OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY REGARDING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRIY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

• Keywords: 9/11
• Collection: DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATED TO 9/11 ATTACKS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006184107
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 490
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2015
• Case Number: F-2005-01900
• Publication Date: June 1, 2005

Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 0015254821Central Intelligence AgencyInspector GeneralIG 2000-0009-INEO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs(U) INSPECTION REPORTOF THEDCI COUNTERTERRORIST CENTERDIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONSAUGUST 2001SECRE-THN-OFO1tNI/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 00152548242.F.A.,M'W7-7-1.11WEVANAIII,A1IG-2001-051322 August 2001MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsDeputy Director for IntelligenceChief, Counterterrorist CenterFROM:Acting Inspector GeneralSUBJECT: (U/La.1.43-) Inspection Report of theDCI Counterterrorist Center1. (U//-AIU0) Attached is the final report of ourinspection of the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The threerecommendations are the same as those contained in the draftreport you reviewed. Based on the DDO's formal comments wehave changed the text or, in cases where we did not agree,identified and included the comments (italicized) as part ofthe text. I will assume your concurrence unless I hear fromyou within 10 days. Please note that the recommendations willbe included in our semiannual report to the DCI.2. (U//AIU0) Please forward to me, within 60 days, aformal report setting forth the actions taken to implement therecommendations and/or a timetable for eventual fullimplementation.3. (1314Aue) If you have additional observations orcomments about this inspection or any related matters, pleasefeel free to contact my Acting Deputy, ; the  Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, or me.Attachment: As statedcc: EXDIR (w/att)DDCl/CM (w/att)CFO (w/att)D/CFO/Budget (w/att)C/ORMS/DO (w/att)Downgrade to U//AIU when ?separated from attachment/signed/CREW-ANEWOREV/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-.,wf.i.irativIrVJALI / /SUBJECT: (U//AIU0) Inspection Report of the DCICounterterrorist CenterOIG/INSFILE:(20 August 2001)TEAMS/CTC2000/ADMIN/A-Final Cover Memo .docDistribution:Original - DDI, DDO, C/CTC (w/att)1 - EXDIR (w/att)1 - DDCl/CM (w/att)1 - CFO (w/att)1 - D/CFO/Budget (w/att)1 - C/ORMS/DO (w/att)1 - IG Subject File/CTC2000 (w/att)1 - IG Chrono (w/o att)1 - AIG  Chrono (w/o att)1 - AIG (w/att)1 - IG w/att)1 - File Copy (w/att)1 - Compliance Review (w/att)1 - C/P&P/OIG (w/att)1 - AIG (w/att)1 - AIG (w/att)1 - Team Leader/CTC2000 (w/att)1 - Team File/CTC2000 (w/o att)2-SEGRETYINCIFUM/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center 5.1CILE-T-717'NCTCYr\l//X1(UHARK7) Table of ContentsExecutive Highlights iiiIntroduction 1CTC and the DO 4Operations to Counter Terrorism 4The Program 9CTC Relations with DO Stations 13Collection and Reporting 18Counterintelligence and Security 20CTC's Analysis 22The Role of Analysis 22Customer Reaction 24Analytic Concerns 26Surge and Information Exploitation Management 28Crisis Management 28Exploitation of Data 28CTC's Community Role 32External Operational Partnerships 34Federal Bureau of Investigation 36Department of Defense 37Department of State 38August 2001_g_CRE-T-H-NferraM7 /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-SEC-14?41-71-tlefrCTICT/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterCTC Leadership and Management Issues 39Mission 39Quality of Leadership and Management 40Funding 42Staffing 44Skills Mix Issues 46Managing Contractors 51Diversity Issues 53TABS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONSSCOPE AND METHODOLOGYEMPLOYEE OPINION SURVEYSEGRE-T--/-1-NOPORNI7 /X1ii August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SF6C-RE-117111/X1(U) EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS(-G) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) is a well-managed component that successfully carries out theAgency's counterterrorist responsibilities to collect andanalyze intelligence on international terrorism and toundermine the capabilities of terrorist groups. CTC fulfillsinter-Agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinatingnational intelligence, providing warning, and promoting theeffective use of Intelligence Community resources onterrorism issues. The Center has made progress onproblems identified at the time of the last inspection in1994?specifically its professional relationship with theFederal Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, since 1994, theCenter has broadened and deepened its operationalpartnerships with other US Government organizationsworking the terrorist target through an increased exchangeof personnel and information.(S) CTC owes its success to a number of factors.? CTC employees clearly understand their mission andbelieve their work is vital to saving American lives. Thissense of mission and belief in its importance and itssuccess have helped to create what customers, partners,and CTC employees describe as a highly dedicated andmotivated workforce which produces quality work.? CTC's resources have steadily increased over the last fiveyears, with personnel growing by 74 percent during thatperiod and the budget moreithan doubling. The Center'scomparatively favorable resource situation allows it notonly to expand its own programs but also to supportoperations against terrorists and liaison relationships thatDO area divisions otherwise could not fund. The OIGcautions, however, that, in recent years, most of theincrease in CTC's budget has come in the form ofsupplemental funding, which is unpredictable.August 2001 iiiApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482IApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482SEC-RE-T-741NORDIUSHX1 DCI Counterterrorist Center? Center employees have earned strong customer support.Customers describe CTC as the leading source ofexpertise on terrorism, responsive to requirements, and acommunity facilitator.? Customers, partners, senior Agency managers, andCenter employees credit the strong front officemanagement team with articulating a clear vision andstrategy and implementing an effective program againsta difficult target.(-S-) Although CTC received generally positivereviews, customers did identify some gaps. Military anddiplomatic security customers are seeking detailedinformation on the plans and intentions of key terroristgroups and timely warning of terrorist attacks with specificson target, date, and place. Customers are concerned that notenough work to provide context for policy decisions isgetting done because reports officers are under pressure todisseminate threat reporting quickly, and analysts have timeonly to focus on crises or other short-term demands. Someconsumers worry that Center analysts do not have the timeto spot trends or to knit together the threads from the floodof information.(S/ /NF) After reviewing the Center's capabilities,current management is trying to increase collection ofactionable information?the reporting gap identified byconsumers. The senior management team determined thatto be successful against key targets requires an operationalstrategy that places an increased emphasis on recruitmentand penetration of key terrorist organizations by traditionalclandestine methods?unilateral operations. A key elementof this strategy is  This includes some shifting of personnel from stations thatgenerally have lessAlthough the program to implementthe new strategy is in its early stages?implementationbegan in late 1999?CTC statistics suggest that it is havingsome success. The impact on of thestrategy shift at this early stage has been difficult to assess.SEG4E-T-11110FO1ZTI//X1 ivApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SF-GRE-T-HiMelfCrMV/ /X1(SI /NF) Although CTC has increased its emphasison unilateral operations, a key component of the center'soperational effort isenhancing the relationship with foreignliaison services so that they become active partnersThe program hasprovided a number of benefits, but the ambitious effort toenlarge the program without a clearly documented andarticulated plan risks the continuity of this strategy beyondthe tenure of the current management team. Therefore, werecommend that CTC develop a written strategy for the program to include, but not necessarily  be limited to:a discussion of criteria , a five-yearresource projection showing both personnel and fundsrequired, a plan for improving responsiveness to operationalcorrespondence and  continued increasedcounterintelligence scrutiny{G) CTC management faces additional challenges infulfilling its mission: recruiting and retaining a skilledworkforce, managing demands and crises to guard againstburnout and to allow more strategic work, and coordinatingand communicating internally and externally. Many ofthese challenges result from the complex, shifting, and high-profile nature of the target and from customer expectationsthat allow little room for error. Center managers are awareof and focused on most of these issues.tej Workforce. The Center has had difficultyattracting and retaining a sufficient cadre of trained,experienced officers required for the new operationalstrategy, expanded 7?Program, and strategic analysis.CTC's customers, partners, and managers have identifiedsome areas of inexperience among both operations andanalytic officers. The Center has made a concerted effort toAugust 2001-SEC-RE-TtitICTURIST/ / X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE.T.,/-/NeFeR111 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Centerattract and retain talented officers?largely through home-basing. A number of CTC managers and officers pointed tocareer development deficiencies that may dissuade talentedofficers from choosing the Center for a career, however.Analysts, for example, expressed concerns about careerguidance and training and ill-defined career paths. Theycharacterized the ceiling on the overall number of DI officersin the Center as a policy that has had a negative impact onCTC's ability to attract and retain analysts. Centeroperations officers also were uneasy about career planningand advancement opportunities. CTC managementdescribed several developmental issues that they are startingto address, but the OIG recommends a more systematicapproach to include detailed, written career guidance foreach discrete CTC home-based occupation.(G-) Stressful Work Environment. Center employeesfrequently operate in a state of crisis?resulting from a seriesof terrorist incidents and multiple known threats?andamidst strong demands from policymakers and Agencysenior managers. Moreover, a substantial proportion of CTCpersonnel believe that their work unit does not havesufficient personnel to accomplish the mission. Thiscombination leads to employee burnout and leaves littletime for strategic reflection on both analysis andoperations?potentially leading to missed opportunities.Employees told us that they deal with this situation byworking extra hours and frequently they have time for onlythe most essential tasks. Center officers noted thatmanagement is sensitive to this issue. Without morepersonnel, however, the OIG accepts that CTC has limitedoptions to deal with this work environment; the center isnearly fully staffed and crises are part of the nature of thetarget.(SI /NT) CTC also must cope with informationoverload, frequently resulting from successful operationsagainst terrorist cells. Most Center interviewees who had anopinion gave mixed reviews of CTC's ability to effectivelyexploit the data the Center collects. They generally believedthat the Center does its best to scope, scan, and prioritizeinformation for immediate action. Some officersacknowledged, however, that the demands placed on CTCE114-1s4eFerltn/ /X1vi August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SECRE-T-AglieFeRNT /X1do not allow it to exploit all the information it collects. As aconsequence, the risk exists that a potential warning will gounidentified. Once again, the OIG recognizes that CTC haslimited options in dealing with this issue, but someefficiencies could be gained with the Language ExploitationBranch?the unit that bears primary responsibility fortranslating clandestinely acquired foreign languagematerials. Specifically, we recommend that CTC develop aplan for the Language Exploitation Branch to addressworkflow and morale issues.