DEFECTION ATTEMPT IN VIENNA ON 5 FEBRUARY 1955, BORIS YAKOVLEVICH NALIVAIKO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00144056
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2021
• Case Number: F-2021-01929
• Publication Date: February 7, 1955

Approved for Release: 2021/08/12 C00144056
has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central inteiligenc� Agency-
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7 February 1955
771)7
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans
SUBJECT: Defection Attempt in Vienna on February 1955,
Boris Yakovlevich NALIVAIKO
1. Background: Boris Yakovlevich NALIVAIKO, Chief of the KGB/
Vienna, West German target group, with the cover position of Soviet
Consul in Vienna, has been a defection target of this agency since
1947. At that time he was Soviet Consul in Berlin, also a cover
position. Robert B. Gray first knew NALIVAIKO
at the time Gray was a Public xelations uinmer attached to General
Lucius Clay's staff in Berlin. As such he had certain duties 'which
brought him into business contact with NALIVAIKO. on this contact
there developed a social relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Gray and (b)(
NALIVAIKO and his wife. (b)(3)
2. Gray
[:=:nrcontinue o maiEtain his contact with NALIVAIKO since available
;
ormation indicated a defection potential. This consisted of
NALIVAIKO's consistent interest in and attraction to Western ideas
and mays; his wife's frequent visits to non-Soviet Sectors of Berlinkb"
his statement to American Naval personnel in Bremerhaven in 1948
that he saved 76,000 Deutsch Marks which he would like to invest in (130)
the West where he hoped to realize a six and one half percent interest
yield; and a steady interest in maintaining his friendship with Gray.
It was realized by Gray and all concerned that this might be a -
calculated provocation. However, the best available assessment of
the individual indicated valid reasons for continuing to believe
him vulnerable to a defection approach if a channel making this
possible could be maintained.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
3. Defection Attempt of 5 May 1954: NALIVATKO was transferred
from Berlin to Vienna as Consul in December 1951. At this time Gray
vas also in Viennz Informa-
tion provided by thorny after his defection- in February (W(1)
1954, showed that NALIVAIKO was KGB/Vienna Chief in charge of Soviet (b)(3)
operations against West German targets. This information also
indicated that NALIVAIKO had had a poor efficiency rating during his
Berlin tour but that he enjoyed the protection of the KGB Rezident
and Soviet High Commissioner ILITCHEV.
(WO)
4. On 5 May 1954 Gray, about to retur4,jhd United States, IkNIQN
had dinner with NALIVAIKO, at which time Gray, according to prearranged ""'")
plans, told NALIVAIKO that a friend of his in American intelligence
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had mentioned NALIVAlKO's difficulties to him. Gray offered to
furnish contact with American officials in the event that NALIVAIKO
wished to save himself from punitive action by the Soviets. NALIVAIKO
declined the offer. KGB surveillance of the meeting was noted, and
that was believed to have been the major reason for NALIVAlKO's
declining the offer. Gray and NALIVAIKO parted on good terms. Several
inquiries made by NAIIVA1K0 to another American source during the summer
of 1954 regarding Gray's welfare indicated an interest in maintaining
his channel to Gray.
5. Defection. Attempt of 5 February 1955: Further information
fro* adicated *better thanvrverage chance for defecting
NAIIVAlKO. To enhance this effortj kTrote a Jetter in � (b)(1)
Which he told. NALIVAIKO about his fa76Fed statis with his American (b)(3)
colleagues; why he had defected; why, in view of NALIVAIKO's bad record,
NALIVA1K0 would do well to defect; and to trust the bearer of the
letter. With the arrest of certain Soviet agents in West Germany, (b)(1)
more information was Shed on NALIVAIKO's espionage career conducted (b)(3)
under consulaik cover. Many-professional errorsmiere noteclaky agg-41py
officials which could embarrass NALIVAIKO whenever the German
authorities decided to release the information and publicize their
charges against the Soviet agents who, meanwhile, were cooperating
with the 'Western officials.
6. This information, plus all that had hitherto been acquired
Fa A T TIT A TIM -plus the strong inducement factors inherent in
Letter suggested: that another - and final - effort (b)(1)
"-should be mad6 before public court action against former NALIVAIKO (b)(3)
agents could take place - which might prompt the Soviets to recall
NATIVAIKO before we could reach him.
