a
distinguished record with the Marines in
World War I. Subsequently, he had been
President of Hobart College; he had wide ex-
perience in Africa; and he spoke Arabic flu-
ently. By an appeal to Secretary Knox,
Donovan secured Eddy's appointment as
Naval Attache in Tangier in December 1941
(a post which had not theretofore existed).
In his memorandum to the President of
22 December (Exhibit W-21), Donovan indi-
cated further the plans in which Eddy was
briefed: "That the aid of native chiefs be ob-
tained, the loyalty of the inhabitants be cul-
tivated; fifth columnists organized and
placed, demolition materials cached; and
--Tep-SeeFet� 94
guerrilla bands of bold and daring men or-
ganized and installed."
Eddy was instructed to maintain a line of
demarcation, in so far as practicable, be-
tween operations and intelligence. It was
In connection with the North African plan
that Stephenson (British Security Coordi-
nator in America) had advised Donovan of
the political implications in England of the
separate SOB and SIS organizations.* At
Tangier it would be notAcRary to deal with.
both SOB and MS.
SA/G recruited two men to serve Eddy in
special operations. One was a noted an-
thropologist with extensive knowledge of and
experience with the Arabs; the other was a
businessman who had had commercial ex-
perience in Morocco. Pursuant to arrange-
ments with SOB, both men were sent to Can-
ada for training early in 1942.
Eddy departed for Tangier on 3 January
1942. Prior to his departure, Donovan ar-
ranged through Mr. Wallace Murray, of
State Department, that Murphy and Mr. Ed-
ward Rives Childs (Charg�'Affaires at
Tangier) be instructed to give Eddy "their
effective cooperation and support" and that
he was to be given appropriate authority
over the control officers.**
Following Eddy's arrival, all intelligence
secured by the operatives in North Africa was
routed to him by pouch and radio. Seem-
ingly routine courier trips to Tangier by the
vice-consuls provided opportunities for nec-
essary personal conferences and the trans-
portation of operational supplies. The
British supplied agent radio sets, and by the
summer of 1942 the clandestine COI radio
network was in operation: MIDWAY (key
station) at Tangier, YANKEE at Algiers,
LINCOLN at Casablanca, FRANKLIN at
Oran, and PILGRIM at Tunis.
� It was in great part as a result of these dis-
cussions with Stephenson, wherein he was ap-
prised of the rivalry and jealousy between the two
British organizations, that Donovan decided to
separate Special Activities into two branches.
See "Special Activities" above. �
� � History rile W-8a, Tab II.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
nip Se.ref
� A spirit of mutual cooperation and cordial
understanding between Eddy and Murphy
characterized American operations in the
field. Eddy also cooperated closely with the
British at Tangier and Gibraltar. His re-
ports to Washington were handled through
Goodfellow's office, all receiving Donovan's
personal scrutiny and attention.
The two SA/G agents arrived in North Af-
rica in the spring of 1942, as did an intelli-
gence agent who had been recruited and
trained by SA/B. All three were under
State Department cover as vice-consuls.*
The situation in North Africa became more
difficult in the spring of 1942. Laval's rise
to power in Vichy France and the increas-
ingly collaborationist tendencies of such or-
ganizations as the S.O.L. and the P.P.F.,**
both powerful in North Africa, further en-
hanced the position of the Axis and made the
undercover work of the Americans more dif-
ficult. The Allies could not act immedi-
ately; it seemed probable that the Axis, as-
sisted by Spain and/or Vichy France, would.
The morale of the friendly elements culti-
vated by the Americans was deteriorating
with despair of Allied action, lack of mate-
riel, and the growing confidence of the Ger-
mans and Italians, as evidence mounted of
Laval's support of what then seemed to be
the winning team. The Americans re-
doubled their efforts, and reported the por-
tents to Washington. Eddy urgently in-
quired as to the promised Allied invasion and
� Since two members of the original group had
been returned to the United States, the arrival
of the new recruits did not mark a suspicious in-
crease in the American representation in North
Africa.
" Service d'Ordre de la Legion and Part' Popu-
laire Francais.
95
requested authority and materiel to arm the
local groups with which he was in contact.
The question of North Africa was taken up
by Donovan with the JPWC in March 1942.
Thereafter and in the same month, the JCS
issued its first directive to COL The direc-
tive confirmed the plan for secret intelli-
gence and subversive action and directed the
establishment of a stockpile of materiel to
arm local guerrilla groups, but only in the
event of Axis aggression. As the United
States was not ready to act, it seemed that
If the Axis were to invade there was nothing
to be done except to "sow the dragon's
teeth". The JCS directive in March 1942
had a significance to COI wholly apart from
Its subject matter. In March the general
reorganization of information agencies in
Washington was pending. It was in that
month also that the JCS proposed to the
President, with Donovan's concurrence, that
COI be made a supporting agency of the JCS.
As in the case of the plan for the Cape Verde
Islands in January,* North Africa presented
an easily recognizable example of the man-
ner in which the COI concept of secret in-
telligence, propaganda, morale and physical
subversion, and guerrilla action could be
used in preparing the way for a large-scale
Invasion.
Therefore, COI operations in North Africa
constituted a cogent argument that the
agency should be placed under the JCS in
the spring and summer of 1942. Subse-
quently, these operations were to prove the
first large-scale test of Donovan's concept of
softening up a target area prior to invasion.
As such, they were to be influential in the
JCS decision when the continuance of OSS
came into question in the fall of 1942.
� See p.37 above.
� "';:Foir-raeeFet-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Section II
THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - OSS
( 13 June 1942 - 1 October 1945)
A. GENERAL SURVEY
13 June-23 December 1942
Before an approach could be made to the
major problems growing out of the general
reorganization of 13 June 1942, it was neces-
sary to resolve the immediate confusion in-
to which the COI activities continued in
OSS were thrown. For example, COI budg-
et estimates for the ensuing fiscal year
were automatically minified, and, since the
functions of OSS had yet to be defined by
the JCS, it was impossible to prepare new
estimates in time to go before Congress for
budget approval. A further situation aris-
ing out of uncertainty as to the agency's
future was the fact that other agencies and
departments of the Government with which
COI had had contracts and arrangements
necessary to current operations demanded
some definite authority for their continu-
ance.*
In the absence of Donovan,** and pend-
ing decision by the JCS about OSS func-
tions, the Assistant Director took steps to
work out a temporary solution. Negotia-
tions were undertaken to secure allocations
from the President's Emergency Fund in
order to supply the finances necessary for
� State Department, in particular, wanted
assurance that it would be reimbursed for com-
munications and other services it rendered in
connection with agents in neutral territories un-
der government cover.
** Donovan was in London negotiating the
SO/SOE agreements. See General Survey, Sec-
tion I above.
�
the fiscal year 1943. And on 22 June 1942,
at the instance of the Assistant Director,
Brigadier General W. B. Smith, Secretary
of the JCS, issued the following interim
order:
Pending the issuance of specific instructions as
to its functions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire
that the Office of Strategic Services continue the.
duties and activities of such Branches and Divi-
sions of the former Office of the Coordinator
of Information as have not been transferred to
the Office of War Information.
This order is designed solely to clarify the re-
lation of the Office of Strategic Services to other
government agencies, to facilitate the transac-
tion of current operations, and to make possi-
ble the continuance of existing contracts and
services"
The formulation of "specific instructions
as to its functions", however, was to prove
no easy problem, since it was intimately
bound up in larger issues of definition and
organization. Among the, necessary steps
were the reconstitution by JCS of several
committees in order to fit OSS into its struc-
ture, and the definition of psychological
warfare. The attempt to solve these prob-
lems inaugurated a period of confusion and
controversy that was not to be resolved for
some six months, and then not entirely.
Donovan returned from London in late
June to find OSS operating on the basis of
the interim order. On 9 July General Smith
requested a report explaining the organiza-
tion of OSS and giving some description of
Its activities and projects, in order to fa-
� See Histor7 File W-17, Ch. XXVI, p.3.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
,..������
-Top-Secret-
- _
-
miliarize appropriate JCS officials with the
new agency. A lengthy memorandum (Ex-
hibit W-23) responded to this request on 17
August. It set forth the general functions
and basic conception of OSS, an outline of
organization, and exhibits which detailed
the purposes and operations of the various
branches: R&A, SI, SO, FN-and Field Photo-
graphic.
In the meantime, the JCS set about bring-
ing order out of the psychological war-
fare situation. There were already several
agencies acknowledged to be engaged in
"psychological warfare", even though the
term was subject to conflicting definitions
and was used to cover a variety of meanings
and intentions. JCS had in early March
1942 established a Joint Psychological War-
fare Committee (JPWC)* which had been
engaged in planning for psychological war-
fare. There also existed a Psychological
Warfare Branch of 0-2. These two entities,
together with OSS, were subject to the con-
trol and direction of JCS. However, there
were other agencies outside the jurisdiction
of the JCS which were engaged in certain
phases of psychological warfare: CIAA,
BEW and the new OWI. State Department,
of course, had a corollary interest in the
subject.
The new set-up which was created on 21
June 1942 by JCS 68 (Exhibit W-24) re-
volved around a reconstituted JPWC. The
Committee was reorganized with a member-
ship of general and flag officers representing
0-2, ONI, "WDGS and COMINCH, and Dono-
van was named chairman. Pursuant to
the authorizing directive, the major respon-
sibilities of JPWC were to initiate and de-
velop plans for psychological warfare in
conjunction with appropriate agencies of
the JCS and the State Department or other
existing governmental agencies; to coordi-
nate psychological warfare activities of
other United States Government agencies,
and to collaborate with interested nations
� The JPWC held its first meeting on 18 March.
-Tep-Secrst-
to bring psychological warfare in accord
with strategy approved by the JCS; to desig-
nate the executive agencies to implement
and approve psychological warfare plans;
and to submit such plans to the JCS through
the Joint Staff Planners (JSP). A Joint
Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee
(JPWSC) was simultaneously established as
a working committee for the JPWC; and
Donovan established within OSS a Support-
ing Committee on Psychological Warfare.
To provide for the coordination of the
psychological warfare activities of other ex-
isting governmental agencies, JCS 68 also
provided for a Joint Psychological War-
fare Advisory Committee (JPWAC). The -
JPWAC, under the chairmanship of Dono-
van, was to include representatives of OWI,
BEW, CIAA and State Department.*
The JPWC, JPWSC and OSS Supporting
Committee held their first meetings on 8
July. One of the first items on the agenda
was the definition of psychological warfare.
This was not to be accomplished even within
these committees for some two months, but
there was awareness at the outset of a basic
difficulty: "Since propaganda is an essential
part of psychological warfare," the JPWSC
commented in a memorandum to its parent
committee on 18 July 1942, "it is obvious
that the JPWC in following its directive to
'Initiate, formulate and develop plans for
psychological warfare in connection with
other U. S. Government agencies,' finds it-
self deprived of one of the essential tools for
conducting this type of warfare." **
Nevertheless, the JPWC proceeded to the
problem of definition. The result was a
"Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare"
prepared by the OSS Supporting Committee
which, after being referred back and forth
several times between that Committee and
the JPWSC and the JPWC, was finally ap-
� The JPWAC held only 6 meetings in October
and November 1942. The OWI representative did
not attend after the first few meettngs.
�
� � See History 1e W-16, p. 3.
98-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
proved by by the latter on 7 September. The
Basic Estimate is noteworthy as the first
United States attempt to formulate in a
comprehensive, manner the doctrine of
psychological warfare, its objectives, and
the means available to the attainment of
those objectives. Note may be taken here
of the general definition it contained and
the means it enumerated. According to the
Basic Estimate, psychological warfare
Is the coordination and use of all means, includ-
ing moral and physical, by which the end is to
be attained � other than those of recognized
military operations, but including the psychologi-
cal exploitation of the result of those recognized
military actions�which tend to destroy the will
of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage
his political or economic capacity to do so; which
tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assist-
ance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of
neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such
support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend
to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory
of our own people and allies and to acquire, main-
tain, or increase the support, assistance and sym-
pathy of neutrals.
As the principal means necessary to the
prosecution of psychological warfare, the
Basic Estimate specified propaganda, sub-
version, combat propaganda companies and
Intelligence secured by research and espio-
nage.
The Basic Estimate, though approved by
the JPWC on 7 September, was not submit-
ted to the JCS. The essence of its definition
of psychological warfare was reflected in
directives of the JCS many months later,
however, and was to underlie many of the
difficulties which eventually had to be re-
solved by action of the President
OSS as an agency, however, was in 1942
only indirectly affected by the position of
JPWC (and/or the JCS) vis-a-vis the execu-
tive agencies necessary to the prosecution
of psychological warfare. Of more direct
and immediate consequence was its relation-
ship to the committees which controlled it.
The already cumbersome situation created
by JCS 68 was complicated to the point of
� See History File W-16, Ch. XILITI. p. 11.
99
impracticability on 15 August 1942, when
JCS 67/3 (Exhibit W-25) added to the re-
sponsibilities of JPWC the administration of
OSS. The directive read in part: "All plans
for projects to be undertaken by the Office
of Strategic Services will be submitted to
the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through the
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for
approval. The Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee will refer such papers as it deems
necessary to the Joint Staff Planners prior
to submission to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of
Staff. The Joint Psychological Warfare
Committee will take final action on all in-
ternal administrative plans pertaining to
the Office of Strategic Services which do not
involve military or naval personnel or mili-
tary or naval equipmerit."
The resulting situation was difficult both
for the JPWC and OSS. Neither the JPWC
nor the JPWSC was composed of full-time
members, nor were the members specialists
in the various elements of psychological
warfare. Thus, for example, the G-2 repre-
sentative on the senior committee was the
Assistant Chief of Staff 0-2, who sat on the
JIC, and also on the Joint Security Control
(JSC), which was established in August;
and the ONI representative had equally
varied responsibilities. It was not long be-
fore the JPWC was involved in a mass
of administrative problems of OSS, and its
agenda was thrown into a state of confusion
which resisted periodic attempts at clari-
fication.
From the stp.ndpoint of OSS, the situation
was frustrating, to say the least. A given
project had to be taken up with the OSS
Supporting Committee; thereafter, it would
be lodged in the JPWSC. After considera-
tion there, it would be passed to the JPWC.
If the project had been approved at each of
these stages, it was referred to the JSP,
which, if it approved, would present its rec-
ommendations to the JCS.* It should be
� An exception was on matters of a purely In-
telligence nature, where the channel was JIC-
JSP-JCS.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tap�Svcret--
[ :
borne in mind that at any one or more of
these stages the project could be, and very
often was, referred back to the preceding
echelon for reconsideration, revision and re-
submission.
Two examples may be briefly cited to
demonstrate the effects of this committee
entanglement upon OSS Activities. On 13
July General Marshall addressed a memo-
randum to Donovan (circulated on 14 July.
as JPWC 21/D) on the subject of organized
sabotage and guerrilla units for OSS, which
read in part:
1. I have looked into the questions involved as
to the functions of the OSS in relation to sub-
versive activities and guerrilla warfare. The fol-
lowing is my conception of the set-up and rela-
tionships:
a. That the OBS will operate training centers
with instructors furnished by the Army and Navy.
The trainees will be trained as individuals to
participate in subversive activities and possibly as
units for guerrilla warfare if such units are
needed by theater commanders in carrying out
their missions.
b. That subversive activities and guerrilla war-
fare will be carried out under the direction of the
theater commander in those areas where theater
commanders have been designated. In other lo-
calities they must act directly under your imme-
diate control, subject to the directions of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
� � � �
3. The entire subject should be reviewed by the
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and its
recommendations submitted to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.*
The matter was thereupon taken up
through the JPWSC and the JPWC. Rec-
ommendations setting forth the nature of
operations and training for both saboteurs
and guerrilla units were forwarded to the
JSP, which approved them on 12 August
and sent them on to the JCS. On 19 Au-
gust JCS 83/1 ** embodied the recommen-
dations which it had received, and added,
among other things, "that the Joint U. S.
Chiefs of Staff accept in principle the func-
� see History Pile W-16, p. 26.
� � See JCS Directives, VoL I, OSS Director's
Files.
--Zop-Sesret�
tions of the Office of Strategic Services as
indicated herein; further study will be made
by the Joint Psychological Warfare Com-
mittee as to training, type of men used and
organization, and that the Committee will
make further recommendations to the Joint
U. S. Chiefs of Staff."
The matter was thus back in the JPWC
and its Sub-Committee. Tables of organ-
ization were drawn up by OSS and sub-
mitted; they were referred back to the
agency for more detailed information as to
duties and assignments. Revised and re-
submitted, they were referred back once
more for further information, since the
proportion of 77 officers to train approxi-
mately 2,000 men was questioned as being
higher than normal in the Army. They
were revised and submitted once more on
18 September, when the JPWSC decided that
they should be incorporated in a proposed
over-all procurement objective to cover all
OSS needs. Subsequent repeated attempts
to bring the proposed requirements for
guerrillas and saboteurs to the attention
of the JCS were also blocked, and on 10
November the matter was still in the JPWC.
It did not reach the JCS until December,
and then only in conjunction with the over-
all consideration of the status of OSS and
the JPWC which is discussed below.
Another example was the OSS Catalogue
of Materiel, which comprised its require-
ments of munitions and special devices, such
as Sten guns, pull switches, clams, limpets,
K-tablets, pocket incendiaries, plastic ex-
plosives, etc. The first request was brought
up in the JPWSC meeting of 5 August. The
Catalogue was subject to modification, re-
vision and expansion until October. It
reached the level of the JSP in November,
but was referred back for re-examination to
determine if any items for "foreign nations"
were included in it, and, if so, to delete such
items and stipulate that any requirements
of the British should be obtained througp
the normal machinery of Lend-Lease. The
100
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 CO0168776_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Seere,-
British thereupon communicated to the
Chief of the Services of Supply the reasons
of security which precluded handling the
matter through "normal machinery." The
Chief of Staff, SOS, therefore, recom-
mended to the JPWC on 19 November that
OSS include British SOE demands as a
separate list in a catalogue of United States
and United Kingdom' requirements, such
catalogue to be processed by the JPWC
through the JSP to the JCS. The Cata-
logue never reached the JCS during 1942.
The atmosphere produced by this situa-
tion was reflected in the minutes of the
JPWSC meeting of 1 December. While the
discussion was at this point directed to the
delays in approval of the Catalogue, it was
perhaps engendered in some part by the
delays attending other matters and cer-
tainly epitomizes the general situation:
IONI representative:3 I brought up this ques-
t!on of your catalogue yesterday � at a meeting
of the parent committee. At least, I asked where
It was, and they said it is back here. Personally,
I think it is a crying shame that this thing has
not long since been passed along, approved and
gotten under way.
IOW representative:] It is a terrible handi-
cap � absolutely stymied.
IONI representative:] I think we should do
something about getting that thing approved. I
have never seen it since it came back from the
Joint Staff Planners.
IJPWSC Secretary:) There was no paper sub-
mitted to us. There was action by the Planners
in their minutes.
tONI representative:) It doesn't come up be-
fore the parent committee; it doesn't come up
before this committee. It is still bogged down,
befuddled in committees. The 085 is practiooly
stymied on their materials.
� (JPWSC Secretary:] It is a question of whether
It is superseded by this paper, JPWC 54.
(0-2 representative:) 54 incorporates a gen-
eral catalogue.
IONI representative:] 54 does not cover the
'catalogue. It merely covers a process.
10-2 representaUve:7 That is all it is, a process
for obtaining what the catalogue approves.
10111 representative:] It is a process for ob-
taining these things after the catalogue is ap-
proved. The catalogue hasn't been approved.
The thing has worried me for some time. There
wasn't anything I could do about it. Even in
the parent committee the acting chairman has
been bent on getting one thing finished.
MSS representative:] What rubbish pile is the
catalogue in just now? �
A contributing factor to the whole situ-
ation was a definite resentment of OSS, as
such, which found its strongest expression
In Donovan's colleagues on the JPWC.
This resentment seemed to be based, in
part, upon the fact that OSS was a civilian
agency, and, in part, upon the position of
OSS as an agency of the JCS and fear that it
might encroach upon the functions of 0-2
and/or ONI.** Needless to say, this atti-
tude was far from universal, but, centered
in the JPWC which had direct and complete
control over OSS, it assumed a dispropor-
tionate importance, and must be mentioned
here since it directly contributed to the
deadlock which resulted in a fundamental
reorganization of the psychological warfare
� machinery of the JCS.
That the JCS was cognizant of the situa-
tion is indicated in a directive of 11 October
1942 *" from General Marshall to the JPWC
101
� See History File W-18, p. 37.
�� This attitude was expressed in the meetings
of the JPWC. For example, in the meeting of
2 November 1942 the 0-2 representative "ques-
tioned whether the theory that the utilization
of scholars to evaluate military intelligence is
tenable unless the same logic could be applied
to other professional gelds. He believed that the
tools used by soldiers must be made by them."
(Minutes, JPWC, 33rd meeting, 2 November 1942.
See History File W-72a.)
Again, in the meeting of 9 November, the ONI
representative, in referring to certain proposed
directives of OSS, "stated that the organization
proposed by the OSS appeared to constitute an
Intelligence center which would make the Army
and Navy intelligence agencies merely an adjunct
of the OSS." The 0-2 representative "added
that it would result in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
depending upon information furnished by civil-
ians, and that this condition would not be cor-
rected by militarization of the OSS." (Minutes,
JPWC, 34th meeting, 9 November 1942. See His-
tory File W-72a.)
***Circulated on 12 October 1942 as JPFC
37/2/D.
�I�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.Top�Soccei�
(Exhibit W-26). In directing the Commit-
tee to consider the question of militarization
of OSS, he enjoined it "to retain the organ-
ization as an instrument of the Joint U. S.
Chiefs of Staff and not as a sub-agency of
either the Army or the Navy", and further,
"there should be no attempt to change the
present functions of OSS." -
Before consideration of militarization
could get under way, however, another
directive was issued which, in combination
with action taken by the JSC in connection
with the psychological warfare preparation
for Operation TORCH, caused a deadlock in
the JPWC which it was possible to break
only by direct action of the JCS.
At the instance of General Marshall, the
JCS on 22 October 1942 instructed the
JPWC (Exhibit W-27) � to submit recom-
mendations which would "clearly define the
functions of the several branches of" the
OSS. In this connection, JPWC was ordered
to indicate: "A clear line of demarcation"
between the functions of R&A and BEW;
and "clearly what intelligence functions the
OSS is better prepared to perform than
either ONI or the Military Intelligence Serv-
ice." The JPWC was further instructed to
Investigate whether OSS photographic ac-
tivities overlapped those of the Army, Navy
or OWI, and was clearly to define the func-
tions of other subsidiary activities of OSS.
As to SO activities it was indicated that JCS
83/1 sufficed, but should be incorporated in
the responsive study for the sake of com-
pleteness.
Within a few days thereafter, however,
an incident occurred which precipitated a
crisis resulting in a complete overhauling
of the JCS psychological warfare set-up.
At that time the JSC completely by-passed
both the JPWC and OSS in placing the con-
duct of psychological warfare in connection
with the TORCH operation in the hands of
OWI and CIAA. Specifically, the JSC sub-
mitted to JCS a memorandum on the im-
� Circulated on 24 October 1942 as JPWC 45/D.
erep-Seerst�
�
plementation of the Italian Plan for psycho-
logical warfare, and at the same time sent
to OWI and CIAA paraphrases of the Span-
ish and Portuguese plans which had been
drafted, as well as the general directive for
propaganda for all countries. No notifica-
tion was given to JPWC, which learned of
the matter only indirectly.
This course of action elicited an out-
spoken demurrer from OSS which was ex-
pressed in the 1November Revised Corrigen-
dum to JPWC 49. After a lengthy exposi-
tion of the immediate results of the JSC
action, the Revised Corrigendum indicated
some of the difficulties inherent in the po-
sition of the JPWC:
(e) It may be urged that JPWC, with its Sub-
committee, Advisory Committee and the OSS
Supporting Committee have failed to develop the
capability either to plan or to operate as con-
templated by the directives. If this is true, it
Is due
(1) to the fact that JPWC, having been assigned
the supervision of all of the administrative opera-
tions of OSS is overwhelmed by their detail;
(2) to the fact that it has become a cockpit
for jurisdictional disputes involving MS;
(3) to the fact that the necessary coordination
of OWI, CIAA, and BEW with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is resented by them (although in vary-
ing degree) and that the Presidential directives
support their attitude of independence;
(4) to the fact that the planning and opera-
tion of psychological warfare, a highly skilled
task involving foreign knowledge, talent in public
affairs, sensitivity to current intelligence and a
knowledge of "black" or SO procedures used by
all countries against each other, is not charac-
teristic of even the best soldiers, and to some
degree is inconsistent with their highest eM-
ciency in their real task.�
In conclusion, the Revised Corrigendum
stated that the principles of psychological
warfare, and the developed conceptions of
It, were in confusion; that there was no
unified opinion on policy; that the machin-
ery set up by the directive had been com-
pletely set aside; and that "it seems neces-
sary to start from the beginning and set
� See History File W-16, p. 20.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Tvp
up a planning and operational unit which
Is workable and adequately staffed, if the
United States is to take an extensive part in
modem warfare." *
The .ISC responded to the Revised Cor-
rigendum on 6 November. It gave three
reasons for its action: (a) The working
time which was available before D-Day re-
quired that some agency initiate promptly
the necessary action with O'WI and CIAA
to coordinate planning prior to broadcasts
on 1)-Day; (b) requirements for security
were such that action taken had to be re-
stricted to informing the minimum number
of people of the minimum amount of infor-
mation necessary for initial planning; and
(c) it had appeared to the JSC that to irn-
plemeaat and supervise the execution of the
various plans would require both JPWC and
JPWSC to remain practically in constant
session. "This would be obviously impos-
sible due to the very limited time at the dis-
posal of the members." "
The JSC denied concerning itself with at-
tempted control of subversive activities or
long-range planning, and made the follow-
ing statement as to the relationship of OWI
to JCS:
It Is the opinion of the undersigned that the
propaganda as such is not under the positive con-
trol of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The Exec-
utive Order which set up O'W1 and CIAA gives the
directors of these agencies the sole authority un-
der the President for planning and executing
such propaganda as they deem necessary or
advisable. It is not through military direction,
but as the result of loyal cooperation of the
directors of OWI and CIAA that the Joint U. S.
Chiefs of Staff exercise control of these impor-
tant agencies. The legal authority for this con-
trol does not exist at present."
Whatever the merits of the respective
contentions as to the particular action of
the JSC, both sides seemed agreed on the
Ineffectuality of the JPWC position.
� See History File W-16, p. 21.
� � See History File W-16, p. 72.
�
On 31 October. 1942, OBS prepared and
laid before the JPWC a comprehensive 4500-
word response to the directive on the func-
tions of OSS (Exhibit W-28).* This state-
ment set forth in detail the functions and
purposes of the agency and its various
branches, and differentiated them from the
activities of other departments and agen-
cies.
At the same time, however, OSS submit-
ted directly to the JCS proposed new direc-
tives (Exhibit W-29)" designed to elimi-
nate the JPWC, strengthen OSS and reor-
ganize completely the psychological war-
fare machinery of the JCS.
The issue was thus clearly joined. The
JPWC discussions, beginning with the meet-
ing of 2 November and concluding with the
meeting on 17 November, resulted in a dead-
lock. In the interests of objectivity, Dono-
van absented himself from these meetings
and OSS was represented by the Assistant
Director and two other key officials. From
these discussions JPWC issued a majority
report and a minority report (Exhibit W-
SO).*" The former stated that many OSS
activities were duplicative, and recom-
mended the continuance of a more power-
ful JPWC. The latter consisted of the pro-
posed directives of 31 October, accompanied
by a memorandum from Donovan to the
JPWC dated 16 November which, after re-
lating the background of the deadlock,
stated:
From the discussions that have taken place, it
seems clear that there is a fundamental differ-
ence of opinion as to the status of OSS between
the representatives of the Office of Strategic
Services and other members of the Committee.
It appears that no agreement can be reached on
this question. OSS cannot recede from its posi-
tion and it is apparent that other members of the
Committee will not recede from their position.
The memorandum concluded, therefore,
that further discussion would serve no pur-
� Circulated on 2 November 1942 as JPWC 45/1.
�� Circulated on 2 November 1942 as JPWC 50.
��� Circulated an 17 November 1942 as JPISIC
45/2.
_ 163
�ftsp-Seere�
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
pose but would merely delay a decision
which had necessarily to be made by higher
authority. This was followed on 19 Novem-
ber by an OSS dissent to the majority re-
port (Exhibit W-31).*
These papers were submitted to the .TIC,
which forwarded them on 20 November to
the JCS with a memorandum (Exhibit W-
32) stating that a majority of the JIC con-
curred in the JPWC majority report. How-
ever, the JIC went on to state:
The Committee unanimously agrees .... that a
decision by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff is
essential to a satisfactory determination of the
functions and activities of the Mice of Strategic
Services and is a necessary prerequisite to the
formulation of a new directive replacing the pro-
visions of JCS 67, 67/4, 68 and 83/1."
The matter was thus officially placed in
the hands of the higher authority of the
JCS. �
While the committee entanglements of
OSS had been approaching this crisis, how-
ever, the other activities of the agency were
beginning to bear fruit. The secret in-
telligence network outside the Western
Hemisphere was expanding, with the vol-
ume of intelligence received doubling and
trebling each month. The value of R&A's
studies and reports was receiving more and
wider recognition, and experience was de-
veloping new techniques in such complex in-
telligence subjects as target analysis and
estimates of enemy capabilities and in-
tentions. FN was a steady source of po-
litical reporting, mainly of service to the
State Department but also useful in pro-
viding background material on political at-
titudes and movements. SO had several
missions in the field which were beginning
to attract attention. The services rendered
by Field Photographic and Presentation
were of acknowledged value.
Recognition of the individual value of the
various components of OSS, however, was
not sufficient. The organization was predi-
� Circulated as JPWC 45/3; also JIC 58/2.
�� See History File W-16, p. 72.
ca:ted upon their combined effect in support
of military strategy and operations. This
was a concept, however valid in theory, that
could only be proved in action, Le., in the
field. Throughout the summer and fall of
1942, the test was in the making in North
Africa. The question was, as it had been
In the spring, whether the organization
should "be disturbed at home before it shall
ever be put to its really crucial work
abroad." *
Operation TORCH provided the first
large-scale test of OSS. As set forth in the
account of COI, the agency had been pre-
paring for action in North Africa from its
earliest days.** The action of the JSC in
Washington could not prevent fulfillment of
those preparations when the operation took
place. The account of COI/OSS partici�
pation in TORCH is set forth elsewhere.***
Note may be taken here of the fact that
when the test carne, all branches of OSS
took part. Comprehensive RSA studies on
the target areas were made available for
both the planning and the operational stage;
Field Photographic personnel accompanied
the invasion forces; OSS representatives
formed an integral part of the AFHQ Psy-
chological Warfare Board established by
General Eisenhower; a clandestine secret
Intelligence radio network had been in oper-
ation in North Africa from March 1942 on;
and cells of resistance had been organind.
OSS agents who had been in North Africa
for more than a year prior to the invasion
accompanied the various task forces. Per-
haps most important, through facilities es-
tablished by OSS at AFHQ on Gibraltar,
the commander of the greatest amphibious
invasion in history up to that time was en-
abled to receive within a matter of hours
secret intelligence by clandestine radio from
the areas toward which his forces were
destined.
� Exhibit W-11.
� � See North Africa in Section I above.
��� See account of TORCH in Europe-Africas
� Section.
104
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Seere.-
In deliberating the future of OSS, the
JCS thus had before it, not only the paper
record of committee discussions, but the
concrete example of accomplishment in
action.
Early in November the JCS designated
General McNarney and Admiral Horne to
inquire into OSS and make recommenda-
tions as to its functions. They visited the
agency separately. Donovan talked with
each of them and prevailed upon them to
spend an entire day with the staff to see
the organization at work.
On 19 November Donovan sent them a
number of memoranda and directives re-
flecting the history and position of COIL-
OSS. They studied the relevant papers
and correlated their study with what they
had themselves seen. Their findings were
favorable and resulted in recommending
that the JCS issue a directive corresponding
in the main to the OSS proposals.
As a result, on 23 December 1942, there
was issued JCS 155/4/D (Exhibit W-33) ,
which constituted the first definitive char-
ter of OSS. By this directive the JPWC was
abolished and OSS was designated as the
agency of the JCS charged (outside the
Western Hemisphere) , in general, with "the
planning, development, coordination and
execution of the military program for psy-
chological warfare," and with "the compi-
lation of such political, psychological, socio-
logical and economic information as may
be required by military operations." The
propaganda aspects of such plans were
limited to recommendations to the JCS
which was responsible for securing the co-
operation of OWL OSS was given author-
ity to operate in the fields of sabotage, es-
pionage and counter-espionage in enemy-
occupied or controlled territory, guerrilla
warfare, ufiderground groups in enemy-oc-
cupied or controlled territory and foreign
nationality groups in the United States. It
provided for a Planning Group to be "set up
In the Office of Strategic Services" consist-
ing of one member from State, two appointed
by the Chief of Staff, two by the Com-
mander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet and Chief of
Naval Operations, and four members, includ-
ing the Chairman, appointed by the Director
of OSS. It stipulated that OSS psychologi-
cal warfare plans be submitted to the JCS
through the .TSP. In the field of intelli-
gence it placed OSS on a par with MIS and
ONL
Consequent upon this directive the com-
mittee entanglement of OSS was resolved.
The abolition of the JPWC led to the con-
comitant abolition of the JPWSC and the
JPWAC. The OSS Supporting Committee
and its Planning Group were abolished, and
the functions of all were absorbed in the new
full-time OSS Planning Group established in
accordance with the terms of JCS 155/4/D.
In a letter to Donovan written on the same
day that the directive was issued, 23 Decem-
ber, General Marshall stated:
I regret that after voluntarily coming under
the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff your
organization has not had smoother sailing.
Nevertheless, it has rendered invaluable service,
particularly with reference to the North African
Campaign. I am hopeful that the new Office
of Strategic Services' directive will eliminate
most, if not all, of your difficulties.
23 December 1942-27 October 1943
The issuance of JCS 155/4/D did not solve
the problem of propaganda. The directive
merely had the effect of placing the responsi-
bility for securing OWI cooperation on a
higher echelon�that of the JCS. This, of
course, did not materially affect the funda-
mental issue of military coordination, which
was not to come to a head for several months.
The directive firmly established OSS, how-
ever. The agency had for the first time a
definitive charter, and the frustrating bar-
riers in its lines of authority to the JCS were
removed. The immediate effect was a rapid
expansion which was reflected not only in
actual operations, but orga ni7Ationally in
the establishment of additional branches.
Such branches did not represent innova-
105
�hp-Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
tions, but the long-suppressed logical de-
velopment of existing functions.
The reorganization of OSS, directed by
JCS 155/4/D, was accomplished by General
Order No. 9 dated 3 January 1943 (Exhibit
W-35).* It carried still further a trend to-
ward a more military set-up which had be-
gun on 17 October 1942. ! At that time, in
anticipation of JPWC action upon the mili-
tarization directive of General Marshall, OSS
branches bad been reorganized in three
groups: SI and SO, R&A and FN, and Serv-
ices.**
In the January reorganization a full-time
Planning Group for Psychological Warfare
was established to supervise and coordinate
the planning and execution of military pro-
grams for psychological warfare, to inte-
grate major projects and plans for psycho-
logical warfare with military and naval pro-
grams, and to develop a psychological war-
fare doctrine. An Advisory Committee was
established to include- representatives of
other agencies as provided in the directive.
A Psychological Warfare Staff became, in ef-
fect, the working committee of the Planning
Group.
Under the Director and Assistant Director
there were established certain independent
branches and administrative functions, such
as Security, Technical Assistants, Secre-
tariat, General Counsel, Special Relations,
Research and Development, etc.
A Deputy Director, Intelligence Service,
supervised and directed the activities of the
Secret Intelligence, Research and Analysis
and Foreign Nationalities Branches.
Under a Deputy Director, Psychological
Warfare Operations, were the Special Opera-
tions Branch, which was responsible for
sabotage and physical subversion, and the
Morale Operations Branch (M0)�respon-
sible for morale subversion to be carried out
� The Order was approved by the JCS on 15
January 1943, and made an attachment to JCS
155/4/D.
�� See Central Administrative Units and Tech-
nical Branches below.
-Top-Secret:
by methods which included the organiza-
tion and conduct of secret ("black") propa-
ganda disseminated by radio, rumors, pam-
phlets, leaflets, photographs, etc., and the
manipulation of individuals or groups.
A Deputy Director, Services, was responsi-
ble for such functions as Procurement and
Supply, Budget and Finance, Personnel,
Communications, Medical Services and Spe-
cial Funds.
Two branches were established at the level
of the Intelligence and Operations Branches,
but not responsible to a Deputy Director:
Schools and Training and Field Photo-
graphic.
The JCS directive and the new General
Order .marked a distinct step forward for
OSS. Its functions were much more pre-
cisely defined than those of the original COI;
Its operations were to be planned and super-
vised by a single authority�the Planning
Group. The agency was more efficiently or-
ganized, furthermore, in that much author-
ity was delegated to the Deputy Directors.
They relieved Donovan of a volume of im-
mediate matters requiring his personal
decision and which had begun to outgrow
the capacities of any single human being.
For the first time, therefore, OSS had a
definite mandate and from this time forward
It was established as an integral part of the
JCS structure. ' But the over-all psychologi-
cal warfare situation was still in a confused
state. Under the provisions of JCS 155/4/D
the Planning Group could submit to the JCS
recommendations as to propaganda objec-
tives which the JCS could in turn request
OWI to carry out. The necessary liaison
was provided for in the Advisory Committee.
However, the position was false in that the
JCS had no control over BEW and OWI as
Instrumentalities neePssary to the execution
of the military program for psychological
warfare.
The injection of "black" propaganda into
the matter by the establishment of the MO
Branch pursuant to General Order No. 9 fur-
ther complicated the matter.
106
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Representatives of Donovan and Elmer
Davis met and negotiated week after week
In an attempt to work out the problem of es-
tablishing a clear line of demarcation be-
tween the spheres of operation of the two
agencies, but without suecs.P.A OWI was
uncertain as to whether or not it thought it
should engage in "black" propaganda, but
the old Issue of fear of military control which
had existed in FIS colored its actions. �
Finally, on 9 March 1943, the President is-
sued Executive Order 9312 (Exhibit W-36),
directing that OW1 be responsible for plan-
ning, developing and executing all foreign
:propaganda activities "involving the dis-
semination of information". The latter
phrase clearly applied to open, or "white",
propaganda; its application, if any, to
"black" propaganda was to be subject to
later interpretation.
The President's Order made it incumbent
upon the JCS to revise the basic directive of
23 December 1942, however. This was ac-
complished by the issuance of JCS 15547/D
on 4 April 1943 (Exhibit W-37). The revised
directive merely ellminnted all reference to
OWI and propaganda from its text, and
stated in paragraph 2:
As used in this directive, psychological war-
fare includes all measures, except propaganda,
taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by
means other than military action, as may be ap-
plied in support of actual or planned military
operations.
Although the above definition was quali-
fied by limitation to the "military program"
contemplated by the directive, it clearly
shows that "psychological warfare" had be-
come a misnomer. Psychological warfare,
In the broad sense in which Donovan used
it, included many things, prime among them
being propaganda. As the term was used by
many others, it envisioned solely propa-
ganda. Still others used the term to mean
propaganda and a few of the activities in-
cluded in Donovan's interpretation. In
any event, propaganda was an integral part
of psychological warfare. Without propa-
�-4ep-Secret
ganda the Military program was not psycho-
logical warfare.
The words were unreal. However, the im-
portant thing was that in the JCS directive
OSS had a mandate which, if not as com-
plete and specific as could be desired, at least
gave it a valid and unquestioned reason for
existence and a sphere in which to operate.
Refinements of phrasing could be taken care
of later-1943 was a year of operation and
expansion.
Actually, a basic change had been taking
place following the invasion of North Africa.
The real decision as to what any agency
would be able to accomplish in the field was
being removed from Washington. General
authority which might be granted in Wash-
ington on almost any question was subject
to the specific permission of theater com�
-
manders. By January 1943 most of the
areas of interest in the world were operating
military theaters. Thus, for example, in the
North African Theater, General Eisenhower
had established a Psychological Warfare
Board which included OWI, PWE, MOI and
OSS personnel. Regardless of whether OWI
was under civil or military control jurisdic-
tionally in Washington, it was obvious that
any activities it performed in the theaters
would be subject to military direction.
The inception of the OG Branch illustrates
this fact. It grew in part, of course, out of
the repeated attempts to secure authoriza-
tion of guerrilla units throughout 1942. The
closest thing to guerrilla units in the Decem-
ber directive was the mention of "operational
nuclei", for which recruiting had begun in
late 1942. The actual organization of the
Branch, however, resulted from a request by
the Theater Command in NATO.
Even prior to the issuance of JCS 155/4/1),
a plan of operations. for OSS in the Western
Mediterranean had been under discussion in
the JPWC. After the final meeting of the
JPWC on 7 December, the plan was submit-
ted through the JSP to the JCS and emerged
on 18 December as JCS 170 (Exhibit W-38).
The directive provided for activities based on
107 Top Cacrut-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Algiers as follows: (a) SI activities in North
Africa from French West Africa to and in-
cluding Libya; south and southwest Europe,
Including the Iberian Peninsula and south-
ern France to the eastern boundaries of Italy
and adjacent islands; (b) SO activities in
Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, France and
such other places as might be required by the
theater commander; and (c) appropriate
counter-subversive and counter-intelligence
activity. JCS 170 further provided for the
establishment of a North Africa OSS mis-
sion and the dispatch of appropriate per-
sonnel and equipment and materiel believed
to be necessary. Prior to any action, how-
ever, it was required that the Theater Com-
mander approve the plan.
The Deputy Director-Psychological War-
fare Operations made an extensive tour of
NATO, MOTO and ETO at the beginning of
1943. As a result of his conferences at
AFHQ in Algiers, General Eisenhower on 4
February approved JCS 170 in principle.
Subsequently, and growing out of these same
conferences, General Eisenhower cabled a re-
quest for "operational nuclei" to be used in
subsequent operations directed toward the
Continent.
Request to the War Department for appro-
priate allotments resulted in an inquiry as
to whether further allotments for other thea-
ters would later be submitted. OSS replied
in the affirmative, and the Operational
Group Command was established by Special
Order No. 21 effective 4 May 1943.
Later, JCS 166/3/D of 27 May 1943 (Ex-
hibit W-39) provided for OSS activities in
the Middle East, and JPS 178/D of 6 May
1943 provided for OSS operations in ETO.* '
A major intelligence function developed
out of the provision in JCS 155/4/D author-
izing OSS to perform "counter-espionage in
enemy-occupied or controlled territory". It
had always been recognized that the develop-
ment of a secret intelligence orprovation
would necessitate the performance of
*Authority for operations in ETO was subject
to much discussion and revision.
counter-intelligence activities for its protec-
tion. However, through the close relations
which obtained between the British Security
Coordination and MS, the British made an
offer which created an unusually advanta-
geous opportunity for the United States,
through the medium of OSS, to develop an
organization in the wider field of counter-
espionage.
The British had built up over many years
a highly coordinated net of security services
which had by long experience been pointed
to a high degree of efficiency and world-wide
coverage. Prior to 7 December 1941, they
were exchanging some counter-espionage in-
formation with G-2, ONI, FBI and COI/OSS.
After the outbreak of war, however, the Brit-
ish became disturbed about giving such in-
formation to several uncoordinated agencies
which lacked carefully-trained specialists
concerned exclusively with counter-espio-
nage techniques. Therefore, they suggested
that all counter-espionage material be chan-
neled through a single agency, and offered
to make available to such an agency the
body of counter-espionage records which
they had accumulated.
Following negotiations in London in the
winter of 1942-43 between OSS and the Brit-
ish security services, a Counter-Intelligence
Division* was established within SI on 1
March 1943. Included in the agreements
made with the British in London were ar-
rangements for the transfer to America of
duplicates of the large body of counter-
espionage records which the British had ac-
cumulated. The United States thus gained
In a very short time the fruits of years of
counter-espionage activity. The Counter-
Intelligence Division sent a small staff to
London to arrange for the transmittal of the
files. 411,
It soon became evident that, by working
In close collaboration with the British,
* This Division was to receive all counter-
espionage information sent by the British, except
that relating to espionage in the Western Hem-
isphere, for which FBI continued independent.
liaison.
108
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Tep-Seeret--
knowledge could be acquired and personnel
trained in the highly intricate techniques of
counter-espionage manipulation and the
control of enemy agents through which
knowledge could be gained of the enemy's
plans and intentions and the enemy could
be deceived as to one's own. .
With the unique opportunity thus offered
to create in a short time a counter-espionage
organization and to engage in such activity
on a wide scale, proposals were made that the
Counter-Intelligence Division of SI be given
separate branch status. Therefore, on 15
June 1943, the Division became the Counter-
Espionage Branch (X-2), one of the three
major branches of the Intelligence Service.
Following relaxation of transportation
freezes, particularly in the North African
Theater after the conclusion of the Tunisian
campaign, there was a rapid build-up of OSS
field base personneL Problems of adjust-
ment occurred when it became apparent that
the theater commands were not familiar
with the expanded scope of OSS, and the or-
ganization had to struggle for the oppor-
tunity to prove itself in the theaters, very
much as it had had to battle for the accept-
ance of the concept which underlay its estab-
lishment in Washington. In some cases
field representatives of OSS who had left
Washington in 1942 were not themselves
cognizant of the development of its various
functions. As the headquarters of the vari-
ous theater commands ceased to be opera-
tional zones, the traditional aversion of field
men to the establishment of headquarters
procedures asserted itself. This was a nat-
ural development but, in combination with
transportation and equipment difficulties, it
may be mentioned in passing as a problem
of adjustment in the development of the
major field bases. By the fall of 1943, how-
ever, bases in London, Algiers and Cairo re-
flected the Washington pattern of organiza-
tion.
However, authorizations given in Wash-
ington were being substantiated in the field.
The fact was that the functions undertaken
by COI/OSS, being new, had to be subject
to evolution. This may well explain the dif-
ficulties which bad beset the attempts at
predefinition. Only general definitions
were possible before more exact capabilities
were indicated in practice. The crucial tests
were being met in the field and it was in the
light of experience that specific definitions
had to be drawn; they could not be pre-con-
ceived, or, if so, would be meaningless.
This became apparent again in the sum-
mer of 1943. As part of its responsibility
for the development of psychological war-
fare doctrine, OSS prepared a "Provisional
Basic Field Manual�Psychologie:al War-
fare", which was submitted to the JSP for
approval on 12 June. The Manual, in ac-
cord with the realities of the situation, pro-
vided for the conduct of operations by OBS
which were not authorized by the basic JCS
directive (155/7/D) and which JSP, there-
fore, could not approve. OSS had the ap-
proval of JCS, however, for the conduct of
these types of operations in certain specific
cases (for example, JCS 170, 166/3/1), and
JCS approval of General Order No. 9), and it
therefore seemed probable that the JCS
would also authorize them generally as a
matter of principle. The JSP accordingly
proposed to Donovan that he draft and sub-
mit to the JCS a new general directive which
would confer on OSS explicitly, formally and
for general use, the additional authority
which the agency was already exercising in
certain cases and which it wished to provide
for in the Basic Field Manual
Thereupon, the Plenning Group, in col-
laboration with the heads of the operating
branches of OSS, prepared and submitted to
the JCS a new revision of the basic directive.
In transmitting the draft, Donovan wrote to
the JCS on 4 September 1943:
1. There is submitted herewith, for your con-
sideration and with the request that you give it
your approval, draft of a proposed directive to
replace JCS 155/7/D defining the functions of
OSS. This proposed directive is submitted in
accordance with letter of the Joint Staff Platt*
nets dated 4 August 1943 suggesting (in trams-
109 ltp-Seeret�
Ap roved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
witting recommendations of its subcommittee �
upon a proposed Basic Field Manual�Psycho-
logical Warfare which I bad placed before you
for approval on 12 June 1943), as an alternative,
that specific request be made to you to widen
the authority contained in JCS 155/7/D. This
suggestion apparently was made so that the basic
directive on the functions of OSS might be
broadened to conform with . present procedure
and practice of OSS as specifically authorized
by you In various basic military plans for psycho-
logical warfare (JCS 166/3/D and JCS 170).
2. The proposed directive submitted herewith
was drafted by the OSS Planning Group in con-
junction with operating branch heads. In the
opinion of the Planning Group the proposed
directive adds no additional functions beyond
those already authorized in basic plans previ-
ously authorized by you or required of OSS by
the armed services. . .�
The new directive, designated JCS
155/11/D (Exhibit W-40), was issued on 27
October 1943. It was the final basic direc-
tive for OSS and was not thereafter revised.
It contained several changes of considerable
consequence. Unlike the earlier directives
of the 155 series, the new directive incorpo-
rated specifically the designations and func-
tions of the various branches along the lines
previously appearing in General Order No. 9.
Further, it acknowledged the fact that
psychological warfare was a meaningless
term once propaganda activities had been re-
moved from its definition, as had been done
In JCS 155/7/D following the President's
Order of 9 March. It changed the term
"Psychological Warfare Operations" to
"Strategic Services Operations". This was
a distinct step forward, since it acknowl-
edged that OSS had progressed, both in the-
ory and practice, to the point where "strate-
gic services" had a new and independent
meaning. As defined briefly in JCS
155/11/D, the term "strategic services" in-
cluded "all measures (except those pertain-
ing to the Federal program of radio, press,
publication and related foreign propaganda
activity involving the dissemination of in-
formation) taken to enforce our will upon
� See Director's File 12570, OSS Archives.
--Top-Secret�
the enemy by means other than military ac-
tion, as may be applied in support of actual
or planned military operations or in further-
ance of the war effort."
The directive specifically, approved the
maintenance of bases by SI in Latin Amer-
ica to serve as ports of exit and entry for
personnel, materiel and information going
to and from Europe and the Far East; it
stipulated that OSS was to have the right
to use MIS and ONI facilities for transmit-
ting reports from Latin America to the
United States; it more specifically provided
for counter-espionage operations; it explic-
itly freed R&A from any geographic restric-
tions; it granted specific authority for MO
operations; it broadened the authority of
R&D; and it conferred on OSS special powers
to set up and operate its own communica-
tions system.
The directive did not affect the basic or-
ganizational pattern of the agency and it
was not necasgstry, in view of the fact that
the directive itself followed the lines of Gen-
eral Order No. 9, immediately to revise the
Order.
Thus, after some twenty-seven months as
COI and OSS, the agency had definitive au-
thorization and sufficient scope to develop
maximum efficiency. By that time it was
accepted as a valid and valuable auxiliary to
military operations.
A glance at the organization accepted and
recognized in October 1943 graphically dem-
onstrates how short-sighted it would have
been to subject the original branches in 1941
or 1942 to the stifling effect of precise defini-
tion; certainly no conception of some OSS
activities at that time would have envisioned
the extent of their development in the brief
period of a year or two. Moreover, such a
restricting definition would unquestionably
have retarded their development even more
than the struggles which accompanied their
battle for existence. The "morale and
physical subversion" to which Donovan had
alluded in his conferences with the Cabingt
110
11111111111111.11111.11.m......mApproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tep-Seeref--
committee in the summer of 1941,* and
which had found its first expression under
COI as the SA/G Branch, was in 1943 the SO
Branch, engaged in sabotage and support of
resistance; the OG Branch, which placed
harassing bands of highly-trained, bilingual
guerrillas behind the lines; the MO Branch,
which engaged in world-wide dissemination
of "black" propaganda and other forms of
morale subversion; and the MU Branch
which engaged in maritime infiltration, de-
velopment of maritime devices and maritime
sabotage operations. The Secret Intelli-
gence functions which were begun as SA/B
In late 1941 had developed into the extensive
espionage network of SI, and the major
branch of X-2 which handled the various
aspects of counter-espionage. These are
but two of the examples which could be
multiplied many times by a closer Priaminn-
tion of the development of various smaller
sections and various independent branches.
The activity which they represented had ren-
dered service of acknowledged value; the
greatest value was yet to come.
With the issuance of JCS 155/11/D,
OSS/Washington had achieved its major
purpose. The organization which it had es-
tablished was not only functioning but au-
thorized to function. The justification for
the long struggle would rest with those
whom it sent to the field.
27 October 1943-27 September 1944
By October 1943, the Allies had established
a foothold in southern Italy. In the suc-
ceeding year the European war reached its
elimax with the invasion of France.
The task of OSS/Washington was one of
supporting the widespread field organiza-
tions which it had dispatched. All
branches were called upon constantly for
both agent and staff recruits for the field.
As the actual invasion of France drew closer,
large-scale projects, such as Jed burgh, Sus-
sex and Proust, necessitated intense recruit-
See Exhibit W-18.
ing drives. OSS/Washington, in addition to
training large numbers of recruits, had to
arrange appropriate clearances for their dis-
patch to the field in time to be of service.
The obligation of OSS to support resist-
ance groups created equally intense demands
for materiel and supplies. It was necessary
to surmount many difficulties in arranging
�for shipment, in view of the fact that avail-
able shipping space was already taxed to the
utmost with regular military demands.
To meet these demands required not only
that OSS be accepted in Washington, for this
had in large part been accomplished with
the issuance of JCS 155/11/D, but also that
the agency be accepted in the various thea-
ters in which it operated. To this end,
Donovan made frequent trips to the field in
1943 and 1944. On such trips he buttressed
the field organizations in their efforts to
achieve appropriate status. In addition, he
acquainted Washington with the peculiar
needs of the various bases which grew out of
the differing situations in the theaters and
the nature of their respective strategic and
tactical objectives.
Further, he was able, by such frequent
trips to the field, to facilitate the proper de-
velopment of - another OSS function�the
formulation of the doctrine of psychological
warfare and the various aspects of strategic
services operations. This doctrine, as laid
down in the basic manuals and the over-all
programs of the Planning Group in Wash-
ington, could not remain static. The spe-
cific programs, which were necessary to the
Implementation of basic plans, were neces-
sarily affected by the limitations which local
operating situations placed upon their exe-
cution. By acquainting Washington with
developments in the various theaters, based
upon his personal observation and intimate
knowledge of all phases of OSS operations,
and by acquainting the field with Washing-
ton developments, Donovan was able to bring
about the necessary consonance between
over-all planning and implementational
111
planning. �
4ep-Seeret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top &Rd et
There were numerous problems of adjust-
ment within OSS which accompanied the
development of its various field activities.
Most of these problems were either local or
transitory in their significance. One prob-
lem, however, which was common to prac-
tically all theaters, and which reappeared
throughout the existence of OSS, was the de-
gree to which the various field bases and
field detachments should reflect the pattern
of OSS branch organization, and the degree
of control which could be exercised by the
respective branches in Washington over
their personnel in the field.
OSS was designed to provide strategic
services. The services which. it could render
and the form which they took, however, were
conditioned by the needs of the respective
local authorities in the field. In the Euro-
pean theaters, strategic services were most
significant in the preparation of territory for
large-scale amphibious operations. In the
Far East, they were most useful in the de-
velopment of guerrilla and subversive tactics
directed against the enemy's lines of com-
munication, where OSS units served to take
the place of regular military components.
The form of OSS activities was further con-
ditioned by relations with parallel services
of Allied governments. The position of OSS
In the various theaters was, at first glance,
ambiguous: The agency was designed to
serve the local command, but at the same
time, it was responsible to the higher au-
thority of the JCS. The value of the un-
orthodox services rendered by OSS depended
upon its strategic position with ultimate
jurisdiction at the highest echelon and its
freedom from the possibility of operating
bias which would have attended its attach-
ment exclusively to any one command or any
one branch of service. The state of organ-
ization of OSS in the various theaters had,
In some instances, to be modified from the
Washington branch pattern. It was only as
the various theater commands, and on oc-
casion, the representatives of OSS itself, be-
came educated to the value of the activities
represented by the new branches which were
formed in Washington, that those branches
could perform their most effective service in
the field.
It was not unusual for local commanders
to fear the possibility of divided allegiance
on the part of an organization which owed
responsibility directly to Washington. The
resolution of this problem was only possible
as experience demonstrated the value of the
orga_nimtion and the fact that a strategic
basis was necessary for its activities.
Another problem, which was related to the
question of branch-type organ i mtion in field
bases, was the degree of control which could
be exercised by the Washington branches
over the personnel they sent to the field.
Personnel in the field were frequently as-
signed to tasks which transcended branch
lines or were of purely local priority. The
branches in Washington, for the most part
dealing with more long-range and strategic
subjects, were desirous that priority be
placed upon their needs by branch personnel
In the field. For example, R&A might wish
some of its personnel in a given area to
search out facts or material necessary to a
long-range strategic survey in progress in
Washington. In the field, on the other
hand, the demands of immediate operations
might require that the R&A personnel de-
vote themselves to the preparation of intelli-
gence for pinpoint selection, briefing, etc.
Also, an R&D man in the field might be un-
der constant pressure from Washington to
send back information of value to the prog-
ress of research and development in the
United States, when the immediate demands
of the theater required his attention to the
demonstration of weapons and devices al-
ready produced or to the production of docu-
ments or physical accessories necessary for
immediate agent operations. While com-
plaints on the part of the Washington
branches in this connection were not infre-
quent, it was the field which in general had
the priority. The decision as to the assign-
ments of personnel in a given area was thee
---Tep--Seeret� .112
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-6eeref-
responsibility of the respective strategic
services officers. They stood in the same re-
lation to local commands as did Donovan to
the JCS in Washington.
Paternal relations in the various theaters
created numerous problems, many of which
evolved from the local situation and from
the natiae of a particular theater establish-
ment. There was, however, one difficulty
which was common to most theaters. This
difficulty revolved around the firm premise
which Donovan had enunciated from the be-
ginning, namely, that the secret intelligence
organization of OSS should be free and in-
dependent. The reasons for this independ-
ence had often been stated. In fact, as
Donovan noted in his memorandum of 17
September 1943 to Major General W. B.
Smith (Exhibit W-18) the committee of
Cabinet members, which met in Washington
In the summer of 1941, had stressed the point
of independence in secret intelligence. After
conferring with Donovan, that committee
had stated that the requirements for a long-
range strategic intelligence service with sub-
versive attributes made it mandatory:
. . . that the intelligence services of one nation
should be kept independent from that of any
other nation, each with its own agents, com-
munications, and transportation � for the fol-
lowing reasons:
a. Security. The disclosure of one will not
necr.g--q rily involve damage tO another.
b. Verification. If networks are truly sep-
arate, it is improbable that information, simul-
taneously received from the two chain-% springs
from a single source.
c. Control. The effectiveness of intelligence
work is dependent upon permanence� at least
In so far as it is not subject to the power of
another to terminate it The danger that its
operation may be terminated by the act of an-
other means subordination. �
The independence of SI was subject to
question in widely separated areas. With
regard to the British, the question was raised
in London at an early date. In NATO it was
necessary to negotiate constantly during
1943 to secure transportation and documents
which would allow SI to operate in France
and Italy from the Algiers base without be-
ing dependent upon the British. In NATO,
also, it was necessary to preserve independ-
ence with regard to the French intelligence
services in connection with operations into
France. In Cairo, while METO was a thea-
ter under British command, the independ-
ence of intelligence operations�particularly
these directed toward the Balkans�came
Into constant question.
The problem was no less acute in the Far
East, particularly in China, where the in-
telligence services of General Tai Li sought
to control all intelligence work. The thea-
ter sections of this Report set forth the de-
tails of these conflicts. From the stand-
point of OSS/Washington, however, the is-
sue was not one of localized significance. As
exemplified by the Sussex and Proust opera-
tions, SI stood ready to collaborate in specific
projects with any of the Allies. OSS, how-
ever, in accordance with its mandate to de-
velop an American secret intelligence serv-
ice, refused to allow domination of that serv-
ice which might impair its effectiveness in
the future. Perhaps more than in any other
phase of its activities, it was necessary that
OSS be conscious of the potential peacetime
significance of its effort to develop the first
American espionage and counter-espionage
organization.
By 1944, OSS was in a position, both in the
field and in Washington, to render varied
and effective services.
In neutral countries, as well as in the
European and Far East theaters, world-wide
espionage and counter-espionage systems
had been established. R&A, centered in
Washington but constantly expanding in the
field to service both the Branch and local
commands, constituted an effective service
for the collation and analysis of intelligence.
The operations branches supported mili-
tary operations by unorthodox warfare and
organized and supplied resistance and guer-
rilla groups�from the Maquis in France to
the Kachins in Burma.
In the European theaters, one of the most
significant developments was the perfection
113 -4ep-Serer44�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
of the "softening up" of target areas prior
to amphibious invasion. In the Far East
theaters, which had secondary priority, dif-
ferences of terrain, race and culture required
that OSS develop in a somewhat different
fashion. The emphasis was upon guerrilla
activities, with intelligence generally tactical
In use and of secondary importance.! By
1944, Detachment 101 had demonstrated
that the unorthodox methods of OSS could,
In the situation in which 101 operated, take
the place of sizable regular units.
� ANVIL, the last large-scale amphibious in-
vasion of the war in Europe, provided the
highest development of the "softening up"
process and the support of military opera-
tions of this nature on the part of OSS. The
Infiltration of secret intelligence agents by
parachute or rubber boat, which had begun
from Algiers in early 1943, had developed a
sizable clandestine radio network within a
year. OSS/Spain had organized French
agent chains which reported by courier and
provided a steady and voluminous flow of
secret information. OSS/Algiers was taken
Into the planning of the actual operation at
an early stage, and assigned a special de-
tachment .to work with the planners of AN-
VIL. The military planners were thus able
to secure replies to intelligence question-
naires on items of specific and immediate in-
terest to invasion plans. The SO build-up
in southern France was directed from Lon-
don and coordinated with SO and SOE in
Algiers. Shortly before the invasion, OG's
were parachuted to disrupt enemy communi-
cations, harass troop movements, etc. The
secret intelligence facilities provided for
ANVIL marked an advance over those which
had been provided for TORCH. At that
time, AFIRra at Gibraltar bad been placed in
possession of secret radio intelligence from
the three widely separated areas toward
which troops were destined. In the case of
ANVIL, 088 Communications at Algiers bad,
for some time before the invasion, estab-
lished mechanical taansmitters which sent a
continuous stream of dummy mecsages for
some time prior to the actual invasion.
