THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 JUNE 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015126
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 3, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
June 3, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category 511(11,12M3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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r CIA 1flJ 1-1(ELI.11J.LIV .1 (JIVE 1
June 3, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon-Syria: No new Syrian forces have been detected moving
into Lebanon. (Page 1)
USSR-Syria: Premier Kosygin, now in Damascus, is in an awkward
position because of the increased Syrian intervention in
Lebanon. (Page 2)
Syria: The latest intervention in Lebanon could increase opposi-
tion to President Asad. (Page 2)
Lebanon: President-elect Sarkis has used the Syrian move to ad-
vance his peace proposal. (Page 3)
Cuba-Angola: A high-level Cuban official reportedly has said
that plans to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola have been
suspended because of the threat of guerrilla operations.
(Page 4)
Zaire-Angola: The long-standing mutual distrust between the two
countries' presidents is inhibiting the implementation of
the reconciliation agreement reached last March. (Page 4)
USSR-Rhodesia: Moscow is not publicizing the visit of Rhodesian
black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, who has lost politi-
cal ground to some of his more militant rivals. (Page 5)
USSR-Philippines: President Marcos is getting the top-level at-
tention he demanded as a prerequisite for his current state
visit to the USSR. (Page 5)
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L AN. I L A-I A At L. LL A LA- LL V A l/ i V 1-.1 A
LEBANON-SYRIA: No new
Syrian forces have been
detected moving into
Lebanon in the past 48
hours.
We estimate that there are now
about 3,000 Syrian troops and
nearly 100 tanks in eastern Leba-
non. This total includes two in-
fantry battalions that have been
at Al-Masna since mid-April. Some
additional Syrian forces/
/are lo-
cated just across the border in
Syria.
The Syrian troops that entered
central Lebanon Tuesday and moved
to Shaturah and Zahlah apparently
were from the armored brigade that
has been astride the central Syria
Lebanon border near Al-Masna since
mid-April.
There has been no significant re-
sistence by Palestinian and left-
ist forces to Syria's advance in
eastern Lebanon.
We have been unable to confirm
press claims that Syrian troops
are in Sidon and have secured its
port and large oil refinery com-
plex. As many as 300 Syrian regu-
lar troops disguised as Palestinian
Saiqa forces have been there since
early April to intercept arms de-
liveries to leftist and Palestinian
forces. The Syrians have been re-
luctant to augment this contingent
because of Israeli warnings that
Syrian troops must stay out of
southern Lebanon.
The US defense attache in Tel Aviv
reported yesterday that the Israeli
military does not appear to have
increased its readiness posture in
reaction to Syrian moves in Leba-
non.
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USSR-SYRIA: The esca-
lation of the Syrian
intervention in Leba-
non on the eve of So-
viet Premier Kosygin's
arrival in Damascus has
put the Russian in an
awkward position.
SYRIA: President Asad's
domestic vulnerability
could further increase
if the latest Syrian
intervention in Lebanon
does not promote a po-
litical breakthrough.
Despite the risks, Asad
is unlikely to withdraw
unilaterally from his
commitment to obtain a
solution in Lebanon.
Kosygin undoubtedly is under strong
pressure from the Palestinians and
the leftist Lebanese to rein in Da-
mascus. On Tuesday he publicly
voiced mild criticism of Syrian ac-
tions in Lebanon, saying Moscow op-
poses "imperialist interference" in
"any form whatsoever."
It is doubtful that at this junc-
ture Moscow has the will to do
more than this. The Soviets still
value Syria as a counterweight to
Egypt, and want to avoid any ac-
tion that might encourage Damascus
to rely on the US for the arrange-
ment of a settlement with Israel.
There is a danger that Lebanon's
confessional strife might spread
to Syria. There already have been
attacks on members of Asad's minor-
ity Alawite sect by leading ele-
ments of the conservative Sunni
Muslim opposition. There also have
been numerous reports in recent
months that Syrian military offi-
cers are disturbed by Asad's sup-
port for Lebanon's Christians.
Asad, however, presumably secured
the backing of his principal mili-
tary commaders before he introduced
additional troops this week.
Despite his reported concern about
the overall reliability of the Syr-
ian military in the present situa-
tion, Asad may well inject more
troops into Lebanon if the politi-
cal stalemate persists. The Syr-
ian President clearly is determined
to recoup the stature he lost when
the Syrian-engineered settlement in
January collapsed and to ensure the
transfer of power to president-
elect Sarkis.
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LEBANON: President-
elect Ilyas Sarkis has
so far managed not only
to dissociate himself
from Syria's decision
to intervene but also
to use the Syrian move
to advance his peace
proposal.
