STATUS OF DIOCCS AND PICC-POS AS OF 23 FEBRUARY 19968

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00133905
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 28, 1968

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mandatory Review
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M=RANDUH FOR: PHOENIX Committee
(See Distribution)
SUBJECT
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28 february. 1968
�^ Status cf DIOCCs and PICC-POs as of
23 February 1933
1. The following is an interim report of the current
situs and operational capabilities of established DICOCs
and PICC-POs subsequent to the Tet offensive. The data was
submitted in response to a series of questiOns posed by the
fADEAUX Staff. Complete reports have not been received
frAiii II and IV Corps. A supplementary report .will be sub-,
m4tted at a later. date.
2. Three of the Cors have given a brief assessment
as �to general effectiveness of DIOCCs during recent emer-
gency and recovery phase, and as to DIOCC potential when
ftore fully developed and practiced.
a. I Corps reported that prior to the Tet
oefedsive, DIOCCs contributed considerable intelligence re-
sarinq the possibility of attacks. Because of the Tet
liday, however, most DIOCCs were severely understaffed or
iotaily inoperative at the outset of the Tet offensive. In
addi-tion, the subsequent tactical situation in many areas
prevented the DIOCC staffs from returning immediately to
their pasts. At the present, DIOCCs are operational with
the exception of those in Thua Thien Province where iht.
'tactical/security situation limits or Precludes,:norroal
OPeraii0115.
Indications are that DIOCCs will be highly
valualge sources of intelligence once they become
deyeloped. Obstructions to effective operations continues
-W.-stem from DIOCC dependence upon US advisors, lack of GVN
davienentinFdirectives, and Vietnamese apathy during week-
ens, holidays and periods of extreme stress such as ikc
recent VC/NVA offensive.
� b. In III Corps the DICCCs were very effective
considering the fact that most DIOCC staffs and intelligence
collectors from all programs were on Tet leave.fit fitt)st �
cases the DIOCC was the only GT; office that reneci �peel
during Tet and through the crLsis.. III Corps cDlisiders the
CONFIDENTIAL
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DTOCC potentil as limitless. � However, the DICCC can be
no better than the intelligence collecting programs of the
Census Grievance, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Provin-
cial Reconnaissance Unit, Special Police, 5-2, etc., support-
ing the DICCC.
c. LV Corps reported that the Tet offenoive had
no appreciable effect on the R:10ENIX program. However,
the VC attacks have resulted in scattered personnel and
diversion of resources into other efforts, i.e., defense
and recovery, and will delay development and progress up
to six weeks. Generally, DICCCs were not involved in the
Tet offensive; however, logic indicates that the DICCC
-72,otential is good, when DICOCs are manned, acquiring in-
telligence, supported by GVN commanders, and are in all
other aspects operational.
3. As of this date complete reporting on the number
of VC: eliminated during the Tet offensive, has not been
receaved. However, reports which have been received are
encouraging. Following are some significant reports which
deserve particular note;
a. In Xhanh Hoa Province many of the Provincial
inter2orfation Center employees never left the PIC for from
six to eight days; practically all of their non-sleeping
time having been devoted to work. Particularly commendable
were the activities of the PIC Chief who controlled the
overall interrogation effort, ran the Collation Section,
processed reports for exploitation, and supervised the trans-
lation of all interrogations and documents into English.
The morale of the whole group was Very high. No less commend-
able were the actions of the exploitation forces, the 2pecial
Police (57), the Police Field Force (PFF), and the National
Police (NP). In spite of the heavy military. commitment in
and around Nha Trang, these forces Were quick to respond to
information given to them by the PIC. As a result, a total
of approximately 65 VCI were eliminated; 60 proven VC: are
currently in the PIC. "Many" sapper personnel have also been
arrested/captured and killed. The Nha Trang VC City Committee
(PRP) has been virtually eliminated. A member of the Dien
Khan VC District Committee. stated, during an interro7ation,
that the VC I organization in that district has been decimated
to the point that it is totally ineffective.
(-1
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b. In Pleiku Province, five senior VCI, .
including two Province Committee mealbers, are currently
being interrogated in the PLeiku plc:
c. In Kontum Province, an individual who
described himself as the VC Chief of Security for Kontum
City, rallied because he was hungry and because he'believed.
he was unable to escape from OVN forces. Initially, he
provided information on VC contacts in and around Kontum
City and an in-depth debriefing is expected to provide
current information on VCI identities at province and
district level. He stated he 'would have been the VC Chief
of Police for Kontum City had the VC offensive been success-
d.'..,,eliminary.re'oorting from II Corps reveals
that during the Tet � offensive a total of ap7;ro:-.:imately 150
VCI personalities have been eliminate. This figure is
substantiated by name and position.. In addition, �ap7)ro:,:imate-
ly 00 NVN sapper personnel have been killed or captured.
e. In IV Corps, Hoa Tan District, Go ConT
.Province, discovery of a VC commo-liaison route by CG cadre
-proved quite lucrative. Their diligence culminated in a_
successful ambush during the night of 9 February resulting
in the elimination (killed) of two provincial level VC
officials; on was the VC Go Cong Province Chief and the
'other. a VC provincial military affairs cadre..
4. Regarding significant damage to DIOCCs which
cannot be repaired through local resources or within avail-
able PHOENIX Memo No. 6 funds:
a. I Corps reported no, damage to DIOCCs.
b. II Corps reported that the Darlac Province
PICC-P0 was destroyed but a tem,00rary PICC-PO has been
re-established, however, no infrastructure information is
being processed. In Tuyen Duc Province renovation had
begun on a building for the PECC-PO. 7e.OLdtding' Was
damaged and repairs thereto are now deewled uneconomical..
No damage to DIOCCs was reported.
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fi,
d. III Corps reported that all DIOCCs except Phu_Noa
DIOQC in Binh Duong Province, are operational. . The Cu Chi '
and Due Hue DIOCCs in Hau Nghia Province, and the Phu Hoa
DICCC in Binh Duong Province, have been destroyed.. however,
these DIOCCs can be reconstructed through local resources.
5. The only reported .lost or damaqed,equipmeAt vias the
loss of 7 DIOCC typewriters which were looted fram the RDC
house in Vinh Long Province, IV -Corps.
6. Ehile it is too early to assess the total impact
against the VCI during and after the TET offensive, it-
nevertheless has produced some interesting fringe benefits.
In Quang Tri Province, past efforts to induce the Special
Police to work with 'other GVN agencies have been successful
only on a one time basis. As a result of the offensive,
Special Police are now seeking out representatives of AVN
S-2, Military Security Service, and Census Grievance to
compare information. A number of combined "in-city�
operations have been initiated, and in ,most cases without
tne u:-ging of U.S. advisors.
.7. In summary, the VC TET offensive created less havoc
than could be expected to the established PHOENIX or5ani-
zation and facilities. This was probably because the TET
offensive was directed at populated areas rather than
districts, villages and hamlets. However, there is reason
to believe that a fully operational system of DIOCCs,
developing both tactical and infrastructure intelligence
would enhance the odds in favor of improved intelligence
collection and early detection of the indicators, of iftpendins
VC actions. Improved facilities for collation of this
intelligence information at province level would serve
further to improve our overall early warning capabilities.
4"42
EVAN PA , JL.
Director, PHOENIXUCEX) Staff
Distribution:
Deputy to C=SMACV for CORDS
Assistant Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS
Special Assistant to the Ambassador.
ACofS, .32 -
ACofS, a
CiPSDh CORDS
c/xac Diu, .cogas
PHOENIX Stafr
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