THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 JANUARY 1977

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466953
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 20, 1977

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
The President's Daily Brief
January 20, 1977
2
----rorse64,43,2,0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemphon category 5B(1).(2).(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 20, 1977
Table of Contents
Egypt: The events of the past two days have seriously eroded
President Sadat's image at home. (Page 1)
Cyprus: President Makarios has agreed to talks with Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash under UN auspices to draw up guide-
lines for new talks. (Page 1)
West Germany - France:
(Page 2)
Notes: USSR-India; OPEC; Yugoslavia; Benin (Pages 3 and 4)
At Annex we discuss European concerns over the impasse on Cyprus.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EGYPT: The events of
the past two days have
seriously eroded Sadat's
image at home.
Leftist organizers--
believed to have Zed
many of the demonstra-
tions--may be able to
sustain the momentum
of the riots.
CYPRUS: President
Makarios has agreed to
meet Turkish Cypriot
leader Denktash under
UN auspices to discuss
the present impasse in
negotiations and to
draw up guidelines for
new discussions.
Discontent over economic griev-
ances has been a problem over the
last year, and Sadat's popularity
had already diminished as a re-
sult. Much of the wrath of the
current demonstrators is directed
personally at him.
The regime's chief support, the
military establishment--which
itself is feeling the economic
pinch--has thus far remained loyal
as indicated by the army's role
in quelling the riots. Certain
military units, however, have been
confined to base indefinitely, and
scheduled leaves have been can-
celed, possibly indicating that
the government fears some military
personnel might join the demon-
strators.
Prime Minister Salim could become
a victim of the government's ill-
considered actions--the imposition
and then suspension of harsh aus-
terity measures. Salim is still
active, but President Sadat may
hope to deflect criticism from
himself by setting Salim up as a
scapegoat.
* * *
Talks between representatives of
the two communities have been stalled
since last February. Makarios
stipulated that the coming meet-
ing not be held until late this
month so that he could assess the
outcome of the visit to Washing-
ton of former Cypriot negotiator
Clerides.
1
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE:
UN representatives on Cyprus are
cautiously optimistic that the
meeting may lead to a resumption
of talks. Turkey, with its eye
on US congressional approval of
the defense agreement negotiated
last March is anxious to show some
forward movement on Cyprus.
At Annex we discuss European in-
terests in Cyprus and the inten- 25X1
tion of European officials to
raise the Cyprus question with
Vice President Mondale during his
visit next week.
25X1
* * *
2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
--continue2'5xi
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Soviet President Pod-
gorny plans to visit
India within the next
couple of months.
Qatari Oil Minister
Al Thani is trying to
work out a compromise
on oil prices.
Yugoslav President Tito
is cutting short his
Middle East tour.
NOTES
The USSR may be seeking reassur-
ances that Gandhi's recent crit-
icism of leftists in her own party
and the pro-Moscow Communist Party
of India are not a reflection of
deteriorating Soviet-Indian rela-
tions.
Moscow is setting the stage for
the Podgorny visit by moving to
resolve outstanding economic prob-
lems with India. The most impor-
tant gesture is a proposed four-
year trade deal that would save
India about $100 million in foreign
exchange annually.
* * *
Al Thani, currently the president
of OPEC, has already talked with
Kuwait and Iran, the two cartel
states most seriously affected by
the impasse on prices. Any at-
tempt to resolve the price issue
would require the concurrence of
both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Nei-
ther has indicated a readiness to
compromise.
* * *
Tito's trip was intended to add
some momentum to Arab efforts to
achieve solidarity on issues in-
volved in Middle East negotiations.
His return home is an indication
of the urgency he attaches to fill-
ing the vacancy created by Premier
Bijedic's death.
He probably also recognized that
President Sadat was preoccupied
with the current rioting in Cairo.
3
--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The situation in Benin
remains tense.
* * *
All US citizens in the capital of
Cotonou are accounted for, but
Beninese security forces are ar-
resting many Caucasians in their
search for the mercenaries left
behind when the coup force fled.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN CYPRUS
European officials intend to raise the
question of Cyprus with US Vice President
Mondale during his visit next week. They
have already tagged Cyprus as the major
external concern of the European Com-
munity in early 1977, and are now trying
to develop a new plan, in cooperation
with the US, aimed at resolving the con-
flict.
The Nine may approve a plan for breaking the im-
passe in negotiations at the foreign ministers' po-
litical cooperation meeting scheduled for January 31
Some officials hope that, with the understanding of
the US, this plan could be presented to UN Secretary
General Waldheim before Congress takes up legis-
lation on US-Greek and US-Turkish agreements. Addi-
tional scenarios are being proposed by UN and Euro-
pean officials.
European interest in a Cyprus settlement springs in
part from concern that Greek-Turkish tension under-
mines NATO's position in the eastern Mediterranean.
The EC also has a special involvement with Greece
and Turkey as associates and prospective members.
Negotiations on Greek membership are under way, but
Turkish membership is not likely for some time.
This makes it difficult for the EC to maintain a
balanced policy toward the two countries.
Turkey fears that Greece, through membership, will
gain the advantage of participation in EC political
talks on Cyprus and other Mediterranean issues.
This has led Turkish officials to propose that
Ankara be included in such talks even before Turkey
becomes a full member of the EC.
Among European countries, France has taken a posi-
tion fundamentally favoring Greek interests, per-
haps because of French emphasis on the role Euro-
peans can play to support democratic government in
Greece. French concern for Greece is also part of
a policy of trying to balance German influence
within the EC.
--continued
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Recently French officials have been reported to op-
pose any Soviet involvement in a Cyprus settlement.
They therefore question the wisdom of a predominant
US role in Cyprus talks lest it elicit a Soviet re-
action.
In contrast, Germany has been solicitous of Turkey,
largely because of Turkey's important but uncertain
future role in NATO defense. While Paris received
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil noncommittally
in early November, his visit to Bonn in mid-December
brought a promise from German Foreign Minister Gen-
scher to do everything possible to meet Turkey's
requests.
The Europeans are pondering a response to a Council
of Europe report harshly critical of Turkey for
alleged violations of the Convention of Human Rights
in Cyprus following the 1974 invasion of the is-
land. The report is on the agenda of a meeting
next month of the Council's Committee of Ministers.
Turkey has threatened to withdraw from the Council
of Europe if the report is accepted.
Both Germany and France hesitate to antagonize Tur-
key on this issue but believe that they cannot com-
promise without undermining the credibility of their
defense of human rights in Soviet bloc countries
and Berlin, particularly in the context of the CSCE
review in Belgrade this summer. Ireland, which is
chairing the February session of the Council of
Europe has asked for US guidance. British officials
may try to avoid a clash with Turkey in that forum
by stressing legal and procedural questions that
may dispose of the report.
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1
,
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050008-1