WASHED BRAINS OF POW'S: CAN THEY BE REWASHED?

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00146082
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 17, 2024
• Document Release Date: January 15, 1983
• Publication Date: May 4, 1953

v,/.1
.HE t:ORE,\t4 .
ashed Brains of P0 t � Can They .1.13 e W aS e (1?
These Chinese characters 5tand for h.si �pr niumner (1.
tzronethiti- like --he now." They mean
Cliineee ruined the word to ronunte the forciblv purging
of �tincican'' ideas front a ntallsS IlOW1 so that lieW 011eS
be forcibly sulttituted. Ent the technique of brain-
� washing was perfected in the oViet t..itioii. and has
ii used to control the thoughts of the people in every Iron
rtain conntrf. The American and other United Nations prison.
who were exchanged at Panmunjom provided a new and first-
id insight into how the Reds wash brains.
the Westerrt. world. hsi-rco Seems
.tic. Bort intelli2enee ciIiccrs in Ko-
'erc stamping -No Interviews" on
lentiRcation cards of some home-
Atrer:c.tn AU Cl ex-
lers, even after being flown to
), were kept under wraps in two
hospitals. Visitors :TeccIed two clif-
passes to enter their wards. The
Korean Covernment planned to
:xchanged r,OK plismers through
anths et re-ednerrti,)n without seeing
iting to their
e reason: the minds cf same of the
)\N"s, like the hapicss eirizens of
.1in-controlled countries. had been
by Communist b--,�.vashinC.
how the hod te:linirjue Works:
nfessloits an Col lo Erain-
ing. starts w irlt zroup�tl:c :vorkers
shop. a ears el stude"..: -a single
act eampound��.viiich ract�ts for sev-
hours each day. Trained "thoucht
oilers- compel Inenrer to eon-
every Past experience. . every
;Irt, whicS was not -democratic.-
te leader and the rest of the group
laTt each political fault and etiti-
it. No cletail is too mir.or: Does he
sorry fcr his ruinously taxed farmer-
:Its? The -People- are his true par-
their interests must come Fast. Did
nee make an envious remark about
ricans? The truth is. the exploited
workers are ra^,-ed and hune,rv.
Ater the must confess all over
a, stressing his sins aod explainim,
proper attitudes himself. Azain he is
7ized. Again he repents and explains.
so it goes, meeting alter meeting. In
same way. group members must
.):1 loaded lectures ("Why Did
7ric.1 Invade Korea?-) and then dis-
them -correctly." They :oust make
:al -progress reports- on their friends'
Ights, as we!! as their own.
:henever snineune shps nif the party
. he is inst.Intly cortcctt:d. Ile must
�nt and res i.e., some iii,ot�tintd Ii.
cme.tion on the suli Ct. :AMOS t
1,litt'Zi LitddtWsly C0111.
list answer to his mind.
his gradual brainwash continues for
� 4. 1953
long periods. But for those who resist, or
for special cases who must be dealt with
quickly. there is a More drastic technique.
It involves straining the brain of the vic-
tim so cruelly that he literally retains no
real thoughts of his own and willingly
adopts the ideas of his captor.
Violent physical tertere is not gener-
ally used. Instead, the subject is allowed
little sleep and weakened by hunger,
thirst, and despair. Night after night he is
yanked from fitful rest to a dark room to
stand motice.less in a painful position. A
brilliant light be.its.�.t his eyes. Hour after
hour, teams of specialists interrozate rum,
deny his every answer, produce "proof"
of every "lie." din their own story into his
ears. The Central intelligence Agency
thinks some drug or "Lie scrum" may
possibl:.� be used to sneed up his collapse.
After one week of this rentine in Red
China, for instance, a devoted Catholic.
missionary. the Rev. Rel.:eel W. Greene
(Newsweee, April 13). feund that "my
mind was incapable of reflection." He
even doubted that he was really a priest,
and dreamily wondered if the incredible
charges against him were true. The co:n-
plete process takes about. three morelis.
