THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JUNE 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015138
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 17, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
i
June 17, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1),(2)(3)
declauified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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June 17, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Damascus has remained silent on the murders yes-
terday of US officials in Beirut. (Page 1)
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud has made little headway with
his plan for a withdrawal of Syrian forces. (Page 1)
Syria: President Asad's visit to Europe this weekend will be cut
short. (Page 1)
USSR: The Soviets have made some changes in the disposition of
their Mediterranean Squadron. (Page 2)
Jordan-USSR:
2g0
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(Page 3) 25X1
France: President Giscard hopes to obtain US backing for a new
multilateral aid fund for Africa. (Page 4)
Notes: Jamaica; China-Pakistan; USSR; Romania; South Africa
(Pages 5, 6, and 7)
At Annex we assess the forthcoming Italian election.
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36
LEBANON
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Bag ad
SAUDI ARABIA
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100 Miles
100 Kitometers
559921 6-76
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Damas-
cus has not commented
on the murders of US
Ambassador Meloy and
Economic Counselor
Waring, and may be
studying whether and
how to take action in
response.
Jallud, meanwhile, has
made no apparent prog-
ress on the Syrian with-
drawal plan he announced
on Tuesday.
SYRIA: President Asad,
who will arrive in Paris
today for a two-day
visit, has canceled his
scheduled visit to East-
ern Europe. He wants
to be back in Damascus
to deal with Lebanon
and related problems.
If Syria concludes that Libyan
Prime Minister Jallud's efforts to
arrange a truce with Palestinian
and leftist forces are likely to
go nowhere, it could use the mur-
ders as an excuse for a major mil-
itary push. The Syrians, however,
seem interested in a truce that
would at least give them time to
resupply their forces.
The Syrians have been playing
along with Jallud in order to win
political credit for seeming to
be conciliatory.
Although no major fighting occurred
yesterday, there has been no sign
that Syria intends to implement
the plan.
The separate efforts of Arab League
Secretary General Riyad to secure
agreement on the size and composi-
tion of the joint Arab peacekeep-
ing force have been no more suc-
cessful.
Christian leaders yesterday en-
dorsed the force, but their accept-
ance contained conditions that
would be virtually impossible for
the Palestinians or Syrians to ac-
cept.
Iraq's military moves demand Asad's
close attention. Baghdad's dis-
play of force has already tied
down several thousand Syrian troops
and presumably has provided addi-
tional encouragement to Asad's do-
mestic opponents.
--continued
1
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USSR: The Soviets have
made some changes in
the disposition of their
Mediterranean Squadron
in response to actual
or anticipated moves by
US naval forces.
Syrian officials trying to use the
threat from Iraq to elicit greater
popular support for Asad and his
policies appear to have made little
progress. There continue to be
signs of dissatisfaction among ci-
vilians and within the armed forces.
We have no information, however,
to confirm Palestinian and leftist
claims that a Syrian army unit pro-
testing its assignment to Lebanon
mutinied on June 14.
25
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--continued
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JORDAN-USSR: King Hu-
sayn, who arrives in
Moscow today, probably
will avoid making any
firm commitment to ac-
quire a Soviet air de-
fense system.
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Husayn and Prime Minister Rifai, 25X1
the chief proponent of a Soviet
system, are anxious about the pos-
sible consequences of a turn to
the Soviets. /
Amman will re-
examine possible alternatives af-
ter the Moscow visit/
The Jordanians reconsidered their
decision to deal with the Soviets
primarily as a result of warnings
from the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia,
and Iran. In addition, Husayn is
increasingly apprehensive about
Soviet activities in the Middle
East.
--continued
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FRANCE: President
Giscard will probably
push his proposal for
a new multilateral aid
fund for Africa at the
Puerto Rico summit.
Paris hopes to gain US
support for the fund
before the summit.
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The French proposal closely re-
sembles a suggestion made by Sec-
retary Kissinger during his recent
African tour. While both plans
envisage a multibillion dollar
program to help the drought-
stricken nations of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the French plan also would
extend aid to other African areas
that Paris wishes to favor.
The political objectives of the
French plan are:
--to preserve close ties with
francophone Africa while expanding
relations with other African coun-
tries and promoting new aid schemes
to improve North-South relations;
--to overcome black African ill
will incited by the recent French
agreement to provide South Africa
with major new nuclear power plants;
--to counter growing Soviet in-
fluence in Africa.
Giscard has indicated that he is
thinking of a fund of $1 to $2 bil-
lion. The French anticipate that
their European neighbors may balk
at the proposal because of large
existing commitments to Africa.
Paris, however, hopes that this ob-
struction can be overcome by making
public and private contributions
voluntary.
--continued
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Jamaica
China
Pakistan.
NOTES
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Soviet\
The first major shuffle
in Romania's Council of
Ministers since 2.974
reflects President
Ceausescu's increasing
concern over possible
consumer dissatisfac-
tion and economic in-
efficiency.
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Ceausescu's grip on the reins of
power is strong, but he apparently
recognizes that the economy is his
greatest vulnerability. He has
now moved trusted supporters with
proven administrative abilities
into key positions in the consumer
welfare sector in order to upgrade
the performance of the economy.
Changes also were made in the mili-
tary sector. The new defense min-
ister, Colonel General Ion Coman,
reportedly is favorably disposed
toward the US. His highly success-
ful trip to this country last sum-
mer was the first visit by the
chief of staff of a Warsaw Pact
army.