Asad may be calculating that the
presence of a large Syrian force
gives Sarkis a trump card in his
negotiations with the leftists.
Sarkis is now in a position to of-
fer to negotiate the withdrawal of
most--if not all--of the Syrians
in return for leftist cooperation.
Sarkis held his long-awaited meet-
ing with leftist leader Kamal Jum-
blatt yesterday and apparently
gained Jumblatt's approval to con-
vene roundtable settlement talks
as soon as possible.
Jumblatt issued a statement follow-
ing the meeting in which he warmly
praised Sarkis, calling him a man
of conscience and independence.
Only weeks ago Jumblatt had treated
Sarkis as little more than a Syr-
ian puppet and had refused to ac-
cept the validity of his election
to the presidency.
Although Jumblatt coupled his
praise with calls for an immediate
Syrian withdrawal, the tone of his
remarks suggests that he may now
believe that cooperation with Sar-,
kis is the only way to get the Syr-
ian troops out.
Jumblatt apparently also met yes-
terday with the son of Christian
Phalanges Party leader Pierre Jumay-
yil. So far we have no information
on the results of the meeting, which
representatives of the two leaders
have been trying for weeks to arrange.
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CUBA-ANGOLA:
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Presi-
dents Mobutu of Zaire
and Neto of Angola do
not seem to be making
much progress in im-
plementing the recon-
ciliation agreement
they reached last
March. Their long-
standing mutual dis-
trust is apparently
the main stumbling
block.
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Cuban forces in An-
gola would be withdrawn only at
the request of the Angolan govern-25X1
ment, and that such a request had
not yet been made. This echoes
what Cuban Deputy Prime Minister
Rodriguez told the press in late
May during a visit to Mexico.
Mobutu's chief political adviser
recently told US officials that
relations with Angola were becom-
ing embittered. He accused the
Angolans of refusing to honor sev-
eral of the agreement's provisions,
including the voluntary repatria-
tion to Zaire of the former Katan-
gan secessionists who took refuge
in Angola in 1963.
The adviser also complained that
the Angolan government is stalling
on putting the Benguela railroad,
an important trade artery for
Zaire, back into operation. Other
information indicates that the
railroad's operations are being
hampered by well entrenched Na-
tional Union guerrillas in central
Angola.
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USSR-RHODESIA: Rhode-
sian black nationalist
leader Joshua Nkomo has
arrived quietly in Mos-
cow on the heels of
visits there by Mozam-
bican President MacheZ
and Angolan Prime Min-
ister Nascimento.
USSR-PHILIPPINES: Phil-
ippine President Marcos'
first state visit to
the USSR seems to be
proceeding according
to plan.
On the Angolan side, according to
the adviser, Neto recently accused
Zaire of continuing to train guer-
rilla forces of the National Front
and to support their cross-border
operations. The adviser argued
that National Front troops are op-
erating on their own and are not
allowed to use Zairian territory.
The two presidents probably will
continue to find fault with each
other. The joint commission es-
tablished to work out the details
of their agreement is operating
under an intentionally vague char-
ter, and mutual suspicion is deep.
Nkomo has long-standing links with
Moscow. He probably hopes that a
visit now will help bolster his
faltering position among Rhodesian
nationalists. Much of Nkomo's in-
fluence has shifted to more mili-
tant rivals following the collapse
of settlement talks with Rhodesian
Prime Minister Smith in March.
The Soviets have yet to make any
announcement of Nkomo's visit.
Moscow apparently does not want to
offend Machel and other black Af-
rican leaders by openly favoring
any particular Rhodesian national-
ist leader. Moreover, in the af-
termath of the Angolan conflict,
Moscow's overall approach to the
Rhodesian and Namibian problems
has been relatively cautious.
The Soviets have given Marcos the
top-level attention he demanded as
a prerequisite for the trip. Mar-
cos has had two sessions with Pres-
ident Podgorny and other Soviet
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officials and one "friendly, busi-
nesslike" meeting with General Sec-
retary Brezhnev. The two sides
yesterday announced the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations and
the conclusion of a trade agree-
ment.
At the Soviet dinner in honor of
Marcos, he pointedly expressed the
hope that Moscow would continue to
pursue peaceful policies in Asia
and elsewhere. Podgorny responded
by stressing the need for all
Asians to work together for Asian
peace and security. This is the
new formulation the Soviets have
adopted to seek Asian support for
Brezhnev's seven-year-old Asian
collective security idea.
During the preliminary negotiations
on the final Soviet-Philippine com-
munique, there were indications
that, in return for a favorable
Soviet reference to the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations,
Marcos might be prepared to en-
dorse the new, watered-down version
of Brezhnev's proposal. The com-
munique is likely to be issued on
Sunday, the final day of Marcos'
visit.
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