SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSLE FIELD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: Intelligence Warning of the 1957 Launch of Sputnik
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006707795
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: September 29, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2017-00016
• Publication Date: March 12, 1957

Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 FOP SECRET RELEASED IN FULL IP SECRET NIE 11-5-57 12 March 1957 033678 N? 300 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-5-57 Supersedes NIE 11-6-54 and its Supplement NIE 11-12-55 SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Concurred in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 12 March 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assist- ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 29-Sep-2017 SECRET _ TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795  Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE ' 1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy Is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. 4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified: CONFIDENTIAL WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UP SECRET TOP SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS Page THE PROBLEM 1 FOREWORD 1 CONCLUSIONS 2 DISCUSSION 4 I. SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED MISSILES 4 Strategic and Tactical Considerations 4 Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems . 5 Soviet Requirements for Offensive Missile Systems . . 5 Soviet Evaluation of Missiles versus other Weapons Systems 6 Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program . 8 II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES 8 Scientific and Technical Capabilities 8 Missile Guidance and Control 9 Missile Propulsion 10 Aerodynamics and Structure 10 Warheads and Fuzes 11 Geodesy and Cartography 11 Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided Missile's � 12 III. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 12 Warhead Selection 13 Surface-to-Air Missile Systems 14 Air-to-Air Missile Systems 16 Air-to-Surface Missile Systems 17 Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems 17 Ballistic Missiles 17 Cruise-type Missiles 19 Earth Satellite 20 Specialized Missiles 20 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UV 6LCK1 I TOP SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.) Page ANNEXES A: A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM 25 I. Possible Program "25 II. Warhead Considerations Affecting Possible Program 32 III. Economic Implications of Possible Program . . . 38 B: SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED MISSILES. . . 42 I. Basic Scientific Capabilities 42 II. Availability of Technical Knowledge from Foreign Sources 42 III. Organization and Control of the Soviet Guided Missile Program 43 C: SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE TESTING ACTIVITIES (Limited Distribution under Separate Cover) D: SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAPABILITIES (Limited Distribution under Separate Cover) TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 �,.. Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UN SEC;RET TOP SECRET SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD THE PROBLEM To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs in the field of guided mis- siles, including earth satellites, through 1966. FOREWORD This estimate supersedes NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Pro- grams in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954, and its supplement, NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs, 20 December 1955. Al- though some new intelligence has strengthened our previous estimate that the USSR has an extensive guided missile program, intelligence on specific guided missile sys- tems continues to be deficient. In making this estimate in a field where positive intelligence is minimal, we have employed three interdependent approaches: mili- tary requirements, scientific and technical capabilities, and economic capabilities. Throughout the entire estimative process, the fullest consideration has been taken of the available evidence of Soviet missile activity, US guided missile experience, and known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields. This estimate is based on previous judgments that the USSR does not now in- tend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date. Except where noted otherwise, the operational capability dates given in this estimate are the earliest probable years during which one or more missiles could have been serially produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment. These dates are based on our estimate that a concerted and continuous native So- viet research and development program began in 1948. Although considerable effort has been devoted to estimating a Soviet produc- tion and operational program for guided missile systems through 1966, the production quantities and time-phasing presented in Annex A represent only a possible Soviet program, but one which is considered both feasible and reasonable. 2 1 Unguided rockets are not included in this estimate. 2 See the Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. TOP SECRET 1 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET CONCLUSIONS GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 1. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive and enjoys a very high priority. (Paras. 17, 27, 29- 30, 50) 2. We believe that the USSR has the na- tive scientific resources and capabilities to develop during this period advanced types of guided missile systems, in all categories for which it has military re- quirements. (Paras. 29-38) 3. We estimate that the USSR has the industrial base and related industrial ex- perience to series produce the missile sys- tems it will develop during this peri- od. However, in view of competing de- mands, the limited availabliity of elec- tronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guid- ed missile production until about 1958. Thereafter, expanding electronics pro- duction will probably make this restric- tion much less severe. (Paras. 45-48) 4. We estimate that the USSR has re- quirements for various sizes of nuclear, high explosive (HE) , and chemical (CW) warheads, and has the capability to de- velop them on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be em- ployed. In view of competing demands, the availability of fissionable materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production dur- ing the period of this estimate. (Paras. 39-42,54, Annex A) SPECIFIC SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS Surface-to-Air Missiles 2 5. We estimate that surface-to-air mis- sile systems have one of the highest pri- orities among current Soviet military programs. At Moscow, an extensive sys- tem of surface-to-air missile sites has been constructed, and all sites are prob- ably now operational. 'This system can probably direct a very high rate of fire against multiple targets at maximum al- titudes of about 60,000 feet and maxi- mum horizontal ranges of about 25 n.m. (Paras. 27-28, 32, 56-60) 6. During the period 1958-1961, surface- to-air systems with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense of critical areas, and with low and high al- titude capabilities for defense of stat- ic targets, field forces, and naval ves- sels, could probably become available for operational employment. Sometime be- tween 1963 and 1966, the USSR could probably have in operation a surface-to- air system of some capability against the ICBM. (Paras. 61-67) 7. We estimate that series production of surface-to-air guided missiles is now un- der way in the USSR, and that it will probably produce such missiles in large quantities. Nuclear warheads could now be incorporated into a limited number of surface-to-air missiles. We estimate that some percentage of surface-to-air mis- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET sues will be so equipped during the pe- riod of this estimate. (Paras. 19, 59-60, Annex A) Air-to-Air Missiles � 8. Despite a lack of significant intelli- gence, we estimate that the USSR has pursued the development of air-to-air missiles, and that it could now have in operational use a 2-3 n.m. range missile capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather. It is probable that the USSR could have a 5 n.m. all-weather missile operational in 1958 and a 15-20 n.m. all- weather missile, capable of employing a nuclear warhead, in 1960. (Paras. 68-70) Air-to-Surface Missiles 9. In 1955 the USSR could probably have had a 20 n.m. subsonic air-to-surface mis- sile available for operational use. In 1956-1957 a 55 n.m. subsonic missile could probably be available, and there is some evidence that such a missile has reached at least final flight test stage. A 55 n.m. supersonic missile could prob- ably be available in 1958. These missiles, designed primarily as antiship weapons, could also be employed against isolated and well-defined radar targets on land. In 1961, a 100 n.m. supersonic missile could probably be available for employ- ment by heavy bombers. Each of these missile types could employ nuclear war- heads. (Paras. 71-74) Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles (up to 350 n.m. range) 10. There is considerable evidence of So- viet development of short-range surface- to-surface missiles, and we estimate that the USSR could probably have had avail- able for operational use in 1954 ballistic missiles with the following maximum 3 ranges: 75 n.m., 175-200 n.m., and 350 n.m. These types could be equipped with nuclear warheads. However, the USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain specific purposes, and might employ HE in the two shorter- range types. (Paras. 75-79, 81, Annex A) Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles (700 n.m. and 1,600 n.m. ranges) 11. Evidence on Soviet development pro- grams leads us to estimate that the USSR could probably have had a 700 n.m. maxi- mum range ballistic missile available for operational use in 1956. We have firm evidence that in 1949 the USSR was in- terested in a 1,600 n.m. intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) , and we believe it is a logical step in the Soviet development program. We estimate that the USSR is developing an IRBM, and that it could probably have such a mis- sile in operation in 1959. Both these mis- sile types would require nuclear war- heads, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use with the 700 n.m. missile for occasional special missions. We believe the USSR would rapidly ac- quire a considerable number of both the 700 n.m. and the 1,600 n.m. missiles. (Paras. 80, 82, Annex A) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM: 5,500 n.m. range) 12. We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM, but we believe its development has probably been a high priority goal of the Soviet ballistic missile program. We estimate that the USSR could probably have a 5,500 n.m. ICBM ready for operational use in 1960-1961. We believe that the 'Date predicated on first operational unit being equipped with prototype missiles. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UP SECRET TOP SECRET USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBM's with nuclear war- heads as rapidly as possible. (Para. 84, Annex A) Submarine-Launched Surface-to-Surface Missiles 13. We believe the USSR would probably have developed cruise-type missiles ini- tially, and there is some evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet submarines equipped to carry such missiles. The USSR could probably have had in opera- tion in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missile capable of a maximum range of 500 n.m., and a supersonic missile capable of this range could probably be in operation in 1957. A supersonic cruise-type missile capable of ranges up to 1,000 n.m. could probably be operational in 1962. These 4 missile types would require nuclear war- heads. With a vigorous program, the USSR might achieve an operational sub- marine-launched IRBM system sometime during the period 1964-1966. (Paras. 83, 85-89, Annex A) Earth Satellite 14. The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting, in 1957, a satellite vehicle which could acquire sci- entific information and data of limited military value. A satellite vehicle posses- sing substantial reconnaissance capabili- ties of military value could probably be orbited in the period 1963-1965. (Paras. 90-91) DISCUSSION I. SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED MISSILES 15. The Soviet guided missile program neces- sarily operates within the framework of cur- rent and future military requirements laid down by Soviet defense planners. While we have no direct evidence on the elements of this framework as it applies to missiles, we believe it would logically have been based on: (a) an appreciation of the USSR's present and probable future strategic and tactical situa- tions; (b) an estimate of the types of attack that could be launched against the USSR in the foreseeable future; (c) operational re- quirements for which missile systems could be employed to replace or augment other weap- ons systems; and, finally, (d) an evaluation of the probable effectiveness of missiles versus other weapons systems to perform required missions. 16. The USSR has almost certainly been as- sisted in determining the scope and priorities of its missile programs by information on Western, including US, military programs. This information is probably complete enough to enable the USSR to judge approximately the time phases in the develoment, effective- ness, size, and composition of US and Allied offensive and defensive forces. Specifically, the Soviet leaders can probably judge such factors as the general size of nuclear stock- piles, the weapons systems into which nuclear warheads have been incorporated, the general progress of air defense programs, and the gen- eral characteristics and availability dates of offensive and defensive missiles. Strategic and Tactical Considerations 17. Certain considerations which have played a role in Soviet military thinking in recent years make it plausible that the USSR should have given a high priority to the development of missiles. The Soviet leaders have heavily emphasized the development of their nuclear capability, and probably also believe that mis- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 lot-' 6LUKt I TOP SECRET sues will ultimately become the primary means of delivery for nuclear weapons. So- viet concern over US and Allied capabilities for strategic air attack has compelled the USSR to place high priority on development of a modern air defense system, in which mis- siles are now an essential ingredient and will ultimately become the primary weapon. Fi- nally, the relative geographic disadvantages faced by the USSR for purposes of strategic attack, due to US possession of a forward base structure on the Soviet periphery, could be offset to some degree by development of long- range missiles for delivery of nuclear weapons. All these factors probably figured in a Soviet decision, taken early in the postwar period, to make a major effort in the development of guided missiles. Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems 18. In preparing their requirements for air defense guided missile systems, Soviet mili- tary planners would probably have construct- ed a picture of the time-phased threat from existing and foreseeable Western offensive weapons systems about as follows: �In 1956: high and low altitude bomb- ing attack by aircraft flying at subsonic speeds and at altitudes up to 55,000 feet; in peripheral areas, attack by short and medium range cruise-type missiles; where ground forces would be in contact, at- tack by short range ballistic missiles. � By 1961: attack by aircraft employing air-to-surface missiles; bombing attack by aircraft capable of supersonic "dash" and altitudes up to 65,000 feet; attack by long range cruise-type missiles capable of high subsonic speeds and altitudes up to 60,000 feet; attack by long range bal- listic missiles. �By 1966: attack by supersonic aircraft and cruise-type missiles, capable of al- titudes on the order of 80,000 feet; at- tack by long range ballistic missiles. 19. The USSR would have proceeded on the assumption that high-yield nuclear weapons or warheads could be incorporated into any 5 of the Western weapons systems described above. This assumption would dictate a re- quirement for air defense missile systems with a high kill probability, and therefore the in- clusion of a percentage of nuclear warheads in Soviet air defense missile systems at an early date. 20. Soviet defense planners would probably have formulated generalized operational re- quirements for both surface-to-air and air-to- air systems capable of countering the threat outlined above. Surface-to-air requirements would probably have included static and mobile systems for the defense of critical governmental and industrial centers, impor- tant military centers and bases, major naval forces afloat, and major units of the Soviet Army. Operational requirements for air-to- air missile systems would probably have been based on the need to increase the kill capabili- ties of existing and projected Soviet inter- ceptors. 21. Our intelligence on Soviet development of surface-to-air missiles to date indicates that time-phased Soviet operational requirements probably began with a point-defense system capable of interdicting bomber aircraft at al- titudes up to about 60,000 feet. Our estimate of the Soviet analysis of the foreseeable threat indicates that SoViet requirements for air de- fense missiles over the next few years would become much more exacting, including longer ranges, higher speeds, and more technical- ly advanced guidance systems. Later in the period, a high-priority requirement would emerge for a system capable of a high kill probability against ballistic missiles. Soviet Requirements for Offensive Missile Systems 22. In preparing their requirements for of- fensive missile systems, Soviet military plan- ners probably would have developed general- ized operational requirements for systems in both the surface-to-surface and air-to-sur- face categories. Available intelligence sup- ports our belief that the USSR has had con- siderable interest in both these categories, especially in a family of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 006707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I01- SECRET TOP SECRET 23. Soviet requirements for shorter range sur- face-to-surface missiles would probably have been derived from the military missions of at- tacking targets in direct tactical support of field forces, and of attacking other targets of importance in a military campaign. Such requirements would probably have been de- rived as follows: a. Soviet requirements for surface-to-sur- face missiles for tactical support of field forces would have been derived in general from the missions of various echelons of the Soviet Army. From current Soviet tactical doctrine we deduce that operational requirements would probably have been developed for bal- listic missiles of up to 75 n.m. range for sup- port of division and corps operations, up to 200 n.m. range for support of field armies, and up to 350 n.m. range for support of army "fronts." 