THE MONSTER PLOT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00096372
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2022
• Case Number: F-2021-01586
• Publication Date: June 5, 1962

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THE MONSTER PLOT
Introduction 1
Chapter I Organizational Background: CIA's
Handling of Soviet Positive.Intelli-
gence and CI Matters 3
Chapter II Biographical Data: 1927-1962 7
Chapter III Chronicle: 1962-1969 12
A. Initial Contacts 12
B. Bona Fides 13
C. The Case Against Nosenko 16
D. Defection 18
E. The Problem of Disposition 27
F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath ^ 28
G. The Decision to Incarcerate 31
H. First Polygraph Examination 32
I. Incarceration and Interrogati6n 36
J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory . � 41
X. Life in a Vault 43
L. Inter-Agency Disagreement 65
M. Voices of Dissent 67
N. Helms Takes Control 73
SitRI'
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Chapter IV
0. Resolution of the Case
Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary
Evaluation
76
81
A. Information on KGB Personnel . �
B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against
a,
81
US Citizens
82
C. Moscow Microphones
84
D.
84
E. Leads to Foreign Nationals
85
F. Summary Evaluation
85
Chapter V
The Analytical Foundations of the
"Monster Plot"
86
A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation .
�
86
B. Faulty Record of Conversations
With Nosenko
90
C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding
Nosenko's Life Story
93
D. Errors or Omissions in Available
CIA Headquarters Records
100
E. CIA Assumptions about the Second
Chief Directorate
101
F. The A Priori Assumption of
Disinformation as Applied to
the Popov and Related Cases
106
Chapter VI
Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept
and Applicatlon in the Nosenko Case .
.
113
Chapter VII
Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison of
Their Handling By CIA
123
SET
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Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko
Case
136
Psychological and Medical Findings
� . .
142
A. The Role of the Psychologist .
. . .
142
B. The Role of the psychiatrist � .
. . .
149
C. Conclusions
157
Chapter X Impact of the "Monster Plot" on CIA's
Positive Intelligence and Cl Missions . . 159
A.
159
B. Effect on Other Potential Opera-
tions 173
C. How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself . 175
Chapter XI Methodology and Leadership
D.
n�flu:nce of Clue
What Went Wrong?
� �
E. Summary
S.
177
177
178
178
179
_381
Chapter XII Conclusions and Recommendations 182
A. The Letter of Instructions 182
184
B.
Recommended Action
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4r.
Introduction
On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official
temporarily assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign
Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to
Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of
events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet
operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since
its establishment. Because the case still has important
implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of
the United States, and because it raises many basic questions
about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors,
a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency
in June 1976. The results are embodied in this report and
its annexes.
Although United States officials of many agencies, up
to and including a president of the United States, were briefed
on the case and either played some role in making decisions
concerning it or actively participated in running the opera-
tion, it does not now appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any
single individual has ever been fully informed as to all its
aspects. The complexity of this investigation therefore
stems in large measure from the fact that the case has pro-
ceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented
tracks. Thus, the effort to get a total picture of what
transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the
files of various components of the Agency, plus personal in-
terviews with a large number of present and former Agency
employees.
The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the
result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a
corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most,
decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the
basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes con-
flicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other
senior colleagues. Thus, this report must, if it is to be
comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process
in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the
individual participants.
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The quintessential quality of a report such as this
is that it be objective. We have not, on the other hand,
refrained from expressing our opinions. Even to have tried
to do .so would have been futile for two rather obvious
reasons. First, into the reconstruction of events of the
complexity herein described there always enters a degree
of selectivity and judgment, in this sense, "opinion" pro-
vides the essential matrix of Our product. Secondly, we
have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism.
stye
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CHAPTER I
Organizational Background: CIA's Handling
Of Soviet Positive Intelligence and Cl Matters
The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended
within the framework of the organization and day-to-day func-
tioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. /n
fact, opinions regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may
differ substantially according to individual's differing
views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning.
This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make
explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually func-
tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from
hot.. it might theoretically have functioned according to
Agency organizational charts and regulations.
The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day
operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division
(known successively by this an names* and
t e Co rintelli ence
*This area component during the period of this report was
known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc
Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter-
changeably.
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Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited
Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn,
it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a
complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi.
He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which
to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the
Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the
ideologue's ideologue.
Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had
been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet penetra-
tions of Western governments. There is no need to go into
detail on them, since they have been well documented else-
where, but they included Brit h sentatives such as
im P *lb a Blake
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In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB
success in penetrating Western governments made it the more
feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services.
Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the-
Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place
such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy
Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.
Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details
regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered exten-
sively in a recent study. However, two points are worth
noting:
2. Secondly, Golitsy sented us right from
the beginning, continually elaborated throughout
the years, a complicated rationale for believing
that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth
program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the
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United States States and its Western allies. This ratio-
nale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of
this report.
It is against this background that we view the approach
to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so,
we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to
the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--elaborated
by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot." In fairness,
it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not
by the thesis' proponents but rather by its detractors; yet
no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers
envisaged as a major threat to United States' security. If
the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter .
were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy, and
this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot"
In the lexicon of this study.
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CHAPTER 11
Biographical Data: 1927-1962
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in
Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko
and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in
1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death,
the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, and recipient of a number of the highest
Soviet awards and medals. He received a state funeral, and
he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young
Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at
the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.
From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev.
In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in
Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer
at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nosenko continued his
schooling in Leningrad until late 1938, at which time he
and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where
he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Ship-
building Industry.
In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and
his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals.
Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the
front, but they were caught and returned home. At age 14
Nosenko entered a Special Naval School that, in August
1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was
forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia.
Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the in-
fluence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval
Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to be confused with
the Frunze Higher Naval School, ars-5 in Leningrad), which
by this time had been relocated to Baku.
Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two
separate occasions to get to the front, but failed. He
and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow with-
out authorization. These escapades seem to form part of a
behavior pattern that was eventually to culminate in defec-
tion.
By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the
Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its
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original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were
sent to a forest (some two hundred kilometers from Leningrad)
on awood-cutting detail. In about November of that year he
wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized.
He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory
School and again, through his father's intervention in about
January 1943, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in
Leningrad.
At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow.
He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of
the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and
the completion of, the tenth class.
At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his
father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers.
For purposes of that trip, Nosenko received temporary rank
as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and
uniform.
Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations
in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year
at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a
military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC,
Nosenko received the rank of junior lieutenant in the
"administrative service" (sic). (The exact meaning of this
term is unclear.)
In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his
parents' wishes, a student whom he had gotten pregnant. He
obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage.
In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lieutenant
General (Major General, US-style) Telegin. s marria
too was neither successful no
Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute
of International Relations, but he actually received his
diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the
examination in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra year in
order to retake this examination.
In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned
language translator in naval in
serving first in the Far East.
as an English
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he
no return to t e ar ut was sent instea to the
Baltic area.
While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied
his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a
certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko
indicated interest in changing jobs, the general made a vague
offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State
Security (MGB). In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko
was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned
from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD
(Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov
personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the
deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal coun-
terintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he
was hired.
His first MGB assignment was in the First (American
embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the
SCD.
In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy
Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top
leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954,
the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was formed.
In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmi1a
Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow
State University.
Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was
elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and
served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954.
skET
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In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor �
kharakteristika (performance evaluation), which described
him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. None-
theless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.
At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his
Komsomol membership and not achieved CP-member status. It
was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate mem-
ber of the CP, and o d as a
In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of
captain. He held this rank until his defection in February
1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and
the fact that he had held several positions that were
usually filled by officers of higher military rank.
Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until
January 1960, when he was transferred back to the First
Section (American embassy) of the First Department. Then
hc held the position of a deputy chief of the First Section.
He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of
late December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he
vas appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department. He
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continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date
he left Moscow on TDY to Geneva.
Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving
behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters.
His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to
England in 1957 and 1958, a TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the
first TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He
also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his de-
fection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter
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CHAPTER III
Chronicle: 1962-1969
A. Initial Contacts
When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June
1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the
KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be security officer of
the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference
being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Taking
advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the
delegation whereas its members could not watch him,
Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the
Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.
