THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 SEPTEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466841
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 9, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
September 9, 1976
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Exempt from general
declaseafication schedule of E 0 11652
exemphon category, 5134 I )12).(3)
declasstfied only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 9, 1976
Table of Contents
China: NCNA has announced the death of Chairman Mao Tse-
tung. (Page 1)
Southern Africa: at the summit
meeting in Dar es Salaam no progress was made toward uniting
the Rhodesian nationalists. (Page 2)
Rhodesia: The government's security forces claim that they have
inflicted heavy casualties on the guerrillas, but the level
of insurgent activity apparently has not changed. (Page 2)
USSR - US - South Africa: Soviet commentary on the US - South
African talks shows that Moscow is concerned about the pos-
sibility that "shuttle diplomacy" will be resumed. (Page 3)
Lebanon: The Syrians apparently are urging Lebanese leaders to
cooperate with the future government of president-elect
Sarkis. (Page 4)
USSR-Syria-Lebanon: The Soviets have issued an authoritative and
relatively moderate statement on Lebanon to convey support
for a negotiated settlement. (Page 5)
OPEC: We have new information which strengthens our belief that
OPEC will vote to raise prices by 10 to 15 percent at the
December meeting in Qatar. (Page 6)
Egypt-Libya: Photography of September 5 seems to indicate that
Egypt is continuing its military buildup along the Libyan
border but at a slower pace than earlier indications had led
us to believe. (Page 7)
Portugal: Prime Minister Soares may be losing confidence in his
government's ability to resolve Portugal's problems.
(Page 7)
Ethio ia:
Notes: USSR; Poland; Angola-Portugal; South Africa (Pages 10,
11, and 12)
At Annex we discuss some of the implications of the death of
Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
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CHINA: NCNA announced
the death of Chairman
Mao Tse-tung in Peking
this morning. At Annex
we discuss some of the
implications of his
demise.
--continued
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Lilongwe
Lusaka
Zambia
outhwest
Africa (Namibia)
Mozambique
Channel
Botswana
Road
Railroad
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SOUTHERN AFRICA: Reli-
able reports confirm
that no progress was
made toward uniting the
fragmented Rhodesian
nationalist movement at
the two-day summit con-
ference of five south-
ern African presidents
at Dar es Salaam.
RHODESIA: The govern-
ment's security forces
claim that they have
inflicted heavy casual-
ties on the guerrillas,
but the level of insur-
gent activity appar-
ently has not been af-
fected.
The five presidents probably held
off making any firm decisions on
ways to strengthen the military
effort against Rhodesia until they
assess the results of Secretary
Kissinger's meeting with South Af-
rican Prime Minister Vorster.
The meeting at Dar es Salaam marked
a broadening of the role of pres25X1
dents Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda
of Zambia, Machel of Mozambi ue
and Khama of Botswana.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Vors125xl
will brief Rhodesian Prime Minis-
ter Smith early next week on the
results of his talks with Secre-
tary Kissinger.
According to government figures,
131 guerrillas were killed in Rho-
desia during August--the highest
monthly total since the fighting
began in 1972. Nevertheless,
press reports indicate that the
insurgents last week made one of
their largest attacks gver. Some
100 guerrillas are said to have
followed up a mortar and rocket
barrage by raiding a Rhodesian
army outpost in northeast Rhodesia.
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--continued
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In southeastern Rhodesia, the guer-
rillas, according to press reports,
shot down a helicopter last week.
The Rhodesian air force now faces
a serious shortage of trained hel-
icopter pilots following the with- 25X1
drawal of South African pilots
last month.
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USSR - US - SOUTH AF-
RICA: Soviet commen-
tary on the US - South
African talks in Zurich
shows that Moscow is
concerned about the
possibility that "shut-
tle diplomacy" will be
resumed.
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Writing in Pravda on September 7,
senior political commentator Yuriy
Zhukov charged that the US role in
Africa may cause "new dangerous
complications" in the area and
that Secretary Kissinger was try-
ing to maintain "racists" in power.
