THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 OCTOBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466865
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 7, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
October 7, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 511(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
October 7, 1976
Table of Contents
Thailand: It is not yet clear whether the Thai military's as-
sumption of power on October 6 was an outright coup or a
move invited by a frustrated and weary prime minister.
(Page 1)
Lebanon: Syrian military activity over the past several days
strongly suggests that Christian and Syrian forces are plan-
ning to use Jazzin as the staging area for their next assault
on the Palestinians. (Page 2)
Egypt: The equivalent of some four to five Egyptian combat bri-
gades are not at their normal locations along the Suez Canal.
Egyptian President Sadat yesterday denied that Egypt has
plans to invade Libya. (Page 3)
Notes: Iraq-Egypt; France - South Africa; Yugoslavia; USSR -
West Germany; South Korea; Cuba (Pages 5, 6, and 7)
At Annex we take a closer look at Thailand's shaky political system.
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THAILAND: It is not
yet clear whether the
Thai military's assump-
tion of power on Octo-
ber 6 was an outright
coup or a move invited
by a frustrated and
weary prime minister.
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The military leaders
are taking pains to
convey an impression
of an orderly change
in the government.
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They reportedly have agreed that
the Supreme Commander of the armed
forces, Air Chief Marshal Kamon,
will head an internal security
force that will administer the coun-
try under the guidance of a military
council led by Sa-ngat for a month
or so until a "reform civilian gov-
ernment" can be established. This
reform government will administer
the nation's affairs until a new
constitution is drafted.
By the evening of October 6, Bang-
kok was quiet and Seni reportedly
was cooperating with Sa-ngat in
selecting members of the new mili-
tary council.
--continued
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sian Contro led
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DAMASCUS
620500 0-76
MILES 20
0 KILOMETERS 20
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The military administra-
tors already have an-
nounced that all treaty
commitments will be
respected and that good
relations with all
countries will be a
prime goal.
LEBANON: Syrian mili-
tary activity over the
past several days
strongly suggests that
Christian and Syrian
forces are planning to
use Jazzin in southern
Lebanon as the staging
area for their next
assault on the Pales-
tinians.
Both Sa-ngat and Kamon had favored
close Thai-US military relations
and were troubled by the recent
US withdrawals. The military
leaders may play down, if not re-
verse, the Seni government's de-
sire to work out an accommodation
with Vietnam.
Both Sa-ngat and Kamon have been
regarded as nonpolitical, highly
professional military officers
with standards for personal hon-
esty
Their reputations will lend
credence to Sa-ngat's public state-
ment that he and his colleagues
are not ambitious to hold power
for an extended period.
* * *
Syrian MIG-21 reconnaissance air-
craft have been scouring the area
and Syrian forces have been adjust-
ing, and possibly reinf
their positions there.
--continued
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190 150 200 Miles
1.0 200 Kilometers
4790312 9-?1376 CIA
r- BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
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Leftist leader Kamal
Jumblatt announced yes-
terday that leftist-
held territory surround-
ing Alayh has been de-
clared a military zone.
EGYPT: The equivalent
of some four to five
Egyptian combat bri-
gades are not at their
normal locations along
the Suez Canal.
No one is to be allowed to enter
or leave the area. Jumblatt, who
apparently fears that the Chris-
tians and Syrians may yet decide
to attack his Druze stronghold at
Alayh, probably has the forces to
execute the order. This action
will sever one of the few remain-
ing access routes to Beirut.
Druze leaders reportedly have been
discussing with Christian Phalan-
gist and Palestinian representa-
tives a proposal to bar all com-
batants from Alayh. Other Druze
leaders traveled to Damascus ear-
lier this week to appeal for re-
straint from Syrian and Christian
leaders.
Many Druze chieftains and their
conservative followers have long
opposed Jumblatt's militancy, but
have continued their allegiance
to him because he was able to limit
their direct involvement in the
fighting. Now that the war is at
their doorstep, some may be won
over by Jumblatt's rivals, who
have created the impression that
they want to save the Druze com-
munity.
We have learned this from prelim-
inary analysis of U-2 photography
Many o
unitc were already missing
One entire brigade is missing, but
in all other cases only elements
of brigades have departed. This
suggests that the missing Egyptian
units were selected to participate
--continued
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Egyptian President
Sadat, in a speech yes-
terday commemorating
the anniversary of the
1973 war, denied that
Egypt has plans to in-
vade Libya.
in the parade yesterday commemo-
rating the start of the 1973 war,
and that after the parade they
will return to their normal loca-
tions.
Egyptian armed forces were on alert
yesterday, presumably because of
the holiday.