(-S4 Communication and Coordination. The Centerbrings an Agency focus to an important transnational target,requiring close cooperation with units in all directorates,particularly the area divisions in the DO. Interviews of areadivision and station officers indicated a need for closercommunication and coordination. Such interaction is criticalbecause CTC is the repository of counterterrorist funds, andchanging priorities and strategies can lead to abrupt shifts inresources provided to the area divisions and field stations onwhich CTC depends to conduct much of its operationalbusiness. The OIG suggests that CTC management findopportunities to engage in a more active dialogue with DOarea division management and ensure a dialogue withaffected field stations to minimize potential fallout.Similarly, we found that CTC was not taking full advantageof resources available in the DI. The Center could increasethe effectiveness of its analytic resources and gain moreregional expertise by fostering stronger relationships with DIregional offices.(?) While CTC employees were generally pleasedwith front office managers, a number of the interviewees,who commented on their management style, acknowledgedthat Center personnel saw little of the chief and deputies.They noted that in the fast-paced and stressful workenvironment, employees desired simple affirmation of a jobwell done from their managers. Almost all the intervieweesrecognized the increasing demands placed on the Center'ssenior management by external and internal customers, aswell as the logistical challenges presented by a largeworkforceAugust 2001vii _SECRET-71-71-NOPORK/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-SEC-R-E-T-11110FORNHX1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterNevertheless, the OIG encourages all front office managersto make interaction with center personnel a higher priority._sur-RE-T-7?74.1ero1NT/Duviii August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SEC?RE-T-fttICIFORIKT/ /X1(U) INTRODUCTION(S) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) wasformed in 1986 as a result of perceptions that terroristincidents were increasing and that CIA's counterterroristefforts required focus (see figure 1). CTC operates under theDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI) but resides in theDirectorate of Operations (DO) for administrative purposes.It performs the counterterrorist responsibilities thatPresidential Decision Directives/NSC-39 and -62 assign tothe Agency. The Center oversees a comprehensivecounterterrorist operations program to collect intelligence onand minimize the capabilities of international terroristgroups and state sponsors and produces all-source analysison international terrorism. This Center brings an Agencyand Community focus to a Tier One transnational target andhas received steadily increasing resources to address thisissue (see figure 2). The nature of the target and the breadthof the Center's scope requires CTC to cooperate closely withunits in all four directorates, particularly the area divisionsin the D0.1 CTC fulfills inter-Agency responsibilities for theDCI by coordinating national intelligence, providingwarning, and promoting the effective use of IntelligenceCommunity resources on terrorism issues.(C.) Presidential Decision Directive NSC-35 ranks counterterrorism as a Tier One objective.August 2001 1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 0015254821 ? ?Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482 ltiN1 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterFigure 2(U) CTC operates in a challenging environment inwhich the target has become more complex and the potentialconsequences of terrorist attacks more deadly than inprevious decades. Terrorists are growing less dependent onstate sponsorship and instead are forming loose,transnational affiliations based on ideology or theology._S.F..c.RE-T-7'-7'icT//X12 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SBC-RE-TI-t/ICTFORT\l//X1Originally organized into groups, terrorist organizationshave become decentralized. Their funding and logisticalnetworks cross borders, and they make use of widelyavailable technology to communicate quickly and securely.As a result of these trends, terrorists are difficult to detectand track, and traditional tools to counter them?diplomaticactivities, economic sanctions, and military actions?are lesseffective.August 20013 -ECR-ETI'-/-NeFORNY /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482 ,Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECPcE-TI//X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) CTC AND THE DO(g) CTC management's operational focus is todevelop a stronger unilateral effort to penetrate terroristorganizations in key areas, maintain strong foreign liaisonrelationships, and build on theprogram. While CTC gets generally goodreviews from field stations and area divisions, bettercoordination on strategy and operations could improvethese relationships and the effectiveness of the Center.(U) Operations to Counter Terrorism(SI /NI') CTC has had some recent notable successesin preempting and thwarting terrorists' plans. The Centeremploys a number of tactics, including recruitments,penetrations, disruptions, and renditions.2???Millennium Threat. In collaboration with US lawenforcement and foreign intelligence and lawenforcement agencies, CTC orchestrated a global effortagainst Usama Bin LadinDisruption of   In the second half of 2000, CTC, working withmultiple stations and services, identifiednoperativesand detained or arrested terrorists. This disruptionprevented attacks against US interests, according to CTC.In late 2000, CTC worked with itsDO and foreign partners to identify and disrupt a2 (UHAIUe) A rendition is the detention of a suspect for whom a legal warrant has been issuedand who is turned over to a legal authority after seizure..SF-C.IZE-T-4-74ififerlt117 /X1 4Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SECRE-T-4-71-NeFORICI7 /XI(S/ /NF) The current CTC senior management teamdetermined that success against key targets, such as UsamaBin Laden, required increasedemphasis on recruitment and penetration of key terroristorganizations by traditional clandestine methods?unilateraloperations. At the  time of the program review by currentCTC management,which Center managersjudged left CTC on the defensive and reactive to threats.They noted that unilateral operations would augment whatthey viewed as effective disruption and rendition programs.  A key element of the strategy wasCenter management increasedthe number of overseas positions and shifted some officersfrom stations andgenerally have less potential for payoff (see figure 3).Cooperation with key liaison services would be maintained,but CTC management was seeking the right balancebetween unilateral and liaison operations.August 20015Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE-T-74-74-NeftYMT/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterFigure 3CTC Overseas Position ShiftsFY 2000-2002*POSITIONSCUTNEWPOSITIONSTO BE ADDED*In alphabeticalord6r.ES) CTC management recognized that this strategywould require new personnel policies.? To increase the number of operations officers available toserve overseas, CTC plans to home-baseofficers from each Clandestine Service Trainees (CST)graduating class; CTC received officers from theDecember 2000 class. The Center began home-basing DOofficers below GS-13 in 1999, which allows it to receivenew CSTs. Moreover, CTC management launched adirect hiring campaign to employ officers with specialskills: native fluency in languages, such as Farsi and_SECRE-T4-71-PietrORK/ /X16 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SECRE-T-4-i-Nerra1N7/X1Arabic; military backgrounds; and advanced degrees. Asenior CTC manager said that the campaign had beensuccessful in bringing onboard hires but thatmany applicants with the desired ethnic backgroundcould not pass the security process.? The Center developed a counterterrorist-focusedoperations course specifically tailored for officersundertaking CTC activities in the field.G/ /NF') In addition, CTC realized the need tocommunicate its new operational strategy to DOHeadquarters and the field. Beginning in October 1999, aseries of cables and briefings explained the strategy,including the need to realign personnel and budgetaryresourcesfield officers interviewed were familiar with CTC's newoperational strategy.August 20017 SEGRE-T-1-/-NerlEVIZN7 /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECR-FAT-4-74NererRN / /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(S/ /NF) Although the new program focusing onunilateral operations is in its early stages?implementationbegan in late 1999?CTC statistics suggest that it is having  some success. Recruitment pitches increased  , suggesting a more aggressive operational posture.(S/ /NF) Station managers primarily supported thestrategy, although the majority also expressed caution.(S/ /N11)/X18 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center-SEGRE+7"ttlefrORTT/ /X1(-S4 The(6) As CTC continues to implement its new strategyand as priorities inevitably shift, further divides between theagenda of the Center and divisions are likely to occur, withPossible long-term implicationsAlthough CTC warned of resourceimplications, the actual cuts and shifts appear to have comeas a surprise to those in the field, based on interview data. Asenior CTC manager said that the Center does discuss theresource implications with affected stations?althoughgenerally after the decision has been made?and in somecases Center management has reversed decisions as a resultof this dialogue. The OIG suggests that CTC managementfind opportunities to engage in a more active dialoguewith DO area division management and ensure a dialoguewith affected field stations to minimize potential fallout.Program(SI /N17) Another key element of CTC's operationaleffort is it!  which focuses or The programbegan in 1998 and was modeled on the successfulAugust 20019 -544441;;H-etentaTIN7/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SEG44E-T---frftcrOFO1X2/X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(S/ /NF) The primary goal of the program is toenhance(S/ /NF) Th rogram has provided a numberof benefits. It has proved successful in(SI /NF)Program Strategy. Although CTC seniormanagement told us that it has aF7program strategy, ithas not yet been documented or articulated to ensurecontinuity of this strategy beyond the tenure of the currentmanagement team.? This lack of written documentation criteria forestablishincan lead to decisions that are viewedas inconsistent, according to interviewees.? This lack of a documented approach can lead toinadequate communication among all pertinent parties,_sEGRE-T-7/-71-Neferrmi /x110 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center_S.ECIZE-T--/--/tterORN/ /X1including area divisions, stations--7or example, a field manager describedproblems and delays in the establishment of a(S/ /NF) Interviewees, including program managers,commented on the need for clearly articulated programguidance that is rigorous and transparent. At the same time,this guidance needs to remain flexible so that aF7 isestablished when it is the best tool to use against the  counterterrorist target  CTC management has shownflexibility to date.{S) DDO Comment: "The discussion of makes too much ofthe fact that there is limited written guidance on the programstrategy. The lack of a written document does not equate to a 'lacko systematic approach'... That said, formalizing the guidance onan be a useful exercise, and we will pursue thatrecommendation."(S4 Program Management. Branch has aclear role in establishing and providing ongoing logisticalsupport  Branch personnel receivehigh marks from field officers, despite the fact that the unitis at less than half strength and experienced nearly100 percent turnover in FY 2000. If the Programexpands rapidly?as planned?this will tax already strainedemployees, and CTC will need to ensure an adequate staff.