7. After considering all possible approaches, it was determined
that Gray was the only person who could establish a bona fide defection
channel. Accordingly, he was sent TDY to Vienna on 25 January 1955.
He was joined there by E. Murphy from the Berlin Operations Base
who was to be introduced as-his AmeriCalik.intalage.P.P. e contact. In
addition to the first _etter, another one was prepared
bringing the material up to date. Also� a dummy galley proof artic],e
ostensibly prepared for publication in Wiener Kurier was presented as
a device to show NALIVAIKO graphically how untenable his position
woad be if such were published.
8. It was planned that a "chance" meeting between the principals
would take place after heavy surveillance of N.441=IT---indicated a
time he could be approached in a public place where he would be free
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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from KGB surveillance. Surveillance showed that a "chance" encounter
was impossible. Therefore, his wife was contacted and vas asked to
deliver a message to NALIVAIKO stating that Gray had a message for him.
HALIVA oned by Gray. It was necessary to deliver to him
the tt, etters, plus a covering letter written in German (b)(1)
by Gra fore he uld agree to a meeting. A meeting did take place (b)(3)
at which NALIVAIKO appeared visibly nervous and shaken. He stated
that he needed time to think over the defection proposal. Ultimately
a meeting was scheduled for 5 February in a Vienna cafe.
9. Very heavy security precautions were taken in order to insure
the safety of Gray and Murphy. Vehicular and foot surveillances were
established outside and the meeting was covered by armed VOB personnel
inside the cafe. NALIVAIKO joined Gray and Murphy. Then the three
conversed for a few minutes. Ebrphy, known as Colonel Manning, showed
NALIVAIKO a letter written on United States water-marked, embossed
Goverument seal note paper which authorized "Manning" to bring NALIVAIKO
and his family to the United States under authority of Public Law 110.
The letter mentioned the Secretary of State and Department of Immigra-
tion ard was signed fictitiously "R. A. Farnsworth". The exact text
of the letter is not yet available at Headquarters. When Murphy reached
to retrieve the letter,- NALIVAIKO accosted Murphy ana publicly accused
him and Gray of trying to force him to commit high treason. At this
moment the Soviet Provost Marshal entered the cafe with four armed,
uniformed guards and assumed control. Other known KGB personnel also
appeared on the scene. Austrian Police, American Yll'ts, British/ets,
and the International Police arrived on the scene almost immediately
as a result of VCBts communications arrangement. Thus was prevented
a possible attempt to abduct Gray and Murphy. The two were duly ten
to the Allied Council building, identified (Gray under true name,
Murphy as Colonel Banning) and released into American custody.
10. The Soviets made an immediate protest to American Ambassador
Thompson. The basis for his formal reply has been coordinated with the
Department of State and states that the two Americas were acting in
good faith and in accordance with announced American policy of providing
asylum for those who seek it. The effort, therefore, is to show-that
NALIVAIKO was not-acting in good faith, as can be proved by evidence
of 1 whose surfacing statements can allude to NALIVAIKOls (b)(1)
true-'status in-k-ustria. and, 2) confessed Soviet agents awaiting trial (b)(3)
in Germany. The latter will reqpire the cooperation of Nest German
authorities who are now being asked to publicize the information
pertaining to NALIVAIKO.
U. Press releases in Austria and this country have given accounts
of the event in the Vienna cafe In varying degrees of detail. All
gave the names of "Robert Gray" and "Colonel Francis Manning". Cover
stories accounting for their presence in Vienna are currently being
worked out.
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= ^ Lsessment: The Soviets have in their possession two
rletters (which, in View of their contents, the Soviets
�mre not likely to publish); Gray's letter in German; Manning's
(Murphy) letter of authority; and the galley proof Wiener Kurier
article. Although the fact of possession is regrettable, it is not
considered likely that United States interests or those of the agency
can be seriously impaired, since attributability can be plausibly
denied.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
13. The results of this difficult operation are highly regrettable.
However, it was an effort as carefully and securely conducted as was
possible, and one which was properly in the interests of the agency.
Two overriding considerations remain; 1) the United States may well
be able to assume the propaganda initiative in this matter and, 2) the
physical safety of CIA personnel has been insured.
JOHN A. BROSS
Chief, Eastern European Division
02,4
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