When the invasion armada got under way,
real messages were inserted into the stream
of dummy messages and, in all, some 90 mes-
sages of fresh secret intelligence were re-
ceived on the command ship while the fleet
was moving to the invasion area and during
the 4n1tia1 stages of the landings. Such in-
telligence included the answers to last-min-
ute questions about enemy dispositions,
movements and Installations in the target
area.
The rapid advance of Allied ,armies in
Europe in the summer and fall of 1944 made
It seem that the end of the European con-
flict was in sight, and the center of military
Interest began to shift to the Pacific. The
requirements of resistance groups in Europe
for materiel and supplies decreased sharply
and a great deal of materiel, previously ear-
marked by OSS for European resistance, was
reassigned to supply increased requirements
In the Far East. There was also a decrease
In numbers of personnel being dispatched to
the European theaters and a shift of person-
nel movement to the Orient. At the same
time, OSS plans for Europe began to be con-
cerned principally with post-hostilities ac-
tivities.
On 18 September 1944 the President in-
structed the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget to study the problem of reconversion
of government agencies to a peacetime basis
and to submit recommendations for (1) the
liquidation of war agencies and the reassign-
ment of such permanent or continuing func-
tions as they possessed, (2) the reduction of
government personnel to a peacetime basis,
and (3) the simplification and adaptation of
administrative structures to peacetime re-
quirements. This was to be done primarily
In regard to adjustments needed following
the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.
On 23 September 1944, the Bureau of the
Budget transmitted to Donovan a copy of
the President's 18 September letter, and
asked information as to the possibility of rer
duction or change in the activities of OSS
114
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
which might be consequent upon the rapid
. development of the European war. The
Bureau further requested that Donovan ap-
point a representative to deal with this mat-
ter.
On 27 September 1944, Donovan ap-
pointed the Deputy Director, Services, to
work out liquidation arrangements for OSS
with the Budget representatives.
27 September 1944-15 August 1945
The progress�of Allied armies in Europe
during the fall of 1944 resulted in a decrease
of resistance group requirements for mate-
riel and supply, and there was a sharp drop
In shipments. In addition to changes in
supply requirements, as the emphasis began
to shift to the Far East, there was also a de-
crease in the numbers of personnel required
for the European war. While the actual ter-
mination of hostilities in Europe was not to
occur for some six months, the defeat of Ger-
many was clearly in prospect
Donovan had never lost sight of the fact
that, while OSS was in one sense a wartime
expedient, it was also an experiment of vital
significance to determination of the question
of a peacetime intelligence structure for the
United States. His own thinking on the
matter, which led to the establishment of
COI in 1941, had been buttressed by some
three years' actual experience which the or-
ganization had accumulated by the fall of
1944.
On 31 October 1944, President Roosevelt
asked Donovan to submit his views on the
organization of an intelligence service for
the post-war period. Donovan replied in a
memorandum of 18 November, with which
he submitted a proposal for a central intelli-
gence service (Exhibit W-43). In his memo-
randum, Donovan proposed the liquidation
of OSS once the wartime necessity for the
organization had ceased. However, he was
anxious to preserve its intelligence functions
In some form for permanent peacetime use.
In essence, this involved returning to the
original COI concept of a central authority,
reporting directly directly to the President, which
could collect and analyze the mass of intelli-
gence material required for the planning
and implementation of national policy and
strategy-1 In his memorandum, Donovan
stated:
In the early days of the war, when the de-
mands upon intelligence services were mainly
In and for military operations, the OSS was
placed under the direction of the JCS.
Once our enemies are defeated the demand
will be equally pressing for information that will
aid us in solving the problems of peace.
This will require two things: �
1. That intelligence control be returned to the
supervision of the President
2. The establishment of a central authority
reporting directly to you, with responsibility to
frame intelligence objectives and to collect and
coordinate the intelligence material required by
the Executive Branch in planning and carrying
out national policy and strategy.
I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab
A) the means by which I think this could be
realized without difficulty or loss of time. You
will note that coordination and centralization
are placed at the policy level but operational
Intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Depart-
ment action) remains within the existing agen-
cies concerned. The creation of a central au-
thority thus would not conflict with or limit
necessary intelligence functions within the Army,
Navy, Department of State and other agencies.
In accordance with your wish, this is set up as
a permanent long-range plan. But you may
want to consider whether this (or part of it)
should be done now, by executive or legislative
action. There are common-sense reasons why
you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at
once.
The immediate revision and coordination of
our present intelligence system would effect sub-
stantial economies and aid in the more efficient
and speedy termination of the war.
Information important to the national tie-
tense, being gathered now by certain Depart-
ments and agencies, is not being used to full
advantage in the war. Coordination at the
strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid
the present confusion that leads to waste and
unnecessary duplication.
Though in the midst of war, we are also in a
period of transition which, before we are aware,
will take us into the tumult of rehabilitatifn.
An adequate and orderly intelligence system
will contribute to informed decisions.
115 --Tep-Seeref�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
We have have now in the Government the trained
and specialized personnel needed for the task.
This talent should not be dispersed.
However, immediate action was not taken.
The Ardennes offensive in December proved
that the European war would take longer
than had been anticipated in the fall and
that defeat of the German armies in France
would not insure an internal collapse in Ger-
many.
December 1944 marked the maximum ex-
pansion of 083. The agency employed some
13,000 personnel, approximately 5,500 of
which were in the United States and the re-
Mainder overseas. Personnel and supply
requirements of OSS in the European thea-
ters had been sufficiently built up and, with
the exception of supplying personnel quali-
fied to work on Germany itself and preparing
for the post-hostilities phase, the organiza-
tion could devote the major part of its oper-
ations in 1945 to problems in the Far East.
By the middle of 1944, OSS had seven
principal bases in the Far East�at Chung-
king and Kunming in China; and at Kandy,
New Delhi, Calcutta and Nazira in India.
After October 1944, when the CBI Theater
was split into the India-Burma Theater and
the China Theater, OSS reorganized its de-
tachments. The new China Theater Com-
mander made OSS responsible for all clan-
destine activities (except Chinese) in China.
The organization in China, following some
two years of effort, thus achieved the basis
for effective operation: integrated forces and
independent control.
In the Pacific Ocean theaters, OSS as a
whole was never active. Admiral Nimitz
originally rejected a plan for psychological
warfare in the Pacific Theater.*
OSS was never fully active in the Southwest
Pacific Theater. In the spring of 1945, Gen-
eral MacArthur approved the dispatch of
personnel and equipment for JAVAMAN, a
secret weapon developed by the Special Proj-
ects Branch. However, the Japanese war
ended before the mission reached the field.
� Embodied in JCS 403, 2 August 1943.
-Top-Secret--
The most spectacular OW activity in the
Far East was Detachment 101, the nucleus
of which had arrived in India in the early
summer of 1942. This Detachment carried
on effective guerrilla and intelligence oper-
ations in Burma. In this respect, its work
was only paralleled by the activity of
OSS/China in the last months of the war.
In Burma, OSS became the principal and
ultimately, the only U. S. ground force in
combat; in China, OSS guerrilla activity was
Important not only in support of the Chinese
armies in the field but also in developing of-
fensive action by them.* .
The work of OSS in Collaborating with the
Siamese was a unique example of the possi-
bilities of a secret organization. In this in-
stance, the Siamese Government, officially
under Japanese domination, became in effect
a resistance group working for OSS. Such
an operation could not have been carried out
by an agency having official_ status.
Through the Siamese, OSS effected indirect
penetration of Japan proper.
By 1945, OSS had at last established itself
In the Far East. The process had been a
slow one, due not only to complicating fac-
tors of race, culture and geography, as well
as political considerations, but to the fact-
that Allied war priorities were on Europe.
The work of OSS in the Far East developed
differently from that in Europe. Paramili-
tary operations were paramount; secret in-
telligence operations were often combined
with other types of operation; and, in gen-
eral, there was less branch-consciousness
than in Europe. However, the principle of
strategic services proved itself. By VJ-Day
OSS had received a degree of support in the
Far Eastern theaters on the Asiatic Conti-
nent which was an effective indication of the
extent of its contribution.
15 August 1945-1 October 1945
The mechanics of liquidating an organiza-
tion such as OSS, which operated on a world-
� Both Detachment 101 and OSS/China re- �
ceived Presidential Unit Citations.
116
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Seaet
wide basis, were complicated. There were
demands from almost all theaters and by
various State Department missions that cer-
tain of the agency's functions be continued.
However, responsible officials were not
agreed upon the form of organization which
should be set up in peacetime. It was im-
perative in Donovan's view, as it was in the
view of many others, that the intelligence
functions of OSS should be preserved in such
form as to be projected into peacetime as a
service to the interests of national policy and
security.
On 25 August 1945, Donovan informed the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Ex-
hibit W-44) that OSS was, in effect, work-
ing under a liquidation budget. He stated
that, within the restrictions of that budget,
OSS was in the process of terminating many
operational activities and reducing the re-
maining parts to a size consistent with obli-
gations then current in the Far East, in oc-
cupied Germany and Austria and in the
maintenance of missions in the Middle East
and on the Asiatic and European continents.
He further stated that OSS had established
a liquidating committee to provide for the
gradual elimination of OSS services in line
with, the orderly reduction of personnel. He
estimated that the effectiveness of OSS as a
war agency would end as of 1 January, or at
the latest 1 February 1946, at which time he
anticipated that liquidation would be com-
pleted.
In this letter, however, Donovan urged the
nPtr.sity of a centralized peacetime intelli-
gence structure. He stated that, upon the
completion of liquidation,
.� . I wish to return to private life. Therefore,
In considering the disposition to be made of the
assets created by OSS, I speak as a private citizen
concerned with the future of his country.
In our Government today there is no perma-
nent agency to take over the functions which
OSS will have then ceased to perform. These
functions while carried on as incident to the war
are in reality essential in the effective discharge
by this nation of its responsibilities in the organ-
ization and maintenance of the peace.
Since last November. I have pointed out the
Immediate necessity of setting up such an agency
to take over the valuable assets created by OSS.
Among these assets was the establishment for
the first time in our nation's history of a foreign
secret intelligence service which reported infor-
mation as seen through American eyes. As an
Integral and inseparable part of this service there
Is a group of specialists to analyze and evaluate
the material for presentation to those who de-
termine national policy.
It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence
system. It is more difficult to do so in time of
peace than in time of war.
It is important therefore that it be done before
the War Agency has disappeared so that profit
may be made of its experience and "Imow how"
In deciding how the new agency may best be
conducted. �
I have already submitted a plan for the estab-
lishment of a centralized system. However., the
discussion of that proposal indicated the need of
an agreement upon certain fundamental princi-
ples before a detailed plan is formulated. If
those concerned could agree upon the principles
within which such a system should be estab-
lished, acceptance of a common plan would be
more easily achieved. .
To the above letter, Donovan attached a
statement of principles which should govern
the establishment of a centralized foreign in-
telligence system, based upon the experience
of OSS and a first-hand study of the intelli-
gence system of other nations. The state-
ment of principles began with the assertion
that the formulation of national policy is
"Influenced and determined by knowledge
(or ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, in-
tentions and policies of other nations." It
continued that all major powers except the
United States had maintained permanent
world-wide intelligence services long prior to
World War II and that the United States,
prior to the war, had no foreign secret intel-
ligence service. Further, the United States
never had and did not then have a coordi-
nated intelligence system. The statement
noted that the difficulties and dangers of the
situation were generally recognized.
The first of the principles stated that each
department of the Government should have
its own intelligence bureau for collecting and
117 --Tep�SaccaL
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
up
purchasing the informational material nec-
essary to its functions. However, since se-
cret intelligence covered all fields and, be-
cause of the possible embarrassment of du-
plication and resultant confusion, no depart-
ment should be permitted to engage in that
field but should call upon the central agency
for such service in appropriate cases.
As its second major point, the statement
set forth the fact that there should be estab-
lished a national central foreign intelligence
agency which should have authority:
A. To serve all Departments of the Govern-
ment.
B. To procure and obtain political, economic,
psychological, sociological, military and other In-
formation which may bear upon the national
Interest and which has been collected by the
different Governmental Departments or agencies.
C. To collect when necessary supplemental in-
formation either at its own instance or at the
request of any Governmental Department by
open or secret means from other and various
sources.
D. To integrate, analyze, process and dissem-
inate, to authorized Governmental agencies and
officials, intelligence in the form of strategic in-
terpretive studies.
The third principle was that the central
agency should be prohibited from carrying
on clandestine activities within the United
States and should be forbidden to exercise
any police functions arising either within
the country or in foreign areas.
The fourth principle stated that, since the
nature of its functions required official sta-
tus, the agency should be independent of
any department of the Government, "since it
Is obliged to serve all and must be free of the
natural bias of an operating department."
Therefore, it should be under a deputy ap-
pointed by the President and should be ad-
rninigtered under Presidential direction.
The statement of principles further set forth
the need of a board, on which the Secretaries
of State, War, Navy and Treasury should be
represented, which would determine policy
for the intelligence agency. �
As the sole organization having secret in-
telligence functions, it should be authorized,
"In the foreign field only, to carry on services
such as espionage, counter-espionage and
those special operations (including morale
and psychological) designed to anticipate
and counter any attempted penetration and
subversion" of national security by foreign
powers.
Succeeding principles provided that the
central agency should have an independent
budget directly granted by Congress, and
that it should be authorized to have its own
system of codes and should be furnished by
other departments of the Government with
such facilities as were proper and neeesrary
for the performance of its duties. In addi-
tion, the central service should include
among its personnel staff specialists, pro-
fessionally trained in the analysis of Infor-
mation and possessing linguistic, regional or
functional competence, in order to coordi-
nate, analyze and evaluate information, to
make special intelligence reports and to pro-
vide guidance for collecting branches of the
agency.
In conclusion, the principles stated that, -
In time of war or unlimited national emer-
gency, all programs of such an agency in
areas of actual or projected military opera-
tions should be coordinated with military
plans and should be subject to the approval
of the JCS or, in the event of consolidation
of the armed services, the supreme com-
mander.
The future of intelligence in the United
States was subject to intensive consideration
at many levels in the late summer and fall
of 1945. The weakness of the United States
In this respect prior to World War II was
generally admitted and it was obvious that
the United States and its leaders could not
permit a repetition of the pre-war situation.
The letter to the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and the principles which it en-
closed were widely circulated to key officials
In Washington, including the President.
With the agency in process of liquidation,
there was once again a recognition of the,,
value of various of its components. That
118
1
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tep-Secret�
the functions which were assembled in OSS,
diverse though they appeared superficially,
actually were related and could achieve their
MaXiM11112 effectiveness only in combination,
however, was not generally accepted. In
transmitting to Judge Samuel Rosenman* a
copy of the letter to the Budget and the at-
tached principles, Donovan stated:
I understand that there has been talk of at-
tempting to allocate different segments of the
organization to different departments. This
would be an absurd and unsatisfactory thing to
do. The organization was set up as an entity,
every function supporting and supplementing the
other.
It's time for us to grow up, Sam, and realize
that the new responsibilities we have assumed
require an adequate intelligence system.
Increasingly, the President will see the need
and I hope a new agency will be set up to take
over a very useful legacy.
There had been at least two crises in which
the continued existence of COI/OSS came
into serious question. The first, in the
spring of 1942, resulted in loss of the function
of open propaganda. At the same time,
however, the agency was placed under the
jurisdiction of the JCS, which was the only
status permitting it to achieve its maximum
wartime effectiveness. The second arose in
the fall of 1942, when there was a definite
move to strip the agency of some of its most
valuable components and weaken the re-
mainder to the extent that it could not pos-
sibly have fulfilled its original concept. In
the late summer of 1945 the continued exist-
ence of the agency was not at issue. Dono-
van hirngelf had recommended its liquida-
tion almost a year before. It was not for
the continuance of the agency that he was
concerned, but rather the preservation of in-
telligence assets which had a manifest sig-
nificance for the future.
The impending liquidation of OSS created
grave problems in the field. Activities were
� Special counsel to the President. It will be
remembered that Judge Rosenman- was influen-
tial in the reorganization of government infor-
mation agencies in the summer of 1942. See
page 55 in Section I above.
being carried on in the immediate post-hos-
tilities period, both in Europe and the Fax
East, as well as elsewhere, which were valu-
able and necessary. But the Government
had not established the machinery to take
over these essential functions in a gradual
and orderly manner. It seemed probable
that it would be necessary to drop the ends
of activities which might be valuable in the
future and, should a new organization later
be established, attempt to find them, pick
them up and piece them together. It was
against the potential loss of these assets, to
say nothing of the dispersion of personnel
experienced in a field in which qualified
people were rare, that Donovan sought to
guard.
By the fall of 1945, COI/OSS had operated
as a secret organization for some four years
and three months. The fact of its existence
had been known, but few were aware of the
nature and the extent of its activities. In
the late summer and early fall of 1945, the
agency was de-briefing and releasing large
numbers of personnel. Stories began to ap-
pear in periodicals and in the press regard-
ing OSS. �
This raised a serious problem of security.
There were certain activities of OSS which
could be made known following the end of
hostilities. However, there were others
which the possibility of a continued peace-
time organization made subject to security
restrictions.
It was apparent that some publicity was
inevitable following the war. If it were un-
controlled, however, existing and future ac-
tivities might be jeopardized. Donovan
therefore decided to reveal the general na-
ture of OSS activities and make known cer-
tain of its accomplishments. In addition,
he established within OSS machinery for the
formal review and clearance of stories prior
to publication.
The public thus learned of the way in
which OSS had askisted the preparation of
target areas for large-scale military inu-
sions in Europe, such as TORCH and ANVIL,
.119
�frip-Seere�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
and of the intelligence, SO and resistance
work performed for OVERLORD. It learned
of the supply and assistance to resistance
groups in Italy. It learned of the exploits
of Detachment 101 in Burma. The fact
that the Government of Siam was, in effect,
a resistance group working in collaboration
with OSS was revealed.. The part that
OSS/Bern played in Operation SUNRISE,
Involving the surrender of some 2,000,000
German troops in North Italy, was also made
known. �
Less newsworthy, perhaps, but nonethe-
less important, was the development of the
organization which made these exploits pos-
sible as well as making possible other activi-
ties the existence of which could not be men-
tioned publicly: The establishment of the
first world-wide United States espionage and
counter-espionage systems; the complex na-
ture of the research and analysis function
and the influence which it had exercised
upon the whole field of American intelli-
gence; the development of the arts of
"black" propaganda and morale subversion;
and the theory and practice of physical sub-
version which had evolved into SO and OG.
More important, the public did not realize,
and it is quite possible that some of the ini-
tiated did not comprehend fully, the signifi-
cance and potential value to America of de-
,�Tep-iSeerat�
veloping the doctrine of unorthodox war-
fare; in providing a foundation for the Amer-
ican practice of espionage and counter-
espionage which could be projected into the
future; in providing a basis of experience for
the various aspects of morale and physical
subversion which could be used in the future
should a war crisis arise; and in promulgat-
ing the principle of a central intelligence
agency.
On 20 September 1945, Executive Order
No. 9620 (Fxhibit W-45) terminated WS as
of 1 October. R&A, Presentation and FN
were transferred to the Department of State;
the remainder of the agency was transferred
to the Department of War.
In a letter of 20 September 1945 (Exhibit
W-46) informing Donovan of the issuance
of the Executive Order, President Truman
stated, in part:
I want to take this occasion to thank you for
the capable leadership you have brought to a
vital wartime activity in your capacity as Direc-
tor of Strategic Services. You may well find
satisfaction in the achievements of the Office and
take pride in your own contribution to them.
These are in themselves large rewards. Great
additional reward for your efforts should lie in
the knowledge that the peacetime intelligence
services of the Government are being erected on
the foundation of the facilities and resources
mobilized through the Office of Strategic Services
during the war.
120
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
B. BRANCHES
In the summer of 1942, the new position of
OBS under JCS made it apparent that the
agency would be subject to considerable ex-
pansion. It was obvious that the establish-
ment of military theaters of operation over-
seas would require OSS, as an auxiliary of
the armed forces, to establish large bases for
Intelligence, guerrilla and special opera-
tions. Similarly, R&A would find some of
Its most valuable source material, and be
able to render important service, in those
theaters. This meant not only a more for-
mal Pdministrative and executive organiza-
tion, but the development of many technical
and servicing branches to support the major
activitiei of the agency.
In the first few months, this development
was delayed by the difficulties of the OSS
position under the JPWC and the controver-
sies which attended the definition of its
functions as an adjunct of the JCS. In Oc-
tober, however, General Marshall's directive
to the JPWC to consider and report upon the
question of militarizing OSS (JPWC 37/2/D,
12 October 1942, Exhibit W-26), made it nec-
essary for the agency to reorganize in antici-
pation of JPWC action. Consequently,
while action on the directive was under con-
sideration in the JPWC, OSS underwent a
reorganization on 17 October (see chart,
page 122).
This reorganization, though effective for
only two months due to the issuance on 23
December of JCS 155/4/D, was significant
in its tendency to pattern the form of organ-
ization along military lines. It placed un-
der the Director certain technical units to
support the operating branches, grouped the
services branches under a deputy director
(rather than the Executive Officer, as was
the case in C01), and placed under one
� The post of Executive Officer was eliminated
In the October reorganization.
deputy director two intelligence branches,
RSA and W.
Significant also was the fact that SI and
SO were placed under one deputy director.
This indicated that the original conception
of combining these two activities, which had
been abandoned temporarily in order to
meet the political realities of dealing with
British SIS and SOE, had not completely
disappeared. Training was set up as a sepa-
rate branch under the same deputy director
to service both SI and SO.
The October reorganization was definitely
a step forward in more formal integration of .
OSS functions. However, it was engulfed in
the disputes leading to the JCS directive of
23 December (Exhibit W-33).
The reorganization of OSS directed by JCS
155/4/D was effected on 3 January 1943 by �
General Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-35) , ap-
proved by the JCS on 15 January (see chart,
page 123).
A deputy director was appointed for each
of three principal groups of branches: The
Intelligence branches (SI, R&A and FN) , the
operations branches (SO and MO), and the
services branches. Included among the lat-
ter were Communications, Special Funds
and Civilian PersonneL Reporting directly
to Donovan through the .Assistant Director
were certain executive and administrative
branches.
The pattern of organization thus estab-
lished was not changed fundamentally dur-
ing the remainder of the existence of OSS.
However, it was subject to certain minor al-
terations in the process of refinement. The
establishment of new branches, generally
accomplished by supplements to General
Order No. 9, did not affect the type of organ-
ization. These included 00, MU, Special
Projects and Field Experimental Unit among
121 �fop-Seere+�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ORGANIZATION CHART
1111=MMII
-II
ImIlm�=011,
11111101.M111.
1
milm����
.1111.11P
122
1
r�
"111
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�
rTTIPM7POKA,ERRIPMMAY/r/PRIAmyr/11/1����-�����.-
OFFICE OF STIIATEGIC SEIVICES
ORGANIZATIOrl CHART
9LL991.000 VZ/60/0Z0Z :aseaia Joi pancuddV
�
JANUAR! I. INS
�
SPECIAL ASSISTANTS &
REPRESEITTAIIVIS TO
MEATY' CO/AR/ANDERS
COAVAITTEI
ASSISTANE
DIRECTOR
PLANNING 0110UP
PC&
ITICHOLOOICAL
WAGNER
COORDINATING
MIKE
Mill OM
Oa il�O�
ADVISORY
COMAIIIIII
PSYCHOLOGICAL
%VARIAN!
STAIR
SERVKE
lIAIR0�4
HEADQUARTERS
DETACHMENT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
PSYCHIXOOICAL WARMS/
OPERATIONS
OMI.
COMMA*
CATION
SCHOOLS
III/MP IMO
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SERVICES
PROCUREMENT
ADMIN.
INED
& SUPNy
SERVICES
OM. ���
PHOTO.
MANIOC
IUDGET &
CIVILIAN
FINANCE
PDISOIINEL
SPECIAL CEAMMUNR
FUNDS CATIONS -c
IMEOKAL
SERVICES
9LL991.000 VZ/60/0Z0Z :aseaia Joi pancuddV
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
...Tap S.4
the operational branches, and X-2 and CD
among the intelligence branches.
As experience accumulated, it was found
that such operational servicing functions as
Special Funds, Communications and Medi-
cal Services, were of more than routine sig-
nificance in an orgni2tIon such as OSS.
They required independent status and chan-
nels of access to the operating branches
which they served. Therefore, when Gen-
eral Order No. 9 was revised on 26 May 1944
(Exhibit W-41), these branches were given
independent status among the branches re-
porting directly to Donovan (see chart,
page 125).
An additional Deputy Director was ap-
pointed for Schools and Training, which had
In January 1943 been established as a sepa-
rate branch. S.SeT was thus placed in a po-
sition of parity with all branches which it
served.
Pursuant to the May revision of General
Order No. 9, personnel matters were handled
by three branches: Headquarters and Head-
quarters Detachment and Naval Command
were independent branches among the Cen-
tral Administrative group to handle matters
affecting personnel drawn from the armed
services. Civilian Personnel, which han-
dled Civil Service employees, remained a
branch under the Deputy Director, Services.
In the next, and final, revision of General
Order No. 9 on 26 December 1944 � (Exhibit
W-42), there were two significant changes.
The Operational Groups became the Opera-
tional Group Command and were removed
from the purview of the Deputy Director,
SSO, and there was established a Deputy Di-
rector, Personnel, who coordinated the work
of all personnel branches. Consequently,
Civilian Personnel was removed from the or-
bit of the Deputy Director, Services, and be-
came one of the Central Administrative
branches reporting to the Deputy Director,
Personnel (see chart, page 126).
-Zap-Scoore.-
1. Central Administrative Units and
Technical Branches
(a) CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
Director's Office. By January 1943, the
fundamental work of organization of OSS
had been completed. While Donovan still
kept extensive direct control of both the pol-
icies and sfirninistration of OSS, the form-
ative stage was over and the organization
was established on such a basis that he could
delegate more responsibility in regard to ad-
ministration and operations. Various po-
sitions and units were created to screen the
vast amount of material being produced in
the agency before it reached Donovan, and
to see that the details of established policies
were properly carried out.
In 1943 and thereafter, the center of in-
terest of OSS was in the field, and Donovan
turned his attention to the establishment of
field bases in appropriate positions vis-a-vis
the respective military theaters. He made
numerous trips to the various theaters and
was largely instrumental in bringing Wash-
ington planning into consonance with op-
erational needs in various areas.
Assistant Directors. The Assistant Coor-
dinator under COI became Assistant Direc-
tor when OSS was established, and contin-
ued to serve as Donovan's principal assist-
ant. He was Acting Director during Dono-
van's frequent trips to OSS overseas installa-
tions. Much of the Assistant Director's time
was devoted to relations with other govern-
ment departments and agencies.
In July 1944, a second Assistant Director
was appointed, his specific responsibilities
including the supervision of OSS allotments
of funds, personnel and supplies. A third
Assistant Director was appointed on 1 July
1945.
Special Assistants and Representatives.
Attached to the Director's Office were indi-
viduals selected by Donovan principally to
serve for particular projects or in speciilc
capacities. In some cases they were called
124
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
111
11
����������P
ig
�����=4
125
��=01���
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
126
m
m
m
L.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
upon to conduct negotiations on behalf of
088 with other branches of the Government,
particularly the JCS and its various commit-
tees. In other instances they were ap-
pointed to coordinate activities within OSS
which transcended branch lines, such as to
centralize all arrangements made by OSS
concerning the establishment of commercial
cover for agents.
Executive Officer. The position of Execu-
tive Officer as it had existed in COI was abol-
ished in October 1942, when the servicing
functions previously under the Executive
Office were placed under the Deputy Direc-
tor, Services. In November 1943, however,
an Executive Officer was appointed to serve
as executive assistant to Donovan. Nom-
inally, his functions were parallel to those
of the executive officer in a military com-
mand. In practice, however, his duties were
elastic and he was frequently given specific
assignments for Donovan, both in the United
States and overseas. The position became
predominantly a staff function of aide and
advisor to Donovan, due to the extensive
"line" responsibilities vested in the Assist-
ant Directors. The Executive Office super-
vised the Secretariat and, after December
1944, the Registry.
Secretariat. The Secretariat was created
In 1942 as a channel for operational projects
and plans submitted to Donovan from within
the organization, until the establishment of
the OSS Planning Group. Thereafter, the
Secretariat served as a personal staff to
Donovan in undertaking preliminary screen-
ing of material coming into his office. While
the large measure of personal direction given
to all phases of the agency's activities by
Donovan entailed direct relations with offi-
cials at all echelons of the organization, the
Secretariat served to keep him informed of
the activities of the individual branches and
at the same time to assure that individual
branch chiefs were adequately informed of
OSS developments generally, both in the
United States and overseas.
All communications between OSS installa-
tions by pouch and cable were reviewed and
cleared by the Secretariat on behalf of Dono-
van,* and periodic summaries were prepared
for him. Also, monthly reports from all
branches and offices in Washington and all
missions abroad were received and summa-
rized. In January 1944, the latter functions
were concentrated in a Reports Section,
which also prepared for Donovan certain
drafts, memoranda and letters, principally
for transmiLsion to the President, the Secre-
taries of State, War and Navy, and the JCS.
Other functions of the Secretariat included
special negotiations and assignments for
Donovan, responsibility for Registry and
pouch control, Top Secret Control, and the
maintenance of OSS casualty data.
Registry. The Registry maintained the
records and the files of the operating
branches. It was divided into three princi-
pal sections for SI, X-2 and the operations
branches (SO, OG, MO and MU).
Theater Officers. As the overseas bases ex-
panded, difficulties arose in meeting theater
demands. This was particularly true in
early 1943, when representatives overseas
sent requests for supplies, equipment or ad-
ditional personnel directly to their respective
Washington branches. Therefore, in the
summer of 1943, Theater Officers were ap-
pointed for each of the major theaters in
which OSS was operating, ETO, METO,
NATO (later MedT0) and FETO.*** The
Theater Officers acted as coordinators for re-
quests from the theaters, following up on
127
� The Secretariat could stop individual mes-
sages inadequately coordinated with all relevant
branches and offices or Improper in form or
content.
�� Records and reports on casualties among
OSS personnel and agents, particularly with re-
spect to notification of next-of-kin, frequently
entailed problems of security and policy which
necessitated close supervision on a high echelon.
***In addition, there was a North American
Theater Officer (NAmT0) concerned with activir
ities on the West Coast, and, for a short period.
a Southwest Pacific Theater Officer.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top�Seare#--
cables and letters received from the field, in-
forming the field bases and missions of de-
velopments in Washington, and advising
Donovan, the Secretariat and the various
OSS branches of specific progress and de-
velopments in the field. They also assisted
In the preparation of detailed plans for the
Implementation of approved OSS projects.
In December 1944, in the course of a re-
organization which resulted in the final re-
vision of General Order No. 9, the Theater
Offices were abolished and replaced by a
Field Section in the Executive Office. Sub-
sequently, twin units for Europe and the Far
East, respectively, were created under offi-
cers re-designated Assistant Executive Offi-
cers.
General Counsel. The General Counsel
was responsible for professional supervision
of the myriad legal problems attendant pon
OSS activities, particularly in respect to
clandestine intelligence operations. He was
charged with the preparation and review of
all contracts, leases or legal obligations en-
tered into by any branch or individual in OSS
prior to commitment on behalf of the organi-
zation or the Government. In addition, le-
gal advice and direction in matters of law
relative to any phase of OSS operations were
supplied by the General Counsel's Office
upon request.
Problems of cover and security compli-
cated the work of the General Counsel. His
office frequently acted as legal advisor to
OSS agent personnel while in training or in
the field.*
The General Counsel gave constant atten-
tion to problems of the Special Funds
Branch, advising and assisting in the deter-
mination of financial procedures with re-
spect to unvouchered funds in order to in-
sure proper and accurate accounting for ex-
penditures. As the activities of Special
Funds ramified, the General ColirisP1 as-
� In the summer and fall of 1944, for example,
the office represented an undercover agent, at
that time active in a theater of war, in a divorce
suit.
..-Tep-ISetref�
signed a representative who devoted his en-
tire time to Special Funds matters.
Cover corporations were established for a
variety of purposes and functions, ranging
from radio monitoring and trading and
shipping agencies to publishing firms for
overseas newspapers. The majority of such
corporations were located in the New York
area.
The General Counsel coordinated all OSS
liquidation procedures, both in the United
States and overseas.** Contracts with indi-
viduals and corporations, leases and other
legal commitments were terminated, and
procedures were established for the settle-
ment of claims for casualties, death benefits
and losses. Items which had been requisi-
tioned all over the world, from caiques in the
Mediterranean to elephants in Asia, were re-
turned to their owners.
All information procured by OSS relevant
to war crimes, both against OSS agents and
personnel and against other Americans and
the Allies, was centralized in the General
Counsel's Office. In the summer of 1945, a
special War Crimes Section was established
by the General Counsel. It was subse-
quently transferred to Justice Jackson's staff
at Nuremberg.
Inspector.*** The Office of the Inspector
was created by General Order No. 9 of 3
� While the use of the corporate form was suc-
cessful in giving anonymity to specific activities,
the use of corporations for more than a short
term or for limited purposes had certain disad-
vantages. The extensive legal and paper work
incident to corporate organization and reporting
In some cases entailed more work in maintaining
the cover than in carrying out the activities for
which the corporation was established.
Corporations, even though established for cover
purposes, were recognized as bona fide govern-
ment companies, under a Treasury ruling issued
at the time of the liquidation of OSS. Employees
of such corporations received credit toward gov-
ernment service longevity.
'� The General Counsel was represented on the
staffs of the principal OSS theater headquarters.
� �� Known after mid-1944 as the Office of the
Inspector General.
128
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Top-Secret�
January 1943. As the Inspector's functions
developed, they were to inquire into and re-
port upon all matters which affected the
efficiency and economy of OSS operations in
the continental United States and theaters
of operation; to recognize and report meri-
torious conduct in the performance of duty
and recommend ways and men s to improve
conditions; and to make such inspections,
investigations and reports and to perform
such other duties as might be prescribed by
the Executive Officer or the Director.*
In May 1944 the Chief Inspector-Europe-
Africa was appointed. He had the same re-
sponsibilities for ETO and MedT0 as had
the Inspector for Washington. He was prin-
cipally based in Washington.
Special Relations Office!' Special Re-
lations was the OSS unit which established
liaison with agencies and departments of
the Government and with embassies, lega-
tions and missions of foreign governments
located in Washington. It was responsible
only for the establishment of the initial con-
tacts, whereafter working liaison was main-
tained by the respective branches.
The principal responsibility of Special Re-
lations was the conduct of relations with the
State Department in connection with agents
and operatives under State cover in various
overseas posts. This entailed many prob-
lems, not only in establishing the cover se-
curely but in setting up the procedures nec-
essary to maintain cover once the agent was
in the field.
Arrangements for passports and visas were
preliminary to the agent's dispatch. Such
routine matters as arranging for innocula-
tions, with due regard to the security factors
involved, and myriad other details required
discreet and specialized handling.
It was necessary to establish means of
paying the agent through the State Depart-
ment in the field in such fashion that he
� General Order No. 9, Revised 26 December
1944 (Exhibit W-42).
�� Until January 1943 designated the Liaison
Omce.
would appear to be a regular employee of the
Department. To accomplish this, a revolv-
ing fund was established with the State De-
partment from which disbursements could
be made in accordance with instructions
given through Special Relations.
Special Relations was also responsible for
the proper handling by OSS of pouch privi-
leges granted by State Department. Pouch
communications, between agents in the field
and their desks in Washington, were chan-
neled through Special Relations, which had
to certify the propriety of the content and
check the physical dispatch of the material
so that the agent's cover would not be vi-
olated.*
Special Relations established a Transpor-
tation Office, which was responsible for the
shipment of OSS personnel and supplies
overseas. Complex liaisons were necessary,
particularly with the State Department and
with the sea and air transport authorities of
the Army and Navy, to cope with such varied
OSS requirements as arranging for an agent
to travel under cover to a neutral country,
dispatching supplies for resistance groups
or routing operations specialists or research-
ers to specific assignments in the theaters.
It was originally thought that the Trans-
portation Office would be concerned prin-
cipally with transporting agents to friendly
or neutral territory. It therefore recruited
a staff experienced in civilian travel agen-
cies. The increasing concentration of MS
overseas activity in military theaters led to
complications, however. It was found that
the civilian experience of the staff was of
little avail in adapting State, War and Navy
procedures to OSS requirements.
The newness of OSS was, of course, basic
to such difficulties. It was necessary to rely
on the cooperation of military and State De-
partment officials accustomed to rigid pro-
cedures and unfFimitinr with the peculiar
needs and problems of OSS which required
� Responsibility for supervision of pouch ma-
terial was transferred to the Secretariat in early
1945.
129 � Top Secret�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seavt�
flexibility. The unusual degree of security
required in a secret organization necessitates
elaborate safeguards in the most routine
matters. The seemingly elaborate precau-
tions necf.t.va ry to protect secret operations
cannot be explained; they must be accepted.
Otherwise, the quality of secrecy is destroyed
and the operation rendered valueless. This
was not always understood by the officials
with whom Transportation had to deal. On
the other hand, understanding of the re-
quirements of other agencies and depart-
ments was not always present on the part of
OSS, as was indicated on occasion by un-
realistic demands of the individual branches
for involved transportation arrangements
on short notice.
In December 1944, the Transportation Of-
fice was transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Deputy Director, Services.* Although this
served to systematize transportation clear-
ances, it tended to reduce the measure of in-
dividual attention which was essential to the
more intricate of OSS transportation prob-
lems.
Board of Review. The Board of Review
was established in the spring of 1944. As
set forth in General Order No. 9, Revised (Ex-
hibit W-41), its functions were to "advise
the Director with respect to the formulation
of policies for, and the direction of, all OSS
finances both in Washington and in the
field." In addition, the Board was to "study,
review and make recommendations with re-
spect to: (1) All financial controls, records
and accountings; (2) all proposed expendi-
tures of unvouchered OSS funds requiring
the approval of the Director or Assistant Di-
rector; (3) such other matters pertaining to
OSS finances as the Director may approve."
The Board was composed of three members,
assisted by the General ConnsF4
All financial matters requiring the atten-
tion or approval of Donovan were first ex-
� For approximately one year between the fall
of 1943 and 1944, Transportation was placed un-
der the OSS Theater Officer.
-Top-fteerof�
amined by the Board, which gathered full
details and factual data to support its recom-
mendations to Donovan. Matters submit-
ted to the Board included funds for new
projects, missions or bases; agent, property
or liability claims; and any expenditures not
specifically authorized or provided for.
Policy was established on rates of pay from
excepted or unvouchered funds, as well as
living and quarters allowances, both in the
United States and overseas.
� In 1944, Boards of Review were established
at the various OSS theater headquarters in
order to advise the Strategic Services Officers
on matters of financial policy. In addition
to their basic duties, these Boards frequently
undertook eloimq investigations and other
assignments as directed. .
Expenditures of both vouchered and un-
vouchered funds came under the Board's
jurisdiction, and the Board was responsible
for the determination of whether vouchered
or unvouchered funds should be used for spe-
cific projects or operations.
Operations and Plans Officer. The Opera-
tions and Plans Officer was appointed in
April 1943. His principal functions were to
keep the Planning Group informed of pro-
jected operations and to correlate the activi-
ties of the various branches with pinning
He thus served in a staff relationship to
Donovan as Operations Officer. The posi-
tion was abolished when General Order No.
9 was revised on 26 December 1944.
(b) PLANNING GROUP
The OSS Planning Group was established
pursuant to JCS 155/4/D of 23 December
1942 (Exhibit W-33). The Planning Group
was set up in OSS to act as a JCS medium
to insure that strategic services operations
would be coordinated with military opera-
tions. It was therefore charged with re-
sponsibility for supervising and coordinRt,-
ing the planning and execution of the mili-
tary program for psychological warfare.
The Planning Group thus assumed the plan;
ning functions previously allocated to the
130
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
up
JPWC, but never exercised by that body due
to the fact that it was overwhelmed by the
dmnLctrative problems of OSS.
The Planning Group consisted of one
member appointed by the Secretary of State,
two members appointed by the Chief of Staff,
U. S. Army, two members appointed by the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations, and four members, in-
cluding the Chairman, appointed by the Di-
rector of the Office of Strategic Services.
Members of the Planning Group were re-
quired to be available for full-time duty.
The December directive also provided for
an Advisory Committee composed of repre-
sentatives from BEW (later FEA), OWI,
CIAA, Treasury Department, and such other
government agencies as might from time to
time be requested to serve. Members of the
Advisory Committee could be called upon by
the Chairman of the Planning Group either
to sit with the Planning Group as individual
members or to function as a separate com-
mittee to consider matters affecting the re-
spective agencies represented on the Com-
mittee. The members of the Advisory Com-
mittee advised the Planning Group on the
manner in which their respective agencies
could assist the successful prosecution of
psychological warfare.
The Planning Group filled a need which
had existed when OSS was under the JPWC.
It coordinated projects and programs of in-
dividual OSS units. In addition, it served
as a body to further the formal development
and definition of the doctrines basic to OSS
operations and the functions and responsi-
bilities allotted to the agency.
In the early stages of planning there was
a tendency to formulate programs and plans
in explicit detail. Consequently, certain of
the first programs, such as those prepared
for Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia, were com-
pleted too late to be effective. It soon be-
came apparent, therefore, that the details
of planning must be left to those officers in
the field responsible for the execution of the
plans They alone were cognizant of last-
minute changes in the local situation and
requirements, and were able to assure proper
coordination with the military programs of
the theater commanders.
In the middle of 1943, the Planning Group
devoted itself to the development and defini-
tion of the doctrine of psychological warfare
and the delineation of general objectives for
strategic services operations. The Basic
Manual for Psychological Warfare which
was compiled was widely used, both within
and outside OSS, for the definition of psycho-
logical warfare. Other specialized "Basic
Manuals" were prepared for the activities of
the individual OSS branches.*
The Planning Group prepared over-all
plans for the various areas throughout the
world in which OSS operated. Such plans
were designed to give general guidance to
Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of Mis-
sion on the established objectives of OSS in
all theaters, as well as in and from neutral
countries. Emphasizing objectives and
definition, they left the preparation of spe-
cific executory plans to the responsible of-
ficers and authorities in the field. A com-
plete set of over-all programs covering all
the relevant areas of the world was prepared,
and was periodically revised to keep pace
with the development of psychological war-
fare doctrine. Thus the over-all plan for
objectives to be achieved from Switzerland
was prepared while it was still impossible to
dispatch SO, X-2, MO and other personnel
necessary for the accomplishment of the
stated objectives.
Special programs were prepared in order
to indicate steps in the implementation of
over-all plans and to reflect the developing
projects and requirements of theater and
field staffs. The special programs were peri-
odically revised as field experience delimited
the boundaries of what could be accom-
plished, or extended the resposibilities placed
� These Manuals were prepared at various
times, and revised as experience in the field was
gained. Copies of the more important Bale
Manuals may be found in History File W-144.
131 �-rap--Seeret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
on 055 OSS by authorities in the field. Donovan
himself was instrumental in seeing that spe-
cial programs were prepared and/or revised
to meet new developments. On his frequent
trips to the field he was able to study and
observe local conditions, requirements and
possibilities and to inform the Planning
Group of handicaps raised, by limitations in
existing plans. In such cases, he informed
the Planning Group of flaws and the nene.9,-
sity for amendments, as well as the desira-
bility of entirely new programs.
The Planning Group also served to keep
the various branches of OSS apprised of the
development of OSS and theater planning
in order to permit advance preparation for
future requirements. This was particularly
valuable to R&D and Communications,
which needed as much advance notice as pos-
sible of the assignments they would receive
in order to initiate the necessary experimen-
tation and development.
(c) PERSONNEL
OSS employed civilian, military and naval
personneL It was necessary to handle these
respective classes of personnel in accordance
with the regulations governing their branch
of service, or, in the case of Civil Service per-
sonnel, in accordance with regulations of the
Civil Service Commission.* Personnel ad-
ministration was further complicated by the
anomalous position of OSS as a civilian
agency under the jurisdiction of the JCS and
active in military theaters, but not a part of
any one of the armed services.
Three units were established to handle the
various categories of personnel: (1) Head-
quarters and Headquarters Detachment for
military personnel; (2) Naval Command for
naval personnel; and (3) the Civilian Per-
sonnel Branch, which was responsible for
Civil Service personneL A Personnel Pro-
� One additional category of personnel com-
prised civilians employed on unvouchered funds.
Such personnel were controlled by the Special
Funds Branch.
--Tep-Seeret-
curement Branch was established in Octo-
ber 1943 as one of the executive branches to
establish. centralized recruiting procedures.
The units responsible for military and
naval personnel were independent branches
In the central PdministratiVe group, report-
ing to the Director and Assistant Director.
The Personnel Procurement Branch, upon
Its establishment, was also given independ-
ent status among this group. However, the
Civilian Personnel Branch was, from October
1942 until the latter part of 1944, under the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Director, Services.
The December 1944 revision of General
Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-42) created the po-
sition of Deputy Director, Personnel, to cen-
tralize personnel policy and procedures.
Consequently, the Personnel Procurement
Branch was placed under him, as was the
Civilian Personnel Branch, which was re-
moved from Services. Headquarters and
Headquarters Detachment and Naval Com-
mand, while remaining administratively in-
dependent for liaison with their respective
services, were substantively subject to the
authority of the Deputy Director, Personnel.
As set forth in the December 1944 revision
of General Order No. 9, the Deputy Director,
Personnel, had responsibility for:
(1) Establishing policies and procedures for
personnel procurement and administration both
In the continental United States and overseas.
(2) Developing and maintaining a program of
personnel relations to include specifically such
subjects as welfare, morale, awards and decora-
tions, and casualties.
(3) Maintaining liaison with the Civil Service
Commission and the War Manpower Comnoc.cion,
(4) Acting for the Director on all personnel
matters except those which the Deputy Director-
Personnel determines should be submitted to the
Director for decision.
(5) Supervising and directing the activities of
the Personnel Procurement Branch and the
Civilian Personnel Branch.
The Civilian Personnel Branch was re-
sponsible for the employment and classifica-
tion of civilian personneL It maintained
close relations with the Civil Service Com-
m' c-sion.
132
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
The Personnel Personnel Procurement Branch han-
dled the mechanics of recruiting and enroll-
ing all types of OSS personnel, preparing re-
quests for allotments of military personnel,
processing returnees from overseas, and
maintaining records on the reassignment
and changes of duty of theater personneL
Through this Branch, recruiting procedures
were centralized and removed from the juris-
diction of the individual branches.
Headquarters and Headquarters Detach-
ment, activated in early 1943, was the mili-
tary unit charged primarily with the main-
tenance and Administration of military rec-
ords and other matters pertaining to army
personnel assigned to OSS. In addition, it
was the official liaison channel with the War
Department on routine military personnel
matters and for the securing of army publi-
cations, such as field manuals, maps, etc.
Administratively, the Detachment was di-
rectly under the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
War Department. The number of officers
and enlisted men included in the Detach-
ment was directly allotted to OSS and was
not included either in the quotas of the Mili-
tary District of Washington or in the tables
of organization of theater commands. Or-
ders for travel within the United States were
cut by the Detachment only after approval
of The Adjutant General's Office.
With regard to Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard personnel, the Naval Command
established parallel procedures for officers
and enlisted men: Officers were administra-
tively detailed to OSS as an activity of the
Offire of Chief of Naval Operations; enlisted
men in Washington were nominally assigned
to the Potomac River Naval Command. In
May 1943, when the OSS Naval Command
was activated, the orders of all officers and
enlisted men were amended to specify as-
signment to it. All matters relating to
change of station or travel entailed requests
to the Navy Department for orders and were
channeled through the Naval Command to
the Bureau of PersonneL The Naval Liaison
Officer in the Naval Command was the offi-
cial contact between the branches of OBS
and various naval intelligence units.
Selective Service requirements compli-
cated personnel procedures in OSS. As a
civilian agency, OSS accumulated a sizable
staff of men of draft age. Programs for in-
dividual draft exemptions or commissioning
Into the Army or Navy were evolved, but re-
quired constant revision due to procedural
and policy changes by Selective Service or
the armed forces. The distastefulness of
draft deferments and the frequent changes
In commissioning procedures resulted in
many OSS personnel being called up for in-
duction into the Army.*
In many cases the reassignment of in-
ducted enlisted men was secured through
arrangement with the War Department
This resulted in problems of military proto-
col. The men involved were often special-
ists holding positions of responsibility com-
mensurate with officers of field grade. In
addition, regulations restricting enlisted
men from access to classified documents cre-
ated artificial problems of security which
had to be overcome. In many cases, such
enlisted men were authorized to wear civilian
clothes in the United States or, in military
theaters, to wear "civilian" uniforms.
The Personnel Procurement Branch suc-
ceeded in obtaining numerous recruits, par-
ticularly for the operations branches, by di-
rect request to the armed services. While
this was valuable as a measure to obtain
services and administrative personnel, it was
rarely useful in procuring personnel of the
calibre or qualifications required by the in-
telligence branches.
The liquidation program was accom-
plished by centralization in personnel mat-
ters which would hardly have been possible
In a situation of continuing operation. On
13 August 1945, a Personnel Branch was es-
tablished which assumed the functions of
. the Deputy Director, Personnel, and con-
* Certain local draft boards chose to regard
service with OSS as essential to the war efgort
and allowed occupational deferment.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
trolled the the liquidation policies of Civilian
Personnel, Personnel Procurement, Head-
quarters and Headquarters Detachment,
and Naval Command. The Personnel
Branch set up procedures for the de-briefing,
reassignment, transfer out of the agency or
release of returnees from overseas theaters.
Area F, which had been the 00 training
center, was made a holding area for return-
ees. There, such personnel were subject to
strict military discipline pending de-briefing
or reassignment. Names of individual re-
turnees declared surplus by their respective
branches were circulated among all other
OBS branches. If there was no request for
retention, processing for release from 088
was initiated.
The program was efficient and succeeded
In rapidly severing a great number of per-
sonnel. Military personnel were treated ac-
cording to rank or rating, and the de-brief-
ing process took no account of the type of
activity or the degree of responsibility with
which such personnel had been invested dur-
ing their service with OSS. Thus, agents
who had been active behind enemy lines, in-
telligence analysts, mess officers and me-
chanics were processed according to military
rank rather than OSS status. The unfor-
tunate result in many cases was the separa-
tion from OSS of personnel under conditions
of diva tisfaction, if not bitterness.
In many cases, staff members of the indi-
vidual branches sought to alleviate the situ-
ation with regard to returnee members of
the branch. However, many of the branches
were themselves pressed to meet arbitrary
liquidation schedules. In any case, re-
sponsibility had been removed from the
branches and placed in a central unit oper-
ating under standardized procedures. As a
result, personnel who had been carefully re-
craned and trained, arid had carried on their
OSS activities on a highly individual basis,
were subjected upon be-briefing to a mass-
production, "assembly-line" procedure.
-Tep-SeeFef-
(d) SECURITY
The Security Office was responsible for the
establishment and maintenance of "such
protective measures as shall be necessary or
advisable in order to safeguard and make
secure the OSS, its operations, members,
property and records, and the areas, offices
and buildings which it occupies or uses".*
It was also responsible for the security of all
OSS installations in the United States and
overseas.
Physical security was the responsibility of
the Internal Security Division.** This Di-
vision was responsible for inspecting and ap-
proving the location of OSS buildings, offices
and areas, whether overt or undercover; pro-
viding adequate protective measures; estab-
lishing a system of badges and guards; and
the general protection of classified material,
couriers, message centers and file rooms.
Supervision of the security of OSS person-
nel was divided between the Personnel In-
vestigation Division and the Service Rec-
ords Division. Personnel Investigation was
responsible for checking and approving all
prospective employees, both civilian and
military, and indoctrinating new employees
In the security principles of OSS. The Serv-
ice Records Division established procedures
for the maintenance of security of OSS per-
sonnel, including re-investigations, re-indoc-
trinations, investigation of violations, secu-
rity approvals for overseas duty, and pre-ter-
mination or de-briefing interviews.
Close collaboration was established with
the X-2 Branch and most of the names in-
vestigated by Security were submitted to X-2
for further check. X-2, in turn, frequently
called on Security for confirmation or sup-
plementary investigation of names or cases
of possible counter-espionage interest. In
addition, relevant security information was
frequently found in the files of the FN
Branch.
� General Order No. 9, $ January 1943 (Exhibit
W-35).
**Later designated the Headquarters Division.
134
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Special security provisions were made for
the employment of individuals on opera-
tional assignments, yet segregated in such a
manner as would not expose them to knowl-
edge of the organization as a whole. Such
cases ranged from newly-arrived European
refugees employed in particular research ca-
pacities to Japanese or-Japanese-Americans
obtained from internment or relocation cen-
ters.
The nature of OSS activities made it
vi-
tally important for the agency to protect
Itself against the employment of persons of
dubious allegiance or affiliated with poten-
tially anti-American elements. Numerous
applicants, both of American and foreign
nationality, were rejected for employment
after investigation revealed connections with
business firms or organizations of known pro-
Nazi interests. In other ea ces, rejections oc-
curred when careful checks revealed doubt-
ful loyalty through past activities with the
Communist Party or showed connections
with questionable or possibly subversive or-
ganizations.
(e) TECHNICAL BRANCHES
�
(1) Communications �
The importance of communications to
secret activities cannot be over-stated. It
Is the efficiency of the communications sys-
tem which makes possible rapid intelligence
procurement and dissemination. In the de-
velopment of special devices for clandestine
transmission and reception, communica-
tions performs a vital service to agent and
guerrilla operations. Through the procure-
ment and carefully directed use of codes and
ciphers, it preserves the secrecy of informa-
tion and activities. Consequently, security
Is of the utmost importance in the field of
communications.
Although communications is a servicing
function, it is so highly technical in nature
that the use of most communications equip-
ment must be controlled by technical ex-
perts; the misuse of a secret radio, a code or
a cipher in one localized instance may result
In a breach of security jeopardizing opera-
tions in other areas. Therefore, control
must be exercised by communications per-
sonnel, who are not only technically pro-
ficient but understand the unique problems
and demands which arise out of the nature
of secret activities.
A small, inadequately staffed Code and
Cable Section and a Message Center had
been established by COI. Lack of clearly-
defined functions, research and development
facilities, central adreiniAration and per-
sonnel became apparent early when the
principal branches outlined their specific
communications requirements. Many of
them would need technical assistance, mes-
sage centers, traffic offices and specialized
telephonic, radio and electronic equip-
ment for field-to-base, ship-to-shore and air-
craft-to-ground communications. Particu-
larly pressing was the need for new devices
which would be efficient and would provide
the maximum degree of physical security
behind enemy lines. In view of the fact
that � no Federal departments or agencies
then extant could provide OSS with these
requirements, Donovan asked the JCS to
approve the establishment of a Communica-
tions Branch.
His proposal, submitted 9 September 1942,
explained to a special committee of the JCS
that the basic requirement for OSS commu-
nications was a system capable of achieving
rapid and secret communication with OW
agents in the field. Specially trained field
agents would be equipped with newly de-
veloped portable sending and receiving sets.
Fixed and mobile base stations would be set
up in secure areas in the field to receive
agent traffic and relay instructions from
headquarters to agents. In addition, these
base stations would maintain wireless and
cable communications between each other
and with OSS headquarters in Washington
and the theaters via Army, Navy and com-
mercial facilities.
135 �Zop-Seerei-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-*op Seurat
1h-
1
r-
Donova.n's proposal was still being studied
on 22 September when he issued an order
combining all OSS signal and traffic facili-
ties in the new Communications Branch.
The Branch was charged with responsibility
for recruitment and training of staff and
field personnel�civilian and military�and
the provision of instructors for communica-
tions courses in S&T camps. It was also the
Branch's responsibility to devise appropriate
channels of communication for all field proj-
ects and to establish supplementary chan-
nels where necessary.
In the general reorganization of January
1943, pursuant to General Order No. 9 (Ex-
hibit W-35), the Communications Branch
was placed under the Deputy Director, Serv-
ices. It so remained for a period of some
sixteen months, at which time it was found
that independent branch status was re-
quired. Consequently, when General Order
No. 9 was revised on 26 May 1944 (Exhibit
W-41), the Communications Branch became
one of the central executive group of
branches, which status it maintained there-
after.
Recruiting and Training. In October 1942
the Communications Branch was made re-
sponsible for all OSS communications train-
ing, including that being given at Area C.
Administration of that Area, as well as others
which subsequently were acquired for such
training, remained the responsibility of
EAT.
Immediately upon taking over training at
Area C, Communications worked out with
S&T a reorganized curriculum, the principal
element of which was a ten-week course cov-
ering code practice, cryptography, security
and procedure. Trainees were given suffi-
cient radio theory and maintenance experi-
ence to care properly for their equipment
and to make repairs. The course culmi-
nated in a field program carried out 200
miles from Area C under conditions simulat-
� See Special Operations�SA/CI in Section I
above.
-Tert-Seeret-
�
lug those which were likely to be encountered
In the field. By January 1943 recruitment
shared with training the major attention of
the Branch, and a Recruiting and Training
Section was organized.
This Section found itself competing with
the Army, Navy and commercial agencies
for manpower. Its object was: (1) To re-
cruit enough civilians to staff the training
schools; (2) to provide civilian operator-
technicipnq for overseas assignment as In-
structors and as construction-maintenance
men; (3) to recruit officers and enlisted men
to be trained for overseas duty; and (4) to
commission directly into the Army, Navy or
Marine Corps certain highly qualified tech-
nicians who could be assigned to the Com-
munications Branch immediately for active
duty abroad. Despite the tremendous de-
mand by the armed forces for radio and elec-
tronics personnel, the recruiting program
was successful. Advertisements, carefully
worded to preserve security, were placed in
metropolitan newspapers. Members of the
Folisted Reserve Corps of the Army Signal
Corps were approached and interviewed.
Communications Branch personnel called
on likely prospects directly. The newspaper
advertisements alone accounted for 300 vol-
unteers between March and May 1943. All
candidates were carefully screened accord-
ing to temperament and personality, as well
as technical ability, the highest priority be-
ing placed on volunteers with extensive
background experience in communications
work, both commercial and amateur. Can-
didates lacking such qualifications, but con�
-
sidered capable of being trained rapidly and
effectively, also were considered. Less than
half of those interviewed were accepted.'
The techniques and procedures used for
personnel procurement functioned so
smoothly that they were continued in Au-
gust 1943, when OSS set up a Personnel Pro-
curement Branch (PPB). PPB made
recommendations to Communications, and
men so recommended were considered. By.
October 1944 the Recruiting and Training
136
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Section had completed essential recruit-
ment and was merged with the office of the
Communications Adjutant. In May 1945,
however, the Section was re-established as a
separate entity; it was found that Commu-
nications training functions and such civil-
ian recruiting as was occasionally necessary
could best be handled by a separate section.
The training program for agents expanded
in 1943 beyond the capacity of Area C. By
July the Communications Branch had 18 in-
structors stationed at the camp and in Au-
gust some 250 trainees were receiving in-
struction. Because of the instruction load,
Camp McDowell, near Napierville, Illinois,
was acquired in October. The camp had
been a Signal Corps Radar Training School
and was suitable for communications train-
ing. Designated Area M, McDowell offered
a more elementary and simplified course
than Area C, where instruction was highly
specialind with emphasis on actual operat-
ing procedure and conditions. At the same
time, the Communications Branch super-
vised the preliminary signal training given
by S&T at Areas A, B, E and F, where per-
sonnel from other OSS branches were given
basic agent training.
In January 1944, in order to prepare men
for assignment to the Far East, an OSS
Training Center was established on Catalina
Island, California, where Communications
training was coordinated with SO, sip and
MU instruction programs. In April an MU
school was established in Nassau, Bahamas,
B. W. I., with a course which stressed under-
water communications. The Communica-
tions Branch undertook the development
and testing of novel methods for transmis-
sion of messages between underwater swim-
mers and a "mother" ship.
It was necpssPry to send trainees at Areas
C and M to ports of embarkation as soon as
transportation was available. As a result,
some agents arrived in the field with in-
complete training. The Communications
Branch staffs in the theaters were respon-
sible for providing the additional instruction
necessary. .
This was inevitable in some cases because
of the time schedule under which the train-
ing areas functioned. They could not con-
trol the exact number of men to be enrolled
at any one time. There were peak and low
periods; sometimes there were more trainees
than the schools could comfortably handle;
at other times, there were too few for the
proper execution of field problems. Be-
cause of a shortage of communications in-
structors, it was often necessary to retain
the more proficient trainees as teachers at
the expense of the theater units for which
the men had been originally intended.
Research and Development Divisions and
Plant and Engineering Division. Research
and development was necessary in order
to solve communications problems involv-
ing physical and electronic characteristics
unique in the light of ordinary commercial
and military requirements. Plans for such
studies were initiated in July 1942. The Re-
search and Development Division was estab-
lished formally as a part of the Communi-
cations Branch when the latter was set up
In September 1942. The problems dealt
with by the Division were, in general, of three
types: (1) Those submitted by the Plant and
Engineering Division of the Communica-
tions Branch, which related primarily to
radio equipment for the important task of
agent traffic, and secondarily to audio and
radio equipment for intelligence and "hom-
ing" operations; (2) problems submitted by
other OSS branches, relating to communi-
cations equipment and/or devices for spe-
cific operations (such equipment, in addi-
tion to radio, also made use of sound and
light�both visible and invisible systems);
and (3) anticipatory development work ini-
tiated by the Division to utilize newly dis-
� Research and development on communica-
tions equipment and devicis was the responsi-
bility of the Research and Development Division
of the Communications Branch; it is not to be
confused with the ORS R&D Branch.
137
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
covered techniques for solving either exist-
ing problems or problems which could con-
fidently be expected to arise as enemy
counter-measures made existing equipment
Inadequate.
In November 1942 the Research and De-
velopment Division acquired a small labora-
tory for communications research. As a re-
sult, the Division could provide technical in-
formation which commercial laboratories
and commercial manufacturers, under war
pressure, were slow in making available.