4 b. Similarly, Soviet requirements for these shorter range surface-to-surface missiles for the support of other operations and for the neutralization of certain additional targets of broad strategic significance would have stemmed from target systems including a va- riety of key installations of both tactical and strategic significance. A family of 75,200, and 350 n.m. missiles would probably have been developed to provide coverage for these targets systems. c. In addition, a requirement might have been developed for a ballistic or cruise-type missile capable of a longer range, both for support of certain army "front" operations and for the neutralization of certain addition- al targets. 24. Considering the ranges from possible launching sites within the Bloc to targets on or near the Eurasian land mass, Soviet plan- ners would probably have developed require- ments for longer range surface-to-surface mis- siles: (a) ballistic missiles of 600-900 n.m. maximum range and of longer ranges up to 1,600 n.m. for peripheral attack missions, in- cluding the neutralization of US and Allied bases and attack on strategic targets in non- ' A Soviet army "front" is roughly comparable to a US army group. 6 Bloc nations on the Eurasian periphery; and (b) a ballistic missile capable of up to 5,500 n.m. range, for intercontinental attack. The possibility exists that interim Soviet surface- to-surf ace missile requirements might have included cruise-type missiles in one or more of the foregoing range categories. Require- ments for specialized naval versions of both cruise-type and ballistic missiles, suitable for launching by submarines or surface vessels, would probably also have been developed. 25. It is reasonable to infer that the USSR would have developed requirements for air- to-surf ace missiles to overcome foreseeable improvements in the capabilities of land and shipborne air defense against bombard- ment aircraft. Generalized operational re- quirements would probably have included a missile of at least 100 n.m. range to augment the capabilities of long-range bombers against heavily-defended land targets and large naval concentrations, as well as shorter range mis- siles for employment against single ships or other isolated and well-defined radar targets. 26. Soviet military planners may also have considered that a requirement existed to de- velop certain missiles for specific functions in the field of countermeasures against Western air defense systems. Such a requirement could include surface-to-surface cruise-type missiles and air-to-surface missiles, equipped with ECM gear, to be employed as decoys to satu- rate air defense radar and control systems. In addition, it could include air-to-surface mis- siles capable of homing on and destroying ground radar installations. Soviet Evaluation of Missiles Versus Other Weapons Systems 27. Soviet military planners, having estab- lished generalized operational requirements for which guided missile systems could be employed, would probably then have evaluated the effectiveness of missiles versus other weap- ons systems to perform the missions of air defense, tactical support, peripheral attack, and intercontinental attack. Based in part on the limited intelligence available on cur- rent Soviet military programs, including the TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OP SECRET TOP SECRET missile program, we believe that the Soviet evaluation was as follows: a. Air defense. The most immediate and greatest Soviet military concern is the safe- guarding of key Soviet strengths and cen- ters of control. In the face of the grave threat from Western, especially US, air-nu- clear forces in being and programmed, Soviet air defense kill probabilities must be brought to a much higher level at a very early date. Conventional antiaircraft artillery is a weap- ons system of negligible value against high performance, high altitude bombardment air- craft, although this system will continue ef- fective for at least a few years against attack by aircraft at lower altitudes. Fighter air- craft with conventional armament will con- tinue to be effective for a few years against many of the likely forms of air attack on the USSR, but can achieve maximum effective- ness against high-performance, high altitude attack only if fitted with air-to-air guided missiles. As the period advances, improving capabilities of both defending and attacking aircraft, and of attacking cruise-type missiles, will dictate more exacting operational require- ments for air-to-air missiles. When super- sonic cruise-type or ballistic missiles consti- tute the major threat, the operational require- ment for air-to-air missiles will tend to phase out. Guided missile systems offer the best promise of raising the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses to an acceptable level. b. Tactical support. The Soviet Army ground forces have been reorganized and mod- ernized since the end of World War II, and for the past three years their unit organiza- tion has been undergoing further changes to meet the requirements of modern warfare, nuclear or non-nuclear. Current Soviet tac- tical doctrine emphasizes allocation of nuclear weapons for use against enemy defensive posi- tions, air facilities, reserves, nuclear capabili- ties, and encircled enemy units. This same doctrine envisages the use of artillery, guided missiles, and tactical aircraft as nuclear de- livery means. Most Soviet requirements for direct support of line divisions can now be met satisfactorily with field artillery, un- guided rocket artillery, and aircraft. How- ever, guided missiles offer certain advantages 7 over tactical aircraft, and should be pro- grammed to augment and to some extent replace the latter. c. Peripheral attack. Among the essential elements in Soviet strategy for the initial phase of a general war are the destruction or neutralization of Western nuclear capabili- ties wherever deployed, destruction of ready NATO forces, prevention of NATO's full mobil- ization, and isolation of the European the- ater by interdicting US reinforcement of over- seas forces. Soviet tactical and naval avia- tion, augmented by units of long-range avia- tion, will be suitable for some time for carry- ing out attacks on the Eurasian periphery. A submarine-launched guided missile could be an important weapon system for this mis- sion. Although conventional air attack will remain effective for some time, a substantially improved capability could be attained with air-to-surface missiles. For peripheral attack generally, and base neutralization in particu- lar, ballistic missiles carrying nuclear war- heads, by imposing maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, could ultimately present a greater threat to Western targets than any other Soviet weapons system. d. Intercontinental attack. To deter the US from initiating general war against the Bloc and to fight such a war successfully should it occur, the USSR requires a power- ful intercontinental nuclear striking force. This force should be capable of neutralizing US nuclear delivery capabilities at the outset, and of inflicting damage of a decisive nature on other continental US targets. There will be a period of years during which the USSR probably will rely principally on the manned bomber for adequate coverage of targets in the continental US, although the Soviet geo- graphic disadvantage, as well as existing US air defenses and foreseeable improvements, will continue to handicap manned aircraft in the execution of the intercontinental at- tack mission. A decrease in the vulnerability of attacking aircraft can be effected by equip- ping them with air-to-surface missiles. Sub- marine-launched missiles could be an impor- tant weapon system for attacks against appro- priate targets in the US. Nevertheless, in the long run, improving US early warning and TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET defense capabilities could render even these attack capabilities insufficient. The intercon- tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) , however, could enable the USSR to present an entirely new type of threat, against which adequate defense, while scientifically possible, would be most difficult. Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program 28. In determining priorities for its program of missile development and production the USSR would have taken into account the fol- lowing main factors: (a) priority of missions to be carried out (i.e., first priority to air defense, second to peripheral and intercon- tinental attack, third to tactical support); (b) comparative value of missiles versus other weapons systems, and of one missile type versus another, in carrying out these missions; (c) feasibility of developing a particular mis- sile or missile system in time to meet require- ments; (d) availability of resources to develop and produce various types of missiles, includ- ing associated equipment and warheads. Tak- ing these factors into consideration, we esti- mate that at some time in the past Soviet military planners established priorities with- in their guided missile program generally as indicated below. While we believe that such a system of priorities is probably governing the Soviet guided missile program at the pres- ent time, we recognize that it will be subject to continuing revision as Soviet programs for the development of missiles and other weap- ons systems advance, and as the USSR re- appraises its military requirements. High Priority a. Missiles which can be developed in a short time: 1. Surface-to-air, HE 2. Air-to-air, HE b. Missiles which can be developed in a longer time: 1. Surface-to-surface, peripheral at- tack, nuclear 2. Surface-to-air, improved, nuclear/ HE 3. Air-t. o-surface, land targets, nuclear 8 c. Missiles which can be developed in a very long time: 1. Surface-to-surface, intercontinental attack, nuclear 2. Surface-to-air, antimissile missile, nuclear Lower Priority a. Missiles which can be developed in a short time: 1. Surface-to-surface, tactical support, nuclear/HE/CW 2. Surface-to-surface, submarine launched, nuclear 3. Air-to-surface, ship targets, nuclear/ HE b. Missiles which can be developed in a longer time: 1. Air-to-air, improved, nuclear 2. Air-to-surface, improved, ship tar- gets, nuclear In addition, an earth satellite with limited instrumentation for scientific purposes has probably been assigned a high priority for development in a short time. A satellite vehi- cle possessing reconnaissance capabilities of military value has probably been assigned a lower priority for development in a very long time. II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES Scientific and Technical Capabilities 29. On the basis of considerable evidence, we are confident that the Soviet missile research and development program is extensive and enjoys a very high priority. Although the USSR had no known guided missile develop- ment program during World War II, it ini- tiated such a program at the close of the war with a thorough and systematic exploitation of German missile experience. A native So- viet program has advanced rapidly since about 1948, and at present it embraces high quality research institutes, design bureaus, and plants, including some of the best facili- ties and equipment available in the USSR. These resources are adequate to continue and to expand the missile program. We believe TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 FOP SECRET TOP SECRET that the USSR need not in the future depend to any major extent upon Satellite support, except possibly in certain narrow fields such as precision optics and electronic instruments.5 30. The large number of Soviet activities asso- ciated with missile development, as well as results known to have been achieved to date, provide clear evidence of the intensity of the program, but there is relatively little informa- tion on its details. Our assessment of Soviet scientific and technical capabilities to develop missile components (presented in this section) and to develop complete missile systems (pre- sented in Section III) is based wherever pos- sible on the limited intelligence available, in- cluding information obtained from returning German missile specialists. However, we have also relied in large measure on known or esti- mated Soviet capabilities in relevant techni- cal fields, and on US guided missile experience. Missile Guidance and Control 31. The foundation for current Soviet capa- bilities in missile guidance is largely postwar exploitation of German personnel, facilities, equipment, and documents. The reconstruc- tion, design improvement, and, in some cases, testing of German equipment by German spe- cialists in the USSR covered almost the entire spectrum of guidance concepts in the surface- to-surface missile category, including radar tracking-radio control, beam riding, inertial, and celestial guidance systems. In the sur- face-to-air, category, the USSR acquired enough German knowledge and equipment to reconstruct the Rheintochter, Schmetterling, and Wasserfall missiles, each of which in- cluded an optical track-radio command sys- tem. An air-to-air guidance system for the Sokol missile, utilizing the same principles, was advocated by the Germans in the USSR. The electronic analogue computer of the Was- serf all system was subjected to further de- tailed studies and design improvements. The Germans also designed a surface-to-air missile system designated the R-113. The guidance 'Detailed information on Soviet scientific and technical resources for guided missile develop- ment, including the availability of technical In- formation from foreign sources, is presented in Annex B. 9 proposed for this system was a two-radar, ground based, command control type, capable of 360� coverage in azimuth. One radar was to acquire and track the target, and informa- tion from this radar was to be fed through a computer to the second radar which was used to track and position the missile. A semi- active radar homing head, also worked on by German scientists, appears to have been de- signed for use in a Wasserfall or R-113 type missile. The USSR exploited German World War II infrared developments, including a missile homing head called Juno. In the air- to-surface category, the Germans worked on a guidance system designated Komet,6 which was a combination beam rider and semiactive homing system. Beginning in about 1948, the USSR apparently reached the point where it could largely dispense with German-assist- ance, except in the missile guidance field. We have no information on German activities in the USSR subsequent to 1954. 32. Firm evidence has not been obtained to indicate which of the many guidance systems are being utilized in Soviet missiles. In the surface-to-air and air-to-surface categories, however, there are some fragmentary data: a. The air defense launching sites around Moscow employ a unique guidance system of native Soviet design. This system apparently has the ability to track multiple targets while scanning for new targets. It also apparently has an ability simultaneously to control mul- tiple missiles against multiple targets. Recent information indicates that a command guid- ance system may be employed. However, the possibility of a combination command-seeker system has not been ruled out. Several years' work on a semiactive surface-to-air homing system, performed by a German group, might have been intended to complement the ground guidance system associated with the Moscow sites. b. In the air-to-surface category, there is some evidence that the USSR continued de- velopment of an antishipping guidance sys- �For purposes of identification in US intelligence, the designation Komet refers not only to this guidance system, but also to the complete mis- sile system employing it. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I SECRET TOP SECRET tem closely resembling the German Komet. Electronic signals emanating from the Black Sea region were intercepted on many occa- sions in 1955 and again in late 1956. These signals were quite similar in many technical characteristics to the signals a Komet system might have radiated. 33. In addition to the fragmentary informa- tion presented above, a strong inferential measure of Soviet success in the guidance and control area is the large-scale ballistic mis- sile test program which has been under way at Kapustin Yar., Considering the above evi- dence in conjunction with demonstrated So- viet capabilities in other electronics applica- tions, we conclude that the USSR possesses the necessary scientific knowledge and tech- nical skills to develop advanced guidance and control systems for all categories of guided missiles. Missile Propulsion 34. As in the missile guidance area, the USSR took energetic measures after World War II to improve its knowledge of propulsion sys- tems for guided missiles. Only in the field of solid propellants, where the USSR had achieved a position of world leadership during World War II, was its interest in German work limited. The USSR acquired large quantities of pulsejet and rocket engine parts, assem- blies, and production tooling from Germany. Both standard and improved versions of V-1 and V-2 engines were produced under Ger- man supervision. Some reports indicate that as many as 100 to 300 V-2 motors of 25 tons thrust 8 were completed during the period 1947-50. The Germans also developed an improved V-2 engine with a thrust of 35 tons. This motor was placed in production in late 1948 and 100 to 250 had reportedly been pro- duced by 1950. At Soviet direction, two groups of Germans also worked on designs for two different 100-ton thrust motors, one of which was to be gimballed for missile directional control. Other evidence indicates that a 100- For details of Soviet ballistic missile test firing activities, see Annex C (Limited distribution under separate cover) . Metric tons are used throughout this estimate. 10 ton thrust motor could have been ready for static test in 1952; this would represent an outstanding achievement in advanced tech- nology. In the surface-to-air category, de- sign improvements were made on the Wasser- fall motor to increase its thruit from 17,000 pounds to approximately 20,000 pounds. We have some evidence of Soviet work in ramjet engines, but we know of no Soviet application of such engines to guided missiles. 