As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a
Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official
funds that he had on his person at the time, inability
to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US.
$250 at the time) -would jeopardize his career. In ex-
change for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed
that he provide us with two items of information.
These items, subsequently verified, related to:
1. KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant
while he was serving in the American embassy
in Moscow as a "code machine repairman."
2. A Soviet official whom the Agency
had ostensibly recruited but who was being
run against us under KGB control.
At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response
to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to
quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent,
and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representa-
tives inside the USSR. Nevertheless, he "agreed 'perhaps'
meet us when abroad" again at a later date.. For our part,
our interest in him was whetted by his identification of
his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR.
In addition, such information as he gave about himself
indicated that he would be of high operational interest.
Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as
head of a KGB sub-section working against American
tourists.
s#T
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B. Bona Fides
By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native
Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a
cable to Headquarters that read in part:
SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PRO-
VIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY,
SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING
MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND
AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.
With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved,
the principal case officer flew to Washington carrying
the tapes of the meeting. His arrival and sojourn at
Headquarters were described by Chief, Cl on 23 July 1976
as follows:
Chief, CI: . . . we got the first message . . . on
Nosenko from Geneva, and (the principal .
case officer] was ordered back, and we
had a big meeting here on Saturday morning,
and (the principal case officer) thought
he had the biggest fish of his life. I
mean he really did . . . and everything I
heard from him was in direct contrast from
what we heard from Golitsyn. I mean, we
had no agents, this, that and . . . yet
here was a Second Chief Directorate man
in Geneva peace talks on disarmament.
So I got hold of (the principal case of-
ficer), and I brought him in here on a
weekend.
Q
What you're saying is that it was unreason-
able for a Second Chief Directorate man to
be there . . .
Chief, CI: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and
needing $300 to . . . "not to be recruited
but to give us three full, big secrets"
for an exchange for the money in order
that he could replenish the account from
which he embezzled the money on a drunk.
So I brought [the principal case officer]
in here one evening, I think it was Friday,
Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about
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10 to 15 volumes of Golitsyn's interroga-
tion, without prejudicing him in any way,
just to read it, and he had all the
books out, and at the end of it all he
said that there was no question about it,
that they were being had. I mean, mind
you, he was of split motivation because
this was the big case of his entire life
and yet there he was reading material,
etc. So we went to Dick {Helms, then
DDPJ and we put up a proposition that we
should permit Golitsyn to read the real
material, I mean the transcripts and
everything from Nosenko. And he wouldn't
agree to that, but we made a compromise
and that was to take the material and
falsify it as though it was an anonymous
letter sent to the embassy by an alleged
KGB person. So the anonymous letter was
drawn up, and [the principal case officer]
interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous �
letter, and Golitsyn's statement was that
"this. is a person under control, I want
to see the letter" which created a situa-
tion because we didn't have a letter.
But he began to point out in some detail
exactly what was instigating and inspiring--
in terms of what he'd already given to us
and he very wisely stated that he wanted
everything on tape, because he knew that
as time passed in hundreds of interviews
and their counteraction took place, there
would be people accusing him of not having
divulged certain information.
The principal case officer's review of the Golitsyn
information had indeed converted him to the view that
Nosenko's defection was bogus. Equally convinced, as
clearly indicated by a number of documents that he
drafted, was his superior, the person who had become
Chief, SR Division in December 1963. The reasons for
Chief, SR's conviction may not have been the same as
the principal case officer's, but for all practical pur-
poses the views of the two men at the time were identical.
A joint Cl Staff-SR Division recommendation was
therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans,
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that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be
made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed,
with the single reservation that Nosenko not be identi-
fied'by name as the source. As a result, a number of
,items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a
letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source;
in this form, it was assumed, the information cou d be
shown to Golits n without disclosin� the
In carrying out the plan, the principal case offi-
cer made his own views clear to Golitsyn:
I told [Golitsyn3 that . . . I thought it quite
possible, in view of his own statements about
disinformation, that this was the beginning of
a disinformation operation possibly relating to
[his] defection.
Golitsyn felt, in general and without having
the full details necessary to an assessment,
that there were indeed serious signs of disin-
formation in this affair. He felt such a dis-
information operation, to discredit him, was a
likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB of-
ficer could be permitted to tell everything he
knew, now, if he worked in the same general
field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far
this source had not done anything to discredit
Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB
is greatly upset about Golitsyn's defection,
and asked what he thought the purposes of such
a disinformation operation now might be,
Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely
one, "to arrange an exchange for me." Also,
to divert our attention from investigations
of his leads by throwing up false scents, and
to protect their remaining sources. He also
added, "There could be other aims as well. The
matter should be looked into. It seems serious
to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first
series of direct meetings with the KGB officer,
to build up our confidence, and then in the
next session do whatever the operation's purpose
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might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass
serious disinformation items, etc.).
C. The Case Against Nosenko
During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division
continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually
any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by
him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation."
If his information was in accord with that from other
sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of
Nosenko but was interpreted as casting doubt on the
other sources as well.
information, the usefulnes
was discounted; onc
was concluded that
him in order
ment ran that
fled sooner o
While the above aspect will be covered at length
in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight
the attitude that prevailed. Nosenko had, during our
meetings with him in 1962, contributed information that
ma� and
�
la ow
had previously provided similar, but less specific,
Nosenko's intelligence
ad been identified, it
been allowed to expose
his own bona fides. The argu(
ould in any case have been idenfi-
n the basis of Golitsyn's leads.
In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva ac-
companying another Soviet delegation. By now, the case
against him had been well established in the minds of
those dealing with the matter, and the record is there-
fore replete with manifestations of suspicion. A particu7-
lar example of our tendency to interpret unfavorably al-
most anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that
Chief, SR forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with
the suggestion that they "convey, very well the flavor
of the man . . . and the complexities of the operation."
By way of backgrou gh Nosenko's cryptonym at
this junctu he had previously been
designated it of history led to the
following in ring a safehouse meeting:
I cannot
����,-1,
attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark
ade on 24 January. As I went
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behind a bar whic tnnds in the-ap
to serve drinks t
saw me standing t the ba
face li a smile
seemed to think it was
am rai. . "eans that he knows his own CIA
cryptonym.
The above incident exemplifies a main theme that CIA
was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before
Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the lat-
ter's allegations that information concerning him was
leaking to the KGB, and the conclusion that the leaks
must have originated within the Agency.
Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27
January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began
as follows:
Our goal in this case must be eventually to
break Subject and learn from him the details
of his mission and its relation to possible
penetrations of US intelligence and security
agencies and those of allied nations as well
as to broader disinformation operations in
the political sphere. Ideally, our interests
would be best served if Subject were broken
as early as possible but since this is
unlikely, our actions must be conceived and
carried out in a manner which contributes to
our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly
at any stage.
Far from "alerting Subject unduly," on the surface
the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and
generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January
1964 meeting make the point clearly:
Nosenko: . . . the only thing I wanted to know and
I asked this question, "What should I ex-
pect in the future?"
Principal case officer:
The following awaits: As I presented it,
you wanted to come to the United States and
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. .41146,
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have some job, some chance of a future
life, which gives you security and if
possible the opportunity to work in this
field which you know. Is that correct?
Nosenko: Absolutely.
Principal case officer:
D. Defection
As might be expected, the principal case officer
devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva
visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko,
however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remain-
ing in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union,
and he became increasingly anxious to defect immediately.
When the principal case officer continued to press him
to remain in Geneva long enough to effect an audio pene-
tration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the
issue. At a meeting on 4'Pebruary, he announced that a
cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back
home for a "tourism conference." Though this claim was
subsequently to be the source of almost endless contro-
versy, it was accepted at the time without apparent
question. Preparations therefore immediately began for
evacuation to the United States.
A layover in another country en route to the United
States lasted about a fortnight. It was used for further
St
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debriefing and assessment, but, while useful from the
operational handlers' standpoint, the delay raised
problems as their charge became impatient:
CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW
DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY
-NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO
HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND
PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID
ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS
MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ
NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS
REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS
VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS
NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND
INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST
MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING
POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE
TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE
OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY
WHAT HE EXPECTS. REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEAD-
QUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ.
AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:
principal and te:
Both . . . were unanimous in their view that
Subject was not a genuine defector. His
contact with us in Geneva and subsequent
defection were, according to these officers,
clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB.
I was particularly interested in [one officer's]
.statement that he had s ected Subeect from
the very.first meetin
SET
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This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included
dinner with Subject and the case officers.
Conversation during this first meeting was
general in nature and followed no special
agenda. _However, it did give me an oppor-
tunity to take Subject's measure. I started
by telling Subject that I had come to form my
own impressions of him as .a person and an
intelligence officer who desired to place his
knowledge and experience at the disposal of
the United States government. I added that
I wished to determine for myself why Subject
had come to the West, a most serious step
which neither we nor Subject should under-
estimate in terms of its lasting effect on
Subject's own life and those of his family
left behind. Subject rose to this opening by
first assuring me in a most fawning manner
that he, as an intelligence officer, fully
understood the need for a senior officer to
make his own judgments on the spot. He then
went on to explain his motivation for first
contacting us, his reasons for defecting and
his intense desire to collaborate with us in
Soviet operations since he has no specialty
other than intelligence. These remarks were
repetitious of his original statements
delivered in the same mechanical fashion, the
major difference being that Subject was intensely
nervous at the outset, calming down only after
it appeared that I was accepting his statements
at face value.
By the end of the evening I had come to the
same conclusions reached by [the principal
handlers]. The totality of our conclusions
are treated in detail in a separate memorandum.
However, in reaching them, I wax beset by a
sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious con-
viction they could pull off an operation like
this successfully and by a feeling of distaste
for the obvious and transparent manner in which
Subject played his role.
istaste was sufficient to overcome any
St e m otherwise have had in a recruitment
opportunity suggested by Nosenko:
*IT
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One other subject touch
ecruitment o
directly
sion tha
plan and
half-heartedly we tried.
. . ject
p a y who liked liquor
be easily blackmailed
f hurt ,g his career
I objectec(
it could �
cause a tremendous political flap if it back-
fired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position
to assure us that it would not have to be "crude
blackmail" in which we would have to get
I certainly got the impres-
ecruitment is part of the
ould succeed no matter how
Despite his misgivings, however remaine(
convinced that the Agency must conti to al semble:
It will be necessary to maintain an effective
degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge
of Subject's true status and our plans to try
to secure from him a full confession. If
Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our
intentions, we will probably be forced to act
prematurely.
With these considerations in mind, he therefore re-
newed the commitments previously made by the principal
case officer:
I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he
was genuine. Based on this and assuming his
continuing "cooperation," I said we would pro-
ceed to make arrangements to bring him to the
States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to
pay him . . . [financial details follow].
On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments,
Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a
safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of
Security. Now that he was in the United States, the
Agency (and the US government as a whole) found them-
selves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial
than the problems facing them while he remained abroad.
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The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and the possible
solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and
7 of a memorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by
Helms on 17 February 1964:
While admitting that Subject is here on a KCB
directed mission, it has been generally agreed
by both us and the FBI that he still possesses
valid information which we would like to obtain.
At the same time, we, at least, 'believe that
Subject must be broken at some point if we are
to learn something of the full scope of the
KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and
the role played by others in it. In addition,
we must have this information if we are to
decide what countermeasures we should take in
terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in
our security practices, and planning for future
operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly,
our desire to continue debriefing to obtain
additional information may conflict with the
need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem
is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject,
or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our aware-
ness of this operation and how long will it
take us to assemble the kind of brief we will
need to initiate a hostile interrogation in
conditions of maximum control?
If we are to proceed along the lines indicated
above we should accept in advance the premise
that we will not be able to prevent Subject
from evading our custody or communicating with
the Soviets unless we place him under such
physical restraint that it will become immedi-
ately apparent to him that we suspect him.
This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is
not, we should so determine right away and
decide on a completely different course of
action. If this is to be the case, we should .
agree to forego additional debriefings, place
Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the
Washington area under full-time guard and com-
mence hostile debriefing on the basis of the
material we already have (although the prospects
for success would not be great). Disposal would
probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press
�������1.
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release to the effect that Subject had con-
fessed to being a plant and had been allowed to
return to Soviet control. [In the meantime,
.SR Division would:]
--Advise Subject that during this phase he will
continue to live and work in the safehouse
and will be escorted at all times when on
shopping trips, visits to movies, etc.,
because of his faulty English and unfamil-
iarity with the country, customs, etc.
While we can explain this regime as needed
for his security, we cannot keep him locked
up in the house 24 hours a day.
--Make available to Subject a portion of the
[money] promised him which be can use for
purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal
effects, etc.
--Agree that whenever this first phase is over
(four to six weeks) that he be permitted to
take a two-week vacation with escort.
The vacation period will be of greater benefit to
us since it will provide us with an opportunity
to review and make judgments on the value of the
information already obtained and also to con-
sider the progress made in the other aspects of
the case outlined below. During the vacation we
can decide whether we should proceed to the
second phase or are ready to commence hostile
interrogation under controlled conditions. If
it is the former, we will have to reckon with
the need to modify the living and working
arrangements for Subject in a way which will
itabl five him some additional freedom.
ore, it
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will be terribly important to make the proper
decision at the end of phase one.
This decision will depend not only on our
evaluation of the material obtained during
the debriefings but on how far we have been
able to go in clarifying other cases which
are related to Subject case and .form an impor-
tant part of any explanation of the KGB's goals
in this operation.
Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi-
valence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed
in circumstances that his principal day-to-day handler
describes as "our typical, luxurious style . . . " He
continues by saying that "there was all the food and drink
one could possibly want . . . I remember all of the effort
and the money we spent to get a billiard table . . . If
On the other hand, this handler, who was assigned to this
case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told
at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been
sent by the KGB . . . "
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A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler
reported more favorable impressions, those of the Office
of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the
safehouse:
Subject is not at all concerned about his own
security or the threat of assassination or
kidnapping. He seems to think the present
security system is fine . . . [This was in
marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.}
Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never
"under the influence" . . .
Subject is not a heavy smoker . .
At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table
with the guards and acts as if he is one of
the boys. He does not sit at the head of the
table but to the side. He always offers the
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-26-
boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and
kids them . . .
He does not play cards, has shown no interest
in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He
does not gamble and doesn't seem to have any
hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy.
He has shown a desire to play pool . . .
Subject does not say anything for or against the
USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing
the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented
on how good the Soviets were and how poor a
showing the Americans made. The same could not
be said for . . . [Golitsyn] . . On the con-
trary Subject wants to be an American as soon
as possible.
xual desires a ear to be normal .
Subject has not commented one way or another,
for or against, any person associated with him,
including the housekeepers. Compared with other
cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid,
doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have
a mental problem, and wants to become an
American and work like and with Americans as
soon as possible.
Subject became angry only once and even then it
was not a loss of temper in the true sense.
The day that [the principal case officer] dis-
cussed the schedule with him, Subject became
moody and started to drink alone. He told the
guards that he wants to use his brains and work
hard as Americans do. He feels that the present
schedule does not utilize his talent to the
fullest.
The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to
Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the
principal case officer had assured him that "both [Chief,
SR] and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about
salt
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future cooperation with him in operations against the
USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to
systematic debriefing with the statement that this
"might represent an attempt to extract all his informa-
tion from him, after which he would not be needed."
He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date
in order to help him forget and get over the strain
and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly
the strain of leaving his family behind."
E. The Problem of Disposition
Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation"
with Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility
of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall
effort to break him" came to naught. In addition, an
alternative plan was being developed for the incarcera-
tion of Nosenko, so that "there can be no question of
[his] escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude."
Finally, it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile
recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible
"anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought
into the operation to back up our interrogation. Helms
originally had some misgivings about this procedure but
appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn
"full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to
Nosenko himself.