+S) Operational guidance, however, has been moreproblematic. Field personnel had a difficult time identifyinga focal point on operational matters, resulting in aperception of inconsistent, contradictory, or inadequateguidance from CTC.  August 200111 SECRET-4--/-ideraRK/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_5ECRE,-T-74-/-fierCrITIC7 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center{-g) The on-site program manager position isdemanding and complex. We found that some of thEprogram managers were overworked and, in some cases,had additional duties. In one instance, the programmanager put in at least 40 hours overtime per pay period.The administrative duties can be burdensome and candistract the manager from guidingDistractions can be damaging{S) Program managers bear heavy responsibility for asuccess, and CTC management is now giving greaterattention to qualifications. The Center has recognized thatexperienced operations officers are needed to  and run operations. Some programand station managers also stress that language proficiency isa necessity in most areas.(s.t7w-9-S.E.GRE-T-7-144eTerR177/X112 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SgC--RE-T-747`NerPORTS/ /X1(S) FINDINGS? have helped focuscounterterrorist target,on the? CTC's plan to double the number o f realized, willrequire start-up money fo nits and operations andmaintenance money fo nits, plus an increasedsupport structure at Headquarters.? CTC has no written formal plan or established criteria for thecreation of? Program managers who work a number of different terroristtargets find it difficult to deal with each of the CTCcomponents responsible for the different targets.? Program managers frequently are burdened with additionalresponsibilities or heavy administrative duties that distractthem from guidin(S) RECOMMENDATION #LtFir C/CTC): That CTCdevelop a written strategy for theprogram. The strategyshould include, but not necessari y e limited to: a discussion ofcriteria for establishing a five-year resource projectionshowing  both personnel and funds required for established andplanned and the Headquarters' t planclarifying points of contact and resvonsibilities for operationalmatters,(U) CTC Relations with DO Stations(S.) About two-thirds of field officers interviewedpraised CTC for the assistance it provides, especially duringhigh visibility events.August 2001 13-SEC--RET+tfterPORTT/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRET--/-444eferm//xi DCI Counterterrorist Center? Stations were particularly pleased that the Center'sfinancial assistance allows them to conduct operationsagainst terrorists and maintain programs to developwhich their_home divisions could not fund (see figure 4).? Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Station was frequently singledout for its exceptional support. Field officers describedthe assistance as "excellent," "timely," "forwardleaning," and "substantive." One manager marveled atUBL Station's ability to respond immediately during fastmoving situations.? Station personnel consistently appreciated analysis andbackground information provided by CTC, particularlysince holdings in the field are so limited. When suppliedin a timely fashion, the information fostered deepercooperatimi  ? Stations visited by the team highly valued thetraining provided by CTC Training Branch, especially the  courses? Station officers praised CTC employees who traveledoverseas to brief and discuss counterterrorist issues._.5ECRE-T-4-744E3FerRICl/ /X114 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SECR-E-T-1-eICTOPN/ /X1Figure 4CTC FUNDING TO OTHER DO DIVISIONSFY 2000*This chart is classified-SEettE'r?(-S) The remaining one-third of field intervieweesnoted some shortcomings, ranging from fairly isolated  incidents to broader concerns. Some stations in  claim to have had to delay operations because ofpoor coordination over thesource of funding. A more frequent complaint was slow ormissing responses to cable traffic-Most interviewees were quick to point out that CTCwas usually responsive to urgent requests, but routinequeries sometimes fell through the cracks. They usuallyattributed this to an overworked staff that was busy puttingout fires. Nevertheless, some reported that slow orinadequate responses put an extra burden on the station  (SI /NO A number of field officers and managersvoiced frustration that CTC's operational advice issometimes "off the mark" and shows a lack of soundjudgment or inexperience in dealing withFrom their view theseoperational lapses?though infrequent?tend to mar theAugust 200115 SJW;RE+17L.NtW1R7//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482sEcRE-T-7,74moro1N/ /x1DCI Counterterrorist Centerimportant cooperative and mutually supportive relationshipwith the area divisions and stations. Interviewees andpartner/customer survey respondents noted that thesemiscues foster the perception that CTC at times does not  show an appreciation for the negative impact  of some of its proposals. Comments from severalDO field managers echoed the wording of the recent IGinspection report on hat CTC is notalways sensitive to " h difficulties they face in balancingbroader, long-ter ith short-term,changing requirements i erent in counterterrorismcollection operations." They cited several examples ofinstances in  which actions proposed by CTC could havejeopardized and Agency credibility.(S) A survey of Headquarters customers and partnersmirrors the field response. Seventy percent of DOrespondents were satisfied with their interaction with CTC,and 78 percent rated the overall quality of the workrelationship as good or excellent. Thirty-four percent of theDO respondents, however, had specific criticisms to offer.When asked how CTC could be more responsive tocustomer/partner needs, survey respondents mostfrequently commented that the Center needed bettercoordination of  operations and a better understanding ofstation equities1 ? ?//X116 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SEGRE?T1tNIORTIZR//X1The OIbeen impeded byand in the field,receive, with the-excreflects a broaderAugust 200117 3XL11.14,419fentN70(1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-SEC-RE-TtrNCWMV/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) Collection and Reporting(-S) Counterterrorism has high priority, and, atseveral stations, this objective is a primary driver of stationoperations.  This emphasis, aswell as resources directed at the target, has paid dividendsin terms of the number and quality of disseminated reports.According to CTC statistics, the number of disseminatedreports has risen steadily since 1997 (see figure 5). Inaddition, the quality of reports has improved, with48 percent of the reports graded "good" or above in 1999 ascompared to 44 percent the previous year.4 No figures forgrades in 2000 were available.Figure 5This chart is classified g_CRET-41-140FORN-Es-)4tE) The DO assigns one of five grades?outstanding, excellent, good, satisfactory, orunsatisfactory?or a more neutral designation?not graded?to its reports. Grades are based oneach report's relevance to national or security interests, impact on US policy, andauthoritativeness.1 II18 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center_S_ECRE-T-V-71-14eferIZTC7/X1Figure 6This chart is classified STeRE-T-IffieFOR-Isi(S/ /NF) Despite the positive reporting trends, CTCmanagement and customers identified some reporting gaps,including the plans and intentions of key terrorist groupsand timely warning of terrorist attacks with specifics ontarget, time, and place. In particular, military customers andsome embassy officials stated the need for detailed, lessgeneric information on planned attacks. CTC managers notethat the emphasis on the strategy isdesigned to close these gaps and provide the morepredictive reporting demanded by their consumers.Nevertheless, the nature of the target will limit the Center'sability to collect timely warning of time, place, and target ofattacks. While supporting this effort, a senior Agencymanager warned that these operations require long-termcommitment and discipline, which can be difficult tomaintain in the current atmosphere, which rewards instantresults.(S/ /NF) Senior Agency officers were adamant thatthe Center had no choice but to follow the "zero threshold"approach for threat reporting?all threat information isdisseminated quickly?leaving customers thirsting for morecontext and analysis. Threat reporting constituted12 percent of all reports CTC disseminated in 2000. Almostall customers interviewed recognized this approach as a"necessary evil" in the counterterrorist field, but some seniorAugust 200119 a_CELET-4/449Feft1//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-gE.C?R-E-T-/-ftlefFCFRFIR X1 DCI Counterterrorist Centercustomers, particularly from the military, complained thatthreat reporting was difficult to act upon if it did not includeenough context to judge the reliability. One senior militaryofficer explained that it was especially frustrating becausereporting from CTC "carries tremendous weight." Given thelevel of activity and limited resources, however, CTC'scannot provideboth timeliness and context to each and every report. As aresult, the Center engages in a delicate balancing actbetween the risk of losing credibility?a concern frequentlyvoiced by field managers and officers?and unacceptabledelays.-(e)- Overall, Washin ton and field customers,managers, and officers give igh marks for rapiddissemination and reaction. The group accomplishes thismission despite being chronically understaffed, and manycustomers and partners credited this record to the dedicationof the reports officers. The majority of field managers andofficers were satisfied with the feedback they received ontheir terrorist-related reporting. Accessions lists?containing grades and comments on disseminated re orts?are the primary source of much of the feedback.provides grades and comments on counterterrorist reportsto the area division reports officers who are responsible forsending feedback on all station reporting to the field. Two-thirds of field managers and officers interviewed rated thefeedback as adequate to good; those from stations workinghigh interest targets tended to be better satisfied.(U) Counterintelligence and Security(SI /NF) CTC in the last year has effectivelyestablished a robust CI element, which is aggressivelyaddressing defensive and offensive CI issues.SEGR-E-T-IITIORTIN/ /X120 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center-SEGREPttNICYFCTITST7/X1August 200121 SZC1E-127L74NOIRYI1M47/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE-T4-74NettYRIC17 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) CTC'S ANALYSIS-(6)- CTC provides tactical and strategic analysis to thepolicy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities, aswell as support to operational targeting and planning.Customers, partners, and Assessments and InformationGroup (AIG) analysts were generally satisfied with theCenter's tactical analysis, but reviews were more mixed onstrategic analysis, with some interviewees identifying gapsin long-term research and analytical depth.(U) The Role of Analysis-(?)- CTC has had an analytic component since itsinception in 1986 as Agency management saw a need tocentralize terrorism analysis. AIG is the Center's primarysource of analysis, and, like the rest of CTC, has undergonegrowth and reorganization, particularly in the last threeyears.5 AIG has expanded from two regional branchesfocusing on the Middle East and the "rest of the world," tofive branches, with increased focus on Usama Bin Ladin'snetwork and the threat from weapons of mass destruction.Despite these increases, the group remains a relatively smallpart of the Center, accounting for only 14 percent of staffofficers or only 7 percent of the total CTC workforce.