The chief of the USA Institute's
Foreign Policy Department remarked
to a US embassy official on Sep-
tember 7 that he personally viewed
the Secretary's activities in Af-
rica as a "carbon copy" of the US
approach in the Middle East.
The selection of Zhukov-- well-
connected commentator who usually
deals with major East-West issues--
to write the Pravda commentary
--continued
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LEBANON: The Syrians
apparently are stress-
ing in their talks
with Lebanese leaders
this week the need for
full cooperation with
the future government
of president-elect
Sarkis.
strongly suggests that more than
just African issues are being ad-
dressed. Zhukov's direct criti-
cism of Secretary Kissinger ap-
pears to be part of an increasing
inclination on the part of the So-
viets to find fault with the US
administration in general and the
Secretary's role in particular.
* * *
The Syrians want Sarkis to have
sufficient stature to conduct
meaningful negotiations. They
recognize that this must come
primarily from his ability to
control his fellow Christians.
Phalanges Party leader Jumayyil
has been a supporter of Sarkis
from the start; however, rightist
leader Camille Shamun has a long-
standing personal grudge against
him and is not in favor of any
negotiations until the Palestin-
ians have been more thoroughly
chastened.
Before his departure for Damascus
yesterday, Shamun apparently com-
mented publicly that current ef-
forts to find a new basis for ne-
gotiations will not be successful
and that the fighting will esca-
late dramatically before Sarkis
is able to take office. His re-
marks will reinforce the suspi-
cion among many Palestinians and
Lebanese Muslims that the current
round of talks in Damascus is lay-
ing the groundwork for another
major Christian-Syrian offensive.
--continued
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Damascus' main concern
at present is the in-
auguration of Sarkis,
now officially sched-
uled for September 23,
the expiration date of
President Franjiyah's
term.
USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON:
The USSR has issued an
authoritative and rela-
tively moderate state-
ment on Lebanon to con-
vey its support for a
negotiated settlement.
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The Syrians would like to hold the
swearing-in ceremony within Leba-
nese territory controlled by Syr-
ian forces, thus allowing some 25
members of the Lebanese parliament
now in Syria to attend. Several
sites in Beirut reportedly also
are under consideration, but the
Syrians fear a ceremony there would
create a potentially explosive se-
curity situation. Moreover, if
significant numbers of parliamen-
tary deputies are prevented from
attending the session, Sarkis' in-
auguration could be challenged on
legal grounds.
The Pravda statement on September
7, signed "Observer" to signify
Kremlin endorsement, criticizes
both the Syrian intervention in
Lebanon and, for the first time,
"leftist elements" within the Pal-
estinian movement. The statement
denounces the Palestinian leftists
for "rejecting out of hand any
peaceful proposals" and calls at-
tention to the deep split within
the Palestinian leadership regard-
ing negotiations. This will be
interpreted by Arafat as an endorse-
ment of his position.
--continued
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OPEC:
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The article?Moscow's strongest
criticism so far of the interven-
tion of Syrian forces in Lebanon--
terms the Syrian decision "harm-
ful." The Soviets are still re-
fraining from forthrightly calling
for withdrawal and instead are ex-
pressing tacit agreement with the
demands of "many Arab countries
and other countries" that these
forces leave. Soviet commentary
is obviously bent on antagonizing
Damascus no more than necessary.
Unlike the last Observer piece on
Lebanon in April, the current ar-
ticle does not go out of its way
to castigate Israel or to raise
the possibility of US military in-
tervention.
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We reported two
weeks ago that the Saudis had as-
sured Venezuela that they would
go along with a price increase of
from 10 to 15 percent. At about
that time the most influential
OPEC ministers--from Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Venezuela, and possibly Al-
geria--met in Saudi Arabia and
discussed the December price in-
crease.
Subsequently, a high Iranian offi-
cial told the US embassy in Tehran
that a 15- to 18-percent rise is
called for.
In the hope of avoiding the kind
of acrimony that developed at the
OPEC meeting in Bali in May, the
ministers who met recently in
Saudi Arabia probably negotiated
the approximate range of the price
rise to be made in December.
