THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 OCTOBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466879
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 23, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
October 23, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification scheduk of E 0 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 23, 1976
Table of Contents
China: Peking radio's casual acknowledgement of the elevation of
Hua Kuo-feng and the arrest of the leftist quartet on the
Politburo falls short of a formal announcement by the party
Central Committee. (Page 1)
Lebanon: Relative.calm prevailed throughout Lebanon on the sec-
ond day of the cease-fire. At the summit in Cairo, Arab
leaders will be asked to indicate whether and in what numbers
they wish to contribute to the expanded peacekeeping force.
(Page 3)
Iraq: The statement issued by the Iraqi regime denouncing the
agreement reached at the mini-summit reflects the Iraqis'
sharp annoyance with Arab sanctioning of Syria's military
intervention in Lebanon. (Page 5)
Portugal: Political tensions are rising, fueled by continuing
rumors of government changes, squabbling among the military,
and divisions within the governing Socialist Party. (Page 6)
Rhodesia: Most of Rhodesia's white population appears to be sol-
idly behind Prime Minister Smith's policy of seeking an ac-
commodation with the black nationalists. (Page 7)
At Annex we discuss the succession issue facing the Soviet lead-
ership.
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CHINA: Peking radio's
casual acknowledgement
on Thursday that Hua
Kuo-feng had been ele-
vated to chairman of
the party Central Com-
mittee and of the Mili-
tary Affairs Commission
and that the leftist
quartet on the Polit-
buro had been "struck
down" still falls short
of a formal announce-
ment of Hua's confirma-
tion by the Central
Committee.
The broadcast moved closer to a full
account of the charges against the
leftists, but a detailed descrip-
tion of the machinations of the
four has yet to be made official.
Nor has a new Politburo, to re-
place that elected at the last
party congress three years ago and
now depleted by death and purges,
been revealed. The elevation of
Li Hsien-nien to the post of pre-
mier--generally assumed in Peking
to be imminent--also has not been
announced, but Hua is now being
identified as chairman rather than
premier.
Many of these formal announcements
may be made this morning during a
television broadcast from Peking,
which is to be transmitted abroad.
In any event, the new Chinese lead-
ership appears anxious to under-
line the legality of its actions--
in contrast to the moves earlier
this year against Teng Hsiao-ping,
which many Chinese considered "il-
legal."
Formal endorsement of the new
shape of political affairs requires
action by the Central Committee
and other national bodies. A Cen-
tral Committee plenum may still be
in session; large numbers of offi-
cials who were flown to Peking
shortly after the arrest of the
leftist quartet still appear to be
in the capital.
No formal announcement today or
during a broadcast scheduled for
transmission abroad next Monday
would suggest that problems had
arisen in sorting out a new lead-
ership and formalizing a new set
of programs. The events of the
past two weeks, however, have
clearly been welcomed widely
throughout China and the current
leadership appears to be acting
with great confidence.
--continued
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Even without the final,
formal announcements,
Hua's enhanced position
and the arrest of the
leftists seem irrevo-
cable.
Hua appears to have the firm back-
ing of the bulk of the military--
a fact underlined in the demonstra-
tions and in Chinese propaganda
since the arrests.
One informal and unofficial ac-
count of the events surrounding
the arrests portrays Defense Min-
ister Yeh Chien-ying--a close as-
sociate of Chou En-lai and an out-
spoken critic of the fallen left-
ists--as the prime mover in the
showdown and the man who convinced
Hua to act. This report states
that Hua decided to move after an
attempt was made on his life on
the morning of October 6 by an un-
named individual instigated by the
leftist quartet. Hua is reported
to have had the support of 8 of
the 11 powerful military region
commanders, suggesting that the
others remained passive or sup-
ported the left.
One probably was Li Te-sheng, com-
mander of the Shenyang Military
Region (Manchuria).
