THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 JUNE 1976
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0006015143
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
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Publication Date:
June 22, 1976
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The President's Daily Brief
June 22, 1976
2
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. I 1652
exemption category 513(1),121,(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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nmyrr, TYllr,f/TY17-7XTPT!NX-ITXT
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June 22, 1976
Table of Contents
Italy: Communist election gains strengthen the party's bid for
a role in national government. (Page 1)
Forming a new government will be very difficult, with pro-
tracted negotiations likely. (Page 2)
Lebanon: A cease-fire arranged by Libyan mediator Prime Minister
Jallud went into effect in parts of Beirut early yesterday
morning. (Page 3)
The Soviet ships that monitored the US evacuation from Leb-25X1
anon are still in the eastern Mediterranean. (Page 4)
Syria:
(Page 4)
USSR: If normal weather prevails during the balance of the grow-25X1
ing and harvesting season, we estimate Soviet grain produc-
tion will be 195 million tons. (Page 5)
China: Barring a marked improvement in the weather, China will
be hard pressed to equal last year's estimated grain output
of 260 million tons. (Page 7)
South Africa: The government's readiness to blame continuing
rioting on subversive elements suggests it will tighten con-
trols on non-white activities. (Page 8)
Notes: USSR - South Africa; Japan; South Vietnam; Kenya (Pages
9 and 10)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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ITALY: The Communist
Party made a major ad-
vance in the Italian
parliamentary election
but fen short of over-
taking the Christian
Democrats as Italy's
largest party. The re-
sults strengthen the
Communists' bid for
some role in the na-
tional government, but
provide no clear-cut
solution to Italy's
political deadlock.
The Communists were the only party
to advance significantly in either
the senate or the chamber of dep-
uties, compared to the previous
parliamentary election in 1972.
The final count for the senate
gave the Communists 33.8 percent,
an increase of more than 6 percent
over 1972. In the chamber, with
96 percent of the ballots counted,
the Communist vote of 34.7 percent
is an increase of more than 7 per-
cent over the party's 1972 showing--
the largest gain the Communists have
registered in any postwar election.
The Christian Democratic totals of
38.9 percent in the senate and
38.7 percent in the chamber are
only fractionally different from
the party's performance in 1972,
although they represent a gain of
about 3 percent with respect to
the Christian Democrats' perform-
ance in the regional elections last
year. The Christian Democrats ap-
pear to have held their own mainly
by offsetting losses on their left--
apparently to the the Communists--
by drawing support away from smaller
parties, such as the neo-fascists,
Liberals, and Social Democrats.
The Socialists, who pushed hardest
for an election, remain in third
place but will be bitterly disap-
pointed by their showing--10.2 per-
cent in the senate and 9.7 percent
in the chamber--which does not dif-
fer significantly from the party's
vote in 1972 and represents a drop
of about 2 percent compared to the
Socialist vote in the regional
elections.
--continued
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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The election results
will make it very dif-
ficult to form a new
government, and pro-
tracted negotiations
are likely.
The election was called mainly as
a result of the Christian Demo-
crats' refusal to yield to a long-
standing Socialist demand that the
Communists be given at least an
indirect role in the government.
The election has now strengthened
the Communists' influence, leaving
the question of their future role
at the center of political debate.
Despite the Socialists' lackluster
showing, they remain in a pivotal
position. The Christian Democrats
will not be able to put together
a non-Communist parliamentary ma-
jority without them. Any negotia-
tions between the Christian Demo-
crats and Socialists on the terms
of a new coalition may thus be re-
duced to a tug of war between the
two parties over the degree of in-
fluence to give the Communists in
national policy making. The Chris-
tian Democrats' ability to make
concessions will be limited by the
fact that their base of support
has shifted even further to the
right as a result of their tough
anti-Communist campaign.
While it is too early to draw firm
conclusions, it is likely to be
difficult, if not impossible, to
isolate the Communists entirely
from the national governing proc-
ess. With their position in par-
liament vastly strengthened, their
cooperation would be needed more
than ever to pass and implement
any major programs proposed by a
government in which they do not
participate directly.
--continued
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LEBANON: A cease-fire
arranged by Libyan medi-
ator Prime Minister
Jallud early Monday
morning has been par-
tially effective. AZ-
though there is still
some heavy fighting,
the truce has allowed
an advance contingent
of the Arab League se-
curity force, made up
primarily of Syrian
troops, to take up posi-
tions around the Beirut
airport.
Jordan
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The terms of the cease-fire clearly
favor Syria and are a measure of
the Palestinians' near-desperate 25X1
desire to open up at least one sup-
ply route to the capital.
Syrian troops
have begun to withdraw from the 25X1
airport area; we have no evidence
as yet, however, that other provi-
sions of the truce are being car-
ried out.
The US embassy has learned that
the League security force hopes to
have the airport open by today or
tomorrow so that additional League
troops can be brought in by air.
Other Arab countries contributing
to the force continue to stall,
and apparently none has any imme-
diate plans to send its partici-
pants.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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The Soviet ships that
monitored the US evacua-
tion from Lebanon are
still in the eastern
Mediterranean.
SYRIA:
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Nine Soviet warships and a few na-
val auxiliaries are continuing sur-
veillance of US forces near the
Lebanese coast. The nearest US
unit to Lebanon is some 50 miles
off Beirut.