--continued
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o 0 loo 150 zoo Miles
1 I 5,
0 50 100 1.50 200 Kilometers
620375 8-76
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 4
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EGYPT-LIBYA: Prelimi-
nary analysis of satel-
lite photography
in 1.cates
that Egypt is contin-
uing its military
build-up along the Lib-
yan border, but at a
slower pace than ear-
lier indications had
Zed us to believe.
PORTUGAL: Prime Minis-
ter Soares may be losing
confidence in his gov-
ernment's ability to
resolve Portugal's
problems.
Unless there is a shift in the
Saudi price position in the in-
terim, the full OPEC meeting in
December probably will agree to a
price increase of at least 10 per-
cent and most likely 15 percent.
Egypt is still in the early stages 25X1
of a build-up of ground forces. 25X1
Photography shows a substantial
increase in logistics support
equipment at Sollum, Sidi Barrani,
and Matruh.
There is no build-up of forces at
Siwah, the area from which/
/they
might launch a major armored drive
into Libyan territory. No new
ground combat units were detected
on the photography.
Construction continues on the new
airfield at Sidi Barrani but not
at the rapid pace observed in July
photography. The Egyptians appear
to be preparing to pave the air-
field's runway. Its completion
would give Cairo two airfields in
the west capable of handling sus-
tained air combat operations.
Soares apparently feels very frus-
trated and pessimistic over the
political-economic situation. Yes-
terday he postponed the announce-
ment of the first of a series of
economic austerity measures, prob-
ably because of the difficulty he
has had in getting his cabinet to
agree on the proposals. He is
said to be particularly disturbed
--continued
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ETHIOPIA:
by the refusal of his labor and
agriculture ministers to cooperate
in a stabilization program and by
the government's failure to at-
tract private investment.
The agricultural and labor areas
are especially significant because
they are being watched closely for
indications of the government's
ability to reduce entrenched Com-
munist influence.
Last week Soares told Ambassador
Carlucci that Portugal requires a
$300-million balance-of-payments
support loan from the US this year
and an additional $1 billion in
1977. Soares said his government
agrees with US suggestions concern-
ing economic recovery measures and
urgently needs a loan commitment
to permit development of an appro-
priate program. He conceded, how-
ever, that his advisers are evenly
divided on the important question
of devaluation.
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Recently appointed So-
viet First Deputy Pre-
mier Tikhonov will han-
dle foreign economic
relations.
Poland's current troub-
les have Zed to specu-
lation about party
chief Gierek's future.
NOTES
According to an official of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
USSR attaches great importance to
this field. Premier Kosygin has
exercised overall direction of
foreign economic relations. In
view of Kosygin's illness, it
would seem logical that Tikhonov
should pick up this responsibility.
* * *
Several influential Polish jour-
nalists recently told a US diplo-
mat that they were "absolutely fed
up" with the Gierek regime, al-
though they said Gierek himself
has "good intentions." One pre-
dicted that Prime Minister Jaros-
zewicz would be the first to go
and implied that within a year
Gierek would follow.
According to our embassy in War-
saw, "the events of these last
three months have left a shaken,
dispirited Gierek regime pitted
against a headstrong, distrustful
and sullen population." Gierek
undoubtedly is in a weaker posi-
tion now than he was before June.
We have seen no indications, how-
ever, of any movement within the
party or from the Soviets to un-
seat him.
--continued
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Angola's foreign minis-
ter informed Portugal
yesterday that the An-
golan government de-
sires to reestablish
diplomatic relations
"in the near future."
Africa
South
* * *
The message is an official fol-
low-up to the exchange of views
last week in Luanda between Ango-
lan leaders and a visiting Portu-
guese Socialist Party delegation.
Lisbon replied quickly and posi-
tively to the Angolan message by
proposing a foreign ministers'
meeting. The minority Socialist
government needs the political
boost that reestablishing rela-
tions with the former territory
will provide. The eagerness the
two countries are showing toward
resuming ties suggests that fu-
ture talks on outstanding issues--
particularly Angolan nationaliza-
tion of Portuguese properties--can
be resolved amicably.