Nearly all accounts of the turbu-
lent month following Mao's death
indicate that the leftist quartet
was counting on some sort of mili-
tary support. Some of the indi-
viduals who supported "radical"
Red Guard groups during the Cul-
tural Revolution have not been
weeded out of active service. How
to handle these men could be a del-
icate problem for the leadership,
particularly those in the army.
It is possible that the army high
command is now grappling with this
--continued
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There may be some con-
cern over how fast to
move against individuals
in Peking and the pro-
vinces who have long
espoused leftist posi-
tions.
Other possible problem
areas are the exact
composition of a recon-
stituted Politburo and
the question of whether
or not to close out the
campaign against Teng
Hsiao-ping quickly.
LEBANON: Relative calm
prevailed throughout
Lebanon on the second
day of the cease-fire
yesterday.
and other immediate problems--the
appointment of a new chief of
staff and a new head of the gen-
eral political department.
Some 500 people reportedly were
arrested in the provinces on the
night of October 6-7, but a hand-
ful of left-leaning province chiefs
and other prominent officials are
apparently still at large. No ex-
tensive arrests seem to have been
made in the propaganda apparatus,
long a leftist stronghold.
One Politburo member, Wang Tung-
hsing, initially rumored to have
falled with the leftist quartet,
appears not to be in political
trouble. Wang had been suspected
by many Chinese and foreign ob-
servers to have leftist sympathies,
but he seems to have cast his lot
with Hua. Security forces, in Pe-
king, which are under his control,
were warmly lauded during a recent
demonstration in the capital.
Hua and some of those close to
him, however, may prefer not to
move too quickly in "reversing the
verdict" on Teng, whose shoes Hua
has in effect filled.
The general quiet in Beirut, the
Mount Lebanon area, and northern
Lebanon was interrupted only by
occasional firing. Action was
somewhat heavier in the south near
the Israeli border, where Chris-
tian forces aided by Israeli ar-
tillery have been moving on Pales-
tinian positions for the last sev-
eral days.
3
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At the summit in Cairo,
Arab League Secretary
General Riyad will in-
vite all Arab states to
indicate whether and in
what numbers they wish
to contribute to the
expanded force.
The joint Palestinian-leftist com-
mand met Thursday night to discuss
the resolutions approved by Riyadh
and issued a statement declaring
that it will not respect the cease-
fire where Israeli forces are in-
volved.
The leftist command under Kamal
Jumblatt reenforced the threat
with a unilateral declaration last
night of its intention to launch a
"large scale armed struggle against
the Israeli incursions" if the
Arab summit conference in Cairo on
Monday does not handle the issue.
The Arab League security forces
yesterday reestablished check-
points to supervise the cease-fire
along the line dividing east and
west Beirut. A security force
spokesman discussed with Lebanese
and Palestinian leaders arrange-
ments for !additional checkpoints
and a buffer zone as interim meas-
ures before the arrival of the ex-
panded peacekeeping force.
The final selection of additional
contingents will be left to Leba-
nese President Sarkis, who is to
have overall control of the eace-
kee in troo s
Saudi Arabia is expected to aug-
ment its contingent and other
troop contributions are antici-
pated from Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco,
and possibly Kuwait.
4
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IRAQ: The statement
issued Thursday by the
Iraqi regime denouncing
the agreement reached
at the mini-summit re-
flects the Iraqis'
sharp annoyance with
Arab sanctioning of
Syria's military inter-
vention in Lebanon.
* * *
The Iraqis probably feel betrayed
by Egypt which, until recently,
has been collaborating with Iraq's
effort to strengthen Palestinian
and Lebanese leftist forces ar-
rayed against the Syrians.
If Iraq attends the Arab summit
conference in Cairo, its perform-
ance may give some hint as to
whether it will try to obstruct
implementation of the agreement.
Despite their opposition to the
pact, the Iraqis may begin to re-
duce their own involvement in Leb-
anon if they believe that Lebanese
leftists and the Palestinians in-
tend to observe the truce. Forces
controlled by Baghdad in Lebanon
are not strong enough to provoke
a renewal of full-scale fighting
although they could spark inci-
dents.