(C) AIG's small size belies the critical role it plays inmeeting the CTC mission. Analysts in AIG have amultidimensional mission that ranges from production oftraditional Directorate of Intelligence (DI) current andlonger-term analytic products to CTC-unique warning itemsin support of operational planning and liaison relations (seefigure 7). This mission is made even more complicated bythe strong demand from policymakers for support in theform of briefings, specialized products, and twice-weeklycommunity video teleconferences, as well as by frequentbriefings to Agency senior managers and Congressional5 fc) In addition to AIG officers TC employees, who work in the Center's two operationsgroups, are in the analytic career service?CTC/DI._SECRE-T-74-/-MerPORN/ /X122 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center_sEcag-T-7?74NerrolM//xitestimony. Interviewees from this group characterized theircustomer base as broad, high-level, and demanding.Moreover, AIG analysts devote a significant amount oftime?interviewees estimated between 30 and 50 percent?to counterterrorism operations support, working closelywith their colleagues in theF7operations groups ontargeting and planning aimed at penetrations, recruitments,renditions, and disruptions.Figure 7CTC Analytical Products for FY 20000 Ad hoc^ Briefings0 Current intelligence0 Terrorism Review highlights0 Terrorism Review articlesD Country Threat AssessmentsNI CommentariesO Intelligence Reports? Community AssessmentsIn Community AdvisoriesThis chart is classified5SRET.(C) Although analysts and managers consistentlydescribed their mission as a blend of analytic production andsupport to policymakers and involvement in operationalplanning, a number of interviewees expressed concern aboutunclear priorities among the competing demands onanalysts' time. AIG interviewees most frequently cited lackof direction or conflicting signals as the biggest obstacle toaccomplishing the mission. In an environment in whichthere is a general perception that analysts are pressed fortime, they expressed the expectation that managementwould set clear priorities for them. AIG management wasviewed as vacillating between its commitment to supportoperations and the more traditional DI analytic functions.As one analyst put it, "we are told the DCI and DeputyDirector for Intelligence (DDI) want more analytic thinkAugust 200123 flaClIET-44-Nettnrq//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE-T-71-71-NeterRICI7 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Centerpieces but management has not explained what that means."Others pointed out that AIG starts each year with goodintentions of doing more long-term research, only to havethose plans scrapped by inevitable crises and short-termdemands. Nevertheless, some of the more senior analystscited their disappointment at perceptions that managementwas attempting to emphasize long-term research at theexpense of support to operations because they had beenattracted to CTC by the opportunity to undertakenontraditional analysis. They expressed concern that theblend of support to operations and analysis thatcharacterizes the "Center" concept was declining in CTC.(U) Customer Reaction-EC+ Policy-level customers generally valued CTCanalysis. Consumers most appreciated it when the analysisprovided the needed context for decisionmaking. A seniorDepartment of State officer, for example, appreciates thecommunity video teleconferences?in which CTC usuallytakes the lead?because it affords him the opportunity tohave a dialogue with analysts who have expertise and arefamiliar with intelligence report sourcing. A NationalSecurity Council (NSC) official said he rated most highlyshort, finished products that provided backgroundinformation. An ambassador was effusive in his praise forthe quality of analytic products on a major terrorist group;these products helped prepare him for his posting.White House CongrePresidentNational SecuNSCLaw Enforcement  FBISecret ServiceDepartment ofSECRE-T-1-1-1140Feitl/ /X124Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SECIZE-T--/-/-NOrrYRST/ /X1(C) Customers were concerned that not enough workto provide context for policy decisions was getting donebecause analysts focus on crises or other short-termdemands. A senior military customer asked for morepredictive analysis from CTC with clearer implicationsbecause he may need to act to protect deployed forces basedon information provided by the Center. Other militaryinterviewees worried that Center analysts do not have thetime to spot trends or to knit together the threads given theflood of information.The consensus from AIG's operationalcounterparts in CTC is that analyst support to operationsplanning continues to be one of the strengths of the Center.Several of the managers from the operations groups stressedthe importance of close cooperation and continue to seekavenues to strengthen the relationship. Moreover, two-thirds of the analysts interviewed could cite examples ofcontributions they made to operations planning.-(e)- AIG officers received mixed reviews on analyticdepth and expertise from both their military customers andDI counterparts. Symbolizing this dichotomy of opinion, DIrespondents to the OIG survey of CTC partners andcustomers identified staff expertise as both AIG's leadingstrength and an area in need of improvement. AIGemployees represent a wide range of experience, but thegroup is slightly more junior than the DI average. A seniorDI manager noted that the relative inexperience of AIGanalysts shows. A primary theme in the comments that DIcounterparts attached to the OIG survey was inexperienceand lack of expertise, which sometimes resulted in weakassessments or questionable conclusions. A senior customercited two examples of inexperienced analysts being poorlyprepared to brief senior policymakers. More experiencedanalysts and managers were singled out for favorablereviews from several policymakers.August 200125 44;44iEttMCMOTST//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-SEC-RE-11//X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) Analytic Concerns-(e)- AIG analysts acknowledge that the constant stateof crisis and strong demand from policymakers and Agencyseniors limit their ability to conduct strategic research anddevelop in-depth expertise. The lack of time to undertakewarning and predictive analysis was one of the mostfrequent concerns voiced by analysts we interviewed. Suchanalysis, they noted, could enable them to predict terrorists'patterns of behavior or operational practices to allow theCenter's operational components "to get ahead of thetarget."-(-er This concern is neither new nor unique to CTC.Following the bombings of the US embassies in Africa, CTCmanagement commissioned the DI'sstaff to review the Center'sfinished intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin and to suggesttradecraft improvements. cknowledged that thefinished intelligence revealed "significant strides inintelligence reporting, analysis, and the application oftradecraft principles" during the period reviewed, butrecommended that AIG management make a consciousdecision to set aside or dedicate analysts to undertakeresearch. The study cautioned that new challenges?theeruption of reporting, much of it unreliable, and the dramaticgrowth in customer taskings?hindered the Center's ability toconduct in-depth research on Usama Bin Ladin and hisorganization. The OIG found that, 18 months after thesurvey, these conditions persist, and AIG remains largelyreactive despite the infusion of more analytic resources. TheOIG suggests that CTC continue to enhance its analyticexpertise and improve its products by: (1) vigorouslypursuing the "lessons learned" approach that it usedsuccessfully in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers and USEmbassy bombings and by (2) commissioning a follow-up study of analytic tradecraft across AIG.-(6)- DDO Comment: "The report highlights the difficulty ofundertaking strategic analysis in a near-constant crisisenvironment. The OIG should know that even as the inspectionteam was conducting its review of the Center, the DCI and DDI_SECRE-T-HtlefFORK/ /X126 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center--SEC?REN/ /X1were working on this issue. The DDI has provided a new infusionof seasoned analysts into CTC, many of whom will serve in a newstrategic analysis branch to meet just those analytical needsidentified in the report."kel AIG management is aware of the relativeinex ? erience of the analyst cadre and the time pressures.oted that the cadre is relatively junior, and somelack the experience to conduct sophisticated long-termanalysis. strategy is to focus on recruiting from the DI,with AIG's improved reputationwill have success. "grow" senior analystsfrom within the Center?which will take five.years?by   payingcareful attention to career developmentissues steps to date include seeking   developmental assimments for some analysts.  (.05 The OIG found that AIG was not taking fulladvantage of resources available in the DI. A number ofpartner! customer survey respondents?including severalmore senior analysts and managers?commented that CTCanalysts should improve their coordination andcollaboration with their DI counterparts. CTC and Office ofNear Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis managershave had preliminary discussions about exchanging analyststo encourage better collaboration and more "crossfertilization" of expertise. We conclude that AIG couldincrease the effectiveness of its analytic resources and gainmore regional expertise by fostering stronger relationshipswith DI regional offices.August 200127 5ECRET/LttliCIFORK/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-SEGRE-T--/-tilORTYKR/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) SURGE AND INFORMATION EXPLOITATIONMANAGEMENT-(5)- Due to the nature of the target, CTC faces thechallenge of surge management. Surge can be triggered invarious ways, ranging from a terrorist incident or knownthreat to information overload resulting froni  operations and disruptions of terrorist cells.(U) Crisis Management4E)- A number of interviewees described CTC asfrequently operating in a state of crisis?responding to aseries of terrorist actions or threats. Center officers andmanagers overwhelmingly believe that they surge well incrisis situations through team effort, initiative, andprioritization. Employees have learned from experiencetheir roles and responsibilities and automatically assumethose roles when a crisis occurs. On occasion, the effort ofCTC employees is supplemented with assistance from the DIand the DO. Several interviewees noted that their managerswere sensitive to the potential for burnout. Management, forexample, does encourage employees to take time off asneeded and as appropriate.(U) Exploitation of Data-(5)- The majority of interviewees who had an opiniongave mixed reviews to CTC's ability to effectively exploit thedata the Center clandestinely collects. They generallybelieve that the Center does the best it can to scope, scan,and prioritize information for immediate action. Theyviewed as the most difficult challenge  Some officers acknowledged, however, that thedemands placed on CTC do not allow it to exploit all the-sEGRE-T-71-i-meperrtv /x1 28Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist CentersEGRE-T-ht:TtrolM / /X1information it collects. As a consequence, the risk exists thata potential warning will go unidentified.-(-St As the unit that provides cleared, native linguisticsupport to CTC, the Language Exploitation Branch (LEB)bears the primary responsibility for translating clandestinelyacquired foreign language materials. The branch, which islocated at  also provides support to a variety of language-related operations. Atthe time of the inspection, the branch included   LEB has undergone significant growth sincethe last OIG inspection.