The laboratory did not include a model shop
with a store of extra components for rapid
assembly of equipment. Consequently, the
Division was compelled throughout the war
to spend much time in locating materials
and manufacturers and in developing a pro-
curement staff for gathering such logistical
information. Still another . activity, not
undertaken by the Division but later consid-
ered desirable, was the assignment of labora-
tory men to operational research in the field.
The relatively late start of the Communica-
tions Branch in basic and applied research
militated against the recruitment of techni-
cians qualified for such field assignments.
In numerous instances there was urgent
need for operational research. The lesson
learned from this need was that scientific
personnel employed for field work should
be among the first to receive assignments.
The Division engaged in elaborate liaison
and cooperative staff work. At its inception
It drew on the long experience of British
SOE in the highly specialized field of clan-
destine communications. SOE was ex-
tremely cooperative, with the result that a
complete interchange of information, mod-
els and operational reports was achieved.
The Division, in turn, helped SOE by locating
In the United States equipment needed by
the latter organization and by furnishing
Instruction concerning the utilization of
such equipment. It also worked with the
Army Service Forces (ASF) , the Navy's Bu-
reaus of Ships and Aeronautics, the National
Defense Research Council (NDRC) and the
National Bureau of Standards. By follow-
ing the progress of the development or stand-
ardization of new items, the Division could
help determine what new devices would be
most useful to OSS and the manner in
which they could be adapted to the agency's
purposes.
To the Plant and Engineering Division.
was given the primary function of ascertain-
ing the supply requirements of the Commu-
nications Branch and arranging for their
procurement. It followed research and de-
velopment work both within the Branch and
in Army Signal Corps, and investigated the
possibilities of newly developed items in con-
nection with the operational needs of OSS.
It also located manufacturers to produce
equipment and coordinated the procurement
activities of the Supply, Shipping and Ware-
housing Division. Also, it assisted in con-
trolling the quality of production. Both
quality and quantity controls proved to be
thorny problems; the small number of large,
well-established and reliable electronics and
radio manufacturers were committing their
productive capacities to the enormous re-
quirements of the Army and Navy. Con-
tractors who originally received small orders
from OSS were more interested in producing
In volume. The Plant and Engineering Di-
vision therefore turned to small manufactur-
ers, many of whom had set up their enter-
prises only after the outbreak of war. They
lacked the experience and technical knowl-
edge which would insure high standards of
production and constant vigilance had to be
maintained in checking the quality of work-
rnsIngbip, as well as its quantity.
The Division procured basic communica-
tions supply requirements for training
schools, overseas base stations and agent op-
erations. It also compiled lists of spare
parts, tools and station accessories. Such
lists were comprehensive and were used to
assure that each shipment sent overseas was
complete in itself, and did not depend upon
items from another shipment in order to be
usable. This policy of shipping out aft
138
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
listed equipment in one vessel proved effec-
tive. Early in the war, when ship losses were
high, OSS experienced considerable supply
losses, but those shipments which reached
their destination were certain to contain a
complete unit for a given phase of base sta-
tion and field operation.
The Research and Development Division
and the Plant and Engineering Division
worked closely together, and share credit for
the development of apparatus which effec-
tively served the unusual communications
needs of OSS.
One of the first models of radio apparatus
which the Communications Branch under-
took to develop was a lightweight portable
radio station suitable for clandestine activi-
ties. Development work on this problem led
to the production of the Strategic Services
Transmitter-Receiver, commonly known as
the SSTR-1.
An early model, designed prior to the es-
tablishment of the Communications Branch,
failed to perform satisfactorily when deliv-
ered for testing. The model operated from
220 or 110-volt AC or DC commercial power,
consuming considerably more electric cur-
rent than was considered necessa ry; also the
antenna tuning circuit was inadequate for
agent operation. The early set was adopted
for use only as a stopgap pending the de-
velopment of a better unit.
An entirely new transmitter was there-
fore designed. It employed a single tube
and a coupling network suitable for various
types of antenna, which its predecessor
lacked. The new transmitter was com-
bined with the receiver of the original model
and housed in a metal container. Mean-
while, research to develop a better receiver
continued. In its final phase of develop-
ment, the SSTR-1 consisted of new trans-
mitter and receiver units housed in splash-
proof CRT1C 9% inches long, 4 inches wide and
3� inches high. The accompanying power
supply unit was VA inches wide. The three
units could be enclosed in a single small
suitcase or, if necessary, in three small pack-
ages. In operation, this "suitcase" radio*
proved satisfactory and efficient Certain
refinements were made, such as a rotary tun-
ing coil and a thermocouple battery charger
(SSP-3). The battery charger burned solid
fuels and produced six to nine watts of en-
ergy for charging six-volt batteries in areas
where wood, charcoal or other fuels were
available. When field operations indicated
that a gasoline-powered generator would be
desirable, a lightweight unit (SSP-8) was de-
veloped.
Although the SSTR-1 was the standard
radio sender-receiver for all branches in the
field, a portable chest radio transmitter with
a range of one to five miles was developed for
SO. This set, known as the SSTR-3, oper-
ated on the 40-megacycle band and was the
outgrowth of a project initiated prior to the
establishment of the Communications
Branch. In the same category was the
SSTR-5, a portable CW transmitter-receiver
so small that it was housed, complete with
batteries, in a case 8x10x2 inches. The unit
included a self-contained 50-foot antenna.
Possibly the mdst spectacular develop-
ment produced by the Communications
Branch was the much-publicized OSS
ground (Joan-Eleanor) , a combination of
the SSTR-6 and SSTC-502. This unit in-
cluded a magnetic wire recorder installed in
aircraft to record ultra-high frequency voice
transmissions between plane and ground.
The equipment was successfully used both in
ETO and the Far East.
Problems arising out of experience in the
field prompted the development of the
SST-102 crystal oscillator to enable an oper-
ator to calibrate his SSTR-1 receiver. The
unit measured 4x2x2 inches complete with
batteries. A wire-tapping and amplifier
� The SSTR-1 became the standard OSS radio
for clandestine operation in enemy and enemy-
occupied territory. It was widely known as the
"suitcase radio", since the most effective camou-
flage was found to be a valise manufactured in
the particular area of operation. Suitcases of
foreign origin were procured from refugees ant
by combing second-hand shops.
139
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
op
unit of extremely small dimensions (SSAA-
401) was developed, which was unique in
that telephone communications could be
Intercepted without physically tapping tele-
phone lines. In addition, a cmill micro-
phone was devised which could pick up con-
versations in distant rooms.
The SSLD-32I and SSLV-322 were a three-
cornered mirror reflector and a night-land-
ing headset, respectively, to be used in locat-
ing parachute pinpoints on which personnel
and/or supplies could be dropped. The re-
Sector on the ground returned a beam of
light sent from a headset in the plane, the
return beam being visible only to the
plane.*
For flares, demolition charges and signals,
the SSR-204 radio switch was developed.
Capable of detonation within a span of 72
hours, the switch could be controlled from a
plane at any time during its operating life
for the purpose of setting off flares, demoli-
tions or signals. The development was par-
ticularly useful for pinpointing bombing ob-
jectives and for delayed demolitions work.
The foregoing are exaniples of a number of
devices developed by the Communications
Branch to support and extend the scope of
OSS operations.
Supply, Shipping and Warehousing Divi-
sion. This Division was established in No-
veraber 1942 to keep accurate records of radio
equipment and related apparatus used by
all OSS branches and to conduct all prelimi-
nary negotiations for the procurement of
equipment and supplies. Final purchase or-
ders and contracts were drawn up by the OSS
Services Branch, but the Division dealt di-
rectly with prime contractors and sub-con-
tractors. Due to extensive Army and Navy
demands for radio equipment, the Division
experienced mounting difficulties in obtain-
� This apparatus was based on the principle
that three plane mirror surfaces placed at right
angles to one another will reflect light back in
a direct line to its source, the light being visible
only to someone in a position along such a direct
line.
lag OSS needs. Lack of a standard proce-
dure whereby OSS could requisition commu-
nications equipment from the Army Signal
Corps for OSS operational use, made it nec-
essary to obtain a separate directive from
the Army's Chief Signal Officer on each
requisition.
This procedure led to increasing difficul-
ties, which made it necessary to revise the
Army supply program for OSS. As a result,
the agency was permitted to submit lists of
its needs and the names of manufacturers
who could meet them. Thereupon, the
Army Signal Corps issued blanket approval
covering OSS procurement. This arrange-
ment saved much time, since it meant that
the Division could deal directly with manu-
facturers instead of relying on Army Signal
Corps officers for such liaison. Since there
were many details concerning OSS opera-
tional requirements with which the Signal
Corps was unfamiliar, this was a decided ad-
vantage.
The OSS communications warehouses
were situated in Capitol Heights, Maryland,
and Arlington, Virginia. Later, the equip-
ment in Capitol Heights was transferred to
a warehouse in Bethesda, Maryland, where a
new building was completed in July 1943.
During the high point of communications
operations, the warehouses contained more
than 5,000 separate items.
Equipment received from manufacturers
was carefully inspected before being shipped
overseas. Packing the shipments entailed
little difficulty, but the red tape involved in
arranging transportation was costly in terms
of time and delayed operations. To send
communications equipment abroad, it was
necessary to obtain theater commander ap-
proval. Supplies were packed in Bethesda
and theater commander approval formally
requested, copies of shipping orders being
sent to Communications officers overseas.
Arrangements were then made to obtain
space and ogsistance at ports of embarkation
for the handling of shipments. However,
requests for theater commander approval'
140
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
had to include the weight and cubic dimen-
sions of each shipment, and such figures
could not be tabulated until after the equip-
ment had been packed. To eliminate the
resultant time lag, OSS obtained blanket ap-
proval for shipments up to a certain monthly
tonnage for ETO and rgro. NATO and
METO declined to give such blanket ap-
provaL In the shipment of supplies by air,
separate requests for priorities were neces-
sary, regardless of destination. Late in the
war, however, Frro provided large blanket
priorities for the flying of 25-30 tons of com-
munications equipment.
The time lost in obtaining appropriate
shipping space was almost as great as that
In securing theater commander approval.
Sea transportation to ETO was generally
available because of weekly sailings, but lack
of shipping space and infrequent sailings
were common in MedT0 and FETO. When
the situation became extremely critical in
1943, Donovan issued a special order whereby
every OSS officer en route to the theaters
would deliver an SSTR-1. Once sets had
arrived in the field in sufficient quantity, the
practice was discontinued, except for Cora-
munications Branch personnel, who contin-
ued to carry equipment to the various thea-
ters. Another expedient was the use of
pouch facilities to convey crystals and other
-small but vital parts which were in constant
demand. It was found also that the SSTR-1
could be broken down, with transmitter and
receiver in one package and the power pack
in another, both packages being within the
limitations of pouch weight. Accordingly,
a regular schedule was established for the
delivery of SSTR-1 sets by pouch.
Message Center. Under COI, the Message
Center was at first controlled by the Liaison
Office, and subsequently by the Registry Sec-
tion. When the Communications Branch
was organized in September 1942, the Cen-
ter acquired guidance as to operational and
policy matters, its primary responsibility be-
ing the sending and receiving of all official
outgoing and incoming telegrams and cables
and the performance of all attendant func-
tions incidental to these duties.
Beginning with three clerks in December
1941, the Center grew to include a maximum
of 130 employees in Washington and 400 in
the field by late 1945. Originally, all clerks
were required to perform enciphering, para-
phrasing, typing, logging, teletypewriting
and other duties. As the establishment ex-
panded, the separate functions of the Center
were divided into the Code Room, the Para-
phrasing and Distribution Section, the Tele-
type Section and Typing Room. In addi-
tion, a Maintenance Section was formed to
maintain cryptographic and other mechani-
cal devices used by the Message Center; and
a Cryptographic Security Section checked
traffic for cryptographic insecurities, devised
new cipher systems, and instructed Message
Center employees in the intricacies of these
systems. A Personnel Section was given
authority over both military and civilian
employees.
For transmission facilities the Message
Center originally relied on commercial cir-
cuits, messages being filed on a per-word
basis. Circuits were installed to provide di-
rect lines between the Messa ge Center and
the Washington offices of Western Union,
Postal Telegraph and RCA. Early in 1943,
OSS found that Army transmission facili-
ties provided the agency with excellent serv-
ice. By April the Army network was han-
dling so much OSS traffic that a TWX tele-
type circuit was installed between the Mes-
sage Center and the Army Signal Center,
obviating the need for couriers. Beginning
in early 1944, Navy radio facilities also
proved useful for transmissions to some Far
East stations. From the start, in October
1941, the facilities of the Department of
State were used to transmit messages in OSS
cipher to and from field agents who were
under diplomatic cover.
The most noteworthy commercial com-
munications line utilized by OSS was a West-
ern Union cable between Washington and
London. Use of this channel was limited
141
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�rep�Secret�
considerably in 1942 since it was shared by
a number of government agencies. In the
following year, Western Union introduced a
system known as Varioplex, which permitted
12 subscribers to use a cable channel vir-
tually simultaneously. The agency con-
tinued to use the company's Washington-
London facilities and in 1944 OSS introduced
new high-speed enciphering and decipher-
ing devices on the circuit which made pos-
sible a series of secret conferences in high-
grade cipher. These devices functioned so
rapidly that conferences by cable could be
held almost as rapidly as by transatlantic
telephone.
From 1943 until the end of the war, OSS in
Washington was in communication by radio-
telephone several nights weekly with its
representative in Bern. On the following
mornings, appropriate OSS branches re-
ceived recordings of the conversations.
New cipher systems were introduced pe-
riodically in order to replace those which
had become outdated or to tighten security.
In addition, procedures were instituted to
step up the processing of messages. Early
In 1945, the Communications Branch main-
tained message centers not only in Washing-
ton but in some 25 major locations in fifteen
countries. The Washington Center alone
handled about 500,000 code groups monthly.
The total for all OSS message centers
throughout the world during April 1945 was
60,500 messages comprising some 5,868,000
code groups.
Physically separated from the rest of OSS
due to the unusual requirements of crypto-
graphic security, the members of the Mes-
sage Center were not always well informed
concerning the operations of the various
branches of the organization and some con-
fusion developed as to how individual cables
should be distributed. In an effort to solve
the situation, the Secretariat, which received
copies of all incoming and outgoing cables,
prepared a distribution list to cover all "rou-
tine" cables Mesgzzes not regarded as rou-
tine were sent to the Secretariat, which de-
termined their distribution. Inasmuch as
approximately half the cables could be con-
sidered routine, the other half had to be sub-
mitted to the Secretariat for distribution.
Personnel. Detailed records on all Branch
personnel were kept by the Communications
Adjutant, whose files included a chronologi-
cal record of every man's performance from
the day he was recruited until his discharge.
The Adjutant's Office also drew up Tables of
OrganizAtion for Communications Branch
units in the United States and in the various
theaters, basing figures on the number of
men needed and/or available. When opera-
tional requirements called for changes in
the allotment of manpower to each theater,
the Adjutant's Office advised the Branch
Chief concerning the flow of personneL
Recommendations were made to the Chief as
to modifications in allotments of operators
for field assignment. When officers, en-
listed men and civilians returned from over-
seas theaters for reassignment or separation,
the Adjutant's Office processed the returnees
and closed out their personnel records.
Miscellaneous Projects. Although the
Communications Branch was a service or-
gani7Rtion rather than an intelligence unit,
it inherited a monitoring project called FBQ,
which consisted of two radio listening sta-
tions, located in New York and California.
Established under COI, the project was of
small interest to the Communications
Branch because the stations were used to
collect short-wave intelligence, which did not
come within the province of the Branch.
The stations were finally transferred to the
CD Branch in 1944,' Communications re-
taining only the responsibility for their tech-
nical maintenance.
Still another inheritance from COI were
D/F-ing operations in West Africa (Africa
101).* Plans had been drawn up in May
� See CD Branch under Deputy Director
Intemzence Service in 2 below.
142
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Secret-
1942 to send technicians and intelligence
personnel to Liberia to protect the Liberian
Task Force from enemy espionage and clan-
destine radio activities. The D/F system
would locate enemy secret radio transmit-
ters which maintained contact with U-boats;
compile strategic information on enemy
radio frequencies, static peculiarities and
other technical data; and report any addi-
tional intelligence gleaned while intercept-
ing German transmissions. In January
1943, the NATO Theater Commander re-
quested the establishment of a D/F system
which would be sufficiently broad in scope to
cover newly activated operational areas.
Installations were set up in Dakar at Rufis-
que Field, in Algiers and in Cairo. In the
fall of 1943, these operations were carried
out by. the Communications and SI
Branches, the former assuming control of
technical matters, the latter of intelligence.
Technically, the project was satisfactorily
-executed, although the expenditure in men
and materiel was ultimately considered
greater than the results achieved. Thanks
to the experience gained in this operation,
however, the Communications Branch suc-
cessfully carried out similar projects in ETO
and the Far East on a smaller, more local-
ized and more easily controllable basis.
The needs of OSS with regard to commu-
nications were unprecedented. The Com-
munications Branch required the highest de-
gree of technical knowledge, research and
development. . It produced special equip-
ment and devices vital to the successful
prosecution of espionage and special opera-
tions, and trained radio operators to facili-
tate those operations. It secured and pro-
tected codes and ciphers to maintain the
secrecy of operations. The Branch regu-
lated traffic between Washington and field
bases and between Washington and agents
In neutral territories who could make use of
diplomatic and commercial channels for
communication by OSS cipher. Washing-
ton also supervised lateral communications
between major field bases. The Washing-
ton headquarters was further under con-
stant pressure to send highly-qualified per-
sonnel and ever-increa ging amounts of spe-
cial and standard equipment overseas.
One of the most important tasks of the
Branch, however, was to Indoctrinate its per-
sonnel with an understanding of the special-
ized needs of OSS. It was not enough that
Communications members be technically
proficient. They had to be able to adapt
their expert knowledge to the demands of
OSS activities. The capacity for improvisa-
tion was one of the greatest assets of the
Branch. This was, of course, vital in the
development of new devices. It was further
Important in the training of agent personnel
for the operating branches.
(2) Special Funds
Special Funds Was responsible for financ-
ing the secret activities of OSS through un-
vouchered funds made available by the Presi-
dent and Congress. Such funds were neces-
sary to the maintenance of cover, whether of
a corporation, a training installation, a re-
cruiting office or an agent or group of agents
in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Un-
vouchered funds therefore constituted the
modus operandi of the most secret opera-
tions in which OSS engaged.
In order to perform this task, Special
Funds engaged in world-wide operations for
the procurement of more than 80 different
currencies which proved neemstry for the
undercover activities of OSS, and main-
tained intelligence files on these as well as
other currencies. It devised and put into
effect intricate procedures by which the pro-
curement and disbursement of unvouchered
funds, both in the United States and abroad,
were camouflaged so that the connection of
OSS or its agents with a given transaction
was not revealed. As in the case of Commu-
nications and R&D, the Special Fun&
Branch performed a highly specialized func-
143 �Tep-Secr44-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tiop-Seeret-
tion in which the most minute attention to
detail was necessary for success. The
Branch had to be constantly alert to enemy
attempts to trap agents through financial
regulations, marking of currency, etc.
Basic to the understanding of Special
Funds is realization of the fact that the
money carried by an undercover agent is es-
sentially an operational supply. Upon the
security of the currency he uses depend not
only the agent's life but the success of the
operation in which he is engaged. The pro-
curement of currency for use in undercover
operations was therefore subject to the most
stringent security precautions. While every
attempt was made to procure the necessary
foreign funds as cheaply as possible, the se-
curity of the transaction and of the currency
Itself was the governing factor rather than
the legal rate of exchange.
Special Funds carried on its own financial
operations, had an extensive network of field
representatives, and maintained an organ-
ization in Washington through which cen-
tralized control was exerted over field trans-
actions. This coordination was particularly
vital in the case of Special Funds, as its
world-wide financial activities were inter-
related, and a given action in one area could
influence simultaneous or subsequent ac-
tions in other regions. It was necessary
that all Special Funds officers constantly
guard against enemy attempts in any part
of the world to disclose clandestine agent
� lictivities through devious financial ruses.
While the Branch, therefore, performed a
services function, it could not be grouped
with the routine services branches. Like
Communications, the service it rendered was
so highly specialized, and so vital to the
secret operations it supported, that the
Branch and its representatives had to know
and understand intimately the activities of
the principal operating branches.
Appropriations. Unvouchered funds are
moneys made available by Congress to sup-
port activities of a confidential nature, and
which may be expended without regard to
--T-ep-SecreL
the provisions of law regulating the expendi-
ture of ordinary government funds. COI
obtained its original unvouchered funds
from the President's Emergency Fund in
September 1941, the first allocation being
$100,000. After the creation of OSS in June
1942, an additional appropriation of some
$3,000,000 was granted for the Ocral year of
1942-1943. A second allotment in the
amount of approximately $10,000,000 was
further supplied for the same period. It
was not until the spring of 1943 that it was
possible for OSS to go before Congress and
obtain directly its own appropriation for the
&Pal year 1943-1944. This appropriation
was granted in the 'amount of $21,000,000,
of which a net portion of nearly $15,000,000
was classified as unvouchered funds. For
the ?meal year 1944-1945, $57,000,000 was ap-
propriated by Congress. The National War
Agencies Appropriation Bill of 1945 author-
ized:
. . . For all expenses necessary to enable the
Office of Strategic Services to carry out its func-
tions and activities,. . . $57,000,000 . . . Pro-
vided, That $37,000,000 of this appropriation may
be expended without regard to the provisions of
law and regulations relating to the expenditure
of Government funds or the employment of per-
sons in the government service, and $35,000,000 of
such $37,000,000 may be expended for objects of
a confidential nature, such expenditures to be
accounted for solely on the certificate of the
Director of the Office of Strategic Services and
every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient
voucher for the amount therein certified.*
According to this authorization, expendi-
tures had only to be endorsed by Donovan
and submitted to the Treasury Department
to secure reimbursement for amounts dis-
bursed from Special Funds. The following
is an extract from the certificate, signed by
the Director, and forwarded to the Treasury:
I certify that expenditures were actually made
In the amount on this voucher according to re-
ports in this office and that it would be preju-
dicial to the public interests to disclose the name
of the recipients, the dates and the names of the
� See History File W-59, p. 1.
144
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
4.op-Seeret--
places in which the expenditures were made.
The expenditures were made incident to collect-
ing and analyzing confidential information and
data bearing upon the national security of the
United States.*
This departure from the normal Congres-
sional requirement of detailed accounting
for every government expenditure was nec-
eq-cnry for OSS security.
Organization. As the operations of OSS
expanded, the demand upon Special Funds
Increased to the extent that the Division
(which under COI had serviced SA/B and
SA/G almost exclusively) was raised to
branch status under the Deputy Director,
Services, in the reorganization of January
1943.
It was soon necessary to
organize the Branch under its Chief with an
Accounting Division, Cashiers Division and
Foreign Exchange Division. In addition, a
legal consultant was assigned by the General
Counsel to oversee the legal aspects of all
dealings in which unvouchered funds were
Involved.
With the growth of OSS overseas, Special
Funds dispatched representatives to the
field. Such representatives were responsible
for all matters in their respective areas in-
volving special funds.
In May 1944 it became evident that Special
Funds represented such a highly specialized
� Bee History File W-52, p.2.
145
function, so closely connected with the oper-
ations of the principal branches which it
served, that independent status was re-
quired. Consequently, the May 1944 revi-
sion of General Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-39)
removed Special Funds from the jurisdiction
of the Deputy Director, Services, and estab-
lished it as an independent branch report-
ing directly to Donovan and the Assistant
Director.
On 11 May 1945 the financial services of
OSS were reorganized. At that time Sup-
plement 38 to General Order No. 9 estab-
lished under the Deputy Director, Services, a
Finance Branch which comprised the Spe-
cial Funds Branch and the Finance Branch
(responsible for vouchered funds). The
Chief of Special Funds became Chief of the
new Finance Branch.
On 30 June 1945 a Field Auditors Depart-
ment was organized and auditors dispatched
to tour the field bases.
Domestic. The Special Funds Branch was
responsible for the financial aspects of all
undercover transactions of OBS. In the
United States, this involved estaiilishing
masked accounts in various banks
from
which disbursements were made m such
fashion that payments would not reveal the
fact that OSS was involved in a given trans-
action.
A Payroll Section was established in the
Accounting Division which was responsible
for payment of allotments and salaries to
families in the United States of undercover
agents in the field. Payroll accounts for
undercover personnel were maintained un-
der code designations.
.4"1.11.11 CvAr
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Tup Sacral,�
The Branch was also responsible for fi-
nancing such cover corporations as were or-
ganized to carry on covert activities. In ad-
dition, such installations as the "Farm",*
which was an undercover training establish-
ment for espionage agents, were financed
through Special Funds.
In 1942 and early 1943 the contracts of
certain OSS representatives, paid from un-
vouchered funds and serving overseas in
military theaters of operation, provided for
per diem allowances. The amounts of such
per diems varied according to the policies of
the various desks. This led to financial in-
equalities. Military regulations in the vari-
ous theaters further complicated the matter.
In Algiers, for instance, General Eisenhower
ruled that no per diem would be paid to Army
personnel since all were quartered and fed
by the Army. This gave certain OSS civil-
ians, who were being similarly quartered and
fed, a distinct advantage. The Strategic
Services Officer in NATO ordered that no per
diems be paid after 31 January 1944, which
abrogated the per diem provisions of Special
Funds contracts signed in Washington.
� See Secret Intelligence in Section I.
Another situation arose in London, where
a $6 per diem was paid to all male employ-
ees, and women were given a living allowance
based on Bureau of the Budget Circular A-8.
Thus some male employees, paid from Spe-
cial Funds, received a smaller living allow-
ance than they would have under standard
government regulations, and others received
more. In Cairo, living allowances were paid
in accordance with Circular A-8, the
amounts being less in some cases than the
employee had been promised by his desk
head prior to departure from the United
States.
The early confusion with regard to per
diems was due to the fact that it was not
realized in Washington that OSS personnel
would be quartered and fed in the theaters
without cost to them. The per diem ques-
tion for all field stations was settled by Gen-
eral Order No. 75-7, effective 20 August 1944,
which directed that per diems and living al-
lowances for all employees, whether paid
from unvouchered or vouchered funds, com-
ply with standard government regulations.
Field Offices. As the overseas activities of
OSS increased there was a progressive de-
mand for Special Funds representatives to
handle unvouchered moneys and the pro-
curement and disbursement of operational
funds for agents to be infiltrated into enemy
or enemy-occupied territory. The follow-
ing Special Funds offices were established:
London March 1943
Gibraltar Spring 1943
Algiers � Summer 1943
Cairo May 1943
LLsbors October 1943
Stockholm December 1943
Madrie January 1944
Kandy (Ceylon) March 1044
Calcutta April 1944
Istanbul July 1944
Kunming August 1944
Athens December 1944
Paris Winter 1944
Germany June 1945 �
146
� Moved to Caserta in 1944.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Top SL-�,
Foreign Exchange Division. The Foreign
Exchange Division, established on 12 August
1942, was responsible for the transfer of such
secret funds abroad as were nececs-Pry to
maintain OSS intelligence and other special
operations, and also for providing foreign
balances in some areas in such manner as
not to disclose the fact that the United States
Government had sizable cash deposits in
those areas.
All funds sent abroad fell into two cate-
gories: (a) Work funds, and (b) task funds.
Work funds were those used to pay salaries
and to maintain undercover agents who were
ostensibly engaged in legitimate businesses.
Unless a man so engaged was openly paid,
his cover would soon become suspect, since
he would appear to have no source of income.
Task funds were those used (often by the
same individual) to obtain confidential in-
formation, or for bribes and other secret op-
erational purposes.
In late 1942 and early 1943 the transmittal
or local procurement of work funds pre-
sented no problems. In fact, operations for
this purpose were openly conducted in order
to divert attention from surreptitious activi-
ties. However, as the financial require-
ments of agents in the field Increased, even
such open transfers of capital became diffi-
cult because of regulations established by
various foreign governments. For example,
In one neutral country an alien could not
receive funds from abroad to an annual to-
tal of more than $6,000, unless a special li-
cense were secured from the local govern-
ment. In another neutral country no lim-
its were placed on capital transfers, but the
amount of cash which could be withdrawn
weekly from the banks was strictly limited.
The procurement of task funds presented
a most difficult problem. All countries in
Europe, whether belligerent or neutral, cen-
sored communications and strictly regulated
movements of capital. In most countries all
banks were required to report to the govern-
ment any sizable or unusual bank trans-
actions, particularly cable transfers of
money from outside the country for the bene-
fit of resident aliens. During the early pe-
riod of operations, when the overseas staff of
Special Funds was small and arrangements
had not yet been made
to u&
bank accounts to channel OSS funds, the'
Branch was reduced to the purchasing of ac-
tual currency notes and shipping them into
the countries involved
In moving task funds it was necessary dis-
creetly to circumvent local regulations with-
out arousing the suspicions of banks, which
were generally under orders to inform their
respective governments. Special Funds
early learned that the enemy was sending
agents into all neutral countries to ferret out
black market and other undercover financial
operations. Such agents were specially
trained and in many cases held responsible
positions in the local banks.
The Branch took every precaution to see
that the currency notes which were acquired
through many devious channels were not
traceable to the United States Government
or to OSS. In order to protect the secret
agents who would use the moneys, Special
Funds endeavored to avoid repetition of suc-
cessful operations, and not to rely upon any
single pipeline for the movement of funds
longer than absolutely necessary. Once an
initial supply of funds had been successfully
placed at the disposal of an agent, means
were studied to keep the agent currently sup-
plied through multiple operations. For ex-
ample, at one time money was channeled
Into a single country through seven distinct
types of operation.
Currencies were bought from banks and
foreign currency brokers wherever possible,
but black market operations were also nec-
ekes; ry. Orders were issued that the agent
who was to use currency for clandestine pay-
ments should not himself obtain the ex-
change.
Many thousands of dollars worth of francs,
lire, pesetas, escudos, marks and other cure
rencies were located and purchased in Lis-
147
�Tep-Seeret�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
'Tap Secret--
bon, Tangiers, Tunisia, Corsica, Cairo, Bern
and other headquarters, mostly through
non-banking channels. Since Balkan cur-
rencies were constantly falling in value, only
small stocks were maintained.
In the surreptitious movement of funds
there was no precedent to follow and no ac-
cepted practices to adopt. The establish;
ment of bank balances and the reduction of
�
such balances into currencies of the coun-
tries involved required constant study and
the development of individual types of op-
eration. Each capital transfer was a special
and separate task, with secrecy the para-
mount consideration. There were cases, for
example, where currency passed through a
chain of no less than seven bank accounts
or individual hands in order to mask a given
operation.
Financial Intelligence. Currencies han-
dled by Special Funds included:
Angolar
Baht or Thal
Iraq Dinar
--Tep-Secret�
Serbian Dinar
Old Yugoslavian Dinar
Yugoslavian FD. Dinar
Chinese National Dollar
Central Reserve Bank
(China) Dollar
Drachma
Escudo
Guine Escudo
Mozambique Escudo
Albanian Franc
Belgian Franc
Belgian Congo Franc
French Franc
Supplemental French
Franc
Algerian Franc
French Equatorial
Franc
Morocco Franc
Tunisian Franc
French West African
Franc
Swiss Franc
Netherlands Guilder
Netherlands E. Ind.
Guilder
Norwegian Krone
Swedish Krona
Leu
Pengo
Lev
Lire
AMG Lire
Milreis
Peseta
Philippine Peso
Australian Pound
British Military
Authority Pound
British West African
Pound
British East African
Pound
Egyptian Pound
Gibraltar Pound
Irish Pound
Malta Pound
Palestine Pound
Union of South Africa
Pound
British Pound
Syrian Pound
Turkish Pound
Reichsmark
Allied Military Mark
Ruble
Rial
Chervonetz
Burma Rupee
British Military Admin-
istration Burma
Rupee
�Tap Burma Military
Rupee
Ceylon Rupee
Indian Rupee
Zloty �
Piaster .
To obtain such funds at satisfactory rates
and with the requisite degree of security
continuous financial intelligence was neces-
sary. Special Funds maintained current
files on some 80 different currencies with
respect to:
(1) Dollar exchange rates;
(2) Exchange rates of one foreign currency to
other foreign currencies;
(3) Exchange rates in terms of gold or silver;
(4) Black market rates in all principal centers;
(5) Counterfeiting (if any) of these currencies,
Including location of such activities and
identification of counterfeiters;
(6) Legality of currencies;
(7) Locality in which currencies were usee;
(8) Acceptability of currencies;
(9) Restrictions placed on importation, exporta-
tion and use of foreign currencies; and
(10) Outlawing of certain currency issues by oc-
cupying enemy forces.
148
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
LI
ii
In addition to the currencies listed above,
Information was constantly secured and dis-
seminated to the field on the following:
Federal Reserve Rank
(of China) Dollar
Hong Kong Dollar
Straits Settlements
Dollar
Military Yen (Jap.)
Imperial Yen (Jap.)
Philippine Military
Peso (Jap.)
Supplemental Military
Yen (USA)
Macao Dollar
Malay States Dollar
Malay States Military
Dollar (Jap.)
Japanese Straits
Settlements Dollar
Aruba Guilder
Curacao Guilder
New Guinea Guilder
Danish Krone
Russian Occupational
Peng),
Cyprus Pound
New Zealand Pound
Hong Kong Military
Yen (Jap.)
Singapore Military
Dollar (Jap.)
Korea Yen (Jap.)
All OSS intelligence agents were briefed
by Special Funds on .current financial
conditions in the areas to which they were
destined, and the proper handling of work
and task funds. Agents were also requested
to report financial information when in the
field and were instructed as to the types of
such intelligence which were particularly
desired.
Financial information was also secured
from various agencies and departments of
the Government in Washington, including
Treasury, State and Censorship.
Gold. As a protection against depreciation
in value of paper currencies, large stocks of
gold were acquired. The initial purchase
was madf
Purchases of mixed French
gold pieces and English Sovereigns followed.
By 1 January 1943, gold coins had been pur-
chased to the approximate value of $800,000,
a large portion of which was store'
Ind was used by Special Funds officers in
ETU, NATO and =TO to purchase almost
every type of usable European currency and
to supply agents and teams
N-f ap-Seroat_
For use in the Far East, OSS acquired
"tolas", a unit of gold widely used in the
Orient. The "tola" was a %-ounce disc
having no distinguishing markings except
the "chop" mark of the private dealer or
goldsmith who assayed it. "Tolas" were
made in discs of one, five, or a long bar of
ten. "Tolas" were not easy to conceal in
time of emergency, however, and agents re-
ported that the pieces were too large and un-
wieldy to be "palmed" or otherwise hidden
when danger threatened. Special Funds,
therefore, madt )irrangement
to manufacture gold welts
approximately toe size of lumps of sugar.
Agents were thereby provided with gold units
of small size and weight, but high* value,
which could en city be transported or con-
cealed.
�
149 �lop-Seca*
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
��
�Top�Seero�
Unorthodox Methods of Acquisition.
Many currencies proved unavailable by reg-
ular means (e.g., Spanish pesetas, Reichs-
marks) or, if they were available through
orthodox channels, were often pegged at
values far out of proportion to their pur-
chasing power (e.g., French francs). Spe-
cial Funds engaged in world-wide black mar-
ket operations to obtain such currencies It
also transferred large sums of capitai,
'nand
out of countries having legal limitations on
such transfers.
At one time, the only currency which could
be satisfactorily used for the supply of an
operation in the Balkans was Reichsmarks,
the circulation of which was currently re-
stricted to the Greater Reich by the German
authorities. Every attempt to acquire
Reichsmarks outside of the Greater Reich
proved ineffective. However, a military at-
tache, accredited to a foreign government in
Berlin, offered to help the American cause
by carrying 400,000 such Reichsmarks from
Berlin to Istanbul. This mission was per-
formed at great personal risk, since the Ger-
man internal fiscal controls were strict and
any infraction was punishable by death.
Some pesetas and escudos were purchased
by Special Funds/Washington through un-
official channels in Argentina. It was as-
-Te'r
certained that in this market (and through
certain individual channels) there was good
security and the currencies could be bought
on an economical basis even though Argen-
tine currencies had to be purchased first.
In 1943 Algiers became a center for the
purchase of French francs for operations
from both Africa and England. In one
black market purchase, 10,000,000 francs
were obtained through intermediaries from
Arab speculators. Additional amounts were
procured in Corsica in exchange for Louis
d'Ors, gold coins which were deemed by the
Corsicans to have considerably more value
than United States dollars.
A major base of financial operations was
Lisbon, where many of the currencies needed
for OSS operations were acquired in the open
market, and over a million dollars worth of
currencies other than Portuguese were pur-
chased. In early 1944 it was discovered that
approximately 90,000,000 francs had been
supplied by German sources. To avoid
jeopardizing agent operations by using these
francs immediately, Special Funds did not
release them until a sufficient area of France
had been liberated, after the St. Lo break-
through, whereafter they could be used.
safely.
The Special Funds officer in Lisbon was
the first to verify the rumor that the Ger-
mans, through their legation and consular
offices, were siphoning French currency into
the open market, knowing that the Allies
would buy it in anticipation of D-Day, and
hoping that recording the serial numbers of
the bills would lead to the capture of Allied
agents in France. Special Funds/Lisbon
Immediately warned all other Special Funds
officers who were engaged in buying French
francs.
Operations in Lisbon were delicate, but
not from the standpoint of legality. There
were no OSS black market operations there.
Legal purchases were made in an open mar-
ket but at heavy discounts from par or offi-
cial rates. The problem was to acquire se-
150
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tep-Seeref�
cure bank notes without disclosing the real
purpose and ultimate use of the currency.
Markea Currency. In 1943 the Germans
began large-scale use of financial methods
for tracing Allied agents, including mark-
ing money, recording serial numbers and
issuing special notes.*
The Gestapo made every bank and post
office in France its unwitting assistant in an
attempt to trap Allied agents. A particular
Issue of notes, the numbers of which had
been recorded by the Gestapo, was sent into
the black market, which was practical as-
surance that the notes would eventually find
their way into the hands of agents being
sent into France. The Gestapo sent out
warning to all banks and post offices in
France that a bank robbery had been perpe-
trated and that notes of a specific series had
been taken. All banks and post offices were
notified that the Gestapo was to be informed
Immediately if any notes of this issue were
passed. The banks and post offices, operat-
ing in good faith and innocently supposing
that they were assisting in the apprehension
of bona fide bank robbers, made every effort
to comply with this request.
OSS had, however, taken preventive meas-
ures and was able to avoid losses. Special
Funds offices in London, Washington, Cairo
and Lisbon maintained a list of suspect and
marked currencies supported by an ex-
change of information with
the Office of Censorship
(Washington) ana other Special Funds of-
flees of OSS. Whenever a shipment of black
market currencies arrived, each note was
carefully checked against this list for serial
number and other identifying marks.
The Gestapo consistently attempted to
spread false rumors on currency develop-
ments. Thus, the rumor that 5,000 franc
notes were to be withdrawn from circulation
In France persistently reached OSS. Lon-
don carried a large inventory of 5,000. franc
notes, since they were of a denomination
convenient for agent operations. Although
the rumored withdrawal never materialized,
a constant check had to be maintained in
France to be certain that an agent would
not arrive in the field with a package of
worthless 5,000 franc notes.
All new notes with serial numbers run-
ning in sequence and which were obviously
direct from the Bank of France were segre-
gated, put through an aging process and
properly pinholed. Aging and pinholing
were illustrative of the minute detail neces-
sary to prepare an agent for the field. OSS
knew that fresh and urunutilated notes were
available in France only to banks or accred-
ited government agencies. The mere fact
that an individual possessed a new note
would make him suspect. It was customary
In French banks to count notes on receipt
from the Bank of France and to pin the notes
together with a common pin into small
bundles or packets. Therefore, any bank
note which had proper circulation in France
through regular channels would show at
least two pinholes. OSS in many cases ac-
quired new notes fresh from the Bank of
France and it was necessary to see that each
of these was pinholed before issuance to an
agent. �
The aging of new notes in order to simu-
late ordinary circulation presented another
problem to Special Funds. Bank notes
could not be aged with ordinary garden dirt
because the soil left a residue whiQh was
easily detected and would render the agent
In possession of such notes immediately sus-
pect, if he were put under close scrutiny.
151
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top-Secret-
1
It was discovered that one of the best ways
to age bills was to scatter them about the
floor of a room in which persons were carry-
ing on routine duties over a period of hours
and to have the notes walked on and gen-
erally scrubbed about underfoot.*
United States Treasury regulations, de-
signed to prevent dollars from reaching en-
emy hands (to prevent possible use by enemy
agents), were complied with as closely as
possible,
When dollars had to be used, serial
numbers were recorded. In one case in Al-
giers, the chief of mission had given a local
resident drafts for $90,000 in exchange for
Algerian francs during the early days of OSS
activity there. The Special Funds officer
was later informed that the individual in
question might pass American currency to
the Germans. The drafts were therefore
re-bought in Algerian francs (at a loss) at
the new exchange rate.
Agent Expenditures. Unlike the vouch-
ered funds of other government agencies, the
unvouchered funds of OSS were, in most
cases, not subject to check Agents return-
ing from the field usually could not present
receipts for sub-agent payments, purchases
and bribes. In some cases, the agents were
dishonest and cached the funds for their own
future use. For instance, thirty-two dia-
monds were issued in early 1945 to SI agents
dispatched into Germany. Of these, not one
was reported to have been sold or exchanged,
yet only nine were returned, and all the rest
� It was the practice of Special Funds/London
to lock one of its offices against intrusion, scatter
one to five million francs about the floor, and go
on with the usual work of the office. A day or two
of this type of treatment generally served to
smudge, rumple and tear the notes sufficiently to
render them innocuous in the hands of an agent
operating in the field.
..--rep-Seeret-
were listed as lost. In one of the "lost" cases,
the diamond was subsequently found in the
agent's possession. Some currency was lost
in parachutage, or during escapes from un-
expected intrusions. A percentage of such
losses as these must be expected in espionage
as part of the price of intelligence. When
considered in relation to the total amount of
money -handled by Special Funds, such
losses may be regarded as almost inconse-
quential.
Most of the agents paid by Special Funds
were in the SI Branch. Such agents re-
ceived an average of approximately $300 per
month, and none was paid more than $5,000
a year (exclusive of task funds). SO found
that special operatives in most cases would
be best protected in the field wearing mili-
tary uniform and with military rank or rat-
ing; consequently, SO agents were mostly
paid by the Army through OSS detachments.
X-2 ran some chains of agents, but its pay-
ments were mostly in lump su,ms for indi-
vidual items of information or for "spot
jobs".
The amounts of operational funds used by
agents varied considerably. In France, for
example, the sums ranged from 136,728
francs' spent by an agent who was in the
field for nearly a year and produced through-
out that time extremely valuable reports, to
1,148,000 francs" used by an agent who
stayed less than a month in the field. Spe-
cial Funds was, however, often successful in
scaling down agent bills, as well as claims of
� Approximately $300 at the rate of exchange
then prevailing.
� � Approximately $2,500.
152
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Allied espionage -agencies for services ren-
dered.
Financing of Resistance. Special Funds
was responsible for procuring and dispatch-
ing the appropriate moneys necessary to fi-
nance various resistance groups supported
by OSS.
Beginning in July 1944, OSS, khared
:be costs of sending the Italian
Committee for Liberation 100,000,000 lire a
month 'increased to 160,000,000 in January
1945).' Special Funds/London
prepared pacxages of money to be para-
chuted into France.
�
Francs were also supplied tu
French resistance groups, the first
large-scale supply being 1,500,000 francs on
7 December 1943. Such funds were Usually
disbursed by OSS agents who transported
the moneys to the field. Some funds were
occasionally parachuted to agent reception
committees. In March a total of 3,790,000
francs was supplied, in April 5,610,000, in
May 13,263,850 francs plus $38,000, and in
June, 8,522,250 francs.
Unvouchered funds were advanced to the
commanding officers of the various OSS field
units accompanying the armies in France.
As the agency became overt in various areas,
many day-to-day expenses were assumed by
the Finance Branch (vouchered funds), with
Special Funds continuing to support any
undercover operations carried on in friendly
or neutral territory.
External Relations. Special Funds was
called upon in many instances to perform
� The Italian Government undertook to reim-
burse the British and American governments for
these advances.
secret financial services for Allied undercover
operations. For example, when the French
Provisional Government was established in
North Africa, American and British military
authorities were requested to provide funds
to organize intelligence chains
Satisfaction of this request devolved upon
Special FtUldb,
153
�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
74op-Saatet�
Government for funds, thus helping to con-
ceal OSS intentions, they furthered the
preservation of OSS cover in France. The
principal difficulty encountered with the
Army was an occasional attempt in various
theaters to inspect and review expenditures
of unvouchered funds. In each instance,
however, the matter was settled by an ex-
planation of the terms of the Presidential
and Congressional appropriations making
Donovan solely responsible to these authori-
ties. In general, Army finance officers were
helpful and often assisted in transferring
funds to advance OSS units with the armies.
United States Army aivance officers were
of considerable assistance to Special Funds.
They provided occupation currency to OSS.
Also, by handling requests to the French
.-fur et-
Responsible for a services function vital
to the organization and execution of secret
activities, the Special Funds Branch oper-
ated in a field without precedent in America.
The type and scope of OSS operations for
which unvouchered funds were necessary
provided a challenge to the ingenuity of the
Special Funds Branch in deyeloping meth-
ods of undercover financing both in the
United States and throughout the world.
While Special Funds was responsible for
the financing of cover transactions in Amer-
ica and for the payment of salaries to under-
cover personnel, its most significant'role was
in the financing of agent operations. It is
worthy of note that no OSS mission was ever
cancelled due to the lack of proper funds pre-
viously screened for safe use and that no
friendly group with proper authority ever
approached Special Funds for financial aid
without that aid being promptly supplied.
The money used by an agent was poten-
tially one of the most vulnerable points in
his cover. It constituted the one commod-
ity which he was forced constantly to use
and which was inevitably subject to close
scrutiny.
The Germans were fully aware of this fact
and used this knowledge in endeavors to de-
tect and neutralize Allied espionag% and
subversive activities in territories which they
controlled. Their methods of financial trac-
ing by marking money, recording serial num-
154
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Secret-
bers, issuing special notes and withdrawing
entire currency issues from circulation were
continually subject to refinement. Further,
they influenced the promulgation by satel-
lite or subject governments of various finan-
cial regulations designed to trap Allied
agents.
The record with regard to the financbig
of OSS agents was impressive. Every OSS
operation which resulted in an agent cap-
ture was carefully investigated to ascertain
whether improper funds were in any way
responsible. No statement of the success or
failure of Special Funds in this regard can
be categorical, since several agents were lost
without trace. However, as of August 1945,
no case had been found of an OSS agent who
was captured due to the fact that he had
been supplied with insecure funds.
(3) Research and Development�R&D
While several OSS branches, such as Com-
munications and MU, carried on research
and development in their specialized fields,
R&D was charged with the general function
and maintained OSS liaison with OSRD,
NDRC and other government departments in
this connection. It was specifically re-
sponsible for the development of special
weapons and equipment necegRary to sub-
versive warfare; the provision of the myriad
Items necessary to support agent cover; the
camouflage of personal accessories or de-
vices to facilitate special operations; and the
collection and dissemination of information
on all types of equipment, developed within
or without the agency, which would be of use
In OSS activities.
R&D grew out of the Technical Develop-
ment Section, which had been established
under SA/G in the COI period. On 17 Oc-
tober 1942, it became an independent branch
reporting directly to Donovan and the As-
sistant Director, a status which it main-
tained throughout the existence of OSS.
Just as the activities of OSS were unique,
so rP-genrch and development on devices,
equipment and cover details necessary to
support those activities was a distinct. and
unusual problem. While certain branches,
such as OG, could rely to some extent upon
standard military weapons, the undercover
activities of SO and SI required the develop-
ment of specialized devices and cover details.
During the early period of R&D as an inde-
pendent branch, it was handicapped by not
having field representatives who could
gather information as to the performance of
existing devices and equipment and the ne-
cessity for new items. Written reports from
the field seldom contained the minutiae of
detail necessary to technical research and
development. As personnel who had en-
gaged in actual operations returned from
the field, this condition was alleviated to
some extent. The coordination of plans,
which was possible after the Planning
Group and Planning Staff were established
and engaged in the preparation of specific
programs to implement over-all objectives,
aided R&D by supplying some pre-knowledge
of the types of operations to be effected.
The Branch was enabled, to some extent at
least, to anticipate the devices and equip-
ment which might be necessary to those op-
erations. It was not until April 1944 that
the first R&D personnel were sent overseas.
Thereafter, the situation improved, but the
fact that the Strategic Services Officers, in
compliance with the demands of theater op-
erations, could divert such personnel to other
than R&D work, or direct them to perform
R&D work only in support of local activities,
was a continuing handicap to the Branch in
Washington.
In order to secure nececsary laboratory
facilities to carry out its work, an arrange-
ment was made in the fall of 1942 with the
National Defense Research Committee
(NDRC) � by which the latter agreed to cre-
ate a unit for the exclusive purpose of de-
veloping weapons and devices for OSS. The
unit, designated Division 19�Special Weap-
� Predecessor, and later one of the advisory
committees, of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development (08RD).
155 Pup
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top--Seaet-
ons, Was supplemented by the este.blishment
of the Maryland Research Laboratory
(MRL) to perform the laboratory work.
Subsequently, when MRL's facilities became
over-taxed, temporary arrangements were
made with certain universities and labora-
tories for work on specific projects. Thus
R&D was able to draw on the skills, tech-
niques and facilities of the leading scien-
tists and laboratories of the United States
The pattern of Branch organization fol-
lowed the development of its functions, but,
as it finally emerged in October 1943, it con-
sisted of four divisions: Technical, Docu-
mentation, Special Assistants and Camou-
flage. Each of these divisions represented
a distinct aspect of the work of the Branch.
The Technical Division was organized in
October 1942, its principal activity being the
development of the special weapons, devices
and equipment necessary to subversive war-
fare. It was organized in Mechanical,
Chemical and Electrical Sections, the staffs
of which included project engineers. While
Division 19 effected basic research and de-
velopment and the Procurement and Supply
Branch of OSS was charged with seeing to
the production of the finished product in
appropriate quantities, the Technical Divi-
sion was responsible for seeing that scientific
research did not exceed the limits of opera-
tional practicability. The Division assigned
a project engineer to follow NDRC develop-
ments closely and to arrange for final test-
ing of devices developed for OSS before the
User Trial Committee.* If the tests were
successful, the project engineer saw that
plans and specifications were drawn up, in-
cluding therein an estimate of total OSS re-
quirements. The project engineer further
maintained contact with field representa-
tives, both for purposes of estimating current
and future needs and to secure evaluations
of the performance of devices in actual op-
erations. All items for SO were coordinated
� Composed of representatives of /MBA IIRL,
the British Liaison tlission, and the OBS Procure-
ment and Supply Branch.
--Zep-freeret-
closely with those of SOE so that, in accord-
ance with the SO/SOE agreement, they
would be interchangeable in the field.
The Documentation Division was estab-
lished to produce all documents necessary to
authenticate agent cover in enemy and
enemy-occupied territory, including iden-
tity cards, passports, ration stamps, drivers'_
licenses, etc.
In December 1944, the Camouflage Divi-
sion was established to camouflage personal
accessories and devices and equipment
needed for special operations. Camouflage
Division personnel were trained in the
United States and sent to the various thea-
ters to supervise camouflage activities there.
The Division was responsible for the camou-
flage of all personal accessories and special
equipment to support agent cover.
The Special Assistants Division was
formed to provide certain specialized items
for agents, which did not fall within the
purview of the three other divisions for tech-
nical or other reasons.
Special Devices, Weapons and Equipment.
It would be impossible in the space available
to list all the gadgets developed either origi-
nally by R&D or improved after the procure-
ment of the original idea or model from the
British. However, certain items may be
noted to indicate the nature of the work.
Basic to the performance of sabotage was
a time delay device which would allow the
agent to put an explosive or incendiary
charge in position and permit a period of
time before detonation, to give him a chance
to escape. Among such devices produced
by R&D was the pocket incendiary which, by
virtue of its size, combined the two essential
features of compactness and camouflage po-
tential. This incendiary device was capable
of starting more than nine fires simultane-
ously at a given time after being placed in
position.
Among the explosive charges developed
was the "limpet". This was a charge which
could be placed on the side of a ship below,
the water line and which would detonate
156
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020109124C00168776
after a period of time delay adjustable to the
situation. It could be used from small craft
operating clandestinely or by underwater
swimmers. The first "limpets" were of a
magnet type, held to the side of the ship by
six extremely powerful, small horseshoe
magnets. Field experience later demon-
strated the necessity for some other method
of attachment, since in certain cases, bar-
nacles on the hulls prevented the "limpets"
from sticking. R&D therefore developed the
"Pin-Up Girl"�a hardened steel nail driven
Into the plates of the ship by an explosive
cartridge.
In some cases it was possible to use stand-
ardized equipment by the development of
special parts which would adapt it to OSS
operations. Among these were silenced
weapons and silencers to be attached to
standard weapons. The silenced .22 calibre
pistol developed by R&D was a clip-fed auto-
matic pistol with a special silenced barrel,
the clip holding ten rounds of high-speed,
long-range ammunition. It was designed
for use in stealthy attacks to eliminate sen-
tries or other enemy personnel without caus-
ing widespread alarm. In addition to the
silencing feature, no muzzle flash was visible,
even in darkness. �
R&D also developed a silenced barrel for
the .45 calibre M-3 sub-machine gun. It
was impossible to achieve total elimination
of noise in an automatic weapon such as the
M-3, but, whereas a previous silencer had re-
duced the noise by 50%, R&D was able to ef-
fect a 90% reduction. In the case of the
M-3, all that was necessary was to unscrew
the old barrel and replace it with the R&D
product; therefore, only the silenced barrel
required transportation to the field. The
silenced M-3 was used successfully by OSS
and was also used by the Marine Corps.
Among the very unusual requests received
by R&D was one from the Far East. This
was for an explosive that could be camou-
flaged as flour. It was desired that the end
product be capable of mixing with water to
form a "dough" which could be baked into
"biscuits or loaves of bread". It was further
specified that the "bread" so baked should
be edible. It was thought that such "flour"
could be transported through the Japanese
lines by the Chinese with safety and could
be kept in a peasant's home without arous-
ing suspicion. The request was fulfilled,
the resultant product being designated
"Aunt Jemima"
Field experience, even in late stages of the
war, indicated the need for improvement in
sabotage techniques. A request came from
ETO that R&D re-examine methods for de-
railing trains. Tests disclosed that the Brit-
ish "one-meter" technique (the placing of
two 3/4-pound charges of plastic explosive
on the side of a train rail one meter apart)
did not result in major derailment. In fact,
the use of that method resulted in 50% fail-
ures. R&D evolved a system of placing
charges beneath the rail so as not only to re-
move about eight feet of the rail, but at the
same time create a crater beneath the gap
Into which the engine would fall. This
method was forwarded to agents operating
In ETO, where subsequent results showed a
margin of only 10% failures.
� A somewhat different type of sabotage was
envisioned in the "Caccolube", or "Turtle
Egg". This was designed to effect sabotage
on gasoline engines. It was a small packet
of abrasive material which, when placed in
the oil intake pipe of a gasoline engine, would
cause seizure of the bearings and disruption
of the pistons and connecting rods some
hours later.
It was found that contaminants, such as
sand, popularly believed to be highly efficse-
cious for the sabotage of vehicles, were prac-
tically non-effective. The common con-
tal ruirtants for gasoline, such as sugar, were
� The only test that was not conclusively met
In laboratory trials in America was that of edi-
bility. When this "flour" was sent to the Par
East, it was later learned that three Chinese
cooks who had baked biscuits from the material
ate some of the biscuits contrary to orders. The
field reports indicated that no ill effects were
observed.
157
Top Sec. el
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Si.f.f et
also found to be ineffective, in addition to be-
ing scarce in occupied territory. R&D de-
veloped the "Firefly". This was a small
three-ounce gadget which, when placed in
the gasoline tank of a vehicle, would, be-
tween 1 and 10 hours later, cause an ex-
plosion that would rip out the bottom of the
tank and set fire to the gasoline. Reports
from the field later indicated that it was de-
termined to be effective in 85% of the opera-
tions in which it was used.
R&D received a joint request from SI and
Communications in early 1945 to develop a
submersible raft, powered by sail or by a
small electric motor, which could be trans-
ported in a submarine. The request speci-
fied that the raft should be capable of carry-
ing 400 pounds of dead weight, including the
entire radio apparatus needed by the agent.
The radio apparatus obviously had to be car-
ried in dry storage. After an agent had
gone ashore from a submarine on this raft,
he should be able to submerge the raft in
twenty-five feet of sea water and leave it un-
til such time as he had established the fact
that he was relatively secure in the position
chosen for landing. It was required that
the raft surface itself and re-submerge at
least eight times from a depth of twenty-five
feet in order that the agent might be able
to use his radio or obtain new supplies, and
between those times submerge it for conceal-
ment purposes. In essence, R&D had been
asked to produce what was practically a
midget submarine.' This requisition was
fnlfil led in approximately four months.
Agent Authentication. The production of
the various documents, clothes and acces-
sories, as well as all the other minutiae nee-
PAPAry to enable an agent to maintain cover,
was the responsibility of the Documentation,
Camouflage and Special Assistants Divi-
sions.
An engraving shop was established in
Washington for the production of various
types of European and Far Eastern docu-
ments. Identity cards, work permits, chauf-
feurs' licenses, etc., were meticulously pre-
-.Top Secret-
pared with appropriate regard for the enor-
mous amount of detail necessary to provide
the authenticity upon which the agent's life
might depend. Through OG's, the French
Maquis was supplied with all necessary docu-
ments for travel and activity in Germany,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. CD
was, of course, responsible for securing the
Intelligence necessary to the production of
agent documentation, but R&D also secured
a great deal of information from other
sources and from its own perscnnel in the
field. In fact, R&D and CD personnel
worked together in many theaters on ques-
tions of documentation and camouflage,
e.g., in London, where a joint office was set
up. Such details as the size of type, kind
of paper and ink used, methods of water-
marking, etc., were of vital importance.
The work of camouflage included not only
methods of disguising various types of ex-
plosive and other devices (for example, the
preparation of plastic explosives in the shape
and appearance of lumps of coal, stones nor-
mal to a given locality, or manure), but the
outfitting of an agent for travel in a given
enemy or neutral territory. The enormity
of such a task is indicated when it is realized
that each agent had to be equipped with
clothing sewn exactly as it would have been
sewn if it were made in the local area for
which he was destined; his eyeglasses, dental
work, toothbrush, razor, brief case, travelling
bag, shoes, and every item of wearing ap-
parel or accessory had to be microscopically
accurate. Upon such details the life of the
agent and, consequently, the success of his
mission might depend.
The Camouflage Division also produced
specialized devices to be used as ipanirnate
letter drops. At first, several letter drops
were made in the form of old pieces of wood,
such as a qinnli part of a branch from the
limb of a tree. The wood was split and a
metal container inserted in such fashion
*that the wood could be replaced and present
an innocent appearance to any observer.
was soon discovered that the cardinal prin-
158
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ciple in producing instrirnAte letter drops
was that the subject of disguise be neither
edible nor burnable. In such cases it is lia-
ble to be used by some casual passer-by.
Thereafter, letter drops were made in many
other forms, such as stones, old tin cans of
various localities, etc. Such letter drops
could be placed in position by agents (e.g.,
at a pre-arranged distance from a given }di-
ameter marker on a European road) and
provide a two-way channel of communica-
tion for intelligence, such as map overlays,
which was unsuitable for transmission by
radio.
Other items produced, in this case by the
Special Assistants Division, to support the
agent in his operations were "K", "L" and
"TD" tablets. The "K" tablet was designed
to insure that the person to whom it was to
be administered would be knocked out for a
reasonable period of time, and the "TD" tab-
let was designed to insure that the subject
would respond favorably to interrogation.
The "L" tablet was to produce death rapidly.
"L" tablets were carried by agents as a pre-
cautionary measure, to be self-administered
in the event of capture in order to preclude
the possibility of revealing information un-
der the strain of interrogation and torture.
Like all of OSS, R&D was handicapped by
not having a long period of preparation prior
to the operational need for its services. This
lack was particularly important in the case
of R&D, not only because the function of re-
search and development is normally a slow
and pninstaking one, but because the objec-
tives of its activities must change constantly
to meet the demands of the situation in the
field. Further, R&D was handicapped by
not having its own personnel in the field
from the beginning; they would have been
doubly useful�both from the standpoint of
obtaining intelligence on operational per-
formance of devices produced and relaying
to Washington current and anticipated
needs for new devices or adaptations, as well
as from the standpoint of briefing agents in
the proper use of R&D products to obtain the
maximum effect.
In view of these handicaps, the achieve-
ments of R&D in developing physical acces-
sories to support the unorthodox activities
of OSS, and the effective perforinance of its
products under operating conditions, are all
the more remarkable.
(4) Medical Services
Medical Services was primarily responsible
for the physical welfare of OSS personneL
The position of the Branch in an organiza-
tion such as OSS, however, offered unusual
opportunity to extend the functions of the
Branch beyond those of routine medical
care. The Surgeon General and others
found that OSS medical officers were fre-
quently in a position to procure medical in-
telligence of value which was not elsewhere
obtainable. In addition, the responsibility
of OSS for the organization and support of
resistance movements required attention to
medical supplies which the Medical Services
Branch was uniquely qualified to handle.
In the COI period the services of medical
officers were secured for particular purposes.
For example, in March 1942 a medical officer
was assigned to accompany the nucleus of
Detachment 101, then preparing to leave
for Burma. In April, another medical of-
ficer was appointed to supervise the health
of Washington personnel and to inspect the
sanitary facilities at Area B. This officer's
responsibilities were extended gradually, so
that he acted eventually as Chief Surgeon
for the agency.
The Medical Services Branch was estab-
lished as one of the services group of
branches in the 17 October 1942 reorganiza-
tion of OSS. The principal attention of the
Branch, however, was at that time still di-
rected toward the training establishments,
and the Chief Surgeon maintained an office
at Area B. The necessity for a more closely
Integrated and extensive service became ap-
parent by March 1943. At that time, the of-
fice of the Chief Surgeon was moved into
159 -Top-Secgat-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
� rup, &nowt
Washington and a headquarters was estab-
lished to deal with matters of medical ad-
rnin Lstration. In practice, the Branch func-
tioned as a part of Headquarters and Head-
quarters Detachment. It continued to ap-
pear on organization charts, however, as a
part of Services.