Iraq, having apparently parted
ways with Egypt on policy toward
Lebanon, may now be seeking a com-
mon approach with Libya. The Lib-
yans have announced they will not
attend the Cairo summit and are
probably urging Baghdad to boycott
the conference, too.
PLO Chairman Arafat, during his
visit to Baghdad this week, prob-
ably pressed the Iraqis to attend
the summit in spite of their mis-
givings. Arafat will probably
urge the Iraqis to offer to send
5
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PORTUGAL: Political
tensions are rising,
fueled by continuing
rumors of government
changes, squabbling
among the military, and
divisions within the
governing Socialist
Party.
peacekeeping forces to Lebanon,
but Syria and most of the other
Arab states would certainly veto
any such offer.
* * *
President Eanes seems to be wor-
ried about the current situation
on several counts:
--He believes Prime Minister
Soares is not doing enough to
tackle Portugal's serious eco-
nomic problems.
--He fears an attempt on his
life by leftists, who would try
to pin the blame on the right.
--He may be concerned that right-
ists in the military are bidding
effectively for greater influence.
--He may also fear that recent
protests by conscript officers
over pay and promotions are
weakening a military long
plagued by internal feuding.
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*
RHODESIA: Most of Rho-
desia's white popula-
tion appears to be sol-
idly behind Prime Min-
ister Smith's policy
of seeking an accommo-
dation with the black
nationalists.
Eanes has not settled on a course
of action, however.
*
*
The Prime Minister reportedly is
reassuring the whites that the
civil service is the key to carry
ing out any government's policies
and it is likely to remain in the
hands of whites well into the fu-
ture. Smith is saying that since
the blacks are not known to have
any programs for taking over the
civil service, the blacks could
assume the top ministry posts
while the middle and lower level
white civil servants remain.
-
Smith's optimism may be misplaced
Once a black majority government
takes power in Rhodesia, it is
likely to move quickly to gain
control over all aspects of the
bureaucracy. There are more edu-
cated blacks in Rhodesia capable
of assuming bureaucratic respon-
sibilities than has been the case
with other former British colonies
at independence.
7
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*
*
8
*
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USSR
The Supreme Soviet is scheduled to con-
vene in Moscow next Wednesday to approve
the new five-year plan and the plan and
budget for 1977. There is a rash of ru-
mors of impending changes in the top
leadership. These rumors are prompted
by uncertainty about Premier Kosygin's
health and the expectation that the Su-
preme Soviet session will be preceded by
a meeting of the party's Central Commit-
tee--the forum for important personnel
changes.
For two years, the question of General Secretary
Brezhnev's health dominated the rumor mill in Mos-
cow, but he now appears in better health than he
has been in a long time. Since he returned from
vacation in September he has been very active, and
rumors, so common earlier, that his .retirement is
imminent have ceased. Instead, attention has
shifted to Kosygin.
The Premier's convalescence from his illness or ac-
cident last summer was a long one, but he looked
fit when he reappeared in public on October 18 to
meet the visiting Mongolian party boss. /
The hallmark of this regime has been stability
within the senior ranks of the leadership. Despite
rivalries and differences, each appears to have
seen his own security as dependent on the security
of the others. What changes have been made have
been in the direction of preserving the old guard
and holding off the intrusion of younger men.
Youth--in the relative sense--particularly when
joined with ambition, has not been well rewarded.
--continued
Al
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This was evident in the response to Kosygin's ill-
ness. In early September, Deputy Premier Nikolay
Tikhonov, a 71-year-old crony of Brezhnev from his
Dnepropetrovsk days, was elevated to first deputy
premier. By that time, it had probably been deter-
mined that Kosygin's recuperation might be lengthy,
and Tikhonov was presumably appointed to assist
Kirill Mazurov, until then the only first deputy
premier, in handling some of Kosygin's workload.