The FBI viewed Nosenko much more favorably than
did CIA. As early as 8 February 1964, Chief, Cl had
sent a cable reading in part:
. [FBI liaison officer) STATED . . . THAT
IS EXPERT IN FBI QUICKLY
SCANNE PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED
US THA 1P VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASm
KNOWN TO THEM.
Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Chief, SR
stated that "the FBI personnel on the case have so far
indicated they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB
defector." By implication, both Chief, SR and Chief, CI
regarded this divergence of view as a serious problem.
Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent
paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans
for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April
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1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were
forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations,
to treat Nosenko as a bona fide defector:
a. Subject to be moved to a high
security safehouse under maximum guard.
b. The DCI to inform the President,
Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and
USIB principals that Subject is a KGB
plant whom we intend to return to Soviet
control after (1) trying to break him,
and (2) publicizing his case.
c. Retain Subject incommunicado for
about three weeks during which time we will
continue efforts to break him.
d. At the same time, commence the
publicity campaign which will precede
Subject's deportation. As a first step,
there will be a brief official announcement
probably by a State Department spokesman
to the effect that Subject has confessed
to having faked his defection at KGB
direction in order (1) to penetrate US
intelligence and security agencies, and (2)
to discredit the act of defection by Soviet
citizens. At the same time, a press back-
grounder will be made available which will
characterize this KGB operation as an act of
desperation following a decade of defection
and disloyalty to the regime on the part of
a score of senior Soviet intelligence of-
ficers . . .
F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath
While planning was going on for his confinement
and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a
for two .weeks' relaxation be inn
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The handler who spent the first part of the
vacation with Nosenko recorded these impressions:
Despite our oral arguments and the various
incidents we experienced, Subject and I�
parted on the best of terms. He gave me an
affectionate embrace on the night of my
departure, and in front of [the principal
case officer] thanked me for my attention
to his needs and patience in dealing with
him. We agreed to see each other upon his
return to Washington.
During the last half of the vacation, the principal
case officer arrived and took charge of the escort team.
Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had
been previously, but the principal case officer had no
success in elicitin
eriod.
On 30 March 1964, Chief, SR wrote a memorandum to
Helms entitled "Final Phase Planning," which Helms
initialed and returned without written comment. Inter
alia, Chief, SR had this to say:
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L. Inter-Agency Disagreement
Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation
of SB .; � II
escra e y i.e
II
S
fIt] will reflect all o state-
ments concerning his pe ona i _, alleged
KGB career and other matters as well as sub-
sequent contradictions or denials of earlier
statements plus the results of our investiga-
ions at home and abroad of these statemen
15 ac ua par 1
w �e analysis and conclusions.
The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on
these points:
a. s a dispatched
KGB age whose ntact with us atter
ultimate defection were carried out
at KGB direction.
lc
\
i
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b. aim to service
in the G was an tegral and vital
part of his KGB agent mission, forming
as it did the basis for all that he has
had to say about KGB operations and
personnel. Yet, of our
interrogations o4 upported
by polygraph exa onstrate
conclusively that juid not
and could not have any of 1.4.0
specific staff positions he has described.
c. Whatever the ultimate goals
of this KGB operation might be, it has
been possible to determine that among
the most s' KGB aims i
directin to
Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated
by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as
between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The
intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on
the validity of Golitsyn information. Whereas SB Division
insisted that Nosenko, durin* his KGB career, had never
"served in any of the specific staff positions he has
described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported
Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service. After a con-
ference with Chief, CI, the Chief, SR summed up the
problem on 29 March:
Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could
submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it con-
tained suggestions that Golitsyn had lied to us
about certain aspects of Nosenko's past. He
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recalled that
ie CI went on to say that if we su mitted
to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we
now have it, it would most certainly cause us
difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever
impact our report would be able to makc on the
overall question of Nosenko's bona fidcs . . .
The disagreements between the Agency and the FBI were
never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within
the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the Cl Staff.
Within house, Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered
over their differences sufficiently to publish a second,
compromise report on the Nosenko case in February 1968.
But by then the case had been taken out of their hands,
and the report was a dead letter even before it went to
press.
M. Voices of Dissent
Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division
remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding
Nosenko as a KGB-di!..patched agent, there was some dissent
at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were
not well received by the leadership, however, and thus
had no effect on the handling of the case. A former
member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometimes possible
to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific
points in preparing the written case against Nosenko
(which was eventually to become the so-called "thousand-
page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis
was tolerated.
The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from
outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one. A
senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to
interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series
of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a result of
his questioning, he became convinced that at the very
least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather
ofc
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-68-
bland assertion, however, was met by Chief, SR with
the statement, "there are things in this case that
you do not know about." Nonetheless, in summing up
the sessions, the psychologist had this to say:
The psychologist claims now trrrhe had more doubts
about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he
felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from a
memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives
'his memory of the situation facing him:
In discussing his lengthy series of inter-
views with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, [the
psychologist] said that he was �very hesitant
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to express the full extent of his doubts
about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-
dispatched agent. The reason for his hesi-
tation was that, when [Chief, SR] got a hint
of [the psychologist's) doubts about the
theory, [Chief, SR) told [the psychologist)
that such doubts might make [the psychologist]
suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/
Nosenko plan.
There is no evidence in the files to indicate that
the psychologist's doubts were accorded any impartial
consideration. Chief, SR, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum
to Helms (who was by then ITC', but still riding herd
on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding
in terms of producing new information or insights . . .
It was obvious that Subject had given some thought . .
to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher
spots in his story."
By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division
who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to
risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a
31-page memorandum to Chief, SR commenting on a "sterile"
version of SR/Cl's "notebook" documenting the case against
Nosenko. It began:
Introduction
At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko
notebook and I hope you will honor my right to
dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a
bona fide defector far more convincing than the
evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as
a KGB agent.
It is because I am concerned about the serious
ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to
set forth my dissenting views in considerable
detail. If the present verdict of "guilty" is
right I believe there must be satisfactory
answers to the questions raised herein; if it is
wrong--as I believe it is--it should be
rectified as soon as possible.
Intelligence Production
There are several references in the Nosenko note-
book to the extent and quality of the intelligence
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he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to
DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of
his positive intelligence with that of other
Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom
we have had an operational relationship shows
that all of them were consistently better able
to provide useful positive intelligence than
has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo
states "His positive intelligence production
is practically nil," and later: "Viewed
overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelli-
gence production has been so meager for a man
of his background, training and position as to
case doubts on his bona fides, without'refer-
ence to other criteria." All of these state-
ments are incorrect.
The three persons in the Clandestine Services
with the background and experience to make such
a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and
access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB
officer has been able to provide more useful
intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has
shown that intelligence usefulness of KCB
officers in general is "practically nil."
Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper con-
text, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence produc-
tion cannot be used in his defense, but neither
can it be said honestly to cast any doubt what-
soever on his bona fides. In the realm of sub-
stance, judgment regarding his bona fides must
therefore be made on the basis of his counter-
intelligence information.
Counterintelligence Production
The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona
fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others
Tild-37'ate, must be based on his production--how
much did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that
the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet
intelligence effort more than all other KGB
defectors combined.
Chief, SR later wrote:
I have read this document and am of mixed minds.
First, it shows clearly that the so-called
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"sterile" book in the hands of a person with
none of the other background on other cases
or appreciation of the penetration problems
affecting us and the FBI can be a very
damaging document. I question seriously
whether we should make it available to
others in its present form. Second, the
book's weaknesses are principally its
language and the fact that it Was made up
of memos from various periods and as our
evaluation matured, or we developed additional
information, the tone of the subsequent memos
changed but the reader can suggest our approach
has been superficial or inconsistent. Third,
we cannot make the book available unless we
are prepared to deal with the totality or
near totality of the picture. Fourth, if a
bock is to be used at all in briefing individ-
uals, it should be re-written and questions of
the kind posed by this . . . paper trrated [sic]
no matter how irritating we find them to be.
If one person has this view, others might at
some point . . .
