THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JANUARY 1977

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0006466950
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
January 17, 1977
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 The President's Daily Brief / January 17, 1977 2 --7-,6r.sts4e.L__15X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E 0 11652 exemption category 5B( I ).(2),(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY January 17, 1977 Table of Contents Egypt-Jordan: The public call by President Sadat and King Husayn for a resumption of the Geneva talks and for a Palestinian state with strong ties to Amman appears designed to keep the pressure on the US and Israel to move toward serious negotia- tions--and on the Palestinians to accept some compromise on a Palestinian state. (Page 1) USSR: A Soviet intelligence ship is in position to monitor today's scheduled initial test-firing of the US Trident SLBM from Cape Canaveral. (Page 1) Thailand: The dissatisfaction of the Thai ruling military council with Prime Minister Thanin has prompted consideration of a new administration. (Page 2) Notes: Benin; International (Pages 4 and 5) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 North Atlantic Ocean French Guiana Cape Verde Islands ,R2 0Ascension Island South Atlantic Ocean 1000 Kilometers 620907 I 77 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY EGYPT-JORDAN: The call by President Sadat and King Husayn for a Pal- estinian state with strong ties to Amman and for a resumption of the Geneva talks appears designed pri- marily to underscore Arab solidarity and to keep the pressure on the US and Israel for serious Middle East negotiations. Sadat has also stepped up pressure on the PLO to accept a compromise solution. USSR: A Soviet intel- ligence-collection ship is in position near Ascension Island to monitor today's sched- uled initial test-fir- ing of the US Trident SLBM from Cape Canaveral. The joint statement issued this weekend insists on equal and in- dependent PLO participation in the Geneva talks. By enlisting Husayn's support on this issue, Sadat hopes to discourage Israeli leaders from believing they can split the Arab camp on PLO participation in negotiations. At the same time, Sadat is again suggesting the possibility of some compromise between the establish- ment of a West Bank Palestinian state and Israel's demand that the Palestinian question be re- solved within a Jordanian context. The PLO thus far has not rejected the idea of a truncated Palestin- ian state. Over the weekend, in fact, a PLO spokesman endorsed the idea of closer relations with Jordan. This moderate stance probably reflects the perception of PLO leaders that they have no alternative at this point but to follow the lead taken by the ma- jor Arab leaders. Husayn, for his part, has probably gone along with Sadat for similar reasons, fearing that to oppose Egypt now would leave Jordan iso- lated in the Arab world. * * * The Soviet ship had been on this station last November, when the initial test-firing of the Trident missile was postponed. Instead of returning to its home base on the Black Sea, the ship conducted 1 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THAILAND: Thai mili- tary dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Thanin may be reaching a crisis stage. operations between the Cape Verde Islands and French Guiana, and then made a port call to Guinea. The ship returned to the Ascension Island area by January 10. The ruling military council has reportedly agreed to give Thanin another 60 days to demonstrate a greater ability to deal with the country's pressing political and economic problems. The council is already thinking in terms of a new administration, however. The military leaders have been un- comfortable with Thanin almost from the time he became prime min- ister in October. His reputation as a well-known jurist of spotless integrity and as an academic specialist on counterinsurgency suggested he would be the ideal front man. --continued 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Some members of the military council would like the military to take a more direct role in running the government. retired Air Chief Marshal Thawi ChunZasap is a likely successor to Thanin. But Thanin's extreme right-wing views have been disquieting to many Thai and somewhat at odds with the consensus among the Thai leadership that a modus vivendi must be reached with their Indo- chinese neighbors. While he has been more restrained in his public pronouncements lately, the mili- tary are impatient with the gen- eral lack of movement on a number of national problems, including stalled relations with Hanoi and indecision on domestic economic issues such as foreign investment regulations. The leaders of the council are concerned, however, that such a move would expose them as mili- tary dictators. They clearly would prefer to continue to mask the military's role with a civil- ian apparatus--a preference that may continue to be a restraint on dumping Thanin. In view of Thawi's unsavory repu- tation for corruption, his appoint- ment would do little for the gov- ernment's image. On the contrary, a government shakeup so soon after the October coup would only add to the impression of a tentative and fumbling regime little better than the parliamentary administra- tions it replaced in the name of stability and progress. * * * 3 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Canary Is (sp We,. ern ' Sahara orocco 27Capoe Verde Mauritania Sen Gambia Guinea Bissau, Guinea Upper Volta Sudan Suer Leone Togo Ghana Benin Nigeria Ube Cameroon Central African Empire la ,?Eq. Guinea,' Sao Tome and principeg Uganda Kenya Gabon Congo zair e Rwanda Burundi Tanzania South Atlantic Ocean Angola Zambia Namibia Walvis Bay (S At) Botswana hodesia Mo Mada ambique Swaziland South Africa Qs 1000 Kilometers tho 620904 I 12 Indian Ocean 95 A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The VS embassy in Cotonou anticipates a possible anti-white backlash fol- lowing the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow President Kerekou of Benin (formerly Dahomey). The world's five major natural rubber export- ing countries?Malay- sia, Indonesia, Thai- land, Sri Lanka, and Singapore?are meeting in Geneva this week to discuss plans to bring the international rub- ber market under greater control. NOTES Government troops repelled a small invading party, probably composed of European mercenaries and sup- porters of exiled opponents of Kerekou. Looking for invaders who may have stayed behind, government forces made a house-to-house search in the city. The residence of the US ambassador, unoccupied at the time, was apparently fired on by Beninese troops after two armed whites were seen nearby. Some whites also were reportedly shot in the street and others were tak25X1 to prison camps. Their plans, first proposed last November, call for setting floor and ceiling prices for natural rub- ber and establishing a buffer stock to dampen price movements. Market forces will prevent natural rubber producers from taking OPEC- like actions to rig price movements. Synthetic rubber producers have substantial excess capacity, and demand for rubber is expected to grow only moderately over the next few years. Nevertheless, oil- related increases in synthetic rub- ber costs should provide a lucra- tive and gradually rising floor price for natural rubber. 4 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Rubber supplies are likely to be more than adequate to cope with the anticipated rising demand be- tween now and 1980. By our esti- mates, natural and synthetic rub- ber industries together will have the capability to produce 15-16 million tons by 1980--some 15 per- cent more than projected consump- tion. Natural Rubber Production Thousand Tons 1975 1980 Malaysia 1,478 2,000 Indonesia 825 1,000 Thailand 349 485 Sri Lanka 149 190 India 136 185 Africa 208 260 Other 153 200 Total 3,298 4,320/ 'Minimum estimate 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1 , Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400050005-1