THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 NOVEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006146486
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 27, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007700230001-7
The President's Daily Brief
27 November 1969
46
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
27 November 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
President Thieu's critics will use the Song My
massacre incident to further their own political
ambitions. There are more indications that the
North Vietnamese are reinforcing the Viet Cong in
IV Corps. (Page 1)
Bonn plans to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty
tomorrow. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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More NVA troops
to reinforce VC
in IV Corps
PHNOM PENH
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
VC NVA
Battalion 200-400 300-500
Regiment 1,000-1,500 1,200-2,000
Division 5,000-7,000 5,000-8,000
VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100 125
MILES
96796 11-69 CIA
93465 1-69
102
104
Forward Element
1st NVA Division
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
I" CORPS
8th NVA
egiment
(SAIGON
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IV CORPS
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FOREST
Ca Mau
SOL TN
CHINA SEA
106 108
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The South Vietnamese Government's casual
handling of the Song My massacre case has left it
extremely vulnerable to criticism by opposition
elements. Official statements have minimized the
likelihood that a massacre took place and have
shown little interest in any further investigation
of the incident. A spokesman for President Thieu
has stated that the government "classified it as
an act of war" and considers the case closed.
This apparent insensitivity has provided Sen-
ator Tran Van Don a ready-made issue to embarrass
the government and to further his own political
ambitions. In his capacity as chairman of the
Senate Defense Committee, Don has announced his
intention to organize an independent investigation
of the case.
Don, a political opportunist, apparently
hopes eventually to achieve power by pro-
viding a bridge between the allies and
the Communists. Recognizing the delicacy
of this strategy, he has denied that he
wishes to furnish propaganda assistance
to the Communists but insists that the
government should not have taken any posi-
tion until it had more facts. This same
theme may be exploited by additional op-
position elements amenable to the "Third
Force" concept.
Evidence is accumulating that the North Viet-
namese are sending more combat troops to reinforce
weakened Viet Cong units in IV Corps, The North
Vietnamese 88th Regiment has moved 18 miles south
of its former position near Tay Ninh Province, and
is now located along the border between Cambodia
and western IV Corps. The shift makes it appear
likely that the 88th will join two other regiments
which during the summer were the first large North
Vietnamese units ever sent into the delta.
(continued)
1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
In addition, a forward element of the North
Vietnamese 1st Division has been shifting south and
west along the IV Corps - Cambodia border recently.
If two more North Vietnamese regiments
and a division headquarters are incorpo-
rated into the enemy force structure in
the delta, it will mean still greater
tests for the South Vietnamese units that
have taken over main defense of that re-
gion. Increased enemy pressure has been
evident in the area in recent weeks, but
so far the South Vietnamese appear to
have been generally effective in contain-
ing the major Communist threats in the
U Minh Forest area in the far south and
in a mountainous section along the Cambo-
dian border in the west.
2
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North Vietnam:
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COMMUNIST CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY
Bonn has decided to sign the Nonproliferation
Treaty without further delays according to the West
German disarmament commissioner. Assuming all goes
well during today's final Bundestag committee de-
bate, the way apparently will be clear for final
cabinet approval and formal signature on Friday.
The decision to act promptly appears to
be motivated by a desire on the part of
Chancellor Brandt to attend the upcoming
European Community summit and the NATO
ministerial meetings with German signature
an accomplished fact. Undoubtedly another
important consideration is the favorable
impact that German adherence is expected
to have on Communist receptivity to Bonn's
Eastern policy.
4
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
-Japan:
Lebanon: A majority of the newly formed Ka-
rami cabinet is generally associated with a pro-
fedayeen parliamentary bloc and can be expected to
take a conciliatory position on the role of the
fedayeen in Lebanon. The government may try to
gloss over the fedayeen issue, however, in hopes
of encouraging national unity and forestalling
further disturbances. Meanwhile, control of Leba-
nese security matters will remain in the hands of
the army, even though Kamal Jumblatt, a long-time
fedayeen supporter, was appointed to the key post
of Minister of Interior.
East Germany - West Germany: Trade between
the two governments is expected to reach a record
level of $925 million this year. Additional sales
that are not officially recorded would boost the
total volume of trade even further, to about $1 bil-
lion. This would represent a one-third increase
above the 1968 level and is due largely to expanded
East German purchases of West German commodities.
Although East Germany admits an increase in inter-
zonal trade, Pankow is reluctant to publish such
data because it is trying to discourage its Warsaw
Pact allies from expanding their relations with
Bonn.
5
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).
Top Secret
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