(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) VI. PRODUCTION RE GOLENIEWSKI

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00144372
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2022
• Case Number: F-2020-00942
• Publication Date: January 1, 1964

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Introduction:
VI. PRODUCTION
It is unfair to Goleniewski's tremendous contribution
to the Western intelligence services to allow the man's
exasperating, paranoid personality to obscure his value. A
review must emphasize the almost total recall with which he
was endowed and which enabled him to give the names and
details of 1,693 intelligence personalities, including offi-
cers, co-opted workers and agents, and his initiative in
sending successfully to the West 1,000 pages of classified
Polish documents which he had photographed and in caching
another 750 Minox film frames of classified documents when
he defected. The Goleniewski tragedy lies in his.unparalleled
contribution to Western intelligence and his hopelessly
paranoid personality which blocked long-term cooperation with
any Western service. On the basis of his exceptional memory,
his experience as an operational intelligence officer and his
intimate association with UB and KGB officers, he should have
been one of the most enduring and valuable defector assets in
the West. His mental illness has made that impossible, which
is a loss for the Western services and a tragedy for the man
himself. It is most important to note, however, that until
approximately early 1964, Goleniewski was an accurate and
reliable source of intelligence.
A. Counterintelligence Production:
1. Goleniewski's counterintelligence production is the
bulk of his information by virtue of his career in
the Counterintelligence Department of the Polish
Security Service. As stated above, the information
he gave us prior to January or February 1964 is as
accurate as any counterintelligence received from a
This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW MOAN 0
the Central Intelligence Agency
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defector. Because of the amount of information
he provided, this review can give numbers and
highlights only. Following is a numerical break-
down of intelligence personalities on which he
reported:
Type and Service Number
Polish Security and Military
Intelligence Officers 650
Agents and Co-opted Workers
for the PIS 903
KGB and GRU Staff Officers 110
Agents 30
Total 1,693
In providing names and considerable information on
650 ranking and middle-level officers of the PIS,
Goleniewski identified most of the PIS. He was
able to provide CIA with a complete list of agents
and co-opted workefs in oi Sqi due to tne
last position he held in the UB as Chief of Section
6 (Scientific and Technical), Department I. His
---extraordinary memory recalled not only names but
specialities, training, personal idiosyncrasies and,
in many cases, birth dates of his UB and Z-II col-
leagues. His status as a KGB liaison officer and a
KGB penetration of the Polish services made it pos-
sible for him to report on KGB operations and person-
nel. Traditionally, the Soviets exploit but do not
trust the Satellite services, but within the limits
of their basic distrust, they probably trust the Poles
more than the East Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, etc.
Goleniewski was allowed to see more of and learn
more of the Soviet, advisors with whom he worked than
most Satellite intelligence officers. He was a
shrewd and capable elicitor of information from his
KGB contacts because he knew how to touch the nerve
of their inordinate pride in their intelligence
accomplishments.
2. The more conspicuous cases based on Goleniewski
leads and which have received press coverage are
the following (the list is not completely any means
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a. George Blake, KGB penetration of the
British Service, MI-6;
b. Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, KGB
illegal network head in London;
c. Morris and Lora Cohen, alias Peter
and Joyce Kroger, KGB agents working as
support agents for Molody in London and
previously part of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel's
organization in the United States, also an
illegal net;
d. Harry Houghton, KGB agent in the
Royal Navy reporting to Molody;
e. Ethel Elizabeth Gee, KGB agent,
Houghton's girlfriend, providing classified
Royal Navy documents for Molody;
f. Heinz Felfe, West German END counter-
intelligence officer and KGB penetration of the
BND;
g. Hans Clemens, KGB penetration of the
BND;
h. Bulla Case, Ursula and Alois Bulla,
KGB penetration of the West German Socialist
Party and West German Government.