While continuing to care for the medical
needs of OSS personnel, the Branch began
to perform other functions as well. For ex-
ample, the Surgeon General's Office of the
Army and the Navy's Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery frequently requested the Chief
Surgeon of OSS to supply them with medical
intelligence. Also, it became apparent that
the heavy demands upon OSS for the sup-
ply of resistance groups would necessarily
include medical supplies which would have
to be handled by the Branch. In view of
these facts, as well as the fact that the de-
cisions of the Chief Surgeon on activities as
highly specialized as medical matters should
be subject to Donovan's review only, it was
proposed that Medical Services be removed
from the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director-
Services and given independent status
among the central executive group.
Accordingly, on 31 January 1944, Supple-
ment 30 to General Order No. 9 established
Medical Services as an independent branch
responsible to Donovan and the Assistant
Director. The functions of Medical Services
included, in addition to the routine matters
of providing medical care for OSS personnel,
requisitioning appropriate equipment and
supplies and training medical personnel for
authorized activities:
Advising and assisting In determining the
medical needs of resistance groups and in the
procurement and distribution of suitable medical
supplies to resistance groups.
Collecting medical intelligence in cooperation
with SI by approved means.
In line with its primary function of re-
sponsibility for the health of 058 personnel
both in the United States and overseas, Medi-
cal Services established dispensaries at the
various training areas, at the Washington
Top Secret-
headquarters and at OSS installations in the
theaters. Certain difficulties were encoun-
tered in the beginning. Many of the
branches in Washingtonlelt that the medi-
cal problem could be more effectively han-
dled at the branch level rather than on a
centralized basis. With respect to the thea-
ters, the belief was widely held that medical
problems of OSS personnel could be handled
by the Army.
It soon became apparent, however, that
the rapid increase in the number of OSS per-
sonnel overseas, coupled with the anticipated
heavy medical demands which would be
placed upon the Army following D-Day in
Normandy, would make it necessary for OSS
to establish its own medical facilities at over-
seas installations. Shortly after the estab-
lishment of Medical Services as an independ-
ent branch, therefore, the Chief Surgeon
queried the various overseas bases as to their
medical requirements. On the basis of the
replies, plans were drawn up to procure
medical personnel and supplies to establish
field offices of the Branch at the various
overseas stations.
The Chief Surgeon toured the theaters in
July 1944. He found, particularly in Lon-
don and Algiers, pressing need for medical
supplies for resistance groups, which had
been furnished almost solely by the British
and French up to that time. Upon his re-
turn to Washington in November, he promul-
gated a more adequate overseas medical serv-
ices program. Consequently, the Medical
Supply Program was established and its
overseas requirements given highest possible
priority. OSS sent medical supplies to re-
sistance groups in France, Yugoslavia,
Greece and northern Italy. American flag
stickers were placed on each major shipment
bearing a legend in the language of the coun-
try to which the supplies were destined to
the effect that they came from America.
This type of distribution had the effect of
fostering goodwill. �
The supply program complemented cer-
tain of the intelligence activities. For one
160
11111111.1111.1.......mApproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.Top et
thing, medical intelligence was more readily
obtaingble where a feeling of goodwill ex-
isted. In the Ballams this held true particu-
larly, the medical intelligence that OSS ob-
tained being the best of any procured from
the Balkan area. In Greece, medical offi-
cers were attached to OSS units with resist-
ance or guerrilla forces. OSS medical offi-
cers who interrogated a returning agent
prior to the capture of Naples secured the
first intimation of the typhus epidemic
which would greet Allied forces upon their
entrance into that city.
In the Far East, particularly valuable
medical services were performed, notably
with Detachment 101.* The care and sup-
ply of native guerrillas in Burma was an ex-
tensive medical job performed under trying
conditions.
In Italy, a Medical Services Officer ar-
ranged to dispatch medical supplies through
the lines in return for intelligence, not only
medical but general in nature. /n London,
OSS Medical Officers procured supplies
which were dispatched to the French, Bel-
gian, Dutch and Scandinavian resistance
groups through channels set up by SOE.
In the post-hostilities phase, medical offi-
cers accompanied most of the City Teams in
the Balkans, for the purpose, not only of car-
ing for OSS personnel, but of securing and
reporting medical intelligence of value to
State Department and the armed forces.
OSS *Medical Officers assisted the Typhus
cornmiccion in Yugoslavia, helped in the ex-
change of British prisoners of war held by
Greek EILAS forces, and supplied Air Corps
personnel stationed in the Bsikarts with
medical care, food and clothing.
OSS Medical Officers in China had sup-
plied medical intelligence to the authorities
there as early as April 1945. By the middle
of 1945 Medical Services was preparing an
extensive program for China, which was to
include Rs& stance to the. Air Corps by estab-
lishing air stations in isolated areas. The
� See Detachment 101 in Far East Section.
termination of the war in the Far East caused
the program to be abandoned.
(5) Field Photographic
The Field Photographic Branch was estab-
lished under COI as part of the Visual Pres-
entation Branch. Upon the formation of
OSS, Field Photo was placed under SI, where
it remained until the general reorganization
of 3 January 1943, when it was established
as an independent branch.
During the OSS period, the Branch pro-
duced three types of films�strategic pho-
tography, documentary photography and
special photographic projects requested by
outside agencies. Field Photo, operating in
the theaters as well as in the United States,
serviced a variety of consumers. Some of its
assignments iiere tactical, requiring only a
short time for completion; others were stra-
tegic, long-range projects which required
many months of work in various parts of
the world. The steadily increasing de-
mands made on the Branch during the OSS
period resulted in curtailing services to agen-
cies outside OSS except when priority re-
quests came from higher authorities.
While a wide variety of documentary films
was produced, such pictures fell principally
Into two general categories: (1) Those pro-
duced as a direct aid to the OSS training
program, and (2) those undertaken to pro-
vide a record of activities in the field. S&T
frequently requested films on a wide variety
of subjects, such as techniques of close com-
bat, maritime operations and clandestine
communications activities. Other films
produced for S&T demonstrated foreign in-
signe, weapons and uniforms. Such pic-
tures became integral parts of the training
program.
The second type of documentary film was
concerned with recording activities of the
various branches. Several branches made
use of this service, R&D, for example, making
repeated requests for films based on its proj-
eets. Among others, Field Photo recorded
In film the activates of Detachment 101 in
161
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Burma, the Seventh Army Detachment in
France, SO in the Balkans, and OSS head-
quarters in Italy.
Strategic photography was concerned
with filming installations, topography, etc.,
the resultant pictures being forwarded to the
various Allied field units to support their
operations against the enemy. The most
significant project of this sort, the Intelli-
gence Photographic Documentation Project
(IPDP), began in France during the rapid
Allied advance in 1944. It was expanded
later to cover the principal countries of West-
ern Europe and, to a lesser degree, certain
areas in the Far East. IPDP was designed
to establish a world-wide basic photographic
Intelligence file of areas and installations of
strategic � importance. It was a joint
R&A/Field Photo program, in which R&A
research work produced the priority intelli-
gence on which Field Photographic based its
films. Not only did IPDP produce pictures
of specific industrial installations, but also
coastline photography of France, Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Sicily and Corsica, as well
as port photography for Belgium, Holland,
Denmark and a substantial portion of
France and Italy. Coastlines were covered
by oblique aerial photography; ports and in-
land installations were covered by both
ground and oblique aerial shots.
Field Photographic personnel used B-25's
and L-5's for air photo coverage. In the
Mediterranean, however, clearance to fly
over the Trieste-Gorizia area was forbidden.
In July 1945 MAAF was liquidated but steps
were taken to complete the final stages of
the program through ground coverage.
The collection and final preparation of the
photographic material was done in close
collaboration with R&A geographers.
Originally, the Branch undertook assign-
ments for outside agencies because of the un-
usually good security conditions which pre-
vailed in its laboratory. However, by 1944,
the amount of outside work was reduced to a
minimum.
-lop-epee:eV
At the request of the Navy, Field Photo
was assigned to cover the Normandy land-
ings, and as a corollary to this activity pro-
duced for the President, Prime Minister
Churchill and Marshal Stalin a motion pic-
ture of the invasion. The resulting 4-reel
film took 60 hours to prepare and received
a commendation from SHAEF. Field
Photographic effected similar, though less
elaborate, coverage of the landings in North
Africa, southern France and certain of the
Pacific islands.
In addition to actual film production, the
Branch carried on research in the field of
specialized photography�covering both
equipment and devices. Unfortunately, the
results of such research were not available
until the end of the war so that, although
they were duly offered to and accepted by
the armed forces, they were never effectively
used. The first was the Iconoscope, a device
designed to make possible the interpretation
of oblique photographs to an extent not pre-
viously feasible. For example, the Icono-
scope made it possible to measure from a
single oblique photograph military installa-
tions, sea walls, low-level bombing obstruc-
tions, tank traps, etc. One of the most valu-
able services that the instrument could per-
form, though under the most ideal condi-
tions, was to accurately estimate the under-
water depth off enemy beaches. This was
effected by a combination of vertical and
oblique photographs taken approximately
simultaneously.
The Jeriscope and the Jeriscope Jr. made
possible the production of perspective draw-
ings of target maps from any angle. With
these devices, untrained personnel could
produce in less than 30 minutes accurate
perspectives�a process which would nor-
mally take expert personnel more than six
hours.
The Iconometer was a portable device
which enabled a pilot, while in the air, to
judge the length of other aircraft and the
distance between his ship and other craft
more accurately than had been previously
162
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
possible. In In addition, the Iconometer made
possible a more accurate computation by
pilots of ground distances, including the
length of runways.
(6) Presentation
Presentation was not established as a
branch of OSS until May 1944. At that
time, it was made an independent branch
reporting directly to Donovan and the As-
sistant Director.
The Branch had its genesis in the Visual
Presentation activities of COL' Upon the
formation of OSS in June 1942, the VP
Branch of COI was divided: Field Photo-
graphic became a division of SI for a short
time but was given independent status in a
few months; Pictorial Records became a sec-
tion of R&A, a status which it maintained
throughout the OSS period. The remainder
of VP was also assigned to R&A and desig-
nated the Presentation Division.
The Bureau of the Budget, however, be-
came convinced that the motion picture ac-
tivities of Field Photo and Presentation were
duplicative, and in July 1943 refused to allo-
cate further funds for Presentation as a part
of RSA. Consequently, Presentation Divi-
sion of R&A was transferred to the Field
Photographic Branch. Under Field Photo,
however, Presentation operated as a unit.
It so continued until May 1944, when the na-
ture and quality of its work caused its es-
tablishment as a separate branch.
When Presentation was placed under R&A
in the summer of 1942, its staff comprised
former members of the Graphics Section of
VP and certain personnel selected from the
Editorial and Statistical Sections of the R&A
Economics Division. Under R&A, the em-
ph-RIR of the Presentation Division's work
was upon sound motion pictures to 14_scfst in
the analysis and understanding of given
problems. In addition, appropriate charts,
slides, brochures and larger planned presen-
tations of complex subjects for conferences
� See Visual Presentation in Section L
and meetings were prepared. Both Field
Photographic and the Presentation Division
of R&A were operating in the field of motion
pictures. However, they differed with re-
spect to techniques and concepts. Meld
Photo was concerned with strategic photog-
raphy and the reporting of field activities.
Presentation's interest was in analytic films
which, by the extensive use of animation,
focussed attention on particular problems
or phases of particular problems which were
abstract in nature.
The first film that Presentation produced
under R&A was a one-reel experimental film
entitled "U. S. Wartime Manpower". It
consisted entirely of animated charts depict-
ing Selective Service methods of classifying
registrants. Its design was to assist the un-
derstanding of Selective Service by an attrac-
tive and clear presentation of complicated
statistics. A second film, "The Organiza-
tion of the Army", was five reels in length
and combined animation with live action.
It received wide distribution on a high eche-
lon and was well received. Subsequently,
General Marshall requested that a restricted
version be prepared for general showing to
the Army. The resultant film was the most
widely distributed of gill Army orientation
pictures. Later films, using the techniques
of both animation and live action, dealt with
a variety of subjects, including an analysis
of then current and potential Luftwaffe
strength, capability and production poten-
tial of certain new weapons, and an exposi-
tion of the tactics and results of the airborne
Invasion of Crete.
Under Field Photographic, Presentation
-entered the field of preparing well-rounded
and complete presentations for large con-
ferences. In the late summer of 1943, the
Office of the Undersecretary of War called a
conference _of leaders of industry, labor and
the press, in an effort to counteract the over-
optimism which was felt to be prevalent with
regard to the outcome of the war. For the
conference, Presentation edited speechesb
prepared 58 charts to illustrate them, de-
163 -fop-geePet�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-rep-Seeref-
[
signed and built display structures, edited
short motion pictures, etc. Subsequently,
similar presentations were requested for
other cities than Washington and were pre-
sented in both houses of Congress. Leaders
in various fields who had attended the con-
ference requested the War Department to
produce some qirnilar presentation which
would be suitable for small communities and
Individual factories. Presentation there-
fore produced a five-reel film entitled "War
Department Report", which involved col-
lecting stock shots and laying out and photo-
graphing animation, as well as producing
some original film. At the end of the first
year of release, "War Department Report"
had been seen by more than. 20,000,000
people in the United States, Canada and
Rinsig At the specific request of General
Arnold, a similar type of film was prepared
for the Air Force.
While under Field Photographic, Presen-
tation produced a number of smaller train-
ing and orientation films. These were often
supported by brochures which undertook
additional explanation and dealt with such
subjects as underwater operations, secret
weapons and United Nations versus Axis
propaganda.
Upon its establishment as a separate
branch, the functions of Presentation were
defined by the May 1944 revision of General
Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-41) as follows:
Under the direction of the Director, the Presen-
tation Branch shall be responsible for production
of all presentations, other than motion pictures, -
and for obtaining and distributing certain com-
pleted presentations including motion pictures.
At the direction of the Executive Officer it shall
assist In the factual content of motion pictures.
Consequently, while Presentation was pre-
eluded from participation in the actual pro-
duction of motion pictures, it could play a
significant role in their compilation. The
Branch remained constant in function and
status thereafter.
As early as January 1944, while Presenta-
tion was still under Field Photographic, it
�Top Seet.11
began to send representatives overseas. In
January 1944 an experimental unit was es-
tablished in India. This unit was later
moved to Kandy, in Ceylon, where, in addi-
tion to general Presentation work, it assisted
MO in the preparation of leaflets and comic
strips. General Wedemeyer was so im-
pressed with the work done in Kandy that
he requested a Presentation unit for China
when he moved to Chungking to replace
General Stilwell. The China unit was in
operation by the beginning of 1945. A Pres-
entation unit was also established in Lon-
don in early 1945, using experienced person-
nel dispatched from Washington. At the
same time, Presentation personnel were sent
to Detachment 101 in India. -
The early and elaborate plans of VP under
COI for the construction of a special build-
ing to be known as Q-2* never got beyond the
model stage. However, throughout its ex-
istence, and often with its status in the
agency doubtful or insecure, the principle
of the use of visual and audio techniques to
assist the clear understanding of compli-
cated statistical and other subjects became
firmly established. Both in the theaters in
which it operated and in Washington, where
the majority of its work was performed, Pres-
entation received frequent commendations
from high officials, and the constant re-
quests for its smosta.nce testify to the effec-
tiveness of its performance.
Upon the liquidation of OSS on 30 Sep-
tember 1945, Presentation was transferred to
the jurisdiction of State Department
2. Deputy Director�Intelligence Service
By January 1943, the three original intelli-
gence branches�R&A, SI and FN�had al-
ready reached an impressive stage of develop-
ment. The official confirmation of the po-
sition of OSS in the JCS framework, result-
ing from the settlement of the JPWC contro-
versies, allowed the organization to consoli-
date progress already made and to prepare
for the greater tftsks ahead.
� See Visual Presentation in Section L
164 �
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Tub, S.-..ret
The reorganization, pursuant to JCS
155/4/D, established a new pattern which
was to obtain throughout the existence of
OSS. Whereas the reorganization of Octo-
ber 1942 had grouped the branches accord-
ing to the degree of secrecy involved in their
operations, e.g., SO and SI under one deputy
director and It&A and FN under another,
General Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-35) reorgan-
ized the agency in accordance with cate-
gories of services rendered. The result was
a tightened organizational structure de-
signed to facilitate inter-branch coopera-
tion and to render maximum service, with-
out hindering necessary development and
expansion.
This was accomplished by placing a series
of Administrative and technical branches
under the Director and Assistant Director,
and grouping under separate deputy direc-
tors related branches in three categories:
Intelligence, Operations and Services. The
Deputy Director of the Intelligence Service
was charged initially with the supervision
and direction of MA, SI and FN, all of which
had been established early in the COI period.
Two branches were subsequently added to
the Intelligence Service: The Je-2 (Counter-
Espionage) Branch which was established
In June 1943, and the CD Branch (Censor-
ship and Documents) which was set up in
November.
The Deputy Director of the Intelligence
Service sat on the JIC and assisted the
liaison of the various branches for which he
was responsible, both with that Committee
and with other outside agencies and depart-
ments. Perhaps his most important func-
tion, however, was to facilitate inter-branch
cooperation. The coorclinPtion effected by
the Deputy Director was particularly valu-
able in matters of intelligence Vanning and
evaluation.
It was always recognized, however, that
each of the functions represented by the
various intelligence branches was distinct,
requiring different techniques and methods.
Therefore, their independence of operation
and liaison was not disturbed.
In coordinating the activities of the intel-
ligence branches, the Deputy Director was
assisted by an Administrative Officer who re-
ported directly to him, and an Assistant
Deputy Director who maintained contact
with the Planning Group and X-2 and co-
ordinated the activities of the intelligence
units in the New York Area Office. The fol-
lowing officers reported to the Deputy Direc-
tor through his Assistant: (1) The Chief of
Evaluation, Processing and Dissemination
Activities; (2) the Chief of Collection Activi-
ties; (3) the Chief of JICA, who supervised
and coordinated all activities of JICA with
respect to OSS; and (4) the Chief of Special
Projects, who supervised the activities of
various units of OSS on permanent intelli-
gence projects.
The chart on page 166 shows the dissemi-
nation of OSS intelligence in Washington
during the twelve months ended 1 April
1945. Many of the reports disseminated in
the field that proved valuable to local head-
quarters are not included, since Washing-
ton distribution eliminated obsolescent and
duplicative items. Although the number of
intelligence reports disseminated cannot be
considered an indication of their value, nev-
ertheless, the chart indicates clearly the
Impressive scope which the OSS Intelligence
Service had achieved by 1945. It is all the
more striking when it is noted that distribu-
tees generally gave OSS reports a high eval-
uation, and that throughout the latter part
of 1943 and thereafter quality rather than
quantity was increasingly stressed in all
OSS intelligence activities.
(a) RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS�
R&A
The functions of R&A were so broad and
complex as to resist precise definition. Ba-
sically, the concept of the Branch grew out
of realization that the intelligence set-up of
the United States was inadequate to cope
with the derruknds of modern war. came_
165
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
11133CIAMI OF NS MIRLICECE II 118111311
12 MONTHS ENDING 1 APRIL 1945
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
JCS AND RELATED AGENCIES
4.
Oak anima of Immige mom mod .4 0.. 'Amy el PAW' le 'Asp rm-Johd Anortiny Mdellomm Swam.
LC CopshOdm %am *ohs el kAwdlows di MIAMI p...%�s,pl seslymo, 610,375 mmdesia sumps.
�
:4' .10,:iVit.
:
r-o- re no,
SERVICES
IMmodiseehe (29-MdeMri VD 0�104) OMAN pi� is.
sollMs dal pogo.) end maw Amplummddr, mudies
(frywandy muld�wellow) Mr "May gorommord el
Goma, sod /spook
AN. � wid� sorlev blo.implidA popriellook Wm.
frial. OrensperlaGeol, eml mho model dud*, end
264402 amps tim perokriur brINKINS of iho minim
APO wpm Wawa& Mow S. ow co man di Me,
CM, eml AL
0000 emoder.doelsomme Mum, molM, MO
rrr.--zrza STRATEGIC (COORDINATED)
INTELUGENCE
11111112111111 TACTICAL (SPOT) INTEWGENCE
AUTHORIZED AGENCIES
Media el ps.44001�9 pvidoes widim aid al dm verlenhod4
mdmiwoys, dhammmod, tvgardflem, aokyl el NOteielo. art*
ow orlon, lesommost4.4 s.d roltabilftgeo. Portfoolwly
104111A, VOL Woe Ulppino, Mod lama,
Iddhol MAN lie Sss. Is the pecilmfor meMems Imbard
~IOW
Walk mon as drowd padad IlmmIdds dad maid upuus. am
sajw derelopmedsIs, Meta Imelda sonMes M add
dipldmoto.
17.14111MOspli
1*400 qmil IMillommo Nom S. IMMes maim adderd M Oar
�800�02.
700 woofiankdolligoto Iwo is Ms Csamodip.IsMius Mak
74I-- MOO poem on poked *Add% mud 60141, el
hordsedwormi� 4.M.405a sea verde Id ILL -Ms* kfaa� CAm
rwilp, eft
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top
quently, as related in the account of the
Branch under COI, there were maromiled to
the over-all intelligence effort sources previ-
ously untapped and skills previously unused.
Though not new in themselves, they consti-
tuted an innovation when combined and ap-
plied to the field of intelligence.
Like COI/OSS itself, the functions of R&A
were defined in practice rather than by fiat.
It was primarily a service so conceived that
it could be of value to many agencies but
subject to none. It served the operating
branches of OSS, but it did most of its work
for various agencies of the JCS, State De-
partment, the armed services, and others.
And in its work for the latter agencies R&A
found its greatest significance.
In one broad aspect of its operations, R&A
engaged in a search for facts. Trained re-
searchers were brought to the service of the
Government to probe out, or deduce, the elu-
sive but necessary fact or set of facts.
In addition, R&A applied to existing facts
analytic and interpretive skills theretofore
not employed for intelligence purposes.
Economists, geographers, political scientists
and historians were enlisted in its service.
Thus R&A developed new techniques for de-
terznining the intentions and capabilities of
other nations.
R&A was in a unique position. Placed at
a strategic level high in government eche-
lons�directly under the President in COI
and under the JCS in OSS�it could main-
tain the objective and independent approach
so essential a prerequisite to accurate inter-
pretation and evaluation. It was in an or-
ganization free of any policy-making re-
sponsibilities and therefore separate from
any particular point of view advocated in
any other quarter or agency. It was given
authority for access to information from all
parts of the Government and, although dif-
ficulties were encountered in obtaining com-
plete coverage, the range of material made
available to R&A was a significant step to-
wards the principal of a centralized intelli-
� gence agency. Furthermore, the success
and effectiveness of R&A techniques, certain
of which were adopted by other agencies,
served in effect to influence, if not revolu-
tionize, intelligence processing throughout
the Government
(1) Reorganization, January 1943.
The development of the R&A Branch
structure was directed toward (1) maximum
flexibility and adaptability to cope with the
wide variety of tasks assigned, (2) relieving
research personnel of problems of arlininie.-
trative detail, and (3) placing auxiliary or
specialized functions such as files, access to
sources, and cartography into positions of
greatest support to the research staff.
Certain basic problems had not been re-
solved in the COI period, particularly the
question of regional versus functional or-
ganization kid the increasing awkwardness
of the arrangements with the Library of
Congress, which entailed a physical and ad-
ministrative separation of a major portion
of R&A personnel At the beginning of
January 1943 a sweeping Branch reorganiza-
tion took place. Under consideration as
early as October 1942, it was not consum-
mated until after the over-all OSS reorgani-
zation which followed the issuance of JCS
155/4/D in December.
Four principal divisions were created, re-
gional in responsibility but with functional
subdivisions. They were designated Europe-
Africa, Far East, USSR and Latin America,
each comprising Economics, Political and
Geographic Subdivisions. The former Eco-
nomics Division staff was distributed among
the various Economics Subdivisions; person-
nel of the former DSI Sections were taken
into the Political Subdivisions; and the Geo-
graphic Reports Section staff of the former
Geographic Division manned the Geographic
Subdivisions. The Psychology Division was
abolished and the greater part of its person-
nel was transferred to the Planning Staff.
A Current Intelligence Staff continued the
preparation of periodic intelligence sum-
maries and was responsible for problems re-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top-Secret�
lated to the collection and dissemination of
information on the immediate situation.
It worked closely with the regional divisions.
To support the work of the regional divi-
sions, CID, the "library" of Branch docu-
mentation, was maintained intact, as was
the IDC. A new functional division, the
Map Division, was created of personnel frcim
the Cartographic Section of the former
Geographic Division.*
The reorganization was physical as well as
administrative, since the agreement with the
Library of Congress was terminated follow-
ing the dissolution of DSL Personnel who
had been working in the Library were moved
to offices nearer OSS headquarters as rapidly
as space could be found.
Effective control over the substantive
work of the Branch was lodged in the Proj-
ects Committee, on which all divisions were
represented. This Committee, directly re-
sponsible to the Branch Chief, grew out of
a Planning Committee which had func-
tioned after July 1942 under the Board of
Analysts.**
It is significant to note that the structure
of the Branch as shaped by the reorgani9a-
tion in January 1943 remained substantially
unchanged thereafter. An effective balance
had been found between regional and func-
tional organization, and under the Projects
Committee the work of the divisions con-
tinued at an efficient level despite the variety
of projects undertaken and the changes in
emphasis requested by "customers" or dic-
tated by conditions.
� A Presentation Division was created at this
time to continue the functions of the former
Visual Presentation Branch, but it was trans-
ferred to the Field Photographic Unit on 1 July
1943.
�� The Board of Analysts met less frequently
following November 1942. It was eventually dis-
solved on 1 December 1943, partly because other
duties required so much of the time of the Board
members, and partly because the editorial and
administrative functions of the Board had been
delegated to other units. Its function as origi-
nally conceived had never fully materialized.
-Top Secrat
(2) Branch Administration
An important part of the reorganization
was the expansion of Branch administrative
machinery. An Executive Officer and an ad-
ministrative staff, responsible to the Branch
Chief, were appointed. Their purpose was
to relieve both the Branch Chief and the
division chiefs of the bulk of necessary ad-
ministrative detail.
Problems of budget and the allocation of
personnel grades, both civilian and military,
predominated. The latter was never satis-
factorily solved. As the war progressed, the
Branch was threatened with the loss of an
Increasing number of its men through draft
calls. However, there was no over-all policy
of military status for essential Branch per-
sonnel. Exemptions were both distasteful
and difficult to obtain; commissions were ex-
tremely scarce, those that were secured be-
ing frequently in ranks not commensurate
with positions of similar responsibility in
MIS or ONI Many of the R&A staff were
Inducted, given basic training and returned
to the Branch as enlisted men.
On the other hand, as OSS received in-
creasing allotments for military personnel,
a number of highly qualified Army and Navy
men of both commissioned and enlisted
ranks, with linguistic or research ability, was
assigned to R&A either by the services or
upon specific request. The result within
R&A was a veritable anarchy of military
rank, with enlisted men or junior officers in
some cases directing the work of men up to
the rank of lieutenant colonel. Some R&A
enlisted men were authorized to wear civil-
ian clothes to facilitate their dealings with
general and staff officers in other services,
and to permit access to installations and
documents forbidden to non-commissioned
personneL
As R&A staffs overseas expanded, problems
relating to the outposts became the responsi-
bility of the Executive Officer. The number
of details involved, from the scheduling and
expediting of transportation requests to fay
cilitating the activities of R&A personnel all
168
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09124C00168776
--Tep--Seeret�
over the world, increased, as some 400 of the
Branch's staff of 1,200 were sent overseas.
(3) Supporting Divisions and Outposts
Ceara/ Information Division�CID. CID
was the reference library for intelligence.
The bulk of documentary material reached.
the Branch through CID, where it was reg-
istered, indexed and made available to the
regional divisions. Such material included
classified and unclassified documents, infor-
mational cables and censorship material, as
well as pictorial and biographical records.
In addition, the Division processed most of
the foreign publications procured by MC.
CID not only proved able to cope with the
variety of materials used by the Branch, but
established a filing system of exceptional
clarity and ease of handling. It used a
cross-reference index system, featuring sub-
ject summaries on index cards, which was
adopted subsequently by several other in-
telligence staffs. In addition, daily acces-
sion lists were circulated throughout R&A,,
noting and summarizing all new items re-
ceived.
Where necessary, special handling proce-
dures were established for specific categories
of documentation. Principal among these
were State Department cables from diplo-
matic posts overseas, copies of which were
forwarded regularly to R&A. They in-
cluded, for example, reports of the State De-
partment press reading group operating in
the Embassy in Moscow.
A liaison staff within CID worked to as-
sure R&A access to maximum sources and
reports of other government agencies and
offices. It also expedited dissemination of
R&A reports in Washington.
By 1945 the Division was processing some
10,000 itinns monthly, each of which was
generally submitted to six or seven analysts
prior to permanent filing in the CD) library
for further use within and outside OSS. The
library indexed over 400,000 cards by subject
and region, including special collections in
OSS custody, such as the German and Ital-
ian Libraries of Information, the similar
French Library and those of other alien or-
ganizations.
The Biographical Records Section (which
had originated in SI) obtained information
from all types of printed matter, interviews
with refugees and prisoners of war, censor-
ship intercepts and other sources, to build
files on key personnel in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory. Some 100,000 docu-
mented biographies existed by 1945, rang-
ing from a paragraph to several pages, and
In constant process of augmentation. Each
Item was checked and evaluated by the ap-
propriate political subdivision before being
made available through normal CID chan-
nels. Field staffs were established in New
York and San Francisco and in 1945 an over-
seas unit was sent to England and France to
supply comprehensive German biographical
data to G-5 SHAM
The Pictorial Records Section (which was
taken over from the Visual Presentation
Branch of COI in June 1942) had collected
and processed some 227,000 photographs by
November 1944. All of such photographs
dealt with enemy or enemy-occupied coun-
tries and were available for the use of R&A
analysts, Army, Navy and other official
agencies.
Map Division. The Map Division was di-
vided into four sections: Cartography, Map
Intelligence, Topographic Models and Spe-
cial Photography.
The Cartography Section produced maps
which constituted specialty studies for stra-
tegic purposes rather than conventional op-
erational maps for tactical use. The pro-
duction of such maps involved research like
that conducted in the regional divisions, and
the cartographers, trained both as geogra-
phers and map makers, worked closely with
the analysts, sometimes translating textual
data into maps, sometimes compiling the in-
formation themselves. The maps that ac-
companied R&A projects were no mere illus-
trations, but were integral parts of th:
studies, many maps constituting intelligence
169 --Tep-Seeret�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Fep-Secoot-
reports in themselves. Approximately thirty
percent of the Section's work was for the JCS,
particularly the Joint War Plans Committee,
and the Section performed continual map
reporting duties for General Marshall. In
addition, it directly served at the Quebec
and Teheran conferences and prepared prac-
tically all the maps for the JANIS studies.
The intelligence cartography performed by
the Section involved subjects as varied as
those in which the regional divisions were
Interested.
The Map Intelligence Section was the only
United States unit with the function of col-
lecting new cartographic material of all
types, both in the United States and abroad.
From road maps and tourist guides to highly
specialized geologic and resources studies,
surveys, installation plans and techni-
cal transportation or telecommunications
charts, it built up one of the largest foreign
map collections in the country. Map Divi-
sion men at R&A overseas outposts served as
map collectors abroad. The Map Intelli-
gence collections comprised approximately
500,000 items, all filed, indexed and cata-
logued for ready reference. During a typi-
cal month in 1944, in addition to answering
frequent spot inquiries, it distributed 110,000
copies of some 20,000 different maps.
The Topographic Models Section per-
formed basic research for geomorphic ex-
pression and produced the large three-di-
mensional models employed in both strate-
gic and operational pp:amine, mechanical
devices were developed by the Section es-
pecially for this work, including the Ortho-
jector,* the ateorob," the vertical slide pro-
jector, and others. In addition, new tech-
� A machine designed to permit the transfer of
geographic information from a glass plate or a
good image on paper to any other surface, the
result being in orthographic projection.
�� A zriAPhine developed to permit the carving
of topographic models under the stereoscopic pro-
jection of maps. The word "atcorob" is derived
from the names of three Ft&A personnel who
Invented It.
-Tiop-freeFet-
niques were pioneered, such as shadow
painting, which was found to be the only
way to bring out minor relief features to the
fullest extent.
The fact that each model consumed an
average of 2200 man hours, and each dupli-
cate 150 man-hours, indicates the painstak-
ing detail required. The Section worked
closely with corresponding units subse-
quently established by the Army.
The Special Photography Section was en-
gaged principally in extending the use of
the topographic models by producing black
and white and color reproductions on which
the daily situation was recorded. Ninety
percent of the Section's work was performed
for the JCS.
Inter-Departmental Committee for the
Acquisition of Foreign Publicaticms--IDC.
IBC was composed of representatives of OSS,
MIS, ONI, FEA, OWI, Commerce, Treasury,
Agriculture, State and the Library of Con-
gress, and served all government agencies
In the regular collection of foreign periodi-
cals and publications, either in their original
form or in microfilm copy. Besides taking a
leading part in the organization and activi-
ties of LDC, R&A was responsible for its ad-
ministration and R&A staffs abroad assisted
in IDC collection activities.
In late 1944 during a typical month 1,000
books, 6,300 serial publications in their origi-
nal form and 10,000 in microfilm were re- �
ceived. The material, including news-
papers, magazines, books and such docu-
ments as telephone and city directories, was
listed in a central card index and daily
resumes were widely distributed. Biblio-
graphic services were supplied on request.
Outposts. While the major part of R&A's
work was necessarily performed in Washing-
ton, the R&A outposts overseas were of in-
valuable FLo�sistance in supporting Branch ac-
tivities and in serving as points of contact
with military and diplomatic "customers" in
the field. By November 1944 R&A staffs had
been established at London, Algiers, Cairoz
Caserta, Paris, Stockholm, New Delhi, Barr
170
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
tr.
--Zeir5errur
Honolulu, Chungking, Bucharest, Istanbul,
Rome, Lisbon, Kandy and Athens.
The activities at the outposts naturally
varied according to their size and the de-
mands of the theater or area in which they
were located, but they had certain general
functions. A primary activity was the col-
lection of fresh intelligence in the field, par-
ticularly in newly conquered or liberated
areas close to the military front. Much of
the information gathered by R&A fell mid-
way between that of SI and the State De-
partment�while the former generally em-
ployed secrecy and the latter had to observe
diplomatic protocol, R&A personnel were re-
stricted by neither of these considerations.
Although the resulting information was fre-
quently for immediate use in the field, it was
also transmitted to R&A in Washington as
rapidly as possible. Another primary func-
tion of the field staffs was to assure the
speedy distribution of Washington R&A
products to appropriate local users in the
field, both inside and outside OSS.
Members of the regional divisions in the
field did not limit their procurement of ma-
terial to that concerning the area of their
primary interest; valuable information on
the Far East or the USSR was obtained in
London as well as Rome and Cairo, and in-
formation of particular use on Germany was
acquired in North Africa, Italy and France.
The specific activities of the field staffs are
more completely covered in the accounts of
OSS operations in the various. theaters.
Aside from the function of relaying material
back to headquarters, each of the outposts
to some degree performed the functions of an
R&A Branch for local authorities.
Field Offices. Permanent R&A field offices
were maintained in New York and San Fran-
cisco as auxiliary bases for Washington re-
search activities.
The New York office was established in Au-
gust 1942 upon the liquidation of OL* It
served the Branch by obtaining information
and documentation from sources available
� See account of Olin SectIon I.-
only in New York, including libraries, re-
search centers, business, commercial and
missionary or educational organizations in
the area. In addition, interrogations or spe-
cific research projects were undertaken as
directed, and close liaison maintained with
OSS units and other government agencies
in New York. A separate specialized staff
was maintained in New York by the Bio-
graphical Records Section of C.
The San Francisco office was similarly use-
ful to R&A in the collection of essential ma-
terial primarily available on the West Coast.
The USSR and Far East Divisions particu-
larly used its facilities and on several occa-
sions sent personnel to San Francisco or
Seattle to direct specific research or interro-
gation 'assignments.
After the establishment of the Civil Af-
fairs Staging Area (CASA) at Fort Ord,*
the R&A staff on the West Coast was in-
creased to contribute to the completion of
Civil Affairs programs for Japan.
(4) Regional Divisions
Projects Committee. This Committee was
the controlling and coordinating authority
for the substantive work of the Branch. The
pqmstant Chief of the Branch acted as
Chairman and its membership was drawn
from all divisions. The members were not
merely delegates of their divisions but also
represented various fields of subject matter
and different levels of administrative au-
thority. The Committee performed a line
function in the control of research, and a
staff function in advising the Branch Chief.
In either case, it represented a direct ex-
tension of his authority.
All requests for the preparation of R&A
studies were submitted to the Committee.
It decided priorities within the Branch on
the basis of all relevant factors, such as pur-
pose of the project, source of the request,
units to be consulted or to cooperate, and es-
timated time required.
The R&A Editor sat on the Projects Com-
mittee. His function was to assure a unit
171
� See 'West Coast Mee below.
1
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
4-ap-Seeoet�
form high standard in all Branch reports
prior to dissemination and to request revi-
sions in editorially unsatisfactory materiaL
Regional DiViSilMS. (Europe-Africa. Far
East, USSR, Latin America). These four
divisions, each concerned with one of the
world's major spheres, were the core of the
Branch. They performed the major func-
tion of research and analysis, and issued the
bulk of the studies and reports that repre-
sented the R&A intelligence product.
Each division was subdivided into three
parts�economic, political and geographic�
each of which was in turn composed of sev-
eral sections to handle specific subjects such
as transport, population and manpower, in-
dustrial and military supplies, agriculture
and standards of living, and localized areas.
In considering the organizational struc-
ture of the Branch, however, it should be re-
membered that it was not a system of rigid
compartmentation; under Projects Commit-
tee direction any one of its components
might work with another and each had to be
prepared to handle a wide diversity of mate-
riaL Flexibility was cultivated so that each
project could receive the most appropriate
treatment�using established analytical
techniques and evaluation processes or, if the
need existed, developing new ones suited to
the particular demands of the subject. Con-
sequently, the complex nature of some proj-
ects frequently required collaboration which
over-rode administrative distinctions. Proj-
ects were often undertaken by special divi-
sional committees of representatives from
several sections, and where projects crossed
regional division lines, research "task
groups" were designated.
To the analysts of the regional divisions
came all intelligence pertinent to their field
of inquiry, so that each current item could
be compared with all that was then known
of the subject in order to determine its re-
liability, to fit it into the general picture, and
to decide what interpretations or conclusions
could reasonably be drawn on the basis of
experience or technical reasoning. Through
their wide background of knowledge and the
variety of sources to which they had access,
the analysts were able to maintain continu-
ing study of changing conditions based on
the latest information, and to evaluate spe-
cific effects that might be expected to result
from proposals or policies submitted to them.
Prior to VE-Day, and to some extent there-
after by reason of the many post-war prob-
lems which came within the purview of R&A,
highest priority was on Europe. Therefore,
at the time of the reorganization of the
Branch in January 1943, the Europe-Africa
Division was assigned the majority of the
personnel of the former Economics and Geo-
graphic Divisions. In contrast, other divi-
sions, particularly the Far East Division,
were handicapped throughout by lack of
sufficient personnel, as many of the small
number of specialfgts on the area with ac-
ceptable qualifications were by 1943 already
engaged by the armed services or other agen-
cies and departments of the Government.
Current Intelligence Staff. A special unit
worked closely with the regional divisions,
securing, editing and disseminating current
intelligence with particular emphasis on in-
formation of a political nature. It was in-
strumental in promptly relaying the latest
information to those who needed it as back-
ground for larger or specialized studies.
The OSS War Room was maintained by
the Current Intelligence Staff with appro-
priate situation maps, charts and reports, as
well as documents. BI-weekly oral reports
on current military and related activities
were presented in the War Room to a re-
stricted group of key OSS and other officers,
principally to facilitate integration of OSS
plans with projected military and naval op-
erations.
CIS prepared periodic current intelligence
publications. The "Daily Intelligence Sum-
mary" was distributed to OSS policy-making
officials and provided factual intelligence
abstracts of the most significant foreign de-
velopments of the day. It also produced th%
172
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Top-Sesse*-
"Political Intelligence Weekly",* a review of
current foreign political and strategic de-
velopments for circulation within OSS and
to operating echelons of outside agencies to
which it served as a valuable supplement to
JIC publications. However, broad top-eche-
lon distribution of such weekly summaries
by OSS had been abolished by JCS as du-
plicative of similar 0-2 and ONI resumes.
Therefore, a "JIC Weekly Sunamary" was
prepared for circulation to 65 policy-making
leaders in the Government. The Current
Intelligence Staff represented OSS on the
JIC Editorial Committee and prepared the
bulk of the text, including both original
papers and summaries of reports written
elsewhere in R&A.
(5) Source Materials �
All 'types and varieties of documents and
materials were used by R&A to yield inteM-
gence. However, ready access to the latest
information from all possible sources was
the basic factor in the preparation of ex-
haustive intelligence studies.
The key researchers and specialists in the
Branch combined in themselves knowledge
not only of their respective fields but of
sound research procedure. The additional
quality of adaptability or flexibility to the
newness of their environment and the multi-
plicity of the problems they faced distin-
guished the most successful R&A personnel.
In applying their research experience to in-
telligence work, they depended on both (1)
existing or established sources of informa-
tion, such as governmental or official files,
and (2) the wealth of data available in overt
sources theretofore little used in the United
States for intelligence, such as foreign and
specialized books, periodicals and publica-
tions, records and files of private corpora-
tions and agencies with interests abroad,
� This was essentially the same as the weekly
summaries previously entitled "The War This
Week" and "Psychological 'Warfare Weekly". See
account of R&A in Section L
and interrogations of travellers or refugees
from all over the world.
Government or Official Sources. Virtually
all departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment with interests in foreign policy or con-
ditions possessed files or documentation of
interest to intelligence research. It was nec-
essary to inspect and coordinate all the vari-
ous files to ascertain the extent of material
available, and to have access to and keep
abreast of any and all new information wher-
ever received.
The principal official sources were Army,
Navy and State Department, and the intelli-
gence or research units of the Departments
of Justice, Commerce, Treasury (including
Foreign Funds Control), Agriculture and
.Labor, as well as the FCC (both technical
and monitoring functions), Alien Property
Custodian and Petroleum Administrator for
War. New agencies, such as the BEW (later
PEA) and the Office of Censorship, contrib-
uted specialized information. In addition,
Intelligence studies were received from Brit-
ish and other Allied intelligence services and
were invaluable both as sources and for
checking or verification. �
The mass of current information flowing
Into the various governmental agencies not
only expanded and brought intelligence files
up to date but as a whole provided compre-
hensive regional and functional intelligence
coverage. All such information was not al-
ways made available to R&A, despite Presi-
dential order in the days of COI and JCS
directive later. This was understandable in
view of natural reluctance of established
agencies to recognize the over-all nature of a
new organization such as R&A. Donovan
referred to the handicap of not receiving all
intelligence reports available to other agen-
cies in the course of the controversies in the
JPWC prior to JCS 155/4/D.* All the JCS
directives of the 155 series specifically en-
joined complete exchange of information be-
tween MIS, ONI and OSS. However, as Uite
� See Exhibit W-28.
173
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24C00168776
..Top-Secret-
as July 1943, the Deputy Director, Intelli-
gence Service, commented, in a letter to the
Executive Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on the difficulties which confronted
R&A due to the disadvantages of not receiv-
ing full cooperation from other agencies in
this regard.* Although the volume of in-
formation received from other agencies in-
creased as working relations developed and
improved, frequently R&A analysts were un-
able to obtain a specific item, or items, of
highly classified information which might
have improved the final product consider-
ably and strengthened the conclusions that
were reached.
Informal liaison with high planning and
policy echelons was maintained by R&A in
order to follow the direction of top echelon
government planning. The Branch could
anticipate specific intelligence requests and
the regional divisions were afforded a more
realistic interpretation in their evaluation of
current intelligence.
Reports of other OSS branches were an
Important source of information. Such
sources as SI became particularly signifi-
cant as the close relations attendant upon
the establishment of the post of Deputy Di-
rector, Intelligence Service, resulted in
quicker and freer interchange of material
- and evaluation.
Overt Research Sources. As a result of
their pre-war experience, the researchers at
once turned to the published sources avail-
able in the Library of Congress, the New York
Public Library, and the specialized collec-
tions in trade or professional associations of
engineering, geography, social sciences and
archaeology, to name a few. These sources
ranged from contemporary technical jour-
nals, meticulously describing the latest
bridges, factories or port installations,
through annual statistics or chamber of
commerce publications on population, trans-
portation, or food consumption, and tele-
phone or business directories valuable in pin-
'See History File W-15.
-fop-Secret-
pointing the exact location of bombing tar-
gets, to early narratives of exploration
among little-visited regions or islands. Late
Issues of enemy publications in the immedi-
ate pre-war years were frequently edited to
conceal important facts and had to be care-
fully checked before use. Thus, an official
Japanese publication listed a registration of
trucks smaller than the number known to
have been shipped to Japan from the United
States alone. On the other hand, an analy-
sis of current issues of European freight
tariffs, which listed rates for shipping oil
from new locations, revealed the existence of
two theretofore unsuspected oil installa-
tions. Photo reconnaissance subsequently
confirmed this intelligence.
The files of private American business,
manufacturing, shipping, insurance, educa-
tional and missionary organizations proved
a most important source. The sale of loco-
motives and rolling stock to a foreign rail-
road necessitated complete information on
trackage, water, fueling, clearances, switch
points, grade cuts, tunnels and bridges. De-
livery of oil products required complete data
on foreign oil bunkering, storage and piping
facilities. Insurance firms reinsuring for-
eign installations had files on construction
details, surroundings and vulnerability.
American firms were cooperative through-
out in making their records and data fully
available to R&A, but they were also ap-
proached frequently by MIS, Chief of Engi-
neers, ONI and BEW with apparently iden-
tical requests. Items gathered by R&A were
regularly accessioned in CID or made avail-
able to other agencies on request.
Extensive interrogations, both of return-
ing travellers and of Americans or refugees
Informed on specific details of foreign instal-
lations or developments, were significant in
indicating new topics for verification or in
confirming dubious or incomplete data.
R&A supplemented the work begun by DI
and developed by SFE; detailed briefings
were given interrogators and additional in-�
174
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top--Sar.�4-
terviews with sources were arranged for
R&A personneL
(6) Types of Studies
R&A studies, which numbered more than
2,500 in December 1944, were so varied in
type that space will permit little more than
an indication of their general scope. In
broad classifications, projects were directed
towards operational planning, diplomatic
problems, military government activities,
post-hostilities regulation of the enemy and
world security policies.
Comprehensive Regional Studies and Ap-
praisals. From the earliest days of the war,
R&A was consistently concerned with the
preparation of complete area surveys, which
Included detailed analyses by text and map
of terrain, climate, transport groups, re-
sources, and the social, governmental and
economic structure of foreign nations:
Three such studies, each several hundred
pages long, were made for the invasion of
North Africa in November 1942, the one on
Morocco serving as a guide in planning the
landings and subsequent operations there.
A survey of the railroads of North Africa was
so comprehensive that it was used by the
United States Army Engineers as a basis
for the organi7a tion of North African over-
land transport. Equally complete studies
were later made of southern Italy, Nor-
mandy, Brittany and southern France. Of
the same general nature were geographic
monographs on small island groups, which,
since they were prepared primarily for the
Navy, placed great emphasis on coastal fea-
tures.
One smaller study of 125 pages, under-
taken as an outcome of the first Quebec Con-
ference, illustrates the problems and tech-
niques involved in such work. The directive
merely requested a study of the Kuriles.
But a preliminary survey of the chain of
islands demonstrated the advisability of con-
centrating on one island, Shimushu-to.
This Island was strategically located with
respect to the line of northern Japanese de-
fenses; was secure on one side, since it was
adjacent to neutral Russia; and was suitable
for the development of airfields due to its
level terrain. The accumulation of source
materials was particularly difficult. Fur-
thermore, place names had been given by
the Russians, by the Japanese, and by Swed-
ish and British explorers, so that it was a
problem, for example, to tell whether a lake
described in a Swedish text was the same as
one differently named on a. Japanese map.
The description of the Island was carefully
built up through the ingenious use of widely
scattered sources. A Japanese limnological
study published in a German hydrographic
journal furnished some excellent photo-
graphs, as did a Swedish naturalist's travel
account. (An obscure original edition of
the latter discovered in a small midwestern
college library was found to contain twice
the number of plates which appeared in the
English translation used by other intelli-
gence agencies.) An eighteenth century
Russian book; an account of sea otter hunt-
ing; Several botanical journals published in
places as far removed as Boston, Tokyo and
Sweden; the proceedings of a Canadian
scientific congress; official Japanese publi-
cations, such as hydrographic bulletins; clas-
sified and unclassified Allied government
documents on climate, tides, etc., and maps
from the Japanese Imperial Land Survey, the
British Admiralty, the Canadian Depart-
ment of National Defense, the United States
Army Map Service, and the United States
and USSR Hydrographic Offices, were among
the many printed sources consulted. To
these were added civilian and military popu-
lation estimates based on housing facilities
shown in aerial photographs, information
on lighthouses from an American submarine
reconnaissance, gun position data from a
captured enemy document, and the location
of defenses discovered through interrogating
� prisoners of war from Attu. Altogether,
more than 500 separate sources were used
and checked one against the other to arrixe
at a full description of Shimushu-to, an
1Y5
Top
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Taf.)�Secre-
island measuring but 18.7 miles by 15.5 miles.
The report was supplemented by eight maps,
one providing general coverage of the Island,
and each of the others illustrating in detail
the seven separate coastal areas.
R&A's early topographic studies served in
large part as a pattern for the Joint Army
Navy Intelligence Studies (JANLS) publica-
tions. The JANIS committee was formed in
April 1943 through the cooperation of MIS,
ONI and OSS, and was subsequer tly brought
under the control of the JCS through the
Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board
(J1SPB). JANIS publications were stand-
ard surveys for strategic planning in the
Pacific.' They set forth in text and maps
the physical, military and cultural elements
which must be known for planning military
operations. Of the fourteen chapters, R&A
prepared the four dealing with transporta-
tion and communication, cities and towns,
resources and trade, and peoples and govern-
ment.
Somewhat analogous were reports, such
as the study of south Germany made for mili-
tary government purposes, which included
1,500 pages of text and 804 maps. Since
their aim was administrative and not opera-
tional, they dealt with new subjects and
treated the old ones from different points of
view, but they resembled the other topo-
graphic surveys in being broad basic studies
of large areas.
Another example of a major project de-
signed to aid military government was the
Civil Affairs Handbooks, which were pre-
pared to provide background intelligence in
text and maps on those countries and areas
in the post-hostilities governments in which
American officers would participate. R&A
prepared the detailed factual descriptions of
the geographic, economic, social and politi-
cal organization of the subject regions,
� Of the 24 JANII3 studies, to which RSA con-
tributed one-third of the work involved, 23 were
concerued with the Pacific; the only one com-
pleted on Europe was that for Bularia.
which constituted approximately 75% of
these studies.
Still another type of broad-range study
was the periodic R&A evaluation of enemy
and Allied capabilities and intentions in
Europe and continental Asia. Similar esti-
mates and forecasts as to Russia in Europe
and the Fax East were made periodically for
the JIC. Such studies presented particu-
larly complex problems, and necessitated in-
genious evaluation of limited, though widely
differing, sources. The evaluations proved
repeatedly to be substantially correct. Meas-
urements of quantitative factors of man-
power, production and consumption, as the
bases of reliable predictions of future trends,
formed the main body of these works. As a
result, these projects made great use of
extrapolation of available statistics in rela-
tion to past trends in the countries under
survey, as well as pre-war, World War I and
related data from other countries. The gen-
eral conclusions of such studies were based
upon detailed analyses of separate compo-
nents, such as production and consumption
estimates of food, clothing and housing, or
the resources and wastage of manpower.
Essentially, therefore, the general apprais-
als of capabilities and intentions were either
the outgrowth or the synthesis of isolated
studies of specific economic, political and
geographic problems.
Specialized Studies. Specialized studies of
kiny one or any combination of the innumer-
able economic, political or geographic fac-
tors neceesAty for specific operational plan-
ning or general strategic background formed
the greater part of R&A projects.
The range of subjects encountered in such
studies varied as widely as the interests of
R&A customers. Detailed studies on the
single subject of foreign economics, for ex-
ample, included surveys of enemy manpower,
Industrial resources, military supply and
commercial relations. In the narrower
area of logistics, studies ranged from the ex-
amination of one bridge, selected as an SO
target, to a survey of "The Posthilities of �
176
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Opening Additional Additional Supply Routes to
China."
The techniques employed were equally
varied, involving both inductive reasoning,
from fragmentary particulars to the general,
and the deductive application of broad 'prin-
ciples to determine what specific steps a
general situation would 'demand.
Inductive techniques were used in the
study of wartime petroleum consumption by
European countries for the Enemy Oil Com-
mittee. As the base for computing the pe-
troleum consumption of the German and
satellite armies, navies and air forces by
major component units, order of battle data,
careful analysis of daily communiques and
analogies with comparable American infor-
mation were used. Factors of wastage and
losses in vehicles, ships and planes by types
and by campaigns were taken into account.
Then civilian consumption, country by coun-
try, was arrived at through painstakingly
sifting some five to ten thousand fragments
of information (from newspaper clippings,
basic reference books, radio broadcasts, trade
journals, cables, etc.) to build up statistics
on the quantity of petroleum products em-
ployed in fuel-using motor vehicles, railways,
Inland shipping, bunkers, dwellings, com-
mercial aviation, agriculture and industrial
plants. Some 500 separate estimates were
made by country, by use and by types of pe-
troleum. Summing up this mass of mili-
tary and civilian information, the analysts
arrived at figures on over-all fuel consump-
tion and on its use by type in each country.
These figures were constantly reviewed and
kept up to date. When French and Ru-
manian official statistics became available
in the fall of 1944, it was found that they
respectively deviated by but three percent
and four percent from the R&A estimates.
In order to determine German aircraft
production, an analysis was made of the re-
lation-chip between various measures of floor
space and output in American airframe and
aero-engine factories and the result was op-
plied to information derived from aerial
photographs of analogous German plants.
The validity of such comparisons rested upon
the extent to which computations could
compensate for presumable differences.
Among the variables requiring adjustment
were: (1) Basic manufacturing techniques,
such as degree of mechanization, use of scaf-
folding, or space required if wings are joined
to fuselage at an early rather than a late
assembly stage; (2) utilization of personnel
on shifts; (3) ratio of working to storage
and inspection areas; (4) amount of sub-
contracting; and (5) airplane weights and
sizes. These computations provided esti-
mates of output based on the complete utili-
zation of facilities during both eight and
ten-hour shifts. The resultant figures
served to verify the production reported by
ground intelligence.
Similar studies, covering the German pe-
troleum, rubber, steel and textile industries,
placed R&A in a position to identify bottle-
necks in the enemy economy and to develop
strategic bombing programs of maximum ef-
fect with the Allied air resources at hand.
With regard to Europe, this work was con-
centrated in the Enemy Objectives Unit in
London.* Originally, a broad study was
made of the economic effects of the R&A
bombardment of Germany, based on the
British principle of strategic area bombing.
R&A took the position that much more
profitable results could be obtained from
strategic bombardment of individual high
priority targets. This type of work led to
active participation in the Bombardment
Advisory Committee, a Presidential commit-
tee later known as the Committee of Opera-
tions Analysts. The work of this Commit-
tee led, in turn, to the establishment of the
American program of priorities for air at-
tack on Europe, as well as to continuing col-
laboration with A-2 staffs both in wro and
MedT0 on target analysis, target selection
and the post-operational evaluation of
� See R&A/London in Europe-Africa-Middle
East Section.
177 Top
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Jep�Seeref�
bombing results. With R&A men supplying
target direction to the air forces both in ETO
and MedTO, the implementation of EOU pro-
grams in both theaters placed OSS in the
position of a coordinating medium for stra-
tegic bombing attacks on Europe.
Study of Japanese production differed
somewhat from the problem faced in Europe
due to the fragmentary nature of the infor-
mation available. The lists of Japanese in-
dustrial and power installations, painstak-
ingly compiled from sources in the United
States, were checked for completeness
through information from analysis of serial
numbers on captured equipment and the
comparison of resultant production esti-
mates with American floor-space-to-output
ratios to ascertain approximate factory areas
needed for such production.
Other more specialized studies on Japan
Included an estimate of air force personnel.
A list of the officers in a Japanese air force
unit and the dates of their schooling and as-
signment to certain squadrons permitted a
statistical analysis of the officers posted in
specific squadrons at a particular date,
which helped in estimating the over-all or-
ganization of the Japanese air force, number
of its squadrons, age and replacement rates.
The specific techniques used in the vari-
ous specialized studies, each posing its own
problems and requiring judgment and evalu-
ation of items of information in a new con-
text, furthered the continuing development
of new and original intelligence research
methods.
Studies for Foreign Policy. The R&A func-
tion in the formulation of foreign policy was
twofold: First, to evaluate and estimate the
effects of various alternative programs, and
second, to supply all background and current
Information necessary for the most effective
development of the program to be followed.
Both types of study were prepared on request
for the President, the JCS and the State De-
partment.
A significant R&A contribution to post-
hostilities policy was in the formulation of
4opr-Secraf
the Civil Affairs Guides for Army and Navy
civil affairs authorities. R&A analysts pre-
pared 40 of the 65 dealing with Germany and
30 of the 57 on Japan. They also assisted in
the training and briefing of Civil Affairs offi-
cers at Charlottesville, 'Virginia, and Fort
Ord, California. The Guides served to com-
plement the Civil Affairs Handbooks by pre-
senting to Civil Affairs officers specific
recommendations for treating the economic,
legal and political problems with which they
would be faced. They were prepared in
close cooperation with Army, Navy and FEA
and were approved by the Editorial Com-
mittee of Civil Affairs Division for distribu-
tion.
Among activities supporting post-war.
planning, R&A economists made detailed
studies of European economic and agricul-
tural conditions. Specific programs and
evaluations were presented on reparations
problems, particularly the use of German
labor for reparations, establishing peacetime
German steel production totals and stand-
ards of living. Two R&A economists as-
signed to the United States Delegation in
Moscow were in constant contact with R&A
staffs both in Germany and Washington in
order to secure essential and recent informa-
tion for the American Delegation as needed.
R&A operated in an intelligence area pre-
viously little developed by the United
States�the complex field of economic, po-
litical and geographic relationships. The
collection of great stores of source material
and the analytic employment of such mate-
rial furnished a rounded background of in-
telligence, primarily employed for military
operations but holding manifold peacetime
possibilities for the strengthening of Ameri-
ca's knowledge of foreign affairs, and con-
tributing to the future security of the United
States.
With the dissolution of OSS on 30 Sep-
tember 1945, R&A was transferred intact to
the State Department. In transmitting to
the Department a brief summary of some of
178
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
..-10p-SeOrel-
the Branch's major accomplishments, Dono-
van concluded:
These efforts, in combination with R&A's many
other activities, represent substantial progress
made toward the ultimate intelligence target, a
thorough knowledge of the other great powers'
capabilities and intentions, on which the strategic
decisions of this nation will be based.
(b) SECRET INTELLIGENCE�SI
The object of secret intelligence activity
Is to obtain by secret means information
which cannot otherwise be secured and
which is not elsewhere available. Such in-
formation is vital in the determination of
strategy or the formulation of policy.
Through the quality of secrecy, its possessor
gains the benefit of surprise on the offense;
and on the defense the opposition is deprived
of this invaluable asset. An effective secret
Intelligence organization is one which not
only can obtain such information at ran-
dom, but can secure it when needed. It
thus becomes a vital national asset gaining
value through permanence.
The continuing effectiveness of a secret
Intelligence organization depends upon the
secrecy of its methods. That secrecy is in
constant jeopardy. For example, the very
action in which secret information is used
may perforce reveal pre-knowledge. Conse-
quently, the organization must eliminPte
evidence of method (e.g., source) upon dis-
semination, and must constantly strive for
originality in technique.
It is axiomatic, therefore, that there are
no formulae for the successful accomplish-
ment of espionage. Repetition of pattern in
operations is one of the surest ways of in-
viting detection. A secret intelligence or-
ganization cannot become standardized in
operations or procedures; it must always be
In process of development. The situations
which it exploits for intelligence may de-
mand the colorless at one moment, the bi-
zarre at the next. The challenge to judg-
ment and ingenuity is constant.
SI was thus a process rather than a sys-
tem. From the smallest one-man outpost
with an operating military unit, to the bases
In neutral territory and the Washington
headquarters, it sought always to adapt old
methods and develop new ones.
In Washington this was evidenced, not
only in the continuous search for new and
different cover techniques, but also in the
fundamental approach of SI to the problem
of secret intelligence. The latter may be
demonstrated by the establishment of the
Labor Section in mid-1942 to operate
through international labor organizations.
In creating this Section, SI approached its
problem along functional, rather than geo-
graphic, lines. The same trend of thought
also led to the establishment of a Counter-
Intelligence Division in SI in March 1943,
which soon developed into a major intelli-
gence branch with co-equal status.
In general, the OSS period was marked by
a natural decrease in the degree of operat-
ing control exercised by SI/Washington. In
large areas of the world operational control
passed to the bases established in military
theaters. Only in neutral countries was ef-
fective direction from Washington possible.
But while the importance of the operating
divisions diminished, that of the Reporting
Board increased as the flow of intelligence
back to Washington constantly expanded.
Accurate evaluation of intelligence, together
with prompt dissemination, demanded
proper handling and analysis. In addition,
as the SI service developed, "directed" in-
telligence�the rapid fulfillment of specific
intelligence requests�became practicable.