-(-9)- The biggest management challenge in LEB isfinding the right people with the right skills and gettingthem cleared. The task of the linguists is particularlydifficult because4.e.) LEB translators have an excellent reputationamong CTC officers for responsiveness and high qualitywork, and they are in constant demandl _  LEB has taken a number of..creative steps to cope with the volume of data that requirestranslation. SOME act as workflow adjudicators,identifying the most time-sensitive work, makingassignments, and establishing deadlines. The linguists alsoare adept at scanning quickly through the large volumes ofinformation to identify threat tipoffs, summarizing data, anddeciding what needs immediate translation and what canwait. Despite these efforts, the translators cannot process allof the information quickly, and several intervieweesexpressed concern about what they might be missing.Although LEB has worked with theAugust 200129 SECIa-T-4-71-NeTORICT/ / X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE-T-4-7-NeFeRtli /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center-(e)- Several interviewees commented specifically onthe importance of a strong, continuous managementpresence in the facility to ensure optimum operation. Thetriage process performed on the large volume of taskingrequires guidance, even beyond what the workflowadjudicators can provide. At the time of the inspection, thenewly-appointed branch chief was without a deputy, whichforced him to divide his time between Headquarters and theLEI E facility; the recent selection of a deputy andimproved secure phone and computer connectivity shouldincrease management presence at the facility. According toSOME the lack of close attention to dailyoperations has resulted in a decline in work quality andproductivity. Management also is an important conduit,providing customer feedback and information about theCenter and Agency to a group of linguists who come from avariety of cultural backgrounds and who have littleexposure to the Agency "culture." Some observed thathaving only one manager who is frequently absent hadcontributed to a decline in morale and did not allowsufficient oversight of personnel work habits and overtimeallocation. Theconscious about protecting  personal security.   ippear to be very securityand their own_SELIZE-T-1-74dererIZICl/ /X130Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SECR&T-47LidefOrtICT/ /X1--(Et Protracted confusion and uncertainty existsamong the linguists over changes in their status, pay,and benefits, which have had a negative impact on morale.Several peoplestrongly stated the desire for clear, written guidance.-(e- FINDINGS? Workflow management in the Language Exploitation Branchis difficult because of shifting priorities and the large volumeof material and requires close management attention.? Maintaining morale in a separate facility with officers ofvaried backgrounds and clearance levels has been a problem.? Entitlements, including pay and benefits, have been subject tochange and have not been spelled out in writing.-(0- RECOMMENDATION #2 (For C/CTC): That CTCdevelop a plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to addressworkflow and morale issues. The plan should evaluate theusefulness of creating an administrative handbook that explainsemployee entitlements.August 200131 _SEC.RE-T-1-/-Nefer1ICT/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_szcaz-T-7L-74NeroRn-/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) CTC'S COMMUNITY ROLE-(6) The DCI is responsible for coordinating thecounterterrorist efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC).In addition, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39 chargesthe DCI to disseminate to US Government entities threatwarnings pertaining to terrorist threats derived from foreignintelligence. As the Special Assistant to the DCI, C/CTCacts as the DCI's community representative forcounterterrorist matters.-(C--) The Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB)is the organizational component of CTC that executes theDCI's community responsibility. C/CCB chairs the Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), a forumfor organizations representing the intelligence, lawenforcement, defense, and regulatory communities to adviseand assist the DCI with respect to the coordination andpublication of national intelligence on terrorism issues andto promote the effective use of IC resources. Asubcommittee of the IICT, for example, meets quarterly todetermine tier listings of intelligence priorities for terroristgroups. Moreover, CCB manages the procedures,production, and mechanisms by which the IC prepares,coordinates, and disseminates terrorist threat publications.The Terrorism Warning Group (TWG), a cross-communitygroup residing within CCB, prepares coordinated IC threatwarnings from the DCI to alert senior policymakers ofpossible foreign terrorist attacks against US and alliedpersonnel, facilities, and interests.fEt The majority of customers and Center managerswhom we interviewed and who claimed to be familiar withCCB praised the board for its coordination role. Customersvalued CCB most for its capacity as an "honest broker" infacilitating and deconflicting community views on threatwarnings. Most CTC managers who had views recognizedthat CCB plays a necessary and frequently unheralded roleas liaison with the community. One manager noted thatCCB is not adequately acknowledged for the contributionthat it makes. Indeed, more than one half of the Center-SEGRE-T-7L7i-fiefevitt/ /X132 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SEGRE-T-filltrOTCW/X1managers whom we interviewed lacked a clearunderstanding of CCB's role and function.--(e)- Some Center managers noted that CCB?particularly the Terrorist Warning Group?is understaffedbecause other agencies had not filled their assignedcommunit ositions. Director of Central IntelligenceDirectiv mandates TWG's role and composition.Interviewees suggested that Center employees often step into fill gaps created by this understaffing.August 2001 33Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482ie 9Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482SEC-REFT-H-MeMPN/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPStt Since the OIG's last inspection of CTC in 1994, theCenter has broadened and deepened its operationalpartnerships with other US Government organizationsworking the terrorist target. The working relationships havebeen marked by an increased exchange of people andinformation (see figure 8). Thendetailees currentlyassigned to CTC form the core of the Center's tacticalpartnerships. This number represents a jump of almost50 percent from the total in 1997. In turn, detailees haveincreased the two-way flow of information by supportingjoint efforts by CTC and their home organization or byworking in regular CTC line positions.SgqR-E-TtttcTCYFrrlrN//X134 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist CenterSE?R-E-T-1-7110FO1zK/ /X1Figure 8August 200135 SECRE-T-/--frMeTrarW /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SEC.14g-T-/-1-144trIZYRK/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) Federal Bureau of Investigation(S) CTC and FBI interviewees consider therelationship between the two organizations to be vastlimproved since the 1994 OIG inspection of CTC.The growth in,  joint activities and cross assignments suggests that therelationship is now more institutionalized and lesspersonality dependent. The  Center provided operationalsupport to about FBI in 1999-2000. in February 2000, CTC described,"cooperative relations with the FBI, which allowed us towork together on what were closely linked domestic andinternational terrorist threats" as one of the three keyelements to the success of the Agency's response to themillennium threat. The assignment of top flight personnel tosignificant positions at the Headquarters level of bothorganizations has substantially improved coordination; oneof the three CTC deputies is an FBI officer, and a seniorAgency officer is assigned to the Counterterrorist Section ofthe FBI.(G) Interviewees noted that some problems persistand probably will never be overcome fully. A naturaltension exists between the two organizations, deriving fromtheir different missions, which can be negotiated but nevereliminated. The most frequently cited catalyst fordisagreements was the difference in organizationalmission?intelligence collection for the Agency andsuccessful prosecutions of terrorists for the FBI. While someinterviewees commented that potential intelligenceopportunities were lost because of deference to lawenforcement goals, most acknowledged the mutual benefitsderived from cooperation. Concerns still remain in bothorganizations about access to the counterpart's missioncritical information. The intensity of this issue, however,was much less pronounced than that encountered during the1994 inspection, suggesting improvement in this area. Thecross assignments provide a mechanism for employees fromSECRET44-14eFe1trsT/ /X136 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SEGRE-T-1-fiterearc / /X1both organizations to gain perspectives on the differentmissions and facilitate sharing of information throughapproved channels.(U) Department of Defense CTC's relationship with NSA has improveddramatically since the last inspection. NSA information hasbeen critical to a number of disruptions and renditionsorchestrated by CTC.  August 200137-SF-CR-E-T1?tNC5FORR/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482?SEGRE41-1-NerOITNI/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U)Ec--)--SECRU-T-4-71-NerPOITN7 /X138 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center 5-ECRET-4-71-NefeiR17/ /X1(U) CTC LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES(U) Mission(e) CTC's mission-oriented workforce is generallywell managed, especially given the size and scope of theorganization and the target. Nevertheless, the OIG foundseveral areas of employee concern that?if ignored bymanagement?could erode the Center's effectiveness.(S) CTC employees clearly understand their missionand believe that their work is vital to saving American lives.Most of the employees interviewed described the mission asincorporating, in total or some part, the effort to "identify,disrupt, render, or, in some other manner, stop terrorismand terrorists." Survey results show that 98 percent ofrespondents understand the mission and function of theirwork units?a figure slightly higher than average in the DO.Moreover, employees believe that they are having an impact.Interviewees pointed to specific actions?renderings, arrests,disruptions?as exemplars of mission successes. Accordingto the survey, 93 percent of respondents believe that they aremeeting the needs of their customers.(G) This sense of mission and belief in its importanceand success have helped to create what customers, partners,and CTC employees describe as a highly dedicatedworkforce that produces quality work. Field officers, forexample, characterized the workforce as "enthusiastic,""proactive," "energetic," and "hard working." More than80 percent of the respondents to the customer/partnersurvey agree that CTC is committed to doing high qualitywork. Likewise, 97 percent of the respondents to thecomponent survey said that the work of their unit is of goodquality, slightly more positive than attitudes measured inother DO component inspections.August 200139 SECRE-T-1-1-PleVORST/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482?SEGRE-T-1-tN0FORST/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) Quality of Leadership and Managementiej- Interviewees characterized CTC's front officemanagers as operationally savvy and models of mission-oriented managers. Component and field personnelgenerally commend C/CTC, in particular, for his review ofthe Center's counterterrorist strategy and decision to expandunilateral operations. Senior Agency managers regard frontoffice management as operating an effective programagainst a difficult target. Customers respect the Center'schief and deputies for opening channels of communicationand for their expertise. Senior customers described C/CTCas "responsive," a "facilitator," and an excellentspokesperson for the Center.(G) CTC employees were generally pleased withfront office management, and survey respondents ratedthese officers on par with the rest of the DO management incommunications issues. Of the interviewees whocommented on their management style, a significant numberindicated that Center personnel seldom saw the chief anddeputies. They noted that, in their fast-paced and stressfulwork environment, employees desired simple affirmation ofa job well done from their managers?something that theythought could be done more often. Almost all theinterviewees recognized the increasing demands placed onthe Center's senior management by external and internalcustomers, as well as the logistical challenges presented by alarge, dispersed workforce,  Nevertheless, the OIGencourages all front office managers to make interactionwith Center personnel a higher priority.