THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 DECEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466921
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 13, 1976

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400020002-1
The President's Daily Brief
December 13, 1976
2
_Thil_se.64,0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400020002-1
Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E 0 11652
exempuon category 513(11.1413)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000400020002-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
December 13, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: The appointment of a cabinet of technocrats last week
appears to have given most Lebanese confidence that Presi-
dent Sarkis will assert his authority over the political
leaders who started the war. (Page 1)
Notes: Spain; Vietnam-Laos-Thailand (Pages 3 and 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON: President
Sarkis' appointment of
a cabinet of technocrats
last week appears to
have given most Leba-
nese confidence that
he will assert his
authority over the po-
litical leaders who
fomented the war.
Confidence in Sarkis
and the generally fa-
vorable reaction to
the cabinet should im-
prove the government's
chances of being
granted emergency pow-
ers by parliament.
Principal opposition
to Sarkis will come
from Shamun and Jum-
blatt.
The formation of an apolitical
government was indeed a victory
for Sarkis over those who argued
for a cabinet that reflected the
interests of major Lebanese po-
litical factions.
Sarkis passed his first major
test primarily because of Syrian
military backing, but his own
careful planning and strong sup-
port from the Christian Phalange
Party were factors. Leftist
leader Kamal Jumblatt also strongly
endorsed the new cabinet. Among
other key Christian and Muslim
leaders, only Christian extremist
Camille Shamun has voiced opposi-
tion.
Sarkis wants to establish security
and begin reconstruction before he
tackles the contentious issue of
political reform. He hopes to
have an overall reconstruction
Program well underway before peace
talks begin between Christians
and Muslims lest it become a sub-
ject of sectarian bargaining.
Both have warned that the restruc-
turing of Lebanon's political or-
der must take precedence over
other matters. They seem aware
that Sarkis is trying to push both
Christians and Muslims into posi-
tions that would force them to
accept compromises.
--continued
1
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:1EDITERRANEA1\'
Beirut
Internatiori I
Airpor
MILES 20
0 KILOMETERS 20
620645 II 76
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Fighting in southern
Lebanon between Is-
raeli-backed Christian
troops and Muslim and
Palestinian forces ap-
pears to have tapered
off.
Ironically, Shamun and Jumblatt
will probably join forces to op-
pose Sarkis' plan to declare a
state of emergency and to seek ex-
traordinary powers from parliament.
They do not, however, control
enough parliamentary deputies to
block the President's requests.
Reports in the Beirut press over
the past several days that large
numbers of Palestinians and heavy
weapons are being moved to the
Arqub and other points in the
south are likely to keep tensions
high. We have no independent con-
firmation that such movements are
taking place.
Lebanese radio stations formerly
held by rival Christian and Mus-
lim groups integrated their opera-
tions over the weekend, and broad-
casts on the security situation
have stopped. President Sarkis
has encouraged and may eventually
impose formal censorship on re-
porting of security matters in an
effort to prevent tensions in one
area from spreading to other parts
of the country.
2
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Activity by some Span-
ish leftists, possibly
aimed at influencing
the referendum on po-
litical reform to be
held on Wednesday, is
unlikely to affect the
expected favorable vote.
Vietnam may be p:,epar-
ing to send three regi-
ments into Laos, a de-
velopment which would
further fuel Thailand's
anxiety about the in-
tentions of its Indo-
chinese neighbors.
NOTES
Authorities have announced that a
left-wing terrorist organization
is apparently responsible for the
kidnaping on Saturday of Antonio
Mario de Oriol. Oriol, a wealthy
Basque and former Franco supporter,
is president of the advisory Coun-
cil of State and a member of Spain's
highest consultative body, the
Council of the Realm. Early spec-
ulation credited Basque separatists
25X1
with the abduction.
If such Vietnamese troop movements
do occur, we believe they would
be a response to the situation in
Laos rather than an indication of
aggressive designs against Thai-
land.
lianoi is committed to various con-
struction projects in Laos, which
would benefit from additional man-
power to supplement some 30,000
Vietnamese troops already in the
country.
3
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
the Lao government
is contending with continued
rightist dissidence
25X1
The Vietnam-
ese were initially reluctant to
participate in anti-insurgent op-
erations in Laos, but the ineffec-
tiveness of the Pathet Lao has
increasingly drawn Vietnamese
troops into joint operations.
Hanoi has reacted sharply to offi-
cial Thai statements warning of
Vietnamese aggression against
Thailand, claiming such charges
are an excuse for more US military
aid and the reopening of US mili-
tary bases in Thailand.
4
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Top Secret
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