35. Known Soviet achievements in turbojets and in both solid and liquid rocket motors in- dicate that the USSR is well advanced in propulsion systems applicable to guided mis- siles. Evidence indicating the application of turbojets to missile propulsion is lacking. Aerodynamics and Structure 36. We have no information on aerodynamic developments in the USSR which can be asso- ciated directly with the missile program since 1950. Most of the German work dealt with ballistic missiles. Many structural design modifications of the V-2 were made, including light weight structure and pressurized, inte- gral fuel tanks. One structural design (the R-14 ballistic missile) differed radically from the V-2. It had a long cone-shaped body with no aerodynamic control surfaces; control was provided by a gimballed motor. New body designs were also provided by the Ger- mans in the surface-to-air category, includ- ing the R-113 missile, which was longer and slimmer than the Wasserfall and had two wings and three tail surfaces instead of a cruciform configuration. 37. We do not know that any German de- signs have been developed fully by the USSR. Native Soviet activity in the design field is indicated by a single German report of a Soviet design for a subsonic air-to-surface Komet missile. 38. The USSR is known to have a number of the world's outstanding aerodynamicists, par- ticularly in the field of theoretical areody- namics, supported by extensive research facil- ities. Despite the dearth of information on native Soviet missile air-frame design, we esti- mate that the USSR has the knowledge of TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OP SECRET TOP SECRET basic aerodynamics, as well as the personnel and facilities, to support a program for devel- opment of guided missiles of transonic and supersonic speeds. Warheads and Fuzes 9 39. The USSR did not intensively exploit Ger- man World War II explosives experience, prob- ably because a high level of native compe- tence in explosive and fuze technology had already been achieved. To a limited extent, however, the USSR did acquire information on German fuzing techniques, equipment, and data, exhibiting interest in the V-2 fuzing system and in electromagnetic fuzes for mis- sile warhead application. We have extremely limited knowledge concerning the native So- viet program of warheads and fuzes. Impact, time-delay, or proximity fuzing techniques would not present any insurmountable tech- nical problems to the USSR. 40. Although we have some evidence on the details of the Soviet chemical warfare (CW) program, there is no evidence of the applica- tion of CW materials to guided missiles. We estimate, however, that the USSR is currently capable of providing CW warheads for any missile intended for antipersonnel attacks. Our estimate of Soviet capabili- ties to develop and produce nerve agents and an examination of the problems involved in the dissemination of agents in missile war- heads leads us to believe that the USSR could have had tabun (GA) warheads in 1954, and sarin (GB) warheads in 1956. We estimate that the USSR could probably develop and em- ploy "V" agents, more toxic than the "G" series, in guided missiles by 1960. This date is predicated on Soviet solution of the prob- lem of generating a proper aerosol for dis- persal of the "V" agent. 41. As in the case of CW, we have some evi- dence of a Soviet biological warfare (BW) capability but no evidence of Soviet applica- tion of BW materials to guided missiles. We estimate, however, that the USSR is capable Detailed estimates on Soviet capabilities and requirements for warheads are presented in Annexes A and D (the latter in limited distribu- tion under separate cover) . 11 of providing BW agents for antipersonnel, anticrop, or antilivestock use as soon as appro- priate missiles are available. 42. We estimate that the USSR could now have nuclear warheads for incorporation into several types of guided missiles. Geodesy and Cartography 43. The accuracies of Soviet long-range guided missiles will depend in part upon the USSR's capabilities in geodesy and cartogra- phy. The large, modern geodetic and carto- graphic organization created by the USSR since the days of Lenin is already notable for its achievements. It has computed a new ellipsoid, resurveyed and greatly extended the first-order triangulation net, and completely readjusted the Soviet survey system to a single datum. Such achievement is possible only by maintenance of very high standards of accu- racy. Most of the USSR is now covered by maps at the scale of 1:100,000 and maps of larger scales (1:25,000 or larger) are now be- ing emphasized. The new Soviet geodesy specifications emphasize the pursuit of still greater refinement and accuracy. 44. We estimate that the USSR can achieve geodetic location of targets in the US relative to launching sites in the USSR with errors of 300-500 feet, provided, as we believe, a tie has already been made covertly between So- viet and North American triangulation across the Bering Strait. If this connection has not been made, the probable error in target loca- tion would be about 1,060 feet. The location' error for European targets is estimated at 200-300 feet. We estimate that by 1965 these errors can be reduced by about half through extension of the Soviet geodetic and mapping system into Satellite areas and through the use of improved intercontinental ties with Europe and North America. The USSR is also working energetically in the study of geo- detic gravimetry, wherein gravity measures are used to reduce the error in calculating the relationship of two points on the earth's sur- face. The high competence of Soviet gravim- etrists and �their energetic data collection program, especially in the Arctic, may also enable the USSR to make early advances in TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 006707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UP SECRET TOP SECRET the study of the extent to which surface gravity variations influence a ballistic mis- sile during flight. There is evidence that the USSR is engaged in the study of the vertical gradient, but information is not available on the details and extent of such work. Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided Missiles 45. We estimate that the USSR has the in- dustrial base and related industrial experience to adapt and series produce developed proto- type missile systems of all types. However, we believe that in view of competing demands, the limited availability of electronic equip- ment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guided missile production until about 1958. Thereafter, expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much less severe. 46. We estimate that approximately two- thirds of the current output of Soviet elec- tronics production (in value terms) is allo- cated to military programs, and that the remainder is shared approximately equally by essential domestic telecommunication applica- tion and civilian consumer goods. Both the announced plans for the Soviet economy and our estimate of over-all Soviet military re- quirements indicate an increasing demand for electronics production during the next five years.1� The Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60) calls for expansion of electronics production by 1960 to three times the value of 1955 productiOn. This increase is one of the largest planned for a major industrial sector, but we estimate that the USSR is capable of realizing this ambitious goal. 47. Other military demands upon electronics output, as well as essential nonmilitary de- mands, will probably restrict the rapid build- up of missile production until new investment in the electronics industry scheduled under the Sixth Five-Year Plan makes additional output available. We estimate that signifi- cant portions of the additional electronics plant capacity will not be available until about " See also NIE 11-4-56, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961, 2 Au- gust 1956, Sections III�IV. 12 1958. In the interim, the USSR could divert electronics output to missiles from the size- able residual of nonmilitary electronics pro- duction or from other military electronics pro- grams, but it probably would not be willing to accept the adverse consequences of such a reallocation. However, we estimate that the Soviet program for expanding electronics production will create by the later years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan an industrial capa- bility to support an extensive and varied guided missile production program as part of a balanced over-all military program. 48. Another potential bottleneck in the pro- duction of guided missiles is the amount of time necessary to train production personnel and to adapt prototype mechanisms to series production. This problem is particularly acute in the production of precision mecha- nisms for missile system components, such as gyros, stable platforms, mechanical comput- ers, and certain valves. However, we estimate that the USSR has the engineering ability to overcome this potential bottleneck, and that it should be able to produce precision mecha- nisms in sufficient quantity to support an ex- tensive missile production program. III. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 11 49. Current intelligence on the specific guided missiles actually under development in the USSR is almost nonexistent, except in a very few instances. In the succeeding paragraphs, therefore, we assess Soviet technical capabili- ties to develop specific missiles types which, among the vast number of types the USSR could develop, seem to us most likely to satisfy the general requirements outlined in Section I above. There is intelligence to indicate that certain missiles are under development u While we consider the development program as a whole to be probable, the detailed character- istics represent a logical growth or developmental pattern within a particular family of missile systems. We have high confidence in our esti- mates on certain missiles currently in various stages of development, test, or operational em- ployment. However, in the light of inadequate evidence pertaining to other missile systems, our estimates of detailed characteristics for such systems are less certain. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET or in operation. In most instances, however, and especially for those types estimated for late in the period, our chief guide is our esti- mate of Soviet requirements and development priorities. Within each broad category of mis- siles (e.g., surface-to-air) , we have presented what we believe is a logical, step-by-step de- velopment program toward the more advanced types. 50. This assessment of Soviet capabilities to develop specific missile types is predicated up- on our estimate that concerted and continu- ing native Soviet research and development in the guided missile field began in 1948. The date given as the estimated Soviet opera- tional capability for each missile type is the earliest probable time at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel 12 in one operational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment. We estimate that the time interval between the Soviet decision to produce in series and the attainment of first operational capability is probably between six and 18 months, � under average conditions. For convenience, in the succeeding paragraphs we assume that in general a Soviet decision to produce a par- ticular missile in series has preceded the esti- mated operational date by an average time of one year. However, in instances of very high priority, the USSR could probably reduce this time interval to zero if the first operational unit were equipped with prototype weapons and if personnel training were begun early enough. These instances are specifically noted in the case of the surface-to-air missile (para. 60) and the ICBM (para. 84) . 51. Based on our current knowledge of the state of the guided missile art and our esti- mate of Soviet capabilities in parallel fields, we estimate that when a particular missile system first becomes operational its system reliability will be 40-60 percent. 13 52. Despite the obvious difficulties of estimat- ing individual weapons types to be developed over a period reaching 10 years into the future, we have sufficient confidence in the estimates made in this section of the paper to characterize the development program in ' "6- 13 the aggregate as "probable." There are sev- eral factors which contribute to this confid- dence, including: (a) sufficient intelligence to indicate at least the general nature of some current Soviet missile programs, notably the surface-to-surface and surface-to-air pro- grams; (b) foreseeable developments in US offensive and defensive capabilities which the USSR can ascertain and must attempt to counter; (c) the probability that the ultimate goal of the Soviet development program in the surface-to-surface category is an ICBM, and in the surface-to-air category an anti- ICBM; and (d) the probability that any de- velopment program will be limited by foresee- able states of the art and will advance through logical steps. In addition, sufficient technical differences exist between the specific missiles in this development program so that cancel- lation of one or several of the projects prob- ably would not appreciably advance the opera- tional dates of others. 53. Nevertheless, we recognize that Soviet re- quirements and priorities could change the development program significantly as the peri- od advances, and new goals, either more am- bitious or more restricted, may be set. This would be particularly likely in the event of an unforeseen technological breakthrough. Warhead Selection 14 54. As a critical portion of our estimate of the Soviet guided missile development pro- gram, we have considered Soviet capabilities to develop warheads for specific missile types. We estimate that the USSR has requirements for various sizes of nuclear, HE, and CW war- heads, and has the capability to develop them on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be employed. Our selec- tion of appropriate warheads for various mis- " Military personnel or civilian scientists and technicians. 'System reliability" in this context means the percentage of missiles which function according to specifications from missile takeoff to detona- tion in the target area. Malfunctions prior to launching are not included in this definition of system reliability. " For details, see Annexes A and D (the latter in limited distribution under separate cover) . TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 006707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OP SECRET TOP SECRET sue types, presented in Table I following Sec- tion III, is based on estimated Soviet warhead design technology and on consideration of the CEP's, payload weights and probable employ- ment of the various missiles. In general, we believe nuclear warheads would be preferable in most missile types and mandatory in some. The USSR would probably consider CW war- heads desirable in some missiles for certain specific missions. HE warheads would be sat- isfactory in some missiles with relatively small CEP's. We do not believe the USSR would develop and produce BW warheads for guided missiles, since BW could be disseminated more effectively by a wide variety of other means, including clandestine delivery. Surface-to-Air Missile Systems 55. In 1945-46, the USSR exploited in Ger- many all the important German surf ace-to- air missiles under development, including Wasserf all, Schmetterling, and Rheintochter, and caused a new design Fluse, to be under- taken. After their transfer to the USSR, the Germans continued work on these missiles, with the exception of the Fluse. Some work was probably done into 1951 to design a semi- active homing head for the Wasserf all, and four models are believed to have been con- structed and taken over by the USSR in late 1950. Considerable interest was also evi- denced by the USSR in improving the capabil- ity of the Wasserf all computer. In 1950, a group of Germans were ordered to prepare a study on an advanced surface-to-air missile, designated the R-113. Some of the Wo-sser- fall features, such as the propulsion system, were to be retained and improved, while other components, notably the airframe, were to be redesigned. Operationally, the R-113 was to be effective at altitudes of from 15,000 to 100,- 000 feet with a 32 n.m. slant range and a burn- out velocity of more than Mach 3. The So- viet specifications for the R-113 were rigorous and more closely supervised than were those of other German design projects. The Ger- man design study for this missile was sub- mitted to the Russians in 1951, but its dis- position is not known. 14 56. The most significant current intelligence in the surface-to-air category deals with guided missile installations around Moscow. Sightings of these installations have been made since mid-1953; there have also been a few reports of similar sites being constructed around Leningrad in 1955 and 1956. 57. In the Moscow area, 24 sites have been located with sufficient accuracy to indicate their arrangement in two concentric rings with radii of approximately 25 and 45 n.m. from the center of the city. The circum- ferential distance between the sites is about 8 n.m. on the outer ring and about 7 n.m. on the inner ring. Observation in all sec- tors around Moscow has not been possible, but we calculate that the inner ring contains 23 sites and the outer ring 34 sites, for a total of 57 sites. A typical site measures ap- proximately one mile by one-half mile, with three longitudinal and about 11 transverse concrete roads and approximately 60 launch- ing positions. Associated building complexes are of sufficient size to house from 200 to 400 personnel at each site. The dimensions, con- figuration, disposition, and quality of con- struction of these installations indicate that they comprise a static guided missile air de- fense system. 15 58. Certain unique equipment, designated in US intelligence as "YOYO," is located approxi- mately one mile from each operational site, on the Moscow side, and is generally aligned with the Center longitudinal road. YOYO is a radar for use in the surface-to-air missile guidance system. A recent report indicates that in tests in 1952, this radar was employed to track 5-6 targets simultaneously, and that it may be intended to track as many as 25 targets simultaneously. Based on this intel- ligence, and on the fact that provision has apparently been made for the simultaneous launching of an undetermined number of missiles from each site, we estimate that this system has a high traffic-handling capability. 59. Missile-like objects were observed in sub- stantial numbers at one Moscow site in 1955. They are estimated to be about 21/2 to 3 feet in diameter and 25 to 35 feet in length. 15 See map and diagrams on following pages. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 006707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I 01-1 SEC.:HET SECRET Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Mos 1 _ 37 ss Kalinin kb . froe,G,�Missile \ .0, , Kimry. 