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3. Goleniewski provided the most complete and detailed
charts and organizational description of the Polish
Security Service and the Polish Military Intelligence
Service received on any Communist service. His
meticulous attention to detail and his extraordinary
memory made it possible to trace all the organiza-
tional shifts which occurred in the two services
since 1945. The control and/or influence of the
Soviets, the relationship to the Communist Party and
the purges following the Gomulka take-over were all
painstakingly described. His knowledge of the
personnel working in the UB was encyclopedic. Having
served in two provincial UB posts--Gdansk and Poznan--
and in the UB Headquarters in both Departments I and
II, he was acquainted with personnel working in both
Lip40
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internal and external counterintelligence opera-
tions. The extent of his knowledge of external
counterintelligence operations was described
briefly above. A very abbreviated summary of his
reporting on UB internal operations follows:
a. During the time spanning his knowledge of
internal CI activities, approximately 1954 to
1958, he knew that the UB had succeeded in
obtaining the codes and ciphers of embassies
and consulates in Poland.
b. In March 1961 Goleniewski told his CIA
debriefer that every embassy in Warsaw, with
the exception of the United States and British
embassies, had been "penetrated". He was referring
to physical penetration of the diplomatic instal-
lations. He added that the UB was constantly
reviewing and planning possible penetrations of
the United States and British embassies.
c. The UB had a pool of attractive female
agents who were used against all Western diplomats.
If a Westerner made the acquaintance of a :-solisL
woman outside of the UB pool, an effort would be
made to remove the latter from the social scene
of the Westerners and substitute one of the female
UB co-opted workers or agents. In several cases
the association has ended in marriage and, accord-
ing to Goleniewski, the Polish woman will be forced
or urged to remain a reporting UB source. She
would also be exploited as an access to her hus-
band. In two cases cited by Goleniewski, the
Western diplomat has had a successful career in
his country's service and in both cases the KGB
has taken the case from the UB. The KGB was
developing the operations at the time of Goleniewski's
defection. Both diplomats were reported by CIA
to the security service of his respective country.
CIA also informed the FBI, because in both cases
one member of the family, either husband or wife,
had occasion to visit the United States. There
are many other examples of the female UB agent
marrying Westerners or leaving Poland with the
assistance of a Western diplomat, too numerous to
be listed here.
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d. The Poznan Fair was and still is exploited
to the fullest by the UB as: an opportunity to
spot potential recruitment targets; a convenient
rendezvous for agents working outside of Poland
who have logical cover for attending the Fair;
and as a source of positive intelligence. In 1960
Goleniewski was in charge of the UB task force
responsible for the intelligence exploitation of
the foreign visitors to the Poznan Fair. He had
used the Fair in previous years for his own opera-
tions but in his position as chief of the UB unit
he had an opportunity to collect considerable data
on UB operations of all departments and on KGB and
MfS activities. One example of the type of.informa-
tion he collected and passed to CIA was an indica-
tion that a high-level Italian diplomat or trade
official with diplomatic rank had been recruited
by the UB when the Italian was serving in Warsaw.
A UB colleague mentioned the Italian by his UB
cryptonym, assuming that Goleniewski knew of the
operation, and commented that the Italian was
visiting the Fair but the UB were ordered to ignore
him because the KGB was assessing the Italian with
a view to taking over the agent (unfortunately
Goleniewski could not ferret out the true name).
In discussing the Poznan Fair, Goleniewski emphasized
the control and exploitation all Communist intelli-
gence services made, not only of Poznan but of all
trade fairs which take place in satellite countries.
He emphasized, in addition, the coordination among
the satellites and the ubiquitous KGB presence.