(e) Interview and survey results suggest thatanalysts feel more removed from Center management thanthe rest of CTC officers. The survey showed that they wereless comfortable discussing concerns or ideas with the CTCfront office than were the rest of the Center respondents;only 32 percent of analysts feel free to discuss these issueswith senior management as compared to 49 percent of totalrespondents. A minority?about 20 percent of AIG analystsinterviewed?observed that the CTC front office does notunderstand or fully appreciate the contribution that analystsSECRET/ /NOFORN/ /X140 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center ..SEC-147-T-71-1-NOPORNHX1make to the center. Their concern frequently centered on theoperations focus of the current management team. Indeed, areview of the briefing slides used by CTC management tomarket its strategic vision reveals a focus on operations andlittle mention of analysis. Some interviewees also expressedconcern over the lack of any institutional mechanisms fortop-down communications. As an example, one observedthat the absence of information fuels an active and negative"rumor mill." The career development recommendationpresented later in this report should help clarify for analyststhe front office's expectations about the role of CTC analystsand offer a mechanism for communication betweenmanagers and analysts.(q Interview and survey data show that Centerpersonnel generally value the dedication and effectiveness oftheir branch and group chiefs. Comments from thecomponent survey suggest that employees find the relativelyhigh rate of supervisor turnover to be disruptive, however.Analysts' survey responses were less positive about theirbranch and group management than on average in theCenter and Agency (see figure 9). AIG interviewees gavemixed reviews of their branch management, and many werereserving judgment about the AIG group chief, who wasnew to the job at the time of the inspection.August 200141 SECRE-T--/-/-NOFCTIZNT/ / X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482SECRE-T-H-NefeaTT/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterFigure 9CTC Analysts' Perceptions of ManagementUnit-level Management is doing a good jobAnalystsCTCAgencyeggim0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%Group-level Management is doing a good jobAnalystsCTCAgencyII Agree0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%111 Neutral 0 Disagree(U) FundingThis chart is classified Uthedici-O--Although CTC's overall budget has enjoyed growthover the last five years, the Center has become increasinglydependent on supplemental funding to maintain a robustmission (see figure 10). Interviewees overwhelmingly saidthat to date the budget had been adequate. DO area divisionofficers compared the Center's finances favorably to otherparts of the directorate and were generally pleased withCTC's financial support to them. Field interviewees, for-SEGRE-TiLl-NOPORIV/ /X142 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SEQ4E-TittleFFORR7/X1example, were able to identify operations undertaken andliaison relationships strengthened as a result of CTCfunding. Nevertheless, supplemental funding as a financialsource is unpredictable, and the attendant uncertainty canhave a negative impact on sustaining the mission.Figure 10This chart is classified SECRET(S/ /NF) In addition, unanticipated crises, whichnecessitate a surge in spending, require programadjustments, both at Headquarters and in the field.Problems occur during the gap between the time thatresources are expended on these surges and reserve orsupplemental funds are allocated to the Center to offsetthese costs. A number of interviewees described FY 2000,during which CTC estimates that 15 percent of its budgetwas consumed by the additional cost of the millenniumsurge, as an especially difficult or "rollercoaster" year. Theadditional expenditures were made during the first quarterof the fiscal year, but reserve funds were not received untilMay, with supplemental money following in August.During the gap period, interviewees told us that programsranging froni  were affected. The impact of the fluctuation infunding was felt in a number of areas, such as  August 200143 -WicAkE4-71-NtWOMIN7/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_SECRE-T-71-i-NelFCTITST/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(U) StaffingThe Center cut financial resources to several groups and DOdivisions in the spring, and cutde ? lo ments, resulting in dramatic cuts  CTC, which is facing the start-up costs of the new along with the operating and maintenance costs forexisting may eventually require increased funding orbe forced to make cuts elsewhere in its program.(-E-) CTC draws on employees from all fourdirectorates, incorporates detailees from the IntelligenceCommunity (IC) and law enforcement agencies, andemploys a large staff of contractors (see figure 11). The OIGviews this diversity as a strength because it contributes tothe Center's ability to integrate the needs and differingapproaches and cultures of Agency components as well asvarious IC partners. We noted previously how detaileesserving in CTC allowed a smoother exchange of informationand contributed to better working relationships with theseagencies.Figure 11This chart is classified.SECRET1411411iTrI1E//X1 44Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center -SEC-14E-T-1-fiiettiftil7 /X1(G) While Center employees consider budgetresources to be adequate, they are less sanguine that CTChas adequate personnel resources to effectively fulfill themission. Forty percent of survey respondents believe thattheir work unit does not have sufficient personnel toaccomplish the mission; these figures are largely comparablewith survey results from the rest of the DO and aresymptomatic of perceived shortages in the entire directorate.A substantially higher proportion of respondents from theoperations, reports, and operational support groups do notbelieve that their work units have sufficient personnel.Interview data generally paralleled the results of the survey.group managers interviewed identified ashortage of personnel or inadequate skills mix as the biggestobstacle to accomplishing the mission. Every interviewee insaid they needed additional personnel to do the job well. InAIG the responses were more evenly split between thosewho believed the group needed additional personnelresources and those who found the resources adequate.(e) CTC has limited options for dealing with thisperceived personnel shortage. CTC's staffing table showsthat, during 2000, the Center was only 3 to 6 percent belowits hiring ceiling. Nevertheless, employees are stretched byany staffing shortage, particularly in those units that arechronically short-staffed, such as theCenter management has redistributed personnel to areas itfeels are facing the greatest demands; UBL Station, forexample, is actually over strength by workers as ofJanuary 2001. Management is also trying to improve theeffectiveness of the staff by addressing the skills mix issue,which is discussed below in more detail.(6) Center employees are managing this perceivedshortage in a way that leaves many vulnerable to burnoutand allows little time for strategic work. Personnel regularlywork extra hours and are only able to perform what theyperceive to be the essential tasks. One manager commentedthat the demand on the staff means that they go from crisisto crisis and are not able to look at trends or more long-range issues to get ahead of the terrorist. An AIG analystAugust 200145 sE4a4gP471-melitimmy/xlApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482.SEC-2X-T--/-44eFelt17 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Centerworried that he only had time to answer the mail, and, as aresult, he might miss warning signs of a threat.(U) Skills Mix IssueskG) As discussed previously, CTC's customers,partners, and managers have identified some areas ofinexperience among both operations and analytic officers.CTC has taken great strides in recent years to attract andretain talented officers?largely through home-basing. YetCTC managers and employees perceive that the Center hasnot been as successful as it could be in this area. Centermanagers identified a number of developmental issues,which they are starting to address.fe) Home-basing. For several years after CTC'sinception, it relied almost exclusively on rotatees from otherdirectorates to undertake the substantive work. Thisstrategy did not ensure that the Center was able to retain thebest officers and contributed to the lack of expertise anddepth.(C-4 The Center now home-bases both analysts andDO officers as a method of developing in-house talent whilecontinuing to draw on DI and DO rotational officers toprovide experience and regional expertise. CTC evaluatesits home-based officers below the GS-14 level in twopanels?one for DI and one for DO career tracks. Aboutthree-quarters of interviewees had a favorable reaction tohome-basing, viewing it as a commitment on the part ofCenter management to counterterrorism as a professionalspecialty worthy of its own career service.(e-) Career development issues. Although CTC's abilityto home-base its officers has addressed some of the Center'sdifficulties with retaining and building expertise, a numberof CTC managers and officers pointed to careerdevelopment deficiencies that may dissuade talented officersfrom choosing to home-base in CTC. Survey and interviewdata revealed concerns, particularly among analysts and_S.ECRE-T-71-4-Netra1S/ /X146 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SEQ4E-T-f-ficlerFOIZST//X1operations officers, that cause them to question the viabilityof a career in counterterrorism.fE) The component survey shows that analysts areless satisfied with career guidance and training than surveyrespondents from CTC and the DI on average (see figure 12).Of the analysts who commented on training duringinterviews, only one expressed satisfaction with the leveland type of training. Moreover, 25 percent of AIGinterviewees worried about the lack of a career path, and thecomponent survey response suggests similar careerdevelopment concerns.Figure 12CTC Analyst Development ConcernsI have received adequate training for my jobAnalystsCTCDI0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%New people receive sufficient guidance and on thejob trainingAnalystsCTCDIMI Agree0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%II Neutral 0 DisagreeThis chart is classified UHAIU0August 200147 SECRET-74-14eftMt///X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482SECRE-T-HiclfferRNI/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist Center(C) Several CTC managers and AIG analystsidentified the ceiling on the overall number of DI officers inthe Center?commonly referred to as the "quota"?as asource of tension and a policy that has had a negative impacton the Center's ability to recruit and retain analysts. CTCmanagers explained the strategy as a means to bettermanage the migration of analysts to operational groupswhere they often experience career development problems.Many of these analysts perform target analysis?operationalopportunities identified through research?a job unique tothe centers. As a result, these analysts can face difficultyadvancing in the DI career track and frequently do not havesufficient training and experience for acceptance into one ofthe DO career services and to sustain a successful DO career.All of the analysts and most of the managers who discussedthe "quota" issue were unhappy with the way in which itwas handled, particularly the inadequate level ofcommunication to explain its purpose and impact. The OIGsuggests that CTC management review its strategy forbalancing between DI and DO officers in the Center andcommunicate its thinking clearly and comprehensively tothe Center workforce.