The movement of ground units from
the canal area to Cairo for the
parade could provide cover for
marshaling forces to be trans-
ferred to the Libyan border.
On the other hand, Sadat and War
Minister Gamasy in a separate
speech put considerable stress
on the danger from Qadhafi's
subversive activities and on
Egypt's right to protect itself.
By stating such concerns Sadat
could be laying the groundwork
that would enable him to label
an attack against Libya as one of
self-defense.
* * *
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--continued
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Iraq
Egypt
*
NOTES
*
*
Faced with mounting criticism of
its failure to honor the arms
embargo against South Africa.
However, France is likely to con-
tinue its lucrative arms relation-
ship with South Africa, its third
largest arms customer. Paris will
probably eliminate direct sales of
weapons that could be used against
insurgents, but will go ahead with
the recent sale of two submarines
and two destroyer escorts and with
negotiations for the sale of naval
missile systems.
--continued
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Yugoslav President
Tito 's recuperation
from his reported
"acute liver disease"
may extend well into
December.
Soviet media are inter-
preting the outcome of
the West German elec-
tion as not simply a
Social Democratic -
Free Democratic victory,
but as a victory for
the policy of European
detente.
South Africa probably will go for-
ward with its plans to produce
nearly 100 Mirage F-is under
license with some French technical
assistance.
* * *
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Since his illness was first an-
nounced on September 10, official
estimates of the duration of Tito's
recuperation have gradually in-
creased. Should Tito remain out
of circulation through December,
a rumored visit by Brezhnev this
fall might have to be postponed.
* * *
Yet, the Soviets have reason to
be unhappy with the narrowness of
the coalition's victory. Before
the election Soviet diplomats ex-
pressed concern that a shift to the
right resulting in a razor-thin
majority for the coalition would
increase the leverage of the Free
Democrats and their leader, For-
eign Minister Genscher, whom
Moscow does not like. They are
also worried about the durability
of the coalition and are well
aware of the Free Democrats' long
history of cooperation with the
Christian Democrats.
To appeal to the business interests
that traditionally back the Free
Democrats, the Soviets have stressed
the "mutually beneficial" business
cooperation that has marked the
--continued
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South Korea's export-
Zed recovery is sur-
passing all earlier
forecasts. GNP is now
projected to grow by
14 percent in 1976.
Havana is likely to
blame militant Cuban
exiles, and possibly
the US, for the crash
yesterday of a Cuban
airliner shortly after
takeoff from Barbados.
coalition's tenure. The Soviets
have returned to their theme that
they will do "everything" to
deepen detente and implement co-
operation with the West Germans.
South Korean exporters have taken
advantage of the economic recovery
in the US and have successfully
penetrated the lucrative Middle
East market. Import growth has
been more moderate, which should
permit South Korea's current-
account deficit this year to be
reduced to $0.5 billion compared
with $2 billion in 1975.
Cuban exile terrorists have been
linked to several bombings of
Cuban facilities abroad in the
past several months, including
unsuccessful attempts to blow up
aircraft in flight.
Cuban Prime Minister Castro last
June warned that Havana might
respond in kind to anti-Cuban
terrorist activity. Unless there
is convincing evidence that the
crash was indeed an accident,
Castro is likely to interpret the
pilot's message that the plane
had experienced an on-board explo-
sion as proof that the crash was
caused by an exile bomb.
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--continued
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THAILAND
The return to martial law in Thailand--
whether it proves to be temporary or
drawn out--is yet another indication of
basic weaknesses in the nation's three-
year-old system of parliamentary democ-
racy. These weaknesses are reinforced
by cultural patterns and are not suscep-
tible to easy elimination. The insta-
bility and vacillation that have marked
government performance can only reduce
the acready tenuous commitment to demo-
cratic rule in Thailand.
The multitude of parties competing for power--19 of
the 41 that ran in the last election were repre-
sented in the parliament--so spread the vote as to
make coalition government unavoidable. Yet the
coalitions that have attempted to govern since the
promulgation of the constitution in 1974 did not
represent common political purposes so much as as-
sociations of convenience among party leaders who
saw cabinet membership as the best way to protect
and advance their personal interests.
Divided as these coalitions were by conflicting
personal ambitions and interests, the development
of coherent government policies has been virtually
impossible until a near-crisis compelled some tem-
porary consensus.
Party Politics
Political parties--now suspended at least temporar-
ily--are basically alien to the Thai culture. Only
the Democrat Party has a semblance of permanence
(it has existed since 1946), while other parties
have made fleeting appearances. The civilian elite
tended to shy away from the risks and futility of
party politics, preferring the real power and in-
fluence of the bureaucracy.
