THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 MAY 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015120
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 27, 1976

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013400010013-4
The President's Daily Brief
May 27, 1976
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Exempt from general
declauification schedule of CO. 11652
exemption category, 5B(11,f 21(3)
declassified on1}1 on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013400010013-4
May 27, 1976
Table of Contents
China: At present, Chinese military procurement in dollars is
less than one third that of the US, and about one sixth of
the estimated dollar cost of Soviet procurement. (Page 1)
USSR-Syria: Moscow's continued efforts to obtain increased ac-
cess to Syrian port facilities may be running into trouble.
(Page 2)
Notes: USSR; Tanzania-Zambia-USSR (Page 4)
At Annex
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Zaire.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CHINA: At present Chi-
nese military procure-
ment in dollars is less
than one third that of
the US, and about one
sixth of the estimated
dollar cost of Soviet
procurement.
Procurement as used here is a meas-
ure of what it would cost to repro-
duce Chinese military equipment in
the US.
The estimated annual dollar costs
of Chinese military procurement
have fluctuated sharply over the
past 10 years. The changing polit-
ical situation has been partly re-
sponsible. During 1967--the first
full year of the Cultural Revolu-
tion--military equipment procure-
ment declined by about 25 percent
to $2.2 billion.
When the Cultural Revolution ended
and Sino-Soviet tensions height-
ened, military procurement rose
rapidly to a level of almost $5.5
billion in 1971.
In 1972, military procurement
again declined, to about $3.2 bil-
lion, where it remained until it
rose again to about $3.6 billion
last year.
The major factor in both the magni-
tude and the pattern of the esti-
mated dollar costs has been the
variation in China's aircraft pro-
duction.
China's past history of sudden
bursts and reductions in defense
production makes it difficult to
judge whether the upturn in 1975
is a temporary phenomenon or the
beginning of a long-term trend.
Over the next several years, as
the Chinese begin to replace obso-
lescent equipment with more modern
systems, procurement costs can be
expected to grow somewhat even if
production in terms of numbers of
units does not increase.
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I LJ AV 1 A.IL AA\ J L.? .I. JIJi V A V 1-1
USSR-SYRIA: Moscow's
continued efforts to
obtain increased access
to Syrian port facili-
ties may be running
into trouble.
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/a So-
viet naval delegation visited
Syria early this month seeking
privileges in the Syrian port of
Latakia similar to those the So-
viets had in Alexandria. Egypt.
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Moscow may be seeking approval
from Damascus to station Soviet
support vessels in Syrian ports
permanently, as well as to gain
access to shore facilities and to
establish storage depots. With-
out major long-term port improve-
ments, the construction of major
repair and overhaul yards, and
training of Syrian personnel, the
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--continued
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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crowded Syrian ports could not
provide facilities similar to
those Soviet submarines enjoyed in
Alexandria.
It seems highly unlikely that Syria
would permit Moscow the type of un-
restricted access it had in Egypt.
The USSR, however, is Syria's pri-
mary source of military equipment,
and it may try to use Damascus'
current financial difficulties to
extract concessions. Damascus will
find it difficult to resist Soviet
requests, at least for regular ac-
cess to Syrian ports by more Soviet
naval ships and establishment of
limited shore support facilities
for the ships.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013400010013-4
The Soviets' new, short-
range, tactical surface-
to-surface missile, the
SS-X-21, was seen with
an operational unit for
the first time in mid-
April.
Tanzania and Zambia,
which are opposed to So-
viet and other outside
direct involvement with
the Rhodesian guerril-
las, also appear unea25X1
in their bilateral re-
lationship with the
USSR.
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NOTES
The characteristics of the new mis-
sile system and its appearance in
a FROG battalion area suggest that
it will replace the FROG--now the
most widely deployed Soviet tacti-
cal surface-to-surface missile.
The SS-X-21 appears to have a
greater range (possibly up to 120
kilometers, or 75 miles), better
accuracy, and improved mobility.
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Central African Republic
Cameroon
Ethiopia
(7\
Equatbrial
Guirti
Gabon
Victoria
Cabinda
KINSHASA
Tanzania
Lake
Nyasa
Kariba
Lake
Rhodesia
South-West Africa
(Namibia)
Walvis Bay ri
(S. At)
Atlantic
Ocean
559829 5-76
Botswana
Swazila
South
Africa
he
que
Indian
Ocean
o 500 MILES
0 500 KILOMETERS ?
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_ _
ZAIRE
--continued
Al
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,
Top Secret
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