THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 NOVEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006146474
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: November 20, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
20 November 1969
47
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
20 November 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
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In South Vietnam the Communists seem to be getting
ready for heavier ground attacks against the Bu
Prang and Duc Lap outposts, perhaps in conjunction
with a greater enemy effort throughout the central
highlands. (Page 3)
Communist forces in Laos also are more active, both
in the Plaine des Jarres area and in the southern
panhandle. (Page 4)
Ethiopian security authorities have quashed an as-
sassination plot against the Emperor. (Page 5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CHINA
Recent satellite photography shows that per-
sonnel trenches are being dug throughout the coun-
try. Since September these trenches have been ob-
served near worker housing areas, government cen-
ters, industrial areas, general storage facilities,
and military installations. The largest concentra-
tions are along the border in northern and eastern
China, but the program appears to be nationwide,
and trenches have been observed even in such remote
places as Tibet.
This program is apparently another ele-
ment of Peking's recent "war preparations"
campaign ostensibly directed against the
Soviet Union--a campaign that, as recent
radiobroadcasts have hinted, is encounter-
ing apathy at local levels. The size and
location of most of the trenches suggest
that they are not military defensive pre-
parations against a land invasion. At
best they could provide modest protection
in the event of an air raid. The trench-
digging program--a crash project involving
large numbers of laborers--has the effect
of dramatizing Peking's exhortations to
the populace on the need to prepare for
"imminent" Soviet attack.
It also gives additional impetus to the
regime's concurrent attempt to move vast
numbers of people from the cities to out-
lying villages. This effort is motivated
by economic and political considerations,
but Peking has attempted to facilitate the
mass movement by connecting it with the
"war preparations" campaign.
At the same time the regime appears to be en-
gaged in a limited readjustment of its military pos-
ture. As reported in The President's Daily Brief
of 18 November, increased numbers of tanks have been
observed in the northern border areas; these tanks
are apparently being dispersed and dug into defen-
sive positions. Some aircraft stationed at north-
ern airfields have also been dispersed. Since 3
October, additional fighter aircraft have been re-
deployed to air fields in southern China in the
general vicinity of the Vietnam border. Finally,
elements of three armies are apparently being
shifted to new locations in southeastern China.
(continued)
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The movement of tanks and aircraft in the
north is part of a modest reinforcement
effort that has been going on near the
Soviet border for some time; dispersal of
these forces seems a prudent precaution
and probably does not reflect excessive
fear of an imminent Soviet attack.
We are hard put to explain satisfactorily
the military movements in southern China,
however. Deployment of additional fighter
aircraft to southern fields may represent
contingency defensive measures on the part
of Peking. At this time there is nothing
to relate the movement of ground forces in
the south to this redeployment of aircraft.
The shift may be part of a routine rotation
of forces similar to one that took place in
this area a year ago. It may also be moti-
vated by domestic political considerations
of one sort or another. We cannot rule out
the possibility that some of these troops
may eventually be transferred to other
areas of the country, however.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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North Vietnamese May Soon Attack Special Forces Camps
LAOS
Communist sapper-battalion
shifted toward camp .
Enemy units to
"strike all bridge positions'
Headquarters of two (\IVA regiments
moye.to the inimediate vicinity
25 50 75 Miles
0 2.5 50 75 Kilometers
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.0/10 PHU Qui
?
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
There are indications in communications intel-
ligence and from other sources that the North Viet-
namese may be readying themselves for sizable ground
attacks against the Bu Prang and Duc Lap outposts.
On 18 November, an intercept disclosed that the
headquarters of two North Vietnamese infantry regi-
ments had moved up close to the camps. The timing
of any, infantry attacks is still not clear. One
prisoner claims they will not come until early De-
cember.
If the attacks come off, they may be part of a
coordinated effort throughout the central highlands.
A Communist sapper battalion has shifted toward the
Dak To outpost and a recent message told other thlemy
units to "strike all the bridge positions," probably
along Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum towns.
Other intercepts have asserted that the "de-Ameri-
canization Scheme" already has been seriously frus-
trated by Communist victories in the highlands and
that a "large offensive" is yet to come.
Despite these preparations, it seems un-
likely the North Vietnamese will risk an
all-out assault on Bu Prang and Due Lap.
We think they will increase pressure,
however, on the South Vietnamese who have
taken over defense of the area. The Com-
munists committed considerably greater
forces during the siege of Due Lap last
year and still could not take the camp,
mainly because of allied air strikes.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Laos: Current Situation
Increased enemy /
, activity ! ,
THAILAND
/
'Communist
Communist-controlled territory t attack
? _
Contested territory
--? Limit of area claimed under
Communist and Neutralist
control, June1962 ? ' ?
. ?
THAILAND
MA RCA TION
Government
? outpost
overrun
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100
MI Les
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CAMBODIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
,Several battalions of North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao troops yesterday attacked the government
support base at Muong Phalane in the southern pan-
handle. Preliminary reports indicate that, although
the .government has been able to hold off the attack-
ers, heavy fighting is continuing on the outskirts
of the village. Farther West the enemy had more
success as local defenders retreated in the .face
of an attack on a small-government outpost at Ban
Taleo.
These attacks are probably intended to
ensure the security of the infiltration
corridor as the flow of men and supplies
to South Vietnam begins to pick up. It
is likely that the enemy move was prompted
particularly by the temporary government
occupation of Muong Phine in early Sep-
tember. That was the deepest government
penetration into Communist supply lines.
in several years.
In the north, Communist forces have recently
made several sharp attacks against government out-
posts around Xieng Xhouangville. The heaviest
fighting has been concentrated near the airstrip,
which has changed hands several times. The Com?
munists have thus far avoided large-unit operations,
probably because of supply difficulties and vulner-
ability to air strikes, but attacks are taking an
increasingly heavy toll of the government's already
dangerously thin ranks.
The loss .of. some government positions
near Xieng Khouangville- does not imme-
diately endanger the government's hold
over the Plaine des Jarres, but it does
appear to signal the opening round of
the enemy's attempt to regain this po-
litically important area.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ETHIOPIA
Security authorities have quashed an apparent
plot to assassinate the Emperor.
the ringleader was Takele Wolde
Hawariat. He is reported to have committed suicide
last Sunday, rather than be taken into custody by
the police. Investigation of the plot is said to
have been touched off by the theft of weapons from
army stores in Addis Ababa. Only one other con-
spirator has been identified, although some army
officers may be involved.
In his seventies, Takele, a former high
official of the Supreme Court, was an
indefatigable plotter. He had been vari-
ously under surveillance and detention
for several years. Takele escaped more
severe punishment during these years only
because the Emperor respected his record
as a resistance fighter against the Ital-
ians.
The government of course has been sparing
in its public commentary on the affair.
So far it has announced only that Takele
committed suicide after wounding a police-
man who was trying to serve him a summons.
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