Organizationally, the Branch in WaRhing-
ton was re-formed in October 1942 in the
course of a purely internal OSS reorganiza-
tion.* On 2 January 1943 it was further
affected by the general reorganization di-
rected by JCS 155/4/D. SI thus came into
closer relationship with R&A, X-2, FN and
CD. The important function of SI training
was consolidated with that of SO in an inde-
�
� See Central Administrative Units and Tech-
nical Branches in 1 above.
179
�Top-Seeret
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Jaw-Seeret-
pendent Schools and Training Branch,
wherein SI was represented.*
The Chief of SI directed Branch activities,
exsisted by an Executive Officer, a General
Deputy, a Special Assistant, and a Senior
Intelligence Ofacer. An Administrative Of-
ficer, a Personnel and Recruiting Officer,
the Reporting Board and the Teehnical Sec-
tion reported through the General Deputy.
The latter was also responsible for the op-
erating units, namely, the Geographic Desk;
and the Labor Section.
Geographic Desks. The Geographic Desks
were grouped and re-grouped at various
times between 13 June 1942 and early 1943.
At the latter time, however, they were estab-
lished in the form in which they remained
throughout OSS, namely, in four divisions:
Europe, Africa, Middle East and Far East.
Under OSS, as under COI, these Desks were
the operating sections and initiated SI ac-
tivities.
The progress of the war and the new posi-
tion of the agency as an adjunct of JCS al-
tered their operations considerably, how-
ever. Those Desks concerned with neutral
countries continued to operate in the same
fashion as in the first half of 1942, although
their activities were directed in greater meas-
ure toward penetration of adjacent or
nearby enemy or enemy-occupied territory.
In some areas, such as parts of Africa and
the Middle East, the principal activity pos-
sible was counter-intelligence. SI agents in
these areas had always engaged in some rudi-
mentary counter-intelligence and continued
to do so, making the benefits of their work
available to X-2.
In the principal neutral countries on. the
perimeter of the Axis, e.g., Sweden and
Spain, X-2 was the sole OSS activity author-
ized, but sizable SI inksions were stationed
there for the purpose of penetrating enemy
or enemy-occupied territory. A special case
was Switzerland, where a few SI operatives
� See Schools and Training in 4 below.
^ S..cret-
had been placed in the first ten months of
1942. The country was completely en-
circled from the time of the German occupa-
tion of Vichy France in November 1942 until
September 1944. This isolation made it im-
possible to dispatch additional personnel
and also created difficult problems of com-
munications and supply. Nevertheless, the
intelligence which SI procured from Switzer-
land throughout the war was outstanding.
Therefore, in the case of those Desks serv-
icing agents in neutral countries the job was
more than one of supply and personneL The
search for suitable cover occupations and
qualified people was continuous. SI repre-
sentation in Spain at its peak consisted of
some fifty agents. Since these agents were
engaged in directing the activities of more
than a thousand sub-agents in France, Ma-
� drid became in effect a field base. The same
was true of Scandinavia, where OSS repre-
sentation reached a total of approximately
fifty in late 1944. In Stockholm, however,
SO and MO also carried on activities directed
� toward enemy and enemy-occupied territory.
Since the Reporting Board was responsible
for the dissemination and evaluation of all
intelligence, there were some cases where
the Geographic DP_Rks ceased to have an op-
erational reason for existence and were
wholly concerned with passing on intelli-
gence. Consequently, several Desks, e.g.,
those dealing with certain countries in
southeastern Europe, were placed under the
general direction of the Reporting Board.
In the case of enemy and enemy-occupied
territories, notably France, Italy and the
Berk�A rl% it was necessary that practically
all operations be directed from field bases in
military theaters, such as Algiers, London
and Cairo. The problem was therefore one
of adequately staffing and supplying the
counterparts of the Desks established at the
field bases. As the services divisions of OSS
became integrated and the position of OSS
with the military in various theaters estab-
lished, the problem of supply became prin..
cipally one of operational supplies, such
180 �
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Iftrp-Sueret---
as miniature cameras, portable microfilm
equipment, camouflaged letter-drops, etc.
Many Americans of French or Italian de-
scent were recruited in 1942 to serve as un-
dercover agents in France and Italy. The
demand for personnel in field bases and out-
posts in various military theaters made it
necessary to divert most of these recruits to.
operational staffs there, however. In any
event, the requirements of effective cover
made it more practicable in most instances
to recruit locally in territories such as Africa
(and later in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and
southern Italy, as those regions were occu-
pied by the Allies) agents who had recent
residence in the target areas, and corre-
spondingly greater facilities for cover. Con-
sequently, the Americans recruited in 1942
and trained in the United States became SI
operations officers at such bases as Algiers,
London and Cairo.
Contact between the Geographic Desks
and their field base representatives was
somewhat complicated during most of 1943
by lack of adequate knowledge in Washing-
ton of field conditions. This was particu-
larly true of Algiers. The situation was
caused by the tightness of shipping and
transportation and rigid theater commander
approval requirements, which made it im-
- possible to send adequate clerical and serv-
ices personnel overseas. Not until late 1943
did conditions permit this problem to be
adequately met.
Personnel problems were particularly
complex and troublesome. The need for ad-
ditional personnel in the field was con-
stant;* the number of individuals with the
requisite skills, experience, language, spe-
cialized knowledge and aptitudes for SI was
smalL When a suitable recruit for field staff
was found, the time required to secure his
services and dispatch him was extensive. If
� One effect of the need for personnel in the
field was that SI/Washington was constantly
under pressure to send its experienced officers to
the field, which threatened continuity of head-
quarters direction.
he were in the Army, it would require five
weeks for security check, two weeks for trans-
fer, three weeks for minimum schooling and,
on the average, two weeks in transit. All
this, of course, was exclusive of any time
spent in waiting for military transportation.
There were many cases where the lack of
commission allotments handicapped recruit-
ing and caused a poor morale situation. For
example, a recruit of exceptional qualifica-
tions might be secured, inducted into the
Army as an enlisted man and sent overseas
with the promise of a commission. In many
Instances it was impracticable for such a
man to operate in civilian clothes in the
field, and in uniform his usefulness was con-
siderably curtailed by his enlisted rank
This often resulted in particular knowledges
of language and target area being applied
in the field merely to barter activities or the
direction of foreign motor pool employees.
The Desks were constantly struggling to
get commissions for such personneL This
problem, which was also encountered by
other branches and sections, was particu-
larly acute in the case of SL
In addition, special projects of an exten-
sive nature, such as Sussex,* put an added
recruiting burden upon the Desks.
As emphasis was increasingly placed upon
personnel for military theaters, the type of
personnel desired for SI also changed.
Whereas the Desks sending operatives to
neutral countries were bound by few, if any,
restrictions as to age or physical condition,
those dispatching personnel to theaters of
operation naturally sought younger people
in good physical condition. Therefore,
while the principal officials of SI were civil-
ian, recruiting efforts were increasingly di-
rected toward the various branches of mili-
tary service.
There was a constant and fundamental
conflict in attempts to impose a military ap-
proach on secret intelligence problems,
which was particularly apparent in the mat-
� See SI/North France in Europe-Africa-Middle
East Section.
181 . --Top-Secret�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-rop-Secce#�.
ter of personnel. The military approach to
recruiting, training and replacement is on a
unit basis; PIAA-1 movement and mass opera-
tions require standardization. The oppo-
site is the case in the field of secret intelli-
gence, where it is imperative that personnel
be recruited and trained and operate on an
Individual and voluntary basis. The un-
orthodox is the norm. No force of discipline
can extract that exercise of ingenuity, judg-
ment and energy which the work itself re-
quires. The subject requires some empha-
sis, since it arises out of the unique nature
of secret intelligence activity and lack of
understanding of such basic differences
breeds ineffectiveness.
At the beginning of 1945, when efforts were
re-oriented toward the Far East, the Desks
were engaged in much transferring and de-
briefing of personnel. Post-war projects
and plans were worked out, despite the fact
that official direction could not be forthcom-
ing pending policy decisions on the future
of the agency.
Reporting Board. The increase in the size
and importance of the Reporting Board in
the OSS period reflected most graphically
the effectiveness of SI's operations.
Under COI the Reporting Board handled
only the information received from parallel
services of other nations. By 8 December
1942, however, the operating efforts of the
COI period were returning such a volume of
Intelligence that the Chief of SI directed
that the evaluation and dissemination of all
SI material be handled by the Reporting
Board.
In the spring of 1943 the Reference Room,
which had been established on the basis of
geographic sperfaliqs, changed its organiza-
tion to one of geographic reports officers.
Consequently, the Reference Room was
gradually dissolved and separate offices were
established on a regional basis to correspond
to the Geographic Desks. However, some
topical breakdown of the material was es-
sential, and the Reports Officer in each unit
assigned certain types of reports to specific
-gop-Sar,e0
assistants. In this procedure the Board
compromised with the British system. MS
used a topical breakdown; SI had preferred
a geographic breakdown, which was sub-
divided topically. The Reporting Board
therefore paralleled the SI Geographic
Desks (operating sections) with regional re-
ports officers, but gave a topical breakdown
within the reports unit itself.
For purposes of comparative evaluation,
check lists were distributed to ONI and G-2,
on which they indicated their evaluation of
reports according to currency of interest,
originality of material, reliability and value.
In early 1943 the Joint Intelligence Col-
lection Agency (JICA) of 0-2, ONI and A-2
was created by the JCS. JICA was not an
agency for the initial procurement of intel-
ligence, but was designed to assemble intel-
ligence from the head field offices of all agen-
cies and forward it to Washington. It
rapidly became evident that submission of
intelligence in raw form to JICA in the field
risked unnecessary exposure of SI agents
and considerably delayed transmission to
SI/Washington.
Therefore, in the summer of 1943 the Re-
porting. Board established field reports of-
fices in the principal OSS bases at Algiers,
London, Cairo, Istanbul, Madrid and Kandy.
The field bag, in turn, set up advance sub-
bases as required by the volume of intelli-
gence. In addition to services to the or-
ganization itself in the field through Com-
parative evaluation and briefing of agents,
these field reports officers were invaluable in
facilitating lateral dissemination of intelli-
gence between bases and maintained liaison
with the appropriate military headquarters
and JICA. By late summer of 1944 the
overseas personnel of the Reporting Board
totalled 123.
The Reporting Board in Washington sub-
jected each field reports officer to an inten-
sive period of training before dispatch. The
practicability of this policy became evident
in the uniformity of practice and procedure
which characterized each field office and
182
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
which Psgisted the prompt evaluation and
dissemination of reports in Washington.
Early in the OSS period the Reporting
Board became the channel for "directed" in-
telligence�questionnaires on specific points
of interest from G-2, ONI and other inter-
ested agencies to agents in the field. The
Increase in the amount of intelligence re-
ceived and its value had been demonstrated
to the older services by that time. The
prompt and efficient handling of "directed"
Intelligence became one of the major con-
cerns of the Board.
A constant objective was the true evalua-
tion of intelligence. In the fall of 1943 an
OSS committee was appointed to consider
evaluation procedure. As a result of this
committee's recommendations, the Report-
ing Board was authorized to ask R&A for the
submission within definite time limits of its
opinion on the content evaluation of polit-
ical and economic reports. The Evaluation
and Procedures Office was established to
handle transmission and receipt of such re-
ports between SI and R&A. R&A checks, to-
gether with comparative evaluations from
MIS, ONI and others, steadily contributed to
the development of truer evaluation by the
Board.
The Board constantly sought to decrease
the time lag between the procurement of in-
telligence in the field and its dissemination
in Washington. The establishment of field
reports offices was particularly effective in
this respect. Bi-monthly progress reports
were subsequently instituted, and the Board
established time comparisons on items of in-
telligence to keep the Geographic Desks in-
formed of remediable delays.
In 1943 the Board established a system of
grading the reports of various agents, which
resulted in average evaluations. Thus an
agent would be rated on the basis of the in-
telligence he produced; such ratings would
be raised or lowered, as the quality of the
Intelligence indicated. In this fashion the
Desks were kept informed of the calibre of
the work performed by their agents and net-
.4ep�Secref
workS. The system had the further effect of
assigting evaluation; a startling or improb-
able report from an agent whose work had
gained a "B" rating would immediately at-
tract attention and careful analysis.
In 1943 the Spanish chains inaugurated a
project for reporting enemy installations in
France by map coordinates and overlays. As
of 1 April 1944, the Board made this system
standard by the use of 1:50,000 scale maps
numbered to a master key with a complete
set of copies in the Reports Offices in Lon-
don, Algiers, Madrid and Washington for
simultaneous reference. The system of re-
porting by coordinates rather than reproduc-
ing overlays resulted in greater economy,
accuracy and elimination of duplication.
Items of intelligence received by the Re-
porting Board for proper dissemination did
not consist of written information alone.
Photographs were frequently received; and
such strange objects as a piece of German
copper wire, sand from a Normandy landing
beach, a piece of soap from Cologne, and a
German soldier's documents had to be prop-
erly distributed. �
The Reporting Board maintained appro-
priate liaison with the recipients of SI intel-
ligence, and its personnel was augmented as
the volume of intelligence increased. Dur-
ing 1943, 32,499 reports were disseminated
by the Board, each report .averaging five
Items of intelligence.
On 4 January 1944, the Chief of SI directed
that increased emphasis should be placed on
quality of Intelligence rather than on quan-
tity. However, the activity of OSS in 1944
was so great that, despite the strictest elimi-
nation of every piece of duplication and of
all antiquated and inconsequential reports,
the Board by 24 November had processed
54,862 reports representing approximately
500,000 items of intelligence.
Labor Section. The Labor Section was a
functional unit established within SI to en-
list the support of labor in all countries,
chiefly for purposes of intelligence, but also
for sabotage and subversion. �
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
up
FT
Little had had been done to invoke labor's co-
operation in securing the organized resist-
ance of Turopea.n labor undergrounds dur-
ing the first few months after Pearl Harbor.
As an OSS report in the summer of 1942
noted, "the fact is that neither the Military
Intelligence Division nor the Office of Naval
Intelligence has developed any relationships
of any consequence with important under-
ground labor groups, nor were such relation-
ships established by the Psychological War-
fare Branch of MID during the period of its
existence. This was due to two reasons:
(1) The lack of appreciation by MID and
ONI of the value of these contacts, and (2)
the lack of confidence of the underground
labor groups in the Military and Naval in-
telligence services."'
Donovan directed that a survey be made in
the spring of 1942 to investigate the possi-
bility of establishing a labor section to sup-
port and strengthen Europe's working men
and women in their resistance to the Axis
and to enlist and integrate labor in the prose-
cution of the war in those spheres in which it
was so eminently and uniquely qualified to
help�espionage and sabotage.
The resultant survey set forth the consid-
erations which affected the question and
recommended the establishment of such a
section. Accordingly, a Labor Unit was es-
tablished in the New York office of SA/B in
the spring of 1942.
In view of the traditional distrust which
existed between labor and official govern-
ment agencies throughout the world, it was
obvious that the type of personnel selected
would largely determine the success of the
venture. Men who knew labor problems,
and who understood and respected the
points of view of labor and its leaders�who
had or could inspire their confidence�were
essential to the work. At the same time,
rivalries among various factions in the field
of trade unionism made it impractical to
staff the Section with men from the unions
� See History File W-54a,
�Tarr-Seem.-
themselves. These factors were paramount
In the selection of personnel. The Chief of
the Section was a practicing attorney in Chi-
cago who had specialized in civil liberties and
labor cases and had acted as conrIsPI for
many important unions.. He established the
Section in New York and sought to recruit
for it men who were thoroughly famnia.r with
labor questions but who were not identified
with any particular labor element or point
of view. The staff soon included a former
chief trial examiner for NLRB, a lawyer of
some experience in the Department of In-
terior and in NLRB, and another who had
served in FHA, SEC, NLRB, and had been
counsel for the La Follette Senate Commit-
tee which had investigated anti-labor prac-
tices.
It was originally intended that the Labor
Section maintain its headquarters in New
York, because so much labor activity, both
foreign and domestic, centered there. The
principal headquarters of the Section were
soon moved to Washington, however, for rea-
sons of OSS policy and administration. The
New York office nevertheless continued to be
of great importance and some of the Sec-
tion's most valuable contacts and projects
were maintained there.
Field operations were, as in other sections
of SI, most important. The first field office
was established in London in the fall of 1942.
The national federations of labor of six oc-
cupied countries had set up new headquar-
ters there, as had the secretariats of five in-
ternational federations of crafts and indus-
tries. In addition, London was the outlet
for European refugees and headquarters for
the many governments-in-exile. The labor
orga ni 7-P tions of neutral countries also main-
tained representatives there.
When the Chief of the Labor Section first
proceeded to London in September 1942 to
make prelim in ry arrangements, he found
that the British authorities were cooperating
only tentatively with continental labor in
the prosecution of the war. Only one man,
a protege of Ernest Bevin, was working full
184
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
time on labor questions. Ostensibly, he was
an advisor to PM: on labor questions; ac-
tually he was doing secret intelligence work
for SOE in this field. He was enthriciPstic
about the prospect of an OSS Labor Section
office in London and endorsed the plans for
cooperation with the continental labor
underground. He was convinced that if the
American Government acted in this field the
British would follow suit�which they did.
Additional field offices were soon estab-
lished, in North Africa and Stockholm in
early 1943, and in Cairo later that year. At
Its peak, the Labor Section had field offices in
London, North Africa, Bern, Stockholm,
Cairo, Bari, Naples, Istanbul, Buenos Aires
and Santiago de Chile. The latter .two of-
fices (working on a limited basis, and in co-
operation with the FBI) served as outposts
for the Ship Observer Project
The Ship Observer Unit (SOU) was cre-
ated in December 1942 "to secure strategic
information about military, naval, economic
and political conditions in enemy, occupied
and neutral territories through seamen, sea-
men's organizations, ship operators, and
other maritime channels".* A secondary
function was to obtain facilities for trans-
porting agents under the guise or cover of
seamen or ship's officers. In addition, the
SOU was to recruit agents from among neu-
tral merchant fleets.
SOU was established in offices at 42 Broad-
way, New York, in December 1942. While
its operations centered there, a subsidiary
office was later opened in Philadelphia and
for a time SOU had a representative in New
Orleans Representatives in Buenos Aires
and Santiago de Chile were also maintained,
as noted above.
SOU secured the cooperation and support
of practically all American and neutral mari-
time unions. In addition, the War Shipping
Administration lent valuable Fcsstance,
principally by advising SOU of the move-
ments of ships whose officers and crews
� See History File W-54s, p. 67.
might be expected to have valuable infor-
mation, and by transporting agents to thea-
ters of operation.
Hundreds of seamen of the merchant ma-
rines of many nations were interviewed.
Stewards and radio operators proved to be
the most useful, but crew members of every
other category, as well as ship's officers, were
of value. Approximately one hundred men
on neutral ships and approximately one
thousand on American vessels were enlisted
as regular informants. Hundreds of others
contributed occasionally to the SOU's grow-
ing fund of information.
These men told little to representatives of
the Army, Navy and FBI who interrogated
them on arrival. They distrusted armies
and navies in general almost as much a., they
distrusted police. Besides, official interro-
gations were often conducted with inade-
quate staff and through interpreters. But
they talked to SOU representatives�over
coffee or rum�in a waterfront saloon, a
seamen's restaurant or a union hall. The
SOU representatives were more nearly their
kind of people, were vouched for by others
whom they trusted, and spoke their lan-
guage�both literally and figuratively.
Some of the information received from
these sources was out of date by the time it
was secured. However, a great deal of it
rivaled in freshness intelligence secured
through infiltrated agents. For example, a
seaman on a Swedish vessel which had been
In Norway on 13 May 1943 arrived in New
York and was interviewed on 10 June. Two
seamen whose ship was at Marseille from
11 to 25 February 1944 were interviewed in
Philadelphia on 20 March. A seaman who
had made several trips between Sweden and
Gdynia in the winter of 1943-44 was inter-
viewed in the United States on 10 February
1944. Another, whose ship had been in
Piraeus for the last three weeks of Septem-
ber 1943, was interviewed in New York on 10
October. Still another, whose ship had bedh
In Salonika from 28 September to 17 Octo-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
4op-Seroof�
ber, was interviewed in New York on 30 No-
vember 1943.
Most of the information procured by the
seamen dealt with harbor and beach de-
fenses and other military and naval installa-
tions. However, information was also
forthcoming on political attitudes, econom-
ics and other factors. In addition, X-2 in-
formation was secured on the Nazi sym-
pathies and activities of individuals.
SOU obtained four types of material: (1)
Oral descriptions supplemented in some
cases by notes on the spot, which were made
into written reports. (2) Maps, in some
cases sketch maps of key areas and installa-
tions drawn by the seamen themselves, and
In others standard maps provided by SOU,
on which the seamen marked the locations
of significant features. (3) Photographs
taken by seamen. (In some cases SOU pro-
vided the men with cameras and equipment;
sometimes the men furnished their own.
Among others, photographs were obtained
of harbor defenses and other installations
at Marseille and of both shores of the Straits
of Meg-Singe .) (4) Foreign publications,
among the most useful of which were under-
ground newspapers and periodicals.
In addition to those who were recruited,
briefed and sent out from the United States,
labor representatives abroad enlisted the co-
operation of seamen in infiltrating agents
Into enemy and enemy-occupied territory.
A second project operating in the United
States was the Office of European Labor Re-
search (OELR). OELR was established on
15 August 1942 in offices at 11 West 42nd
Street, New York City. It was a semi-auton-
omous private agency, having no ostensible
connection with the Government and work-
ing for the Labor Section on a contract ba-
sis. Its staff was composed of German and
Austrian emigre labor leaders, who acted as
private citizens and not as government offi-
(lain or employees.
The purpose of OELR was to collect infor-
mation on the European labor situation, re-
lated economic problems and the status of
--Tep-Seeret-
resistance; to introduce Labor Section offi-
cers and field representatives to foreign labor
leaders and vouch for their good faith; and
to assist the Labor Section in finding quali-
fied agent recruits of foreign origin.
The OELR produced some 200 short re-
ports and more than eighty large studies.
In addition to its work for the Labor Section,
it prepared in 1943 five special reports on
various French labor questions at the request
of UNRRA. Its more comprehensive sur-
veys included labor manuals for France,
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ger-
many, and "Who's Who" listings of labOr in
Axis and Axis-occupied countries. These
surveys were continuing studies, maintained
on a current basis.
Most important were OELR's introduc-
tions. Almost every representative of the
�
Labor Section, and a good many representa-
tives of other OSS units, profited at one time
or another by OELR introductions to inter-
national labor leaders.
By the spring of 1944 the OELR had lost
much of its reason for existence. Thanks in
large part to its efforts, the Labor Section
enjoyed the confidence of the OELR con-
tacts in its own right. Moreover, a year's
close collaboration with OELR had familiar-
ized the principal officers of the Labor Sec-
tion with OELR operations. Finally, the
Labor Section had recruited qualified per-
sonnel in sufficient numbers to enable it to
carry on the work which OELR had done.
The OELR was therefore liquidated on 30
April 1944.
The international affiliations of labor
made it impracticable to deal with it on a
regional desk basis. However, the Labor
Section A-ssisted other OSS units which were
organized on a regional basis, such as the
SI Geographic Desks and SO. In addition,
the Section carried out its own infiltration
operations. The results of field operations
may be found in the theater history of
Europe-Africa-Middle East It is worthy of
note, however, that the first OSS agent in
186
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
U1./
Germany was infiltrated by the Labor Sec-
tion.
The Labor Section was a successful experi-
ment in secret intelligence. It was an ex-
periment, because seldom in either peace or
war have organized labor and an undercover
government agency cooperated more closely,
or more confidently. It was another ex-
ample of applying to the field of intelligence
careful choice of personnel and knowledge
of delicate human factors which sometimes
hinder cooperation, however great the desire
on both sides.
The accomplishments of the Labor Section
have significance for the future. The value
of labor's contribution to secret intelligence
and unorthodox warfare should be recog-
nized and developed promptly.
Technical Section. The Technical Section
was established on or about 1 May 1943 to
assist in reviewing and screening technical
reports and to cooperate with translators to
insure technical accuracy. In addition, it
assisted R&D, Communications and Special
Projects, and cooperated with other agencies
and departments of the Government and
armed services on technical matters. It was
of particular value in preparing "indicators"
which were sent to agents in the field to fa-
cilitate recognition of installations, equip-
ment and devices and their proper designa-
tions in finished reports.
The work of the office grew rapidly to such
an extent that the Army, Navy, and es-
pecially the Air Force, regularly sent repre-
sentatives to the Technical Section's office to
obtain quickly at first-hand late informa-
tion. The collection of information regard-
ing research areas and development of V-1
and V-2 weapons was particularly instru-
mental in increased defensive activity. The
Section reviewed as many as 5,500 technical
reports per month, screened them and dis-
seminated the important ones to appropriate
officials.
The Technical Section was the instigator,
and cooperated with R&A, in preparing and
sending abroad for the Army and for OSS
special operational use, certain condensed
technical and design information on road
and rail bridges and water aqueducts in
Italy, France, the Low Countries, Yugoslavia
and Germany. Such detailed information
on design, spans, strength, etc., was particu-
larly valuable in showing points vulnerable
to sabotage. Such information also was
useful to the armed forces in milking quick
repairs. '
Daily liaison was maintained between the
Technical Section and the Manhattan Proj-
ect. The full story of these relations may
best, be found in Manhattan Project records.
For the purpose of this Report it may be
stated that the Technical Section, in addi-
tion to maintaining daily liaison, received
and transmitted to SI agents in Switzerland,
England, Sweden, Spain, Italy, and eventu-
ally in Germany itself, specific intelligence
directives furnished by General Groves.
Also it received, processed and returned to
him some 2,000 detailed reports on the
enemy's progress in the field of atomic fis-
sion. On 10 October 1945, General Groves
stated in a letter addressed to the Chief of
the Technical Section: "I would like to ex-
press to you my personal appreciation of the
unlimited cooperation which your office has
always extended to me. Your assistance has
been invaluable."
The Section operated with approximately
32 services of the Army, Navy and Govern-
ment in preparing and sending special de-
tailed requests to the field for intelligence.
Upon the affiliation of OSS to JCS in 1942,
the efforts of SI were directed increasingly
toward the procurement of military intelli-
gence. However, intelligence was not lim-
ited to this category, and economic, political,
social, psychological and other types of in-
telligence were also obtained.
Whatever the attitude toward OSS may
have been in the higher echelons of JPWC
and other JCS committees during the critical
period June-December 1942, G-2, ONI, A-7,
Ordnance and others began to submit more
187
--Fop�Seerct
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
and more more questionnaires to SI on the specific
Items, areas or types of intelligence they de-
sired. By 4 August 1942 an SI statement
noted that C1-2 and ONI furnished lists of
concrete objectives to be used in briefing
agents for the field. By 1 November 1943
requests for intelligence from the armed
services were continuous and, as indicated
in the discussion of the Reporting Board
above, liaison was continuous and prompt
both on requests for intelligence and evalu-
ation of reports submitted by SL
SI maintained liaison with the undercover
agencies of other United Nations govern-
ments both in America and abroad. Much
Information was procured through these
services, with the relation becoming active
collaboration in certain localized instances,
such as the Sussex. plan and the Labor Sec-
tion's VARIAN project.*
The operations of SI began with peacetime
methods of establishing representatives un-
der governmental, commercial or profes-
sional cover in neutral territories. These
operations produced probably the bulk of
� long-range intelligence. In the widening
spheres of military theaters, field bases de-
veloped techniques of air, sea and land in-
filtration which produced strategic and tac-
tical intelligence valuable to planning in
Washington as well as to theater operations.
Cooperation with and support of resistance
groups laid a valuable groundwork which
could be turned to advantage when the ar-
mies actually invaded.
The question of arranging for the dispatch
of personnel, with due regard to necessary
security, continued to be troublesome. It
involved relations with State, Army and
draft boards and, while particularly impor-
tant to SI, affected other branches as well.
The evolution of SI from the time of its
Inception in October 1941 when a small num-
� See SI/North France in Europe-Africa-Middle
East Section.
-lop-Seeret--
ber of men began to study the problem of
establishing an undercover organization on
the eve of war, through the stormy period
of COI and the something over three years
of OSS, was a process in the course of which
an effective secret intelligence service
emerged. Although volume does not reflect
quality, SI's effectiveness may be partially
indicated in contrasting the fifty reports
submitted to the armed services in May 1942
with the 5,000 reports per month which
were disseminated at the peak of its activity.
The development of SI was at once an ac-
complishment and an experience. The im-
mediate value of the accomplishment lay in
Its service to the prosecution of the war; the
ultimate value of the experience can only be
realized in its significance for the future.
(e) COUNTER-ESPIONAGE�X-2
Counter-espionage is a distinct and inde-
pendent intelligence function. It embraces
not only the protection of the intelligence
Interests of the government it serves, but, by
control and manipulation of the intelligence
operations of other nations, it performs a
dynamic function in discerning their plans
and intentions, as well as in deceiving them.
An effective counter-espionage organization
Is therefore an intelligence instrument of
vital importance to national security.
The development of a secret intelligence
organization makes protective counter-intel-
ligence inevitable. However, to confine such
activity to its protective aspects would be to
eschew the development of the affirmative
phpses of counter-espionage which give it its
unique and distinct value.
A counter-espionage organi7a ton usually
develops slowly. Basic to it is the vast body
of records which is the key to its operations
and which normally takes years to accumu-
late. A second requirement, however, no
less vital, is skilled personnel familiar with
the intricate techniques by which the intel-
ligence efforts of other nations may be con+
trolled and directed.
188
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.Seere4-
The United States lacked these basic fac-
tors. At the outbreak of the war its counter-
intelligence activities were performed by sev-
eral agencies and departments of the Gov-
ernment and the armed forces, principally
FBI, G-2 and ONI. Fortunately, the domes-
tic security problem, most important at that
time, was efficiently handled by the FBI,
which kept itself alerted to threats from be-
yond United States borders by liaison with
Allied security services, chiefly those of the
British. With respect to areas outside the
Western Herrovhere, however, the United
States had virtually no security protection.
Also, the divisions of interest of the various
American organizations concerned with
counter-intelligence and the limitations
upon their several misgions had resulted in
Incomplete and duplicative records, which
were scattered and uncoordinated. The
lack of complete past and current records of
enemy espionage organiv-A tons, their per-
sonnel and activities, made the effective
prosecution of counter-espionage seem im-
possible.
The development by COI/OSS of a secret
Intelligence organization to operate outside
the Western Hemisphere made it obvious
that it would be necessary to establish a se-
curity organization for its protection. It is,
of course, Inevitable that a secret intelligence
agent in a foreign area will attempt to ac-
quaint himself with the intelligence activi-
ties and undercover personnel of other na-
tions operating in the same area. This,
however, provides only localized and unco-
ordinated knowledge. Furthermore, it does
not take advantage of the affirmative possi-
bilities inherent in the possession of such
knowledge, if it is coordinated with related
data and supported by an efficient central-
ized organization.
It was widely recognized that centraliza-
tion was the key to counter-espionage. This
may be said to be true of secret intelligence
generally. When it became apparent in
early 1942 that SI would have to set up some
form of security organization, the question
of centralization was raised. By midsum-
mer, the subject had been discussed by
COI/OSS, not only with other agencies and
departments of the Government, but with
the British Security Coordination. Such �
discussions stimulated the move to estab-
lish a CI Division in SL
The British had been sharing with COI,
G-2, FBI, ONI and other interested agencies
certain counter-espionage information. Ex-
perience gained in unravelling Axis espio-
nage and sabotage organizations had de-
veloped a high degree of efficiency in the co-
ordinated net of security services which the
British had long maintained. In addition,
they had built up over many years one of the
essential instruments for CE work�a com-
prehensive and current registry on hostile
and suspected persons and on their organ-
izations and relationships. Nothing re-
motely like it on overseas CE intelligence was
available to American agencies. Nor could
such a body of records be produced except
after decades of extensive operations.
Therefore, the British were particularly
anxious that the handling of the informa-
tion which they made available to the Amer-
ican services should be consonant with the
highly specialized CE techniques they had
evolved. This demanded carefully trained
specialists, solely concerned with CE mate-
rial. In addition, America's entry into the
war complicated the problem of disseminat-
ing CE material to loosely coordinated
United States agencies.
In August 1942, therefore, representations
were made by the British which strongly
suggested an arrangement between the Brit-
ish and American agencies that would pro-
vide a more restricted and secure channel
for the handling of CE information. If such
an arrangement were concluded, the British
Indicated that they would be willing to make
available all the CE information in their pos-
session. The significance of this offer to the
development by the United States of a
counter-espionage organization cannot be
overstated. The United States was given
189 �Top-SesFei-
-me
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-f-
the opportunity opportunity of gaining in a short period
extensive CE records which represented the
fruits of many decades of counter-espionage
experience. Furthermore, the British of-
fered to train American personnel in the
techniques essential to the proper use of
those records and the prosecution of CE op-
erations.
The proposed arrangement envisioned the
establishment of a civilian CE organization
within OSS�in short, an American entity
similar to MI-6 (V) and MI-5, the British
services for overseas and home security re-
spectively, both of which were civilian serv-
ices only norninnily under military control.
Following preliminary discussions in the
United States, Donovan designated one of his
special assistants to proceed to London in
November 1942, where he worked out with
the British arrangements whereby a small
liaison unit of the projected CE organiza-
tion would be stationed in London. Proce-
dure for transmission of the CE material to
the United States also resulted from these
discussions.
At that time it was intended that the new
CE unit to be established within OSS should
become the exclusive link between British
and American CE services. .FBI, however,
had long maintained a close and cordial
liaison with the British security services,
particularly MI-5, in the interests of Ameri-
can security in the Western Hemisphere. It
was therefore agreed that FBI, in view of its
jurisdiction over CE in the Western Hemi-
sphere, would continue its independent liai-
son with the British services in so far as ex-
change of CE information relating to that
area was concerned.
Definitive arrangements having been
concluded, a Counter-Intelligence Division
within the SI Branch of OSS was established
by General Order. No. 13 of 1 March 1943.
Arrangements were made to send four offi-
cers and four secretaries to London for the
sole purpose of preparing the British CE
material for transmi q.sion through British
channels to the United States. This group
-fop-Seeret-
arrived in London by the end of March. The
American offices of the Division were estab-
lished in the OSS headquarters in New York
City, which adjoined the offices of the British
Security Coordination. CE material from
overseas and from Washington was received
through the British in New York and was in-
dexed and carded by the CI Division there.
The New York office served as headquarters
for the new Division for some six months.
As the CI Division of SI expanded, reslliza.-
tion of the full possibilities of counter-espio-
nage, together with certain problems of rela-
tionships both within OSS and with various
British agencies, made it evident that the ul-
timate development of the CE function
would not be possible if its divisional sta-
tus were maintained. In the first place,
counter-espionage, as explained above,
serves a greater purpose than the protection
of secret intelligence activity. Secondly,
the British SIB and their domestic and for-
eign security services were totally separate
and distinct organizations between which
rivalry existed. Also, COI/OSS policy had
been from the beginning to maintain com-
plete independence in the secret intelligence
field, whereas close cooperation and collabo-
ration with the Brish CE services were essen-
tial to the CI Division. As has been noted,
It is doubtful that the activity could have
been more than nominal during the war
years had not the cooperation of the British
been offered and advantage taken of the
unique opportunity thus presented.
An additional factor which complicated
the position of the new Division as a part of
SI was that the approach to CE necessarily
had to be functional, in effect, as opposed to
the geographic set-up of the SI desks; that
Its Registry (which formed its major activity
in the United States) had to be completely
Separate; and that CE security problems
were distinct from those of a secret intelli-
gence service.
In view of these factors, it was proposed
that the Division be given independent sta-
tus as one of the intelligence branches. In
190
�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
e--Tep-Secref-
this proposal SI concurred. On 15 June
1943, therefore, General Order No. 13 was re-
vised to create the Counter-Espionage
Branch (X-2) of the Intelligence Service of
OSS.
X-2 was therefore free to develop the pos-
sibilities of CE in the protection of the se-
curity of American intelligence activities
abroad, as well as the protection of national
Interests in foreign areas. In addition, the
Branch was in a position to take advantage
of long British experience and knowledge of
the techniques of manipulating enemy
agents, and therefore to enter the intricate
field of CE operations.
The London office of X-2 soon became, and
remained for the duration of hostilities, the
base for the control of CE operations in
Europe. The broad liaison established in
London, consequent upon the elevation of
X-2 to branch status, diminished the signifi-
cance of the relations with the British in New
York. Further, the arrangements for card-
ing and processing of incoming material in
New York, useful while the American carders
were in the tutorial stage and needed the
help of their British colleagues, became awk-
ward when that stage had passed. Much
of the material arrived initially in Washing-
ton, had to be transmitted to New York for
a short time and then returned to the per-
manent and central X-2 Registry in Wash-
ington. In addition, CE material had to be
screened from the mass of information flow-
ing into other OSS branches in Washington,
and such material could not be conveniently
sent to New York for carding. Therefore, in
September 1943, the research work in New
York was discontinued and the files trans-
ferred to Washington. The move facilitated
the work of X-2, tightened the unity with
which the Branch operated, and placed the
control of the Branch closer to the central
authority of OSS.
By September 1943, X-2 was therefore in a
position to address itself to the job of de-
veloping a major security orgp ni7P tion in the
remaining period of the war.
Organization. In January 1944, by the end
of the formative period, it was possible for
X-2 to lay out a firm plan of branch organi-
zation. An Assistant Chief, who served as
head of the office in the absence of the Chief,
dealt with current policy problems. The
Administrative and the Liaison Officers, to-
gether with a Deputy Chief, reported directly
to him.
The Adm in istrative Officer was responsible
for all budget and finance matters, the pro-
curement of office personnel, arrangements
for home and overseas travel, and other ad-
ministrative functions.
The Liaison Officer established and main-
tained channels for the exchange of intelli-
gence with other branches of OSS, with ONI,
0-2, FBI, State Department, OEW, X-B, and
other American and Allied agencies.
The Deputy Chief had charge of the pro-
curement of military and civilian personnel
for overseas duty; for the headquarters serv-
ices to overseas operations and research; for
the training, indoctrination and briefing of
all personnel; and for the organization of
field offices and field communication pro-
cedures. He had under him a field procure-
ment and training officer.
The Deputy Chief was assisted by an Ex-
ecutive Officer whose main concern was the
four offices which handled Security, Plan-
ning, Personnel and Training.
Headquarters intelligence activities were
organized under an Operations Officer and
a Director of Research who reported to the
Deputy Chief.
The Operations Officer was responsible for
all overseas operations; for all routine func-
tions in connection with procurement for
overseas personnel; for cover, communica-
tions, and other like arrangements.
The Director of Research supervised the
work of the "geographical" desks�divided
on the basis of theaters of war�where re-
ports were processed and marked for card-
ing and for distribution. He also super-
vised the Traffic Index and Registry Section!
which maintained the card index system of
191
II
-fop-Sa
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
f
enemy agents, organizations and their rela-
tionships, maintained files of documents and
cables, and received, recorded and dis-
patched all X-2 documents. Under him
were four desks for special studies: The Ene-
my Intelligence Organization Section�
which produced over-all studies for use in
operational planning and for the informa-
tion of field personnel�the Watch List Unit,
the Insurance Intelligence Section, and a
CE/Smuggling Section. The X-2 Art Unit
was added to these special sections a year
later.
The first drastic change in the early ar-
rangements for handling the intelligence
(Registry-Desk) activities in the Washing-
ton headquarters came in April 1944, when
the Divisions of Operations and Research
were abolished. Their functions, hitherto
separated, were combined under geographic
area offices, supervised by Theater Officers.
The Carding Section was discontinued as a
unit and its files were divided among the
geographic area offices. Thereafter the
carding was done under the immediate di-
rection of the area intelligence officers. The
alphabetical control card file, which showed
the location of all personality cards, was lo-
cated in the X-2 Registry. The Office of
Special Studies continued as an independent
unit on the same level as the Theater Offices
and reported directly to the Deputy Chief.
The former Director of Research was made
Coordinator of Analysis to assist him.
A further change was made in November
1944 with the creation of the office of Execu-
tive Assistant to the Chief of the Branch.
This officer was given authority to act in the
name of the Chief over the entire Washing-
ton X-2 organization. At the same time, a
Chief Intelligence Officer was appointed to
supervise the work of all intelligence per-
sonnel, thus eliminA ting the Office of the
Deputy Chief. The Office of Special Studies
was abolished, as was that of the Coordinator
of Analysis. These functions were placed
under the Chief Intelligence Officer, as were
those of the Theater Officers. A Vetting Of-
-Top�Sratif�
Deer was placed on his staff, and the X-2
Registry was taken from the administrative
office and put under his direct controL This
adjustment placed all research activities�
intelligence reporting, the making of intelli-
gence records, processing and the like�un-
der the direction of the Chief Intelligence
Officer. One of the purposes of the change
was to bring headquarters' handling of in-
telligence into line with that of the London
War Room, which had been set up to assist
SCI units with armies and army groups in
the field after D-Day.
The reorganization signalized the fact
that the field offices, controlled and directed
In the beginning by the area desks, were
largely self-sufficient. The executive func-
tion had lapsed in proportion as that self-
sufficiency developed. The Washington of-
fice was on the receiving end, either of re-
quests for services which could be handled
by administration or for information which
could be produced by a staff intelligence of-
ficer.
Registry. One of the main coordinating
CE instruments is the body of records�of
foreign, enemy or potential enemy person-
nel, organizations, relationships, activities,
known plans�kept by the registry section.
In a certain sense, the organization exists to
produce its files of current, tested, readily
available information, and to apply them to
the protection of national interests. It is,
therefore, at once an end and means of all
CE activities, being the focal point at which
all lines of such activities meet. It thus pro-
vides the basis for the coordination which is
essential. The files provide leads for the
field, which in turn produces material for the
growing accumulation of data in the files.
The CE registry may supply data useful in
illuminating decisions on the application of
national policy in certain areas, or for the
light it can throw on the problems met by
CE workers in the field. No positive intelli-
gence collecting agency can operate safely
for long without the protection CE files can
afford to its agents.
192
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-7-op-Sociat.
CE e9 SPA may take years to mature. Items
In the files that have every appearance of
being dead can suddenly become of primary
Importance. Thus, it is known that enemy
organizations will normally plant as many
"sleeper" agents as they can to be alerted
and used at a later date. It is well in all
cases to go on the old CE axiom: "Once an
agent, always an agent�for someone."
Such individuals may not be important in
themselves, but they will in due time be vis-
ited by and call attention to more significant
figures.
The assembling of CE records is usually a
long and expensive business. The European
� intelligence services�because of the geo-
graphical, industrial, military and political
situation of their states vis-a-vis their neigh-
bor states�have been forced to recognize the
significance of security information. They
never go out of business, and they regard the
money laid out for keeping up their files as
money well spent. CE operations cannot be
mounted quickly and still be made to yield
useful returns. �
Liaison with other government agencies
and the intelligence services of friendly gov-
ernments�and, on occasion, those of un-
friendly ones�provides a valuable source of
CE information. This is particularly true
In time of crisis or of war when mutual in-
terests can be served by exchange of infor-
mation. Thus the X-2 liaison in Washing-
ton with FBI, 0-2, ONI, State Department,
Office of Censorship, Treasury Department,
FEA and OWI, was carefully maintained
throughout the war. The reports passed on
by other branches of OSS also added valuable
material to the files. The richest sources,
however, were those opened to the Branch by
the British, and, in varying degrees, by other
Allied services.
Like control of the enemy's pouched riles-
sages, the interception, when possible, of his
telephoned, telegraphed or wireless mes-
sages provided positive and security intelli-
gence of the highest value. A CE organiza-
tion inevitably secures�especially in war-
time from captured agents�information
very useful to the cryptographic depart-
ments of its government; in turn, such rel-
evant information as those departments
pass on is used to protect the security of na-
tional interests. Interchange of mutual
services apart, there is normally in all major
intelligence systems a close tie, based on se-
curity considerations, between the overseas
CE organization and the departments that
work on codes.
The improvement of the mechanics of the
Registry, and of the related processing of re-
ports by the intelligence desks, was a matter
of constant concern to X-2. The efficiency
of the CE Registry is an index of the effi-
ciency of the organization that exists to pro-
duce and apply it; any maladjustment in the
organization of the headquarters office is
felt there seriously; maladjustment in the
Registry, in turn, reacts on the work of the
liaison section and on the operations of the
agent network. The basic principle that
the CE Registry must be separate from other
Intelligence registries and be served by
people trained in CE methods and proce-
dures was recognized at an early date when
an independent section of the OSS Registry
within X-2, manned by Branch personnel,
was established. It took some time, how-
ever, to get the Registry and desk arrange-
ments running smoothly. Such arrange-
ments aimed at a full and free flow of infor-
mation from and to the field, a speedy, ac-
curate recording system, and an organiza-
tion of the records which would at once re-
Sect the world-wide unity of the agency and.
make all items eaxily available. In the be-
ginning, the Registry-desk problems arose
chiefly from a lack of experience and of
trained personneL
The Branch Chief was able to announce in
September 1945 that X-2 had received a total
of more than 80,000 documents and reports
and 10,000 cables, yielding a card file of some
400,000 entries. Lists, reports and studies
based on this material had been distributed
to United States departments and agencies,
193 (-Top-Seccet_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
op Secret'-
to Allied organizations, and to X-2 offices in
the field. In the period 1 April 1944 to 1
April 1945, for example, X-2/Washington
distributed 2,780 classified reports, ranging
from over-all studies to reports of more usual
length, to government departments and
agencies.
Personnel Procurement and Training.
The Personnel Procurement and Training
and the Administrative Sections were faced
with multiple difficulties which inevitably
grew out of the rapid expansion of the
Branch in the first six months. The task of
carrying through the necessarily slow proc-
esses of contacting, checking, assessing, in-
doctrinating, training and briefing more
than two hundred CE workers and subse-
quently dispatching a large percentage of
them to the field was particularly formidable
in view of the Branch's rigid security stand-
ards, the strictness of the procedural and
security arrangements of a CE machine, the
tightness of allotments of Army and Navy
personnel during those months, the shortage
of transportation, and other elements in the
wartime situation that restricted freedom of
choice and movement.
With the settlement of policy and practice
with respect to recruiting and training and
the acquisition of a larger number of more
experienced officers in the Washington office
to help with the program, the training of the
four hundred recruits, later added to X-2,
became more manageable. A formal indoc-
trination course, which followed attendance
at the assessment school, was set up in June
1944 for overseas personnel It was given in
part in the headquarters offices and in part
at a staging area in New York City while
personnel awaited transportation to the
field. A month later a program was estab-
lished for the training of headquarters offi-
cers and secretarial workers.
Inter-Branch Relations. All matters of
inter-branch policy were determined in
Washington. Questions arising on matters
within the jurisdiction of the London office
--Top�SooF0-
were decided in Washington on information
from London. As the field operational con-
trol office, London was vested with the au-
'thorny to make decisions necessary for field
operations in Europe, North Africa, the Bal-
kans and the Middle East.
Problems of adjustment were inevitably
numerous in the first few months�especial-
ly those that involved interpretation of the
basic principles of X-2 to other branches of
OSS and to other agencies.
The peculiarities of a CE organization
were for a time not fully understood within
OSS and the necessity for special X-2 ar-
rangements was not at first acknowledged..
The need for separateness of its Registry was
one such matter. Unique CE security regu-
lations, especially with respect to cable com-
munications, was another.* Also, StiT had
originally based its curricula on the special
needs of SI and SO, and changes which were
necessary for the adequate training of X-2
personnel could only be brought about
slowly. Misapprehensions as to the close
relations between X-2 and the British serv-
ices were not infrequent For the last
months of 1943, then, the establishment of
Branch policy in these respects was one of
the main preoccupations of the Branch
Chief and his assistants.
The definition and adjustment of such
policy decisions in terms of the organization
and work of the Branch were constant. Fre-
quent adjustments within the frame of es-
tablished policies were called for by manage-
ment difficulties that arose from forces be-
yond the control of the Branch�the regula-
tions of other services and the like�and by
� The problem of X-2 operational communica-
tions was never satisfactorily resolved. X-2
communications, unlike other OSS traffic, were
not read for Information by other OSS officers or
branch staffs in Washington or in the field.
However, several incidents of using X-2 com-
munications to by-pass normal OSS channels
finally resulted in the compulsory review of all
X-2 messages in Washington by the Director's
office and in the field by the Strategic Services.
Officers.
194
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�I0
those that came from the necessarily ex-
ploratory and tentative character of the or-
ganizational pattern during a period of very
rapid expansion.
Liaison With Other Agencies. One of the
chief activities of X-2/Washington was the
transmission of CE information to other
user agencies and for that reason the Liai-
son Section was one of its busiest units. In
addition to responsibility for arrangements
within the Branch to expedite liaison with
Allied services, the Section maintained con-
tinuous liaison with State Department, 0-2,
ONI and FBI, as well as with A-2, the Office
of Censorship, FEA, OWI, Treasury (includ-
ing the Bureau of Narcotics, Secret Service,
War Refugee Board, Foreign Funds Control,
Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue), and such other governmental depart-
ments and bureaus as were interested in CE
information. It also maintained the Ameri-
can contact with British Counter-Intelli-
gence and British Imperial Censorship.
In the year before the German collapse
more than 3,000 reports were disseminated
to Washington agencies. Of these, 682
went to the Office of Censorship, 410 to FBI,
977 to 0-2,480 to State, and 125 to ONI.. In
addition to such disseminations, X-2 made
available to FBI a list of titles of approxi-
mately 5,000 documents of an intelligence
nature from its records. The liaison with
FBI was concerned largely with the ex-
change of information on the overseas back-
ground of persons of interest to the Bureau;
with intelligence regarding enemy agents
who might operate in the United States, as
well as on enemy schools and training cen-
ters abroad in which agents were especially
prepared for work in the United States; and
with the coordination of policies and ar-
rangements for the handling of certain
double agents prior to their departure from
Europe for the United States.
Special Units. A Watch List Unit was set
up in July 1943 to collect for dissemination
to the United States Office of Censorship,
British Imperial Censorship and French
Censorship all CE information derived by
X-2 from the communications of known or
suspected agents. The Unit listed all names
of such agents, and their cover addresses,
letter boxes or mail drops, so that enemy
communications could be intercepted and
surveyed. It was possible for the Unit to
pass on to the censorship offices with which
It cooperated studies not only on persons and
organizations but also on methods of secret
communication. In turn, it received like in-
formation from those offices.
An Insurance Unit was established when
X-2 headquarters were in New York and its
work was directed from there throughout the
existence of the Branch. Its function was
the detection of enemy intelligence activities
operated through insurance cover. As its
work progressed, it evolved into an X-2 - SI
unit, with its most profitable investigations
those of a secret intelligence nature. Never
a large unit--it was staffed by six officers
who were insurance experts�it did impres-
sive work. For example, its London office
secured, after other American intelligence
investigators had failed, information valu-
able to the military, naval and, especially,
air commands, with regard to the Far East,
as well as Europe. The procurement of such
Information illustrated once more the intel-
ligence principle that the richest intelligence
on an area frequently can be gathered at a
point outside that area.
A CE Smuggling Unit, planned toward the
end of 1943, was designed to coordinate in-
formation on smuggling from all available
sources because of the frequent tie-up be-
tween that activity and espionage. It was
hoped that such a unit, surveying, for in-
stance, the smuggling traffic between Iberia
and South America, could produce for OSS,
FBI and other American intelligence agen-
cies studies on the relations between various
Fascist intelligence systems, their communi-
cations, etc. Actually, this promising plan
came to nothing because of a shortage olio
officers. As a result, the geographical desks
195
--Top-SeGrai.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
had to deal piecemeal with such problems as
they arose.
An X-2 Art Looting Investigation Unit was
established in the second half of 1944, when
It became apparent that the Germans in-
tended to carry on with plans for subversive
action after the cessation of hostilities, and
were making arrangements for a supply of
funds during the post-hostilities period. It
was known that various sorts of treasure, in
the form of items of small bulk but great
value (jewels, paintings, objets d'art), which
could be converted into money, had been
stolen or otherwise acquired and were being
stored at various places in Europe. The Al-
lies appointed the Roberts Commission and
the McMillan Conunission to advise the
United States War Department and the Brit-
ish War Office, respectively, on questions in-
volved in returning such objects to their
rightful owners. X-2 was primarily inter-
ested in the people who would attempt to dis-
pose of works of art of this kind, as a source
of information on current and future activi-
ties and plans of the enemy. The staff of the
Art Looting Investigation Unit, which was
related to the commissions mentioned above,
worked under the direction of the London
office.
OSS Field Security. The rapid growth of
CE files, resulting from Washington and
London liaison and from field operations,
made it possible by early summer of 1944 for
X-2 to be increasingly useful to OSS field se-
curity at a time when SI and other OSS op-
erations ramified on the European Conti-
nent. Pursuant to a directive from Dono-
van, X-2 took over the CE investigation of a
large number of new categories of OSS per-
sonnel: In July 1944, 677 names were vet-
ted;* in August, 1,167. Field stations of
American agencies, other than OSS, had re-
course to X-2 files for the vetting of em-
� Vetting is the process of checking all avail-
able CPI files to ascertain whether the individual
In question has ever been reported to have un-
favorable or potentially dangerous associations.
-Zer-Seeret-
ployees, especially in enemy territory under
American control, as did foreign offices of the
State Department in connection with visa
applications and arrangements for the entry
of members of foreign missions to the United
States. Such work was performed under
the supervision of an X-2 Vetting Officer.
By 1944, also, careful studies of prisoner-
of-war lists were undertaken through liaison
with the Captured Personnel and Materials
Branch of MIS, with increasingly interesting
results. Subsequently, an arrangement was
made whereby an interrogation officer from
CPM was assigned to X-2 for CE liaison. He
was briefed by X-2 from its flies so that CPM
could use the material without endangering
the security of sources. Relations with the
office of the Provost Marshal General were
maintained to locate prisoners of war in or-
der that identifications of certain prisoners
as known or suspect agents could be sup-
plied.
Field Operations. The principal function
of CE was to penetrate the enemy's or poten-
tial enemy's closely guarded undercover in-
telligence services in order to discover his
Intelligence objectives. Knowing the ene-
my's aims, it was the further function of CE
to neutralize his intelligence efforts or con-
trol and direct them to its own purposes.
One of the principal methods by which this
was accomplished was the manipulation of
double agents, that is to say, captured agents
who would be pursuaded to continue their
activities for the enemy, ostensibly in good
faith but actually at the direction of X-2.
Various forms of pressure were brought to
bear upon such agents, depending upon the
particular situation. Generally, however,
the motivations of self-interest and self-pres-
ervation were sufficient. A second stand-
ardized form of double agent operation
would be the case of an agent recruited by
X-2 and infiltrated into enemy territory to
Induce the enemy to employ him as an agent
and return him to Allied territory.
In both of the above basic types of double
agent operations, there were varying bene-.
196
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
fits from the standpoint of intelligence:
The controlled agent could call for supplies
or money. His reports to the enemy could
attract replies which revealed not only ac-
tual or projected enemy intelligence activi-
ties, but enemy intentions of greater magni-
tude. Further, such a controlled agent
could serve as a magnet to draw other enemy
agents into the CE-controlled network.
Such operations naturally required the ut-
most delicacy in the handling. The two ba-
sic types of operation mentioned above were
subject to an infinity of variations and ad-
aptations, depending upon the particular
circumstances. On occasion, operations in-
volving controlled agents became extremely
complicated. The enemy, of course, en-
gaged in the same types of activity. Thus,
an enemy agent might be infiltrated into
Allied territory to seek employment as an
agent. His objective would be to return to
enemy territory, ostensibly working for an
Allied service, but actually operating for the
enemy. Such an agent might be tripled, if
his real purpose were discovered when he
sought employment with the Allies.
Another variation would be a captured
agent who might agree to be doubled, that Is,
to continue ostensibly operating his radio or
other channel of communication for the
enemy while under Allied control. If the
enemy realind that such an agent had been
"turned", he might try to feed the Allies de-
ceptive material in the form of question-
naires. However, if it were realized that the
enemy was aware of Allied control, the agent
might be quadrupled in an intricate opera-
tion of deception and counter-deception.
On occasion, the operation might become too
complicated, whereupon it would be dropped.
One of the principal uses of double agents
was to feed the enemy such seemingly good
Information from a given area that he would
feel no need of sending additional agents to
the region. In this fashion, X-2 could gain
complete control of the intelligence which
the enemy received from a particular area.
There were infinite variations in methods
of manipulating agents. They depended
solely upon imagination, ingenuity and
judgment. The value of success in such op-
erations was, of course, great. Control of
the enemy's intelligence instruments pro-
vided an important channel of deception;
evarnination of the enemy's intelligence
questionnaires to agents gave an indication
of what he wished to know, and thereby pro-
vided a basis for deducing his plans and in-
tentions.
A primary principle was not to induce open
defections on the part of enemy agents. If
the enemy were aware that one of his agents
had defected to the Allies, not only was an
Important channel of deception and a source
of information closed, but the enemy would
be inclined to send other, and perhaps more
successful, agents to the region in question.
The actual operations of X-2 were, of
course, carried out in the field. It was the
function of the Washington headquarters to
receive and preserve in usable form the fruits
of field operations. The Washington Regis-
try, however, made many field operations
possible. The central Registry, in which
was collected all available data concerning
enemy intelligence organizations, agents
and sub-agents, as well as organizational and
individual relationships, provided the coor-
dinating instrument which was vital to suc-
cess in counter-espionage. Those files did
not lose their value at the conclusion of a
given operation, or of a war. Individuals or
relationships which have seemed dormant
for a long period may become active again
and provide the key to detection of wide-
spread intelligence activities.
The uncoordinated fragments of enemy
subversive personality lists, which had ex-
isted in June 1943 when the Branch was es-
tablished, had by 1945 grown to a registry
of some 400,000 carded names. These re&
ords, together with those of FBI, provided a
197 �Top-Secret
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
foundation for for American security intelli-
gence.
By October 1945, when OSS was liquidated,
X-2/Washington had become the headquar-
ters for a widespread net of overseas stations,
with a total of some 650 personnel. London
was operational headquarters for North Af-
rica, Western Europe, the Balkans and the
Saddle East, with rnicRions in France, Bel-
gium, Italy, Germany, Austria, Switzerland,
Sweden, Spain and Portugal; Rumania, Bul-
garia, Hungary; Greece, Turkey, Syria,
Egypt. CE work in India, Burma, Ceylon
and China had been organized around head-
quarters in New Delhi, Myitkyina, Kandy,
Kunming and Shanghai, each of which re-
ported directly to Washington.
In addition to the valuable files of CE in-
telligence kept current by these stations and
the reports resulting from liaison, X-2 had
developed two other major elements of an
effective CE organization: A pool of trained
and experienced personnel and a net of re-
lationships, principally in the form of basic
agreements and operating contracts, with
Allied counter-espionage services at home
and abroad.
Virtually all of the X-2 staff had received
extensive CE operational training and ex-
perience in cooperation with Allied special-
ists in such work, both in the United States
and overseas. The high success of a number
of exclusively conducted X-2 operations in
the field indicates the degree to which the
staff of the Branch benefited from this ex-
perience.
In the two years and four months of its
existence, X-2 worked out firm agreements
with FBI, G-2 and the Department of State.
In London, the basic operating agreement
that was negotiated in 1943 with MI-6 (V)
was supplemented by a scarcely less impor-
tant agreement with 111-5 in early 1944.
X-2 thus gained full access to the experience
and extensive files of both the external and
Internal British CE services. Similar work-
ing agreements were concluded with the
French services. Liaison contacts were es-
-/op�Seeref
tablished with the competent services in lib-
erated countries, notably Belgium, Holland,
Denmark and Norway. Basic agreements
with the military, for example, SHAEF,
AFIIQ, Cora Z, 6th and 12th Army Groups,
Implemented by SCI units, had prepared the
way for X-2 to service the occupation au-
thorities after the collapse of Germany.
Similar agreements in the Far East had
opened up an additional field of operations.
Starting at a late date, X-2 developed a
CE organization for wartime service which
could take its place among the major secur-
ity services of the world. No small part of
the credit for making this achievement pos-
sible was due to the records and experience
made available by the British. In the course
of exploiting that opportunity for wartime
purposes, the United States assembled the
elements of an effective CE service.
(d) FOREIGN NATIONALITIES�FN
Following the establishment of OSS in
June 1942, some question was raised as to
whether FN should continue as an OSS ac-
tivity or be transferred to the Department
of State. FN prepared several statements
for the JCS and for the Director pointing up
Its quasi-military contribution to the war ef-
fort with special reference to the personnel
recruiting services rendered to SI and SO.
Effective evidence that the State Depart-
ment because of its official status was not in
a position to do the work was secured early
In July. At that time FN obtained from a
Czechoslovak official information on a secret
treaty concluded in July 1941 between the
Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile and the
USSR. The State Department had known
of this development by rumor only, since its
officers were forbidden to make the necessary
approaches to get information.
The JCS decided that Fit functions be-
longed in OSS, and the reorganization which
followed JCS 155/4/D* of 23 December 1942
fixed the position of the Branch as part of the
W8
� Exhibit W-33.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Tup Szi.ref
1
Intelligence Service. FN's assignment was
defined as "Contact with foreign nationality
groups in the United States to aid in the
collection of essential Information for the
execution of psychological warfare opera-
tions in consultation with the State Depart-
ment."
A question of internal authority was re-
solved early in the OSS period. SI had be-
gun to carry on some intelligence work with
foreign nationality groups, and, though the
branches worked closely together, inevitable
difficulties developed when both branches
wanted to use the same contact. Finally,
In October 1942, an appeal to the Director
resulted in his statement that SI and SO had
priority and in the event of conflict other
branches must give way.
By the beginning of 1943 all lines of au-
thority, within and without OSS, were clear.
Relations of the Branch with outside agen-
cies were untroubled. OWI was a new cus-
tomer which received information formerly
supplied to FIS. In November 1945 the Act-
ing Chief of the Foreign Language Division
of OWI stated that the Division could not
perform its work without FN information.
Similar assurances regarding the value of
the work carried on by FN were received
from the FBI and various quarters in the
State Department.
Pelf's growing support in the State Depart-
ment was accelerated in September 1942
when the Branch Chief fulfilled a signifi-
cant request from Assistant Secretary Berle.