By then the prisoner is ready to stand in
flicy broadeasts a "elm fessiun"
open come as Cardinal Minds/a:oh. del
Iii Iluneaty, and confess to crimes
could tint hove li:tilpent:t1. And 1,,� us ::1
believe that he is teiline the turtle
'Nutisiti�r� ono Boys% Ali of thtee
methods. returned Ainetican prisoners
testified last week, were ti,cci in,
POW camps in North Korea. Prisotie:s
had up to ten hours of classes a day.
They had to make "progress recent,"
They were told: "You will be puili�leei
if you do not learn your lessons." Ti.
main lesson, according to Egt. Od:e
Lawley, was: "The United States started
the whole war. All they could talk abeet
was General MacArthur end Preeideet
Truman. They called them warmoneers."
For willing pupils. called "number er.c
boys" by the rest, there were rewards�
cigarettes, better tend, and even ee-
guarded billets outside tile stockade. aol
girls. For "innlicious elements,": there
were hard-labor "reactionary camps
threats of uncomfortable cages as ounisle
meat for active resistance. Possibl:.� for
these reasons, rather than out ot coevie-
tion, a few prisoners "wrote some ;ne:te
bad stun" for Communist magazince:
ers "preached just like the Chieese."
A small number evidently tee.lersvee:t
cm:centre:eel brainwashing. S"ene went
on propaganda tours of the Soviet setel-
lites, giving party-line "interviews" to
Red press. Others, like Col. Fr ,-1- II.
Schwable and Nlaj. Roy 11. Bley.
can Marine airmen, made public "cettfe-,-
sions" of having waged bacterkli....rgitai
warfare. Major Ble y was quoted by tee
Reds as eat-Munro: that his nt!'t!
"ciropned. :,erm bornits" end that he
see-01v "eeree-lellob conrdy."
*I Laughed": South Kerean nuthrei-
ties believe many freed ROI<
have been deeply influenced. Et:: far the
majority el Western prisoners, at lee-t.
the intioetrinetien prcerant was apper-
ently crude and ineilective. and it was
'speedily dropped in several cemps.
reacted' like Navv Hospital Cerp:imen
Thomas H. Wecichil of Fort \Vieth.
Texas: "I just laughed at thent."
How seriously the few who did eat
laugh were affected is not yet clear. Oee
official in the Far East confideteiy
asserts: "There's nothing to this brain-
washing that it good steak and an ice-
cream cone won't cure." The Peetaeen,
which hopes so. decided last week to le.t
the security cover from all ex-pri...,nee;
when they reach the United St.ttvi.
then, it felt, any "confusion" in their
minds should have been dispelled.
But if the free environment ch.es net
clear III, tlIc ,ymptirrts of itW-11110, eorr T-
tive treatment�tewashing the it.......
may take a In: time. The Army 'et,:
never bad to face the problem byttee.
37
�
(E r,0751/44 V/AR
ELT=ErTri, 777 ;Jr �
VICE ADMIRAL C. TLII.INIER JOY:
-r.r More 711 ,
ii.E _h. saan. _it.(u)i Ca
"ice Admiral C. Torner Joy,
now Superintendent Of the U. S.
Naval Academy at Annapolis,
watelied every twist of Communist
maneuvering as senior U.N. dele-
gate to the �truce talks from July
Ifl51 until Mao 1952. As the Pan-
munjom taTI,o.; resumed, A. T.
Hadley of Nesysweek's Washington
bureau interviewed Admiral Joy for
his expert slant on the Ileds mo-
tives mid the prospects for peace.
Why do you believe the Chi-
nese and North Korean Com-
munists clecided to reopen the
stalled Korean truce talks at this
. time? Do )ou think they did this
of their own volition or as part
of an over-all plan laid clown
by the Kremlin?
In dealing with the Communists it is
idle, not to oly foolish, even for a
Communist, to pretend omniscience.
If I were to guess. I would say that
the Communists no longer see any
advantage to themselves in playing a
waiting game. I think it must be clear
to them by now that we are not going
to be victims of our own impatience.
Also, I think it may be a matter
or disapponoment to thorn that the
change in our national administration
has not resulted in any change in our
natimod attitorio toward Korea and, in
fact, has resulted only in a reaffirma-
tion of the validity. of our purpose.