Tikhonov's position entitles him to a seat on the
Politburo, and he may receive it at the plenum next
week. Another change expected at the plenum is the
pro forma removal of Politburo member Ustinov from
the party Secretariat. It is not customary for an
official to hold both a full-time party job and a
government post, and Ustinov has not been identi-
fied in his Secretariat post since he was named
Minister of Defense in April. These may be the
only personnel actions to come out of the plenum.
If Kosygin Does Retire
In the less likely event that Kosygin has decided
to retire, it is not at all clear who would replace
him. Tikhonov would seem to lack the credentials
for the post. His appointment as first deputy pre-
mier may turn out to have been a spoiling operation
to damage Mazurov's chances.
As the only first deputy premier for several years,
Mazurov had established the clearest claim of any-
one to succeed Kosygin. His difficulty is that of
all the younger ambitious Soviet leaders--to culti-
vate a public image is to arouse the suspicions of
the seniors, while to seek anonymity is to risk
being forgotten. Mazurov has not written a major
article or given an important speech aside from
obligatory ones, in four years.
One other possible candidate to succeed Kosygin is
party secretary Kirilenko. Although his name has
not been included in the rumors, his selection
would fit the pattern of keeping the top post
within the ranks of existing senior Politburo mem-
bers. It would place in the top government post
a long-time associate whom Brezhnev knows better
--continued
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than he knows Mazurov. It would also serve to re-
move Kirilenko from the line of succession to the
post of general secretary, a development that Brezh-
nev may no longer be reluctant to see. Kirilenko
might object, but it would be difficult for him to
refuse such a responsible post.
Kirilenko has been one of Brezhnev's closest asso-
ciates since the two served together in the Dnepro-
petrovsk region in the Ukraine. He has for a num-
ber of years acted as Brezhnev's unofficial deputy
on the party Secretariat. He has filled in for
the party boss in his absences, specifically dur-
ing Brezhnev's long illness during the winter of
1974-75. Kirilenko has long been viewed in party
circles as the most likely candidate to succeed
Brezhnev should the latter step down in the not
too distant future.
Yet Kirilenko has never been publicly recognized
as second-in-command in the party and continues to
be ranked in protocol listings behind veteran ide-
ologist Suslov. The two have been engaged for many
years in desultory rivalry, a situation that Brezh-
nev has seemed content to allow to continue. In
the last year there have been signs that a little
of the warmth may have gone out of Kirilenko's re-
lationship with Brezhnev.
There is some evidence suggesting that contacts be-
tween Brezhnev and Kirilenko on matters of party
business may have fallen off in the past year.
Brezhnev seems to have increasingly insulated him-
self behind bureaucratic layers of personal aides
and Central Committee staff members. He seems to
be relying particularly on Konstantin Chernenko,
who as head of the Central Committee's General De-
partment, serves as the top executive aide to the
Politburo.
The elevation of Chernenko to the party Secretariat
at the 25th party congress last spring formalized
his special standing and must have caused Kirilenko
some concern. The close relationship between Brezh-
nev and Chernenko was publicly demonstrated two
months later when Brezhnev in an unusual gesture
--continued
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took over President Podgorny's function and person-
ally presented Chernenko with an award for services
to the party.
Kirilenko's curious speech last week at the cere-
mony honoring him on his 70th birthday may reflect
some uneasiness about his chances at the succession.
He seemed to go out of his way to prove his loyalty
to Brezhnev by a lengthy eulogy of his accomplish-
ments. Yet Kirilenko combined this praise with a
quite extraordinary recital of his own achievements.
The Succession Issue
Even if, as seems likely, Kosygin stays on as pre-
mier and the plenum brings no changes in the top
leadership, Kosygin's illness must have raised
again the need to take some steps toward the even-
tual rejuvenation of the top ranks of the leader-
ship. All the senior members of the Politburo ex-
cept Brezhnev are over 70, and Brezhnev will be 70
this December.