-(G) Survey and interview results show thatoperations officers?both CTC home-based and thosecurrently on rotation to the Center?are uncertain about theprospects for a successful and full career when home-basedin CTC. Operations officers who responded to thecomponent survey were less positive than the Agencyaverage on career planning and advancement opportunityissues (see figure 13). About 50 percent of these officers, forexample, expressed dissatisfaction with CTC's careerdevelopment process. Most case officer intervieweesclaimed to be weighing their career options and taking a"wait-and-see" attitude to a CTC career. Several voiced theirperception that, despite increased hiring and more overseasslots, CTC management is not focused on careerdevelopment guidance for operations officers, particularly atthe GS-13 journeyman level and beyond. Some noted thatthe expectations for what experiences and training constitutea career path for CTC home-based DO officers appear tohave changed and are not transparent. Several interviewees-SEC?14E-T--/--/-14eriORN7 /X148 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _SF-C2X-T-4-71-iiertYRIS7 /X1suggested that Center management needed to be moreaggressive in articulating the special role of CTC operationsofficers and serving as their advocate in DO assignment andpromotion panels.Figure 13CTC Operations Officer Career Management ConcernsAgreeI receive adequate career planning help fromCTCOps OfficersCTCDO-0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%I am satisfied with advancement opportunities inCTCOps OfficersCTCDO0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%Neutral 0 DisagreeThis chart is classified UllAttitr(G) Center managers are aware that these careerdevelopment issues need to be addressed if CTC is tocompete for talent with the rest of the Agency and developits own cadre of qualified counterterrorism specialists. Forinstance, the new C/AIG is focusing on training anddevelopmental assignments, including internal rotations andthe Analyst Overseas Program. Prior toLlarrival, theAugust 200149 Jiticaur44-NetricwixiApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterCenter had begun, but never completed, a process to definean analytic career for CTC. The multi-dimensionalrecruiting program, and the pilotourse all are steps taken to enhance careeropportunities in CTC for DO officers. The recent plan, titled"CTC Best Management Initiative - 2001" includes aproposed "Career Development Council" that is designed toaddress multiple career development issues.(e) FINDINGS? Home-basing, while helpful, has not addressed the careerconcerns of CTC officers, particularly as CTC has stepped upefforts to recruit officers directly into the Center.? A sizable number of CTC analysts and operations officershave expressed dissatisfaction with the career developmentguidance and training opportunities currently available tothem.? CTC managers have taken some steps to address theseconcerns; but, as in the case of the DI "quota" issue, they havenot been adequately communicated and have lacked acomprehensive, Center-based approach.fe) RECOMMENDATION #3 (For C/CTC): That CTCprepare detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTChome-based occupation (analyst, operations officer, desk officer,reports officer), building on the initial work done last year foranalysts and taking into consideration the "Career DevelopmentCouncil" model. The guidance should identify assignments,training, and other development opportunities for each CTCoccupation at the developmental, full-performance, andsenior/expert levels. This guidance should be made available toall CTC employees, and managers should be held accountable forcounseling employees individually on the implications for them.CTC should also develop a program for educating managers onthe new guidelines and a plan for holding them accountable.-SEC4E7ftslt,FCY"R[CT7 /X150 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center?SECRE-T-71-/-1400FORICl/ /X1(U) Managing Contractors(S.) CTC employs abou contractors?or roughlyri3ercent of the Center's total workforce?who performvital services. They translate documents and other materialsacquired in support of CTC's mission, provide centraldevelopment and support, train  personnel in  the tradecraft of counterterrorism, and provide  suDvort for stations  (g) This diverse contractor population is complex tomanage. Contractors fall under three different types ofarrangements-beachgoverned by a different set of re ulations. Moreover, manof the contractors are locatedAugust 200151 13.BARE-144449FEffeli/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-,SEGIct-E-T-7ittlefFORTST/ /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterThe decentralized administration and diversity ofcontracts have made it difficult for Management Group toensure fairness and consistency, particularly as the numberand variety of contracts have grown. CTCmanagement recognizes the problems in contractadministration and has recently created a business advisorSEQ4+.//tIOTTIORNI7/X1 52Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SEC-14E-T-1-eletferlt17/ /X1Diversity Issuesposition to provide centralized oversight. The advisorreported for duty at the beginning of January 2001, and oneof her first tasks was to create a list of all contractors toinclude the type of arrangement under which they work.OIG strongly endorses the creation of this new position andrecognizes that CTC's contract population would benefitfrom oversight and standardization. The size andcomplexity of that population also suggests some level ofon-site support in outlying units.The OIG found no pattern of gender or minoritydiscrimination in CTC. The Center's workforce-48 percentfemale and 11 percent minority, according to CTCstatistics?is roughly as diverse as the rest of the Agency'spopulation. More than 80 percent of component surveyrespondents saw no gender or race preferences with regardto promotions, assignments, awards, and other personnelactions. These responses were slightly more positive thanresponses from other DO and Agency components. Centermanagement should note, however, that 39 percent ofrespondents who identify themselves as minority believethat non-minorities receive preference with regard topersonnel actions as compared to 22 percent of minorities inthe DO. Comments from CTC minority interviewees,however, did not further clarify this perception. C/CTC isaware of this issue and has indicated that he will address it.August 200153 WITUZ,LAW.OFENei//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center SECR-E-T-i-i-NeFer1Z17/ /X1(U) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS(S) FINDINGS?have helped focuscounterterrorist target,?????on the? CTC's plan to double the number of if realized, willrequire start-up money for nits and operations andmaintenance money for inits, plus an increasedsupport structure at Headquarters.? CTC has no written formal plan or established criteria for thecreation of? Program managers who work a number of different terroristtargets find it difficult to deal with each of the CTCcomponents responsible for the different targets.? Program managers frequently are burdened with additionalresponsibilities or heavy administrative duties that distractthem from guiding(S) RECOMMENDATION #1 (For C/CTC): That CTCdevelop a written strategy for the program. The strategyshould include, but not necessarily be limited to: a discussion ofcriteria for establishing LIIIIIIJ a five-year resource projectionshowinersonnel and funds required for established andplanned and the Headquarters' , a planclarifying points of contact and responsibilities for operationalmattersAugust 20011 _sticlaT4Hietrnm7/xlApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482sucit-E-T-71-71-Nererrav /XI DCI Counterterrorist Center() FINDINGS? Workflow management in the Language Exploitation Branchis difficult because of shifting priorities and the large volumeof material and requires close management attention.? Maintaining morale in a separate facility with officers ofvaried backgrounds and clearance levels has been a problem.? Entitlements, including pay and benefits, have been subject tochange and have not been spelled out in writing.EC-) RECOMMENDATION #2 (For C/CTC): That CTCdevelop a plan for the Language Exploitation Branch to addressworkflow and morale issues. The plan should evaluate theusefulness of creating an administrative handbook that explainsemployee entitlements.(?) FINDINGS? Home-basing, while helpful, has not addressed the careerconcerns of CTC officers, particularly as CTC has stepped upefforts to recruit officers directly into the Center.? A sizable numb4jof CTC analysts and operations officershave expressed dissatisfaction with the career developmentguidance and training opportunities currently available tothem.? CTC managers have taken some steps to address theseconcerns; but, as in the case of the DItquota" issuOhey havenot been adequately communicated and have lacked acomprehensive, Center-based approach.fei RECOMMENDATION #3 (For C/CTC): That CTCprepare detailed, written career guidance for each discrete CTChome-based occupation (analyst, operations officer, desk officer,reports officer), building on the initial work done last year foranalysts and taking into consideration the "Career DevelopmentCouncil" model. The guidance should identify assignments,--SEC?R-E-TirSTORTIZTT/ /X12 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C01525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center sEGRE-T-71-ficteperm /x1training, and other development opportunities for each CTCoccupation at the developmental, full-performance, andsenior/expert levels. This guidance should be made available toall CTC employees, and managers should be held accountable forcounseling employees individually on the implications for them.CTC should also develop a program for educating managers onthe new guidelines and a plan for holding them accountable.August 20013 ..1434-i4474ifilltORIN7/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482A0010a0H1311 3c109SApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center EF-C-12,g-T-4-/-fieferIM/X1(U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY(E-) A team of eight inspectors, one research assistantand one secretary conducted an inspection of CTC fromSeptember 2000 through February 2001. Based on the Termsof Reference provided to senior CTC management, theinspection focused on a range of topics, including: missionaccomplishment, customer satisfaction, and operational andpersonnel management success. The goal was to provideAgency senior managers, and the Chief of CTC in particular,a balanced, objective view of the Center?highlightingprograms and processes that are working well, and notingthose areas that need improvement.(G) The team gathered information for this reportfrom interviews, a CTC employee opinion survey, acustomer/partner survey of DI and DO officers, two focusgroups, and numerous documents on a wide range of topicsrelated to the Center's activities. In addition to 16 overviewbriefings from CTC managers,  Inspectors spoke with 112 non-Agency customers and CTC counterparts in the Washingtonarea, andoverseas. Views were solicited from officers representingthe following agencies and organizations: the NationalSecurity Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, theNational Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,the Departments of State and Defense, the Secret Service,and the Congressional oversight committees. The teamsupplemented its own interviews with information relevant,to CTC from interviews conducted as part of IG inspectionsof Central Eurasia Division and Latin America Division in1998, and inspections of European Division, Office ofMilitary Affairs, and the DCI Nonproliferation Center in1999. Team members reviewed a large number of policy,substantive, administrative, and budgetary documents, aswell as the June 2000 report of the National Commission onAugust 20011 _S.F.C.14E-T-H-IIMOIC7/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482?SEcit-E-T-/-1-144eYFOITV/ /X1DCI Counterterrorist CenterTerrorism, chaired by Ambassador Bremer. There were  responses to the employee opinion survey, which represents56 percent of the CTC employees and detailees who werepolled. In additionDO and DI officers responded to thecustomer/partner survey, includingnwho providedwritten comments. These surveys provided valuable dataon CTC employee and customer/partner perceptions of keyissues.