THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 DECEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466916
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 7, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
December 7, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 5B(1).(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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December 7, 1976
Table of Contents
Mexico:
(Page 1)
Iraq - Palestinians - Arab States:
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(Page 2)
Notes: Cuba; France; China-USSR (Pages 4 and 5)
At Annex we discuss Syria's foreign policy following Arab en-
dorsement of the Lebanese cease-fire in late October.
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MEXICO:
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The Lopez Portillo gov-
ernment apparently has
reached an agreement
with protesting peasants
in the northwest state
of Sinaloa.
IRAQ - PALESTINIANS -
ARAB STATES:
According to press reports, peasant
leaders have agreed to withdraw
within 48 hours from the fertile
land that they invaded last week.
Government officials reportedly
are trying to persuade landowners
in Sinaloa to cede an additional
5,000 hectares (12,000 acres) to
the peasants; last month, Sinaloan
landowners gave peasants about
13,500 hectares (33,000 acres).
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* * *
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The top power structure
in Cuba remains largely
unaltered despite nomi-
nal changes instituted
last week.
NOTES
Fidel Castro--now Cuba's presi-
dent--is in supreme command, and
his younger brother Raul is still
the number-two man in the regime.
Osvaldo Dorticos was removed from
both the presidency, which he had
held since 1959, and from his post
as chief of the Central Planning
Board. Health problems rather
than political difficulties are
probably responsible for Dorticos'
reduced status.
The only other significant change
is the replacement of Raul Roa--
aged 70 and in poor health--as
foreign minister by Isidoro Mal-
mierca Peoli. Malmierca is 46,
has traveled extensively, speaks
English, and was a member of the
pre-Castro communist party. He
may owe his appointment to Cuban
hopes of improving relations with
the US.
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Chinese diplomats con-
tinue to express skep-
ticism in conversations
with US and other offi-
cials that any new So-
viet proposals will pro-
duce progress in Sino-
Soviet border talks.
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A Chinese official in Moscow has
asserted that recent Soviet ges-
tures were actually aimed more at
Washington than Peking. A second
diplomat did not entirely rule out
the possibility of movement but
noted that progress would depend
on what the USSR had to offer.
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SYRIA
Syrian President Asad's position both at home
and abroad has strengthened since the Arab heads
of state endorsed the Lebanese cease-fire in late
October. The halt in fighting--even without prog-
ress toward a Lebanese political settlement--has
brought to a stop most public expressions of dis-
content within Syria as well as effective pressure
on Damascus from Egypt and the USSR, and the possi-
bility of a conventional military move by Iraq.
Asad's improved political position has opened the
way for him to focus on foreign policy concerns
beyond Lebanon and is almost certain to make him
push harder for progress in wider Middle East peace
negotiations. It will not, however, make him any
more willing to offer significant concessions to
Israel.
Syria's strategy now is to marshal as much Arab and inter-
national support as possible to press the US and Israel to
resume serious peace negotiations. To minimize political
risks and to avoid the appearance of making concessions,
Asad probably will work through Arab states with close ties
to the US, particularly Jordan and Egypt.
Strategy Toward Jordan
Asad's immediate aim is to strengthen further his close
ties to Jordan. During his current visit to Amman, he is
likely to urge on Jordanian King Husayn a joint announcement
of the two states' intention to create--sometime in the fu-
ture--a federation or confederation of the two countries.
The Syrians undoubtedly believe that such a demonstration of
Jordan's support and confidence, following Syria's victory
in Lebanon, will remind the US, Israel, and Asad's Arab
critics that Damascus holds a significantly stronger position
in the region, and that its views on Lebanese and Middle East
peace negotiations must be accommodated.
King Husayn probably will endorse the principle of closer
political cooperation. He will delay indefinitely, however,
implementing any scheme that would cede to others significant
influence over Jordan's internal security or foreign and mil-
itary policy.
Coordination with Egypt
Asad is now willing to put aside his public criticism of
the second Sinai accord while he attempts to work through
--continued
Al
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Sadat to make gains in negotiations. Asad plans to visit
Cairo on Saturday.
The Syrians prefer that Sadat take the lead in arranging
a new round of talks. Asad recognizes that Egypt has had
more experience than Syria in dealing with the US, and he
prefers that Egypt suffer the public criticism that would
accompany a failure to get talks going again.