Brezhnev appears to be in good form now, but it is
safe to assume that the pattern of wide fluctua-
tions in the state of his health will continue.
Uncertainty about his health has contributed as
much to the near paralysis of political life in
Moscow as has the seniors' preference for the sta-
tus quo. Brezhnev has not for several years been
sufficiently well long enough to provide consis-
tently dynamic leadership, nor has he been sick
long enough to force the succession issue.
Some New Factors
This pattern may well continue, but there are new
factors that could bring some movement on the po-
litical scene. Even if reports of a cooling be-
tween Brezhnev and Kirilenko have been exaggerated,
Kirilenko's age becomes an increasing liability
for him and there is a growing likelihood that
Brezhnev will start to look elsewhere for an heir.
If the leaders wish to attempt to control the suc-
cession process to any extent they will have to
place their candidates in responsible positions
where they can gain vital national experience and
recognition.
--continued
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With the exception perhaps of Mazurov, there are
no leaders in their 50s or 60s who are now in the
right spot with the right qualifications to have a
good claim to any of the top posts. A number of
qualified leaders on the national scene who once
seemed to be possible contenders for higher office
are now seriously hampered in one way or another.
--Andropov is an experienced and well-connected
party official, but he would have to put some
distance between himself and his present KGB
post before he could be considered.
--Kulakov is in an advantageous position, rank-
ing after Kirilenko in the party Secretariat,
and he seems to be a favorite of Brezhnev,
but he has for too long been too narrowly fo-
cused on agriculture. He was released from
the position of head of the Central Commit-
tee's Agriculture Department last May presum-
ably to allow him to take on wider responsi-
bilities, but there is no evidence that he
has yet acquired any important new assignments.
The two most favored contenders at the moment ap-
pear to be Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitsky and
the head of the Leningrad regional party organiza-
tion, Romanov. All have strong support in Moscow,
but they are all severely hampered by lack of ex-
perience at the national level.
Shcherbitsky, another member of the Dnepropetrovsk
group, is Brezhnev's closest protege. Unlike his
predecessor as Ukrainian party boss, Shelest,
Shcherbitsky has avoided making enemies in Moscow
by assiduously putting the national interest above
local concerns. After several years of being troub-
led by factionalism in the Ukrainian leadership, he
now seems to have strengthened his local base of
support sufficiently to feel free to accept a Mos-
cow post.
Romanov's elevation to full membership on the Pol-
itburo at the 25th Party Congress tagged him as a
comer, and his name has been mentioned frequently
in the current round of rumors of leadership
changes. He is evidently a favorite of Suslov, an
important voice in any succession question. Sus-
by oversaw his appointment to the Leningrad post
six years ago. Suslov's appearance with Romanov
at a recent award ceremony in Leningrad again
--continued
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called attention to their good relationship. Ro-
manov has also worked out a close and mutually ad-
vantageous relationship with Brezhnev; Kosygin, as
a fellow Leningrader, presumably views his candi-
dacy favorably.
If, as seems the case, these men are viewed in Mos-
cow as the most promising candidates eventually to
succeed the seniors, it seems imperative that they
soon be brought to Moscow to gain experience. It
would make sense to bring them in as a group and to
place them in responsible though not front-running
jobs. The senior members of the Politburo would
probably find it easier to agree among themselves
if a package deal were involved. The candidates
could continue to compete and would be protected
from the dangers that await an anointed heir appar-
ent.
There are at least two leadership positions that
could be filled--party secretary for the defense
industry (vacated by Ustinov) and head of the trade
unions organization (vacant for 18 months).
Next week's meetings will offer yet another oppor-
tunity for the seniors to begin to lay plans for
an orderly succession. They have passed up numer-
ous opportunities to do this, but while to do noth-
ing may politically be the easiest course, it is
not entirely neutral. It works to the benefit of
those already well-placed on the national scene,
such as Kirilenko, Mazurov, and Kulakov.
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