THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 18 JANUARY 1977

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466951
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 18, 1977

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The President's Daily Brief
,/
January 18, 1977
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category, 5B11)(2)(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
January 18, 1977
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Table of Contents
Rhodesia:
(Page I)
USSR-Egypt: A Soviet official who is in Cairo to take soundings
on breaking the impasse in Soviet-Egyptian relations is un-
likely to be successful. (Page 2)
USSR: In an effort to take the offensive against Western criti-
cism of its sale of heavy water to India, the USSR has made
its strongest statement to date on nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. (Page 2)
France-Israel: France's handling of the Abu Daud affair is un-
likely either to become a major domestic political issue or
to have a serious effect on relations with Israel. (Page 3)
Notes: Yugoslavia-Libya-Egypt; USSR-Uganda; USSR (Pages 4 and 5)
At Annex, we discuss the level of political disorder in China
since the arrest last October of leading leftists.
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RHODESIA:
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USSR-EGYPT: A high-
ranking Soviet diplomat
at the UN arrived in
Cairo last week to take
soundings on breaking
the impasse in Soviet-
Egyptian relations, but
he is not likely to be
successful.
USSR: The USSR, in an
effort to take the of-
fensive against Western
criticism of its sale
of heavy water to India,
has made its strongest
statement to date on
nuclear non-proZifera-
tion.
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* * *
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The arrival of a Soviet trade dele-
gation on January 25 will be an-
other test of Soviet and Egyptian
willingness to normalize relations.
According to the Soviet ambassador
in Cairo, Moscow has decided to
take a tough line in negotiations
for a new trade agreement because
of Egyptian efforts to undercut
the Soviet role in the Middle East.
* * *
The recent shipment appears to
contradict declared Soviet policy,
which holds that IAEA safeguards
on all elements of the nuclear
fuel cycle should be a precondi-
tion to any future exports of nu-
clear supplies. Nevertheless, in
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE-ISRAEL: France's
handling of the Abu
Daud affair, strongly
defended yesterday by
President Giscard, is
unlikely to become a
major domestic politi-
cal issue.
The French hope the
Daud incident will not
seriously affect rela-
tions with Israel.
response to a US query about the
sale, a prepared Soviet statement
repeated previous Soviet proposals
to strengthen and extend the guide-
lines of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group and emphasized the Soviet
view that the nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty must be strongly
supported and IAEA safeguards made
more effective.
The statement also objected to the
delay over completing a safeguards
agreement between Euratom and
IAEA. This underscores the Soviet
insistence that international safe-
guards must be universally applied,
and that Euratom safeguards are
less than adequate substitutes for
IAEA controls.
* * *
Both the left and right wish to
avoid taking what could be inter-
preted as either a pro-Israeli or
a pro-terrorist position.
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* * *
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Yugoslav President Tito
leaves Belgrade today
for three days of talks
with Libyan leader Qad-
hafi, followed by sim-
ilar discussions in
Egypt with Sadat.
NOTES
There are no indications that Tito's
discussions with either leader will
result in major changes in the po-
sitions of any of the parties on
the basic components of a Middle
East settlement.
Tito may try again to nudge Sadat
to improve Egypt's ties with the
Soviet Union and thus balance
Cairo's relations with the super-
powers. He may also believe he
can help ensure that Palestinian
interests are kept in the fore-
front as the Arabs prepare for a
reconvening of the Geneva confer-
ence.
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.s
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5
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U. S. S. R.
Lake Ba
U.S.S.R.
? Lake
Balkhash
Mongolia
Shen-yang
Military Region
PEKING*
Pao-ting.
North
Korea
Yellow
Sea
South
Korea
Cheng-chou.
Shanghai
Bangladesh
North
Vietnam
ng Kong (U K )
Macao (Port I
East China
Sea
o
('Al-WAN
(TAIWAN)
HAI NAN
AO
South China
Bay of Bengal
Sea
Thailand
outh
am
0
500 Kilometers
620909 177
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UNREST IN CHINA
The level of political disorder in China
has declined since the arrest last October
of the "gang of four," the leading left-
ists on the Politburo. In fact, the sit-
uation at the local level may be calmer
now than at any time in the past decade.