4 � van'kovo Taldom A 'G. � 0 1.1 � � 0 Missile launching site, confirmed Missile launching site, location tentative Missile launching site, predicted assembly plant, confirmed Missile assembly plant, tentative Principal road Principal milroad 10 20 30 11, 9, NAUTICAL MILES SECRET a. Bysokovsk Solnechnogorsk ru i .i1 .( Dmitrov Q ..1 s Aleksandrov 'V Zagorsk ), e 0 < S Kirzhach 56 el olokolamsk � ushkino a o ik 4, . i il (i ). 7 0 A. 1 AR 0 Kubinka le. "tPP11 4 Usovo. ------ '...MOSCOC �*MIN abushkin Lyubertsy hchelkovok't..- t"0 nino al Moska alahih a,. 11 i A IP Noginsk 0 73 \ Pavlovskiy� > s--Posad t a Kurovskoye 0 Klvoz Orekhovo Zuyevo aro-Fominsk Domodedovo Podol'sk ... 4,0�cf .9 Yegor'yevsk .55 Maloyaroslivets \ 4g. fil e Kolomna Oka 5 Kalu a 37 Serpukhov i Oka KashSirtaupino 38 _ Ozery Zaraysk 39 24439 2-57 SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I 'jrott...rt Typical Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Site, Moscow Area Map 2 Aci.Yo Radar are.i -....A&........,_,,,,,,...........................,.....�.............,. .�......................4..........�,,,,,,,. .'"t4,,,i. .A �/, ool m''' Ofie. 7.->-- vOt 5.0� Masi oat. . frare;unc e 71 ' . �AAA.> Possible transformer area , , Storage area 11,--11F- IISecurity Housing and administrative # ' Appro 5900' 0 --*/, , imately 2640' % / / / to MOSCOW /. - __ 'A",:: �,-,-,_-,S,-- --,- _...-- ..."--:.A.-.... .,.\ , --....1:-.,.- .i, Ai r,!,,ients . .- -- Air vents - ---/< / �...----:, Anterra>,- tJ'A' ' 14i f.- \''-----.:>: .-------- '..--2C----.. -'--/ '..7.1--....:"...:: - ' I( / ,.Intrance / Yo.Yo Rotors Artists Conception of Yo-Yo Bunker4:- NOTE: Details and 6.nensions ere opwaxim.� end Artists Conception of a Typical Layout of a Yo-Yo Radar Area Service 0 Security fendes --.4 111. Launching .tee iiii..E:= EjCp a r_____--FiE13 L-----'�'�' Jo 5280' MOPS . NiiA launch pad Concrete pathwaY Concrete road nidentified v. Bunker h pads Launc NoTE: 0.,,,..,. oppoximat� ond subj.. to ootiotion. Launch Pad and Bunker Arrangement � SiteLayout (Schematic) 24440 2.57 TRepsitcdffgr Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 FOP SECRET TOP SECRET 60. We believe that some sites in the surface- to-air missile defense system around Moscow have been operational since mid-1955, and that all sites are probably now operational. Based on the size and configuration of the missile-like objects observed, and on technical assessment of the capabilities of the YOYO, we estimate that at present this system prob- ably employs missiles capable of carrying a 600-700 pound payload 16 to a maximum al- titude of 60,000 feet, and a maximum horizon- tal range of 25 n.m. 17 Its guidance system is probably of the command type, with a CEP at maximum range of about 190 feet, or possibly a command and semiactive seeker with a CEP of about 50 feet. We believe that in this in- stance, the high priority requirement for im- proved air defense capabilities probably dic- tated the equipping of the first operational unit with prototype missiles simultaneously with the decision to begin series production. 61. The USSR has an excellent capability for the development of more advanced surf ace- to-air systems, and a high priority will almost certainly continue to be given to this program. It is probable that the currently operational surface-to-air missile system can and will be improved. We estimate that in 1957 a com- mand-type guidance system capable of 360� traverse could be available for employment with Moscow-type missiles, but that such a system would have a lower traffic-handling capability than the current Moscow system. 62. The current Moscow system will probably continue to have only limited effectiveness at very low altitudes. To overcome this defi- ciency, it is probable that the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1958 a surface-to-air system for low altitude cover- age, effective to a maximum of 40,000 feet al- titude and 15 n.m. range. This system could " Payload includes the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism. For the estimated yields of nuclear payloads which could be employed in these and other missiles see An- nex D . (Limited distribution under separate cover) . 17 This range represents our estimate of Soviet capabilities to extend the maximum horizontal range of the system. It probably had a maximum horizontal range of 20 n.m. when it first became operational in 1955. 15 probably employ missiles carrying 150 pound payloads, and achieve a CEP of about 50 feet with semiactive homing guidance. 18 63. It is also probable that the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1959 a surface-to-air system capable of carrying a 500-800 pound payload to a maximum of 80,000 feet altitude and 50 n.m. range. Its guidance would probably be of the command type or a command-seeker combination. The former could probably achieve a CEP of about 500 feet, the latter about 100 feet. 64. Although we have no firm evidence of So- viet interest in surface-to-air missiles for ship- borne defense, we believe a requirement for such missiles exists. We estimate that the USSR could probably have a 40,000 ft/15 n.m. missile system in operation in 1958, and an 80,000 ft/50 n.m. missile system in operation in 1960. We also estimate that the USSR could modify either or both of these missiles so as to make them suitable for dual purpose use as surface-to-surface missiles in appro- priate naval roles. Recognizing tllat a high degree of accuracy would be dependent upon the ability of the launching ship to acquire targets by radar, we estimate that the maxi- mum effective range of the 80,000 ft/50 n.m. system against surface targets would be roughly 30-50 n.m. 65. For improved range capabilities in defense of critical areas, it is probable that the USSR will develop and could have in operation in 1961 one of two missile systems: (a) a ram- jet propelled missile capable of carrying a 500-pound payload to a maximum altitude of 60-80,000 feet and a maximum of 100 n.m. Such a missile would have a speed of about Mach 2.5 and a CEP of 100 feet with terminal homing or 500 feet with command guidance; (b) a rocket-propelled missile capable of the " It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that the USSR would be unlikely to have an effective all-weather land based low altitude surface-to-air missile system in operational use prior to 1960-61. There is no evidence of So- viet interest in, or development programs for such a system. Further, the advanced radar techniques required for an operational guidance and homing system for such a missile are prob- ably beyond the capability of Soviet electronic technology, prior to 1960-61. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 lop SECRET TOP SECRET same payload capacity, accuracy, and range, but with an altitude up to 90,000 feet and a speed of about Mach 4. We estimate that the latter would probably be the USSR's selection, although the development of such a system would present more complex problems than the development of a ramjet missile system. 66. The required performance characteristics of a surface-to-air missile system which could effectively engage both supersonic cruise-type missiles and ICBMs are not fully known. Re- quired engagement characteristics are esti- mated as 75 n.m. horizontal range and 300,000 feet altitude to oppose the ICBM, and 300 n.m. horizontal range and 90,000 feet altitude to oppose cruise-type missiles. We do not be- lieve a single system effective against both these targets at maximum range and maxi- mum altitudes could be developed by the USSR during the period of this estimate. 67. We estimate that anti-ICBM defense would receive the higher priority, and that the USSR could probably develop a missile system of some capability against the ICBM for first operational use during the period 1963-66. We are unable to estimate with confidence the characteristics of such a system. It might carry a 1,000-pound payload to a horizontal distance of about 40 n.m. and an altitude of about 200,000 feet. An extension of these range and altitude capabilities would require advances in radar design which we believe are not within Soviet capabilities during this period. Such an anti-ICBM system might be modified for use against aircraft and cruise- type missiles up to altitudes of about 100,000 feet and to ranges of about 150 n.m. Devel- opment of antimissile defense systems will un- doubtedly be continued beyond the period of this estimate. Air-to-Air Missile Systems" 68. In late 1945 and 1946 the USSR acquired several German air-to-air missiles and designs. Although during this period German scientists in the USSR successfully applied Soviet solid propellants to German unguided rockets, we "unguided rockets are not included in this esti- mate. 16 know of only one instance in which the Ger- mans worked on a guided missile employing these propellants. This design was the Ger- man Falke, later given the Soviet designation Sokol. The Sokol was designed to have a solid-propellant rocket motor of 2,800 pounds thrust, an optical track-radio command guid- ance system, and an HE warhead of 106 pounds, to be detonated by either radio or acoustic proximity fuzing. The design study, excluding guidance, was completed by the Germans in 1948. We have no evidence that the USSR pursued any of the German work to completion, but there is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the USSR now has an air-to-air missile development program. 69. Despite the lack of significant intelligence in this field, we believe that Soviet air defense requirements would have dictated that the development of air-to-air missiles be given an initial high priority. This estimate is sup- ported by some indirect evidence, including Soviet interest in infrared homing devices and the fact that the airborne intercept radar which has been developed for the FLASH- LIGHT fighter could be used in conjunction with air-to-air missiles. We therefore believe that the USSR continued development work after 1948, and that by 1955 it could probably have had in operation a solid-propellant air- to-air missile capable of carrying a 25-pound payload to a range of 2-3 n.m., with a CEP of 30 feet. However, the passive infrared homing system probably employed in this mis- sile would limit its use to tail-cone attacks under conditions of good weather at the en- gagement altitude. 70. The probable limitations of the above mis- sile would have dictated high-priority efforts to develop an all-weather air-to-air missile, and we believe that in 1958 the USSR could probably have such a missile in operational use, employing a semiactive homing system and capable of carrying a 50-pound payload to a range of 5 n.m., with a CEP of 40 feet. In addition, the USSR will probably develop a longer range all-weather missile, and could probably have in operation in 1960 a missile capable of carrying a 150-pound payload to a range of 15-20 n.m., if launched at 60,000/ altitude. This missile could probably achieve TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 006707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET a CEP of 50 feet, employing semiactive horn- ing guidance, or infrared homing for tail-cone attacks. Air-to-Surface Missile Systems 71. Complete design data on all German air- to-surface missiles were acquired by the USSR, as were many completed German mis- siles. The USSR also obtained information on German air launchings of the V-1. One German group at Design Bureau 2, Moscow, engaged in research and development work from 1947 to 1951 on a guidance system for a Soviet-designed antiship missile designated Komet. Details are not available on the de- sign of its warhead, airframe, and propulsion system, although from information provided by the Germans who worked on the guidance system we have deduced general information concerning the over-all system performance. The TU-4 (BULL) was designated as the launching platform, and release of the mis- sile was to be accomplished at about 10,000 feet altitude at a maximum range of 55 n.m. from the target. The missile speed was esti- mated to be about 485 knots. A radar in the launching aircraft was to provide for beam- riding during the first two-thirds of the mis- sile's flight, and to illuminate the target for radar homing during the remainder of the flight. We believe that a missile system of the Komet type, or other air-to-surface sys- tem with similar performance characteristics, has reached at least final flight test stage.2� 72. We therefore estimate that a subsonic air- to-surface missile, capable of delivering a 3,000-pound payload to a range of 55 n.m. from the launching aircraft, could probably be in operational use in the USSR in 1956-57. This missile, possibly employing beam-riding with semiactive terminal homing guidance, could achieve a CEP of 150 feet against ships or other isolated and well-defined radar targets. A supersonic missile to fulfill this require- ment could probably be operational in 1958. 73. Although we have no evidence on other Soviet activities in the air-to-surface field, our estimate of Soviet military requirements "See Annex C (Limited distribution under sepa- rate cover). 17 leads us to believe that the USSR has prob- ably also developed a shorter-range missile for employment against ships. It probably could have had in operation in 1955 a sub- sonic air-to-surface missile capable of deliver- ing a 3,000-pound payload to a range of .20 n.m. A guidance system using television with a radio command link could probably achieve a CEP of 300 feet, but such a system could be employed only in good weather. 74. It is also probable that, in order to im- prove its long-range bomber attack capabili- ties against heavily defended land targets and large naval concentrations, the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1961 a supersonic air-to-surface missile capable of carrying a 3,000-pound payload to a range of 100 n.m. The CEP of such a missile would vary with the type of guidance employed, ranging from about 0.5 n.m. with homing on a clandestine beacon to 1-2 n.m. with inertial guidance (assuming in the latter case that the launching aircraft could determine its own position within 0.25 n.m.) . Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems Ballistic Missiles 75. After World War II, the USSR acquired from Germany a number of complete V-2 ballistic missiles, as well as component parts and production facilities. V-2's were test- fired at Kapustin Yar as early as the fall of 1947. During the period up until about 1950, several different groups of German missile specialists and engineers in the USSR devoted considerable effort to improve the V-2 sys- tem, increasing the thrust of its motor from 25 to 35 tons, and improving its accuracy. At the same time, a Soviet team attempted to increase its maximum range of about 200 n.m. to about 350 n.m. 76. German experts under Soviet direction also performed preliminary design studies for other ballistic missiles. In December 1948 they completed a design study for a missile designated R-10, to employ a 32-ton thrust motor and designed to carry a 2,150-pound payload to a range of 430 n.m.; this study actually represented the consolidation of a number of proposals for further improvement TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UF 6tC;KE I TOP SECRET of the V-2. Beginning in the spring of 1949, they worked on detailed designs for a missile designated R-14, which was to be a single- stage missile, to employ a 100-ton thrust mo- tor and to carry a 6,600-pound warhead to about 1,600 n.m. A series of feasibility studies was made for an R-12 missile, to be a staged missile carrying a 2,200-pound warhead to about 1,300 miles. The Soviet utilization of these studies is not known. 77. We believe that exploitation of the Ger- mans, together with parallel and subsequent native efforts, enabled the USSR to make sig- nificant progress in the development of bal- listic missiles of short and medium ranges after 1948. In addition to the 25- and 35-ton thrust rocket motors which were available at that time, we believe that a 100-ton thrust mo- tor was successfully developed by 1953. As indicated in Section II, we also believe the USSR has high capabilities for development of guidance systems, warheads, and probably air- frames for ballistic missiles. These estimates are supported by the extensive Soviet ballis- tic missile testing program which has been under way at Kapustin Yar.21 78. Based on the evidence cited above and in Annex C, we believe that the USSR has pur- sued the development of several surf ace-to- surf ace ballistic missile systems. A missile of 175-200 n.m. maximum range has been developed and could probably have been oper- ational in 1954. It is probable that this mis- sile employs a 25-ton thrust motor and could carry a 2,000-pound payload.22 Using a com- bination of radar track-radio command and inertial guidance, a CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probably be achieved, and this could probably be improved to about 2,000 feet by 1955-57. A CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probably be achieved " For further details, see Annex C (Limited dis- tribution under separate cover). 22 The 2,000-pound payload weights given for the 75, 175-200, and 350 n.m. ballistic missiles de- scribed in paragraphs 78, 79, and 81 represent our basic estimates. However, we believe that if the USSR incorporated certain technically feasible refinement in structural design, these missiles could carry to their maximum ranges payloads weighing 1.5 to 2 times as much as those esti- mated. We have no evidence of such Soviet developments. 18 with a pure inertial guidance system by 1958-59. 79. In addition, a missile of about 350 n.m. maximum range has been developed and prob- ably could also have been operational in 1954. It is probable that this missile employs a 35-ton thrust motor and could carry a 2,000- pound payload. 22 Using a guidance system similar to that of the 175-200 n.m. missile, this missile could probably achieve a CEP of 1-2 n.m., which could be improved to 3,000 feet by 1955-57. A CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probably be achieved with a pure inertial guidance system by 1958-59. 80. Development work has also been in prog- ress on a missile of about 700 n.m. maximum range, which could probably have been oper- ational in 1956. It is probable that this mis- sile employs a 100-ton thrust motor and could carry a 6,000-pound payload. A guidance sys- tem similar to those of the first two ballistic missiles described could probably achieve a CEP of 3 n.m., improvable to 1-2 n.m. by 1957-59. A CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probably be achieved with a pure inertial system by 1958-62. 