In short, they have failed to
uncover any aclvantage in stalliog and
are now ready to take their chances
on a more dyihnnic approach. hoping
to engineer us into awkward situations
and to exploit any mistakes we might
make. As for where the idea of resum-
ing the talks ori;ioatod. I do not know,
but I do not helieve it xvould ever
have been acted on without the ap-
proval of the Kremlin. .�
Do you think that the Com-
nousist invasion of the Kinedom
of Laos in lodo.China has any
connection with the truce talks.?
Is it probable that the Reds are
using the talks as a shield for fur-
ther aggression in Indo-China?
If we take the realistic view that we
Ore confronted by an enemy whose
announced ohjective is world domina-
tion and that we are in the middle Of a
war that is [Might aminoi the glohe
maoy fronts in to.my ways. we are
tint likely to mom cl an event like the
invasion of Laos .16 being unrelated to
the over-all pattern. On the contrary,
we Wdl see it as a conflimation of
what ,we know the pattern to be. �
It is a mistake to consider the lova-
sioo of Laos and the resumption of the
time talks as iodated froin each other.
us the b:1111C bmeath, I would say that a
great many thinking people must be
genuinely concerned that the net ef-
fect of an eventual truce in Korea
would be to create an illusion that the
global war is over.
It should be remembered that Ko-
/
Joy:
1111, tuss..{�� L. z %S, y
No illusions, no surprises
rea is only a phase, though the "Most
painful phase." of a war that is fought
around the globe.
. NVcre you surprised at the .
stories of maltreatment told by
some or thc returning prisoners
of war? What do you think the
Reds hope to gain from the ex-
change of sick and wounded
POW's? And do you anticipate
that many of our soldiers vill
have been brainwashed?
I would have been a lot more sur-
prised if our returning prisoners had
not binught back s-tories cif maltreat-
ment. Of course, the Communists are
not above treating small snookers of
Our prisoners well for poipaganda pur-
poses. I think the Communist decision
to accept nor proposal 4/11 ti me CX-
change of sick and wounded was an
. -
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. ' \ � � � � < \ 2
o, � : �
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.74
oftcrthought to their decisimi to re-
quest a resumption of die talks.
The e'xchange did not cost them
anything and served the osefol �-
pose. ol creating a favorable atmos-
phere tor thc resumption of the taiks.
As for brainwashing. if there has
been any, the most effective antidote
will be a breath of free air and the
sight of home.
'How can we best conduct fur-
ther negotiations with the Com-
munists in Korea? Are there :my
particular pitfalls the U.S. shoold
be wary of in the negotiations?
I have not been involved with the
negotiations for nearly a year now and
am not conversant with current *-
tailed exchanges. I fence. I ;on raiLin a
position to point out speciEc 17:it .ms�
the Communists are always ckvisins*,
new ones. The impottant in
negotiating with the Commtmists is
to know what you want and why,
and then go after it with pAtienee
and unmistakable firmness. It isn't
complicated: it's just difilroilt. �
Of course, by far the best w:ly to
negotiate with the Commitnists hi a
military situation is to apply ste7ieient
military posver to give emphasis and
meaning to your arguments.
What do you think of the
chances for a trice settlerneo,:
now? Do you think that the Coro-
monists arc ready to compromise
" on forcible repatriation?
There is good reason to believe the
Communists may want an armistice.
Basically, they want to get us oh the
Korean peninsula. They haven't been
able to drive us off the peoinsoI... and
I believe they see their best hope of
doing so through an armistice and the
political conference to follow it. l'ott
will remember that one topic they
insist be taken up :It that political con-
ference is the withdrawal ot all foreign
forces from Korea.
If the Cconnumists find a way to
save face on the prisolier�repa oiation
issue. I belieVe we may tif�V :III CIA to
the fighting. I bneever, Vitopr no one .
is so naive as to believe that on armis�
tice will be the maeie solution .1:1:i the
end to mum problems. in Kolea. let
alone the rat. E..o.t or the %so, hi.
3B
N. coos. er , :'L .m' I, I'?"..1