The "gang of four" had been the major instigators of
conflict in the provinces. Local leftists, deprived
now of support from national leaders in Peking, tend
not to act on their own.
The Western press has erred in treating Chinese ac-
counts of the past activities of the leftists as a
description of the current situation. To our knowl-
edge, there was only one attempt to organize open
local resistance to the arrests of the leftists last
October. It occurred in Shanghai, long a leftist
bastion and the home of three of the four leaders
concerned, and was stopped before it could gain mo-
memtum. Military units throughout China were not
put on alert at the time, an indication of the new
leadership's confidence in its ability to handle lo-
cal situations.
On three subsequent occasions, Peking resorted to
brief military intervention to restore order at lo-
cal levels. These episodes have been the object of
considerable recent attention' in the Western press,
but in all three cases, the unrest had developed
well before the fall of the senior leftists.
Pao-ting
The only area in which unrest appears to have in-
tensified after the fall of the Peking leftists is
Pao-ting, a city near Peking. Last spring local
leftists in Pao-ting apparently raided a military
arsenal, prompting a strong reprimand from the cap-
ital. local military units,
believed loyal to the leftists, were themselves in-
volved in partisan political activity and perhaps
went so far as to distribute weapons to their civil-
ian followers.
--continued
Al
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After the fall of the "gang," the situation in Pao-
ting again became serious as local leftists resumed
their disruptive activities. Intervention by other
military units stationed in the area quickly restored
order, although not without some bloodshed. Foreign
Ministry officials have described the current situa-
tion there and elsewhere in China as calm.
The Pao-ting situation points to an espe-
cially delicate problem for Peking--how
to deal with those senior military offi-
cers who were aligned with the leftists
or who were in general sympathy with
them.
The majority of the military leadership at regional
and provincial levels appears to be aligned with the
new leadership. The allegiance of at least one mil-
itary regional commander, however, is questionable.
Li Te-sheng, politburo member and commander of the
Shen-yang Military Region, seemed especially vocif-
erous in his attacks last year on former vice premier
Teng Hsiao-ping. The propaganda from that region
and from the area where Li has previously served was
harsher than other attacks on Teng, and party chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng indicated immediately after the fall
of the senior leftists that Li's province deserved
attention.
The leadership will probably move cautiously on this
problem in order to avoid refueling factional fires.
Although the case of Li Te-sheng may now be under
investigation in Peking, no action is likely until
the leadership is confident that the matter can be
resolved with a minimum of disruption.
The Military's Role in "Rectification"
The military has assumed a leading role in
the campaign to identify and punish local
followers of "the gang of four."
One of the more important aspects of Peking's efforts
to eliminate leftist factionalism was the publicity
given the use of military troops, either through
radio broadcasts or the circulation of official di-
rectives.
Peking's demonstrated willingness to use troops and
the obvious fact that the military can be relied upon
to put down leftist disruptions should prevent major
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unrest. The coming "rectification" campaign--a
housecleaning of local administrative organs that
will probably result in the removal of lower level
leftist officials--presents Peking with an opportu-
nity to reduce sharply, if not totally end, local
factionalism.
Problems Persist as Factionalism Recedes
_ _
Once the purge of local leftists has been
completed, Peking will still face problems
at the provincial level.
The leftist ideology represented by the "gang of
four" has a constituency throughout the country, and
the removal of disruptive leftists will not end dis-
putes over how best to implement policies established
by Peking. Pressures from younger party members for
a larger share in local administration will also con-
tinue to mount.
The most likely source of friction at the local level
will be the new leadership's approach to economic
development. The expected heavier reliance on eco-
nomic incentives to boost production could result in
a spiral of rising expectations that Peking will not
be able to meet. Strikes for higher wages have been
a periodic problem for several years, and the clamor
for more and better creature comforts can be expected
to become a growing problem for Peking.
In short, China's fundamental ideological, genera-
tional, and economic problems will persist and be-
come more prominent as the political factionalism
of the Mao era recedes. But post-Mao conflict over
policy issues promises to be less explosive and di-
visive than the open political warfare of the past
decade.
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