In replying to Chief, SR, another SR officer also
attempted to take a balanced view:
The paper suffers from many faults. These
include bias, intellectual arrogance, and
lack of Cl background. Needless to say, the
conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found
it to be a useful paper, and I think that we
would be wise to treat it seriously, because
it does highlight some problems which we have
all 'been aware of for some time.
uninformed judgments and intemperate
comments contained in [this) paper. I urge
that we all strive to overcome the temptation
to reply �n kind.
comin s
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When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to
Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following com-
ments:
Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by
phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble
with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore
going to turn it over to the DDCI, who he hoped could
get to the bottom of it for him. Helms also asked the
author if he would agree to Helms' passing his paper to
an Agency psychologist. A few days later, Helms again
called the author by phone and asked if he would agree
to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and the
Director of Security.
/kET
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N. Helms Takes Control
With the third anniversary of Nosenko%s confinement
drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight.
The FBI continued to take what Chief, SB described as a
"neutral position" in regard to Nosenko.
The conflicting views of the various interested
parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of
this study to require a detailed coverage. What is
relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms'
impatience with continued delay. He therefore initiated
a number of measures that gradually took handling of the
entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division.
The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to
undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case.
When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21
September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his involvement
as follows:,
DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms
(saying] that there was a matter that worried
him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he
doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst
the people in the Agency who handled it so far
to arrive at any kind of a really objective
solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive
indeed, would I please look into it and let him
know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me
about Nosenko, the defector, who was at that
time incarcerated . . And he mentioned that
there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to
whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether
he. had been sent on a mission, and that in any
case he, Helms, felt that it was wrong to keep
him confined and we had to do something with him
one way or the other.
Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?
DDCI: Yes, he Was really distressed about the fact that
this fellow had been in confinement so long and
that they had never been able to arrive at a con-
clusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether
he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved
and something had to be done to get this fellow
in a . . . oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,
SXR5
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but in a more acceptable position. So, I
said, yes, I would undertake this job and I
sent for all the background papers on it and
studied them first. Then I interviewed [Chief,
Cl and Chief, SB] and arrived at the conclu-
sion . . . I think I talked to some other
people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also,
but I arrived at the conclusion that people
had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion
as to one side or the other of the case, that
it was just damned near impossible to get any
worthwhile information out of interviews. And
I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I
indicated that I had, after reviewing the . . .
making a preliminary review of the case, that
I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a
plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was
planted for. Nor could I get out of anybody
else what he was supposed . . . what his mission
was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis . .
. . . My second memorandum to Helms was to the
effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe
that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the
Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and
I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with
the idea of rehabilitating him. And [the Director
of Security] then had him moved . . .
Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms'
reactions to your recommendations?
DDCI: He seemed rather pleased with the information.
I got the impression from discussing the case
with him that he never had been able to get what
he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from
anybody; and I got the impression that he felt
at last he had a fair appraisal of it.
On 26 May 1967, the DDCI called the Director of
Security to his office, and the Director of Security re-
corded the meeting as follows:
[The DDCI) started by asking me whether or not
I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing
the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and ex-
ploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not
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read it personally but that [a member] of my
Security Research Staff was now in the process
of reviewing it and commenting on selected por-
tions of it. He then asked if I agreed with
its conclusions. I told him that I did not;
that it had been the consistent position of
this Office that while we did not, under any
circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were
not convinced that he was a provocation dis-
patched by the KGB with a specific mission.
Rather, our position has always been that there
is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story
but we do not know enough in order to make a
final decision.
I went on to point out to the [DDCI] that I
had thought, and had so recommended on numerous
occasions in the past, that it would make a lot
of sense for [a member) of my Office to take
over the interrogation of [Nosenko) in order
to resolve sev al di cr a 2
concerned us.
[The DDCI] said that he thought this was an
excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had
everything to gain and nothing to lose through
such a course of action and that he would so
recommend to the Director. I pointed out to
him that one of the things that had always con-
cerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had
never released any verbatim transcripts covering
their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that
we could make our judgment only on the basis of
written summaries prepared by the Division.
Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of
Security transferred Nosenko to "a decent, respectable
safehouse." SB Division was cut out of the case, as was
the CI Staff.
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0. Resolution of the Case
The Office of Security took over the handling of
Nosenko in October 1967. The officer in charge immedi-
ately inaugurated a rapid transitiOn to normal livin
conditions. Thro
full coo erative
The following is a summary report prepared on 16
November 1967:
Nosenko was moved to his current location on
27 October 1967 and the first interview with
Nosenko occurred on 30 October. During the
first interview, particularly the first hour,
Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain
reticence to talk. This condition ameliorated
rapidly and it is considered that the current
situation is better than could have ever been
anticipated in view of the conditions of his
previous confinement.
Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete
willingness to answer all questions and to write
his answers to questions on areas of specific
interest. It was determined that his English
is adequate both for inte 'ew and for �re ara-
tion of written materia
There does not appear to be any impairment of
his memory. His current living conditions,
although physically secure, are luxurious com-
pared to those he had been in during the past
three years and have resulted in a relaxation
of physical tension.
Definitive resolution of the complex problems in
this case will require a considerable period of
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-77-
time for further interviews, preparation of
written material and a comparative analysis
against his previous statements and information
from other sources, interviews.and investigation.
Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies con-
cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and
having received certain awards or decorations.
All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and
transcripts of the interviews are being prepared.
In addition, all written material from Nosenko
is being typed with certain explanatory re-
marks . . . In addition, the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence has bee
b the Direc urit .
in a Or W 1Ch will permit dissemination to
the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemina-
tion is considered appropriate.
Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a
clarification of certain areas of previous
controversy. As an example, it is considered
that there can be at this time little doubt
that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approxi-
mate period which he claims to have been in
the KGB. The matter of the actual positions
held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953-
early 1964 period is not considered adequately
resolved at this time and any speculation con-
cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be
completely premature.
If even a degree of optimism is realistic, it
is felt that the additional interviews and work
in the Nosenko case together with a detailed
comparative analysis of all information will
provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion
of the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very
responsive [to] the normal consideration he is
now receiving, e.g., our current work with him,
and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at
least condition Nosenko more favorably for what-
ever future action is taken relative to his dis-
position.
stiu
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This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a
separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results
were covered in two reports published at about the
same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA
Office of Security's on 1 October 1968.
The essence of the Office of Security's findings
was expressed in a covering memorandum to the Director
of Security:
In brief, the conclusion of this summary is
that Nosenko is the person he claims to be,
that he held his claimed positions in the KGB
during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was
not dispatched by the KGB, and that his pre-
vious lies and exaggerations are not actually
of material significance at this time.
ing:
The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweep-
1. The current interrogations and collateral
inquiries have established a number of significant
omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968
CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority
of conclusions on which that paper reliedsto--
discredit Nosenko.
*Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examina-
tion of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August
1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office
of Security.
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Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave
up its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent.
On 31 January 1969, the Cl Staff argued that to accept
Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the
only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of
time which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA."
An undated memorandum written by the Office of
Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings
this chronicle to a close:
Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private
residence and since June 1969, his own automobile.
Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if
he chose to do so, acted in a way seriously
adverse to the best interests of this Agency
since control was not of such a nature as to
preclude independent action by Nosenko.
It is the opinion of Agency representatives in
regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely
interested in maintaining the anonymity of his
current identity, that is, not b .... .ublicI
e ous
ted his interest in participating
under the Nosenko identity in some action or
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activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko
considers that he has certain capabilities
and knowledge which could be useful in the
effort of the United States government against
the KGB. This interest has not been associated
with any particular curiosity in regard to the
activities of this Agency . . .
Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep
interest in obtaining United States citizen-
ship as soon as possible. He realizes that
under normal circumstances, citizenship could
not be obtained until February 1974, but also
is aware that citizenship can be obtained in
less than the normal waiting period by legisla-
tive action.
Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and
FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have
made an unusual adaptation to American life.
He lives like a normal American and has an
obvious pride in his home and personal effects.
His home life from all appearances is quite
calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English
language has greatly increased and there is
no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in
his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously
his accent and occasional incorrect sentence
structure (and misspelling of words) has not
been eliminated and probably will never be
entirely eliminated.