D. Examples of Counterintelligence Production:
1. KGB: Goleniewski gave an extensive amount of
information on the KGB. He reported on KGB organiza-
tion, personnel, and at length on those KGB officers
with whom he had been acquainted. As revealed by
the operations stemming from his reporting touched
on briefly above, he produced extremely valuable
leads to KGB operations. His knowledge of KGB
manipulation of the Satellite services and coordina-
tion between the Satellite services is revealed in
all of his counterintelligence reporting. He,was
extensively debriefed on KGB illegal operations and
the KGB Illegal Directorate. The basis for his
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knowledge was a campaign the KGB undertook to
force the Poles to establish illegal rezidenturas
in North America, where, the KGB stated, the
large number of Polish immigrants made it rela-
tively simple to build up illegal networks.
Using the KGB insistence on UB activity in the
illegal field, Goleniewski learned the following:
a. In August 1956, Sakharovskiy (General
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich), then Chief of the KGB
First Chief Directorate, summoned a UB and GZI
delegation to Moscow for a conference. Goleniewski
was a member of the Polish group. The discussions
led, to criticism of the Polish intelligence serv-
ices for not exploiting the excellent material
available in Poland for illegals. Sakharovskiy
urged the Poles to create six to eight illegal
rezidenturas in the United States. When the
Poles demurred, saying the Soviets probably did
not have that many, Sakharovskiy became angry,
went to a safe and pulled out a large number of
dossiers. Throwing them on the table, he
announced that the GRU and KGB had 53 illegal
re=identuras in the United States. This was
changed to include Canada and Mexico, but all
targeted against the United States.
b. During the same month, August 1956,
Goleniewski had an opportunity to bring up the
number of KGB illegal rezidenturas with
Yevdokimenko, senior KGB advisor in Poland, who
was also present during the Moscow conference.
The latter said that 57 was a slight exaggera-
tion for the benefit of the Poles and there were
40 active illegal rezidenturas in North America.
c. Still in 1956, Goleniewski, with his
usual thoroughness, asked Karandashov-, former
KGB advisor to the UB who was visiting Warsaw,
about the number of illegal rezidenturas in
North America. Karandashov confirmed the number
of 40 active rezidenturas.
d. Ostryakov, deputy chief of the KGB Third
Chief Directorate, visited Warsaw in September
1956 and Goleniewski checked the number of illegal
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rezidenturas with him. Ostryakov confirmed
the number of 40 in North America.
e. In August 1957 Goleniewski, during a
trip to Vienna, asked the KGB rezident in that
city, Legeyev, a personal friend of the recently
arrested Abel, about the Soviet illegal
rezidenturas in North America. Legeyev stated
that the figure was between 40 and 50.
f. Back in Warsaw Goleniewski again raised
the question of Soviet illegal rezidenturas with
Vladykin, deputy to the senior KGB advisor in
Poland, Yevdokimenko. Vladykin stated that
Sakharovskiy's figure of 53 was accurate and
added, "The Czechs work well, the Romanians do
not know how, the East Germans are just trying
to mount operations now, and the Poles are not
doing anything."
The above is cited as an example of Goleniewski's
careful research when he wished to confirm a
report. He was very positive about the extensive
KGB illegal operations on the North American
continent. The number of rezidenturas would
include "MOB" (described below) and active
illegal rezidenturas.
2. "MOB" Networks: "MOB" comes from the word "mobiliza-
tion" and is the name given sleeper networks which
would become active in case of war. Their missions
are primarily sabotage and diversion. They main-
tain communications periodically but do not engage
in clandestine activity. According to Goleniewski,
the Russian term for the "MOB" nets is "in storage"
and the agents should be exempt from the draft and
in good standing with the local police. An example
of a large "MOB" net was given by General Korczynski,
head of Z-II, from his last visit to China (report
is dated 1960). Korczynski said the Chinese had
told him that they had 2,500 "MOB" agents in
Japan, now inactive, who would remain inactive
unless war were declared. Goleniewski stated there
was an "MOB" net in Scandinavia and in Canada,
The Canadian net was created in the early 1930's
with the assistance of the Canadian Communist Party.
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The information, admittedly vague, was given
the RCMP.
