PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COPY ATTACHED) TITLED EVALUATION OF CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES OF POSSIBLE CONCERN TO NATIONAL SECURITY DATED 28 JANUARY 1952

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00144688
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: October 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: January 15, 1983
• Publication Date: January 20, 1952

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1.=cz1 702: Asaistant Director for Policy CoordinatCon
Assistant Director for Special Operatioas �
; Assistant Director for Inspection 24 Securit:;,
Str2JPOT
: Proposed Memorandum for Secretary of Defcreso
(copy attachca)
Ir.'t "0 1952
Ve-114
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1. The aitaehei nemorandun fer the Secretary of Defense is
another ste? in the phase of Project Artichoke havir? to do with
1AC interests. The Service Denartment renresentatives are review-
ing the papers now In nreparation for concurrence by their Chisfs.
2. Significant aeoects of the atta-heti nao^rs of '-le,rest.
to CIA are:
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a. The pamers follow the thme already developed in the
Office of the Secretary of r:efen.se, aLB,. and. the Se:vices that
� this-eubject require study and rtisearch from the defensica
'standpoint.
1:),. Such -.tuay and researr-h. is similar to fllat neceesary
tv offe:leiv prere.m.
. .
c. The'RD3 aCtion Les not affect z,ny Docartnent of De-
fensc�or CIA 7)rcera.cs now going on. Eowever, it will facili-
tate.cOordination of certain Department of Dafensc prograns
where unnecessary duplication now e-rists.
. .
� d. CIA can utiliiee the information from the PD3 meetinge
and the resulting reeonmendations to insure our concentration
on the most nroductive lines of approach -and to avoid cestly
basic recearch projects. Therefore the need for commlete co-
ordination between the carious CIA offices now attempting to
evaluate Articholce techniques and plaanir for their _use is even
more pressi--,.
3. J1..my co:a-me:its or su-restions you may wish to make reF:arding
the attached mapers will be annreciated. Since it is expected that
---1=t-E:'TLEnry-oFdir:ation will be cc=pletca by 5 Yebruary 1552, recci:et
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of yo uz co=ments in this office on or before that date solicited.
Assietant Director
Scientific Intelligenee
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� 28 January 1952
14EMORAZ.1.1'.'07t: The Se.g.�.retary of Defense
SDTJECT
� � Evaluation of Certain SCientific Techniquee of
Possible Concern to National Security
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C.�I.
1, The Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the
Military intelligence le-encies, has d. uLder study for some time a
problem which may be of concern to national scsurity on a govern-
ment-wide level. The attachei paper indicates the nat=e and scope
of the problem and contains certain recornendatie-s as to steps
necessary before the full implications af this matter can be evaluatEi.
2. The Conmittee on Medical Sciences of the Research and Dsvelcp-
ment Beard has been suPeeted
as the vsnropriate agency for this etuI-y.
, Informal conversations with representatives of the Research and Devel:-
.
ment Board indicate that they are aware .of the possible seriousness of
this matter and are willing to undertake the study if requested.
3. Should. you agree that the Committee on Medical Sciences is
the appropriate agency, I would. appreciate your arransing for,-the con-
sideration of the problem by that Committee along the lines rccommer2.ed
in the attachment. The Central intelligence Agency and the Military
Intelligence Services are prepared to provide.guidance and assistance
as necessary.
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4. I am sure that you will recoGnize the implications which
miGht be drawn should it become hnown, Generally, that CIA or the
Military IntaliGence AGencies are directly concerned in thls matter,
oven thouGh this concern stems primarily fro= the defensive.aspsts
of the p7ob1em. The natter is being handled on an individual "ZTTS
ONLY" basis, therefore, 'and. all reports or references to the profs-et
shOuld 'on so protected. The code word 'Artichoke" has been aid
and is unclassified when used in such a way that it d.ses not reTi-al
the nature or scope of the Problem..
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ATT.:..CIIME17.0 A.
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1. Whether or not, and to what extent, any azent or procedure
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can be used to cause an individual to become subservient to.am
immosed control; and subsequently.thnt individual be unaware of the
event.
BASIC 77,7'.f7.7TS OF TYT., P7.07771:
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1. Medical Scisnce, varticularly in the fiells of psychiatry
and psychoth.-.rap7, has developed a variety of techniques whereby
some control can be ihnosed-on the will of an individuco. The tech-
_
niqu.7.s include neurc-surgery, electric. shock, druzs, h7pnosis and
others.
2. In certain cases after the administration of these tech-
flies, the individual has amnesia with resnQct to the event.
3. The techniques have not been developed in the United States
to the point where the results can be predicted with respect to the
.extent of control that can be achieved; whether or not and to what
extent atinesia will result; and what undesirable physiolozical re-
actions may occur in aadition.
C07.CLUSIC73:
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1. If these techniques wore eercloped by a foreica covern-ecnt
to the extent that reliable rests co be expected in thp
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majority of cases, it is evident that a ceribus threat to U. S.
National Security would exist.
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2. Reports of Soviet interest and research in this directien,
plus rumors, reports and evaluations of possible Soviet use of those
techniclues in interrezatiens, arc sufficient to warrant careful in-
vestigation of the subject as a basis for evaluating the extent of
the threat to U. S. 1Tational Security.
1. That a board of scientists
priate medical fields, and nrovided
guards to insure access to material
with commetence in the
appro.-,
with the necessary security ss..fc-
bearing
on the subject, be re-
queited to study the -oroblem and rake recommendations.
.7 2. That the study include reference to all ageats or procedumes-
which might be considered in relation to this problem and elininate
those which U. S. science can establish as unfeasible.
3. That, in the case of agents or procedures or combinations
thereof where a potential threat may oxist which cannot be:evaluated
on the basis of the present state.of U. S. science, recommendations
'be made for further research, if practical results can be achieved
within a rcascnable tine.
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4. That the recommendations include
the scope of tho research
(
rcuired,'established facilitins where such research might be under-
taken, and the aprrox!r.ate cost of the research.
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That the board submit an interim rcport within three,
months of the initiation of the study and further inteiim report
every three months until the study is completed.
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