THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 DECEMBER 1976
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006466930
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 22, 1976
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The President's Daily Brief
December 22, 1976
2
-T,-.Irrtit?&I
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 513(1 5.121.13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
December 22, 1976
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Table of Contents
Saudi Arabia:
(Page 1)
Egypt-Syria: The plans revealed yesterday for eventual unity
between Egypt and Syria probably will never come to
fruition, but the announcement underscores, primarily for
the benefit of the US and Israel, the two countries' deter-
mination to be united on Middle East peace negotiating
tactics. (Page 2)
Syria-Jordan: Syrian President Asad's desire to strengthen Syr-
ian-Egyptian relations in preparation for the next round of
Middle East peace negotiations has led him to mute further
talk of federation with Jordan. (Page 3)
USSR-Japan: The USSR apparently has decided to resume normal
relations with Japan in the aftermath of the MIG-25 inci-
dent. (Page 4)
Notes: South Yemen - Iran; Lebanon; China-USSR (Pages 6 and 7)
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SAUDI ARABIA:
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EGYPT-SYRIA: The plans
revealed yesterday
for eventual unity be-
tween Egypt and Syria
probably will never
come to fruition, but
the announcement under-
scores, primarily for
the benefit of the US
and Israel, the two
countries' determina-
tion to be united on
Middle East peace ne-
gotiating tactics.
Egypt and Syria probably do not
intend to work toward a full mer-
ger. Their joint declaration on
the subject and subsequent remarks
by the Syrian and Egyptian foreign
ministers mentioned "relations of
unity" rather than "union." A
separate communique issued by the
presidents of the two countries
made only scant reference to the
unified political command to be
established to lay the basis for
"unity."
Syrian President Asad and Egyptian
President Sadat, who probably
still harbor private suspicions
about each other, no doubt view
the unified political command as
a useful mechanism for keeping
each other in line.
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SYRIA-JORDAN: President
Asad's desire to
strengthen Syrian-Egyp-
tian relations in prep-
aration for the next
round of Middle East
peace negotiations has
lead him to mute fur-
ther talk of federation
with Jordan.
This is particularly true of Asad,
who undoubtedly fears that Sadat,
despite his disclaimers, could
again adopt an independent negoti-
ating policy, as he did last year
in pursuit of the second Sinai
agreement. Asad probably looks
on the joint command as a means
of better ensuring that Sadat will
coordinate policy and of prevent-
ing Sadat from again moving too
far ahead of Syria and the other
Arab countries.
Sadat, for his part, has become
increasingly concerned over the
last year about Asad's rising
stature in the Arab world and par-
ticularly about Syria's efforts
to gain control over the Palestine
Liberation Organization. He prob-
ably sees the joint command as a
way of maintaining some Egyptian
influence over both the Palestin-
ian movement and Syrian negoti-
ating policies.
The Syrians are reluctant to move
toward more formal ties at present
because of their desire to work
out a common Middle East negoti-
ating strategy with Saudi Arabia
as well as Egypt.
Asad knows that President Sadat
and the Saudis are already deeply
suspicious of growing political
cooperation between Syria and Jor-
dan and would probably oppose a
federation. The Saudis balked
over financing the Jordanian Hawk
missile deal with the US earlier
this year partly because of their
mistrust of Husayn's ties with
Syria.
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The Syrians at present
regard Husayn primarily
as a useful channel
both for gaining a sym-
pathetic hearing for
their views in Washing-
ton and for exploring
ideas with the US for
avoiding a negotiating
impasse.
USSR-JAPAN: The USSR
has apparently decided
to resume normal rela-
tions with Japan in
the aftermath of the
MIG-25 incident.
Asad is likely to continue to fos-
ter closer relations with Husayn,
taking special care to allay Jor-
danian fears of Syrian domination.
Whether these ties-take the form
of a formal arrangement probably
matters little to Asad.
Asad clearly hopes that closer
military cooperation will ensure
Jordanian support in disputes
with Iraq, or any future war with
Israel.
Husayn believes close relations
with Syria are essential to pre-
vent Jordan from becoming isolated
in the Arab world and to enable
it to strengthen its position
against the Palestine Liberation
Organization. Husayn is in direct
competition with the PLO for the
loyalty of the Palestinians, par-
ticularly those within Jordan,
where more than half the popula-
tion is Palestinian.
* * *
Late last week, the Soviets in-
formed the Japanese that they were
ready to schedule two economic
meetings they had threatened to
postpone because of Japan's han-
dling of the MIG-25 incident.
They also promised the Japanese an
early meeting to work out the
problems for Japan that result
from the USSR's recent imposition
of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive
fisheries zone.
--continued
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The USSR issued a great deal of
propaganda on Japan's handling of
the MIG-25 incident, but the only
concrete retaliation seems to
have been the seizure of an abnor-
mally large number of Japanese
fishing boats in September and
October for alleged violations of
Soviet territorial waters.
The Soviets were reluctant to
carry out their threats to retali-
ate in other economic areas because
Soviet-Japanese economic coopera-
tion benefits the USSR as much as
it does Japan. The USSR, more-
over, did not want to give China
an advantage with Japan's new
leaders by prolonged remonstrances
over the MIG-25 affair.
--continued
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South Yemen has released
the surviving pilot of
the Iranian reconnais-
sance plane shot down
last month.
The quadripartite com-
mittee charged with
overseeing the truce
in Lebanon--composed
of representatives
of Syria, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait--is
unable to agree on a
course of action for
collecting heavy weap-
ons from the combatants.
NOTES
Progress has also been made on the
more difficult issue of recovering
the aircraft--an F-4--which crashed
off the South Yemeni coast.
Iran has been concerned lest a
communist government gain access
to the plane in the course of sal-
vage operations. According to an
official statement from Saudi
Arabia, which has acted as inter-
mediary in negotiations, Saudi
"experts" will participate in the
salvage operations and the air-
craft will be returned to Iran.
* * *
All the parties have been caching
their weapons since the cease-fire,
and there is little likelihood that
any will hand them over voluntarily.
Camille Shamun's National Liberal
Party has taken a step toward turn-
ing in heavy arms, but a spokesman
has made it clear that the party
will turn no arms over to the Leb-
anese government until the quad-
ripartite committee has adopted a 25X1
definitive plan.
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For the second time in
little over a month,
Soviet and East European
diplomats have walked
out of a Chinese state
banquet.
Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
had sharply criticized the USSR
during a reception for the visiting
South Yemeni head of state, charg-
ing that Moscow will be the "main
source" of a new war and lambasting
Soviet "expansion" in the ArEb
countries.
Li's accusations are the first
high-level Chinese comment on So-
viet activities since the Sino-
Soviet border talks reopened in
Peking earlier this month.
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