3. "Aktion": One of the first reports Goleniewski
sent through his letters of 1958 concerned a pro-
posed KGB propaganda offensive against the Western
Powers in the German Federal Republic labeled by
him "Aktion". The program originated with the
KGB Second Chief Directorate and that Directorate's
Chief, Gribanov, and was to be implemented by the
Satellite services. The objective of the propaganda
assault was to support and strengthen the Soviet
contention that West Berlin was an outpost of the
Western intelligence services and the West German
service, the BND, was a tool of the Western Powers.
After the KGB explained its plan, it became obvious
that the Satellites would be sacrificing their
agents in West Berlin and the Federal Republic to
achieve the KGB goal. The proposal did not meet
with enthusiasm and the plan, as originally
presented, was dropped but the BND agents who had
been identified in West and East Berlin and in the
GDR were exposed. The planning for "Aktion" occurred
during the months of April, May, June and July 1959
and was in preparation for the Geneva Conference
which the Soviets would attend. According to
Goleniewski, the failure of the plan was blamed
on the KGB advisors to the pertinent Satellite
services and there were Khrushchevian fireworks
aimed at the KGB in general.
4. "Hacke": This was Goleniewski's label for a long-
term KGB operation, the purpose of which was to con-
trol a neo-Nazi organization. Some history is
necessary to understand the source of his informa-
tion. As has been alleged and reported from other
sources since the end of World War II, Heinrich
Mueller, Chief of Amt IV of the SD, known as "Gestapo
Mueller", was recruited by the Soviets before the end
of World War II. Through him the MGB obtained
information on a proposed post-World War II Nazi
secret conspiracy which Bormann was organizing. The
head of the MGB from 1946 to 1951 was Abakumov, who
came into power through his emphasis on external
operations, primarily against the United States.
Abakumov recognized the potential offered the MGB
by a neo-Nazi group in contact with the agent networks
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which the Germans had in North and South America.
He knew that the Nazis were still very hostile
toward the United States and would probably con-
tinue to plan underground operations inimical to
the United States. He ordered, for this reason,
an interrogation of all Nazi leaders who would
be in a position to know the members of the neo-
Nazi conspiracy in order to identify the members
of the group. Goleniewski was called in to pick
up the interrogation of the former Gauleiter of
Danzig, Foerster, who had been under interrogation
by another UB officer without results. The Soviet
General, Gezborodov, who was visiting Danzig in
early 1951, told Goleniewski that the first UB
interrogator had failed to get Foerster's.coopera-
tion in spite of very hostile interrogation.
Bezborodov ordered Goleniewski to report only to
the Soviet advisor, Sklyar, on the results of
Foerster's interrogation. The interrogation or,
as Goleniewski described it, the talks to restore
Foerster's "psychic balance" after the brutal
treatment by the previous interrogator lasted
until June 1952, when Foerster gave the first
indication of knowledge of Nazi plans following
a defeat. As soon as Goleniewski reported the
results to Sklyar, Foerster was taken from the
Danzig prison and flown to Moscow. Abakumov's plan
was to have the MGB control only the two or three
men who were heading the Nazi group and operate
under the "false flag", i.e., the remaining Nazis
and German intelligence assets would be unwitting
of Soviet control, believing themselves in the
employment still of the Germans. The "Hacke"
information was passed to the BND.
E. Positive Intelligence:
1. A general count of pages of the documents received
from Goleniewski is: 1,000 pages while still in-
place in Warsaw; 750 pages on film retrieved from
the cache in Warsaw after his defection. These
documents included significant positive intelligence
provided numerous clues to penetrations of Western
governments, armed forces, NATO, etc., and contained
invaluable counterintelligence information.