81. We have no firm evidence of Soviet devel- opment of any ballistic missile of shorter range than 175 n.m. We believe that a re- quirement exists for a missile with 75 n.m. maximum range for tactical support of ground forces, and for neutralizing certain additional targets, and that its relative ease of develop- ment would probably have led Soviet plan- ners to include it in their program. We esti- mate that such a missile could probably have been in operation in 1954. Employing a 10- ton thrust motor, it could probably carry a 2,000-pound payload 22 and achieve a CEP of 1,200 feet, using a combination of radar track- radio command and inertial guidance. This CEP could probably be achieved with a pure inertial system by 1958-59. 82. Estimated Soviet requirements for im- proved attack capabilities against peripheral Eurasian targets and against the continental US lead us to believe that intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles are probably under high priority development. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET These missiles are the logical goals of the step-by-step Soviet ballistic missile develop- ment program which was clearly under way by 1948. The R-14 studies ordered by the USSR in early 1949, as well as the R-12 stud- ies, confirm an early Soviet interest in at least the IRBM. The significance of the R-14 studies is further increased by recent US ex- perience, which indicates the feasibility of achieving ranges up to 1,600 n.m. with a single 100-ton thrust rocket motor. In view of prob- able Soviet requirements and the progress of the Soviet program to date, we estimate that the USSR is probably developing and could probably have in operation in 1959 a single- stage IRBM, capable of carrying a 1,650- pound payload to a maximum range of 1,600 n.m. A CEP of 3-4 n.m. could probably be achieved with a combination of radar track- radio command and inertial guidance, improv- able to 1-2 n.m. in an additional one to two years, or in an additional three years with a pure inertial system. 83. In view of the potential capabilities of an IRBM against the continental US as well as overseas targets, if launched from a subma- rine, we believe the USSR may attempt to develop an IRBM for submarine employment. However, the formidable problems involved (including the development of pure inertial guidance, precise navigational equipment, and specially configured submarines with the nec- essary handling, fueling, and launching equip- ment) lead us to estimate that with a vigor- ous program the USSR might achieve an oper- ational submarine-launched IRBM system some time during the period 1964-66. 84. There is no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM, but its development has probably been a high priority goal of the Soviet ballistic missile program. We estimate that the USSR now possesses, or is rapidly acquiring, the necessary data for attacking the� aerodynamic, structural, and guidance problems of an ICBM. The solution of many problems, including the re-entry problem, has already been aided to some extent by the 700 n.m. ballistic missile development program, and should be further advanced by_sazork_att IM_-andarth satellite programs. It is 19 therefore probable that the USSR could have ready for operational use in 1960-61 a proto- type ICBM capable of carrying a 1,500- pound payload to a maximum range of 5,500 n.m. The high priority requirement for an operational ICBM would probably dictate the equipping of the first operational unit with prototype ICBMs. Such a missile would prob- ably employ two 100-ton thrust motors for first-stage propulsion and one 35-ton motor for second-stage propulsion. With a combina- tion of radar track-radio command and iner- tial guidance, a CEP of about 5 n.m. could probably be achieved, but an additional two years would probably be required to achieve this CEP with a pure inertial system. Cruise-Type Missiles 85. Many German V-1 component parts and considerable manufacturing equipment were shipped to the USSR after World War II. Es- timates on the number of V-1 missiles assem- bled in the USSR range from 50 to several hundred. German V-1 experts were exploited until about 1950; their work included proj- ects to improve the V-1's guidance system and its pulsejet engine. The Germans reported that Soviet scientists experimented with twin- pulsejet V-1 type missiles in 1948 and 1949. Also, a German group prepared a preliminary design study for a ramjet cruise-type missile designated R-15, which was to be a 1,600 n.m. missile boosted to operating altitude and speed by a jettisonable V-2. However, no German ramjet experts were involved and there was no evidence of any Soviet interest in this proj- ect after the completion of the design study in December 1949. 86. The postwar work on pulsejet missiles, while far less extensive than work in other guided missile fields, could have permitted the USSR to have improved V-1 type missiles in operational use by 1950. However, because of the apparent lack of Soviet interest and the limited speed and altitude capabilities and high fuel consumption of pulsejet motors, we believe that the USSR probably did not carry development of such missiles to completion. 87. The potential military value of subma- rine-launched surface-to-surface missiles, to- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP, SECRET TOP SECRET gether with the difficulty of employing ballis- tic missiles with submarines, would probably have led the USSR to develop cruise-type mis- siles initially. There is some evidence, as yet inconclusive, of the existence of Soviet subma- rines equipped to carry such missiles. Based on estimated Soviet requirements and capa- bilities, we believe that the USSR has probably developed and probably could have had in operation in 1955 a submarine-launched tur- bojet missile capable of carrying a 3,000-pound payload at high subsonic speeds to a maxi- mum range of 500 n.m. The accuracy of this missile would probably vary from 0.5 to 10 n.m., depending upon the guidance system employed and the accuracy with which the guidance submarine could fix its position. 88. A supersonic missile to fulfill this require- ment could probably be in operation in 1957. Guidance could probably be improved to ob- tain a CEP of 1-2 n.m. at maximum missile range in 1960, using an inertial guidance sys- tem monitored by radar map-matching. 89. The requirement for submarine-launched missiles will probably lead the USSR to de- velop a longer range cruise-type system. A supersonic missile capable of carrying a 3,000- pound payload to a maximum range of 1,000 n.m. could probably be operational in 1962. As with the 500 n.m. missile, CEP's would vary considerably with the type of guidance employed. Earth Satellite 90. In April 1955, the USSR announced the formation of the Permanent Interagency Com- mission for Interplanetary Communications. There is other evidence indicating the exist- ence of this commission at least as early as the fall of 1954. The public announcement was the first official indication that the USSR was actively engaged on problems associated with the launching and orbiting of earth sat- ellite vehicles. The six commission members named are among the leading Soviet scien- tists; their competence in such fields as astro- physics and nuclear research is internationally recognized. One of the first tasks of this corn- 20 mission was stated to be the organization of work for the creation of an "automatic" lab- oratory for scientific research of outer space. Since late 1955, numerous unofficial state- ments have been attributed to Soviet scien- tists concerning Soviet intentions to launch satellites during the International Geophys- ical Year (1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958). In September 1956, the Soviet IGY Committee announced its intention to participate in the IGY rocket and earth satellite programs. No detailed program was submitted, however. 91. The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. On the basis of estimated Soviet guided missile capabilities, we believe that the USSR possesses the basic technical ca- pabilities, skills, and other resources required to develop, build, and orbit an unmanned satellite vehicle. The successful orbiting of a satellite vehicle requires solutions for many of the scientific and technical problems encountered in the development of long- range ballistic missiles, except for the re-entry problem, and with the added requirement for a small, long-life power supply. We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting, in 1957, a satellite vehicle which could acquire scientific information and data of limited mili- tary value. A satellite vehicle possessing sub- stantial reconnaissance capabilities of military value could probably be orbited in the period 1963-65. Specialized Missiles 92. We consider that, during the period of this estimate, it will be within Soviet capa- bilities to develop specialized missiles for em- ployment as decoys and antiradar weapons. We have not estimated specific Soviet pro- grams among the wide range of possibilities in these fields. However, we believe that some of the air-to-surface missiles described in the preceding paragraphs could be modified to home on ground radars, and that a portion of the air-to-surface missile production estimated in Annex A might comprise these antiradar weapons. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 ur OLUI,L I Designa- tion First Opera- tonal Capa- bility Date � TOP SECRET TABLE I SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 Para. Refer. Maximum Maximum Horizontal Altitude Range (ft.) (n.m.) SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS Accuracy (CEP In ft.) Payload ' (lbs. and type) Maxi- mum Speed (Mach No.) Guidance Ground- Launched SA-1 * mid-1955 60,000 20 (1955) 50 or 190 600-700 2.0- Command type (190' CEP); 56- 25 (1957) nuclear or HE 2.5 mid-course command with terminal homing, probably semiactive (50' CEP). 60 SA-2 1958 40,000 15 50 150 HE 2.0 Semiactive homing 62 SA-3 1959 80,000 50 100 or 500 - 500-800 nuclear or HE 3.0 Command type (500' CEP); command with homing (100' CEP). 63 SA-4 1961 90,000 100 100 or 500 500 nuclear or HE 3.5 Command type (500' CEP); command with homing (100' CEP). 65 (Anti-ICBM System . SA-5 1963-66 ( 200,000 40 1,200 (Modification for use against aircraft and 1,000 nuclear cruise-type 8.0 Command type 67 ( missiles ( 100,000 150 500 1,000 nuclear 7.0 Command with homing Ship- borne SA-6 1958 40,000 15 50 150 HE 2.0 Beam riding and/or semi- active homing. 64 SA-7 1960 80,000 50 100 or 500 500-800 nuclear or HE 3.0 Command type (500' CEP); command with homing (100' CEP). 64 Remarks First operational capability simultaneous with decision to series produce. Charac- teristics are those estimated for early 1957. For low altitude defense. Alternate system also possi- ble. See paragraph 65. (Characteristics estimated are (subject to considerable error. (Could be modified for dual- (purpose use as surface-to- (surface missiles in appropri- (ate naval roles. We evaluate this program as "probable," with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. See footnote to title of Section III. Those missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are indicated by an asterisk following the missile designa- tion. 'These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference. The same designations are used in Table II following Section I of Annex A. ' For definition, see paragraph 50. Payload includes the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism. Warhead capabilities and requirements are discussed in Annexes A and D (the latter in limited distribution under separate cover). See Director of Intelligence; USAF, footnote to paragraph 62. TOP SECRET 21 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 ur, btuit TOP SECRET TABLE I (Cont'd) SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966' AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS First Opera- tonal Maximum Approx. Capa- Maximum Payload' Speed � Gross Designa- bility Range Accuracy (lbs. and (Mach Weight Para. tion Date � (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) (lbs.) Guidance Refer. Remarks AA-1 1955 2-3 30 ft. 25 HE 2.0 175 Passive infrared homing. 69 Tail-cone attack in good weather. AA-2 1958 5 40 ft. 50 HE 2.0 300-450 Semiactive homing. 70 All-weather. AA-3 1960 15-20 if Soft. launched at 60,000' 150 nuclear 2.0 or HE 800 Semiactive homing or in- frared homing. 70 All-weather or tail-cone attack. AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS First Opera- tional Capa- Maximum Payload' Cruise Speed Designa- bility Range Accuracy (lbs. and (Mach tion Date' (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) AS-1 1955 20 300 ft. 3,000 nuclear or HE 0.8-0.9 A5-2. 1956-57 55 150 ft. 3,000 nuclear or HE 0.9 AS-3 1958 55 150 ft. 3,000 nuclear or HE 1.5 AS-4 1961 100 0.5-2.0 n.m. 3,000 nuclear 2.5 max. Approx. Gross Weight (lbs.) 6,000-8,000 8,000- 10,000 8,000- 10,000 11,000 Guidance TV with radio command link. Beam riding with semi- active terminal homing. Beam riding with semi- active terminal homing. Command type, radar map- matching, or homing on clandestine beacon (CEPs of 0.5 n.m.); with inertial guidance, 1-2 n.m. CEP as- suming launching aircraft can fix own position with 0.25 n.m. Para. Refer. Remarks 73 For use in good weather. 72 For use against ships or other well- defined radar targets. 72 Ditto. 74 For use against heavily-defended land targets or large naval concen- trations. ' �" See footnotes on page 21. 'Does not include speed of launching aircraft. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 22 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 ijroct....1w TOP SECRET TABLE I (Cont'd) SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS First Opera- Thrust trona]. of Approx. Capa- Maximum Payload ' Motor Gross Desig- bility Range Accuracy (lbs. and (metric Weight nation ' Date ' (n.m.) (CEP) type) tons) (lbs.) Ballistic Missiles Guidance Para. Refer. Remarks SS-1 1954 75 1,200 ft. 2,000 ' 10 12,000 Radar track-radio command/ 81 For tactical support of ground nuclear, inertial. Same CEP attain- forces, and for neutralizing certain HE, or able with pure inertial sys- other targets. CW tern by 1958-59. SS-2� 1954 175- 1-2 n.m. 2,000 ' 25 28,000 Radar track-radio command/ 78 Ditto. 200 (1954) nuclear inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at- 2,000 ft. or CW, tamable with pure inertial (by 1955- possibly system by 1958-59. 57) HE SS-3 * 1954 350 1-2 n.m. 2,000 5 35 42,000 Radar track-radio command/ 79 Ditto. (1954) nuclear inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at- 3,000 ft. or CW tamable with pure inertial (by 1955- system by 1958-59. 57) SS-4� 1956 700 3 n.m. 6,000 100 110,000 Radar track-radio command/ 80 For peripheral attack; see paras. 23 (1956) nuclear inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at- and 27c. 1-2 n.m. tamable with pure inertial (by 1957- system by 1958-62. 59) . SS-5 (IRBM) 1959 1,600 3-4 n.m. 1,650 100 150,000 Radar track-radio command/ 82 For peripheral attack. (1959) nuclear (single inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at- 1-2 n.m. stage) tamable with pure inertial (by 1960- system by 1962. 61) 88-6 (ICBM) 1960-61 5,500 about 1,500 First stage, 300,000 Radar track-radio command/ 84 First operational capability simul- 5 n.m. nu- two 100-ton inertial; same CEP attain- taneous with decision to series pro- clear motors; second able with pure inertial sys- duce. For intercontinental attack. stage, one 35- tern by 1962-63. ton motor. 1e SS-7 (IRBM) 1964-66 A submarine-launched IRBM system, with characteristics similar to those of the 1959 83 ground-launched system, might be available for operational employment some time during the period 1964-66. See footnotes on page 21. These payload weights represent our basic estimates. However, if the USSR incorporated certain technically feasible refinements in structural design, these missiles could carry to their maximum ranges payloads weighing 1.5 to 2 times as much as those estimated. We have no evidence of such Soviet developments. TOP SECRET 23 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Jr, oct..d1C I TOP SECRET TABLE I (Cont'd) SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS (Cont'd) First Opera- tional Cruise Approx. Capa- Maximum Payload Speed Gross Desig- bility Range Accuracy (lbs. and (Mach Weight nation' Date' (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) (lbs.) Cruise-Type Missiles SS-8 SS-9 SS-10 Guidance Para. Refer. Remarks 1955 500 0.5-10.0 3,000 0.9 12,000 Radar track-radio command (CEP of 0.5 n.m. 87 Designed for sub- n.m. nuclear with forward guidance station within 100 n.m. of marine launching. target; 1.0 n.m. with forward station within 200 n.m. of target); hyperbolic radio (CEP of 1-10 n.m.); combination of inertial guidance and homing on clandestine beacon (CEP of 1-2 n.m.); inertial system monitored by radar map- matching (CEP of 1-2 n.m. by 1960); pure iner- tial (CEP of 10 n.m. in 1955, with 2.5 n.m. at maximum range attainable by 1984, assuming submarine can fix own position within 0.5 n.m.). 1957 500 0.5-10.0 3,000 1.5-2.0 12,000 Same as 1955 subsonic missile. 88 Ditto. n.m. nuclear 1962 1,000 1-10 3,000 1.5-2.0 25,000 Hyperbolic radio (CEP of 1-10 n.m.); inertial 89 Ditto. n.m. nuclear system monitored by radar map-matching (CEP of 1-2 n.m.). CEP of 5 n.m. at maximum range attainable with pure inertial system by 1964, as- suming submarine can fix own position within 0.5 n.m. "a See footnotes on page 21. TOP SECRET 24 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OF' SECRET TOP SECRET ANNEX A A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM 1. The program outlined in this Annex can- not be taken as the most likely or the prob- able Soviet program. We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.' I. POSSIBLE PROGRAM 2. We have direct evidence of the series pro- duction and operational deployment of only one of the 24 missile types discussed in Sec- It is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF, that the number of certain shorter range surface-to-surface and shorter range air-to-sur- face missiles projected in this estimate is in ex- cess of any reasonable production in light of the limited availability of nuclear warheads and the limited requirement for HE and CW warheads. The number of missiles in these categories as shown in Annex A has been predicated mainly on the assumption that, although the Soviets recognize the desirability of having a high pro- portion of nuclear warheads (e.g., paragraphs 35 and 37 of Annex A) they would: (a) Produce far more of these missiles than the number for which they could provide any significant percentage of nuclear warheads (paragraph 40 of Annex A and Table II, Annex A) (b) Produce and use HE or CW warheads for the bulk of this large number of missiles (e.g., paragraphs 37 and 40 of Annex A) (c) Plan for and be willing to accept the high cost and relative ineffectiveness of using a missile to deliver HE or CW on many mili- tary missions for which a nuclear warhead is highly desirable, if missiles are to produce the effects desired. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, agrees that the USSR would indeed satisfy its requirements for missiles with HE and CW warheads, includ- ing reserve stocks, but believes that a shortage of nuclear materials would then limit the fur- ther production of missiles in these categories to the number for which nuclear warheads could be provided. 25 tion III of the DISCUSSION. We have no knowledge of the actual Soviet program for production and employment of missiles during the next 10 years, and we could reasonably ex- pect little direct evidence bearing on the prob- lem. The range of possibilities is wide. In at- tempting to narrow this range, and to arrive at a better-defined judgment of the dimen- sions of the Soviet missile threat which will confront the US during the decade, we pro- ceeded as follows: First, we estimated Soviet military requirements for numbers of missiles by type, making this estimate consistent with the date at which we believe each type could be available. These numbers were then modi- fied in the light of: (a) the estimated avail- ability of nuclear materials for warheads; (b) the estimated limitations of the Soviet economy, e.g., of the electronics and con- struction industries; and (c) an assumed So- viet desire to plan a reasonably economical program involving efficient production and an expenditure curve which would not move too sharply or irregularly and thus severely affect expenditures for other military programs. 3. In considering the numbers of missiles to be stockpiled, we have been unable to make definitive estimates of the Soviet view as to the effectiveness of missiles versus other weap- ons systems. We have, however, exercised judgment along the general lines indicated in Section I of the DISCUSSION as to the rel- ative weight Soviet planners would give to par- ticular missile types versus other available weapons to perform various missions. We do not believe that Soviet planners would at pres- _ ent be capable of realistically evaluating the effectiveness of their own as-yet undeveloped weapons systems. When such evaluations can ' be made, various aspects of any currently visualized Soviet program will be modified. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 4. This analysis is predicated upon our basic . estimate that, barring unpredictable techno- logical or political changes, there will be no specific war readiness target-date in Soviet . military programs through this period. We have therefore not attempted to postulate what Soviet military planners would judge necessary to meet their full requirements for war readiness. We assume that the USSR will develop a missile force in-being consistent with Soviet judgments as to the effectiveness of missiles versus other weapons systems, that it will apportion its efforts according to the priorities of the various missions, and that it will stress the development and maintenance of production skills, experience, and facilities that can be expanded rapidly if necessary. We have not attempted to define the force in- being as optimum, maximum, or minimum, nor have we attempted to arrive at precise percentage requirements for air defense ef- fectiveness or precise numbers of targets to be attacked by missiles. 5. Clearly the following paragraphs cannot be regarded as defining the most probable Soviet accomplishment over 10 years. There are far too many doubtful factors entering into the calculations; moreover, it is certain that any 10-year program of missile produc- tion envisaged now, whether by the USSR or by ourselves, will be subject to extensive change as the years go by. We believe, how- ever, that these paragraphs set forth a pro- gram which, in the light of our uncertain knowledge at. the present time, is not only possible but is also feasible and reasonable. Warheads' 6. We have not attempted to estimate pre- cisely what proportion of the stockpiles of various missiles would be provided with nu- clear, HE, or CW warheads where such a choice would be feasible. We recognize, how- ever, that the availability of nuclear materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production during the period of this estimate. In those cases where CEP's See Section II of this Annex, and Annex D (the latter in limited distribution under separate cover) . 26 and payloads make HE or CW warheads feasi- ble, we believe the USSR would produce such warheads in sufficient quantity to meet its requirements for certain specific missions, without regard to the availability of nuclear materials. However, we are unable to deter- mine whether shortages of nuclear materials would in fact result in the production of fewer missiles of certain types than estimated here- in, or in the production of additional HE or CW warheads, or both. Surface-to-Air Program Ground-Launched 7. We estimate that the high priority almost certainly assigned to air defenses generally, together with the necessity for air defense weapons compatible with the requirements for defense against high-performance aircraft and missiles, probably gives surface-to-air mis- sile defenses one of the highest priorities among current Soviet military programs. Ob- servance of construction of the first of an estimated 57 launching sites around Moscow in 1953, some five years after the initiation of a native missile program, tends to confirm this estimate. Construction of the Moscow launching sites represented a major effort during the years 1953-56. On the basis of an estimated 60 launchers per site, and on allocation of four missiles per launcher, the missile stockpile requirement for the entire Moscow system would be about 14,000 mis- siles. Our estimate that large-scale produc- tion of these missiles is under way is sup- ported by observations in 1955 and 1956 of four and possibly as many as six factory-type facilities near the city. These unique and almost identical facilities, at present in dif- ferent stages of completion, appear to be par- tial fabrication and final assembly plants for surface-to-air missiles. At one of them, more than 450 missile-like objects were observed in September 1955. 8. Aside from the information presented above, plus some evidence that launching sites may be under construction near Leningrad, we have no intelligence on Soviet programs for the operational employment or produc- tion of surface-to-air missiles. We believe, TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 uP SECRET TOP SECRET 27 however, that the surface-to-air program will � . continue to enjoy high priority. We believe that each surface-to-air system developed by the USSR will, with relatively minor improve- . . ments, possess combat utility for some five to seven years following the introduction of the succeeding system. In this manner, new- er systems can either supplement older sys- tems or permit their allocation to less criti- cal static targets or to mobile units for de- fense of field forces. 9. Soviet military planners undoubtedly view the defense of Moscow as being of very high priority and of critical importance. They probably recognize that the current Moscow surface-to-air system will satisfy their require- ments for only a few years. Available intelli- gence indicates that although the Moscow system has the advantage of a very high rate of fire, it imposes limitations on the sector covered by individual sites to about 600, and a large number of sites are required to provide adequate all-around coverage. Be- cause of these limitations and the great ex- pense of the current installation in fixed facil- ities, we believe the surface-to-air missile de- fense as observed around Moscow to be a spe- cial case dictated by the special importance of Moscow to the USSR. We believe that the Moscow-type surface-to-air defenses as now constituted and in terms of the level of defense effort would not be deployed in any additional Soviet areas, except possibly Leningrad. 10. To provide surface-to-air missile defenses for other critical areas, several alternatives are open to Soviet planners. For example, a single ring of sites, comparable to the inner Moscow ring of 23 sites, could provide a rela- tively high level of defense at most defended areas. With the present YOYO guidance sys- tem, we believe that 12 sites would be required to give 360� coverage with acceptable overlap. On the other hand, we estimate that in 1957 the current system could probably be modi- fied to incorporate a guidance system capable of 3600 traverse. Such a system would have a lower traffic-handling capability, but it would have the advantage of permitting sub- division of the large fire-units of 60 launchers into smaller units, each with its own guidance system. 11. We have no intelligence to indicate wheth- er the USSR will elect to defend a few critical areas at a high level of defense or, alternative- ly, a larger number of areas at a lower level of defense. In any case, we estimate that a logical program for the 60,000 ft./25 n.m. mis- sile might involve the activation of 150 units by 1959. This would require a stockpile of about 36,000 missiles, to be produced in the period 1955-58.3 12. The low altitude capability estimated for the 40,000 ft./15 n.m. system which could probably become available in 1958 4 would make it a valuable weapon for augmenting the defenses of both critical areas and field forces. This low-altitude coverage would prob- ably be required to supplement the later, more advanced high-altitude systems as well as the current 60,000 ft./25 n.m. system. The USSR might thus produce a stockpile of about 22,400 of these missiles in the period 1958-66, and activate about 350 units for their employ- ment.� A portion would probably be assigned to critical static target areas and the remain- der, employing mobile launchers, to field forces. 13. It is probable that the USSR would desire to defend a relatively large number of critical military installations and industrial areas with surface-to-air systems of the 80,000 ft./ 50 n.m. and 90,000 ft./100 n.m. types. The improved characteristics of these systems would permit a reduction in the number of units assigned to the defense of any given critical area. We estimate that a total stock- pile of about 60,000 missiles of these two types might be produced between 1959 and 1963, and that a total of about 250 units might be activated.� Beginning in about 1959, missiles of the 60,000 ft./25 n.m. type would probably ' Calculation based on 60 launchers per unit, four missiles per launcher. See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph 62 of the DISCUSSION. 5 Calculation based on 16 launchers per unit, four missiles per launcher, with an allocation of 150 units to static defense and 200 units to field forces. " Calculation based on 60 launchers per unit, four missiles per launcher. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UP SECRET TOP SECRET be phased out of the defenses of critical areas and be redeployed to less critical areas and field force units. 14. The numbers of interim anti-ICBM mis- siles and units which the USSR might have by 1966 is conjectural. The USSR might elect to stockpile several thousand as an ultimate objective, the exact number depending upon: (a) its estimate of the number of US ICBMs to be countered; (b) its estimate as to the net effectiveness of the system against ICBM's; (c) the number of nuclear warheads avail- able for use in the anti-ICBM role; and (d) its estimate of the effectiveness of this system, as modified, against high performance bomb- ers and cruise-type missiles. The uncertain- ties as to when such a weapon might be brought to first operational use (1963-66) precludes confident numerical estimates. On a tentative basis, we estimate that a reason- able number of missiles produced through 1966 might be 1,000 for use in the anti-ICBM role, and the number of units about 15. Shipborne 15. While the defense of naval surface units would probably have a lower priority than the defense of key land targets, Soviet planners would almost certainly recognize that ship- borne surface-to-air missiles could provide valuable protection for the Soviet surface fleet and decrease its dependence on shore-based aircraft. Considering these factors together with the economic cost of such a program, we believe the USSR might seek during the period of this estimate to equip about two- thirds of its cruisers and about one-sixth of its destroyer types with surface-to-air missiles. On the basis of estimated Soviet naval strength for 1961, and assuming a relatively constant force after that date, about 24 cruis- ers and 48 destroyer types might thus be equipped with surface-to-air missiles by 1966. A logical program might be as follows: (a) equip six cruisers and eight destroyer types with 40,000 ft./15 n.m. shipborne mis- All calculations based on four launchers per cruiser and two launchers per destroyer type, with an allowance of 30 missiles per launcher and a small allowance for reserve. 28 siles, producing a stockpile of 1,500 such mis- siles between 1958 and 1961; 7 (b) later, equip 24 cruisers, including the six above, with � 80,000 ft./50 n.m. shipborne missiles, pro- ducing a stockpile of 3,000 such missiles be- tween 1960 and 1966; (c) equip an additional 40 destroyers with the 40,000 ft./15 n.m. mis- siles (including those withdrawn from the original six cruisers) , the conversion of these destroyers and production of an additional 2,500 missiles to be accomplished by 1966. 16. Warheads. Nuclear warheads could be employed in any of the surface-to-air missile types estimated for the period except the 40,000 ft./15 n.m. types. While the small CEP's of most surface-to-air missile types would make HE warheads satisfactory, we estimate that the USSR would include nuclear warheads in some of these missiles. Such war- heads would be mandatory for anti-ICBMs. 17. Cost. The ground-launched surface-to- air programs, involving the activation of about 750 static and mobile units and produc- tion of a stockpile of some 120,000 missiles, would cost an estimated 36 billion 1955 dollars in investment and operating expenditures through 1966. This represents about one-half of the dollar cost of the over-all missile pro- gram set forth in this Annex, and its dollar allocation is more than three times that of any other single category of missiles. The shipborne surface-to-air programs would en- tail investment and operating costs amount- ing to seven billion dollars, or about 10 per- cent of the over-all missile program.8 Air-to-Air Program 18. We have no evidence of any Soviet pro- gram for the operational employment or pro- duction of air-to-air missiles, but we believe that such a program has probably enjoyed a high initial priority as part of the over-all Soviet air defense effort. The Soviet air-to- air missiles which we estimate will probably be available during the first half of the period have several advantages which tend to coun- teract their guidance and payload limitations. For details of the estimated costs of the entire missile program, see Section III of this Annex. All dollar costs presented in this estimate are in 1955 dollars. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I U1-) SECRET TOP SECRET These include: (a) their relatively cheap unit cost; (b) the availability of large numbers of fighter aircraft as carriers; and (c) their abil- ity to improve fighter kill capabilities. Con- current surface-to-air and air-to-air programs are justified during much of the period be- cause of their complementary relationships. We believe, however, that late in the period the contribution of air-to-air missiles to the over-all Soviet air defense effort will probably decrease as the nature of the threat evolves. 19. We estimate that the USSR will continue to maintain about 9,300 fighter aircraft in operational units through at least 1961. As- suming an initial program to equip about one- fourth of these fighters with the currently available 2-3 n.m./good-weather air-to-air missile, a stockpile of about 20,000 missiles might be produced by 1958.9 Soviet planners would probably consider this air-to-air sys- tem as an interim measure only, to be sup- plemented by the 5 n.m./all-weather air-to-air system which we estimate could probably be available in 1958. A Soviet program for this missile might involve full equipment of the 4,800 Soviet all-weather fighters estimated for 1961. Thus a stockpile of about 55,000 such missiles might be produced between 1958 and 1961.19 20. Soviet production of the 15-20 n.m. air- to-air missile, which could probably first be available in 1960, would probably be limited by the actual or impending threat of attack by cruise-type and ballistic missiles. How- ever, since the 15-20 n.m. missile could carry a 150-pound payload, three times that of the 5 n.m. air-to-air missile and capable of em- ploying nuclear as well as HE warheads, we believe some production would probably be undertaken. As a tentative figure only, we estimate that some 7,000 such missiles might be produced between 1960 and 1963. 21. Cost. The air-to-air programs described would entail an investment and operating cost amounting to about seven billion dollars, or 10 "� Calculations based on four missiles per aircraft per sortie, with sufficient 2-3 n.m. missiles avail- able for two sorties per aircraft and sufficient 5 n.m. missiles for three sorties per aircraft. 29 percent of the total cost. The entire air de- fense missile program, including surface-to- air and air-to-air missiles of all types, com- prises approximately 70 percent of the dollar cost of the over-all Soviet missile program set forth in this Annex. Air-to-Surface Program 22. While there is considerable evidence to in- dicate Soviet interest in air-to-surface missiles and we believe that one type has reached at least final flight test stage, there is no evi- dence of Soviet series production in this mis- sile category. Our belief that such a program would probably be undertaken rests primarily on two factors: (a) Soviet planners probably estimate that they face a serious threat from US and Allied carrier task forces and that the capabilities of these task forces to defend themselves against close-in attacks by air- craft are already high and will continue to improve; and (b) they probably estimate that as the period advances, the capabilities of their own bombers to penetrate the defenses of key Western land targets will materially decrease. 23. Until 1961, the air-to-surface missiles available to the USSR will probably be those designed primarily as antiship weapons. A Soviet program for these missiles might be as follows: (a) on an interim basis, produce by 1958 a stockpile of about 1,000 11 subsonic air-to-surface missiles, of which the majority might be 55 n.m. missiles of 8-10,000 pounds gross weight, and a portion might be 20 n.m. missiles of 6-8,000 pounds gross weight; (b) replace this stockpile with the supersonic 55 n.m. missiles which could probably be available in 1958, producing a stockpile of 1,000 11 by 1960. Such a program could pro- vide air-to-surface missiles for employment by 300 or more aircraft,'2 most of which would be of medium bomber or larger types. Some 55 n.m. missiles could be employed against 11 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the numbers of shorter range air-to-surface missiles shown here are excessive. See his foot- note to paragraph 1 of this Annex. L2 Calculation based on one missile per aircraft per sortie, with sufficient missiles for three sorties per aircraft. