THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 JUNE 1976

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0006015143
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RIPPUB
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T
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16
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date: 
June 22, 1976
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 The President's Daily Brief June 22, 1976 2 *op?s? t? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Exempt from general declassification schedule of ED. I 1652 exemption category 513(1),121,(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 nmyrr, TYllr,f/TY17-7XTPT!NX-ITXT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 June 22, 1976 Table of Contents Italy: Communist election gains strengthen the party's bid for a role in national government. (Page 1) Forming a new government will be very difficult, with pro- tracted negotiations likely. (Page 2) Lebanon: A cease-fire arranged by Libyan mediator Prime Minister Jallud went into effect in parts of Beirut early yesterday morning. (Page 3) The Soviet ships that monitored the US evacuation from Leb-25X1 anon are still in the eastern Mediterranean. (Page 4) Syria: (Page 4) USSR: If normal weather prevails during the balance of the grow-25X1 ing and harvesting season, we estimate Soviet grain produc- tion will be 195 million tons. (Page 5) China: Barring a marked improvement in the weather, China will be hard pressed to equal last year's estimated grain output of 260 million tons. (Page 7) South Africa: The government's readiness to blame continuing rioting on subversive elements suggests it will tighten con- trols on non-white activities. (Page 8) Notes: USSR - South Africa; Japan; South Vietnam; Kenya (Pages 9 and 10) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - SaniliZd.6sop7A-Pp7-ovr'eiFfo'-'r 'ci'i-76'/OF/i.97:1-C`I-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 ITALY: The Communist Party made a major ad- vance in the Italian parliamentary election but fen short of over- taking the Christian Democrats as Italy's largest party. The re- sults strengthen the Communists' bid for some role in the na- tional government, but provide no clear-cut solution to Italy's political deadlock. The Communists were the only party to advance significantly in either the senate or the chamber of dep- uties, compared to the previous parliamentary election in 1972. The final count for the senate gave the Communists 33.8 percent, an increase of more than 6 percent over 1972. In the chamber, with 96 percent of the ballots counted, the Communist vote of 34.7 percent is an increase of more than 7 per- cent over the party's 1972 showing-- the largest gain the Communists have registered in any postwar election. The Christian Democratic totals of 38.9 percent in the senate and 38.7 percent in the chamber are only fractionally different from the party's performance in 1972, although they represent a gain of about 3 percent with respect to the Christian Democrats' perform- ance in the regional elections last year. The Christian Democrats ap- pear to have held their own mainly by offsetting losses on their left-- apparently to the the Communists-- by drawing support away from smaller parties, such as the neo-fascists, Liberals, and Social Democrats. The Socialists, who pushed hardest for an election, remain in third place but will be bitterly disap- pointed by their showing--10.2 per- cent in the senate and 9.7 percent in the chamber--which does not dif- fer significantly from the party's vote in 1972 and represents a drop of about 2 percent compared to the Socialist vote in the regional elections. --continued 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy'AP?prov'ed'fo'-'r, 6r CTIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 The election results will make it very dif- ficult to form a new government, and pro- tracted negotiations are likely. The election was called mainly as a result of the Christian Demo- crats' refusal to yield to a long- standing Socialist demand that the Communists be given at least an indirect role in the government. The election has now strengthened the Communists' influence, leaving the question of their future role at the center of political debate. Despite the Socialists' lackluster showing, they remain in a pivotal position. The Christian Democrats will not be able to put together a non-Communist parliamentary ma- jority without them. Any negotia- tions between the Christian Demo- crats and Socialists on the terms of a new coalition may thus be re- duced to a tug of war between the two parties over the degree of in- fluence to give the Communists in national policy making. The Chris- tian Democrats' ability to make concessions will be limited by the fact that their base of support has shifted even further to the right as a result of their tough anti-Communist campaign. While it is too early to draw firm conclusions, it is likely to be difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the Communists entirely from the national governing proc- ess. With their position in par- liament vastly strengthened, their cooperation would be needed more than ever to pass and implement any major programs proposed by a government in which they do not participate directly. --continued 2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 RLWARAT 1-11Al$ 559945 6-76 0 KILOMETERS 20 Declassified in Part =Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 ....-----, ,--- ,----, ---- -,. ..--.-----1 T'1-% -rN rs, r r 1--, TT. 7- 1 rl TT 7-,1\ Trn 4.-11\ TT XT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 LEBANON: A cease-fire arranged by Libyan medi- ator Prime Minister Jallud early Monday morning has been par- tially effective. AZ- though there is still some heavy fighting, the truce has allowed an advance contingent of the Arab League se- curity force, made up primarily of Syrian troops, to take up posi- tions around the Beirut airport. Jordan 25X1 The terms of the cease-fire clearly favor Syria and are a measure of the Palestinians' near-desperate 25X1 desire to open up at least one sup- ply route to the capital. Syrian troops have begun to withdraw from the 25X1 airport area; we have no evidence as yet, however, that other provi- sions of the truce are being car- ried out. The US embassy has learned that the League security force hopes to have the airport open by today or tomorrow so that additional League troops can be brought in by air. Other Arab countries contributing to the force continue to stall, and apparently none has any imme- diate plans to send its partici- pants. 25X1 25X1 25X1 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 25X1 25X1 - 25 T. l\ Ir 7-, TIT' CI T T'? r7, /-1 Ti 'IT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 The Soviet ships that monitored the US evacua- tion from Lebanon are still in the eastern Mediterranean. SYRIA: 25X1 25X1 Nine Soviet warships and a few na- val auxiliaries are continuing sur- veillance of US forces near the Lebanese coast. The nearest US unit to Lebanon is some 50 miles off Beirut. There are now 66 Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 'USSR: Major Grain Growing Regions East Siberia 559944 6-76 0 500 Miles 0 500 Kilometers Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 ?