There are now 66 Soviet naval units
in the Mediterranean.
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'USSR: Major Grain Growing Regions
East Siberia
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USSR: Growing condi-
tions in the Soviet
Union have improved,
and prospects are favor-
able for a grain harvest
well above last year's
disastrous crop of 140
million tons.
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If normal weather prevails during
the balance of the growing and har-
vesting season, we estimate Soviet
grain production will be 195 mil-
lion tons. Unfavorable weather
conditions could substantially re-
duce the size of the harvest, ahd
under optimum weather conditions
output could be as high as 215 mil-
lion tons.
--continued
5
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Based on a harvest of
195 million tons, we
estimate that Moscow
will import about 20
to 25 million tons of
grain in the 15-month
period beginning on
July 1, 1976.
Later today the USDA will release
an estimate of 190 million tons,
based on a different methodology.
Crop conditions in much of Euro-
pean Russia, the major winter
grain area, are now good, and the
main harvest will begin early next
month. Almost one third of the
area sown last fall, however, was
lost.
Prospects for spring grains have
improved during the past month.
Soil moisture problems apparently
are not as critical or widespread
as indicated by earlier weather
data.
Soviet needs for grain imports
this year depend not only on the
size of the harvest and on basic
grain requirements, but also on
the rate at which Moscow chooses
to rebuild livestock inventories
and replenish grain stocks.
Twenty million tons would be only
about two thirds of the amount pur-
chased last year to cover the
shortfall in grain. Moscow would
welcome such a reduction since rec-
ord hard-currency deficits are be-
ginning to cause payments problems.
World supplies of grain have eased
from last year and seem adequate
for Soviet needs.
Our grain import forecast would
allow 30 million tons of grain for
starting an ambitious livestock
program--after last year's distress
slaughtering--and for rebuilding
depleted reserves.
So far this year Moscow has proba-
bly bought 12 million tons of
grain. Thus, the Soviets would
have to import another 8 to 13 mil-
lion tons if our 20 to 25 million
--continued
6
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CHINA: Barring a
marked improvement in
the weather, China will
be hard pressed to
equal last year's esti-
mated grain output of
260 million tons.
ton forecast turns out to be cor-
rect. They are obligated to take
at least 3.8 million tons more US
grain under the US-USSR grain
agreement. As in the recent past,
a little more than half of total
imports probably will be feedgrains.
Spring- and summer-harvested crops,
which account for 40 percent of
the annual output of grain, were
probably no better than last year,
despite a reported acreage in-
crease.
In the northern part of the North
China Plain--the major winter
wheat growing area--crops were ad-
versely affected by excess rain
during fall planting and by drought
after sprouting this spring. More
favorable conditions in the south-
ern part of the Plain will not
compensate for these losses.
The rice crop has suffered repeated
setbacks from bad weather this
year. The first rice to be har-
vested from the spring and summer
crop will be ready in July.
The rains that brought relief to
spring drought areas may have
slowed the planting of fall grains,
which normally account for 60 per-
cent of the total grain output.
It is still too early to gauge
what China's grain import position
will be. The leadership has not
moved to purchase more than the
roughly 2 million tons scheduled
for delivery from Canada and Aus-
tralia in 1976.
7
--continued
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SOUTH AFRICA: The
readiness of South Af-
rican leaders to blame
the recent rioting on
subversive elements
suggests they will
tighten already strin-
gent controls on non-
white activities.
In a preliminary assessment, the
US embassy in Pretoria states that
government leaders are unlikely to
consider reforms of the apartheid
system--the continuation of which
is setting the stage for future
violence.
The embassy sees no factual basis
for the assertion by the minister
of justice in parliament last week
that the rioting was fomented by
white radicals and black subver-
sives. It also discounts Prime
Minister Vorster's subsequent in-
timations that the rioting was in-
tended to scuttle his meeting with
Secretary Kissinger.
Although the rioting has not posed
an immediate threat to white su-
premacy, the embassy believes the
events have intensified the sense
of insecurity among South African
whites that became apparent during
the Angolan crisis last winter.
Fear of racial violence at home
probably also will reinforce Pre-
toria's instincts toward caution
rather than innovation in dealing
with Rhodesia and Namibia.
--continued
8
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The Soviets
South Africa
Japan
NOTES
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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After a year of rela-
tively moderate rule in
South Vietnam, the com-
munists are beginning
to tighten their con-
trol.
In early June, South Vietnam's
Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment announced stern measures, in-
cluding the death penalty, to pun-
ish those who violate economic and
security regulations. A special
people's tribunal will be set up
to try publicly and without appeal
entrepreneurs who allegedly worked
closely with the US and are still:
--Hoarding and speculating.
--Trying to evade taxes or brib-
ing government officials.
--Storing weapons, "colluding
with the reactionaries," or or-
ganizing refugee escapes.
During the past year, a debate has
developed between those who advo-
cate a gradual consolidation of
the communists' position in the
south and advocates of rapid and
forceful change. Although those
favoring a faster pace apparently
now hold the upper hand, public
commentaries remain contradictory,
suggesting that the issue is still
unresolved.
Hanoi so far has not acted on what
is potentially the most controver-
sial issue--collectivization of
agriculture in the south. Some in-
sight into the communists' approach
on this matter probably will emerge
from the Fourth Party Congress
slated for sometime this year.
10
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Top Secret
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