Working with Egypt also helps Syria in its relations with
the other Arabs. It particularly pleases the Saudis, who
provide budgetary support to Syria, fund the predominantly
Syrian Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon, and control use
of the Arab oil weapon.
The rapprochement between Syria and Egypt also helps under-
cut Asad's radical Arab critics. The Palestinians and the
Iraqis succeeded in delaying the establishment of a Syrian-
backed peace in Lebanon when they had active backing from
Egypt, but without Egyptian support they have had to acquiesce
in the Syrian occupation.
As long as the Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement holds, the Pal-
estinians will find it much more difficult to play the Syrians
and Egyptians off against one another. Cooperation between
Cairo and Damascus reduces chances that the Palestinians will
be able to veto any formula arranged for the return of an Arab
delegation to Geneva. It also makes less likely Palestinian
use of a future meeting of the Palestine National Council--
the Palestinian parliament--to reduce Syria's control of the
fedayeen.
Peace Talks
Syria has equivocated publicly for months about the utility
of reconvening the Geneva conference. If Damascus believes
it can make significant progress in peace negotiations, there
is no doubt that it will be willing to return to the conference.
Damascus' renewal last month of the mandate of the UN observer
force on the Golan Heights without significant political wran-
gling reflects in part Syria's interest in avoiding an obstruc-
tionist image at a time when the Arabs are pushing for a resump-
tion of serious negotiations.
Asad is not likely to abandon his position that the Palestin-
ians must be represented at Geneva from the start of any new
round of talks. If he perceives that progress may be possible
on substantive issues, however, he might agree to the forma-
tion of a joint Arab delegation--which Egypt would support--
that would include Palestine Liberation Organization represen-
tatives but not have the PLO present as an organization.
This would have the advantage, from Syria's point of view, of
facilitating control of the PLO by the moderate Arab states.
--continued
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It would also have the advantage of putting both the PLO and
Israel on the defensive. Neither would like such a formula,
but both would be concerned about the possible political costs
of rejecting it outright.
On substantive matters, Syria in the coming months will press
for negotiations aiming at the return of the Arab territories
occupied by Israel in exchange for an end to "all forms of
aggression."
Israel and Lebanon
Asad's successful pursuit of his Lebanon policy against the
wishes of the Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians, and Soviets
almost certainly has reinforced his conviction that persever-
ance pays off. We anticipate that the net effect of the Leba-
nese involvement will be to make Asad more confident and de-
termined than ever to maintain pressure on Israel, and to give
Israel no excuse to refuse either to participate in negotiations
or to turn to military action.
Syria will continue, for example, to reaffirm its support
for the creation of a Palestinian state. This worries the
Israelis and also disarms Asad's fedayeen critics, who argue
that his Lebanese policy was directed against the Palestinians.
The presence of approximately 30,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon
serves as an implicit threat to Israel, even though they are
dispersed throughout the country and pose no immediate threat
to Israel's security. The Syrian troops are likely to remain
for some months even if the Lebanese cease-fire holds and
will tend to create new political problems between Israel and
Syria. Having not protested so far, however, the Israelis
will be in an awkward position to counter this threat.
Syria has begun to rebuild the Syrian-controlled Saiqa
fedayeen group in Lebanon and has moved small units of the
Syrian-dominated Palestine Liberation Army into the Arqub
region of southern Lebanon. These actions are not directed
at Israel, but, because they expand Syrian control in Lebanon,
will also raise Israeli concern.
Syria has indicated in the public media its desire to move
its forces into the southern Lebanese port of Tyre to eliminate
the last important source of resupply for the Palestinians and
leftists. It has delayed doing so to deny Israeli forces an
excuse to move into southern Lebanon in force. Should the
Syrians decide they cannot risk a move into Tyre, they are
likely to conclude also that continued tension and occasional
skirmishing between the fedayeen and Lebanese Christian and
Israeli forces in the border area--despite the adverse impact
on Lebanese stability--serve Syria's interests in dealing with
Israel.
--continued
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Continued tension, the Syrians might calculate, would oblige
the Israelis to choose between a Syrian presence in the bor-
der area and low-level fedayeen cross-border terrorism.
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v
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Top Secret
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