Although Berle had previously expressed the
fear that FN work might depart from its in-
formational character and encroach on the
policy field, he nevertheless requested FN to
undertake an operation for the Department
of State: Tension between the Czechs and
Slovaks in this country had increased alarm-
ingly, and Berle wished the Branch Chief to
attempt to effect peace between the leaders.
He agreed to do this, in his personal capacity,
and actually was able to arrange a truce.
Meetings of the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee of agencies concerned with foreign
nationality problems continued through 27
April 1943, and the maintenance of close
liaison with the State Department was as-
sured by means of a standing weekly ap-
pointment between Berle and the Branch
Chief. In early 1943 Secretary Hull stated
that FN had already demonstrated its im-
portance, which would be even greater in
the post-hostilities period. By the end of
1943, the State Department had accepted FN
unconditionally. Two other agencies con-
cerned with foreign nationality groups, the
Department of Justice and the OWI, cur-
tailed their activities drastically by the
middle of 1944, so that FN had a virtual
monopoly in the foreign nationality field.
In early 1943, the FN staff had reached a
total of approximately fifty regular employ-
ees and one hundred volunteers�a total
which it maintained throughout the OSS
period. Activities of the volunteer readers,
located at twenty universities throughout
the country, were directed from Princeton.
In addition to the offices at New York and
Washington, field representatives were es-
tablished in Pittsburgh and San Francisco.
By the end of 1944, there were additional
field representatives in Boston, Seattle, Chi-
cago, Cleveland, Detroit, and two cities in
Wisconsin. Pittsburgh, an important cen-
ter for many foreign nationality groups, sup-
plied particularly valuable information.
The field to be covered varied not only geo-
graphically but in character. For this rea-
son approaches varied. In at least one case,
the field representative worked under cover
but the more practicable arrangement was
to operate as the representative of a govern-
ment agency, naming OSS if necessary, who
acted as a channel to the Government for the
desires of foreign nationality groups. The
success of field representatives depended
substantially on their ability to overcome the
predilection of a given contact to regard
them as "government spies". At the same
time, they had to present the subject with
an attractive proposition and continue cont
tacts with maximum discretion.
199
�Tup
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
44,-,Seeref
1.7
LT
FN's main sources of information were the
press summaries, reports on public meetings
and situation reports. The general press
summaries supplied by the Special Defense
Unit of the Department of Justice were dis-
continued in November 1943 along with the
Unit itself, and FN began to rely heavily for
this type of information upon the Overseas
News Agency, a commercial service to which
it subscribed early in 1943. The State De-
partment wished FN to continue at least
some of the services supplied by the Depart-
ment of Justice. It was arranged therefore
that, in addition to the political analyses of
Its volunteer readers, FN would supply State
with information on new developments in
that part of the foreign language press not
covered by the Department. This was ac-
complished by supplementing the work of
the volunteers and the Overseas News
Agency with scanning in the Chancery Di-
vision itself.
The meeting reports were a comparatively.
new source of information. In May 1942
the Branch Chief had agreed to supply OFF
(later part of OWI) and the Special War
Policies Unit of the Department of Justice
with reports on public meetings among the
foreign nationality groups. These reports
proved very valuable as basic information
for FN and were continued throughout OSS.
In September 1942 the Field Study Division
began to develop from among the field repre-
sentatives a group of reporters who attended
the meetings.
The situation reports, obtained through
personal contact and observation, were in-
terpretive reports on activities and trends in
foreign nationality groups. They were pre-
pared by field representatives or other mem-
bers of the regular staff, by the volunteer
reporters or readers, and by specialists in the
foreign nationality field hired on a tempo-
rary basis.
Liaison with other agencies supplied FN
with additional information. The Office of
Censorship watched the mail of certain in-
dividuals, and the FCC monitored specific
-Tep-Seerei�
broadcasts as requested by FN. Appropri-
ate Canadian and British officials, princi-
pally the British Security Coordination in
New York/ supplied information on Cana-
dian groups. The CIAA and State Depart-
ment diplomatic rni.ggions supplied informa-
tion on Latin American groups. Additional
contributors to FN's total information were
SI, R&A and the Foreign Agents Registration
Section of the Department of Justice.
The information received from these vari-
ous sources was analyzed, briefed and in-
dexed in the Chancery Division at Washing-
ton, and used as the basis for reports pre-
pared for distribution by FN analysts.
These reports were issued in categories which
the Branch setup. The most substantial of
FN's disseminations were the Reports, in-
tended to deal with large situations in a
comprehensive way. The first of these was
Issued on 13 February 1942,
Bulletins followed, the first being circu-
lated on 11 September 1942. They were de-
signed to keep readers posted on recent de-
velopments in a given foreign nationality
area and to treat generally subjects not of
sufficient significance to warrant Report
status.
The next category was a series of Specials,
beginning in April 1943. These dealt with
matters particularly secret or controversial,
or closely related to the formulation of policy.
They were prepared by the Branch Chiei,
usually in the form of memoranda to the Di-
rector of OSS and the Secretary of State, and
distribution was extremely limited. Often
they included reports of interviews with such
Important figures as Count Sforza, Don Luigi
Sturzo, Jacques Maritain, Archduke Otto of
Hapsburg, Tibor Eckhardt, Eduard Benes,
Milan Balza, and many others.
A series of News Notes was inaugurated on
28 August 1944 to call attention to "spot
news". These were generally obtained from
press items, emphasizlng unusual news not
mentioned elsewhere or significant changes
In editorial opinion. The first informations
of the startling reversal of Communist policy
200
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�T-er-Seeref--
in the United States in 1945 was clignerni-
nated in May 1945 in the News Notes.
In addition to these materials, FN sent
numerous individual memoranda to State
Department officials. Two issues of a Hand-
book of foreign nationality groups were pub-
lished, containing a wealth of statistical and
historical information with respect to the
composition and location of these groups in
the United States. It listed their news-
papers and organizations, and summarized
their activities and attitudes in relation to
current issues of foreign politics. The first
Issue, distributed in September 1943, com-
prised 185 pages; the second, distributed in
April 1945, totalled 266. The Handbook was
received enthusiastically: 379 copies of the
first issue were distributed and 411 of the
second. It was especially useful to the Of-
fice of Censorship. FN also contributed to
The War This Week, and to its successors,
the OSS Weekly Survey and the PW Weekly,*
until discontinuance of the latter in April
1944.
The distribution of FN material was
geared to the needs of the consumer. Re-
ports and Bulletins were distributed most
widely, Specials were carefully limited, and
News Notes and Meeting Reports were sent
only where a positive interest was known to
exist. General distribution within OSS in-
cluded the Director and other principal of-
ficers, X-2, SI, R&A, MO, the Security Officer
and Strategic Services Officers abroad.
Wide distribution was made within the State
Department. Pursuant to specific requests,
additional copies were supplied for diplo-
matic missions abroad.** Nearly all FN
material was sent to the Foreign Agents
Registration Section in the Department of
� See RSA above.
� � Anthony Biddle, when Ambassador to sev-
eral governments-in-exile in London, found FN
papers of "inexpressible benefit" and marked
them as "MUST" reading for his entire staff.
He was subsequently attached to General Eisen-
hower's staff, and early in 1045 asked to be sup-
plied with FN releases for use in his new post.
Justice and also to the FBL Selected dis- �
tribution was made to the Administrative
Assistant to the President, following his re-
quest in May 1944, the JCS, G-2, the Direc-
tor of ASF Intelligence, ONI, the CCS, the
British PWE and the British Security Co-
ordination. Occasional distribution, where
appropriate, was made to OWL FEA, FCC
and the Office of Censorship.
On 16 March 1945 the Chief of FN resigned
and was made a Special Consultant to the
Director. Before he left the Branch he pre-
pared, under date of 15 February 1945, an
appraisal of FN's work up to 31 December
1944. This appeared in booklet form en-
titled "The Study of Foreign Political De-
velopments in the United States, A New Field
of Political Intelligence". It stated that the
FN yield of intelligence had developed to
cover three main subjects: (1) Reflection in
the United States of situations abroad and
foreshadowing here of possible developments
abroad; (2) diplomatically unrecognized
movemer and dissident agitation; and (3)
the American democratic process�pres-
sures at Washington touching points in in-
ternational relations. The first subject, the
wartime focus of FN activity, would probably
recede in importance with the opening of
more direct means of obtaining foreign po-
litical intelligence in the post-hostilities
period. However, the other two categories
of FN information would still be a necessary
aid in the formulation of foreign policy. It
would be essential to have contact with
movements-in-opposition which might some
day become governments. Even apart from
the possibility of their ultimate success,
these movements affected the relations of
the United States with foreign powers. Na-
tionality group pressures were becoming in-
creasingly articulate, which made it incum-
bent upon the Government to know exactly
the nature of the pressures, who originated
them and why.
Although he was Special Consultant to the
Director, the former Chief of FN spent most
of his time, as a result of his experience, as
201 �Tep-Sesref-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.,-T-cfp-Sarraf
special adviser on foreign nationality prob-
lems at the San Francisco Conference.
With the xssistance of the FN staff, backed
by the information on call in the New York
and Washington offices, he served as shock
absorber and intelligence officer for the
American delegation in so far as foreign na-
tionality groups were concerned.
The new Chief of FN brought up the ques-
tion of establishing FN work in the Oriental
field in the spring of 1945. Up to that time
FN had consistently side-stepped proposals
to this effect, maintaining that the Orient
was removed from the study of normal poli-
tics, and that clandestine and subversive ac-
tivities were for the FBI or other agencies.
The new Chief, however, secured approval to
set up an Oriental section and drafted a
budget proposal in May. Request was made
at the same time for funds to allow expan-
sion of FN activity in anticipation of an
increased need for material on the German-
American community. However, the MS
budget for 1945 obliged IN to begin in July
an over-all reduction in force and to become
by September a skeleton staff operating in
New York.
During August the activities of the field
representatives were terminated and the
permanent staff in Washington and New
York was cut from 47 to fourteen. The of-
fice moved to New York on 1 September, and
the volume of reports-61 in July�dropped
to 22 in August and nine in September. On
28 September IN was transferred to R&A,
and on 30 September moved with R&A to the
State Department
Throughout its existence IN kept the
State Department and other customers sup-
plied with a valuable and substantial body
of intelligence totalling, as of 24 September
1945, 247 Reports, 399 Bulletins, 271 Meet-
ing Reports, 152 News Notes, and 126 Spe-
cials. In addition, 350 individual memo-
randa had been sent to various State De-
partment officers. Incoming reports, to-
talling 18,082, were excerpted, indexed and
filed for ready reference. Such reports cov-
-Top-Secoal-
ered 20,350 individuals, 3,550 organizations
and 2,053 publications.
IN proved that through study of foreign
nationality groups in America it was possible
to obtain indications of future European de-
velopments. For example, it deduced that
the new Czechoslovakia would have to be
recognized on a basis of much wider local
autonomy, it foresaw the problems of the re-
stored Greek Government, and it discerned
the great issues affecting Poland and her
neighbors.
FN's contribution was not confined to the
field of political intelligence. It made an
incidental contribution to the democratic
process. In fulfilling its function as intel-
ligence reporter, FN became automatically
a channel to policy-makers of the thinking,
particularly with respect to foreign policy, of
foreign nationality groups.
(e) CD�CENSORSHIP AND DOCU-
MENTS
The CD Branch was established on 3 No-
vember 1943 by Supplement 13 to General
# Order No. 9. The Branch was composed
originally of a Censorship Division and a
Document Intelligence Division. A Radio
Intelligence Division was established on 1
March 1944 to provide administrative con-
trol for the Reseda and Bellmore Stations
and for the direction-finding operation
known as "Africa 101".*
By the end of 1944 the permanent com-
ponents of the Branch were established, and
revised General Order No. 9 dated 26 De-
� cember 1944 (Flrhibit W-42) set forth their
duties and functions as they were to con-
tinue throughout the history of OSS:
The functions of the Radio Intelligence Divi-
sion shall be:
(I) The supervision and control of the radio
intelligence activities known as "Africa 101."
(2) The supervision and control of the collec-
tion, processing and dissemination of radio In-
* See "Communications" under "Central Ad-
ministrative Units and Technical Branches"
above.
202
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-T-op--Seeret�
telligence received by the two radio stations
maintained by OSS in the United States.
(3) The establishment and maintenance of
liaison with Radio Security Service (British) and
(jointly with the Executive Officer, Communica-
tions Branch) with FCC and War Conununica-
tions Board (JCS).
The functions of the Censorship Division shall
be:
(1) The collection and distribution to the ap-
propriate branches and offices of OSS of all mate-
rial arising from censorship sources.
(2) Establishment of liaison with the Office of
Censorship, both in Washington and in the field.
The functions of the Document Intelligence
Division shall be:
The collection from all possible sources of per-
sonal documents and identity papers and similar
documentary material used for travel or residence
In enemy-occupied or neutral territories and pro-
viding samples of such documents and informa-
tion regarding them to appropriate branches and
offices of OSS.
Radio Intelligence Division. This Division
was organized to develop for intelligence pur-
poses the facilities of the radio monitoring
stations operated by the OSS Communica-
tions Branch at Bellmore, Long Island, and
Reseda, California. Consequently, it was
recommended that these stations, together
with the West Coast 'Translation Unit; which
had been organized into a cover corporation
known as the FBQ Company, Inc., should be
placed under a separate division of CD. The
Radio Intelligence Division was therefore es-
tablished pursuant to Supplement 10 of Gen-
eral Order No. 9 dated 25 February 1944,
effective 1 March.
Under the organizational plan for the FBQ
Company, the General Manager of the Cor-
poration was also Chief of the Radio Intel-
ligence Division: He had direct control over
what material was to be monitored and how
and to whom this material was to be dis-
seminated after translation. In addition,
he handled liaison with FCC, FEA, OWI,
Army and Navy. All decisions on policy and
personnel, as well as corporate financial mat-
ters, were in his hands.
During the period when the Company was
under the direction of the Communications
Branch, it monitored commercial aid press
messages, such as Domei dispatches, as well
as diplomatic me-gRages. The resultant ma-
terial was forwarded to CD/Washington,
which in turn sent some of it on to SL Coor-
dination with the intelligence branches was
not close, however, and it was felt that fuller
exploitation was possible. Therefore, when
FBQ was transferred to CD, a Radio Advisory
Committee composed of a chairman from
the Office of the Deputy Director of the In-
telligence Service and representatives of SI,
X-2 and R&A was established. Weekly
meetings were held to review developments
and changes and to discuss means of improv-
ing the "take" of the stations.
After the transfer, closer liaison was es-
tablished with FCC, Army and Navy and it
was decided that monitoring of press ma-
terial by CD was an unnecessary duplication
of FCC's activities. Thereafter, CD moni-
toring was restricted mainly to point-to-
point commercial messages received in Bans
and Morse code. Provisions were also made
for the reallocation of positions, thus increas-
ing the total coverage by all agencies con-
cerned.
After the transfer, the monitored mate-
rial was transmitted to the Reporting Board
In Washington, which further screened and
edited it.
Following the organization of the Radio
Intelligence Division, more extensive inter-
change of monitored material was made be-
tween OSS, the Navy and FCC. Within
OSS, the monitored material circulated more
widely and rapidly to appropriate branches.
Theretofore, the value of the material had
not been widely recognized, but statements
of Branch offiriolg at a later date indicated
that the material was found to be of consid-
erable value.
The Africa 101 Project, which was origi-
nated by the Africa Desk of SI in late 1942
to locate clandestine stations on the conti-
nent of Africa by direction-finding, was
-fep--Sesret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Top�SetTer
transferred to the Radio Intelligence Divi-
sion upon its establishment. D/F stations
were erected in Cairo, Casablanca, Algiers
and West Africa in 1943 with SI operators,
under ATC and Pan American Airways
cover. When the Project was transferred to
CD in the spring of 1944, steps were taken
immediately to begin liquidation, which was
completed in September.
Censorship Division. Prior to the estab-
lishment of CD, material from the Office of
Censorship had been received in both SI and
R&A. In October 1941 arrangements were
first made for SI (then SA/B) to receive in-
tercepts, but the material was confined to
Items of "name value" and not circulated
to any other branch. In April 1942 an Inter-
cepts Unit was established in R&A, which
acted as an indexing, filing and accessioning
unit, and disseminated appropriate mate-
rial to other branches. A directive was is-
sued in November 1942 which provided that
the Censorship Materials Unit (formerly the
Intercepts Unit) under R&A should codify,
Index, file, accession and distribute all ma-
terials received from the Office of Censorship.
Following formal notification to the Office of
Censorship, the number of submissions in-
creased, and the Censorship Materials Unit
inaugurated a uniform system for the whole
agency.
On 23 June 1943 an OSS order was issued
which provided for the establishment of a
Censorship Section on the Staff of the Dep-
uty Director�Intelligence Service. This
Section was responsible for the collection of
all material from censorship sources and its
dissemination to all OSS branches, as well
as for liaison with the Office of Censorship.
The overlapping of activities between the
two units was resolved when it was agreed
that the Censorship Materials Unit of R&A
should continue to function as a processing
and disseminating unit to handle unclassi-
fied censorship material as in the past, but
should cooperate fully with the Chief of the
Censorship Section who would maintain
Top Com-gat
liaison with the Office of Censorship and
handle the secret material. In November
1943 this Section was transferred to the
newly activated CD Branch in accordance
with the Director's policy that operations
should not be carried out by the Deputy Di-
rectors. The Censorship Division, in addi-
tion to its work in handling intercepts, main-
tained a current and continuing directive for
the Office of Censorship outlining OSS inter-
ests, a general Watch List* and a White
List" for special handling of mail by the
Office of Censorship. Special privileges,
such as pre-censoring mail and material to
be carried by OSS travellers, made possible
a closer enforcement of OSS security, par-
ticularly with regard to the protection of
undercover personneL
There were five types of material which
OSS received from the Office of Censorship,
namely, postal intercepts, cable intercepts,
telephone summaries, Censorship Reports
and Travelers' Censorship Interrogation
Reports.
During the period when CD was handling
Intercepts, considerable progress was made
In demonstrating to other branches the
value of the material contained therein, and
advances were also made in clarifying the
requirements of OSS to the Office of Censor-
ship. Moreover, trips to various censorship
centers including San Juan, Puerto Rico,
Trinidad, Bermuda, and the New York Pris-
oner of War Station, and a trip during which
arrangements were made to examine the
mail being brought back on the Gripsholm,
did much to expand the value of the material
received.
Document Intelligence Division. Although
R&D had been counterfeiting documents for
� A list of names which are given specialized
treatment at all censorship stations according to
the wishes of the requesting agency.
'A list of names submitted to the Office of
Censorship and Imperial Censorship with the re-
quest that the mail dispatched and received by
the individuals so listed be expedited and given'
special handling.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
lop Secret�
agents entering neutral and enemy coun-
tries at the request of the dispatching
branches since late 1942, no immediate at-
tempt was made to collect and catalogue the
background information for such work_
In the fall of 1943 it was found desirable
to centralize the collection of personal docu-
ments and related intelligence for the use of
those branches which required false docu-
ments as authentication for agents.
After some discussion it was decided that,
In order to avoid duplicating R&D activities,
CD would concern itself only with the collec-
tion, evaluation and distribution of docu-
ments and related intelligence; R&D would
continue to handle the actual manufacture.
At first it had been thought that CD would
undertake the preparation of cover stories,
and, working from these, provide all clothing
and other accessories necessary to substan-
tiate them. However, since the operating
branches already had cover experts, they
continued to fabricate the original cover
story. CD would then provide the docu-
ment or equipment intelligence necessary to
authenticate the agent's cover.
In order to expand the collection of docu-
ments as far as possible, liaison was estab-
lished with the Documents Section and the
Prisoner of War Branch of G-2, as well as the
Division of Travellers' Censorship of the Of-
fice of Censorship, all of which provided val-
uable material. The Survey of Foreign Ex-
perts and SI also supplied additional mate-
rial.
From the first it was realized that Wash-
ington would be primarily a storehouse and
servicing unit for the overseas units of the
Branch.
When Cl) first sent representatives over-
seas, OSS was largely dependent for docu-
mentation on the British in ETO and on the
French in NATO. Within a year and a half,
however, the OSS had become independent
In this respect and approximately 900 agents
were authenticated by CD in ETO and
NATO.
3. Deputy Director�Psychological War- �
fare Operations
�
In the reorganization of January 1943, the
post of Deputy Director�Psychological
Warfare Operations (PWO) � was estab-
lished to supervise and direct the activities
of the two operations branches: SO and MO.
Under General Order No. 9 of 3 January
1943 (Exhibit W-35), which effected the re-
organization, SO was authorized to "organ-
ize, train and employ operational nuclei for
guerrilla warfare", but no provision for the
necessary military allotments had been
made. The JCS endorsed the basic idea
of guerrilla forces, as evidenced by JCS
83/1,** but were not clear as to where such
units would fit into theater plans. In the
winter and spring of 1942-43, therefore, the
Deputy Director�PWO visited North Africa,
the Middle East and England where, in ad-
dition to urging the general position of OBS
in the theaters, he promoted the idea of
operational nuclei for guerrilla purposes.
The reaction of the theater commanders was
favorable, and they dispatched requests for
such guerrilla forces. Upon presentation of
these requests to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-1, the requisite allotments were promptly
forthcoming. Thus the Operational Group
Command (OG) became a third branch
under the Deputy Director�PWO in May
1943.
The Maritime Unit (MU) was given
branch status in June 1943. MU developed
out of the Maritime Training Unit, which
had been established under SA/G in the
COI period.
In December 1943 still another unit was
separated from SO and raised to branch sta-
tus. This was Special Projects, which de-
veloped out of a specific SO project known
� This title was changed to Deputy Director-
Strategic Services Operations (SSO) when "stra-
tegic services" was substituted for "psychological
warfare" in JCS 155/11/D of 27 October 1943.
� � See General Survey, 13 .Tune -23 December
1942, in A above.
�
20$ �Tep-SecceL_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Tep--SeeFef-
as MACGREGOR. Special Projects was ad-
ministratively under the Deputy Director�
SSO, but for operational purposes it had
complete independence and was responsible
to Donovan.
Throughout 1943 there were minor reor-
ganizations which were designed to consoli-
date the control of the Deputy Director over
the operational branches. Two exceptions
were Special Projects which, as noted, en-
joyed operational independence, and the OG
Branch which constituted a separate mili-
tary command and was subject to the Dep-
uty Director only for over-all planning.
Another branch was added in March 1944
with the establishment of the Field Experi-
mental Unit, bringing the total number of
operations branches to six.
The Deputy Director supervised the activi-
ties of the operational branches through an
Executive Officer and three pdminfctrative
sections: (a) An Administrative Office which
provided services for Civil Service and mili-
tary personnel, budget, finance, transporta-
tion and security activities; (b) a Materiel
and Supply Office, which allocated materiel
upon requisition of non-standard items of
military equipment, and assembled and co-
ordinated shipments of project require-
ments; and (c) a Training Office, which ar-
ranged the training curricula of operatives,
and processed trainees according to sched-
ules established by the Schools and Training
Branch.
(a) SPECIAL OPERATIONS�SO
The purpose of SO was to effect physical
subversion of the enemy. As defined in JCS
155/11/1) (Exhibit W-40), its functions in-
cluded sabotage operations in enemy and
enemy-occupied countries, and support and
supply of resistance groups in those coun-
tries.
The nature of such work and the increas-
ing portion of the world which came under
the jurisdiction of military theaters of oper-
ation made it imperative that SO activities
--Forr-Secre+-
be almost exclusively under the control of
the various theater commanders. Conse-
quently, the job of SO/Washington was a
servicing one in the main. Its staff person-
nel in Washington numbered only approxi-
mately 45 at the peak of activity in 1944.
These servicing functions were principally
in the fields of recruiting, training and sup-
ply. Over-all planning was accomplished
In Washington, but its effectiveness was
handicapped by the operational control of
theater commands and the constantly
changing situation in the field.
As the account of SA/G under COI In.di-
cates, SO was the parent of all the operations
branches and the genesis of many functions
subsequently raised to branch status may
be found in the varied activities begun in
SA/G. Thus the Maritime Unit evolved
from maritime training activities begun -at
Area D in April 1942; the OG Branch de-
veloped out of the continuous attempts to
secure approval for guerrilla activities which
had been the concern of COI and SA/G as
early as December 1941; R&D grew out of
the Technical Development Section of SA/G;
and the Special Projects Branch had its be-
ginnings in the SO-directed MACGREGOR
Project.
Therefore, a great deal of the early history
of SO is included in the first efforts of these
branches. It may be noted that, from the
� time of JCS 155/4/1) in December 1942, each
Deputy Director�Psychological Warfare
(later Strategic Services) Operations pre-
viously had been Chief of the SO Branch.
Unlike secret intelligence, where inde-
pendence of the American organization was
both desirable and necessary, it was recog-
nized at the outset that independence in spe-
cial operations was impractical and would
lead to confusion and chaos. Therefore, it
was essential to work out some sort of firm
arrangement with British SOE for the neces-
sary world-wide collaboration.
Negotiations by Donovan and Goodfellow
for OSS and Sir Charles Harnbro for SOE �
were in progress in London when COI be-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.-Top StA., ef
came OSS in June 1942. They resulted in
the SO/SOE agreement of 26 June, approved
by JCS 86/1 on 26 August 1942. The agree-
ment, which set forth the basic elements of
cooperation in every theater of war, was
based upon the general principle that Ameri-
cans would control areas specifically desig-
nated as spheres of American influence,
while SOE would control special operations
in areas dominated by the British. India,
East Africa, the Balkans and the Middle
East were to be the province of SOE, with
American Doi Ron and os.cistance. SO was
to control special operations in China, Man-
churia, Korea, Australia, the Atlantic islands
and Finland.
Several vital areas were subject to special
consideration. It was agreed that Western
Europe, where SOE was already operating,
would continue under its supervision. How-
ever, American units were to begin opera-
tions on the Continent under general SOE
control, preserving the independence of sep-
arate unit command. Special procedures
were also established for North Africa, in-
cluding Spanish Morocco. This area was
regarded as predominantly an American
sphere of operations and the Chief of SO in
North Africa was to coordinate the activities
of SO and SOE. (Gibraltar, however, was
an exception to this arrangement since it
was to remain outside the sphere of the
American SO miscion in North Africa.)
West Africa was to have an American mis-
sion working through the British SOE office
there.
In the matter of resources and supplies, it
was agreed that there should be interchange
of personnel and plans to effect the great-
est possible economy and cooperation. The
agreement provided that each organization
should finance its own operations. For
security reasons, however, and because of
the practical impossibility of separating ac-
counts in dual operations, records were to
be kept of the destination of all materiel
issued but there would be no payments or
financial obligations as between SO and
SOE or their respective governments. The
agreement also confirmed arrangements for
training American recruits in SOE schools
In England and Canada.
The provisions for production and stand-
ardization of special items of equipment
were the subject of some discussion in the
JPWC during the hectic period of June-De-
cember 1942.* Representatives of the sen-
ior services on the JPWC were reluctant to
permit American production of materiel
without definite assurance that it would be
used exclusively for American operations.
This was of course impracticable in view of
the duality of the prospective operations and
because the requisite accounting procedures
would have violated essential considerations
of security. In addition, the position of the
JPWC majority failed to recognize the defi-
nite advantages to be gained by SO in secur-
ing the benefit of British SOE experience in
research, design and practical use of special
devices.
Following the JCS directive of 23 Decem-
ber 1942, arrangements were made for the
production of equipment in America for the
benefit of SOE, to be charged to Lend-Lease
In such fashion that the security of opera-
tions would not be breached.
By December 1942 several SO activities
In the field had begun to bear fruit, and it
became easier to impress upon military au-
thorities the value of SO. The work of SO
personnel in North Africa in connection
with TORCH was of demonstrable aid, and
Detachment 101 in General Stilwell's thea-
ter was already credited with notable
achievements.
Regardless of the attitude of the authori-
ties in Washington, the essential point was
to convince the respective theater command-
ers that SO would be of benefit to their oper-
ations. To this end, the Chief of SO, who
became Deputy Director�PWO in the reor-
ganization which followed JCS 155/4/D,
.
* See general Survey. 13 June -23 December
1942. In A above.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep--Seeref�
made an extensive tour of IMO, NATO
and ETO in the winter of 1942-43. His pri-
mary purpose was to promote acceptance of
SO and 00, as well as other OSS services.
Success in this mission was reflected in the
requests for SO from these theaters and the
definite arrangements to establish SO per-
sonnel in the principal OSS field bases which
were made at that time.
The first operations, such as TORCH and
Detachment 101, had been carried out by
recruiting and training small groups of
capable men and putting them in the field,
with only a directive as to the general ob-
jects of their mission. In the case of 101,
It was to perform such SO jobs as might be
permitted by the Theater Commander; in
the case of TORCH, it was to prepare for the
invasion of North Africa, subject to opera-
tional directives worked out, for the most
part, in London. Supplies for TORCH were
borrowed from the British; most of the sup-
plies for Detachment 101 in the early period
were borrowed from the Theater Conunand.
Such arrangements placed emphasis on the
leadership and ability to improvise of the in-
dividuals concerned. It is a tribute to them
that these early migsions were so eminently
successful, and the subsequent opportunities
of OSS in the SO field may be attributed in
no small measure to their efforts.
The rapid expansion of OSSaactivities in
1943 changed the nature of its organization
in the field. Outposts became field bases set
up to reflect the pattern of the Washington
organization, in which SO took its place
among the various branches. This trend
was accompanied in the theaters by certain
problems of adjustment, entirely normal in
view of the traditional aversion of field per-
sonnel to headquarters procedures.. It was
accompanied by continued and increasing
requests to Washington for field staff per-
sonnel and agent recruits, which presaged
the important position of SO in future mili-
tary campaigns.
It was, therefore, difficult to maintain con-
tinuity in the Washington staff and changes
-Top-Seeret-:
were frequent, since personnel usually de-
parted for the field after a short period of
indoctrination. The rather informal or-
ganization which began the job of sending
small groups of individuals to the field in
1942 became more tightly integrated in or-
der to recruit and dispatch large numbers of
agent personnel, maintain correspondingly
large training areas, and satisfy the con-
tinuous demand for large amounts of special
devices, explosives and other materieL
Organization. The general plan of organi-
zation of SO was designed to fit the pattern
of military theaters and changed as theaters
were consolidated, for example, when MUM
and NATO became MedTO. The Branch
organization was further affected by a series
Of changes begun in 1943 and designed to
integrate the various operational branches
more closely under the control of the Deputy
Director�SSO.
The organization as it existed on 1 Feb-
-ruary 1945 may be used to exemplify Wash-
ington headquarters administration. The
Branch was directed by the Chief, who pro-
vided executive and administrative decisions
and coordinated projects and policies with
other branches and government agencies.
Reporting to him were an ETO Area Opera-
tions Officer and a FETO Area Operations
Officer. The Operations Officers supervised
recruiting, training, transportation and
supply of their respective field and staff per-
sonnel; directed studies and planning for
SO missions; and initiated action on all SO
communications. In performing these du-
ties each of the Area Operations Officers was
assisted by a Maps and Reports Officer and
a Personnel, Training and Transportation
Officer.
Recruiting. One of the major functions of
SO/Washington was recruiting. In the
early COI phase, recruiting was carried on
informally and often without reference to
branch lines. By the spring of 1943, how-
ever, with firmer establishment of branch
lines and clearer delineation of objective
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Inp-Seeref--
by military authorities, it was possible to re-
cruit in a more organized fashion on the
basis of geographical and branch needs.
Personnel officers worked closely with the
Area Operations Officers and their subordi-
nates to find and process different groups of
foreign language volunteers for field oper-
ations.
In general, staff personnel both for the
field bases and Washington were older than
agent personnel; staff personnel were also
subject to less stringent physical qualifica-
tions. SO turned more and more to the
military as a source for field recruiting, al-
though no possible source was overlooked;
other OSS branches and personal contacts
were of continued value.
Recruiting procedure may be illustrated
by the action taken pursuant to a request
from NATO in May 1943 for 75 Italians to be
in North Africa by 1 August. 'This request,
supported by a cable from General Eisen-
hower to the War Department, came as part
of the implementation of JCS/170 (provid-
ing for OSS operations in the Western Med-
iterranean). Five OSS officers conducted a
recruiting trip in May, during which they
visited Camp Mackall, Fort Bragg and Fort
Benning, seeking various types of Italian-
speaking officers and men for both OG's and
SO. Recruits were required to speak fluent
Italian, and be willing to participate in dan-
gerous sabotage operations (not always in
uniform). They had to be of such calibre
that they could absorb training in intelli-
gence work as well as sabotage technique.
The tour resulted in the selection for SO of
some 50 recruits out of 4,000 applicants. A
subsequent recruiting visit to Camp Forrest
in Tennessee produced the additional 25
needed to fill the quota specified by General
Eisenhower.
The next step was to obtain the transfer
of these volunteers to OSS. The Army was
reluctant in many cases to give up to a new
organization men whose military training
had already begun. The considerable paper
hurdles involved in this problem were finally
surmounted, however, and by 1 August some
of the recruits were on their way to NATO.
A month later all 75 were on their way,
transportation having been requested for
them the moment their transfers to OSS
were accomplished.
One of the perennial difficulties in recruit-
ing for SO, as for other OSS branches, was
the belief in many quarters that it could be
conducted on a mass or "pool" basis. This
was reflected in the North Africa Area Oper-
ations Officer's report for November 1943
which complained of the difficulties inherent
in over-all pooling of recruits for highly spe-
cialized mikcions such as SO was called upon
to perform.*
In mid-1943, METO requested some hun-
dreds of personnel for Yugoslavia, Albania
and Greece. Recruiting in connection with
this request was particularly difficult since
many potential recruits among the appro-
priate groups in America were subject to
doubts as to their ultimate political alle-
giances, and traditional divisions along na-
tional, tribal and religious lines further
complicated the matter.
Experience in the field indicated eventu-
ally that, rather than using agents of for-
eign descent, it was often better to use men
who were obviously Americans as organizers
to work with resistance groups in certain
enemy-occupied territories, such as Yugo-
slavia and Greece. Such personnel were
found to be less susceptible to participation
in factional differences inside the country
than those with, local ties. In addition, the
prestige of being obviously a representative
of the United States had a certain symbolic
value during the war. This did not mean
that the recruits sought were less difficult to
find, for personnel with the requisite degree
of tact, intelligence and good sense, in ad-
dition to the requirements of courage and
daring implicit in all SO work, were ex-
tremely scarce.
One of the most important recruiting jobs
was that for Western European operations,
� See History File W-57, p. 74.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
11
which became
became particularly Intense in 1943-
44. Possible recruits for France and the
Low Countries existed in greater numbers
than for some territories having less cultural
affiliations with the United States. The
pool of French-speaking officers at Fort Ben-
fling was an excellent source and, with the
cooperation of the War Department, a num-
ber of suitable men were interviewed,
screened and trained. Prospects from such
French-speaking centers as New Orleans and
New York City were canvassed on numerous
recruiting trips. SO files contained a long
list of French personalities in America.
From this list men who could meet the ex-
acting standards set up for French agents
were chosen. In this connection the prob-
lem of adequate commiRTions was particu-
larly acute. It was difficult to secure ap-
propriate rank for many mature men who
were available and had unusually good quali-
fications for agent work. In the case of
many agents, who volunteered out of deep-
seated patriotism and desire to assist the war
effort, only second lieutenancies were avail-
able when field grades were merited.
Recruiting for JEDBTJRGHS was a sepa-
rate task. These special teams consisted of
one American or British officer, one French
officer, and one American, British or French
enlisted W/T operator. Their job was to
organize resistance groups. As set forth in
a communication from London to Washing-
ton on 1 September 1943, the SO recruiting
objective was 44 officers for staff, 50 officers
fluent in French for team leaders, and 50
enlisted men for WIT. Time was of the es-
sence in this matter, and special dispensa-
tion by OPD to overcome the transportation
freeze was requested by the Theater Com-
mand to facilitate the dispatch of these re-
cruits to ETO. The importance attached
to the JEDBURGH program was indicated
by the fact that the Director ordered all
branches to turn over officer slots to SO
until JEDBURGH requirements were filled.
The JEDBURGH plan required the coopera-
tion not only of other branches but of the
--;efp-Svcret�
British. The Communications Branch ac-
cepted responsibility for WIT training; OG's
assisted in finding and training officer lead-
ers; the British detailed a skilled training
officer from SOE in Canada to temporary
duty with OSS to aid in the training pro-
gram. By 2 November 1943, 59 officers
were in training and ready for shipment to
England, where further specialized training
was to be given. By the end of December
the requisite 94 officers and 50 enlisted men
had been dispatched.
The achievements of the =BURGHS are
recounted in the Europe-Africa-Middle East
Section. SO/Washington's contribution to
those achievements involved the solution of
a recruiting problem of unusual difficulty
In point of time, qualifications and num-
bers. Every possible source was scoured for
men "of superior intelligence", prepared "to
be parachuted behind enemy lines", with
"aptitude for the use of small arms" and
above all, excellent knowledge of French.*
There was necessarily a margin of wasted
effort and time in trying to carry out a re-
cruiting program of such a specialized na-
ture as that required by the JEDBURGH plan
In the short time allotted. After the re-
cruits had been trained in the United States
and dispatched to London, they were sub-
jected to further screening and training.
Only 46% passed the final tests and were ac-
cepted for actual operations; yet this per-
centage was far higher than that achieved
by the British. JEDBURGH recruiting was
discontinued after D-Day in Normandy
The task of SO/Washington in prepara-
tion for Allied invasion of the Continent was
not confined to JEDBURGH and agent per-
sonnel. Demands for additional staff, train-
ing and services personnel were continuous.
Recruiting for the Far East began with
the nucleus of Detachment 101, which was
dispatched under COI in May 1942. There-
after SO activities in the Far East demanded
personnel for AGFRTS (the OSS detach-
210
See History File W-57, pp. 89-90.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-;ep-Soc.r.at-
ment with the 14th Air Force), Detachment
202, the THAI mission, the MEYNIER mis-
sion, and others. Excellent physical condi-
tion and qualities of self-reliance under
rugged outdoor conditions were paramount
requirements. Between May 1942 and 1
January 1945, 168 officers, 159 enlisted men
and seven civilians were dispatched to the
CBI Theater. A total of 32 SO officers and
men were sent to SEAC in the same period.
By 28 March 1945, 235 officers and 246 en-
listed men had been sent to CBI and a tote' -
of 53 to SEAC. Thereafter the pace was
further accelerated by the transfer of per-
sonnel returning from ETO and MedTO.
Supply and Training. Following solution
of the difficulties which accompanied at-
tempts to secure approval of the OSS cata-
logue of materiel between June and Decem-
ber 1942,* supply procedures became more
standardized. The battle for priorities and
for shipping space was constant, as were re-
quests from the field and complaints about
delays. The records of SO activities in the
various theaters, which show the substantial
tonnage of materiel dropped to resistance
groups, indicate the burden placed upon
Washington in this regard.
SO training was incorporated in the
Schools and Training Branch upon the or-
ganization of the latter; S&T thereupon
took over the areas originally secured and
opened by SA/G in the spring of 1942. Nat-
urally, SO participated actively in adapting
the training program to the lessons of ex-
perience gained in the field.
The real story of SO, like that of so many
other branches, was written in the field, and
it is to the accounts of operations in the van-
ow theaters that one must turn to realize
the effectiveness of SO's accomplishments.
� See Survey, 13 June - 23 December 1942, in A
above.
SO began on a slender basis of authority
In 1941; its activities were given impetus by
the establishment of OSS as a supporting
agency of the JCS; and its functions were
finally acknowledged to be a valuable aux-
iliary to military operations. It is in no
small measure due to the work of SO that
sabotage operations and unorthodox ma-
neuvers, not previously recognized or at-
tempted by the armed forces, came to be ac-
cepted.
In the development of the SO program,
men from all walks of life had a part. Im-
aginative planning and recruiting was neces-
sary in order to find volunteers with a wide
enough range of talents and aptitudes to
learn the techniques of parachuts.ge, bridge
blowing, radio, lock-picking, booby traps and
forging. ���
The experience of SO confirmed the fact
that physical subversion had important psy-
chological implications. It does more than
merely destroy or kill�it surrounds the ene-
my with an atmosphere of insecurity and
fear. As Donovan once stated, it keeps the
enemy "looking over his shoulder".
211
(b) MORALE OPERATIONS BRANCH
�MO
Among the many distinctions drawn be-
tween aspects of propaganda (or political)
warfare is that between "white" and "black".
The former is actually or apparently objec-
tive, admits its source, and conforms to the
policies of the government for which it
speaks. The latter is subversive by every
possible device, disguises its source, and is.
disowned by the government using it.
"Black" propaganda was always an essen-
tial part of Donovan's program for psycho-
logical warfare. "Persuasion, penetration
and intimidation," Donovan felt, "are the
modern counterpart of sapping and mining
In the siege warfare of former days." In his
view, "white" and "black" propaganda war-
fare should be conducted in accordance with
a single coorclinPted program under the over-
all direction of the military. Sherwood and
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
FIS successfully fought against the idea of
military supervision in the spring of 1942,
and the result was the assignment of foreign
propaganda to OWI when that agency was
established in Jure. After the reorganiza-
tion it was Donovan's intention that MO be
conducted and directed as a part of SO.
However, British inter-agency conflicts made
such a set-up impracticable. PWE, which
conducted both "black" and "white" opera-
tions, was under the direction of the Foreign
Office. SOE, of which SO was the American
counterpart, was responsible to the Ministry
of Economic Warfare. PWE balked at
working not only with SOE but with any
foreign unit closely associated with SOE.
"Black" propaganda and sabotage, therefore,
had to be separate in OSS in order to avoid
Involvement in British internal controversy.
The MO Branch was established on 3 Janu-
ary 1943 by General Order No. 9 (Exhibit
W-35). In early 1942 an OSS official spent
three months in England studying the or-
ganization and methods of PWE. In July
he had drawn up a complete program for
Morale Operations, but at that time it was
still hoped that the JPWC would be able to
coordinate foreign propaganda as an instru-
ment necessary to the execution of the mili-
tary program of psychological warfare. WS
was the agency responsible, on behalf of
JCS, for the execution of psychological war-
fare. According to the interpretation ac-
cepted by JPWC, this included, in addition to
propaganda, subversion, sabotage and espi-
onage. More ambitious programs than that
of July 1942 were being pressed. They failed
to win approval; on the contrary, other OSS
activities were severely questioned. These
moves were settled by the issuance of JCS
155/4/D, but that directive did not itself
contain any specific authority for MO, ex-
cept in a paragraph assigning to OSS "the
conduct of special operations not assigned to
other goyernment agencies".
The Executive Order (Exhibit W-13) creat-
ing OWE authorized it to formulate and
Carry out "information programs designed
-Top-Seeret-
to facilitate the development of an informed
and intelligent understanding, at home and
abroad, of the status and progress of the war
effort and of the war policy, activities, and
aims of the government". Nothing in the
Order could be construed to include subver-
sive morale operations as part of OWI's
propaganda functions. MO was conse-
quently established as a Branch of OSS re-
sponsible for "the conduct of subversion
other than physical".
The Branch started under many disadvan-
tages. Its sphere of operations was not
clear, OWI was suspicious, and the other
branches of OSS were uninterested or even
reluctant to have anything to do with it.
Members of SI and SO, in particular, had
been glad to see FLS removed to another or-
ganization; they looked on propaganda op-
erations as a danger and a handicap to the
security of their own activities. Having
been released from their association with
FIS, they were reluctant to expose them-
selves again to the insecurity which they
feared would attend the execution of "black"
as well as "white" propaganda.
Moreover, MO, like FIS in its early stages,
lacked the means to discharge the responsi-
bilities vested in it. It had neither the
physical facilities nor the agents to transmit
Its subversive messages. Radio stations,
printing presses and qualified agent person-
nel were, by that late date, extremely hard to
secure, particularly in view of the uncer-
tainty as to MO's budget and authorization.
The first eight months of the Branch's ex-
istence were marked by controversy over its
proper functions and by lack of administra-
tive continuity.
Pursuant to General Order No. 9, MO was
organized to incite and spread dissension,
confusion and disorder within enemy coun-
tries, and to promote subversive activities
against enemy governments. In enemy-oc-
cupied or controlled countries, it was to en-
courage and support resistance to the enemy.
Secret propaganda by radio and word of
mouth (e.g., rumor), or hand to hand If/
212
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-S0OW-
pamphlets, leaflets, pictures, etc., as well as
the manipulation of individuaLs or groups,
were set forth as the methods necessary to
accomplish these aims. These functions
had previously been the theoretical responsi-
bility of SO, which could spare little atten-
tion to them. After 3 January 1943 a Dep-
uty Director-Psychological Warfare Opera-
tions was charged with the direction of sepa-
rate branches for physical and morale sub-
version.
The first Chief of MO started on the as-
sumption that, since OSS had been charged
by JCS with "the military program for psy-
chological warfare", MO could conduct not
only "black" but also front-line propaganda.
The War Department transferred to OSS the
1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections which,
after training by MO, were to be sent to North
Africa as combat propaganda units. They
were to use radio, loudspeakers and leaflets,
as well as a monitoring service to intercept
enemy broadcasts. MO started to recruit
and train men for these units. However,
the position of OSS in the field of psychologi-
cal warfare was still in dispute. Executive
Order 9312 (Exhibit W-36) of 9 March 1943
reaffirmed the control of propaganda by
OWI. This forced a drastic revision of the
budget which MO had been struggling to
have approved, and on the following day the
JCS ordered that the .combat propaganda
units be returned to the War Department.*
The Order gave OWI jurisdiction over "the
federal program of radio, press, publication,
and related foreign propaganda activities in-
volving the dissemination of information."
Accordingly, the basic directive to OSS was
revised on 4 April 1943 by JCS 155/7/D (Ex-
hibit W-37), which omitted every reference
to propaganda which had appeared in JCS
155/4/D. Nothing was done, however, to
define MO's functions affirmatively: MO
knew now what it could not do, but was still
uncertain about what had been left to it.
� They were later used by PWB in NATO but
not under OSS.
The provisions of General Order No. 9 in re-
gard to MO were invalidated by the Execu-
tive Order, at least in part. The situation
was not clarified until 27 October 1943, when
JCS 155/11/D (Exhibit W-40), the final ver-
sion of the basic directive to OSS, provided
higher authority for MO's activities. �
In the meantime, MO attempted to develop
Its purely subversive functions. OV71 re-
fused to concede MO's responsibility for
"black" radio, on the theory that propa-
ganda was propaganda whatever form it
took. Negotiations between OWI and OSS
broke down when examination of the OWI
"Pacific Plan" revealed the fact that OWI
wished to conduct all clandestine propa-
ganda behind enemy lines. In April 1943
the Chief of the Branch gave the following
list of unmistakably "black" operations:
Contacts with underground movements . . .
bribery and subsidies, blackmail, counterfeiting
of currency, ration cards, passports, personal pa-
pers of enemy prisoners or dead, rumor, abduc-
tion, chain letters, poisoning (distribution of and
instructions on how to use toy gadgets and
tricks), assassination by suggestion or agents, ill-
ness and epidemics by suggestion or agents, and
divers manipulations such as black market in
neutral countries, etc.*
It should be noted that no mention is made
of "black" radio, pamphlets or leaflets,
"forged" newspapers or the like; also, that a
great proportion of the operations listed
would require that MO have its own agents
In enemy-controlled territory. When this
memorandum was written, MO had three
men overseas, but they were not engaged in
infiltration activities.
These men had been sent to NATO early
In 1943, when MO's task was being optimis-
tically interpreted. They were immediately
assigned to PWB at AFHQ. This was an
overt propaganda orpnixn tion, which had
all the facilities for dropping leaflets by air-
craft, for broadcasting the "Voice of Amer-
ica", for placing propaganda posters in the
towns of North Africa, but which at that time
had no facilities for clandestine broadcast-
See History File W-$2., p.8.
�
213 --Zoia-Seefef�
Ap
roved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
ing, infiltration of subversive literature, or
disgemination of rumors by agents behind
enemy lines. An OSS representative had
been placed in charge of PWB's intelligence
section prior to the North African invasion.
Following his departure from the Theater in
March 1943, the post was assigned to an MO
man. When the first three MO personnel
were assigned to PWB, MO justifiably felt
combat propaganda to be within its province.
By the time Executive Order 9312 restricted
MO's field of responsibility, these men were
completely occupied with PWB activities,
and MO/Washington was unable, as a prac-
tical matter, to withdraw them for actual
MO work Consequently, MO planners in
Washington were without an outlet even in
the one Theater where they had representa-
tion.
For several months thereafter, MO had no
other field representatives. In May 1943,
the Chief of MO left for London to set up the
Branch there. He negotiated an agreement
with the British whereby rumors originated
by MO/Washington would be disseminated
by the PWE networks. For some time, this
was MO's only channel of dissemination.
No other MO outposts were established until
a representative was sent to Cairo in July.
To perform MO activities in Stockholm, Bern
or Lisbon, the Branch was forced to rely on
the cooperation of SI or SO. Although MO
established a Far East Section in the sum-
mer of 1943, it did not begin field operations
until the following year.
The MO staff in Washington during these
first months was small, but the Planning
Staff* devoted much of its time and attention
to psychological warfare. Some of the earli-
est MO campaigns originated there. The
Planning Staff also undertook, in coopera-
tion with MO, the preparation of a Basic MO
Field Manual. This was intended to set
forth the doctrine of morale subversion and
� Working committee for the OSS Planning
Group. See account of Planning under Central
AdminiEtrative Units and Technical Branches
above.
�rop�Seere.--
to serve both as a description of MO and as
a guide for operations.* .
Washington Organization. By May 1943 a
formal chart of Branch organization was
drawn up, even though all the positions es-
tablished were not filled immediately, and
. several positions were often held by one in-
dividual. Others were temporarily filled by
men who had been recruited for overseas
posts. �
The structure of MO/Washington re-
mained fundamentally the same through-
out its existence. Under the Chief of the
Branch there was a European and Mediter-
ranean Section and a Pacific and Far East
Section. The chiefs of these sections each
had, in addition to two Area Operations offi-
cers, Administration, Production and Plans
officers. Within the Pacific and Far East
Section were subsections for printing, radio
and other special projects. These subsec-
tions were nececgary in view of the difficulty
of obtaining and using Japanese type and
Japanese translators, writers and broad-
casters.
An MO Plans and Operations Committee
(MOPO) was established in May 1943 under
the chairmanship of the MOPO coordinator.
The remaining members of MOPO were the
heads of the four theater desks and their as-
sistants. Long-term, over-all planning was
left to the Planning Staff. However, MOPO
met three times a week to consider the ex-
ploitation of current events which might be
used for subversive purposes. Much of its
discussion was necessarily insubstantial,
since MO still lacked the facilities to imple-
ment MOPO's schemes. The main output
consisted of rumors which had become a
recognized weapon of psychological warfare,
and were being used extensively by the Brit-
ish. An effort was made to develop rumors
in accordance with special campaigns, such
as a campaign to split the Germans and Ital-
� See History File W-144. Note that MO Field
Manual is misdated: for 26 February 1943 read
1944.
214
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top-Sisseet--
fans, or to demoralize submarine crews. In
its first two months, MOPO considered some
one hundred rumors, thirty of which were
approved for distribution to the field. Oc-
casionally these rumors had unintended ef-
fects. For example, the first one, sent out
on 10 April, was to the effect that Mussolini
had applied to the Swiss for asylum in case
of an Allied invasion, and had been turned
down. This rumor reached the United
States Minister in Bern, who cabled it to the
State Department with the request that "the
Information be given careful protection".*
However, few of the rumols sent out in the
first half of 1943 reached their ultimate des-
tination. Those few were, with rare excep-
tions, rumors sent to London and dissemi-
nated by the British,** for, as already noted,
MO had no dissemination charmels of its
Own.
The other branches of OSS were reluctant
to undertake MO work principally for two
reasons: First, that an agent in enemy terri-
tory could not spread MO rumors or litera-
ture without jeopardizing his security; sec-
ond, that communications facilities were al-
ready heavily burdened without the addi-
tional task of decoding MO rumors or cam-
paigns. Moreover, MO plans, like others
made in Washington, were often outdated
and far removed from the realities of the
situation by the time they reached the field.
MO was also suffering from internal diffi-
culties. Departures and rapid changes of
assignment meant a lack of continuity in
Washington administration which was, in
view of the shortage of personnel, inevitable.
The first Branch Chief left in May for Lon-
don, intending to stay for only two months.
However, he was only able to return for a
brief visit in December. In his absence, a
series of acting chiefs administered MO until
anew chief was appointed in May 1944.
In August 1943, a report on the Branch
was prepared by a member of the Planning
� See History File W-32, p. 17.
�� See MO/London in Europe-Africa-Middle
East Section.
Staff. This investigation was the result of
concern in the OSS Executive Committee
and the Planning Group over the failure of
MO to show progress. The report, sub-
mitted on 20 August, analyzed the reasons
for this failure. The first reason was "con-
fusion as to its objectives and functions".*
This confusion, it was pointed out, should
be settled at last by the "proposed agree-
ment between the Morale Operations Branch
of the OSS and SOE and PWE for combined
operations in the war against Germany and
Italy" which Donovan had negotiated a �
short time previously in London. This in-
formal agreement, though never signed, was
in general adhered to. Moreover, it indi-
cated that in Donovan's mind MO's place in
OSS operations had not changed from that
originally indicated in General Order No. 9.
The first paragraph of the proposed agree-
ment read:
It is the function of the Morale Operations
Branch to attack the morale and the political
unity of the enemy through any primarily psy-
chological means operating within or purporting
to operate within the enemy or occupied tern-
tories.�� The principal means to be employed
are field agents, native residents of the enemy
and occupied countries, rumors, printed matter
and radio. �
The second reason for MO's slow start was
found to be "lack of cooperation between
Psychological Warfare operations and MO
management." The Deputy Director-PWO
strongly supported a contention by SO that
MO should not have its own agents. The
Planning Staff report, however, observed
that MO had been established as an operat-
ing branch, and that to reduce it to a plan-
ning branch would in effect be' a duplica-
tion of the functions of the Planning Staff
and RSA. The proposed agreement speci-
fied that MO was not only to use field
� See History File W-32, p. 24.
� � The phrase "operating within or purporting
to operate within the enemy or occupied terri-
tories" became the key point in definitions of
MO's sphere, and was later accepted as such by,
OWL
�� � See History File W-32, p. 23.
215 Top So.ref
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Zap-Satre-
agents, but also to supply agents and other
personnel for the forces available to SOE
and PWE.
Other reasons for the failure set forth in
the August report were the Branch Chiefs
departure for England before organization
had been completed and his successor's in-
ability to grasp the organizational problem;
the failure to recruit a sufficient number of
suitable personnel; and, finally, the lack of
recognition of the tremendous possibilities
of MO as a major weapon in psychological
warfare.
The report concluded with recommenda-
tions that the definition of MO's scope given
In General Order No. 9 be adhered to, that
the Deputy Director-PWO be instructed ac-
cordingly, that the planning functions of
MO be transferred to the Planning Staff, and
that recruiting, both of staff and agent per-
sonnel, be pressed.
Two months later�on 27 October 1943�
JCS 155/11/D (Exhibit W-40) charged MO
with the "execution of all forms of morale
subversion by divers means including: False
rumors, 'freedom stations', false leaflets and
false documents, the organization and sup-
port of fifth column activities by grants,
trained personnel and supplies and the use
of agents, all for the purpose of creating con-
fusion, division and undermining the morale
of the enemy".
In spite of the Planning Staff's report and
recommendations, it was decided that all
agents for MO and SO should be under the
latter Branch. MO was to be represented
in the selection of agents suitable for its
work, although the object was to secure
agents capable of serving both branches.
The Branch expanded rapidly in the last
half of 1943. In May MO /Washington had
a staff of twelve. By August it had 75, and
by January 1944 it had 150. An effort was
made to preserve a degree of continuity by
naming a deputy chief of MO, who would re-
main in Washington when it was necessary
for the Chief or any of the Area Operations
Officers to perform overseas missions.
-Zap-Smut-
On 8 May 1944 the original Branch Chief,
who was still overseas, was made Chief of
MO/Europe, and a new Chief of MO was ap-
pointed. By that time, MO/Washington
had abandoned its early ambitions to plan
and direct subversive psychological warfare
and had become largely an administrative
and recruiting unit with little authority over
field operations. The new Chief sought to
return the over-all direction of MO opera-
tions to Washington. He laid down the
principle that long-term strategy, which in-
volved coordination with the State Depart-
ment and OWI, must be Washington's re-
sponsibility. The field offices should be re-
sponsible for making tactical decisions and
carrying out this strategy in accordance
with the requirements of the local military
authorities.
The problem of reaching an agreement
with OWI was revived in the summer of 1944.
Prospects in this regard seemed favorable,
since many of the personalities contributing
to the failure of early OSS/OWI negotiations
were no longer on the scene. In June 1944,
by exchange of letters between Elmer Davis
and Donovan, a distinction was drawn be-
tween the activities of the two agencies. It
was based entirely on the source from which
the propaganda actually or ostensibly ema-
nated, rather than the nature of the propa-
ganda (i.e., "black" or "white"). Owl's re-
sponsibility for official propaganda emanat-
ing from American sources outside enemy-
controlled territory was recognized. On the
other hand, it was agreed that OSS had
charge of propaganda which originated, or
purported to originate, from within the
enemy's lines.
Thus OWI would be responsible for leaflets
dropped by aircraft and traceable to their ac-
tual source. However, leaflets dropped in
containers to a reception committee for dis-
semination and purporting to come from a
subversive organization in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory would be within the prov-
ince of MO. With regard to radio, OSS,
agreed not to install or operate "black" sta-
216
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
tions outside enemy-controlled territory
without OWI's concurrence. OWI, in turn,
agreed not to operate agents or installations
Inside enemy territory. Provision was also
made for close working relationships in the
field (which already existed in fact).
Shortly after the negotiation of the agree-
ment with OWI, MO was invited to send a
representative to the weekly meetings of a
psychological warfare board, composed of
State, Navy, War Department and OWL
members, which developed OWI's central
propaganda directives. At the same time,
closer relations were established with the
State Department after a meeting between
the Chief of MO and Assistant Secretary of
State Ber:e. The European and Far East-
ern Sections of MO thereafter had direct con-
tacts with the political divisions in the State
Department. These divisions were subse-
quently represented on the various advisory
panels formed to scrutinize MO production
for policy and quality.
One of the first results of this closer co-
operation was the issuance of weekly MO di-
rectives, which were designed to implement
by subversive techniques the "white" direow.
tives of Owl. The "black" directives were
composed for the most part in the MO Work-
shop, where most of DLO/Washington's proj-
ects were developed. The Workshop was es-
tablished at Area F in April 1944. In Oc-
tober the Workshop was moved to Temporary
Que Building and combined with the MO In-
telligence Unit under the Plans and Produc-
tion Section.
The "black" directives were discontinued
after several months because of their limited
usefulness in the field, where MO was obliged
to direct its output along lines determined
by special relations with the Army (as in
PWB at AFHQ) or Allies (as in SACO), by
the "cover" of radio stations or publications,
and by rapidly changing local conditions and
opportunities. However, some of the sug-
gestions contained in the directives proved
useful. The Orlull Ariel affair, for example,
was exploited by MO in a way that was not
open to OWL In April 1944 an obscure Ro-
man Catholic priest from Springfield, Mass,
went to Russia and secured an interview
with Stalin. He returned to the United
States with assurances of Stalin's friendly
intentions toward Poland. German propa-
ganda was exploiting the "Bolshevik Men-
ace" extensively, particularly among Catho-
lics. The MO line suggested in the "black"
directive was that Orlemanski's trip, assert-
edly made with the knowledge and approval
of the Vatican, proved beyond all doubt the
close collaboration between the Western
Allies and Russia and foreshadowed a rap-
prochement between Moscow and the Holy
See. Radio Paris, under German control,
was forced to deny this rumor, which served
to give it still wider circulation.
ETO/MedTO. As indicated above, the
Plans and Production Section of MO/Wash-
ington was actively helpful to the outposts
In the planning of rumor campaigns. One
such campaign, directed against Hitler in
the summer and fall of 1944, was an example
of particularly effective teamwork in the exe-
cution of "white" and "black" operations.
At Owl's request, the MO directive of 20
June stated, "It is important that you com-
mit Hitler to deliver a speech on August 3rd,
anniversary of the founding of the SA, so
that 'white' may later explain his non-ap-
pearance." Hitler had not spoken or ap-
peared in public for some time, Germany was
suffering reverses, and the rumors were de-
signed to convince the Germans that Ger-
many's plight was indeed hopeless. An at-
tempt was made on Hitler's life on 20 July
while the rumor campaign was in progress.
The attempted assassination gave MO un-
expected opportunities. The "black" direc-
tive instructed the field to play up in every
way the rumor that Hitler had really been
killed. The previously-rumored speech of 3
August was used to strengthen this suppo-
sition. Later, the theme that Hitler was
dead was abandoned, and Hitler's continued
silence was explained by alleging a growing
schism within the Nazi Party (FiniTnler
217
Approved for for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
would not allow Hitler to speak), Hitler's
flight by submarine to Argentina or Japan,
and, finally, the proposal that Hitler was ac-
tually insane.
These rumors, launched or encouraged by
"black" methods, were picked up by Allied
broadcasting stations, which gave them in-
creased circulation by speculating on their
veracity. MO/Cairo planted stories impli-
cating Von Papen and other Germans in
Turkey in the anti-Hitler plot. MO/Rome,
through the SAUERKRAUT operations,* in-
filtrated German POW's to plant subversive
material, and the German commander in
Italy, General Kesselring, was forced to deny
authorship of an "official proclamation"
posted by these agents in his name.
Finally, Hitler was again "committed" to
speak on 9 November,** and his failure to do
so resulted in a frenzy of speculation in the
Allied and neutral press. Rumors and
counter-rumors about Hitler's illnPs's or
death continued until they were largely dis-
pelled by. his speech on 1 January 1945.
Even then, the possibility was put forth that
the speech was either a recording or had been
delivered by a "double".