Nosenko continues to complete work assignments
expeditiously and with interest. As indicated
above, Nosenko is very interested in doing
"something active" which is understandable.
Full consideration .should be given to this
interest since if properly controlled and
channeled, could be used in a way adverse to
the best interest of the KGB.
Nosenko has since become a United Stated citizen,
has married an American woman, continues to lead a normal
life, and works productively for the CIA.
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CHAPTER IV
Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation
Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the US govern-
ment must begin by pointing out that he might well have been
able to contribute more had he been permitted to do so.
Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious considera-
tion to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments
of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions
along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the
US government. There is no telling what potential recruit-
ment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's
defection, briefed him with such targets in view.
In this part of our study, we therefore confine our-
selves to a summary of the contributions that, despite con-
siderable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take-them,
very briefly, one by one.
A. Information on KGB Personnel
The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up
Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:
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B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens
Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with
the KGB involved efforts against US citizens, either
visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy in
Moscow. As a r is background, Nosenko was
able to provide dentifications of, or leadst
to, Americans in KGB had displayed some interest-.
Some of-the KGB operational efforts culminated in
"recruitments" that, according to Nosenko, were more
statistical than real; the KGB played the numbers game,
for purposes of year-end reporting. Nonetheless,
Nosenko's reporting did result in the uncovering of
certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intel-
ligence:
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C. Moscow Microphones
In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on
the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow.
This information was promptly sent to the Department of
State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was
cited as one of the reasons. It was not until Nosenko's
more detailed information was communicated to the Depart-
ment of State in March and June 1964 that action was
taken that led to the uncovering of a system of 52 micro-
phones, beginning in April of that year. Of the micro-
phones found, 42 were active at the time of discovery.
These microphones covered most of the offices in the
embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint.
D.
in
told us the KGB had an agent
Though this information
t and conviction o
IA for some time
this success.
htiT
�
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gtigET
E. Leads to Foreign Nationals
gether, Nosenko is estimated to
identifications of, or leads to
(including recruited agents) i
countries in whom the KGB had an active
have provided_
F. Summary Evaluation
It is not feasible, within the terms of this study,
to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelli-
gence production and that of other similarly qualified
defectors. Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate
on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and
quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of
great value to the US government.
*ET
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Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within
this fiamework, an understanding of the functions
and responsibilities of any deputy chief of sec-
tion in the KGB is important. The following
description of this position has been confirmed
by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn, Goleniewski,
and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking
in general terms:
a. He must be broadly informed
on the section's operations and individual
case officer duties in order to act in
the chief's absence, when he assumes
responsibility for the entire section's
.work.
b. He approves and retains monthly
schedules for planned use of safehouses
by the section.
c. He discusses agent meeting
schedules with individual case officers
and approves and then retains a list of
planned agent meetings for each case of-
ficer on a monthly basis.
d. He approves the acquisition of
new agents and new safehouses and their
transfer from one operation to another.
e. He usually maintains liaison
with other KGB units on matters related
to the section's target.
Div
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f. Based on file reviews and
discussions with individual case offi-
cers, he assigns priorities for the
operations that each case officer
handles.
g. He reviews and approves by
signature the periodic written reports,
general operational plans of the sec-
tion, periodic section progress reports,
and specific operational proposals of
individual case officers which are re-
quired by the KGB. If the department
(sic�meant to read "section") chief
signs these papers, the deputy chief
still reads them in order to keep him-
self informed on the section's activity.
h. He assigns priorities for
processing microphone material and
telephone taps, for selecting targets
for surveillance, etc.
i. He participates directly in
important operational activities and
is often in contact with agents or
agent prospects. As a senior officer
responsible for the section's opera-
tions, he or the section chief are
almost invariably present during the
compromise and recruitment of important
target individuals. He periodically
participates in control meetings with
the section's agents in order to check
on the development of individual opera-
tions and case officer's performance.
Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a
different picture. Nosenko said that, as deputy section
chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise
operati al activit
clerks
*LT
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As for other aspects of his "job description,"
Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief
told him to do, and, while he granted that he did
from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined
above, he denied that he had any such fixed administra-
tive responsibilities. He contended that the other
officers in the section were not children and did not
require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to
do it.
The outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" was
erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation
of the Russian word zamestitel, the term Nosenko applied
to himself when speaking his native language. When the
meaning of this terms was researched in 1968, a clear
distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet
conceptions of a "deputy":
"Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureau-
cratic practice and usage is not limited to
denoting what we think of as the number 2
in the office, but rather is a broader term
which can perhaps most accurately be
rendered in English as "assistant." Soviet
offices, at least at the higher levels,
commonly have several "Deputies"; some may
have five or six or even more. In keeping
with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does
not carry with it the same sense of responsi-
bility and authority paralleling the Chief
and of automatic replacement as the American
term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is
probably not as intimately associated with a
specific slot as is the American position
of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at
all.
In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's"
duties can be considered tendentious because it was de-
signed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that
Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case
officer examined the validity of the criterion more
closely, he could easily have determined for himself that
it was unrealistic.
How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be
was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB
atu
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Division officers in January 1969. The following ex-
cerpt is instructive:
[Officer No. 1
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F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to
the Popov and- Related Cases
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a
retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involve-
ment of Nosenko therein.
stiEr
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1. Prologue
It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn
should have become so involved in the retrospective
analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a
great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have
become thus involved had it not been for the dis-
information hypothesis.
Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case
officer was given access to tape transcripts of de-
briefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB off.cer who
had defected in Helsinki in December 9
In a memorandum written by-the principal case
officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his inter-
view with Golitsyn, he set forth his views on
"Possible Control of [Nosenko)." He opened with a
statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] produc-
tion in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the
possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major
Soviet disinformation operation . .
2. Implications of the Popov Case
Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end
of his first meeting with the principal case officer
in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov
was cau�ht." Feelings ran i h ov his case,
etr Po ov a CIA source within the GRU
from o October 1959, when the KGB
roll ation in Moscow. He was the Nrt
important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the
advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any informa-
tion Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned
of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of
great interest.
In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise,
he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had
uttc
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under surveillance a member of the American
embassy in Moscow who the were certain, was
a CIA officer- When they
observed this clandestinely
mailing a letter i loscow, e B intercepted
the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr
Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was
working for CIA. He was arrested soon there-
after and sent under KGB direction to make
several clandestine meetings with another CIA
officer, Russell Langelle. Finally in October
1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately
after such a meeting, with material in his
possession just received from Popov. The Popov
case was over.
Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information
concerning the Popov case had been slight. As
of the time of -his defection in 1961, he knew
or believed only that:
a. There had been an agent leak-
ing Soviet military, political and intel-
ligence information to the U.S.
b. When CIA officer Russell Langelle
was assigned to Moscow, he was going
there to handle "a special agent or mis-
sion . . . "
c. Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow
then led the KGB to Popov.
Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing
bdt added that the KGB had been led to Langelle
through t of another CIA officer
in Moscow, Unfortunately, to the
principal o icer � statement meant what it
urported to mean. Under Golitsyn's influence,
is doubts concernin Nosenko's bona '
is une memoran um was ritten, the principal
case officer had decided that the story of the Popov
compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to
determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by
the KGB.
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-109-
Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov
was compromised, i.e., identified by name
through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow
in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the
name of the officer surveilled.. The Golitsyn
report was actually completely omitted from a
17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission
passed unnoticed is not explained in any records
in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a com-
pletely different story of the compromise in June
1964, after he had read all the Popov case
materials,this story became the Golitsyn gospel
and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's
argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964
version shortly, but first some additional back-
ground is needed.
Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his
friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in
Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several
occasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer,
Nosenko specifically denied that he was.
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3. Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise
Theory!'
Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy.
case, it is important to know that in October 1962,
only four months after the first Nosenko meetings,
the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another
penetration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy.
This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious
than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried
thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's ex-
posure.
Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions
within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division--
that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for
two such calamities to have occurred within three
yea
4. Golitsyn's 1964 stoYy
In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's
version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated
that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962
stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov
as a double because he could not be trusted. He
then went on to give a completely new story of the
Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his
original information.
Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov
(first name not given), who had been in 'the KGB
in Vienna during the period Popov was there, sus-
pected Popov of being a Western agent and made
known his suspicions. At the time, no action was
taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, how-
ever, when the KGB received similar information
from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany be-
cause he knew Popov and was familiar with his back-
ground. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here
implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified
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by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957
or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated
within the framework of the facts that follow.
. On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the
passage to Colitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all
materials passed to CIA by Popov, including
English language transcri s of 2
meeti v
us, y t e time Golatsyn
commenting Nosenko's version of the Popov
compromise in June 1964 he had become aware of
everything Pop what
was oin on i
In view o
that Golitsyn's story in 1964 varied drastically
from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate
to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's
compromise based on deductions he had made after
reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964
decision must be thrown out of court.
5. The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated
Unfortunately for the course of events in the
Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that
was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which
condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962
version had supported Nosenko. The reason for this
is obvious. The Popov compromise hypothesis had
been feeding on itself for so long that it had come
to be treated as fact, with the result that the sub-
ject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus
paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet
source reporting to CIA on Pepov agreed with Nosenko
that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent--
a penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then
that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-
growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration(s)
of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to
produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been
sir
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compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was
Interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetra-
tion must exist.
The acceptance of Golitsyn'5 story in turn
guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be
seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet
sources must be considered suspect if they supported
Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort
seriously for a number of years the ability of the
Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona
fides of any defector or agent.
SIT
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CHAPTER VI
Dozinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and
ATITlication in the Nosenko Case
There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko
received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken
place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet in-
telligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore,
the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of
Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some
of the same or similar persons OT leads as had Golitsyn, and
Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the
KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a
dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to
preclude "normal" professional treatment.of.Nosen.ko.�As_a
defector, Nosenko's bona fides should haver,r_bernestablished,
or not established, on the basis of carefUl and sound
analysis and investigation of the information he provided
under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he
came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before
he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was
therefore based upon this prejudgment.
Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of
long standing that has been defined or described by numerous
sources through the years. Two representative definitions
are as follows:
Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the
deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false
information regarding accomplished facts and/or
intentions, plans of action, etc., for the pur-
pose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations
may be accomplished by means of the press, radio
and television, agent reports and communications,
operations, etc. The term also refers to the in-
formation itself.
Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the
term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, in-
complete, misleading information passed, fed or
confirmed to opposition services for the purpose
of causing these services (and their governments)
to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR
or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to
the USSR.
akT
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By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to
Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes to ensure that the
policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false
impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture.
Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed
to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless
research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely
affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world,
to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting,
individuals who are considered a threat to the national
interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or
strengthen certain political parties.
With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin,
Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet
state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions
is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity that is
the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It...has,5,
always been carrigkout as a matter of government policy, as
an activity that at times may involve the security organs.
Before 1959, there was no separate dczinformatsiya de-
partment within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations),
although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from
time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign
intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya
work within its own-sphere of activity. All such work was
carried out with the approval of higher authorities within
the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with
the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya
insofar as it was to be the concern of.the First (foreign
intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized
within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of
dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking
of CIA counterintelligence officers.
The dezinformatsi a concept was first highlighted for
the sen
r Mi who
ile uninterrogation o
ing as defection in Ja y 1961. The information he provided
was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the
subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953 and was in
fact not only a ranking Polish intellig�nce officer but also
a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to
refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to
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CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our
analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim
that, the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence ser-
vices played a major role in the implementation of such
policies.
Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was
to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would
do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer.
Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB
dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means
ot action designed to mislead Western security services. He
listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya
operations those designed to confirm unimportant true informa-
tion, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the
reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes mislead-
ing information to anti-Soviet governments.
Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation
might be designed to discredit accurate information of signi-
ficance received by the opposition through sources not under
Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the
veracity of the source or sources of this true information.
Goleniewski stated further that the information passed
through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis
of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e.,
could stem from defector damage assessments. One means
obviously might be the channeling of information at variance
with that provided by the defector. Another means might be
the provision of "give away" material, which neither added
to information already in the hands of the opposition nor,
by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB.
In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some
of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the
reputation of an agent p. etration.of unist
intelli�ence
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In all its essentials, tho information provided by
Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn,
who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant
Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after
Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of
dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or
riku) defectorIs file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya
unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit
the situation, after review of the probable areas of informa-
tion revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated
in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the
KGB maintained .extensive files organized on a topical basis,
containing all information on a given topic that was known
(from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double
agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi-
tion intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer
assigned to Beirut to work against, the American embassylho-
defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of
Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about
KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel.
By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Depart-
ment of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent
to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to
CIA.
On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be
assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have
received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinforma-
tion and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West.
However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when
they presented themselves as defectors; they received com-
pletely different handling, based on quite different assess-
ment of the information they provided and their motives for
defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in
relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected
as a bona fide defector, as explained below.
Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of
the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961.
Information that he provided relating to the organization
and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true,
at least in part because there was relatively little record
information against which it could be compared, but also
because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable.
In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information
on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were
limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to
siET
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be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these
holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations
that was not only accepted at face value but received with
outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information,
plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included
an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and an
emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona
fides was accepted in March 1962.
The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in
1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did
not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides
would be determined on the basis of the information he pro-
vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves
reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III. Golitsyn
himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the
trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to
label Nosenko as a deception agent.
This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts
with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities
that was similar to that provided a few months earlier by
Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been
warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by
false information fed to them through no matter what channels,
the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko
was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led
to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn
soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn
immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or
even assassinate him.
Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence offi-
cers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an ana-
lytical technique that has been referred to variously as "double
think" or "mirror reading." This "analysis" led to the con-
clusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us
what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko
said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had
been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy
in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had
been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information
on a given topic that we had already received from another
source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that
particular piece of information, hence the other source un-
doubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts were
discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis
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that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources
whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or dealt
with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded
as "contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered
part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko
figured.
Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical pro-
cess." As soon as Nosenko's defection became public,
Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's
interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed
that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and
given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning
at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's
function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation
was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's
assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly,
over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with.
material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at
his request was supplied with all available biographic data
on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.
On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief, CI
Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division. The
following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting:
Golitsyn: I have made a study of the docu-
ments and information which was provided to
me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I
would like now to make known my conclusions
. . . my conclusion is that he is not a
bona fide defector. He is a provocateur,
who is on a mission for the KGB . . . to
mislead, chief in the field of investiga-
tions . . . on Soviet penetrations made
mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate
to Moscow . . Why did they choose Nosenko
for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was
recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk*
for the mission. Nosenko could have been
*Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich
Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were
colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the Second Chief
Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a
one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he trans-
ferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the
Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations
in Geneva at the time of Nosen 's temporary duty thera in
1962.
SE
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named or recommended by them and the KGB
gave these people a chance. They are
very energetic--all of them. And, of
course, they discuss things among themselves.
Many of them had made mistakes--they had
told too much. They were, therefore, in
the damage report (on my defection) and
for them the only way to act was to suggest
an operation against me in order to save
their face, to save the situation.
It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a)
to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre-
eminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence
services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote
his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the
Soviet Union in political and strategic matters, and thus
to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall
Soviet political matters.
Golitsy clearl had a 0 inion of himself.
e defec
ic a e
e to �iscuss wi ennedy and the
Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them
to what was going on and to measures-needing to be-taken.
Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other
US government agencies underwent changes from time to time,
depending upon whether his demands for access to and inter-
views with specified ranking officials of those organizations
were granted.
Golitsyn's chosen 'role as interpreter of Soviet policy
and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of
Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all
of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with
an "interpretation" of the latter's role. In any event, the
idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammer-
ing away at this theme that we were being "had" by the
Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of
clever KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko
had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make
clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet
machinations.
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o attention was paid to the fact that, despite the
assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known
case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a
previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence
service. After brief consideration of the notion that
Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at *11, it was
decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.