The Democrat Party comes closest to being a polit-
ical party in the Western sense. Once regarded
as the best organized and least corrupt of the Thai
parties, it has become deeply divided along regional
and generational lines, divisions that have clearly
weakened the position of former prime minister Seni
and dissipated the strength that should have accrued
from the party's large plurality in the just-dis-
solved Assembly.
--continued
Al
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The Thai Nation Party, the second largest, is more
typical of Thai political bodies; it is a coali-
tion of conservative businessmen, many of them re-
tired military officers, and civilian bureaucrats
held together by a web of personal and business re-
lations. The party is descended from a powerful
military clique of the 1950s that was ousted from
power by Field Marshal Sarit in 1957. The overthrow
of Sat-it's heirs, Thanom and Praphat, gave the old
clique new life.
Political Cliques
Most of the political parties are composites of
such cliques, or, in the case of many of the small
ones, temporary vehicles to further one person's
ambition. The Thai clique system is a reflection
of the patron-client phenomenon that pervades Thai
society--a natural falling into place of a su-
perior-inferior relationship with attendant obli-
gations on each side.
These patron-client relations are transitory--
clients are constantly reassessing the advantages
of existing arrangements and seeking more benefi-
cial patrons. In the parliamentary context, parties
were unstable, continually shifting in relative
strength as individual members offered their alle-
giance to the highest bidder.
The 1974 constitution corrected some of the more
glaring deficiencies that contributed to the fail-
ure of earlier experiments in representative gov-
ernment. Members of the legislature could no
longer change parties without losing their seats,
a provision that contributed to some stability in
the most recent Assembly.
Protest and Polarization
Fractious and vacillating government clearly en-
dangered the long-range prospects for democracy
in Thailand. The Thai are a conservative people,
comfortable with forms of paternalistic authoritar-
ianism and uncertain that free-wheeling Western
democracy is really compatible with their society
and their needs.
The growth of protest politics and its attendant
violence contributed to public skepticism and
reduced the tolerance level of right-wing civil-
ian and military groups. In the past few years,
--continued
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students, workers, and farmers, traditionally pas-
sive elements of society, were increasingly drawn
into active politics--but their impact was sporadic.
The students remain the cutting edge of protest
politics. They have lost much of the glamor they
once enjoyed for their role in bringing down the
military regime in 1973. Since then, the more
visible activists have grown increasingly leftist
and now form the core of a nascent radical movement.
The radicalism of a few student leaders and the
public's impatience with their activities encour-
aged repressive measures by right-wing forces.
The extremism of both rightists and leftists has
contributed to a growing polarization in Thai poli-
tics, which has been reflected in the increasing
violence of recent months.
This growing tendency to violence may abate some-
what under martial law, at least initially, since
leftist activists are likely to go into hiding
to avoid arrest--and worse--at the hands of the
military.
The King
The King has little formal political authority,
but he commands considerable moral influence and
has been an important stabilizing factor. (
//In moving on October 6 to take charge, the
military was doubtless convinced that the King sup-
ported the declaration of martial law.
The Army
The key factor in Thailand's political future is,
as always, the army. With strong leadership, the
army could be the most disciplined and effective
--continued
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political force in the country--ready to be used as
a voting bloc to influence a parliamentary election
or as the muscle for a coup.
The First Division of the First Army--the Bang-
kok garrison--is the traditional coup force, and
the political proclivities of the First Army com-
mander are of utmost importance to the government.
The minister of defense holds another crucial
post; he can place his allies in key military as-
signments when the annual retirements and rotations
take place. The supreme military commander, as
head of all the armed forces, is also in an influ-
ential position, as indicated by his selection on
October 6 to run the new interim military council.
Until called upon to take over in the wake of the
new student violence this week, most senior army
officers seemed disinclined to think in terms of
a return to military rule. There was growing
dissatisfaction within the military with the
government's weak and ineffectual performance,
but most apparently felt
that the army should not be directly responsible
for the collapse of Thailand's fragile democracy.
Their basic interests were not seriously threatened
by the conservative civilians in power, and the
military's links to the political parties enabled
them to manipulate the political system. The
outbreak of serious violence together with Seni's
manifestly weak leadership, however, set the stage
for the declaration of martial law.
Disunity and Indecision
Thailand's parliamentary government has always
been sustained more by negative factors than by
positive ones. The parliamentary government's
underpinnings have been weak, and the commitment
to its conceptual foundation fragile. The majority
of the Thai people had become increasingly disen-
chanted with the weak performance of their govern-
ment under former prime ministers Seni and Khukrit,
and, while not pleased at the prospect, are probably
resigned to living for a period under the martial
law regime established on October 6.
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