Other ZIO/MedT0 projects to which the
Plans and Production Section made substan-
tial contributions were Das Neue Deutsch-
land, the SIOUX mission in Stockholm, and
MUZAC.***
Das Neue Deutschland (DND) purported
to be the organ of an underground German
peace party. Its contents were conceived as
though such a party, liberal and religious in
character, actually existed in Germany, and
in such fashion that a genuine party might
crystq 1117e around the DND program. One
of its goals was to make more palatable to
Germans the "unconditional surrender"
formula of the Allies, an object which could
not be achieved by "white" propaganda.
� See MO/Italy in Europe-Africa Section.
� � Anniversary of the Munich beerhall putsch.
� �� See MO/France and Stockholm in Europe-
Africa Section.
This undertaking, first reported by the
Chief of MO in the Mediterranean in April
1944, was warmly received by OWI and the
State Department, although certain pos-
sible dangers in it were perceived. For one
thing, reports of such a movement might
strengthen in Allied countries the position
of proponents of a "soft peace" for Germany,
and MO's creature might take on a danger-
ous life of its own. In July, an Editorial
Board of OW!, State Department and 088
membership was established as the strategy
board for "black" propaganda against Ger-
many. One of its main tasks was the direc-
tion of policy for DND. However, even be-
fore this Board met, MO/MedT0 had already
published one edition of the paper, and dis-
tributed it to reception committees in France
and the Sallcang with instructions for its dis-
semination to German troop& Later, Wash-
ington contributed not only guidance on the
paper's editorial policy but considerable
"copy".
The major contribution made by
MO/Washington to the SIOUX mission in
Stockholm was in connection with the "Har-
vard Project". This was a weekly news let-
ter (July 1944-April 1945), purporting to be
prepared by German interests in Sweden for
the information of businessmen within the
Reich. It had limited circulation, and was
intended to subvert a small but influential
group which, by tradition, social status, fi-
nancial investments and pre-war interna-
tional connections, would be especially sus-
ceptible to MO's design.s.
Copy for the "Harvard Project" was pre-
pared weekly by an editor in Washington.
The publication, named Handel und Wan-
del, sought to impress upon German busi-
nessmen the damage to their interests re-
sulting from Nazi policy and leadership. It
stressed the effectiveness of Allied industrial
efforts and the willingness of Allied business-
men to work with German businessmen once
the Np7ic were out of the way.
One issue reported that cummler was or-
ganii71n g secret groups of saboteurs in an
218
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Secret�
Industrial plants to make sure that the offi-
cial "scorched earth" policy would be ruth-
lessly carried out. Handel und Wandel
urged plant owners to protect their property
by forming their own counter-groups. It
argued also that the dominant radical wing
of the Nazi Party was making a deal with
the This-sin-las in order to maintain its power.
The obvious remedy was a sound German
capitalism which the Allies could support.
Copy for the "Harvard Project" Was
cleared with the State Department, and the
fact that such delicate material should be
allowed out of MO/WP-chington was an indi-
cation that "black" propaganda had become
an accepted weapon in psychological war-
fare and that confidence in MO was increas-
ing.
MO/Washington also contributed to the
"MUZAC Project", which constituted MO/-
London's participation in the operations of
"Soldatensender West". This was a power-
ful radio station run by the British which
posed as a German station relaying enter-
tainment and news to the Wehrmacht. It
became a joint Anglo-American undertak-
ing, with MO providing the entertainment
features which, during the last year of the
war, commanded a steadily growing audi-
ence of German troops. American popular
music (all of it known as "jazz" in Europe)
was the rt�iPinAtay of "Soldatensender West".
German lyrics were written for American
tunes, and sung by artists of German or Cen-
tral European origin. Some of this work
was performed in England, but most of it
was done by recording in New York. A
dummy corporation was organized to han-
dle the business matters involved, such as
hiring orchestras, studios, performers, nego-
tiating with the musician's union, etc. A
small MO staff made translations and super-
vised production. From July 1944 until Ap-
ril 1945, 312 recordings were made, many by
celebrities such as Marlene Dietrich, the
Metropolitan Opera Star, Grete Stueckgold,
and various night club entertainers.
The German lyrics, composed by a former
writer for the Austrian stage, were of high
quality. Many of them had no propaganda
content whatsoever, but were intended solely
to attract and hold listeners. Others had a
nostalgic appeal designed to promote war-
weariness and defection. Still others were
hard-hitting satirical songs attacking Nazi
leaders or relating the discomforts and dan-
gers of army life.
In addition to the straight musical pro-
grams, there were three fifteen-minute vari-
ety shows in the best tradition of the "polit-
ical cabaret" so well liked in Europe. The
"MUZAC Project", which kept the Wehr-
macht listening to Allied propaganda for ten
crucial months, was one of MO's most profi-
cient and worthwhile achievements.
Pacific and Far East. The Pacific and Far
East Section of MO/Washington was given
almost complete autonomy by the Branch
Chief, in view of the specialized nature of
questions relating to Japan. As a matter of
practice, the Chief of the Section had direct
access to Donovan, who had always been
firmly convinced of the value of morale oper-
ations against Japan. In spite of his sup-
port, however, it was not until the last few
months of the war that this value became
widely recognized in other quarters. That
such recognition was achieved is due not
only to the efforts of MO but to the vision
and experience of Joseph C. Grew, then
Under Secretary of State and formerly U. S.
Ambassador to Japan.
Even those who thought the Japanese vul-
nerable to MO realized the peculiar difficul-
ties which existed. It was agreed that Japa-
nese troops in the field were not a promising
target, and that the most effective MO work
should be directed toward the home islands.
MO had no transmitters powerful enough to
reach them. MO shared Ambassador Grew's
opinion that the basic beliefs and institu-
tions of the Japanese, such as the Emperor,
should not be attacked. But MO believed,
as did Grew, that there were cleavages which.
could be exploited. These included jealousy
219 �Top-Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top--Sarrnt
between the army and navy and between the
Emperor's civilian rninisters and. his mili-
tary advisors, the clisillusion of Japanese
businessmen, and possible conflicts between
Shintoism and BuddhiRyn
Under the circumstances, it was felt that
the most promising approach would be
through concentrated underground work in
China, with the use of clandestine radio,
leaflets, etc. next in importance. A plan
was devised to use a boat of the North Pacific
Fishing Fleet as a floating radio station.
This idea had to be abandoned, since Navy
approval could not be obtained. Thereafter,
MO made arrangements with the Theater
Commander in Alaska for the installation
of a transmitter there. Although approval
from the Theater was obtained, the .JCS re-
fused to authorize the project.
In connection with these and other proj-
ects, the Pacific and Far East Section re-
quested permission to purchase three trans-
mitters. This request was finally approved
In OSS after a personal appeal to Donovan
by the Section Chief, whereupon priorities
were obtained and the transmitters were
purchased. However, two of them had to be
relinquished to OWI, since MO was unable to
obtain authority to operate them. The re-
maining transmitter was set up in China.*
In August 1943, negotiations were begun
In Washington for MO operations in China
under the terms of the SACO Agreement.**
Article No. 11 of that Agreement provided for
a psychological warfare section. Colonel
Hsiao, General Tai Li's representative at the
Chinese Embassy, was very receptive�on
certain conditions. The Chinese Bureau of
Investigation and Statistics was preparing
an intensive campaign of subversion against
the puppet governments, and would furnish
MO with agents, provided that MO supplied
equipment and a great deal of money.***
Plans were drawn for MO operations from
� See account of MO/China in Far East Section.
�� See account of SACO in Far East Section.
*** This was quite in keeping with Tai Li's
approach to SACO generally.
�Tep-Seeret�
China directed toward Manchuria, Korea,
Indo-China, Japan proper and Formosa.
At the same time, discussions were initi-
ated with PWE with regard to operations in
South East Asia, specifically Burma, Siam,
msisya and Sumatra. 085 was active in
Burma and Siam by the summer of 1943.
Originally, MO had contemplated little more
than liaison with India-based British psy-
chological warfare agencies. However, with
the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten
as Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC, with
General Wedemeyer as his Deputy, MO ex-
panded its plans, since both men had shown
Interest in psychological warfare. On? Sep-
tember 1943, MO representatives conferred
with General Wedemeyer in Washington.
His reaction was favorable. Accordingly,
extensive plans were drawn, envisaging the
use of "black" radio, subversive leaflets and
cartoons, faked newspapers, poison pen let-
ters, rumors, and sound and visual devices.*
It was recognized that there would be
jurisdictional difficulties with the British, as
well as a number of unusually delicate polit-
ical problems. MO had to exercise caution
so as not to commit or involve the United
States Government in conflicts between the
British and Dutch and their former subject
peoples who had been overrun by the Japa-
nese.
By the end of 1943, MO's plans for the Far
East were sufficiently developed to establish
a personnel objective of 240. The Section
only had 25 members, including technical
experts (radio and printing) and men fa-
miliar with the peoples and psychology of
the Far East, particularly anthropologists
and psychologists. Recruiting to meet the
personnel objective was slow. Far East ex-
Sound devices which seemed promising for
use against the Japanese included "junior
heaters," which reproduced sounds of tanks,
trucks, etc., for tactical deception. When tested,
most of these devices showed need for further
development. Moreover, MO found that they
came under the jurisdiction of the Joint Security
Control so far as JCS was concerned. For these'
reasons, the project was shelved.
220
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seepet-
perts were few; priorities 'within OSS were
given to the war against Germany, so that it
was hard for MO/FE to get allotments for
military and naval personnel, and security
considerations made difficult the hiring of
Japanese, even Nisei
In December 1943, Donovan cabled from
New Delhi requesting the immediate dis-
patch by air of key MO personnel for New
Delhi and Chungking, to be followed by sev-
enty additional "bodies" in the next three
months. Nevertheless, by September 1944,
MO/FE had only 154 of the planned 240.
In January 1944 the Chief of the Pacific
and Far East Section departed for the field
to survey possibilities and to arrange basic
working agreements for MO.
After long and delicate negotiations, an
MO section was established in SACO, bases
agreed upon, and authorization for "black"
radio obtained. MO was to supply trans-
mitters and other equipment; the Chinese
were to furnish agents and intelligence. Ar-
rangements were also made for morale oper-
ations to be conducted under AGFRTS with-
out the knowledge of the Chinese. If the
SACO arrangements failed to work satis-
factorily, MO personnel could be turned over
to the AGFRTS organization, which offered,
In any case, an opportunity to pursue purely
American objectives.
Additional difficulties were encountered in
attempting to develop MO operations with
Detachment 101. These were largely due to
concern in the Planning Group, Washin.g-
ton, over the dangers of MO work in Burma.
Both Donovan and the Commanding Officer
of 101 favored MO operations with the De-
tachment, but it was not until late October
1944 that an MO team was dispatched.
In early 1944 the Chief of MO/SEAC was
made the Commanding Officer of Detach-
ment 404. By 15 May the MO contingent at
Ceylon numbered six�more than MO had
anywhere else in the Far East. Plans called
for "black" radio and for agent infiltration
into Sumatra, Malaya, North Burma and
Siam. Two radio programs using Japanese
wave lengths and purporting to originate in
Sumatra were started in the spring of 1945;
the requisite scripts were forwarded regu-
larly from Washington. Plans for the
use of agents were vitiated by the fact that
it was difficult to find natives of the target
countries. In addition, SI had first priority
on all agent recruits.
Meanwhile, a trip by Donovan to Admiral
Nimitz' headquarters revitalized planning in
Washington for MO operations in the Pa-
cific. Such planning contemplated the se-
cret installation and operation in the Aleu-
tians or the Marianas of a radio transmitter
to broadcast subversive propaganda and cre-
ate interference on short and medium waves.
MO succeeded in obtaining two transmitters
for the project in October, but failed to ob-
tain Navy authorization to use them. The
"black" radio program for Japan had to be
shelved until the spring of 1945, when OWI
made its radio transmitter on Saipan avail-
able.
221
During this period Washington produced
material for the MO staffs in China, Burma
and Ceylon, since efforts to send them Japa-
nese personnel for writing or translating in
the field had been unsuccessful. In Febru-
ary 1944 a special production unit for the
preparation of written and spoken (re-
corded) Japanese material was formed. It
was staffed by Japanese and its production
was based on intelligence obtained from
monitored Japanese broadcasts, Japanese
magazines and newspapers, and captured
letters and documents. A secondary pur-
pose of the unit was to train Japanese for
overseas assignments. In June a second
unit was established for the same purposes.
In order to review the material produced by
the two units, the Branch Chief established
a Far East Panel of Experts, on which OWI,
State Department, 0-2 and ONI were repre-
sented. After four or five meetings the
Panel gradually dissolved, but during its ex-
istence close relations were established with,
State Department, which thereafter took an'
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.4ep�Seeret�
active interest in psychological warfare
against Japan.
Guidance was also received from the JCS.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a paper
dated 23 May 1944, entitled "Joint Anglo-
American Outline Plan for Psychological
Warfare Against Japan", together with an
annex, "Inducement to Surrender of Japa-
nese Forces". JCS forwarded these papers
to OSS, requesting that they be implemented
In close collaboration with the appropriate
United States and British agencies.
Closing Months. By March 1945, the im-
minent conclusion of the war in Europe led
to the decision that MO personnel in rro
and MedT0 should be sharply reduced. MO
reached an agreement with SI previding that
the two branches collaborate closely, particu-
larly in post-hostilities work, and that MO
field men be attached to SI and the collec-
tion of morale intelligence stressed. MO/-
Washington undertook the preparation of
copy suitable for use in Germany after Al-
lied occupation. One project concerned a
purported DND organ which, if authoriza-
tion could be obtained, was to be published
during the U. S. G. C. C. phase.
The surrender of Germany in May led to a
discontinuance of all MO operations in Ebro
and MedTO. Liquidation of MO outposts in
these theaters was begun immediately, the
only exception being the joint MO/SI proj-
ect on propaganda intelligence. A small
staff of former MO personnel was to be re-
tained in SI/ETO as a propaganda intelli-
gence section. This was formally accom-
plished in Washington in August by a direc-
tive from the Chief of SL In that month an
experimental monthly report was compiled
and sent to the chiefs of overseas missions
with the request that the field prepare ChT11..
Jar material and forward it to Washington.
As morale operations were drawing to a
close in Europe, there were prospects of even
greater activity in the Pacific and Far East
Theaters. In June meetings were held in
Washington with the JCS Planners Steering
Committee, the Operations Division of the
�lop�Seerer
State Department, the staff of the Military
Government Program for Japan, the Psycho- -
logical Warfare Division of 0-2, and repre-
sentatives of the Army Air Forces, ONI, OWI
and State Department. All of these agen-
cies expressed growing interest in morale op-
erations against Japan, both in the Pacific
and in the Far East. Japanese personnel
were at least being moved overseas. AMobile
Van Unit for the Pacific was being prepared
and "black" programs were being broadcast
over MO transmitters in China and SEAC,
as well as OWI transmitters on Saipan.
Washington production was at an all-time
high and included material for use against
Japan and against targets in Siam and else-
where in Asia.
The surrender of Japan brought these pro-
grams to a close. In August selected per-
sonnel from MO were assigned to the Strate-
gic Bombing Survey to study Japanese pub-
lic opinion concerning the economic, socio-
logical, psychological and other results of
the bombing of Japan.
MO's efforts to disrupt, confuse and divide
the enemy through "black" techniques had
been made in the face of serious handicaps.
� Among these were failure to coordinate
"black" and "white" operations; confusion
and controversy over MO's functions; a late
start, which made it difficult to secure first-
class personnel and necessary equipment;
and lack of confidence in MO, which was
often justified by the circumstances, on the
part of other OSS operating branches.
Nevertheless, by the time hostilities ended
the principle of morale operations had come
to be appreciated by other military and po-
litical agencies. MO had demonstrated its
value against both Germany and Japan.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of MO was
that it brought to the attention of American
authorities a weapon which the United
States had not theretofore systematicalli
and effectively employed. It drew atten-
222
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seeret-
tion, also, in time of peace, to the advantages
of a specialized type of intelligence�infor-
mation on the morale, social cleavages and
underlying worries of foreign peoples.
(c) OPERATIONAL GROUPS�OG
OG's were authorized by the JCS directive
of 23 December 1942 (Exhibit W-33) which
provided that OSS should organize opera-
tional nuclei to be used in enemy and enemy-
occupied territory. The OG's were highly
trained foreign language-speaking soldiers,
skilled in methods of sabotage and small
arms, and trained parachutists, designed to
be used in small groups behind enemy lines
to harass the enemy.
The OG Branch developed from the plans
for guerrilla units with which Donovan and
Goodfellow were concerned as early as De-
cember 1941.5
In August 1942, shortly after the estab-
lishment of OSS, JCS 83/1 approved in prin-
ciple the formation of guerrilla units and re-
ferred the preparation of detailed authoriza-
tion to the JPWC which controlled OSS.
However, attempts to decide the matter in
the .TPWC failed, as set forth in the General
Survey in A above. There seemed to be a
deep-seated disapproval of the organization
of independent military forces on the part of
the War Department. The Strategic Serv-
ices Commands* was dissolved in December
1942. In the same month, consolidation of
the OSS position under JCS and the definite
placing of the military program for psycho-
logical warfare under OSS paved the way for
what subsequently became the 00 Branch.
Pursuant to JCS 155/4/D, OSS was to be re-
sponsible for the "organization and conduct
of guerrilla warfare", personnel for this pur-
pose being limited to "organizers, fomenters
and operational nuclei of guerrilla units".
Thus, while the formal beginnings of OG
� See Special Activities and SA/0 in Section I
above.
� � Successor to COI Service Command; see
SA/0 in Section L
may be said to stem from the December 1942
directive, it is apparent that the OG idea
extends back to 1941.
The first definite request for OG's de-
veloped out of the approval by AFHQ of JCS
170 (Exhibit W-38) , which set forth the ob-
jectives of OSS in the Western Mediter-
ranean. This request, as it applied to OG's,
Involved four to eight operational groups to
be used as organizers, fomenters and opera-
tional nuclei in areas adjacent to North Af-
rica. When the War Department was re-
quested to assign officers and men for 00
operations in NATO, 0-1 inquired whether
tables of organization would also be sub-
mitted for other theaters. OSS replied in
the affirmative, and the War Department
granted the OG's approximately 540 slots.
The OG Branch was established by Special
Order No. 21, issued 13 May 1943, effective
4 May 1943.* All 00 personnel were mili-
tary as was the organization of the Branch.
Its Washington headquarters comprised a
Commanding Officer, -ciAted by an Execu-
tive Officer to whom a Maps and Reports
Officer reported. The staff positions were
those of Training Officer, Adjutant and Sup:
ply Officer.
Following the initial allotment to 00, a
recruiting program was immediately under-
taken. It was thought that the best quali-
fied men would be found in line outfits, and
for this reason the first OG's were secured
from infantry and engineer units. Radio
operators were secured from the Signal
Corps; trained medical technicians from the
Medical Corps. Knowledge of foreign lan-
guage was essential.
Prospective recruits were usually inter-
viewed in groups made up of individuals who
met the two basic requirements of physical
qualifications and linguistic ability in order
� 00 was initially responsible to the Deputy
Director - 580. On 27 November 1944, by Sup-
plement 25 to General Order No. 9 (Rev.). the
Operational Group Command was activated as a
separate military unit withiq OSS. Thereafter,
the chain of command was from the Director to.
the Commanding Officer of 003c.
223
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top...Sectet�
to judge whether they were otherwise suit-
able. They were given the opportunity to
volunteer for "hazardous duty behind enemy
lines". Such groups were then advised that
Interested individuals would be granted per-
sonal interviews. In the interests of secur-
ity, operational plans were not divulged, yet
enough was told so that the recruit under-
stood what he might expect. Only men giv-
ing evidence of a real desire for such duty
were chosen. It was found that approxi-
mately ten percent of those initially inter-
viewed in groups subsequently volunteered.
The basic unit of orgs ni7Ption was origi-
nally conceived to be a group composed of
four officers and thirty enlisted men. Each
such group was to be commanded by a cap-
tain and a first lieutenant, and divided into
two sections of sixteen men; each section
was sub-divided into two squads.
In actual experience, units used in the
field varied from a liaison team of one officer
and two enlisted men (T/Sgt. and radio op-
erator) to units slightly larger than the
group. For the NATO-based French opera-
tions, the section, commEmded by a captain
rather than by a lieutenant, was the basic
unit.
On 27 November 1944 the Operational
Group Command was activated as a separate
military unit within OSS. The chain of
command thereafter was from the Director
to the Commanding Officer, OG Command,
and thus control by the Deputy Director-
850 was eliminated. This was the result of
several factors which indicated the wisdom
of separating the OG's as far as possible from
OSS administratively. One such consider-
ation was experience in the field indicating
that OG's were likely, despite the fact that
they operated exclusively in uniform, to be
treated without regard to the Geneva Con-
vention when captured. It was felt that
for their protection in the event of capture
every effort should be made to eliminate
the possibility of connection with OSS.
Another consideration was the fact that the
OG's were exclusively military, and the
quasi-military administration of OSS
caused some confusion. OSS continued
throughout, however, to maintain coordi-
nated operational control.
Since all OG's were recruited from the
Army, it could be assumed that they had
completed basic training. As a result, OG
training was specialized in nature, with par-
ticular emphasis on physical conditioning.
Courses were conducted by men who had
themselves volunteered for 00 duty and
were therefore combat soldiers in the United
States on a temporary basis. This policy
served as an incentive to instructors and
pupils alike. Courses were designed to make
all OG's proficient in demolitions; small arms
(both of American and foreign make) ; scout-
ing, patrolling and reconnaissance; first-aid;
unit security measures; living off the land;
knife and hand-to-hand lighting; camou-
flage, map reading and compass; and equip-
ment and methods of operation of airborne
and seaborne raids. A large percentage of
the tactical exercises was conducted at night.
Operational training included mountain
operations, parachutage, amphibious oper-
ations, skiing and mountain climbing, light
artillery, radio operation, and advance es-
pionage tactics. Aggressiveness of spirit
and willingness to close with the enemy were
stressed.
The OG's recruited for Italian operations
were designated Company A, those for
France Company B, and those for the Bal-
kans Company C. An additional unit, not
designated by a company symbol, consisted
of OG's to be used in Norway.
In April 1943 recruiting parties toured
Army camps to secure personnel for the
groups intended for operations in Italy. Ap-
proximately 200 volunteers, of whom nine-
teen were officers, were selected. The requi-
site transfers were initiated in May. The
unit was ready for dispatch on 12 June but
transportation delays intervened. A small
contingent departed in July and the n-
mainder in August
224
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Up cs.
In July and August 1943 recruiting for
French OG's was in progress. The first
group consisted of thirteen officers and 83
enlisted men. As part of their tactical
training they took part in the combined air-
borne troop carrier maneuvers in North
Carolina in December 1943. They were dis-
patched in January and arrived in NATO in
February.
Six additional groups, two Italian and
four French, were formed in the winter of
1943 and 1944 and departed in March 1944
to augment Companies A and B in NATO.
One German group was formed in the
spring of 1944 and arrived in North Africa
In July, where it was attached to Company A.
The first OG's for Yugoslavia left the
United States on 24 October 1943; others
left on 24 January. The Yugoslav 00's
comprised fifteen officers and n0. enlisted
men.
A Greek OG unit was formed at the request
of the Greek Government-in-Exile. In the
summer of 1943 an ass recruiting team
visited Camp Carson, Colorado, seeking per-
sonnel with Greek language qualifications.
So many of the 122nd Infantry Battalion
(Sep.) volunteered for this duty that its
Commanding Officer offered the entire Bat-
talion. Negotiations with the War Depart-
ment were undertaken to secure approval
of this unusual step, and in September.1943
the requisite authority was granted. The
Battalion was assessed by the OSS recruit-
ing team, and officers and men were given a
second opportunity to volunteer. Almost.
all reaffirmed their desire to become OG's.
Of the Battalion, 17 officers and 205 enlisted
men were chosen and trained in units of ap-
proximately 25 men each. A total of 172
enlisted men and 18 officers was dispatched
to Cairo in early 1944.
As a result of discussions held in early 1943
in London between the Deputy Director�
PWO and officials of the Norwegian Govern-
ment-in-Exile, and subsequent discussions
with the Norwegian Military Attache in
America in the spring of that year, it was de-
cided to recruit qualified officers and en-
listed men from the 99th Infantry Battalion
(Sep) ,an all-Norwegian United States Army
unit stationed at Camp Hale, Colorado. In
July 1943, 10 officers and 69 enlisted men
volunteered and were transferred to OSS.
In the succeeding five months this group
went through intensive specialized training
and was dispatched in December 1943.
The tables of organization for OG were
amended and enlarged, so that in August
1944 the OG's became known as the 2671st
Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate
(Prov.). At that time the OG's numbered
some 1,100.
After the collapse of Germany in the
spring of 1945,00's who had participated in
operations against the Axis were returned
to America and processed for transfer to the
Far East. This involved reassessment and
additional training.
The actual record of OG operations is a
matter for the theater accounts. The OG's
were not Rangers, an idea which Donovan
had sponsored in early 1942. However,
they did partake of the nature of com-
mandoes and of Rangers in some aspects of
their operations. The distinction was
simply that, while Donovan saw the Ran-
gers as operating in front of the enemy,
the OG's fitted into the pattern of OSS ac-
tivities behind the enemy lines.
All of the OG's saw action, and, both as
individuals and as units, won distinction for
courage and resourcefulness. They proved
the validity of Donovan's contention that
the potential liability of a large foreign lan-
guage population with various ties to other
countries, could, by careful screening, inten-
sified training and daring maneuver, be-
come a definite asset in the prosecution of
modern unorthodox warfare. The OG rec-
ord in the field amply justified Donovan's
faith in such an organization and the fight
he made to have it established.
22.5
(d) MARITIME UNIT�MU
The Maritime Unit evolved from SA/G
---Top-SeeFef�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
np-sr-
training activities begun at Area D in April
1942* which were designed to educate SO
and SI agents in techniques of clandestine
Infiltration by sea. The importance of mar-
itime activities became clearer as Allied
forces reached striking distance of the
enemy, whereupon the number of MU per-
sonnel increased and the Branch developed
In status and function.
MU was established as a Branch under the
Deputy Director�PWO by Supplement 4 to
General Order No. 9, issued 10 June 1943.
effective 9 June 1943. It had four principal
functions: (1) Infiltration of agents for
other branches by sea; (2) supply of resist-
ance groups and others by sea; (3) execution
of maritime sabotage; and (4) development
of special equipment and devices to effectu-
ate the foregoing.
The first maritime training activities at
Area D were begun with personnel allotted
by the United States Navy under the direc-
tion of an experienced British naval officer
who had been loaned to COI in February
1942. The area selected presented certain
obstacles to Fru; 11 boat maneuvers: Lack
of surf and beach conditions comparable to
those existing in theaters of operation, to-
gether with pollution of Potomac River
water. However, the area afforded good se-
curity, and, in view of this advantage and
Its proximity to Washington headquar-
ters, a lease was executed. A small cabin
cruiser was procured for use in night exer-
cises to represent a submarine or surface
vessel from which the operatives would land
by rubber boat or other small craft
The first class, consisting of eighteen stu-
dents from SI and SO, began training on 4
August 1942. The training schedule was
designed to fit them to effect clandestine
entry by sea, and also to engage personally
or through sub-agents in sabotage of cargoes,
dock facilities, warehouses, etc. Simple
seamanship, elementary navigation and
small boat handling, particularly folboat,
� See Training under SAJG in Section L
3ep-Seeret-
rubber boat and raft, were also studied.
Other equipment, such as kayaks and
canoes, was gradually obtained. Equip-
ment was, however, rudimentary compared
to that which -was later developed. Never-
theless, this training was valuable in the
field since the latest equipment was not al-
ways available in areas of actual operations
and improvisation was often necessary.
Throughout 1942 maritime activities were
confined to training and had no separate
Identity.
On 20 January 1943 Donovan constituted
maritime activities the Marine Section of
SO, and in March this Section assumed
complete control of Area D. Even at that
time, however, the potentialities of maritime
activities were not fully relied by the other
branches of OSS. They were considered
purely as a servicing function, and there was
little appreciation of the possibilities of
maritime sabotage as a distinct operational
activity or of the service which a maritime
unit might provide in supplying guerrilla
and resistance groups. The Marine Section
sought to bring to the attention of OSS au-
thorities the desirability of branch status,
so that it could take its place with the operat-
ing branches.
In the meantime, the Section was perform-
ing research on new equipment, notably an
Inflatable surfboard and a collapsible eight-
man kayak which could be taken apart
easily and used from a submarine. In ad-
dition, a new two-man kayak was developed.
The latter caused such favorable comment
that the British immediately ordered 275 of
them for shipment to various parts of the
world.
Underwater swimming groups developed
out of plans for such a unit approved by
Donovan on 18 February 1943. The first
group was placed in training at Annapolis
on 24 May, becoming familiar with such de-
vices as the Lambertsen Unit (an under-
water breathing apparatus which permits a
man to remain beneath the surface for NI
long as an hour or more). Subsequently,
226
fl
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Fop-Seeref--
the group proceeded to Area D for training in
small boats, limpets, navigation, etc. The
polluted water at Area D prevented effective
swimming training and the men were later
sent to Silver Springs, Florida, for further
training and research in underwater breath-
ing devices.
By the summer of 1943 the potentialities
of maritime activities began to be realized,
and MU was established as a separate branch
on 9 June. Consequently, MU had for the
first time authority to send its own person-
nel into the field. In late July, the first MU
officer was dispatched to METO, where a
calque service, which had been established
by SI for purposes of clandestine maritime
supply and infiltration, was taken over
by MU.*
Once the Strategic Services Officers in the
various theaters were apprised of Mira ex-
panded functions, requests for boats and
maritime training personnel were continu-
ous. In CBI some sea operations had been
attempted under conditions of extreme dif-
ficulty because of lack of trained personnel.
Boats and crews trained in maritime activ-
ity were immediately requested. In METO
the Strategic Services Officer advised Wash-
ington that he expected eighty percent of his
operations toward Greece to be maritime.
ETO requested that an MU group be dis-
patched as quickly as possible. The Stra-
tegic Services Officer in NATO desired equip-
ment but did not immediately request MU
personnel. However, he subsequently ap-
proved the dispatch of an MU officer to sur-
vey maritime possibilities in that Theater.
In 1943 R&D questioned the practicability
of MU continuing independent experimenta-
tion and development of maritime equip-
ment and devices. This matter was settled
on 15 October when Donovan decided that
the Chief of MU should be responsible for his
own experimental and developmental work.
It was also decided in October 1943 that
maritime training would continue under the
direct control of the Chief of MU and his in-
structors, but that training camps were to be
maintained, equipped and otherwise staffed
by the Schools and Training Branch.
The Branch expanded as personnel were
sent to the theaters following October 1943,*
and impressive advances were made in the
development of many specialized items of
equipment In the same period the train-
ing program moved into high gear and new
training sites were located. It was found
that the warm water of the Pacific facili-
tated under-water swimming training and
camps were established in California at
Camp Pendleton in November 1943 and on
Catalina Island in February 1944. In May
1944 an additional under-water training
base was established in Nassau, British
'Rah amp
The Maritime Unit was instrumental in
the development of undersea breathing ap-
paratus, a compass which could operate
under water and which would resist the ef-
fect of magnetic limpets, luminous and
water-proof watches, and depth gauges. An
electrically powered inflated surfboard ca-
pable of carrying two men (total weight-
carrying capacity 1,800 pounds) was also
developed. It had a speed of five knots and
a maximum cruising range of fifteen miles.
The silent electric motor and the low sil-
houette made it particularly effective for
approaching ships at anchor without detec-
tion, and it could also be used for clandestine
landing of operatives.
MU collaborated with the Navy in experi-
ments conducted in Guantansuno Bay,
Cuba, designed to test the effectiveness of
harbor defenses, such as submarine, anti-
torpedo and various other types of under-
water nets. In these tests the lengthy
training showed commendable results, be- .
cause the swimmers were able to circum-
vent the net defenses in each instance. An
additional point of value was proof that the
�
the Maritime Unit had a
� See Greece in Europe-Africa-Middle East � By 31 August 1544
Section. total personnel of 226.
227 �fep-Seope.-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-Seaga-
Navy sound-detection gear did not reveal
the presence of underwater swimmers.
MU also experimented with midget sub-
marines; while the experiments never got
beyond the model stage during the war,
their results should be valuable to any fu-
ture efforts in this field.
The field histories recount the numer-
ous instances in which clandestine maritime
operations were used to infiltrate agents.
This method of infiltration was particularly
effective from Corsica toward North Italy
and southern France, from bases in the
Aegean Islands and southern Italy toward
Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, and in the
Far East. The success of the maritime sup-
ply (calque) service operated by MU in the
Eastern Mediterranean was another achieve-
ment. Underwater swimming groups were
effective in the Pacific towards the close of
the war.
The full possibilities of maritime sabo-
tage were never realized, however. In the
latter stages of the North Italian campaign,
the San Marco Battalion (Italian)* was
used to good effect, but, in general, the
United States was slow to realize the possi-
bilities of this form of attack. America was,
therefore, far behind both its enemies and
its Allies in this respect. The Japanese used
midget submarines in the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The British had not been slow to
develop these instruments, and the attack
of two-man submarines upon the Tirpitz is
well known. Perhaps the most effective,
and certainly the most impressive, opera-
tions in maritime sabotage were conducted
by the Italians. Their exploits in destroy-
ing shipping in Gibraltar and Algiers in
1942-43 were particularly successful. In
using the Italian San Marco Battalion un-
der MU direction, OSS benefited to some ex-
tent from their experience.
Despite its late start, MU was able to dem-
onstrate the effectiveness of clandestine
maritime entry and attack and to develop
� See account of North Italy in Europe-Africa-
Middle East Section.
-rop-Seca4-
new and valuable special maritime devices
and equipment.
(e) SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE
� The Special Projects Office was established
on 31 December 1943 by Supplement 27 of
General Order No. 9 to "carry out special as-
signments and rnis-sions as approved by the
Director". It was, therefore, responsible for
operational purposes directly to Donovan.
However, for administrative purposes Spe-
cial Projects was given branch status under
the Deputy Director--SSO.
The Office grew out of the MACGREGOR
Project which was started under SO in the
summer of 1943. MACGREGOR, with Don-
ovan's approval and the active support of
the Secretary of the Navy, had for its purpose
the subversion of a portion of the Italian
fleet. However, the capitulation of Italy in
the late summer of 1943, while the Project
was in progress with a mission overseas, ob-
viated the necessity for continuing with the
original plan.*
When Donovan arrived in NATO in Sep-
tember 1943, he secured Italian clearance
for MACGREGOR to pursue the results of
certain Italian experiments on secret weap-
ons, particularly glider bombs.** Accord-
� As a part of MACGREGOR, it was necessary
to make contact with a high-ranking Italian
admiral. Personnel for the Project arrived in
Algiers in the summer of 1943 with a directive
from Washington that all OSS branches should
afford every assistance possible. Several methods
were used to attempt contact with the admiral:
A courier was dispatched from Cairo to try to
make his way through the Balkans; MAC-
GREGOR personnel, with the assistance of
Italian SI, recruited an Italian agent in Sicily
and infiltrated him by sea to the Italian coast
near Rome; OSS/Bem was requested to dispatch
a courier to Rome to make the essential contact.
The last method succeeded in delivering the
preliminary mPcsPze a short time before the
Italian capitulation.
�� The dramatic and effective use of the glider
bomb by the Germans during the landings at
Salerno made this subject of prime interest te
Allied intelligence.
228
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-SesFe.�
ingly, MACGREGOR made contact with an
Italian vice-Pdrniral and an Italian scientist
who specialf7ed in the field of electronics,
and transported them to the United States.
At the same time, some personnel remained
In NATO to search the ruins of the Torpedo
Works at Baia in an effort to salvage a barge
loaded with secret and experimental weap-
ons which the Italinns had sunk in Naples
harbor. When the equipment had been sal-
vaged and certain important Italian engi-
neers and technicians had been contacted
and dispatched to the United States, the Sec-
retary of the Navy issued a priority making
an LST available to carry the salvaged ma-
terial directly to America.
The equipment included, in either model
or descriptive form, magnetic torpedo pis-
tols, new guided torpedoes, winged aerial
bombs, and a three-man assault submarine.
The Italians and the equipment were turned
over to Naval Ordnance experts at the
United States Naval Torpedo Station at
Newport, Rhode Island. The Navy later
stated that the results of this operation had
saved one year's work on the part of the Re-
search and Technical Sections of the Tor-
pedo Station.*
The Branch was established at the end
of 1943 in order to develop projects which
normally would not fall within the purview
of any one branch and the execution of
which transcended geographic theater
boundaries. Although the Branch was not
limited as to the nature of the projects to
be handled, the great interest in secret
weapons in late 1943 and early 1944, to-
gether with the results achieved by MAC-
GEGOR in this field, determined its focus
of interest. Of the projects which were
undertaken by the Branch, SIMMONS and
JAVAMAN merit particular interest.
The SIMMONS Project began in April
1944. Its purpose was to secure intelligence
data on secret weapons, particularly the
115-293, a new guided radio rnis-cile which
� Minutes of conference, Naval Torpedo Sta-
tion. Newport, Rhode Island, 31 January 1944.
had been developed by the Germans in late
1943. Special Projects had compiled some
Information on the subject in the form of
photographs and information based on
pictures taken by a scientist who hap-
pened to be on the Island of Bornholm
In September 1943, when the Germans
launched (presumably from Peenemilnde) a
radio-controlled Tni sile against the Island.
He was later captured by the Germans; but
the British had the pictures and the techni-
cal data which he had compiled subsequent
to the attack. This information was for-
warded to the United States in December.
In April 1944 SIMMONS became active,
following the receipt of intelligence which
Indicated that a factory in Portes des Va-
lence was being used by the Germans as a
storehouse for HS-293's. Special Projects
enlisted the cooperation of the Air Force and
the French Resistance in planning an opera-
tion to secure physical possession of an
HS-293 receiver and/or transmitter. The
MAAF supplied twelve planes to bomb the
factory; following the attack members of the
resistance, disguised as firemen, were to
search the debris for specimens of the mis-
sile. This was one of the first plans for co-
ordinated resistance ground-air bombing
operations. The operation was first laid on
for the night of 10-11 May. It failed when a
storm prevented the attacking planes from
reaching the target area, although a diver-
sionary raid was made on schedule and the
Maquis arrived on time. Another operation
was thereupon scheduled for a month later,
the night of 9-10 June. However, two days
after D-Day, all German troops in the Portes
des Valence area were moved out, together
with the HS-293's.
Following the abortive Portes des Valence
operation, a Special Projects representative
went to Cairo to discover what intelligence
was available there with regard to secret
weapons. While he was in Cairo, contact
was established with a German �Meer who
was willing to deal with OSS in regard to
the radio control mechanism of the HS-293.
229
IJ1J
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Top-seems�
The equipment in question was from an Me-
109 grounded in Greece. It was forwarded
to the Air Corps, which expressed its appre-
ciation in a letter addressed to the Director
of OSS and subsequently requested that
STivrivi.ONS expand its operations in connec-
tion with secret weapons generally.
In the SIMMONS Project, the Branch had
been concerned with procuring high priority
technical intelligence. However, it should
be noted that Special Projects was an out-
growth of SO, and its attention soon turned
toward the field of actual operations. The
JAVAMAN Project,* which had been under
consideration as early as the spring of 1944,
provided the opportunity.
JAVAMAN was a missile craft** designed
to effect the sabotage of enemy vessels and
Installations which, because of tight pro-
tection by inner and outer harbor defenses,
could only be attacked by using operational
deception. Disguised as an ordinary craft
normal to the area of operations, JAVA-
MAN would operate by remote control radio
from an aircraft and be aimed by the use
of television.
Experimentation and development were in
progress throughout the late spring of 1944.
A test was made in August. In this test the
cooperation of the Air Forces, begun during
SIMMONS, was continued. They made
available to Special Projects a 5,000-ton, 300-
foot derelict for the experiment, which took
place on 11 August 1944 in the Gulf of
Mexico. Representatives of the JCS, the
Navy, the Air Forces and OSS were present
at the maneuvers. In these tests, a JAVA-
MAN craft, containing high explosives,
under remote control from a plane which
aimed the missile by the use of television,
was completely successful in sinking the tar-
get vesseL
� This project was originally known as
CATU,ErTs.; it was retitled JAVAMAN in January
1945 at the request of the CC&
� � Air-sea rescue boats, appropriately modi-
fied, were the foundation for JAVAMAN craft.
-Tep-Sectat-
Consequently, at the end of September
JAVAMAN was declared ready for opera-
tional use in LW. Maneuvers and opera-
tional runs continued during the period of
waiting, pending Theater Commander ap-
proval.* By March 1945, this approval was
not forthcoming and Special Projects turned
to another theater to find operational em-
ployment for JAVAMAN.
In May 1945 General MacArthur requested
and approved appropriate air priority for
Special Projects personnel to proceed to his
Theater to discuss the possibilities of JAVA-
MAN there. Personnel was dispatched and,
as a result of the discussions, General Mac-
Arthur on 21 June approved the dispatch to
his Theater of a JAVAMAN misedon with ap-
propriate equipment, on condition that
transportation would not be.charged against
Theater tonnages.
By mid-July, the first group of ARB's was
ready for shipment to the Pacific on tankers
allotted by the Army Transportation Corps.
The sudden end of hostilities in the Pacific
on 17 August obviated the possibility of using
JAVAMAN in actual operations against the
enemy. Contracts were cancelled, work
was stopped and liquidation begun.
(f) FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT
The Field Experimental Unit was estab-
lished in March 1944 "to carry out special
assignments and missions as approved by
the Director". It was operationally respon-
sible immediately to Donovan, but was
placed for administration under the Deputy
Director�Strategic Services Operations.
The Chief of the Unit was the former com-
mander of Detachment 101 in Burma who
had led the Detachment from the time of its
Inception in the spring of 1942. The actual
work envisioned for the Unit was of an opera-
tional nature. However, the Chief made an
extensive tour to various theaters in the
spring and summer of 1944, ostensibly for
� This was contingent upon British Admiralty
COIICIIITeriCe.
230
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�-Tep-Secret�
the purpose of demonstrating newly de-
veloped devices and special weapons to field
missions. In reality, he was surveying the
possibilities for special miggions to be as-
signed to the Field Experimental Unit.
Thereafter, recruiting activities to secure
some 300 personnel began. The first groups
of Field Experimental Unit personnel began
an intensive training period on Catalina Is-
land - in the middle of January 1945. The
program covered parachutage, "Joan-Elea-
nor", and the use of various items of under-
water equipment which had been developed
by MU.
By August, some 45 of the anticipated 300
had been recruited and were in training.
With the end of the war the project was
liquidated.
4. Schools and Training�S&T
The problem of training personnel for the
varied activities of OSS was a complex one,
In some respects as unusual as the activities
themselves. There was no precedent in
America for such an undertaking and it was
necessary at first to piece together various
fragments of seemingly relevant knowledge
from other agencies of the Government, to
borrow instructional techniques from the
British, and to adapt certain technical as-
pects of orthodox military training to the
probable conditions under which guer-
rilla units and resistance organizers might
operate.
The initial task was to establish training
facilities and programs which would produce
spies, saboteurs and guerrillas. By 1943
the problem was complicated by the neces-
sity of preparing "black" propagandists and
counter-espionage experts. In addition, it
was necessary to train the staff members who
would direct from field or Washington head-
quarters the activities of agents and opera-
tives, and also to train in the fundamentals
of OSS those who would perform more rou-
tine tasks, so that they would understand
the unusual security requirements upon
which the lives of agents and the success of
operations depended. Consequently, EMT
was called upon to establish training cur-
ricula to prepare a wide variety of personnel
for the unorthodox and unprecedented ac-
tivities in which OSS engaged.
The complexity of the over-all training
program was added to by the fact that, with
the exception of certain types of paramili-
tary training, all training had to be as highly
individn tbred as possible. Ideally, the
training of spies, saboteurs, "black" propa-
gandists and counter-espionage experts
should probably be on a completely individ-
ual, I. e., tutorial, basis. However, in a sit-
uation of war, with the heavy demands from
the field for large numbers of staff members,
agents and operatives which the rapid ex-
pansion of OSS dictated, it was necessary to
establish training by classes.
There were two separate categories of
training initially established under COI in
1942.* One was designed to prepare agents
for espionage, principally under conditions
prevailing in neutral territories. The other
was designed to prepare personnel for vari-
ous forms of sabotage and to establish simul-
taneously a program and physical facilities
which could be adapted to the training of
guerrilla units when authorization therefor
should be secured.
As the progress of the war transformed
most of the areas of interest in the world into
either Allied military theaters or enemy and
enemy-occupied territory, the numbers of
agents which could or should be sent to neu-
tral territories diminished in relation to
those destined for military theaters or actual
Infiltration into enemy or occupied regions.
Therefore, the cover technique and the
method of infiltration of the spy became es-
sentially the same as that of the saboteur
in most cases. The entry of the spy into a
neutral country was illegal in intent but
not in method, and his cover was predicated
upon authentic documents. In enemy or
enemy-occupied territory, however, he was,
like the saboteur, dependent upon forget
See SA/13 and 8A/G In Section L
231 �Tap Secret
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
"Tap-Sescat__
credentials and such unlawful modes of en-
try as the parachute, the rubber boat, or a
surreptitious crossing of battle lines.
It thus became evident shortly after the
establishment of OSS that training for all
OSS branches should be centralized and the
various types of training subdivided within
one branch, so that trainees could secure
more readily any type of training pertinent
to their mission&
The first move in this direction was the
establishment in September 1942 of a Train-
ing Directorate composed of officials of SA/B
and SA/G. Since the members of the Di-
rectorate had approximately equal powers,
however, responsibility could not be fixed in
any one person. It was therefore decided
that OSS training should be placed under
one individual with the status of a branch
chief. Consequently, the S&T Branch was
established on 3 January 1943 as part of the
OSS reorganization effected by General Or-
der No. 9 (Exhibit W-35):
The Branch was immediately subject to
three distinct pressures: (1) To find capable
Instructors and develop appropriate curric-
ula for new types of activity such as MO
and X-2, in addition to expanding the facili-
ties for SI and SO training; (2) to provide
the best possible instructors for training ac-
tivities at overseas stations, such as Algiers,
Cairo, London and in the Far East; and (3)
to adapt its physical facilities and training
curricula in the United States to handle
effectively the large numbers of personnel
being prepared for departure to overseas
posts.
The three factors mentioned above were
particularly acute in 1943 and they exerted
pressures upon the Branch which resulted
In some confusion. S&T was forced to send
Its best instructors overseas, a fact which
benefited training abroad but handicapped
domestic operations. There were few in
America experienced in the activities in
which OSS was engaged, and it was neces-
sary to school the instructors them selves.
Even this was difficult, however, since the
-Tap-Socso.-
functions of the various branches of OSS
were actually being defined and developed
by experience in the field, so that clear-cut
direction from the operating branches in
this early period was lacking. During 1943
S&T was forced to lean heavily on the Brit-
ish for assistance, both by sending potential
Instructors to British schools and by bor-
rowing instructors from the British for
varyirig periods of time.
Furthermore, the training facilities were
severely taxed in attempting to school the
large numbers of personnel necPssary for
rapidly expanding overseas activities. In
addition, transportation was scarce and had
to be taken advantage of when it became
available which created an uncertain period
of time prior to dispatch and made fixed
periods of training impracticable in many
cases.
The entire training situation was re-ex-
amined in the fall of 1943, and the Chief of '
S&T was replaced by the Commanding Offi-
cer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detach-
ment. This move, which placed an Army
officer in charge of all training establish-
ments, was in one sense an effort to reconcile
the friction which had arisen between the
military and civilian approaches to various
phases of OSS training. In general, intelli-
gence training had been established and op-
erated on a civilian basis Conversely, SO
schools had been run along more military
lines, not only because most SO personnel
were drawn from the farmed forces, but also
because the facilities were to be made avail-
able for the training of military guerrilla
units.
It soon became apparent that the type of
Irregular training necessary to most OSS ac-
tivities did not lend itsPif to the strictly mil-
itary approach. Consequently, the Com-
manding Officer of Headquarters and Head-
quarters Detachment secured an Army offi-
cer with civilian background to become his
Executive for Training.
Some sources of friction remained, howt.
ever, since the Headquarters approach to
232
11
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�-r-op-SeeFet-
training was too rigid and was not in accord
with either the operational or the training
needs of OSS. Ultimately, Donovan secured
the services of a civilian with long experience
as a college president to act as his advisor on
training. Following an extensive survey of
the situation, recommendations were made
that training be reestablished as an inde-
pendent branch and that the full operation
of all training establishments be placed
under the control of a branch chief. At the
same time, in order that S&T might be in a
position to maintain independence in deal-
ing with the various branches it served, it
was recommended that there be appointed a
Deputy Director�Schools and Training, to
whom the Chief of S&T would report.
These recommendations were put into effect
when General Order No. 9 was revised on
26 May 1944. Donovan's advisor on train-
ing was appointed Deputy Director, and es-
- . sential civilian control of training was thus
- established.
The administrative position of S&T re-
mained unchanged thereafter. The Deputy
Director was responsible to Donovan and the
Assistant Director of OSS. The Chief of
S&T had two principal Pssi stants, one for
pdministration and one for training. The
commanding officer of each school or area
reported to the Chief of S&T. Each such
commanding officer was responsible for the
administration of the servicing functions of
the establishment he controlled and was as-
sisted by a Chief Instructor, who was directly
responsible for the actual training.*
Training. The. principles of undercover
training derived primarily from espionage
techniques. However, they were also appli-
cable to the work of saboteurs who might in-
filtrate enemy or enemy-occupied territory
to operate under cover, to "black" propagan-
� While S&T was charged with the administra-
tion of all training establishments, the actual
training pre-:7=ns for such specialized activitle,s
as those of Communications and kW were subject
to the direction of those branches.
dists who might similarly be engaged in in-
filtration operations and to counterespio-
nage staff members who had to be thor-
oughly fernillAr with the techniques of
enemy espione se which it would be their
purpose to circumvent and turn to ad-
vantage.
In this field, cover was synonymous with
security. Upon the effectiveness of an
agent's cover depended the success of his
activities. It was recognized that there were
several types of cover. In neutral territory,
an agent might be semi-overt, that is to say,
he would be ostensibly in a diplomatic or
other government post, his connection with
the United States Government being ob-
vious: In some such instances, the fact that
the individual was engaged in intelligence
activities might be well known, which would
attract disaffected political elements or in-
dividuals who, for various motivations, were
willing to give information. However, even
In such semi-overt activities, the cover in a
given operation had to remain strictly invio-
late. In other words, secrecy had to be
maintained as to connection with OSS and
as to how intelligence operations were
executed.
A more complicated type of cover in neu-
tral countries would be that of ostensibly
engaging in a business or profession. In
such cases the cover requirements were more
rigid, since knowledge of the fact that the
Individual was engaged in intelligence work
was not to be revealed. However, such cover
was generally predicated upon an occupa-
tion with which the agent was familiar, and
his presence in the area would be supported
by authentic credentials. In most such
cases, the problem was to find an occupation
for the agent which would allow him free-
dom of time and movement to carry on his
clandestine activities without jeopardiging
his cover.
Perhaps the most rigid type of cover was
that of the agent infiltrated illegally into
enemy or enemy-occupied territory. In
such cases, cover was quite often supported
233 --fep-SeeFe.-
11
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Toir-Searat_
by documents, forged at least in part, and
the identity assumed by the agent was often
completely false. The agent would take up
an occupation, compatible with the iden-
tity he assumed, in which the same qualifi-
cation was present as in the case of neutral
countries, namely, freedom of time and
movement to carry on surreptitious activity.
A variation of cover in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory was that which was only
partly false, that is to say, someone who had
previously engaged in the cover occupation
In the assigned area and who had all or most
of the requisite documents necessary to sup-
port his presence in the area. However,
there would necessarily-be a period of ab-
sence which had to be covered by falsifi-
cation.
The matter of cover was basic to practi-
cally all of the activities in which OSS en-
gaged. Staff members, operations officers
and intelligence officers, who were to deal
with agents and would on occasion recruit
and direct agent activities in the field, had
to understand cover and the techniques nec-
essPry to preserve it. Needless toy, those
who were actually to act as undercover
agents, whether in neutral, enemy or enemy-
occupied territory, had even more necessity
for such knowledge.
Therefore, all OSS training, with the ex-
ception of that for 00 units, stressed from
the beginning the importance of maintain-
ing cover. An informal civilian atmosphere
prevailed at the intelligence schools and the
students were forbidden to disclose their
real identities and lived under assumed
names At the same time they were in-
structed to attempt to pierce the cover of
their fellow stddents. It was sought to
create, under a relaxed surface, an atmos-
phere of tension which would characterize
real activities in the field. In the SO
schools, as in the Communications areas,
students wore fatigue uniforms without
designation of rank. While these schools
were run along more military lines, the iden-
tities of the students were not revealed and
--Top�Seca*
the preservation of cover was equally
stressed.
Intensive interrogation exercises of var-
ious types were carried on in attempts to
force the student to break his assumed iden-
tity. In each of these the student was made
fernilipr with the various techniques of in-
terrogation and the importance of the most
minute detail in his cover preparations was
stressed. The entire atmosphere at all
training establishments was designed to
prepare the trainees psychologically for the
fact that the life of an agent is a constant
and continuing gamble with detection.
" If the agent were to accomplish anything,
however, it would be necessary for him to
take action, and every action taken would
create another vulnerable point in his cover.
Most agents were to operate primarily as or-
ganizers. Their object would be to organize
chains of sub-agents to perform the actual
espionage, sabotage or dissemination of
"black" propaganda. Therefore, a great
deal of attention was given to methods of
agent organization. The primary purpose
of such methods was to insulate the main
agent from the-possible consequences of de-
tection of any part of the various activities
carried out under his direction.
One of the prime factors was the use
of cut-outs�an intermediary who would
handle all actual dealings with sub-agents
for the principal agent. In the event of a
"blow", arrangements would be niade for
the cut-out to go underground or leave the
area, whereupon the remnants of a given
chain could be re-activated by a new cut-out.
In this fashion, sub-agents would not know
the identity of the principal agent, and
would therefore be unable to implicate him.
A principal agent might use any number of
cut-outs, depending upon the situation in
the area in which he was operating at a given
time. Modifications and adaptations of the
cut-out principle might also be devised.
Another expression of the principle of in-
sulation was the cell system. While sub-..
ject to numerous variations, its basis was
234
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
---for1R-Ter
organization of a chain of small units of sub-
agents. One member of each unit would
know one member of the group above, and
another member of the same unit would be
the only one who would know the identity
of a member of the unit below. In a &Ain of
this nature, a "blow" would result generally
in the loss of only one group, and at most
three, before the possibility of further de-
tection could be blocked off.
Communications, other than technical,
were also basic to agent activity. All stu-
dents were fs.miliarized with various cipher
and code systems and were apprised of their
Inherent weaknesses. It was, of course, ba-
sic that no cipher or code system could be
used through technical facilities provided
by the Communications Branch unless for-
mally authorized. However, it was recog-
nized that certain low-grade ciphers and
home-made codes might be employed for lo-
cal communications with sub-agents in a
given area, where detection by the enemy
would not jeopardize other operations. The
technique of writing "innocent text" letters,
Le., seemingly ordinary letters which con-
cealed a previously enciphered me-csa ge, was
also practiced.
The precautions necessary to the estab-
lishment of "safe_ houses" were also ex-
plained. A "safe house" (one where the
people were friendly and willing to take the
risk of harboring an agent or sub-agent)
might be necessary to a q.iat the concealment
or escape of a sub-agent, or, on occasion, the
principal agent torngelf. As it developed in
the field, chains of "safe houses" were often
'useful in facilitating the escape of wanted
individuals who possessed experience or
knowledge potentially valuable to the Allies.
Also, chairm of "safe houses" frequently con-
stituted a route to safety for escaped prison-
ers of war. The use of "safe houses" to re-
ceive newly infiltrated agents and shelter
them until they could make arrangements
to establish themselves in their cover occu-
pations was of primary importance in
enemy and enemy-occupied territory.
Letter drops were necessary to agent com-
munication. Such letter drops might be
animate or immimg te. A news dealer or a
tobacconist might be used to receive and
pass messages A designated tree, or an
empty tin can placed at a pre-arranged spot
in relation to a given kilometer marker on a
European road, might be used. It was pos-
sible to use an inanimate letter drop for the
actual transportation of intelligence reports
over great distances. For example, agents
might place intelligence material at a desig-
nated spot on a railroad car or locomotive.
Such material would be removed by con-
federates in another city and forwarded.
The above subjects were not taught so that
the trainees would learn them by rote. They
were given merely as principles and ex-
amples of what had been done. The stu-
dents were constantly made aware that va-
riations and adaptations, as well as entirely
new techniques, must be developed by them.
All instruction was designed to sharpen the
student's ingenuity, and to impress upon
him the necessity for exercising the utmost
judgment in calculating the risks inherent
in a given activity.
The study of cover and security and the
techniques of agent organization and com-
munication was fundamental to all activities
of OSS. Basic courses also included Intelli-
gence Objectives and Reporting, Small Arms,
Sabotage, Demolitions and Close Combat.*
In addition, rudimentary training in
counter-espionage and the various tech-
niques of "black" propaganda was added, as
those functions became integral parts of OSS
activities.
The basic course included two separate
undercover field problems in the course of
which students were dispatched to various
cities. Such problems required that each
student prepare a cover story, with appro-
priate cover credentials, and attempt to
penetrate an industrial establishment in
� This vras the system of unarmed combat de-
veloped by Major Fairbairn, whom the British .
lent to OBS as an instructor in 1942.
�fop--Seere.�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
7p 3
such cities as Baltimore, Philadelphia or
Pittsburgh. While such practice operations
could not involve the element of actual dan-
ger which would be met in the field, they
gave the students an opportunity to test in
practice some of the theories which had been
given them in the courses, and were valuable
as a means of psychological conditioning for
actual operations.* Field problems, which
comprised simulated night sabotage attacks,
compass runs and various tests of observa-
tion and reporting, were also carried out in
course of basic training. .
The period covered by basic training was
only three weeks, and, since it was so short,
was necessarily 1ntenlve. Students were
kept hard at work from dawn until late at
night and were given no breaks for week-
ends or holidays. This intensity had not
only the effect of teaching the most in the
shortest possible time, but also, by the pres-
sure which it exerted, eliminated some of the
lazy or incompetent
The final night of basic training was os-
tensibly a party, with refreshments freely
available. In actuality, this farewell
"party"�in an atmosphere which fostered
the feeling in the students that they were
not under pressure and could relax after the
arduous training program�provided an ex-
cellent opportunity for final judgment. A
thorough evaluation of each student was
prepared by the instructors and submitted
to Washington headquarters upon the con-
i5lu5io1 of each course.
The basic training was not intended to pro-
duce finished OSS operatives, but to be pre-
liminary to more advanced courses for those
who would specialize in some particular ac-
tivity, and to provide those who were to go
overseas in staff positions with a general un-
derstanding of the problems inherent in OSS
operations.
� A by-product of these field problems was that
by reporting security weaknesses in defense
plants, OE's was able to contribute indirectly to
the improvement of security practices in various
Industries.
A second type of training was SO basic
training. This was designed to fit SO men
for their missions, and was quite often given
to such personnel subsequent to OSS basic
training. The emphs_sis was upon physical
conditioning, survival in the field and knowl-
edge of sabotage devices. The course was
three weeks in duration.
Subjects given during SO basic training
Included Field Craft, Demolitions, Map
Reading, Weapons, Morse Code and Close
Combat. Students were taught how to
make basic types of demolitions charges for
the sabotage of industrial establishments,
rail lines, bridges, etc. They were instructed
in the use of small arms for most rapid and
effective day and night firing. They were
further instructed in methods of sabotage
by abrasives, contaminants, "slow-downs",
etc. -
The course included field problems com-
prising night map and compass runs, vari-
ous types of reconnaissance and the placing
of demolition charges on dummy targets.
The atmosphere of the SO schools was
military in nature. As stated above, train-
ees wore no designations of rank and pre-
served cover identities throughout the
course.
MO personnel usually took OSS basic
training first. Thereafter, they received ad-
vanced MO training in such subjects as
propaganda fundamentals, propaganda
writing and radio propaganda. Emphasis
was chiefly upon "black" propaganda, in-
cluding such subversive techniques as
poison-pen letters, rumors, etc.
For X-2 personnel, basic OSS training was
also considered preliminary to advanced
courses which went into the more detailed
aspects of the enemy intelligence services
and also into the techniques of manipulat-
ing and controlling double agents, as well as
the specialized X-2 personality report.
CIG training was originally set up by SO
Instructors who worked out a program
which consisted, in effect, of longer and more
elaborate courses of physical toughenint,
236
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
.4ep-Serrei-
� weapons training, close combat, map read-
ing, and the like. OSS basic training was
not considered essential to OG's. Their
training was distinguished from that of SO
in that they were to operate as uniformed
troops in well-organized and disciplined
units, rather than as individuals or small
teams.
When MU was established, maritime
training became the responsibility of that
Branch, but S&T remained in charge of ad-
ministration. Orig,inally, maritime train-
ing was a specialized aspect of SO training
and included small boat infiltration opera-
tions and the elementary techniques of mari-
time sabotage. In the early period it was
one of the advanced courses for trainees who
had been given SO basic training. Follow-
ing the establishment of MU, specialized
maritime schools were set up, and the train-
ing was extended to include various ad-
vanced forms of maritime sabotage, under-
water demolitions, beach reconnaissance
and the use of the new and specialind de-
vices which MU developed.
Another type of training for which S&T
was only administratively responsible was
communications. There were two cate-
gorieThrtrainees at the communications
areas�those intended for base station duty
overseas and those who would enter enemy
territory either as SO or SI agents. The
general atmosphere of the communications
schools was military. In the case of pro-
spective base station operators, there was no
concealment of rank or true identity. Stu-
dent agents, however, preserved cover iden-
tities and bore no indication of rank.
In communications training for clandes-
tine radio operation, the emphasis was not
upon the speed of transmission, but rather
its accuracy. Student agents generally
were not required to be proficient in Morse
code beyond a speed of 18 words per minute.