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I 01-) SECRET TOP SECRET land targets, although the guidance system estimated for these missiles would limit their employment to isolated and well-defined radar targets and the short range would also limit their utilization. HE warheads would prob- ably be satisfactory for employment against single ships, but nuclear warheads would be employed against land targets and ship con- centrations. 24. The supersonic 100 n.m. missile of 11,000 pounds gross weight, which could probably be available in 1961, would increase the capa- bilities of manned heavy bombers to attack well-defended land targets, and could decrease the vulnerability of these aircraft. A Soviet program for these missiles might involve pro- duction of a stockpile of about 1,000 by 1966. Because of their CEP's payloads and prob- able employment, these missiles would require nuclear warheads. Surface-to-Surface Program Ground-Launched 25. Information from returned German per- sonnel, as well as the large-scale testing of ballistic missiles in the USSR, indicate that at least experimental or pilot-line production has been under way for six to eight years, and that there must be at least one major assembly facility committed to such produc- tion." Other than this circumstantial evi- dence, we have no knowledge of any Soviet program for the production or operational employment of ground-launched surface-to- surface missiles. 26. In estimating possible Soviet stockpiles for ground-launched surface-to-surface mis- siles, we have considered the different priori- ties the USSR would probably assign to mis- siles for augmenting or replacing other weap- ons systems in the tactical support, peripheral attack, and intercontinental attack roles, 14 and weighed these priorities against the re- quirement for economy in expenditure and in utilization of nuclear materials. While we have generally equated the stockpiles of cer- tain missiles to numbers of operational units 15 See Annex C (Limited distribution under sepa- rate cover) . " As set forth in Section I of the DISCUSSION. 30 and targets to be attacked, the stockpiles themselves were not derived by any precise calculation of these factors. The stockpiles represent a time-phased program designed to achieve a reasonable degree of readiness and an expandable production capability. This we have done in the belief that Soviet planners must make contingent decisions when technology and doctrine are changing rapidly and comparative evaluation of com- peting weapons systems is not clear-cut. 27. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (up to 350 n.m. range) a. Because of its relatively low priority within the missile program, a production pro- gram for 75 n.m. ballistic missiles would prob- ably be phased over a fairly long period. A stockpile of about 9,000 15 such missiles might be produced between 1954 and 1960, with stress on maintaining an expandable produc- tion capability. This stockpile could equip about 90 missiles units." The estimated 1,200-foot CEP of this missile would permit use of nuclear, HE, or CW warheads against appropriate targets. b. On the same basis, a stockpile of about 3,000 15 ballistic missiles of 175-200 n.m. range might be produced between 1954 And 1960. This stockpile could support about 30 units. A basic requirement exists for nuclear war- heads. The estimated 1954 CEP of 1-2 n.m. would probably preclude the use of HE but not CW warheads, and would limit employ- ment of these missiles to static targets. With a CEP improved to 2,000 feet by 1955-57, the use of HE would be feasible for some operations. c. To provide an improved capability for attack against NATO or other forces, the USSR might have produced a stockpile of about 700 15 ballistic missiles of 350 n.m. range between 1954 and 1956. This stockpile could support about 14 units. 17 The same warhead 15 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the numbers of short range surface-to-surface missiles shown here are excessive. See his foot- note to paragraph 1 of this Annex. I� Calculation based on 100 missiles per unit. Units assumed to have four launchers each. 11 Calculation based on 50 missiles per unit. Units assumed to have two launchers each. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 - Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 - TOP SECRET TOP SECRET and target limitations would apply as in the 175-200 n.m. missile, except that the use of HE would not be practicable. 28. Ballistic Missiles of 700 n.m. and 1,600 n.m.- Ranges. Ballistic missiles of 700 n.m. range could reach much of the Eurasian land mass, Japan, Alaska, and a portion of the UK from launching sites within the Sino- Soviet Bloc. IRBMs of 1,600 n.m. range could cover these same targets from more secure launching sites and could extend the coverage to include more distant target areas. While we have not fully assessed the number of tar- gets the USSR might elect to attack by this means rather than by other weapons systems, we estimate that the USSR might stockpile about 900 of these missiles. We have as- sumed that the advantages the USSR could gain by acquiring a missile capability in-being for attack on Western Europe would probably lead it to produce the stockpile fairly rapidly. We have thus allocated the larger portion of the stockpile to the 700 n.m. missile because of its earlier availability, and on this basis we have assumed a stockpile of 700 ballistic missiles of 700 n.m. range produced between 1956 and 1960 and a stockpile of 200 IRBMs produced between 1959 and 1962. We recog- nize, however, that the earlier program might be cut back to allow some increased produc- tion of IRBMs. The CEP's, payload weights, and probable employment of both the 700 n.m. missile and the IRBM would require nuclear warheads, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use with the 700 n.m. mis- sile for occasional special missions. 29. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (5,500 n.m. range). We believe that the USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBMs with nuclear warheads as rapidly as possible. In reaching this conclusion we have considered: (a) the great potential military value of the ICBM as compared to competing Soviet weapons systems, particularly for sur- prise attack; (b) the military advantage the USSR could gain if it could acquire a substan- tial ICBM capability before the US had de- veloped adequate countermeasures or similar forces in-being; (c) the potential economy of the ICBM system as compared to compet- ing weapons systems; and (d) the probable 31 low initial system reliability and accuracy of the ICBM. On these grounds, a Soviet ICBM program might include production of a stock- pile of about 1,000 missiles between 1960 and 1965. 18 To provide security and permit rapid rates of fire, but at the same time to conserve investment in facilities, the USSR might em- ploy about 100 widely dispersed ICBM launch- ing sites, each with 10 missiles and two launching pads, although many other methods of deployment would be possible. Shipborne 30. Any of the present Soviet submarine types could be equipped to carry one or two cruise- type missiles in topside stowage, and conven- tional-powered or nuclear-powered boats about the size of the "Z" class could be converted or constructed to accommodate four missiles each in internal stowage. While there is no evidence to indicate how many guided missile submarines the USSR intends to convert or construct, we estimate that it could now have about 10 submarines equipped to carry mis- siles in topside stowage. Its future program might call for the construction or conversion of about 50 submarines with internal stowage by about 1966. 31. We estimate that production of surface- to-surface cruise-type missiles is probably un- der way, and that a Soviet production pro- gram might be as follows: (a) to acquire an initial capability rapidly, produce a stockpile of 100 missiles with 500 n.m./subsonic capa- bilities between 1955 and mid-1957; (b) pro- duce a stockpile of 150 missiles with 500 n.m./ supersonic capabilities in the period 1957- 60; (c) produce a stockpile of 300 missiles with 1,000 n.m./supersonic capabilities in the period 1962-64, in part to replace the sub- sonic missiles and in part to equip submarines converted or constructed after 1960. The CEP's, payload weights, and probable employ- ment of these missiles would require nuclear warheads. These dates assume first operational capability of the ICBM at the earliest probable date (i.e., the beginning of 1960) . Within range of our estimate, however, a Soviet ICBM might not be operationally available until the end of 1961. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 32. The USSR might also adapt 80,000 ft/50 n.m. shipborne surface-to-air missiles to per- mit their alternative use against surface tar- gets in appropriate naval roles. The basic numerical requirement for such missiles is in- cluded in the shipborne surface-to-air pro- gram (paragraph 15 of this Annex). 33. Cost. The estimated investment and oper- ational cost of the entire surface-to-surface program is about 20 billion dollars, or approxi- mately 27 percent of the dollar cost of the over-all missile program. The included ICBM program represents about eight percent of the over-all program. Table II, summarizing Section I of this An- nex, begins on page 33. II. WARHEAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE PROGRAM Nuclear Warheads 34. The production and operational program for guided missiles described in Section I of this Annex has been assessed in the light of the estimated availability of nuclear materials to the USSR during the period. " The accu- racy of the assessment is necessarily limited by the element of uncertainty in our estimates of past and future Soviet production of fission- able materials. 211 It is further limited by our inability to determine with any validity the planned Soviet allocation of fissionable mate- rials available for weapons. 35. From the standpoint of destructive effect alone, a probable Soviet objective would be to allocate nuclear warheads to a large percent- age of all those missiles for which it is tech- nically possible to design such warheads. It is highly unlikely that sufficient nuclear mate- See NIE 11-2-56, The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro- gram, 8 June 1956 (Limited distribution) . This estimate will be superseded by the forthcoming NIE 11-2-57. " The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative Soviet production of U-235 up to the present probably does not exceed plus or minus 50 per- cent of the estimated value and plutonium plus or minus 25 percent. The error in our estimates of future production is less predictable. 32 rials will be available during the period of this estimate to permit such an allocation. 36. We have not made an estimate of the amount of fissionable material which the USSR would allocate to guided missile use. Nor have we estimated the percentage alloca- tion of nuclear warheads to all the various missiles. However, in order to assess the lim- itation imposed by the availability of nuclear materials, we have selected those missiles which, because of their probable employment and/or CEP's, we believe would be equipped almost entirely with nuclear warheads, and have assumed that they would be 100 percent so equipped: a. all submarine-launched surface-to-sur- face missiles (total: 550); b. all 700 n.m. ballistic missiles, IRBMs, and ICBMs (total: 1,900) ; C. all surface-to-air missiles employed as anti-ICBMs (total: 1,000) ; d. all 100 n.m. air-to-surface missiles (total: 1,000) . Calculations based on Soviet weapons capa- bilities show that the USSR could equip all of these missiles with nuclear warheads, by allocating tollie missile program about 55 per- cent of tl U-235 and about 30 percent of the plutonium which has been estimated in NIE 11-2-56 to be available for weapons on a cumulative basis through 1966. 21 22 37. It is clear that if during this period the USSR equipped with nuclear warheads the long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, anti-ICBMs, and long-range air-to-surface missiles postulated in this Annex, it would have to equip the large 21 The Director of Naval Intelligence did not con- cur with the figures in NIE 11-2-56 for the esti- mated production of U-235, and for the esti- mated production of plutonium after 1959, which were used as a basis for the calculations in this estimate. The Director of Naval Intelligence believes the figures to be too high, and that for planning purposes a more practical magnitude of cumulative quantities of U-235 would be in a range below that of the minus 50 percent lower limit of the estimates in NIE 11-2-56. " For further details, see Annex D (Limited dis- tribution under separate cover) . TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TABLE II A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program. We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.' � First Opera- Donal Identi- Capa- fying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)' Desig- bility Charac- pile nation ' Date � teristics ' Goal 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1982 1963 1964 1965 1966 SURFACE-TO-AIR, GROUND-LAUNCHED SA-1 mid-1955 60,0001 36,000 - 1,000 10,000 23,000 36 000 25 n.m. (1957 charac- teristics) SA-2 1958 � 40,0001 22,000 � - 1,000 3,800 6,800 9,900 12,900 15,900 18,900 22 000 15 min. SA-3 1959 SA-4 1961 80,000'/ ( 50 n.m. (60.000 90,0001 ( 100 n.m.( SA-5 1963-66 Interim 1,000 anti- Icrim - 5,000 17,000 35,000 47,000 60,000 Operational Units Remarks 150 units act!- Static defense of vated 1955-59. critical areas. 350 units act!- For low altitude vated 1958-66, defense. 150 for static defense and 200 for defense of field forces. 250 units acti- Replaces 60,0001 vated 1959-63. 25 n.m. system in critical areas and defends addition- al such areas. Earlier system transferred to less critical areas and field faces. Stockpile a ten- tative figure only. Production might begin as late as 1966. 100 400 LQ0 15 units. 'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference. The same designations were used in Table I following Section III of the DISCUSSION. �For definition, see paragraph 50 of the DISCUSSION. For further details, see Section III of the DISCUSSION. These figures do not include missiles produced for testing and training. Stockpile goal, once reached, is in general maintained throughout the period. 'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph 62 of the DISCUSSION. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 33 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I yr, om..,Kt TOP SECRET TABLE II (Cont'd) A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program. �We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.' First Opera- tonal Identi- Capa- fying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)' Desig- bility Charac- pile Operational nation' Date ' teristics ' Goal 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 . 1964 1965 1966 Units Remarks SURFACE-TO-AIR, SHIPBORNE SA-6 1958 40,0001 4,000 � � � � 100 300 700 1,400 2,100 2,800 3,500 4.000 6 cruisers 15 n.m. equipped by 1960, 8 destroyer types equipped by 1961,40 addi- tional destroyer types equipped 1962-66. SA-7 1960 80,000'/ 3,000 � � � � � � 100 300 700 1,400 2,100 2,800 3.00k 24 cruisers, in- Replaces 40,0001 50 n.m. eluding 6 above, 15 n.m. system on � equipped by 6 cruisers origi- 1966. nally equipped, and equips 18 ad- ditional cruisers. Earlier system transferred to destroyer types. AIR-TO-AIR AA-1 1955 �AA-2 1958 AA-3 1960 2-3 20,000 � 500 6,000 16,000 20 000 One - fourth of Interim system. n.m./ Soviet fighter good force of 9,300 weather aircraft equipped 1955-58. 5 n.m./ 55,000 � � � � 2,000 18,000 44,000 55 000 4,800 all-weath- Supplements 2-3 all er fighters fully n.m./good weath- weather equipped by er system. 1961. 15-20 7,000 � � � � � � 300 2,400 5,600 '7,000 n.m. All-weather Stockpile a ten- fighters. tative figure only. ' See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. Footnotes 2-5 on page 33. TOP SEC-RET 34 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I Ur omu-:(t TOP SECRET TABLE II (Cont'd) A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program. We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.' First Opera- tional Identi- Caps- fying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)" Desig- bility Charac- pile Operational nation ' Date � teristics � Goal 1954 -1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1968 Units Remarks AIR-TO-SURFACE A8-2 1956-57 55 n.m./ 1,000' � 1001000 300 medium Production might . subsonic bomber or anti- not begin until shipping recon- 1957. Portion of naissance air- stockpile might craft. be 20 n.m. missiles (AS-1) which could have been available in 1955. A8-3 1958 55 n.m./ 1,000' � _ _ .... 150 600 1 000 300 m e d i u m Replaces subson- super- bomber or anti- ic version. sonic shipping recon- naissance air- craft, not in addition to those above. A8-4 1961 100 n.m. 1,000 � � � � � � � 150 300 500 ' 700 900 !Q Heavy bombers. For strategic at- tack against well-defended targets. - SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, GROUND-LAUNCHED (BALLISTIC) 88-1 1954 75 n.m. 9,000* 600 1,800 3.200 4,700 6,100 7,600 9 000 88-2 1954 175-200 3,000' 200 600 1,100 1,600 2,000 2,500 3,000 n.m. 90 missile units: For tactical sup- port of ground forces,: and for neutralizing cer- tain � :other tar- 30 missile units. Ditto. - See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. Footnotes 2-5 on page 33. 'The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the numbers of AS-2, AS-3, SS-1, SS-2, and SS-3 missiles shown in this table are excessive. See his footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. , TOP SECRET 35 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I Ur, OCUlt I TOP SECRET TABLE II (Cont'd) A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program. We present it as only a possible. program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.' First Opera- tional 'dent- Capa- fying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)' Desig- bility Charac- pile Operational nation' Date' teristics' Goal 1954 1955 1958 1957 1958 1959 1980 1881 1962 1963 1984 1965 1986 Units Remarks 88-3 1954 350 n.m. 700' 200 500 700 14 missile units. Ditto. 88-4 1956 ?DO n.m. 700 � 50 150 250 500 700 Not estimated. For peripheral attack; see paras. 23 and 27c of the Discussion. 88-5 1959 1,600 n.m. 200 �����-30 100 170 200 Not estimated. Peripheral at- (IRBM) (IRBM) tack. , . 