THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 28 NOVEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006146488
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 28, 1969

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The President's Daily- Brief
28 November 1969
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
28 November 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Xuan Thuy's recent comments to Western reporters
do not seem to reflect a willingness to alter the
inflexible approach the Communists have maintained
in Paris, but he has, nonetheless, given the first
sign in some time that Hanoi may not want to let
the negotiations simply languish. (Page /)
A statement by the Warsaw Pact powers yesterday on
the Middle East was probably intended to set the
stage for new Soviet pressures for a settlement.
(Page 3)
The Romanians are being pressed by the Soviets to
admit publicly that the invasion of Czechoslovakia
was justified. (Page 4)
Some of the problems facing Venezuelan President
Caldera are discussed on Page.5.
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NORTH VIETNAM
North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy has used Western
press and radio outlets on three occasions during
the past week to counter US charges that the Com-
munists are responsible for the impasse in the
Paris talks. Each time Thuy expressed willingness
to hold additional private talks with US officials,
but with the proviso that all issues of the war be
discussed.
This unusual effort to pin the blame on
the US for the failure of private talks
probably is aimed chiefly at regaining
the propaganda initiative. The North
Vietnamese obviously have been stung by
what must strike them as a concerted US
effort in recent weeks to show that the
talks are stalled solely because of Com-
munist intransigence. The announcement
last week of Ambassador Lodge's resigna-
tion apparently Zed Hanoi to conclude
that it must strike back.
Thuy's references to private talks are
the first time that the North Vietnamese
have acknowledged these meetings in pub-
lic. This unusual step probably reflects
real concern in Hanoi that the US may be
downgrading the talks. It also suggests
that the Communists believe they can
strike a responsive chord among critics
of US Vietnam policy by holding out some
prospect that new private talks might be
productive.
In our view, there are no real indica-
tions in Thuy's comments of a willingness
to alter the inflexible approach the Com-
munists have maintained in Paris for so
long. Nonetheless, he has given the first
sign in some time that Hanoi may not want
to let the negotiations simply languish.
(continued)
1
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By urging the US to discuss all issues
bilaterally with North Vietnamese nego-
tiators, Thuy in effect renewed the pro-
posal made privately to Ambassador Lodge
by Le Due Tho last May.
Thuy apparently did not bring up Laos in his
interview with CBS correspondent Peter Kalishcher
on 24 November or in his press conference on 25 No-
vember. This suggests that whatever he said about
Laos to Harrison Salisbury, who reported last Sun-
day that Thuy had raised the possibility of recon-
vening the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agree-
ments, was not intended as a significant Communist
initiative.
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WARSAW PACT - MIDDLE EAST
The Warsaw Pact powers yesterday issued a new
statement on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The decla-
ration contained nothing really new, repeating the
now familiar attacks on Israel and its "imperialist
sponsors," and reaffirming support for the Arabs.
Romania, which has consistently been at odds with
its allies' pro-Arab policy, was not associated
with the statement.
The Soviets probably intended the decla-
ration as a backdrop to the resumption of
four-power talks, now scheduled for 2 De-
cember. Moscow has for some time appeared
to be writing off the chances for progress
through bilateral talks with the US.
Egypt has already indicated it considers
the latest US proposals unacceptable, and
Moscow can be expected to follow Cairo's
lead.
The Russians may accompany their talks
with the US, UK, and France with renewed
efforts to enlist UN support for a settle-
ment in line with the Security Council
resolution of November 1967, calling for
Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab
territory. Moscow probably believes that
both forums offer better opportunities
for gaining an agreement favorable to the
Arabs than the two-power discussions.
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USSR-ROMANIA
A Romanian official has told our embassy in
Bucharest that the Soviets are putting unremitting
pressure on Romania to admit publicly that the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia was justified. The Roma-
nian leadership, according to the source, is meet-
ing to consider a response to the Soviets, and will
make a decision soon.
The Romanian position on this issue has
clearly weakened now that Moscow has
forced the Czechoslovaks to acknowledge
the validity of the invasion and has per-
suaded Belgrade to drop the subject. Ro-
mania has been silent on Czechoslovakia
since early this year but has not re-
nounced its condemnation.
We are inclined to doubt that Bucharest
would agree that the invasion was justi-
fied. To do so would imply renunciation
of Romania's basic policy against inter-
ference in the affairs of other states,
which could in turn open the way to ad-
ditional Soviet pressure. Still, some
softening of Romanian adamancy on the
Czechoslovak issue is possible.
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VENEZUELA
Discontent has been. noted amon *unior officers
as well.
Military discontent is only one of CaZ-
dera's problems.. His popular support--
never very great--has been eroded consid-
erably because he has been unable to de-
liver on his promises of economic and soc-
ial reform. An economic slowdown and
Venezuela's first serious labor problem
in years have also caused political pres-
sures, as has ,a virtual breakdown of the
administration of the universities.
Curiously enough, the student protest
movement may provide Caldera with a lever
to reduce the impact of some of his other
problems. The recent use of troops to
put down student riots, and the ensuing
military occupation of the Central Uni-
versity in Caracas, helped boost military
morale and also re-established some of
CaZdera's sagging popularity.
By itself the occupation of the univer-
sity will placate the public and the mili-
tary for only a short time. It does seem,
however, that calls for a military coup
are highly premature. Most military of-
ficers are committed to support the demo-
cratically elected government, and no .
significant sector of the society is apt
to accept, much less incite, an unconsti-
tutional change unless the situation gets
very much worse than it is.
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NOTE
Australia: The Liberal Party-Country Party
coalition beat down a series of Labor Party censure
motions by votes of 61-58 in the opening session of
the newly elected Parliament. In the election for
Speaker, the final tally showed one coalition mem-
ber voted for the opposition Labor Party.
6
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Top Secret
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