-? r-r-r rr 1, TT TT YT Ta Trr, ..."? a yr TT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19: CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 USSR: Growing condi- tions in the Soviet Union have improved, and prospects are favor- able for a grain harvest well above last year's disastrous crop of 140 million tons. 25X1 25X1 If normal weather prevails during the balance of the growing and har- vesting season, we estimate Soviet grain production will be 195 mil- lion tons. Unfavorable weather conditions could substantially re- duce the size of the harvest, ahd under optimum weather conditions output could be as high as 215 mil- lion tons. --continued 5 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - SanilizedZop7APFroN7eFfo7lie'le?L7207/0F/Td:'CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Based on a harvest of 195 million tons, we estimate that Moscow will import about 20 to 25 million tons of grain in the 15-month period beginning on July 1, 1976. Later today the USDA will release an estimate of 190 million tons, based on a different methodology. Crop conditions in much of Euro- pean Russia, the major winter grain area, are now good, and the main harvest will begin early next month. Almost one third of the area sown last fall, however, was lost. Prospects for spring grains have improved during the past month. Soil moisture problems apparently are not as critical or widespread as indicated by earlier weather data. Soviet needs for grain imports this year depend not only on the size of the harvest and on basic grain requirements, but also on the rate at which Moscow chooses to rebuild livestock inventories and replenish grain stocks. Twenty million tons would be only about two thirds of the amount pur- chased last year to cover the shortfall in grain. Moscow would welcome such a reduction since rec- ord hard-currency deficits are be- ginning to cause payments problems. World supplies of grain have eased from last year and seem adequate for Soviet needs. Our grain import forecast would allow 30 million tons of grain for starting an ambitious livestock program--after last year's distress slaughtering--and for rebuilding depleted reserves. So far this year Moscow has proba- bly bought 12 million tons of grain. Thus, the Soviets would have to import another 8 to 13 mil- lion tons if our 20 to 25 million --continued 6 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized CopyApproved for.616/07/16 7CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 CHINA: Barring a marked improvement in the weather, China will be hard pressed to equal last year's esti- mated grain output of 260 million tons. ton forecast turns out to be cor- rect. They are obligated to take at least 3.8 million tons more US grain under the US-USSR grain agreement. As in the recent past, a little more than half of total imports probably will be feedgrains. Spring- and summer-harvested crops, which account for 40 percent of the annual output of grain, were probably no better than last year, despite a reported acreage in- crease. In the northern part of the North China Plain--the major winter wheat growing area--crops were ad- versely affected by excess rain during fall planting and by drought after sprouting this spring. More favorable conditions in the south- ern part of the Plain will not compensate for these losses. The rice crop has suffered repeated setbacks from bad weather this year. The first rice to be har- vested from the spring and summer crop will be ready in July. The rains that brought relief to spring drought areas may have slowed the planting of fall grains, which normally account for 60 per- cent of the total grain output. It is still too early to gauge what China's grain import position will be. The leadership has not moved to purchase more than the roughly 2 million tons scheduled for delivery from Canada and Aus- tralia in 1976. 7 --continued FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 - Declassified in Part - Sanillied-eoPTKpFro7ecifOi-iiele-as-e267/07/i67c-IA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 SOUTH AFRICA: The readiness of South Af- rican leaders to blame the recent rioting on subversive elements suggests they will tighten already strin- gent controls on non- white activities. In a preliminary assessment, the US embassy in Pretoria states that government leaders are unlikely to consider reforms of the apartheid system--the continuation of which is setting the stage for future violence. The embassy sees no factual basis for the assertion by the minister of justice in parliament last week that the rioting was fomented by white radicals and black subver- sives. It also discounts Prime Minister Vorster's subsequent in- timations that the rioting was in- tended to scuttle his meeting with Secretary Kissinger. Although the rioting has not posed an immediate threat to white su- premacy, the embassy believes the events have intensified the sense of insecurity among South African whites that became apparent during the Angolan crisis last winter. Fear of racial violence at home probably also will reinforce Pre- toria's instincts toward caution rather than innovation in dealing with Rhodesia and Namibia. --continued 8 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitiz;-(]`Conpy 'A?p-rprro?ved.lonr R-'erears.-se 271.6r/r0r -7/67'. 61-AliDP79T00936A013500010003-4 The Soviets South Africa Japan NOTES 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY --continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 2bAl 25X1 25X1 TI V' T1 T) C, 1TI 77 7\ T /-1 7. T INT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 After a year of rela- tively moderate rule in South Vietnam, the com- munists are beginning to tighten their con- trol. In early June, South Vietnam's Provisional Revolutionary Govern- ment announced stern measures, in- cluding the death penalty, to pun- ish those who violate economic and security regulations. A special people's tribunal will be set up to try publicly and without appeal entrepreneurs who allegedly worked closely with the US and are still: --Hoarding and speculating. --Trying to evade taxes or brib- ing government officials. --Storing weapons, "colluding with the reactionaries," or or- ganizing refugee escapes. During the past year, a debate has developed between those who advo- cate a gradual consolidation of the communists' position in the south and advocates of rapid and forceful change. Although those favoring a faster pace apparently now hold the upper hand, public commentaries remain contradictory, suggesting that the issue is still unresolved. Hanoi so far has not acted on what is potentially the most controver- sial issue--collectivization of agriculture in the south. Some in- sight into the communists' approach on this matter probably will emerge from the Fourth Party Congress slated for sometime this year. 10 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013500010003-4