PROPOSED BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE<SANITIZED>

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: DNI
• Keywords: ICBM
• Keywords: SPUTNIK
• Collection: Intelligence Warning of the 1957 Launch of Sputnik
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006137053
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: September 27, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2017-00014
• Publication Date: August 29, 1957

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30 April 1957
-Final '
IAC Approved
PROPOSED BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONYUrszt
on
'TBE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM"*
INTRODUCTION
1. The purpose of this presentation is to.furnish a summary of the US
intelligence community's latest estimates of Soviet guided missile capabilities
and probable programs. The intelligence community includes the intelligence
organizations of the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs
of staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Central Intelligence Agency, which has a coordinating responsibility in the.
field of. national intelligence. Inasmuch as our intelligence community is
responsible for producing intelligence on foreign'powers'and is neither
responsible nor qualified to evaluate comparable US programs, this presenta-
tion will be limited to a discussion of our best intelligence assessment of
the Soviet guided missile program. The data for this briefing are based on
our most recent community estimates.
BACKGROUND
2. Although the USSR had no known guided missile program at the close '
C)? World War II, we have conclusive evidence of a great postwar Soviet
* The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstains, the
saject betng outside-his juriediction.
This materiel contains intorThation attecting Ind
national defense cf Ole within the
meaning of the espionage laws, Tilic 18, B
er -s.
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interest in guided missiles, mAny strong indications of a large and active
research and development program, and firm evidence of the present opera-
tional deployment of a surface:to-air missile defense system around Moscow"..
. Unfortunately, the viry effective security surranuling the entire Soviet
military complex, and particularly around sensitive areas such as their
guided missile program, hampers our gathering of intelligence. This in
especially tvue on the details of specific guided missile systems.
There-
fore, in order to estimate these specific Soviet missile capabilities in a
field where positive intelligence is not always available, we are forced to
develop our estimates from: (a) all available evidence of Soviet missile
activity
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Y(b) general knowledge of the ",,tate-of-the-:'t" in the guided
missile field in the US; an?! (c) known ani estimated SovieZ capabilities in
related fields. Our estimmtes of the intended !soot of. the &octet program,
as contrasted to ::apabilities, are based largely on probable Soviet military
requirements for missiles in relation to other military weapons system2.
3. Lot me enlarge somewhlt upon what is meant by "available evidence
of Soviet missile activity". lAmedioxely after World War II, the Soviets
initiated a thorough and systmmatic exploitation of German guided missiles
and miasile personalities, faciltties, and equipment. From this exploita-
tton, mt believe the Soviets obtained foln general reeults: (a) the
acqgisition of operational an prototype minsiles, research and production
facilities and equipment, antt approximately hoo German missile specialists;
(b) completed studies of German achievements prior to the war's end--1945;
(c) the familiarization of Soviet personnel with German techniques of
research, development, to3ting, and production of missiles and components;
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and (d) further technical studies and limited, hardware development per-
formed by German scientists. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
4. Most of the German missile scientists and technicians taken. to the .
USSR have been returned to Germany. \
Although we cannot ace/retell assess the degree to which the
German missile contributions have heel incorporated in the native Soviet.
guided missile program, we believe that by 1948 the USSR bad raised the
level of its guided missile knowleiGe to that which existed ie Germany at
the close of World War II. We t:arefore estimate that a concerted and
continuous native Soviet guided. missile research and. development program
could have begun in 1948. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
5. /
/out knowledse of Soviet capabilieles in related fields such as electrcnics,
aerodynamicc propulsion, and nuclear energy, are ueed in our assessment of
Soviet seeded missile capabilities and probable programs.
C. The dates given in this brie:Ing are the earliest probable years
.arring which one or more missiles coued have been serially produced and
placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit, thus
constituting .a limited capability for operational emeloyment. It should be
noted that an additional period of time, varying from a few months to
several years depending upon the missile system, would be required before
we are faced with a significant threat in terms of actual employment in 4. '
general war. Our current estimate is based on the judgeeent that the USeR
does not now intend to initiate general war delflerately, and is not nos
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preparing for general war as of any particular future date. Our estimate
on which this beefing is based covers the period through 1966, although,
of course, estWates as to future years are sUbject to revision as new
intelligence hecomes available. '
SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES
'GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
' 7. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive
and enjoys's very high priority.
8. .We believe that the USSR has the native scientific resources and
.capabilities to develop during this period advanced types of guided missile
.
systems, in all categories for which it has military requirements:
9. We es imate. that the USSR has the industrial base and related
induntrial experience to series produce the missile systems it will develop
during this period. However, in view of competing demands, the limited
availability of electronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and
variety of Soviet guided missile production until about 1958. Thereafter,
expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much
less severe. .