-SEC?R-E-T--/-1-NettlItIl/ /X12 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _COINIF4PEN-T-I-Ati /X1(U) EMPLOYEE OPINION SURVEY(U/ /-44T449) As part of its inspection of the DCICounterterrorist Center (CTC), the Office of InspectorGeneral conducted a component survey. We distributed thesurvey questionnaire via Lotus Notes to all CTC careerists?both working in CTC and on rotation outside the Center?and to personnel belonging to other A enc components butcurrently serving in CTC. We received responsesrepresenting a return rate of nearly 55 percent.(U/ /A-17d6) The survey items assessed opinions on anumber of career and job related issues. For most items,respondents were asked to choose from among six possibleresponses" Agree, Tend to agree, Neutral, Tend to disagree,Disagree, and Not applicable/Don't know. The responseswere aggregated into three categories as follows:Category ResponsesAgree Agree and Tend to agreeNeutral NeutralDisagree Disagree and Tend to disagree(UI AIU0) Most items in the report are worded sothat "Agree" represents a favorable opinion and "Disagree"an unfavorable opinion. Responses of "Not applicable/Don't know" were not counted in tabulating results. Forcomparison to the CTC survey results, columns labeled"CTC1994" and "AGENCY" are included. The firstrepresents the survey results from the 1994 OIG inspectionof CTC, the latter is a compilation of OIG survey resultstaken of 38 other Agency components since 1993.August 20011 _C-014F+BENTricr/ /x1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 0015254821DILF-IPENITIVE7 /X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterInspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000TotalCTC1994 CTC2000 AGENCYSample1.Considering everything,I am satisfied with my job.Agree86% 81%78%Neutral6% 9%9%Disagree8% 10%14%Base2. My job makes good use of my skills and abilities.3.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBaseI believe that my78%6%16%81%8%11%76%9%15%efforts and contributions are valued and appreciated.Agree80%74%67%Neutral11%12%14%Disagree9%14%19%Base4.I believe I am performinga valuable function for the Agency.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase93%5%1%5. CTC is a good place for me to work and develop my career.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase70%19%12%77%10%12%61%19%20%6. If you have your own way, will you be working for CTC 3 years from now?YesNo assgt endsNo will retireNo otherBase58%22%3%16%51%15%8%26%7. I believe the primary strengths of CTC are:Staff expWork unit supCntr leadrshpResourcesWork impactWork envOtherBaseResponses58.7%31.5%28.0%62.2%86.2%62.6%99.2%1C-014FfeEtlITAT/ /X12 August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center _CONFLIPENTTAT,/ /X1Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000Total SampleCTC1994CTC2000AGENCY8. I believe CTC needs improvement most in these areas:Staff expWork unit supCntr leadrshpResourcesWork impactWork envOtherBaseResponses26.4%32.7%28.7%17.7%3.9%8.3%22.8%82.7%9. I understand the mission and functions of my work unit.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase99%1%98%1%1%94%3%3%10. My work unit meet the needs of our customers, i.e., we are doingthe right things.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase93%3%4%93%5%2%87%7%6%11. The people in my work unit are committed to doing high quality work.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase94%3%2%12. Overall, the work done in my work unit is of good quality.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase97%1%3%97%2%1%93%4%2%13. I know what is expected of me at work.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase84%10%14. At work my opinions seem to count.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase74%15%10%15. My work unit has sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase50%10%40%49%9%43%August 20013-CONFIDEN-TtAt/ /X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_CCLIS4?49ENTTICE//X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterInspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000Total SampleCTC1994CTC2000AGENCY16. My work unit has the appropriate skills mix to accomplish its misison.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase77%8%15%71%9%20%17. I have access to the computers and specialized equipment I need todo my job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase94% 85% 88%2% 7% 4%4% 8% 8%18. I receive the computer support I need to do my job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase86%5%9%72% 80%12% 8%15% 12%19. I receive the administrative and clerical support I need to do my job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase72%7%21%58% 71%15% 11%27% 18%20. I have access to the information I need to do my job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase82%9%10%21. CTC effectively exploits the information on terrorism that isavailable to it.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase83%11%6%22. People in my work unit cooperate to get the job done.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase93%2%6%92%3%4%88%6%6%23. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in otherCTC components are:ExcellentGoodFairPoorBase31%55%12%2%S9124PREINTIWE70(1 4Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center c.ONIF?IgiENT-11ct/ /X1Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection?Dec 6, 2000Total SampleCTC1994CTC2000AGENCY24. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in otherAgency components are:ExcellentGoodFairPoorBase26%62%12%1%25. My work unit's working relationships with its contacts in othergovernment organizations are:ExcellentGoodFairPoorBase31%58%11%1%26. Responsibilities for issues that cut across different work unitswithin CTC are clearly defined.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase61%18%21%56%15%29%44%23%33%27. Responsibilities for issues that cut across CTC and otherAgency components are clearly defined.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase64%17%19%51%22%26%47%23%30%28. I understand CTC's current work priorities.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase81%12%7%29. Most of the time, the amount of work I am expected to do on my job is:Too muchAbout rightToo littleBase33%60%7%38%59%3%36%56%8%30. I am satisfied with the amount of freedom I have in doing my work.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase92%3%5%84%6%10%86%5%9%31. Overall, my own management at the work unit level is doing a good job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase87%6%8%80%9%11%78%11%12%August 20015_C_Q..INIF-IPRdtrXE//X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482-CONFIfie NtrAT// X1 DCI Counterterrorist CenterInspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000Total SampleCTC1994CTC2000AGENCY32. Overall, my supervisor manages people effectively.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase77%5%18%74%10%15%70%11%19%33. Overall, my supervisor effectively manages the substantive oroperational efforts of my work unit.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase87%5%8%78%11%11%74%11%14%34. My supervisor gives appropriate attention to security matters.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase92%3%90%8%2%85%9%6%35. CTC devotes appropriate attention to counterintelligence.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase86% 80%9% 13%5% 8%36. Overall, my own management at the group level is doing a good job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase71%15%14%67%17%17%37. My group level management has a good understanding of what mywork unit does.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase72%13%38. CTC management sets and communicates clear standards for employeeconduct and office practices.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase76%12%11%68%19%13%64%15%21%39. CTC management deals effectively with people who are notmeeting the requirements of the job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase45%22%33%37%31%32%28%23%49%SaaNI4PENIT7L//X1 6Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center_coNgiplectift-A-r/ /x1Inspector General Survey forcpricialtTotal SampleDO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Decrmr20n0 AGENCY6, 200040.CTC management communicatesfor the future of theto its employees a clearCenter.visionAgree 66% 53% 50%Neutral 16% 25% 19%Disagree18% 22% 30%Base41.The vision and missionof CTC make me feel like mywork is important.Agree 85%Neutral 10%DisagreeBase42.CTC seems to be makinglong-range goals.reasonable progress in achievingitsAgree 77% 76% 56%Neutral 17% 15% 27%Disagree6% 8% 17%Base43.Overall, CTC front officemanagement is doing a good job.Agree 83% 69% 59%Neutral 9% 21% 21%Disagree8% 10% 20%Base44.CTC front office managementits actions.explains adequately thereasons forAgree63%48%45%Neutral19%29%21%Disagree19%24%34%Base45. I am informed in a timely manner about events and decisions thataffect my work.Agree73%61%56%Neutral9%16%17%Disagree18%23%28%Base46. I am satisfied with the information I receive about what is going onin CTC.Agree66%45%52%Neutral9%24%20%Disagree25%31%28%Base47. I feel free to discuss work-related matters with my immediatesupervisor.Agree92%88%87%Neutral2%5%5%Disagree6%7%8%BaseAugust 20017siluactE44.-T-f2-r/ /x1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482_COINIF414E-NITAr/ /X1DCI Counterterrorist CenterInspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000Total SampleCTC1994CTC2000AGENCY48. I feel free to express concerns or ideas to management at thegroup level in CTC.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase66%18%16%63%14%23%49. I feel free to express concerns or ideas to CTC front officemanagement.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase78%6%16%49%22%29%51%18%31%50. My PARs fairly and accurately reflect my performance.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase90%4%6%84%9%7%80%9%11%51. My supervisor gives me enough feedback so that I know how I am doing.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase68%8%24%72%14%14%62%14%24%52. There is sufficient reward and recognition given in CTC fordoing good work.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase62%11%27%59%11%29%47%17%36%53. My supervisor encourages my development.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase73%12%15%54. At work, I have had opportunities to learn and grow.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase81%9%10%55. I know the criteria for promotion from my current grade levelto the next.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase79% 69%5% 8%15% 23%61%11%28%-(A4P4F414ENfftt//X1 8Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482August 2001Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482DCI Counterterrorist Center-GGNI17fi3ENTTICE/ /X1Inspector General Survey for DO/CTC 2000 Inspection--Dec 6, 2000Total Samplecmr10941 Te2000 AGENCY56. The CTC promotion panels evaluate people fairly.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase62%17%21%48%23%29%57. I am satisfied with the help I get from CTC in planning my career.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase37%19%44%32%26%42%34%22%45%58. I am satisfied with my opportunities for advancement in CTC.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase45%21%34%50%22%28%40%19%40%59. I have received adequate training for my current job.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase77%8%15%67%16%17%75%11%14%60. New people in my work unit receive sufficient guidance and on-the-jobtraining.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase79%12%10%70%13%17%68%14%18%61. Personnel practices in CTC demonstrate strong commitment to creating andmaintaining an effective, culturally diverse workforce.AgreeNeutralDisagreeBase60%23%17%69%19%13%65%20%15%62. With respect to promotions, assignments, awards and other personnelactions, my experience in CTC is that:Men preferredWomen preferredAll are equalBase11%6%83%10%17%73%63. With respect to promotions, assignments, awards and other personnelactions, my experience in CTC is that:Minority pref.Non-mnr pref.All are equalBase3%9%88%15%7%78%August 20019 1:0N4419ENTIAV/X1Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001525482