138-8 1960-81 5,500 n.m.. 1,000 �����-100 300 500 700 900 1 000 _.._ 100 launching Intercontinental (wpm) . (ICBM) sites, 2 launch- attack. Produc- ing pads each. tion might not begin until the end of 1961. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, suRMARINE-LAUNCHED (CRUISE-TYPE) 88-8 1955 500 n.m./ 100 � 5 60 100 subsonic ) 10 submarines To acquire initial ) with tops 1 d e capability. 88-9 1957 500 n.m./ 150 _ _ _ 5 50 100 150 >stowage plus _ supersonic ) 20 submarines ) with internal 88-10 1962 1,000 n.m./ 300 � � � � � � � � 40 120 .200 280 300 )stowage by Replaces subson- supersonic � ) about 1960. 30 ic missiles and ) additional sub- equips additional ) marines w i t h submarines. ) internal stow- , - ) age by about ) 1968. 'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1. Footnotes 2-5 on page 33. �See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to page 35. TOP SECRET 36 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET majority of its other missiles with non-nuclear warheads. However, it would be highly desir- able and most probable that some percentage of other missiles, particularly surface-to-air and shorter range air-to-surface and surface- to-surface missiles, would be provided with nu- clear warheads. We are unable to postulate valid percentage allocations, and present the following only for illustration: if an addi- tional 10 percent of the fissionable material ac- cumulated through 1966 were allocated to these other missiles categories, about 700 sur- face-to-air and 500 air-to-surface and surface- to-surface missile warheads could be provided. The desirability of providing larger numbers of these missiles with nuclear warheads is equally apparent, but their competing de- mands could not be met without reducing the amount of fissionable materials allocated to some other part of the program. For example, the scale of the surface-to-air missile program postulated in this Annex is such that the USSR could not equip a major portion of these missiles with nuclear warheads, even by utiliz- ing all the fissionable material available for weapons. 38. There are certain factors, however, which tend to offset the stringency of nuclear mate- rials: a. The USSR could gain some flexibility of utilization by developing interchangeable nu- clear components for certain weapons systems employing these components. b. Through technical advances after 1960 it will probably increase the explosive yield attainable from a given weight of nuclear materials and the economy of use of these materials in individual weapons. c. Some missile types could be effective with other than nuclear warheads. Moreover, cer- tain missiles for which we have assumed 100 percent nuclear warheads might for certain specific missions achieve acceptable effects with other types of warheads, or could employ nuclear warheads of lower yields than those we have assumed for the assessment in this Annex. d. Finally, the possibility cannot be ex- cluded that the USSR would deliberately plan to restrict its wartime employment of nuclear 37 weapons under certain circumstances and in certain areas which it planned to occupy or exploit, in order to cause the minimum amount of physical damage. � 39. Nevertheless, the USSR would face many difficulties in the allocation of fissionable ma- terials to its various weapons systems during this period. It could mitigate these difficul- ties by phasing the equipping of certain mis- siles with nuclear warheads over a longer period of time, by producing smaller quanti- ties of certain missiles during the period of the estimate, or by deliberately planning on the extensive use of non-nuclear warheads. We cannot estimate with confidence what the USSR will do in this respect, but we believe it might adopt some combination of these three courses of action. 40. We have not undertaken to estimate the probable basic Soviet allocation of nuclear materials as between the guided missile pro- gram and other uses. However, we believe that within a plausible basic allocation � as- sumed in this estimate as about 50 percent for the missile program the USSR would be able to equip with nuclear warheads: (a) a very high proportion of the postulated produc- tion of missiles for which nuclear warheads would be regarded as essential (i.e., those types named in paragraph 36 of this Annex) ; and (b) a much smaller proportion of the postu- lated production of selected other missile types. Chemical Warheads 41. There is no evidence of Soviet develop- ment of CW warheads for guided missiles. However, our estimate of Soviet capabilities to develop and produce agents and to solve the problems of dissemination by guided mis- siles leads us to believe that the USSR could . have had tabun (GA) warheads by 1954 and could have had sarin (GB) warheads by 1956. Active Soviet military interest in CW is shown by the extent of their CW organization, the widespread issue of chemical defensive equip- ment, the extent of their training pro- gram for CW defense, and the statements of Soviet leaders. The USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UI tt..,Kt I TOP SECRET specific purposes: for attack on personnel in the open; for employment against personnel in areas where the USSR would wish to hold physical destruction to a minimum; and pos- sibly for psychological effect. 42. On the basis of our estimates of Soviet CW agents available, missile warhead weights, and Soviet capability to develop the necessary munitions, we believe the USSR could achieve with GB agents a 50 percent casualty effect against unprotected personnel in the open over the following areas: 23 Warhead Class Area Radius of Effects 2,000 lb. 4,000 lb. 6,000 lb. 1.3 sq. mi. 3.0 sq. mi. 8.0 sq. mi. 3,300 ft. 5,100 ft. 8,400 ft. 43. We estimate that the USSR could prob- ably develop and employ "V" agents in guided missiles by 1960. This date is predicated on Soviet solution of the problem of generating a proper aerosol for dispersal of the "V" agent. Recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets have made substantial progress in aerosol generation, although no evidence is available to indicate its application to the dissemina- tion of CW agents by guided missiles. Use of "V" agents, far more toxic than the "G" series, would enable the USSR to obtain area cover- ages approximately three times as great as those shown for the "G" series. Biological Warheads 44. We estimate that antipersonnel BW agents which could now be available to the USSR are brucella, tularense, anthracis, and pestis. The means employed for CW dispersal by guided missiles could also be used for BW. 45. The use of antipersonnel BW agents would be profitable only in situations where delayed casualties are acceptable. Other than this, the advantages of using these agents in guided missile warheads would be generally similar to those of CW. However, greater 28 In determining area coverage, favorable con- ditions for agent dissemination are assumed. Soviet GA would be slightly less effective than GB. 38 quantities of BW agents could be dissemi- nated over even wider areas by clandestine delivery and other means than by guided missiles. 46. We estimate that the USSR could also have certain anticrop and antilivestock agents which could be used in guided missiles. III. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE PROGRAM Costing Methods and Limitations 47. The problem of estimating the costs of a Soviet guided missile program for a period extending 10 years into the future has many limitations. Because neither the US nor the USSR has had sufficient experience in the production of these new weapons systems, costs calculated at present cannot be con- sidered as accurate estimates of the actual future costs of producing and operating the guided missile systems postulated. They are, however, adequate for distinguishing the economic differences between one missile sys- tem proposal and another. They are the type of estimates used by the US in plan- ning its future missile programs and are sim- ilar in nature and reliability to those which might be used by Soviet planners in making decisions about their own future programs. 48. In the absence of firm data on Soviet mis- sile characteristics, production methods, and cost of component parts, the program has been costed in dollars, using known or esti- mated production costs for the nearest US counterparts of the missile systems under con- sideration. Almost all the data employed re- flect planning costs supplied by the US mili- tary services responsible for the various US counterpart missiles. These data have been applied to the stockpile levels and time sched- ules stipulated in Section I of this Annex, using analytical procedures consistent with standard weapons systems cost analyses. Ruble costs have been derived by applying known or estimated ruble-dollar ratios. 24 " For purposes of analytical convenience, all dol- lar costs used in this estimate are calculated in 1955 dollars; all ruble costs are in 1951 rubles. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OF 6LCI-�1 I TOP SECRET 49. Because it is necessary to know the direc- tion of any bias in the estimated costs of the program, it was decided that where there was a choice of militarily acceptable approaches with differing costs, the one with the lower cost would be used. This type of choice was made on economic grounds, without further consideration of the relative military effective- ness or vulnerability of the costed system as opposed to others. Other decisions also made the estimated costs somewhat lower than they might actually be. Certain items necessary to the operation of the various guided missile systems have not been included in the cost calculations because they were not consid- ered exclusively guided missile items. Among these exclusions are the costs of early warn- ing and ground control intercept systems and the costs of aircraft and naval vessels which carry missiles. The costs of nuclear warheads were not included. Also specifically excluded from the estimated totals are investment in plants and industrial equipment to produce missiles, and expenditures on research and development. All these factors tend to give the over-all estimate of the cost of the postu- lated missile program a severe downward bias, and it should be considered as a minimum fig- ure. Our best judgment of the degree of downward bias for the items which were in- cluded in the costs is that it is not greater than 20 percent and more likely falls between five and 15 percent. Cost of Program 50. The program for the production and op- erational employment of guided missiles, as described in this Annex, would be a large and costly one. We estimate, however, that such a program is within the economic capabili- ties of the USSR, although it would necessi- tate an increasingly heavy economic alloca- tion through at least 1961. The program would incur an aggregate cost of about 73 billion (1955) dollars, or about 400 billion (1951) rubles, during the 14-year period from 1953 through 1966. The aggregate dollar out- lay for this program is apportioned among broad categories of missiles approximately as follows: total air defense program (including all surface-to-air and air-to-air systems), 70 39 percent; total ground-launched surface-to-sur- face program, 25 percent; air-to-surface pro- gram, 2 percent; submarine-launched surface- to-surface program, 3 percent. The ground- launched surface-to-air program would incur by far the largest dollar outlay of any single category, comprising about 50 percent of the total. The ICBM program would comprise about eight percent of the total dollar outlay. (See Figure 1.) 51. For purposes of analysis, the aggregate costs of the program have been broken down into broad areas termed "initial investment costs" and "annual operating costs." 25 In dol- lars, investment costs through the period rep- resent about 44 percent of the aggregate cost of the program, with operating costs repre- senting about 56 percent. (See Figure 2.) 52. The postulated program results in a fair- ly smooth but rapidly rising cost curve. An- nual outlays in dollars rise from 0.5 billion in 1954 to 5.2 billion in 1959, and then rise sharply to about 8 billion in 1960, with annual expenditures ranging between 7.4 and 9.4 billion for the remainder of the period. Considering the entire period, about 20 per- cent of the total dollar outlay would be in- curred through 1959 and about 80 percent between 1960 and 1966. The nature of the economic burden also shifts drastically from investment to operating costs as the period progresses. By 1966, nearly seven billion dol- lars per year are required to operate and main- tain the missile systems which have been de- veloped and produced during the period. (See Figure 3.) 21' "Initial investment costs" are those one-time costs incurred in producing and activating a particular missile system, including missiles, in- stallations, guidance and special equipment, or- ganizational equipment, initial personnel train- ing, and transportation. "Annual operating costs" are those additional recurring expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the equipment and personnel, including main- tenance of installations and equipment, missiles fired for proficiency and tests, personnel pay, allowances and, subsistence, and support com- mand. Neither "initial investment costs" nor "annual operating costs" take into account those excluded costs factors described in paragraph 49 of this Annex. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UI SECRET TOP SECRET 53. The cost of the missiles themselves is only a partial measure of the economic mag- nitude of the missile program. Missiles and spare parts would account for only 25-30 per- cent of the dollar outlay for each missile sys- tem, while the major part of the outlay would be for associated equipment, facilities, and personnel. Therefore, changes in the organi- zational structure and method of deployment described in Section I of this Annex would have a proportionally greater effect on the total cost of the program than would changes in the size of the missile stockpiles to be pro- duced. The ICBM program provides a strik- ing example of this phenomenon. We have postulated a stockpile of 1,000 ICBMs de- ployed on 100 sites (10 per site) . However, if the same stockpile were deployed on the basis of one ICBM per site, the presently estimated cost would be increased by a factor of about 10. 54. In conjunction with earlier estimates of Soviet military expenditures through 1961, presented in Appendix B of NIE 11-4-56, the effects of the possible missile program on total Soviet defense spending can be roughly determined. Assuming that the total mili- tary expenditures estimated in NIE 11-4-56 would not change, the missile program's share would rise from some two percent in 1954 to about 24 percent in 1961, and would require some reduction in the nonmissile expendi- tures. If, however, the nonmissile expendi- tures remained as estimated, the addition of this missile program would require increases in over-all military expenditures, reaching as much as 17 percent in 1961. Impact on Electronics Industry 55. While the demands of the missile program on the Soviet electronics industry would be quite heavy, we estimate that the program is 40 within the growing capabilities of that in- dustry. As indicated in the DISCUSSION, the estimated capacity of the Soviet electron- ics industry will probably limit its ability to support a varied and extensive missile pro- gram and also meet the competing demands of other Soviet military and essential non- military programs until about 1958. The mis- sile program described in this Annex places its heaviest demands upon the electronics industry in the years after 1959. For ex- ample, roughly 20-25 percent of the estimated dollar value of Soviet electronics output would have had to be allocated to the missile pro- gram in 1955 and in 1956. This allocation would rise to roughly 30-35 percent in 1960. These percentages take into account the large increase in the total value of electronics out- put called for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Assuming that approximately two-thirds of the dollar value of annual electronics output continues to be allocated to military pro- grams, the missile program would require somewhat over half the military electronics allocation for 1960. Research and Development Costs 56. Limited data, based on US experience, pro- vides some measure of the research and de- velopment costs which would be incurred in a national missile program of the magnitude estimated in Section III of the DISCUSSION. We have not included such costs in our aggre- gate figures for the period because we have no basis for determining R and D costs charge- able to the development of those missile sys- tems which would not materialize until after 1966. As an indication of probable R and D costs in the early years, we estimate that such costs would have climbed from about one billion dollars in 1953 to a peak of about 1.7 billion in 1957. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I UP SECRET TOP SECRET 41 FIGURE 1 Total Cost of Possible Missile Program, 1953-1966 By Category of Missile Billions Billions of 1955 Per- of 1951 Per- Dollars cent Rubles cent Surface-to-Air, Ground-Launched 35.8 49.4 196.1 49.3 Surface-to-Air, Shipbome 7.4 10.2 42.8 10.6 Air-to-Air 7.3 10.1 44.2 11.1 Air-to-Surface 2.4 3.3 14.1 3.5 Surface-to-Surface, Ground-Launched (up to and includ- ing 700 n.m.) 10.0 13.8 49.9 12.5 Surface-to-Surface, Submarine- Launched 2.2 3.0 11.1 2.8 IRBM 1.3 1.8 6.9 1.7 ICBM 6.1 8.4 33.8 8.5 72.5 100.0 398.9 100.0 FIGURE 2 Total Investment and Operating Costs of Possible Missile Program 1953-1966 By Category of Missiles Initial Invest- Oper- ment ating Costs Costs Total (Billions of 1955 Dollars) Surface-to-Air, Ground-Launched 15.5 20.3 35.8 Surface-to-Air, Shipborne 3.8 3.6 7.4 Air-to-Air 3.2 4.1 7.3 Air-to-Surface 1.4 1.0 2.4 Surface-to-Surface, Ground-Launched (up to and includ- ing 700 n.m.) 3.2 6.8 10.0 Surface-to-Surface, Submarine-Launched 1.0 1.2 2.2 ERBM 0.4 0.9 1.3 ICBM 3.2 2.9 6.1 31.7 40.8 72.5 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 .r (billions of 1955 dollars) 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 Total annual costs (billions of 1955 dollars) Investment costs Operating costs Total annual costs (billions of 1951 rubles) 24461 3.57 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 yr- JC1._::KC I TOP SECRET Annual Costs of Possible Missile Program 1953-66 I ......... ....... 1953 54 55 56 57 44. 58 Figure 3 ......... 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 .5 /.2 2.2 2.5 3.3 5.2 8.3 9.4 8.5 8.7 7.6 7.5 - .5 1.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 3.3 5.6 5.5 3.6 3.2 1.5 1.0 .5 - - .3 .7 1.4 1.9 2.7 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.9 66 7.4 1 - 3.1 8.0 13.8 15.3 19.0 31.1 50.4 55.6 46.7 46.7 37.6 36.4 35.3 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 Approved for Release: 2017/09/29 C06707795 I OF tt.:1-