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--continued
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CHINA AFTER MAO
The death of Mao Tse-tung, announced
this morning, will not come as a trau-
matic surprise to the Chinese popu-
lace; the regime has been preparing
the public for this event for some
time through wide dissemination of
photographs showing an increasingly
aged and infirm Chairman. The polit-
ical repercussions of his demise, how-
ever, may well last for years.
Mao had been an important member of the Chinese
Communist Party since its founding in 1921, and
Chairman since the mid-1930s. He has been the most
important and the central reference point in the
often confused politics of the party for much longer.
Even when his will was partly thwarted by others in
the Chinese leadership whose policy views differed
from his own, his personality and programs could
never be ignored; even his opponents claimed to be
speaking in his name and to be carrying out his
commands.
As the dominating force in Chinese politics, a
founder of the party, the formulator of the "Chin-
ese way" to communism, and the man who led the
Chinese revolution to triumph, Mao will be irre-
placeable. There is no one on the Chinese scene
today who even remotely commands the authority that
has been accorded to him or who can easily assume
the charismatic role of leader of the Chinese people
he exercised for years.
In the upper echelons of the party, however, the
Chairman's death may come as something of a relief
to a considerable number of second-level leaders.
Mao's autocratic actions, suspiciousness, and some-
times erratic policy shifts were almost certainly
resented by some of his associates and subordinates,
particularly in the past decade. Some of these
individuals are now likely to believe that more
orderly and rational approaches to policy problems
can be taken without fear of reprisals from the
Chairman.
Although Mao's place in the three-thousand-year-old
history of the Chinese state is likely to loom large,
one conspicuous failure in his long domination of
the political scene is already glaringly evident and
--continued
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is likely to have serious implications for the future.
The Chairman did not succeed in providing for a widely
acknowledged and recognized successor. Two desig-
nated successors, Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, fell by
the wayside in 1966 and 1971 respectively.
A third, Teng Hsiao-ping, who appeared in a posi-
tion to inherit much of Mao's authority if not the
formal title of party chairman, was removed from
all his high positions in early April. At the same
time, the young Wang Hung-wen, who by virtue of his
position in the hierarchy seemed to have a shot at
succession to the formal title of party chairman--
but probably without much of the authority that
normally could accrue to that post--was passed over
for promotion last April. Finally, Chou En-lai,
who by virtue of his experience and the respect ac-
corded him by most Chinese was perhaps the most
logical of all possible successors to Mao, died last
January.
For several years the Chinese have talked about
post-Mao arrangements in terms of a collegial group
which would in effect share the Chairman's author-
ity among themselves. Such an arrangement is en-
tirely possible, at least in the short run, since
it seems clear that no single individual has the
stature to replace Mao in his full leadership
capacity.
It is possible, in fact, that the post of party
chairman may now be retired, as a post that could
only be held by the irreplaceable leader who has
just died. The Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan fol-
lowed a similar procedure at the death of Chiang
Kai-shek last year. In this case, Peking would
probably revive the post of party secretary-general,
which has been dormant since the start of the Cul-
tural Revolution, in order to provide a manager
for party affairs.
If the post of Chairman is to be filled, however,
the most likely candidate for the job is Premier
Hua Kuo-feng, who is now "first" party vice chairman,
a new post created in early April, at the time of
the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping. Hua is, however, a
compromise figure who lacks a strong power base and
who has operated at the center of power for only a
few years. In his hands the post of chairman would
be less important than it was when Mao occupied the po-
sition. Moreover, there are almost certainly a number
of senior leaders of the party who would prefer that
additional power and prestige did not accrue to Hua.
There have been occasional covert attacks on Hua in the
media since January, and his deputy in Hunan Province,
--continued
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which he ran before coming to Peking, has been under
heavy political pressure for several months.
It is possible, therefore, that Hua's elevation to
the chairmanship could be contested, and in fact
any decision to fill the post might be put off for
some time. It is also possible that if Hua were
elevated to the chairmanship, he could be balanced
off by a reconstitution of the post of secretary-
general. In this case a leading candidate for that
job would be the leftist political boss of Shanghai,
Chang Chun-chiao, who probably performs the func-
tions of secretary-general on a de facto basis at
present. There is certain to be opposition to this
appointment from the party's right wing, however.