10. In consonance with missions to be accomplished, we estimate that
the USSR has requirements for various sizes of nuclear, high explosive (HE),
and chemical (CW) warheads, and has the capability to develop them on time
scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be employed. In
view of carpeting demands, the availability of fissionable materials will
impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production
between now and 1966.-
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SPECIFIC MISSTUI CAPABILITIES
U. The following dates for specific missile capabilities give the
earliest probable years in which we ettimate the threat agAll begin, but,
as previously indicated, an additionnl period of time, varying with missile
type, would be required for these missiles to bei:ome available in quantity.
12. Surface-to-Air Missiles. We estimate tat surface-to-air missile
.systems have one of the highest pilorities.amOng Cwrent'Soviet military
programs. At Moscow, an extensi.e.system of surface-toLair missile sites
has been constructed, and all n...tes are probably.noW wrational. This
system can probably direct a vary high rate of fire agairist multiple targets
at maximum altitudes of about 60,000 feet and maximum hori:ontal ranges of
'about 25 nautical miles.
13. During the pericit 1958-1961, surface-to-air ante= with increased
range and altitude capabilities for static defense of critical areas, and
with law and high altitule capabilities far defense of static t4rgets, field
forces, and naval vesse..s, could probably become available for olorational
emplOyment. Some tilts between 1963 and 1966, the USSR could probably have
in operation a surface-to-air system of sow: capability afiainst the )CBM.
14. We estimne that series production of surface-to-air guided.
missiles is now vAderway in the USSR, and that It will probably protbne
such missiles IA:large quantities. Nuclear warheads could now be incor-
porated int(' a limited number of burfaze-to-air nissiles. We estimate '.bat
'some percultage of surface-to-air missiles will le so equipped between
now.and
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15. Air-to-Air Missiles. Despite a lack of significant intelligence,
we estimate that the USSR has pursued the development of air-to-air missiles,
and that it could now have in operational use a 2-3 nautical Mile range
missile capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather. It is probable that
the USSR could haven. 5 nautical mile all-weather missile operational in
1958 and a 15-20 nautical mile all-weather missile, capable Of employing
a nuclear warhead in 1960.
16. Air-to-Surface Missiles. In 1955 the USSR could probably have
had a 20 nautical mile subsonic air-to-surface missile available for
operational use. In 1956-1957 a 55 nautical mile subsonic missile could
probably be available, and there. is some evidence that such a missile has
reached at leistfinal flight test stage. A 55 nautical mile supersonic
missile could probably be available. in 1958. These missiles, designed
primarily as anti-ship weapons, could also be employed against isolated
and well-defined radar targets on land. In 1961, a 100 nautical mile
supersonic Missile could. probably be available for employment by heavy
bombers. Each of these missile types could employ nuclear warheads.
. 16. Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles with up to 350 Nautical
Miles Range. There is considerable evidence of Soviet development of
short-range surface-to-surface missiles, and we estimate that the USSR
wild probably have had available for operational use in 1954 ballistic
missiles with the following maximum ranges: 75 nautical miles, 175-200
nautical miles, and 350 nautical miles. These types could be equipped
with nuclear warheada. However, the USSR would probably consider CW
warheads desirable for certain specific purposes, and might employ BE in
the two shorter-range types.
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18. Surface-to.-Surface Ballistic Missiles with 700-1600 Nautical
Miles Range. Evidence on Soviet development programs leads us to estimate
that the USER could probably have had a 700 nautical mile maximum range
ballistic missile for operational use in 1956. We have firm evidence that in
1949 the USSR was interested in a 1600 nautical mile intermediate range
ballistic missile (IRBM) and we believe it is a logical step in the Soviet
development program.. We estimate that the USER is developing an IRBM, and
that it could probably have such a missile in operation in 1959. Both, these.
missile types would probably employ nuclear warheads. We 'believe the USSR
would rapidly acquire a. considerable number of both the 700 nautical mile-
� and the 1660 nautical mile missiles.
,19. Intercontinental Ballistic Miesiles with 5500 Nautical Miles Range.
We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM, but we
believe its development .has probably been a high priority goal of the
Soviet ballistic missile' program. We estimate that the USSR could probably
have a 5500 nautical mile ICBM ready for operational use in 1960-1961. We
believe that the USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBM's
with nuclear warheads as rapidly as possible.
� 20. Submarine-launched Surface-to-Surface Missiles. We believe the
US would probably have developed cruise-type missiles initially, and
there is some evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet sUbmarines
� equipped to carry such missiles. The USSR could probably have had in
operation in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missile capable of a maximum range
of 500 nautical miles, and a supersonic missile capable of this range could
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probably be in operation in 1957. A supersonic cruise-type missile capable
of rangcoup to 1000 nautical miles could probably be operational in 1962.
These missile types would 'require nuclear warheads. With a vigorous program,
the USSR might achieve an operational sub:thrine-launched IRBM system sometime
during the period 1964-1966.
21. Earth Satellite Vehicle. The USSR will probably make a major
effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe
that the USSR has the capability of orbfAing, in 1957, a satellite vehicle
which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military
value. A satellite vehicle possessing substantial reconnaissance capabilities
of military value could probably -be orbited in the.period 1963-1965.
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