--continued
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South African police
have sealed off Soweto
Township, the all-black
suburb of Johannesburg,
following yesterday's
rioting by thousands of
secondary students.
The riots, which left many persons
dead or wounded, capped a strike
that began in mid-May when black
students rebelled against the gov-
ernment's insistence that certain
courses be taught in the Afrikaa-
ner language.
The authorities seem to be in con-
trol of the situation and should
be able to keep the disturbances
from spreading. If, however, the
government reverses its stand on
the language requirement it would
be regarded by some blacks as a
political victory--and could lead
to other demands for change.
--continued
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_FA I 1.-/
ITALY
The Italian election on Sunday and Monday
is essentially a referendum on Communist
participation in the government.
Precise prediction of the outcome is im-
possible. The Communists could fall
short of the 33 percent they scored in
regional elections last year, but they
will almost certainly exceed the 27 per-
cent they won in the 1972 parliamentary
contest.
Even if a non-Communist government can be
formed after the election, there will be
heavy pressure for some kind of accommo-
dation with the Communist Party. Commu-
nist restraint will be a prerequisite for
political stability and Communist inter-
vention with organized labor will be nec-
essary if labor is to cooperate in an eco-
nomic recovery effort.
There is no question that disgust with the Christian
Democrats has deepened in the past year or that the
Communists are seen as the major force for change.
The Christian Democrats, however, have waged a vig-
orous campaign designed to arouse fear that the
Communists would lead Italy into an authoritarian
society linked to Moscow.
The Communists have done everything short of an-
nouncing a break with the Soviets to convince the
public otherwise. The outcome will be determined
by wavering voters who must resolve what Communist
chief Berlinguer has called the "conflict between
the need for change and the fear of novelty."
The Socialists
The polarization of the campaign around the Chris-
tian Democrats and Communists has tended to obscure
the essential role the Socialists will play after
the election. It is virtually certain that neither
of the larger parties will receive enough support
to form a majority without the Socialist Party.
--continued
Al
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Seeing themselves in a pivotal position, the Social-
ists have kept nearly all of their post-election op-
tions open. These include:
--First, an interim emergency government, pro-
posed by the Communists, in which all parties
except the neo-fascists would participate.
--A government with the Communists should the
election result in a Socialist-Communist ma-
jority and if the Christian Democrats refused
to participate.
--A coalition with the Christian Democrats, on
condition that the latter agree to involve the
Communists formally in the formulation of gov-
ernment programs and seek Communist support in
parliament.
Despite the Socialists' stated preference for an
emergency government including the Communists, a
majority of Socialist leaders privately hope it
will be possible to form a cabinet with the Chris-
tian Democrats with the Communists relegated to an
indirect role. They believe this would give the
Socialist Party maximum influence, while involving
the Communists sufficiently to make them share pub-
lic responsibility for the tough decisions the post-
election government will face.
The Communists
There is considerable evidence that Communist chief
Berlinguer is willing to settle for less than the
full government membership he is calling for in the
campaign.
--continued
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Berlinguer hopes to avoid a leftist coalition with
only the Socialists. The Communists reportedly
fear that such a government would provoke a hostile
reaction abroad and lead to unrealistic expectations
among the Communist rank and file. Berlinguer may
even think it would be more difficult for the party
to resist pressure from Moscow in such circumstances.
An indirect consultative role would give Berlinguer
the best of two worlds. It would give the Commu-
nists more influence on government policy and amount
to an implicit recognition of their potential as a
governing party. At the same time, the Communists
would be in the enviable position of being able to
disclaim responsibility when things went wrong.
The Christian Democrats
The unequivocal anti-Communist posture of the Chris-
tian Democrats during the campaign makes it unlikely
that the party could agree to form a government with
the Communists immediately after the vote. Language
in the party platform, however, clearly signals a
willingness to accept a limited accord with the Com-
munists on specific government programs. A debate
is apparently already under way among Christian
Democrats over how far to bend on the question of
indirect Communist participation.
Indirect Participation
In sum, there appears to be a degree of willingness
in each of the three major parties to move toward a
government based on Christian Democratic - Socialist
collaboration but open to some form of indirect par-
ticipation by the Communists.
Agreement on the indirect participation formula
would not come easily, however. In addition to dis-
agreements between the Christian Democrats and So-
cialists over the role to be played by the Commu-
nists, there are substantial differences within each
party on the advisability of such an agreement.
Some Communists for instance would view acceptance
of such a role as a gift to the Christian Democrats.
Berlinguer is reportedly being criticized already
by some Communist leaders for being too easy on the
Christian Democrats.
--continued
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The evolution toward compromise could be cut short
by a sharp swing toward the Communists at the polls.
If the Communists score a decisive plurality it will
be very difficult to deny them cabinet status. Such
a development could lead to an expanded leftist coa-
lition that would leave the Christian Democrats in
the opposition.
Election Outcome
On balance, the election is unlikely to produce a
clearcut result that would allow a relatively com-
patible combination of parties to deal decisively
with Italy's mounting economic and social problems.
If the election fails to give any party a marked
advantage, a caretaker government might be installed
to preside until the dust settles and until party
leaders have had time to digest the results. In
that event, efforts to form a coalition might be
postponed until the fall.
Unless the parties can find a way to resolve the
fundamental differences that led them to hold the
election ahead of schedule, the prospect is for con-
tinued instability and immobility. The current con-
test may well turn out to have been but a prelude
to another election, fought on the same issues in
the not-too-distant future.
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Top Secret
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