If the post of chairman were abolished, that of
the current party vice chairman would also have to
be abolished. In addition to Hua, the other vice
chairmen are Wang Hung-wen, whose youth makes him
suspect to many older party members and whose
alignment with the left wing of the party is a
major disability in the eyes of the rightists, and
Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying, a long-time asso-
ciate of the late Chou En-lai who has been identi-
fied with the party's right wing and who came under
criticism earlier this year for his vehement sup-
port of Teng Hsiao-ping.
The balance these two men provide could be an argu-
ment for preserving the system of chairman and vice
chairman. If, however, that system is scrapped,
Hua Kuo-feng would be an obvious candidate for the
secretary-general's post. Since Chang Chun-chaio
also has claims on this job, a clash between the
two could easily develop.
Insofar as the principle of collegiality is followed
by the Chinese, the three current vice chairmen,
Chang Chun-chiao and Peking Military Region Com-
mander Chen Hsi-lien would almost certainly form
the core of the collective. These five men are the
most powerful in China today. They are not likely
to work easily together, however. The left-right
split between Yeh, on the one hand, and Wang and
Chang, on the other, is already pronounced, and as
already noted, there is potential for serious fric-
tion between Chang and Hua.
--continued
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Chen, even more than Yeh, the defense minister, is
likely to represent military interests in the col-
lective. Many important military figures have re-
sented the leftist leaders since the days of the
Cultural Revolution, and to the degree that Chen
speaks for them, he could come into conflict with
Chang and Wang. Chen, however, appears to be an
ambitious man whose personal interests could lead
him into temporary and expedient alliances with any
civilian faction. He is reported to have abandoned
Teng Hsiao-ping at a crucial juncture last January,
for example, and this move may have been an important
factor in Teng's subsequent political demise.
Latent factionalism among the ruling group is likely
to come to the fore rather quickly, in fact. Mao's
death occurs at a tense and rather fluid moment in
Chinese politics. Repercussions from the Teng purge
are still echoing throughout the country--in the
provinces and in Peking. The fissure between the
party's right and left wings is perhaps wider than
at any time since the late stages of the Cultural
Revolution, and the issue of relations between the
military and civilian members of the party is still
not fully resolved. Since the attacks on Teng began,
the army has begun to reemerge as an important fac-
tor in political affairs; this tendency is likely
to become more pronounced in the wake of Mao's
death.
This confused situation makes a struggle among the
various factions in the leadership all but inevita-
ble, and this struggle is likely to make itself
manifest sooner rather than later. Mao has died at
an unpropitious moment for the party's left wing,
however. This group--a minority in the party and
among the leadership--has not yet managed to achieve
a solid and largely unassailable position, as it
clearly hoped to do before the Chairman's death.
Mao had his differences with the leftists in recent
years, but they were at most times able to play on
his obsessive concern for the development of an
equalitarian China, and their enemies were inhibited
by fear that Mao could intervene on their behalf in
unexpected fashion. This inhibition has now been
removed.
One likely victim of these changed circumstances
is Mao's wife, the termagant Chiang Ching. She is
widely disliked, and without the Chairman's potential
protection she may well fall by the wayside rather
quickly. The left as a whole is in fact now in a
--continued
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200050001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200050001-1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
somewhat unenviable position. It is likely to be on
the defense in whatever struggle develops in the wake
of Mao's death. Nevertheless, leftist leaders, al-
though a minority, speak for a significant portion of
the Chinese party, and the struggle, if it develops,
is not likely to be resolved quickly.
This fact, plus the obvious difficulty the Chinese
will have in adjusting to a China without Mao, is
likely to inhibit the development of new policy
initiatives and to slow the implementation of poli-
cies already adopted, both in the domestic and
foreign policy spheres. If the military gains an
increased voice in policy-making, however, it is
possible that Peking may become more receptive to
the idea of moderating somewhat its unyielding op-
position to the USSR.
A5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200050001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200050001-1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/14 : CIA-RDP79T00024A000200050001-1