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2. The representatives from the Army interviewed
Goleniewski alone without a CIA representative
present. Goleniewski was extremely antagonistic
toward one of the Army debriefers and, if his
comments to his CIA debriefer are indicative of
his attitude, he was not very cooperative. Listed
in broad categories, the Army disseminations based
on information obtained from him are:
a. Soviet SAM sites and security measures
around the sites; Soviet discussions with Poles
regarding IRBM bases in Poland;
b. Polish Order of Battle; Polish mobiliza-
tion plans; arms and equipment of Polish Army;
Polish Office of the Quartermaster General; purge
of Jewish officers from the Polish Army; Soviet-
Polish border transshipment points; arrangements
for Soviet transport through Poland; organization
and personnel of Polish Ministry of National
Defense; Warsaw Military District;
c. Soviet aircraft: MIG-23Bis, MIG-24;
A-powered aircraft; Soviet interest in the B-58;
d. Nuclear weapons: Soviet units of tactical
destruction and assault; Soviet nuclear submarines
and Soviet deception methods to conceal true sub-
marine strength; bunker for atomic ammunition;
Soviet ray guns; Soviet technical collection
systems and Soviet deception to avoid technical
collection;
e. Warsaw Pact and Polish MOB plans; armament
strength of Warsaw Pact nations;
f. Nine reports on military operational
leads.
3. The State Department did not assign a debriefer
as the Army had done but specific topics were
covered at the request of State, which were:
a. Soviet-Satellite relations in connection
with the Sino-Soviet dispute;
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b. Sino-Soviet differences;
c. Outline of developments in Poland in
1956 which brought Gomulka back to power;
d. KGB technical surveillance capabilities.
4. In the field of communications, he gave information
on communications security, UB knowledge of Western
ciphers (mentioned above in CI Production) and the
Martin-Mitchell case (NSA defectors).
5. Other disseminations based on his information were:
a. The Katyn massacres:
b. Scientific and technical intelligence
exchange among Communist countries;
c. Soviet scientific and technical intel
ligence;
d. Comments on the Iraqi revolution;
c. The U-2 case;
f. S/W screed in Polish service passports;
g. A Soviet-manufactured digital computer,
Ural-2.
6. The voluminous dissemination on the KGB, the KGB
advisors, and the KGB/UB relationship should be
counted among his positive intelligence production.
It is a study of a hostile intelligence service, but
it is also a historical record of Soviet measures
to bring an East European nation's security/intelli-
gence services under complete Soviet domination and
the maneuvering of the East European nation used to
gain a small degree of independence and national
identity.
F. Comment on Production:
1. Goleniewski "went on strike" against CIA before it
was possible to complete debriefings on topics which
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he had previously agreed to cover and, in some
cases, he had suggested should be covered in
detail. Following are four of the larger
categories which were not covered as thoroughly
as planned:
a. His biography was never completed (as
mentioned above in the Biographical Section);
b. "Pax": Goleniewski was, when rational,
insistent that the "Pax" organization should be
very carefully examined because the organization
was a KGB-developed and controlled operation
designed to counter the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church in Poland and parts of the
Ukraine. He asserted that the UB resented the
KGB control of "Pax" and the hidden struggle
between the KGB and the UB was well worth the
attention of Western services. The "Pax" debrief-
ing was never accomplished;
c. The series of Z-II or 0-II bulletins
which he photographed and sent West merited a CI
analysis, according to Goleniewski. He suggested
that the bulletins be carefully analyzed in an
effort to identify the Polish Military Intelli-
gence sources. Because of his low opinion of the
US Army debriefer, he refused to bring up the
topic with him and insisted, when still talking
to CIA, that one of his CIA debriefers should
work with him on the Z-II bulletins. Time was
inadequate for the examination of the bulletins
before he stopped cooperating with CIA;
d. WIN: When he arrived from Germany, he
warned CIA that the UB study of the WIN case
included in the cache documents was a UB training
study and misrepresented the UB role. He suggested
that a comparative study be made, using the UB
paper and CIA's own background on the WIN opera-
tion, to detect the UB mistakes. This was never
done.
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