It was reo ind that, in transmitting under
conditions where the base station operator
could not "break" the agent,* accuracy was
the prime consideration. Agent radio oper-
ators were given instruction in radio theory
and in maintenance of their sets, with em-
phasis upon the improvisation which might
be necessary in enemy or enemy-occupied
territory, where replacement parts would be
difficult to obtain. Two of the most difficult
problems facing the clandestine radio oper-
ator were power supply and concealment of
his antenna. Field problems, in which the
prospective agent was required to set up a
radio clandestinely and make contact with
the "base" (school), were carried out over
distances up to 200 miles.
In communications training, also, it was
sought to impress upon the agent the neces-
sity for the exercise of ingenuity in carrying
on his operations.** The period of training
for an agent radio operator was normally
some 10 weeks.
Therefore, the complete training of a se-
cret agent required 16 weeks-3 weeks for
OSS intelligence training, 3 weeks for SO ba-
sic training and 10 weeks for communica-
tions training. At the conclusion of such
period, the prospective agent was familiar
with undercover intelligence practices, the
arts of sabotage, the elements of field craft
and the procedures and techniques of clan-
destine radio operation. -
Certain other branches gave their overseas
personnel various types of training prior to
dispatch. R&A personnel for the most part
� A cardinal principle of agent radio operation
was that the agent might interrupt base trans-
tinssion at any time when the exigencies of his
situation demanded it, whereas the base station
(which could not know the conditions of emer-
gency under which the agent was sending) might
under no circumstances interrupt the agent.
�� One of the. developments to camouflage an-
tennae was the concealment of antenna wire in
the form of a clothes line. Students were en-
couraged to use their ingenuity to the utmost.
On one occasion, a student on a field problem
managed to make contact with the school over a
short range of 75 miles by using the springs of a.
bed as an antenna.
237
-fep-Seere.�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-
required
required no training which was included
among S&T curricula. However, certain
R&A personnel were given OSS basic train-
ing prior to departure for overseas assign-
ments. Prior to dispatch for overseas mis-
sions, most Special Funds officers received
OSS basic training and most Field Photo-
graphic personnel went through the SO ba-
sic course.
There was never any consistent policy
with regard to S&T indoctrination or orien-
tation for all OSS personnel. Many people
were sent overseas without any particular
training because it was assumed that they
would be engaged in purely servicing func-
tions. In some instances where the exigen-
cies of the situation in the field made it neces-
sary for such personnel to be transferred to
more active duties, the lack of training con-
stituted a handicap.
One other type of training played an im-
portant role in many OSS operations over-
seas. In the early days of COI, a smal/
parachute school had been established at
one of the SA/G areas. The staff of this
school was sent to North Africa in late 1942
to establish parachute training facilities
there. Arrangements were made with the
Army in order that OSS personnel requiring
parachute training in the United States
might receive it at Fort Benning. Those
who were sent overseas without parachute
training, and whose wicsions required such
training, received it at the OSS school in
North Africa or at British schools in Eng-
land.
One additional responsibility of S&T was
to set up courses to fnifin Army require-
ments that all enlisted men receive basic
military training before going overseas.
The necessity for this developed out of the
fact that many OSS civilian.s were drafted
and reassigned to the agency prior to de-
parture for overseas assignments. By con-
siderable streamlining and inti-rilive work,
S&T compressed the elements of basic mili-
tary training into a 4-week course.
Zap -Secret.
Assessment. In the summer and fall of
1943, the rapid expq-nsion of OSS, with its
concomitant demands for large numbers of
personnel overseas, resulted in an intense
recruiting drive by all branches which taxed
to the utmost the capacity of the training
areas. There was naturally a percentage
of recruits who were either unfit to receive
training for various reasons or psychologi-
cally unsuited for operations overseas. In
addition, instruction was handicapped be-
cause the poorer students established the
pace of the class. There were security risks
In releasing students who "washed out" dur-
ing training, since they received at least
some knowledge of the secret operations
and methods of the organization.. The risk
In sending overseas personnel who might
not be emotionally fit for field activity was
even greater.
In the fall of 1943, therefore, it was pro-
posed that a holding area be established, at
which no actual training would be given but
which would serve to screen prospective
trainees as to their physical, mental and
emotional capabilities for their intended as-
signments. Before this proposal could be
put into effect, reports were received that the
British SOB had established a program of
psychological evaluation for the potential
agents. The merits of this idea seemed so
obvious that members of S&T, in conjunction
with the Planning Staff, proceeded to evolve,
Independently of the British, a plan of psy-
chological assessment. The OSS plan
proved to be remarkably qiniilar to that of
SOB.
Several prominent psychologists and psy-
chiatrists were called to Washington to im-
plement the program. A country estate
(Station S) in Fairfax, Virginia, was leased.
In January 1944, Station S opened_as-the
first OSS assessment school. The program
called for a three and a half day period of
tests and problems designed to evaluate the
potential trainee from the standpoint of
emotional stability, mentality, personality,.
aptitude, etc. Initially, the assessment
238
..1�����
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top Se...ret
program was considered in the nature of an
experiment, and its facilities were offered to
OSS branches on an optional basis. The
results of the first three months proved so
impressive, however, that in March 1944
Donovan ordered that all OSS personnel des-
tined for overseas assignments be assessed
before departure from the United States.
The result of this order was to place an
untriginageable burden upon Station 8, as,
in addition to staff and agent recruits, cleri-
cal and services personnel were included
within the purview of the order. It was,
therefore, decided that personnel in the lat-
ter categories should be given a one-day as-
sessment course which would be sufficient to
screen out the obviously unfit. A house in
Washington (Station W) was rented for this
purpose. Thereafter, it was possible to
make the assessment program at S more
rigid and more closely geared to the prospec-
tive overseas assignments of SI, SO, X-2 and
MO personnel.
In June 1944, an assessment area was es-
tablished on the West Coast, designated Sta-
tion WS, to handle personnel destined for
the Far East.
Area F* became the fourth assessment sta-
tion in November 1944, when a reassessment
program was established for returnees from
European theaters in order to determine
their fitness for further assignments in the
Far East or Washington. In the reassess-
ment program, particular emphasis was
placed upon the possibility of nervous ten-
sions resulting from war experience. As an
Incident to the reassessment program, use-
ful facts were elicited by the interviews in
regard to operational techniques which
proved of value to the various training pro-
grams.
Assessment had two primary objectives:
(1) To analyze the personality of the candi-
date in order to determine his ability to with-
stand the rigors of war; and (2) to make
some estimate as to the type of activity for
which he was best suited, and, incidentally,
� Formerly used for OG training.
whether he could perform the job for which
he was intended.*
By April 1944, Station S rated all candi-
dates in terms of twenty major qualifica-
tions. These included motivation, initia-
tive, resourcefulness, inference, discretion
and leadership; an additional category�job
fitness�was added later.
The programs at S (three and a half days)
and W (one day) were varied in order to indi-
cate as far as possible the candidate's skills,
as well as latent emotional disturbances
which might handicap his performance in
the field. In general, the various tests were
designed to determine individual adjustment
and adjustment to a group situation. Sta-
tion W, in the short time allotted, secured
excellent results with a condensed and neces-
sarily somewhat general program. The pro-
gram at Station S was longer, more rigorous
and consequently more valuable as a defini-
tive estimate of the candidate.
During the assessment course at Station
8, all candidates wore Army fatigue uni-
forms without indication of rank. Imme-
diately upon arrival, each candidate was
subjected to routine paper and pencil intelli-
gence tests which provided a general index
of his intellectual capabilities and aptitudes.
A variety of tests were evolved which
were designed to produce not only material
for a psychological analysis of the candidate
but also a job analysis, namely what he could
do best and whether he was capable of per-
forming the task for which he was employed.
However, no test produced one type of evi-
dence only. For example, a candidate
would be required to transport a 150-pound
case, presumably of ammunition, to the top
of a nine-foot wall. He would be provided
with two ladders, a block and tackle, several
planks and a hand truck. He would be given
� Assessment reports were for OSS use only.
They were kept separate from personnel files and
were not available to the subject, or to the scru-
tiny of persons outside of OSS. They were or-
dereddestroyed at the time of the liquidation of
OSS.
239
VI! CIA,
fl
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
six minutes to complete the job. Obviously
the results of a test such as this demon-
strated a variety of things about the candi-
date, including physical strength, ingenuity,
presence of mind, etc. The same was true
of a test which involved supervising and di-
recting two a-ssistants in setting up a com-
plicated frame construction in ten minutes.
The affl.sistants, who were actually junior
members of the assessment staff, were di-
rected to make things as difficult as possible
for the candidate, while professing every de-
sire to Racist him. This type of test indi-
cated the candidate's ability to withstand
frustration, to persevere, to think clearly,
etc. The results of such tests as these were
on the whole general in nature.
More precise tests undertook to discover
the candidate's ability to memorize maps,
faces, terrain, etc. In one test, two sets of
slides were used. Each slide of the first set
had on it a man's photograph, his name, age,
occupation and place of residence. The sec-
ond set consisted only of the photographs.
The candidate would be shown the first set
of slides in groups of four, each slide being
exposed for twenty seconds. After each
group, the corresponding slides of the second
set were shown for thirty seconds in random
order. During the showing of the second
set of slides, the student was asked to write
down all that he could recall of the informa-
tion appearing on the first slide. Aptitude
of this nature was more essential to an in-
telligence agent than a saboteur and pro-
nounced ki1j in the test was considered an
indication that the candidate might have
additional capabilities which would make
him a worth-while intelligence officer or
agent.
Other tests, designed to indicate a candi-
date's specific aptitudes, involved asgign-
meats to process propaganda material
(MO), and ability to instruct and speak ex-
temporaneously before a group (which was
useful in determining the potentialities of
prospective instructors). Additional teas
9p
were devised to indicate aRtitudes for other
OSS activities.
The clinical interview played a decisive
role in the assessment of a candidate. This
was a personal conference of varying length
between the candidate and a staff member
designated as mentor for him. The inter-
view was designed to bring together by con-
versational and interrogational techniques
all the data on the candidate which had been
acquired in paper tests, by observation, etc.
Following the interview, the results of the
various tests and the opinions of the inter-
viewer were compared. In addition, the ob-
servations of other staff members were also
considered. On, occasion, the interview
evaluation conflicted with the cumulative
Indications provided by the tests. 'This
raised a question as to the validity of the
tests vis-a-vis the clinical interview. On
the whole, it was the interview which carried
more weight. Actually, there was seldom
conflict of this nature, and the fact that it
arose in certain exceptional cases did not de-
stroy the validity of the original concept,
which was that clinical data is stronger when
supported by situational data but is not in-
validated by an occasional discrepancy.
The assessment program was most effec-
tive in providing a psychological evaluation
of the candidate. It was less effective in
determining the candidate's suitability for
a particular job. There were many reasons
for the latter. For one thing, no member of
the assessment staff, at least until very near
the close of the war, had actual field experi-
ence with OSS and, with the wide latitude
necessarily given to theater units to divert
personnel from their original assignments to
other activities, it was difficult to secure from
the branches precise job descriptions. Fur-
thermore, even when a reasonably precise
job description could be provided, there was
no assurance that the candidate would not
be transferred in the field to another assign-
ment.
From January 1944 to July 1945 the OSS
assessment schools screened 5,300 midi?
240
a
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�41,--freeret�
dates for the European theaters. On the
West Coast, Station WS handled 210 candi-
dates. These statistics are not particularly
ilhiimnating since there is no basis for com-
parison. The assessment program certainly
succeeded in screening out the 15% to 20%
who were obviously unfit. However, it is
Impossible to ascertain with any exactitude
whether the courses could have been so de-
signed as to be more effective.
The effort to e c�Pqs an individual's total
personality had never before been attempted
In the United States. The psychologists and
psychiatrists who handled the program for
OSS later used the techniques developed un-
der the stress of war to establish programs
for the Veterans Administration and several
leading universities, in addition to giving the
benefit of their experience to various depart-
ments of the Government. It seems obvious
that the OSS assessment program estab-
lished a precedent and accumulated experi-
ence which will in the future facilitate effec-
tive personnel selection in many fields.
Training Areas. In June of 1942 only four
schools were in actual operation. These
were RTU-11 (the "Farm") and Areas A, B
and C.
The "Farm" was located in Maryland
about 20 miles from Washington. It was
used for both elementary and advanced in-
telligence training until basic. training be-
gan at Area E, whereupon it became the ad-
vanced, or finishing, intelligence school.
Area A, which comprised approximately
5,000 acres of heavily wooded terrain near
Quantico, Virginia, was subdivided into four
separate schools, designated A-2, A-3, A-4
and A-5. Area A-4 was used primarily for
basic SO training
Area B, comprising some 9,000 acres of
mountainous wooded terrain in the Catoctin
area in Maryland, was used primarily for
pan, m,litary training.
� Area D hnd been acquired by SA/G in the
COI period and as beln7, pre,n2zc-d for marleme
training. See SA/13 and SA/G in Section L
241
Area C was located on wooded terrain ad-
jacent to Area A, and was used for communi-
cations training.
In mid-November 1942 Area E, located in
Maryland some 30 miles north of Baltimore,
was opened. It was somewhat Firnilar to the
"Farm", conAfsting of three country houses,
and became the principal school for OSS.ba-
sic training.
Area D, located on the Potomac River near
Quantico, was activated in March 1943 to
conduct training in maritime activities.
Area F was acquired in April 1943. n was
located at the Congressional Country Club
on the outskirts of Washington, and was
used primarily for the training of OG's. To-
ward the close of the war, when large num-
bers of personnel were returning from Euro-
pean theaters for de-briefing or transfer to
the Far East, Area F became a holding area
and was used for de-briefing and reassess-
ment.*
In October 1943, Area NI, a former Signal
Corps camp (MacDowell) in Indiana, was
acquired and used for communications train-
ing.
In January 1944, Station 5, a country es-
tate at Fairfax, Virginia, was acquired to pro-
vide facilities for the assessment program.
In a short time, Area S proved inadequate to
handle the large numbers of candidates, and
a house was acquired in Washington (Sta-
tion W) where a shorter assessment program
was established for clerical and services per-
sonnel.
In mid-1944, a West Coast assessment pro-
gram was established at the Capistrano
Beach Club in San Clemente, California.
After mid-1944, most training was per-
formed on the West Coast, and the schools
In the east were gradually closed. By VE-
Day, the eastern establishments were being
used mainly as holding areas, in which per-
sonnel could be de-briefed or screened for
possible use in the Far East.
� See Personnel, under Central Administrative
Units above. �
Sves.4--
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-
The need need for exceptionally qualified people
In the Far East led to the establishment of
courses under university auspices. George-
town University made available facilities for
a two-week course on the economic and polit-
ical backgrounds of Far Eastern countries.
In January 1945, arrangements were made
with the University of Pennsylvania to train
specially selected students .in the Japanese
and Korean languages. This was a six-
month course which included, in addition to
language instruction, a comprehen Rive sur-
vey of the sociological, political and economic
problems of the Far East.
Overseas Training. Until the middle of
1944, S&T/Washington had practically no
authority over training programs conducted
In various theaters. It was called upon for
Instructors, and made available the material
used in training in the United States.
Late in 1942 several instructors were dis-
patched to NATO, where they took part in
the Tunisian campaign. After the fall of
Tunis, training schools were established in
NATO for Italian and French agents. North
Africa soon proved to be a fertile area for re-
cruiting and an excellent base for infiltra-
tion operations. When parachute training
became necessary, the staff of a parachute
training school which had been set up under
COI in the United States was dispatched to
NATO in early 1943. In the following two
years, over 2,500 male and female agents
were given parachute training. Included in
this total were agents trained for the British
and French services, as well as for OSS.
When parachute infiltration into southern
France and Italy was virtually completed,
the parachute school was moved to China
where it achieved a notable record in the
training of American and Chinese com-
mando groups for parachute operations.
In late 1942 and early 1943 instructors who
had been schooled in the United States were
sent to Burma and China to prepare training
programs for native agents. Such instruc-
tors established trP ining bases in forward
areas where, in addition to teaching, they
-Tep-Seeref�
were called upon to recruit and direct the op-
erations of such agents.
In the spring of 1943, S&T began recruit-
ing a group of instructors for the OSS base
at Cairn where agents were to be recruited
and trained for Balkan operations. The
staff was composed of personnel with Greek,
Bulgarian, Rumanian, Serbian and Hun-
garian language qualifications. Following
the arrival of the training staff in Cairo, it
was found that, since the Balkans were pri-
marily a British sphere of operations, there
was less OSS training to be done than had
been anticipated. Consequently, most of
the agents trained in Cairo were destined for
Greece. Later, when part of the Cairo train-
ing staff was transferred to Bari, some agents
were trained for Yugoslavia and Hungary,
but very few for the other Balkan countries. �
By the summer of 1943, OSS in London
had worked out arrangements for joint Brit- -
ish-American training in England In. con-
nection with certain projects, and S&T/-
Washington was requested to dispatch its
best instructors to ETO. Most of S&T's vet-
eran instructors were on their way to Eng-
land by the fall of 1943.
The shift in emphasis from Europe to the
Far East early in 1944 necessitated the dis-
patch of instructors to Ceylon and China.
In both of those countries, assessment per-
sonnel worked closely with the training staffs
in an effort to screen and assess natives who
were recruited as agent prospects.
In 1944 further requests were received
from the European theaters for instructors
qualified to train German-speaking agents.
; It became evident by August 1944 that
overseas training was somewhat spotty and
uneconomical under the ariminiatration of
the various operating branches. Conse-
quently, Donovan, by order of 14 August
1944, directed that S&T was to provide and
operate all facilities for the instruction and
training of OSS personneL From that date
until the liquidation of OSS, a great variety
of overseas training establishments, holding �
areas and dispatching areas were operated
242
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Seeref-
� by S&T. From the viewpoint of S&T/Wash-
ington, the order created manpower prob-
lems which were difficult to surmount On
, the other hand, it also made possible some
much-needed rotation of personnel.
Following the collapse of Germany, S&T
began a large program of closing down vari-
ous overseas areas under its jurisdiction.
S&T completed its mission in ETO with the
establishment in Germany of a small train-
ing school attached to the OSS mission in
Germany and the establishment of another
school in which some 2,000 Germans were
trained for posts with Military Government.
f. In addition to providing personnel for
1 overseas training, S&T/Washington also de-
1 veloped a considerable research staff to see
that the proper training aids, lecture mate-
rials, etc. were dispatched to all overseas
J. training establishments. In turn, S&T/-
Washington received from overseas some of
I,- its most beneficial training material in the
form of reports of agent operation.
From the first day of January 1944 to July
1945, the assessment schools evaluated
and/or screened 5,300 candidates. Basic
Espionage Schools graduated over 1,800
trained personnel as operatives in gather-
ing, analyzing and disseminating informa-
tion. The Paramilitary Schools, concerned
with the training of sabotage men, trained
a total of 1,027. The "Farm", specializing
In advanced intelligence training, graduated
from May 1942 to December 1944 over 800
men and women.
The above figures cover only those trained
for European operations and, furthermore,
do not take into account specialized groups,
over which S&T had divided or little control,
such as Communications, OG, MU, etc.
From the beginning of training on the West
Coast until its conclusion, close to 1,003 per-
sonnel were given basic OSS training, ap-
proximately 250 advanced SO training and
203 advanced SI training; 210 were a.scssed
on the West Coast, where approximately 103
were given advanced MO training. These
are, of course, over-all figures, and give only
a general indication of the scope of the pro-
gram
The rapid expansion of OSS, both in num-
bers of personnel and in function, presented
a eh Rilenge to the training program. There
was another challenge which cannot be so
clearly delineated by the use of statistics.
It grew out of the fact that only a small por-
tion of OSS operations consisted of subjects
that could be taught by concrete example,
e.g., the use of demolitions materials, small
arms, codes and ciphers. The precise situa-
tion which any agent or agent team would
encounter in the field could not be foreseen.
Therefore, the major goal was psychologi-
cal�to develop in the student-agent an at-
titude of mind which would respond to an
emergency in accordance with the exigencies
of the particular situation. Examples were
cited and principles, discussed, not for the
purpose of learning them by rote, but so that
the student could use them as a springboard
for his own ingenuity.
Field problems, likewise, were not used so
that the student-agent, be he spy, saboteur
or guerrilla, would learn to react according
to habit; they were in no sense rehearsals.
Rather, they were designed, as was the gen-
eral atmosphere at the schools, to provoke
an undercurrent of tension and nervous pres-
sure beneath a relaxed surface. Even in
such technical fields as demolitions, only the
fundamentals could be taught�the sue-Pecs-
ful execution of sabotage would require the
ingenious application of such principles in
the context of a given situation in the field.
Thus, the OSS training program was never
static, but was constantly being developed,
refined and improved in the light of experi-
ence from its inception in 1942 until the
liquidation of the agency on 1 October 1945.
5. Services
The rapid expansion of OSS and the indi-
cations of large-scale overseas activities In
the summer of 1942 made it obvious that a
2443 --Top-Seeref-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
cep--Sssfefr
great burden would be placed upon its servic-
ing branches. In the COI period, various
servicing functions had been loosely grouped
under the Executive Officer. Within a short
time after 13 June 1942 steps were taken to
unify and integrate the services branches.
In October 1942, as part of the reorganiza-
tion in anticipation of prospective militariza-
tion,* the branches of OSS were divided into
several groups, each under a deputy direc-
tor. One of these groups consisted of serv-
ices branches. The October reorganization
proved to be temporary, since JCS 155/4/D
was issued within two months. The conse-
quent reorganization of 3 January 1943 pur-
suant to General Order No. 9 (Exhibit W-35)
established the pattern which was to remain
throughout the existence of OSS.
Reorganiza tion under General Order No.
9 divided the activities of OSS into four cate-
gories: (1) The branches which were admin-
istrative or technical in nature and which
reported directly to the Assistant Director
and Director; (2) the intelligence branches;
(3) the operations branches; and (4) the
services branches under the Deputy Direc-
tor - Services.
The Order was twice revised. On 26 May
1944 it was amended to remove the Special
Funds and Communications Branches from
the orbit of services and to give them inde-
pendent status among the executive
branches (Exhibit W-41). On 26 December
1944 it was further revised to create the po-
sition of Deputy Director - Personnel, who
assumed responsibility for the Civilian Per-
sormel Branch which had previously been
under the Deputy Director - Services (Ex-
hibit W-42). This latter revision also added
to Services responsibility for the overseas
transportation of all OSS personnel, a func-
tion which had been previously an indepen-
dent branch and before that one of the re-
spcnsibilities of the Special Relations Office.
According to the fins1 revision of General
Order No. 9 on 26 December 1944, therefore,
� Sle General Survey, 13 June -23 December
1942, In A above.
lop-See.r.44-
the Deputy Director - Services was responsi-
ble for the following branches: Budget and
Procedures, Procurement and Supply, Re-
production, Transportation, Office Services,
and Finance (exclusive of Special Funds).
OSS was a unique organization engaged in
unorthodox activities. Normal government
and military procedures were not so estab-
lished as to permit anything like the degree
of flexibility which the agency required. It
was, therefore, engaged in a constant
struggle to reconcile its exceptional and
ml-
usual needs with standardized government
and military regulations. This problem had
been particularly evident in the COI period
with regard to personnel. Under OSS the
problem of securing sufficient military al-
lotments, both in number and grade, was
ever-present. In addition, gimil r problems
arose in connection with transportation of
personnel overseas and shipment of mate-
riel.
One of the basic factors in this problem
was, of course, the unusual degree of security
which attended most OSS operations. It is
a truism in the performance of secret activi-
ties that they are most susceptible to expos-
ure through errors in seemingly routine mat-
ters. For example, the marking of a ship-
ment of ordinary equipment with the symbol
"OSS" when destined for a cover detachment
or individual could work irreparable injury
to the activities in which that detachment
or individual was engaged. Similar dangers
attend such routine matters as mailing, or
drawing up payrolls, telephone directories,
etc. In a secret organization these activi-
ties continue to be routine in performance,
but the potential cost of a petty mistake is
so great as to require the establishment of
precautions that sometimes seem over-elabo-
rate to the uninitiated.
The question of priority for shipments of
materiel is another aspect of the same prob-
lem. Its solution revolves around the im-
portance attached by the appropriate au-
thorities to the special activities which rut
organization such as OSS is to perform.
244
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776_
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Top-Secrot-
While it is probable that no headquarters
organ17a tion ever escapes constant demands
from the field for more and quicker ship-
ments of equipment, there was a notable im-
provement in the case of OSS as the success
of its early operations created a demand for
their continuance on the part of field com-
manders, and as OSS gained stature as a
valuable, if unorthodox, auxiliary to the
prosecution of the war.
The rapid expansion of any organization is
generally attended by increasing emphasis
on procedures. OSZ.1 was no exception. But
the establishment of procedures was compli-
cated by the necessity for flexibility which
arose out of the nature of the orga nimtion's
activities, and the fact that it had to deal not
only with various branches of the armed
services, but with other standardized govern-
ment agencies. It is doubtful that this
problem could ever be solved to the satis-
faction of all concerned. However, it was
met in the case of OSS by a series of com-
promises with regulations existing in the
various military and civil departments with
which it had to deal.
It would serve no purpose to go into a de-
tailed discussion of each of the various
branches which carried out the servicing
functions of OSS. Transportation is dis-
cussed elsewhere,* since for the greater part
of its existence it was under the Special
Relations Office and, later, an independent
branch. Office Services functions are self-
explanatory, and the activities of this
Branch were subject only to the general
� complications discussed above.
Reproduction. In April 1942 the Repro-
duction Branch was completely reorganized.
A specific assignment had precipitated the
reP1i7R tion that an improvement in security
policy was necessary. The assignment was
the so-called Caroline Islands job, a series of
seven volumes, covering projected military
operations in the Pacific. The material was
secret and speed was essential. The job
� See Special Relations under Central Adminis-
trative Units and Technical Branches above.
proved beyond the capacity of the existing
facilities, both as to time and security. At
the end of two months, only two volumes
were completed and the job was taken else-
where to be re-done.
Donovan saw a clear instance of inade-
quacy, and directed that the Branch be over-
hauled so that it could handle assignments
for the JCS with the requisite degree of se-
curity. The essence of the problem was to
create and maintain a situation of maxi-
mum security and efficiency. To this end, a
substantial number of Army personnel was
brought in and stricter security measures
were inaugurated, as well as a system of
production record and control.
The introduction of the military resulted
In a tightening of control geared to height-
ened security and a rapidly widening field of
endeavor, coupled with expanding facilities,
both the direct result of Army prestige.* It
thus became possible for the Branch to en-
gage in experimentation, with the result
that certain inventions in the field of re-
production proved valuable to both OSS and
the armed services during the war.
Of the security methods introduced, the
most notable was the so-called "job-control
system." This took the form of a ticket
which noted all relevant data from the time
that a given assignment entered the Branch
to the time of completion and return to the
originator. This procedure was supple-
mented by a simi12r control system within
each section which indicated who had
worked on the job and the nature of his con-
tribution.**
As the Branch established a record of com-
petent performance, it gained increased
� Personnel statistics indicate the degree of ex-
pansion: Total personnel employed in November
1941 � twelve; total personnel employed in Feb-
ruary 1945 �126, of whom 96 were military and
thirty were civilians.
� � As early as January 1943 the security posi-
tion was firmly established, as indicated by a re-
quest from OPA to print coupons for shoe
rationing. Strict security was essential since
violation would result In immediate price rise and
the buying up of existing stocks.
245
-Top Secret-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
--Fop-Snag-
recognition. Following the abortive Caro-
line Islands job, Reproduction performed
many large conference jobs. These included
the Quebec Conference in the spring of 1943,
the Tehcr.qn Conference in the fall of 1943
(a book of 600 pages completed in three
weeks), and the Yalta Conference in the win-
ter of 1944. In 1945 Reproduction sent four-
teen technicians to the United Nations Con-
ference in San Francisco. Experience in as-
signments of this magnitude led to the estab-
lishment within the Branch of a bookbinding
section to avoid the introduction of outside
personnel for rush jobs�a previous expedi-
ent which came into question from the
_standpoint of security.
Reproduction inaugurated a training pro-
gram in early 1943, which included instruc-
tion not only in regular reproduction devices
but also in special devices such as the "Gil-
hooley",* spy cameras, and the like. Some
500 operatives received instruction, includ-
ing a substantial number of R&A personnel
who were thus enabled to microfilm maps,
documents, periodicals, etc., in the field.
In 1943 map reproduction increased to the
extent that it represented some 60% of the
total work of the Branch by the end of the
year. In 1944 a color photography section
was established. One of its most important
contributions was its experimentation with
fluorescein and invisible inks. In this con-
nection, the Chief of MIS gave the Reproduc-
tion Branch a special commendation for
what he termed, in the interests of security,
"special application of certain processes to
materials for use in spy work".
Perhaps the most notable technical de-
velopment was the "Gilhooley", which was
developed in the summer of 1943. It was a
portable field photostat machine and was
subsequently used all over the world by OSS
and United States military forces. Another
significant technical development was the
so-called "spy camera", which could take a
full-view picture from any position. It re-
� see below.
Top-f�erftt-
quired no focussing�nothing more than
general aiming at the object. The working
model was completed on 3 November 1943,
and Eastman Kodak produced the finished
product. It was generally acknowledged to
be the finest espionage camera in existence
from the standpoint of simplicity in opera-
tion and design.
The Reproduction Branch provided field
plants in all theaters where OSS was repre-
sented in force. Outposts were thus estab-
lished in London, Oxford, Paris, Rome,
Caserta, Bad, Algiers, Cairo, Kunming,
Chungking, Calcutta, Kandy, and at the end
of the war in Nuremberg. (There was also
a field plant in New York.) Teams with
portable equipment were provided for vari-
ous missions with advance troops and the
Washington Reproduction Branch also pro-
vided mobile units for MO teams in the
field.
Recruiting and training personnel for
these plants was the responsibility of Wash-
ington, which also processed the technical
equipment and supplies to meet their many
requirements. The first overseas mission of
Reproduction Branch was a two-man team
sent to Oxford, England, in 1942 to copy the
British Admiralty Strategic Photographic
File, consisting of several million pictures
for R&A. Soon after preparations began
for other specific missions, such as the mo-
bile unit intended for North Africa and the
printing plant in Calcutta for MO. Be-
cause of shortages of skilled personnel and
necessary equipment, missions were planned
only to meet specific needs.
In general it may be said that inadequate
attention was paid to reproduction in ad-
vance planning for field operations. Obvi-
ously the collection of intelligence is wasted
effort without dissemination. An MO leaf-
let carhpaign may be well conceived to no
purpose unless the leaflets can be produced
quickly and securely. Although in Wash-
ington Reproductions Branch came to be
responsible directly to a Deputy Director,
In the field it was administratively in th0
246
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Services Branch. Services officers often
failed to appreciate the time required to set
up adequate reproduction service or to
realize the scarcity of qnPlified personnel
and proper equipment, or the technical diffi-
culties involved in establishing a field plant.
Budget and Procedures. As indicated in
the account of COI in Section I above, the
early period of this Branch was character-
ized by informality. From July 1941 to 13
June 1942 COI subsisted on a series of allo-
cations from the President's Emergency
Fund which totalled, for both vouchered and
unvouchered funds, some $12,000,000. In
the late spring of 1942, COI prepared budget
estimates for the succeeding fiscal year.
As a result of the President's Military Or-
der of 13 June 1942, however, the new agency
was caught in something of a squeeze play.
The Order automatically nullified all COI
budget estimates for the fiscal year 1943, and
yet there was not time to go before Congress
for funds. In any event, the preparation of
adequate budget figures would have been
difficult, if not impossible, until the JCS
clarified the status and functions of OSS.
The situation was resolved by informal ar-
rangements whereby OSS was financed for
an additional period from the President's
Emergency Fund, rather than on a regular
budget. These arrangements continued un-
til 30 June 1943, when the first formal bud-
get, for the fiscal year 1944, went into effect.
Total expenditures for the period from July
1942 to 30 June 1943 were $22,100,000, of
which $9,500,000 constituted unvouchered
funds. This brought the over-all total sup-
plied by the President for the first two years
of the existence of COI/OSS to $41,000,000.
OSS presented its first budget request to
Congress for the fiscal year 1944. After the
Budget Bureau had reduced the estimates
substantially and Congress had effected a
token cut, OSS emerged with an appropria-
tion of $35,000,000, of which $21,000,000 was
available "for -objects of a confidential na-
ture". In addition, $2,000,000 were ear-
marked to be used "for the purchase of
things or services which were not ordinarily
available with regular government funds".
This represented a substantial increase over
figures for the fiscal year 1943. In spite of
the increase in appropriation, however, OSS
would have been unable to operate through
1944 on $35,000,000 if it had not been for
what could be termed a financial "break",
viz., permission to requisition from the Army
standard military supplies for all operations
In which such supplies could be used. Since
standard Army items were rapidly becoming
an important part of the OSS budget, this
represented a tremendous step forward, even
though OSS was still required to pay from its
own budget for "special items of a military
nature".
OBS continued to expand. Congress
granted an appropriation of $43,000,000 for
the fiscal year 1945. Of this sum, $21,000,-
000 was available for "objects of a confiden-
tial nature". The high budget figure re-
flected a corresponding high in OSS opera-
tions. In anticipation of a reduction in
overseas operations, the 1946 budget of $45,-
000,000 constituted a substantial reduction
In the 1945 figure. The Bureau of the Bud-
get reduced this figure further to $38,200,000.
Following the submission to Congress of this
latter figure, hostilities in Europe ceased and
the Appropriations Committee of the House
of Representatives recommended that the
estimates be reduced to $20,000,000.
On 30 September 1945 OSS was liquidated.
Thereupon, the $20,000,000 appropriation
was further cut to $10,500,000, for allocation
between the State and War Departments, to
which residual OSS functions were trans-
ferred.
Procurement and Supply. The main prob-
lem of this Branch was to keep abreast of
the rapidly expanding overseas activities of
the agency. In late 1942 and during 1943,
when OSS outposts were developing into
major fled bases, a great deal of standard
equipment had to be shipped. As the field
bases became established, and in turn set up
sub-bases, communications equipment and
247 -fop-Seefef-
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�forSearat
special materiel for supply of resistance
groups became an increasingly important
part of the shipments. The peak of activity
was reached in 1944-45.
To expedite shipments to the theaters, the
Branch established supply coordinating of-
fices for ETO, MedT0 and FETO in July 1944.
The total weight of shipments for that
month was approximately 7,000,000 pounds,
which represented twice the June volume.
A great portion of the shipments at that
time was ultimately destined for resistance
groups. In August 1944, there was a 1%
Increase over the July total, but in September
there was a sharp decline in the amount and
size of shipments to both ETO and MedTO.
The decrease was a direct result of the re-
duced demands of the resistance groups in
those theaters consequent upon the Allied
advance.
Thereafter, Procurement and Supply con-
centrated on FE110 requirements, even to
the extent of diverting in November 1944 a
substantial amount of materiel slated origi-
nally for ETO and MedTO. This was a tem-
porary development, and the main efforts
of the Branch, after the beginning of 1945,
were directed toward a tabulation of prob-
able OSS surplus. This had been requested
by the War Department in view of the immi-
nent cessation of hostilities.
As of 11 June 1945, all procurement action
temporarily ceased. It was resumed on 30
June 1945 and operated in routine fashion
until the liquidation of OSS.
6. New York and West Coast Offices
(a) NEW YORK OFFICE
The New York Office was established by
SA/B at 630 Fifth Avenue in February 1942.*
In the COI period it was an undercover of-
fice, primarily for secret intelligence matters
requiring attention in New York. As such,
it acted as a service agency in connection
with particular projects which could not be
See SA/13 in Section L
directed as effectively by SI in Washington.
Such projects were designed to obtain for-
eign intelligence, recruit agents and main-
tain liaison with the principal United Na-
tions which had information agencies in
New York.* It was also used for special
Inquiries of a secret nature through civilian
channels. During the COI period, SA/G
also used the New York Office and main-
tained representatives there.
Upon the establishment of OSS in June
1942, the agency lost the large F18 office
(which went to OWI) , and the OI office was
abandoned when that unit was dissolved.
The SI office, therefore, became the principal
office of the agency in New York. Conse-
quently, the original undercover idea had to
be abandoned and the office became overt
and expanded to accommodate all branches
of OSS which found it necessary to conduct
any activities in the New York area. Among
the branches which established representa-
tives and/or units in New York were SI, R&A,
X-2, FN, SO, MO and Services.
Additional office space was leased at 630
Fifth Avenue, but rapid expansion soon
made it necessary to establish branch offices
In other locations. For example, R&A estab-
lished an office at 55 West 42nd Street. In
addition, other offices were leased for various
special undercover projects operated in New
York. In most of these cases the office
would be an undercover one, and no connec-
tion with the Government or OSS would be
evident. Also, small offices or hideaways,
such as undercover recruiting offices and
places suitable for secret conferences, were
secured at numerous locations and for vaiy-
ing periods of time, when necessary for the
confidential work of SI, X-2 and FN.
In 1943 instances of overlapping and un-
registered" activities were reported. In
� One of the principal reasons for establishing
the office at 630 Fifth Avenue was its proximity
to British Security Coordination which was lo-
cated in the same building.
�� Regulations required the registration of any
new 0133 �Mee with G-2, ON! and FBI.
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
September 1943, therefore, the Chief of SI in
New York was designated "Chief, New York
Area". As such, he had authority over all
OSS personnel stationed in or entering the
Area and was responsible for supervising
general OSS policy and relation-ships with
all agencies and government departments
there. Furthermore, all OSS personnel who
passed through the Area were required to re-
port to the New York Office and anyone from
the Washington headquarters who inter-
viewed possible recruits in New York was re-
quired to submit a list of the candidates he
contacted.
SL Although it was necessary to depart
from the original concept of maintaining the
New York Office as an undercover office for
secret intelligence purposes, SI remained the
principal branch represented and the most
Important projects developed by the New
York Office were of a secret intelligence na-
ture, either exclusively or in collaboration
with other branches.
One of the most important SI functions in
New York was its liaison with the informa-
tion services of various United Nations which
maintained headquarters in the City. The
British had a parallel agency in New York� �
British Security Coordination�with which
COI/OSS had maintained extremely cordial
relations from the beginning. Cooperation
was facilitated by the fact that British and
OSS offices were in the same building. With
respect to the French, there was a rather in-
volved liaison problem since, although there
were a number of French agencies repre-
sented in New York, there was no officially
designated French service and conse-
quently no clear opposite number with which
to deal. SI in New York maintained con-
tact with all the French agencies and col-
lected such intelligence as became available.
Naturally, the effectiveness of such relations
depended to a great degree upon the estab-
lishment of cordial personal relationships in
the absence of official directives and clear
lines of demarcation between the various
French groups. The same situation ex-
.40p-SeGf
isted, in some degree, with respect to the in-
formation services of Norway, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Belgium and
Luxemburg. None of these countries had
an active parallel agency to OSS, but they
did have secret services which were operat-
ing in Europe, and SI/New York secured in-
formation from them.
The position of SI/New York was not the
same as OSS/London, where dissemi-
nations came to OSS as an accredited con-
sumer and by virtue of formal arrangements.
Such intelligence as was received by OSS in
New York, in effect, constituted a check on
the completeness of the intelligence received
through London, and occasionally was se-
cured more speedily than that received
through official channels.
SI/New York carried on extensive recruit-
ing activities for the Branch in Washington.
In addition, it was extremely useful in the
negotiations which were necessary to estab-
lish and maintain private commercial cover
tor SI agents. Such negotiations required
constant regard for the highest degree of
security. Only American firms normally
transacting business in the given foreign
areas were approached. Contact was made
only with individuals at the top leveL OSS
agents were carried on the personnel roster
of the firm concerned, were paid through
usual corporate channels, then secure
methods were devised for reimbursement Of
the corporation involved.
Many of the projects undertaken by SI/-
New York have been described elsewhere in
this Report, for example, the Ship Observer
Project and the Office of European Labor
Research, both of which were directed by
the LabSir Section.*
An additional project was the Survey of
Foreign Experts (SFE). This was a joint
SI/R&A project,** which grew out of the eel,.
tivities of OL The purpose of SFE was to
-
� See Labor Section in SI above.
�� SFE was originally established jointly by
OBS and BEW.
249
Liam.
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-Seefoi-
establish an index of American and alien ex-
perts residing in the Western Hemisphere
who had detailed knowledge of foreign coun-
tries which could be used either as basic eco-
nomic, industrial, political or sociological
intelligence, or to confirm and/or amplify
Intelligence secured through other channels.
The contacts of SFE included, in particular,
various industrial and technical experts who
had knowledge of specific installations or
areas abroad. They also included political
refugees.
Originally, SFE concentrated on political
Intelligence. The emphasis gradually shifted
to operational intelligence in support of the
strategic air program directed against the
Reich. For example, in July 1943, SFE did
a substantial amount of work on Peene-
milnde. The resultant composite descrip-
tion of the Nazi air experimental station
formed a portion of the great volume of in-
telligence upon which the RAF attack was
based. In addition, SFE was of great value
to R&A in making available for interview
experts who could confirm or add signift-
cant information necessary to R&A studies.
The SFE staff was recruited mainly on the
basis of language qualifications. Since
many of the persons interviewed had experi-
enced Gestapo interrogation methods, the
psychological factor was important The
intention was to conduct the interviews
upon an informal basis which would over-
come latent or habitual fears. The great-
est degree of security and discretion was nec-
essary, not only in the actual interviews but
in the dissemination of the information
which resulted from them. In some cases,
disclosure of source would have cost lives
In Axis or Axis-dominated countries, and in
other cases reports explicitly or implicitly
included information which, if known by the
enemy or enemy satellites, would have
"blown" routes and methods of escape then
In operation.
By the middle of 1943, the SFE staff of six
averaged 130 interviews per month. From
October 1943 to 31 December 1944, SFE built
-fop-emsfat-
up an index containing names, addresses
and blographictil data of some 12,500 indi-
viduals. During the same period, it con-
ducted approximately 2,600 interviews. The
latter resulted in some 1,500 "regular" re-
ports, which received a progressively in-
creasing distribution. The British Security
Coordination received them in New York and
transmitted them to London for dfsqemina-
ton to various British agencies. In the
United States, dissemination was made to
ON!, G-2, A-2, OW!, Army Service Forces and
the Department of Justice, among others.
In addition to "regular" reports, SFE issued
some 360 special reports of high classifi-
cation.
In anticipation of a shift of emphasis to
the Far East, plans were made in 1943 for
SFE to operate in California. The West
Coast unit was established in August 1944.*
New York acted as a training school for key
personnel who went to the West Coast and in
general provided counsel, but activities in
New York continued to be identified with the
European theaters.
An SI project which operated through the
New York Office was the GEORGE Project**
This was operated by a native-born German
recruited by SL The Project maintained
headquarters under corporate cover outside
New York City and was never listed as an
OSS unit. The Chief of the Project never
came to the New York Office, but reported
directly to SI/Washington. The facilities
of the New York Office were used, however,
for general supervision and for transmission
of the intelligence produced. The Project
was designed to secure intelligence through
the analysis of intercepts. Since most of the
material derived from British censorship
sources, close cooperation with the British
was necessary.
Generally under SI supervision in New,
York was the Mohawk Trading Corporation.
This was a cover corporation established by
� See West Coast Mee below.
�� See accounts of SI projects in Exhibit W-23.
250
.01
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-Tep-geroef-
the Washington Secretariat to make pur-
chases which, if made openly in behalf of
OSS, would have breached security by dis-
closing secret activities.
R&A. R&A cooperated jointly with SI in
the establishment and operation of SFE. In
addition, it maintained a separate office at 55
West 42nd Street. The Biographical Rec-
ords Section of R&A also maintained an office
In New York, collecting, carding and collat-
ing data on important enemy personalities.
In this work, R&A cooperated closely with SI,
since much of the source material originated
with SI interviews.
1-2. Originally X-2 maintained its princi-
pal United States headquarters in New York
due to the close collaboration with the Brit-
ish which was necessary when the Branch
was first established." The center of X-2
activities soon moved to Washington. How-
ever, the Branch remained active in New
York, its special projects including the In-
surance Unit which was established in an
undercover office in the Wall Street
sector.***
FN. Due to the fact that New York was a
center for foreign nationality groups and
Individuals in the United States, FN was ex-
tremely active in the Area. It maintained
several cover offices and hideaways. In ad-
dition,, its principal contact with the Over-
seas Press Service was effected in New York.
A fuller description of FN activities in New
York is included in the account of the
Branch under Deputy Director - Intelligence
Service above; some indication of the ex-
tent of its activity is evidenced by the fact
that in one month, September 1944, FN
held 118 interviews in New York and added
800 names to its files.
SO. This Branch was active in New York
throughout. It performed extensive re-
cruiting activities there and also carried on
negotiations necessary to the design and
production of special devices and equipment.
� See Outposts in Rddi above.
� � See 1-2 above.
� �� See Special Units in 1-2 above.
MO. The principal project operated by
MO in New York was MARIGOLD�the only
project in the New York Area concerned with
the Far East. It employed some 12 Chinese
who were engaged in printing posters and
magazines for eventual distribution as
"black" propaganda in the Orient. Such
literature was forwarded to the theaters
through Washington. The operation was
conducted with high regard for the security
factors involved and none of its personnel
ever appeared in the New York Office. In
May 1945, when the entire focus of war in-
terest shifted to the Far East, the project
was terminated so that the personnel might
be released for operational minions in the
field.
The New York Office, which had a total
personnel of 69 at the end of 1942, expanded
to the point where it employed some 200 per-
sons in August 1944. Thereafter, with
the end of the European conflict in prospect,
activities and installations in New York
were gradually liquidated. On 1 June 1945
the Chief of the New York Area resigned and
the Office accelerated the process of liquida-
tion, which was concluded in September.
251
(b) WEST COAST
The need for representation on the West
Coast became apparent by 7 December 1941.
At that time, liaison was established with de-
fense command chiefs on the West Coast and
the various intelligence offices there. A rep-
resentative was appointed in San Francisco,
who maintained such liaison and served as
the local point of contact for COI, and
later OSS.
By the end of 1943 there were offices in
San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle, and
training schools in the Catalina area. R&A
was active in interrogation and document
collection, and two more specialized tecluits
cal activities, radio monitoring and photog-
raphy, were established in Hollywood.
Administration. In addition to specific as-
signments for OSS branches, the West Coast
-Up-Seerei-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Top-Sowei.
offices arranged local transportation, rooms
and services for OSS personnel on official
business. In January 1945 direct TWX
communications were opened between OSS/
Washington and the San Francisco office.
A North American Theater Officer was ap-
pointed in Washington in June 1944. His
principal function was to represent West
Coast installations at Washington head-
quarters. In addition, all OSS personnel
going to the West Coast were required to
clear through his office prior to departure.
Warehouse facilities were maintained in
San Francisco for OSS cargo, shipments and
supplies, and secure arrangements were
made to route both personnel and supply
shipments through West Coast ports.
Recruiting of personnel for the Far East
became an important activity in the summer
of 1944. In September of that year a roster
was begun of the names and, wherever pos-
sible, other data, of persons known to have
language or area experience in Japan, Korea,
Formosa or coastal China. Early in 1945 a
full-time PPB staff was assigned to the San
Francisco office. From the several thou-
sand names assembled, approximately fifty
recruits were obtained.
Training. In September 1943 the OSS
maritime training school was shifted to the
Pacific Coast.* The first installation
(designated WP) was at Camp Pendleton
near San Onofre. This was maintained for
almost a year, but due to its proximity to
Marine Corps activities it could not be used
for advanced training requiring the highest
degree of security.
Several areas were opened on Catalina
Island, where the climate, rugged coastline
and surf conditions were ideal for year-
round training. In addition, Army, Navy,
Coast Guard and Maritime Service activities
on the Island made them restricted areas
with stringent security measures. This
greatly simplified OSS security problems but
� The first group of underwater swimmers was
sent to the Itahltrno in March 1944 to complete
training. See MU in 9 above.
4-ep-Seere.�
pecessitated special procedures for oriental
agent trainees. In December 1943 an area
was established at Toyon Cove (WA) which
was prepared to handle up to 200 men; in
January nearby Cherry Cove was prepared
for the permanent and semi-permanent
housing of 100 men. An assessment school
(WS) was opened in June at the former San
Juan Capistrano Beach Club. Training,
aAiministrative and supply headquarters
were established at Newport Beach (WN),
connected by teletype with OSS/West Coast
headquarters at San Francisco. At the peak
of activity, six training areas were in opera-
tion, with a monthly turnover of 100 stu-
dents. In addition to training for field
operations, special areas were operated for
MO and the Field Experimental Unit.
Intelligence and Research. A small R&A
office was maintained in San Francisco, simi-
lar to the Branch's New York office. Staffs
from Biographical Records and Pictorial
Records were established in June 1944.
A complete R&A unit was established at
the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA), first
at Fort Ord in January 1945 and later at
the Presidio at Monterey. Its purpose was
to assist in the training and briefing of Civil
Affairs officers for Japan and the elaboration
of post-occupation plans for 47 Japanese pre-
fectures.
R&A played a major part in the special
OSS group designated by Donovan to be
available as needed by the American delega-
tion at the San Francisco conference In April
and May 1945.
To secure information on personalities,
the Biographical Records staff in the San
Francisco office combed West Coast sources,
including universities, libraries and per-
sonal interviews on private files.
The Pictorial Records Section operated
both in Los Angeles and in the University of
California Library. The technical work of
picture reproduction was done either in the
Army Signal Corps laboratories or commer-
cially, until May 1945 when Field Photo-
graphic Branch fzirilities in Hollywood were
252
A
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
used. Among the more productive sources
of picture material were the records of the
Alien Property Custodian.
In September 1944 the Survey of Foreign
Experts began operations in San Francisco
to conduct specific and detailed interroga-
tions on the Far East. Close liaison was
maintained with R&A, and much of the vol-
ume of interrogation was cleared by REA
personnel.
An FN officer was dispatched in Septem-
ber 1944 to cover developments among
groups on the West Coast.
Specialized Activities. OSS radio moni-
toring was done by the FBQ Station at
Reseda, near Hollywood.* Acquired in late
1942, it was damaged in a flash flood in De-
cember. By March 1943 repairs were com-
pleted and the station's activities expanded
both for OSS and for the Navy.** To sup-
plement the work an intercept translating
staff was assembled in Los Angeles.
The Field Photographic Branch main-
tained a special technical photography sec-
tion in Hollywood. In September 1942 the
Joint New Weapons Committee and OSRD
requested that the section record photo-
graphically the operations and results of
highly secret projects, particularly rocket
bombs and similar weapons being developed
� See CD Branch in 2 above.
� � Letter from Chief of Naval Operations Office
dated 26 June 1944 notes that improvements in
Reseda "were definitely appreciated . . . since
the value of the station to the Navy was very
high." A separate Navy Station was established
at Point Loma in September whose work FBQ
continued to complement. "The cooperation and
use of OSS facilities greatly aided the Navy's im-
portant task of maintaining Navy security."
(Vice Chief of Naval Operations, letter of 4 Oc-
tober 1944.)
.74,-.Seer el-
principally at California Institute of Tech-
nology. When test photos proved suer-PA-I-
AA, both for observing results and training,
the section was placed on a permanent foot-
ing.* Most of the films were for the Bureau
of Ordnance or the Bureau of Aeronautics of
the Navy, Division 3 of NDRC, Amphibious
Training Command, California Institute of
Technology, or Republic Aviation Labora-
tories.
The preparation of morale operations
aimed against the Japanese was the function
of the MO Branch training unit and pro-
duction staff located first on Catalina Is-
land and, after April 1945, in San Francisco.
Personnel included the staff of the MARI-
GOLD Project transferred from New York,
and various other selected American and
Japanese-American personnel, including
prisoners of war. The production unit pre-
pared scripts for "black" radio transmission
and served to support the OSS "black" radio
operating on Saipan in the last months of
the war.
Liquidation. In July 1945 all Pacific Coast
activities were ordered terminated by 1 Oc-
tober. Activities such as Reseda, Field
Photographic and MO continued until V.7-
Day. All others were rapidly terminated
and their files transferred to Washington.
The R&A/CASA staff remained with the
Civil Affairs group. The General ConinsP1
supervised the closing of installations and
the terminating of leases and contracts.
� In one representative month of operation
(June 1945) colored films were prepared on
experimental fire from Navy F6F, comparing 5-
inch &SR with 5-inch HVAR; first firing of 5-inch
spin stabilized rockets from the nose of a Navy
PBJ-1; comparing effects of 5-inch HVAR with
base fuse and nose fuse when used against 2A-4 me-
dium tanks; dropping of aerial torpedoes at high
speed in shallow water.
�
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
JepS.
OBSERVATIONS
In one sense, an agency such as OBS
may be viewed as a wartime expedient,
liquidated as soon as it had served its pur-
pose. As such, its value can best be meas-
ured in terms of its active contribution to
the prosecution of the war. That contri-
bution is the subject of the succeeding
Volume of this Report which deals with
activities in the field, in the various theaters
of war.
In another and perhaps larger sense, the
agency was an experiment�not only in the
many phases of unorthodox warfare in
which it engaged or the various fields of in-
telligence which it explored, but in the or-
ganizational structure which it evolved and
the administrative and jurisdictional prob-
lems which it encountered. In these as-
pects, its value is less easily discernible
since it must be appraised in terms of con-
tribution to future developments.
While definitive conclusions would thus
be inappropriate, a study of the inception
and development of the agency prompts
certain general observations on (1) its po-
sition within the government, (2) its ad-
ministration and organization, and (3) its
personnel requirements.
Admittedly, COI/OSS was established in
time of crisis and existed in the abnormal
circumstances attendant upon a state of
war. Since its functions, in their full scope,
were new to the United States, they were not
clearly understood for more than half the
period of the agency's existence. The evolu-
tion of these functions, and consequently
the development of the organization to
carry them out, was conditioned in part by
the exigencies of the agency's struggle to
gain acceptance of its status. In setting
forth these observations, the intention has
been to overlook such situations as arose
from political or other pressures peculiar to
the time, but to stress instead such absolute
factors as. may be considered basic to the
working of an agency of this type.
1. Position within the Government.
An agency engaged in secret and unortho-
dox activities is peculiarly susceptible to
difficulties in its relations with other agen-
cies and departments of its government.
Secrecy inevitably creates a psychological
attitude of distrust and suspicion on the
part of others. In many instances, this at-
titude is aggravated by the clash with es-
tablished procedures and regulations which
the performance of irregular and unortho-
dox activities often entails.
Such an agency occupies a position of
high trust. This is most patently evident
In the fact that there must be made avail-
able for its operations special funds which
cannot be accounted for in usual fashion,
since detailed explanation of the use to
which such funds are put would destroy the
secrecy of the activities they support. The
same considerations affect other factors,
such as personnel and materiel.
Essentially, the function performed by
such an agency is a service function. Secret
Intelligence and operations are not ends in
themselves, but means to ends. The agency
does not make policy, but provides informa-
tion to guide the makers of policy, and can
undertake operations to advance policy once
It is made. In much that it does, it is de-
pendent upon facilities which must be pro-
vided by the agencies and departments
which it serves. To do its job well, it must
have their confidence and support, even
though at times it will make unusual de-
mands requiring a relaxation of standard
procedures and regulations. The element
of secrecy in its activities often makes it im-
perative that its demands be accepted as a
55
-Top-Seem+
pproved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
�Up -Secret�
whole, without question; they cannot be ex-
plained step by step as they develop.
Thus the effectiveness of the agency de-
pends directly upon the confidence placed
in it. But the fact that it cannot reveal
its day-to-day activities precludes the pos-
sibility of a broad base of official or popular
support. Unable to make use of public re-
leases or to make widely known the details
of its activities, it must operate on a high
echelon and depend upon the support of a
few key officials. In other large nations,
the acceptance and understanding of such
an organization had become traditional
long before World War U. In the United
States, that was not the case. Inevitably
OSS was on occasions faced with the dilem-
ma that, while the confidence of others was
essential to success, success was a necessary
preliminary to the winning of confidence.
If the experience gained with OSS leads to
acceptance of the role of an intelligence
agency, this in itself will constitute a major
contribution of OSS to the future security
of the country.
A fundamental question which the record
of OSS must help to answer concerns the
necessity and propriety of mrdntaining a
permanent agency to carry on its functions.
World War II has shown for the United
States. es for other countries, the impor-
tance z cc.:.P.iinated, centralized intelli-
gence d levels of the national effort, not'
only in the winning of a war, but in the
preparation for peace.
This much is also evident: If there is to
be centraliza tion of peacetime intelligence
activities, it must be at the policy or strategy
level. All agencies and departments of the
government must cooperate fully in mak-
ing available to the central agency the in-
formation necessary to its proper function-
ing. This does not mean that such agencies
and departments should not maintain their
own distinct and separate intelligence or-
ganizations, for the central agency is pri-
marily concerned with long-range, strategic
and policy intelligence.
�./ap_Socrai�
But the central agency must have per-
manent status, and within certain fields�
namely, secret intelligence and counter-
espionage outside the United States�it
must be given exclusive authority in the
conduct of operations. In these fields, it
must be the agency to service other United
States departments, and it must be able
to count on the cooperation of the State
Department for "cover" positions, passport
privileges, and the use of diplomatic com-
munications facilities. In time of war,
many of the same considerations must be
extended by the armed forces, with the ad-
dition of transportation�both for travel in
friendly territory and for clandestine in-
filtrations.
Morale and physical subversion programs
In time of war also depend in great degree
upon similar cooperation and support on
the part of the armed forces, with the ad-
dition of the important matters of materiel,
research, facilities, priorities, and actual
supply.
2. Organization and Administration.
The form of organization of OSS was in-
fluenced by three major factors: (1) The
political necessity of working in coopera-
tion with various parallel agencies of Allied
governments, which necessitated separation
of functions in some instances. (2) The
necessity of establishing separate sections
or branches to deal with various other
agencies and departments of the govern-
ment, e.g., separate personnel sections for
civilian, military and naval personnel (3)
The fact that normal routine functions in
a secret agency in some cases do not lend
themselves to combination. For example,
Special Funds must be separate from the
branch which handles normal vouchered fi-
nances, and cannot be included in a group
of Services branches. Similarly, Communi-
cations, and even Medical Services, become
so highly specialized as to require independ- �
ent branch status.
The first two factors mentioned above
might not be valid in the future. They
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
-fop-Secret
arose principally because OBS was new and
there was no clear acceptance of the agency
for approximately a year and a half. OSS
set precedents which may well influence
wider understanding,. both within and out-
side the government, of the basic require-
ments for secret and unorthodox activities.
Unavoidably, the variety of functions ex-
ercised by an agency such as OSS neces-
sitated a complex organizational structure,
which in turn complicated problems of ad-
ministration. For example, that branch of
the agency which handled the research and
analysis function, employing many persons
at the domestic headquarters and involving
a great deal of clerical work, was Confronted
with an extensive adminictrative burden.
This was not true of the branch which
handled the secret intelligence function,
which employed fewer persons at head-
quarters and required a minimum of clerical
assistance, since a great deal of its head-
quarters work was high-level secret plan-
ning. A completely different adminictra-
tive structure was required by the branch
which handled special operations, where the
organimtional pattern was virtually mili-
tary in form. Nevertheless, all these func-
tions were intimately interrelated, from
strategic penetrations through tactical mili-
tary support to intelligence analysis, and
the organization of the agency had to be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate them
all.
Furthermore, the field organizations of
such an agency varied in accordance with
local situations. Where they operated
under cover in neutral territories, the chan-
nel of command was direct to Washington
headquarters which maintained immediate
operational controL In the various war-
time Theater Commands, the field bases
were patterned after the Washington or-
ganization, containing in themselves most
of the major branches and facilities of the
Washington headquarters. Organization-
al emphasis, however, depended upon the
needs of the individual theaters, whose cora-
manders exercised operational controL
Even so, the strategic functions of the
agency's Washington headquarters con-
tinued. The problem of the relative em-
phaqi3 to be placed on headquarters or on
field functions might well ceps" to exist in
a future conflict if sufficient personnel were
available to satisfy both the demands of
headquarters and the requirements for local
theater operations. Failing this, the more
Immediate operational needs of the theater
must of necessity prevail, as they did with
OSS.
S. Personnel.
Modern war has demonstrated the impor-
tance of unorthodox activities of the type
performed by OSS. It is impractical to
maintain during peacetime any but a frac-
tion of the personnel which would be re-
quired in case of another war, and any
future crisis will therefore necessarily in-
volve a major and rapid expansion. The
basic personnel problems of OSS, problems
of number and of status will thus recur.
In OSS all categories of personnel were
employed: civilian, military and naval.
Since the functions of the agency were con-
stantly redefined and the agency was con-
stantly expanding to meet additional needs
as they arose, the allotments of Civil Serv-
ice grades and military commissions were
never considered sufficient. In future situ-
ations of this sort, the precedents estab-
lished by OSS will provide a valid basis for
comparison.
The problem of status is more complex.
OSS was harassed throughout by the diffi-
culties and inequities inevitable with a staff
of select personnel recruited for specialized
skinS rather than on the basis of Civil Serv-
ice status or military rank. In any future
military emergency it might be possible to
accord to the personnel in an agency such
as OSS status as members of an independent
branch of service. A war situation might
necegsitate the use in many instances of
military and naval rank for cover and
257 �rop-freeFel-
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776
liaison purposes. In such cases a system of
brevet commuldons might be worked out
with grades determined by the nature of the
assignment, to be in effect for the duration
of the assignment only.
Basic to personnel policy for an agency
conducting secret operations is recognition
of the importance of the individual.
The agency, and the personnel who com-
prise it, hold a position of high trust. Dis-
cretion, ingenuity, loyalty and a deep sense
of responsibility are required. No force of
discipline can extract from personnel the
exercise of these qualities. At the staff
level, this applies to such intangibles as
judgment and human understanding; at the
level of actual operations, it holds true be-
cause disciplinary measures cannot be ex-
tended to personnel operating under cover
In remote areas or in enemy territory. It is
Indeed remarkable that among the person-
nel in OSS, although quickly assembled and
working largely in unusual and unprece-
dented situations, there were so few in-
stances of outright irresponsibility.
Pride of organization and a spirit of serv-
ice go, as in the case of select military units,
hand in hand. It is a cement stronger than
discipline, indispensable where the em-
phasis must be squarely upon the individual.
Without this intangible but easily recog-
nizable pride and spirit, no placement pro-
cedure ever devised can meet the high stand-
ards which must be required from an agency
such as OBS.
�
Approved for Release: 2020/09/24 C00168776