SEW
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Conclusions
In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that
(a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent
defection, no information has ever been developed to sub-
stantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn
or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with
respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent;
and (c) Golitsyn-himself as the architect and sponsor of
theories presented has not been able to support his claims,
despite the wealth of information made available to him for
analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper,
dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:
Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet
leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy"
(peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics,
united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable
as a statement of the "Right" strategy
developed during the mid- and late-fifties
and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow
Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this
policy as, in toto, a "misinformation"
operation Tests upon his extremely broad
use of that term: "special deliberate
efforts of the communist governments to
mislead Western studies and to direct them
in wrong directions" by means of official
Soviet speeches and Party documents, offi-
cial press and propaganda outlets, travel
controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc
His vocabulary and general handling of this
new Bloc policy gives the strategy a con-
spiratorial quality not justified by its
essentially open and public character.
The Tole of the KGB in the execution and
coordination of this policy is constantly
alluded to, but no evidence is provided to
define the precise nature of its role and
no actual "covert" disinformation operations
are cited for the years from 1959 to the
present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence
for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959,
but its new role may also be interpreted to
cover routine operations of covert propa-
ganda, political action, recruitment of
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agents of influence and specific "disinforma-
tion" operations without involving the KGB
(or the Bloc intelligence services) in any
broader role.
s*
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CHAPTER VII
Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison
Of Their Handling By CIA
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differ-
ences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy
Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this
study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain
theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped
to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when
he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material,
since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko.
Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.
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It seems self-evident that these two defectors should
have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect
as the other until completion of all appropriate processing
aimed at determining bona fides.
:ak
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� . t�N
.,������.
CHAPTER XI
Methodology and Leadership
We accept without question the necessity for counter-
intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process
concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert
and clandestine activities against the United States and
our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill
its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic
methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no
such thing.
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B. 110ifluence of Chle.40:ACI cm-WreltAfBology
C.
The predominant influence in the counterintelligence
field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, Cl.
His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly
unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political
role. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert
on this subject. His an-iI7is, based on fragmentary and
often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than
systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor
replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor
and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never
vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he
surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy.
His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number
of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence com-
munity, both American and foreign, he doled them out
selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever
point he was trying to make at the time.
�
Chief, CIlispreferenc ral over written communica-
tion is worth em hasizin
There is an important interrelationship between coun-
terintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the
collection of positive intelligence from human sources.
Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full im-
pact of the events we have been describing be comprehended.
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At the time CIA was established, the primary mission
of what was later to become the Plans.Directorate's
'Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection
of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine
human sources. How successful was the Clandestine Service
in fulfilling thiltemission?
Agency claims of success in the human-source col-
lection field have often been so phrased, whether inten-
tionally or not, as to give the impression that our
achievements stemmed largely f i. the �rocess ed
"develo ment and recruitment."
D. What Went Wrong*?
There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless,
a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of
those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on
the problem and permit the formulation of constructive
recommendations for future action.
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On the otheilliand, the best of the Service's liad-ers
--and there were many good ones--were successful because
they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called m-
m se e should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors
of the period 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained
in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they seldom
were in a position to demand high standards of analysis
of their subordinates. Until the massive outflow of
retirees in recent years changed the demography of the
Service, most senior operational supervisors had received
their higher educations before systematized analysis be-
came routine even in such "soft" subjects as political
science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics
is now required at most universities). Many, probably
most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during a
sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical
logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced
by emphasis on scientific method. In the realm of
technology, almost all senior executives in the Clandestine
Service before 1970 had finished college before the first
digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became
commercially available about 1951.
s � ots.
n of course a number of bri
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E. Summary
If we seem to have wandered far afield from the
nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko
bona fides studies, We have done so because the unfortunate
handling of Nosenko Was not an isolated event. Rather,
it was symptomatic some fundam � inade uncles of the
Plans Directorate.
Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that
the last quarter of this century is going to be even more
' exigent, though in a different way, than the past twenty-
five years. We therefore sun up the implications of this
chapter by posing a single question: Bow can we ensure
that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders
is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges
that face them than were those who ran the Service in
the sixties?
�
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CHAPTER XII
Conclusions and Recommendations
A. The Letter of Instructions
General guidance for the preparation of this report
was contained in a Letter of Instructions, signed by the
Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It as-
signed the following tasks:
You are tasked to write an analysis of the
Nosenko case which will address the following
matters:
[1]. The bona fides of Nosenko.
[2]. The value of Nosenko to
the United States And allied govern-
ments.
[3]. The relationship and
significance of Nosenko to other
agents and operations.
[4). The identification of unex-
ploited Nosenko penetration leads and
information.
IS]. The nature and validity of
methodology of previous Nosenko bona
fides studies.
We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather
liberally, because the ramifications and implications of
the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we,
and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated.
Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter
with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs
a. through e.
1. Bona Fides
Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of
our own making. Had the job of initially assessing
him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating
the intelligence he had to offer, been handled
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properly, he could have been declared a bona fide
. defector as readily as have many other Soviet in-
telligence officers.
This is not to say that we can be certain of
the genuinenesoCof any defector. It will always
remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet
*overnment, acting through the KGB or some other
instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended
"disinformation agent" or prospective penetration
of our government on our doorstep. But the useful-
ness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner as-
cribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as
slight as is the feasibility. Soviet success in
using native-born citizens of other countries to
spy on their own homelands has been considerable.
By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's suc-
cesfully infiltrating the government of a major
non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged
Soviet .citizen, least of all one whose career has
been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security
service.
We therefore conclude that�Nosenko was from
� the beginning a bona fide defector.
2. Value of Nosenko
Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in
Chapter IV. He.has been of great value, but he
probably could have been even more valuable had he
been properly handled.
3. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations
As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the
Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector him-
self, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine
operations in the Soviet field.
4. Identification of Unexploited Leads
We have not felt that this subject was one we.
could feasibly Or properly investigate. To do so
would have meant delving into the past and current
operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff
to ascertain the extent to which there might have
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been "exploitation" of any of th
persons whom Nosenko identified
would not have permitted us to accomplish this
task, nor would our doing so have been consistent
with the principle of compartmentation.
5. Methodology
It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the
variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did
not conform to any generally accepted sense of the
term "methodology."
B. Recommended Action
Most of our recommendations for action have been
previously stated or implied. In the following para-
graphs, we recapitulate them, with such supplementary
remarks as seem necessary.
1. Examination of the Role of Professionals
We recommend that the role that can properly be
played within the Agency by members of the organized
professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law,
and others--be given careful study, within the con-
text of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills
to the best possible use, and (b) refraining from in-
volving them in matters not properly within their
professional purview.
2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards
We recommend that the Operations Directorate,
and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps
are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber
of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the
future.
We realize that the present personnel selection
system sets high standards for those entering on
duty at the professional level, particularly as
regards IQ and education. But the standards presently
in force do not by themselves guarantee that future
selections will possess independence of mind, analytical
ability, and objectivity.
41*
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In the case of personnel already on board,
it should be kept in mind that we live in a
rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented
civilization. Knowledge and intellectual
skills adequate at this time may be inadequate
a few years from now. For an intelligence or-
ganization, %fa...define "inadequate" as anything
that is less than the best.
We suggest that a board of expert consultants
be established, drawn primarily from research in-
stitutions, high-technology enterprises, and the
academic world to recommend a program of screening
new entrants and improving the analytical skills
of those already on duty, with the aim of achiev-
ing and maintaining a high level of intellectual
excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.
3. Detection of Deception
We recommend that high priority be accorded a
program-to develop new methods of detecting deception.
Specific criteria of bona fides will follow
naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.
4. Psychological'Asects of Defector/Agent Handling and
l'ersonnel Selection
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e us su stantially re cc t e thre at -
the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities
poses for the Agency, and particularly for the
Operations Directorate.
5. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors
Implementation of this recommendation would,
if the other programs above-recommended are also car-
ried out, contribute substantially toward authentica-
tion of agent sources and information.
�
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