THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 27 APRIL 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015093
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 27, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
April 27, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification sshedule of E.O. I 1652
exemption category MI
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved 6714-ere-a-s-e-2-61-6/67%19 b-I-A:RDP79T00936A013300010024-3
April 27, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: The selection of a successor to the late Soviet Defense
Minister Grechko should pose no great difficulty for Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev. (Page 1)
Tanzania-Cuba-Rhodesia:
(Page 2)
Portugal: The indecisive election results open many options for
forming the next government, and the maneuvering is already
under way. (Page 3)
Lebanon: The fighting has subsided, but the problem persists of
how to provide adequate security for parliament when it
meets to choose a new president. (Page 4)
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Notes: Panama; China; Japan-Egypt; Mozambique-USSR (Pages 6 and 7)
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USSR: The selection
of a successor to the
late Soviet Defense
Minister Grechko should
pose no insurmountable
problem for General
Secretary Brezhnev.
Brezhnev is in a stronger position
now in relation to his colleagues
than he was when the previous de-
fense minister, Marshal Malinovsky,
died in 1967. Moreover, the sudden-
ness of Grechko's death offers lit-
tle time for maneuver among poten-
tial successors.
The new defense minister must be
acceptable to both the political
leadership and the military estab-
lishment. A decision must also
be made as to whether he will be
seated soon on the Politburo or
only after having demonstrated his
loyalty for some years, as Grechko
had before he became a Politburo
member.
A delay would leave the military
unrepresented on the Politburo
while the Foreign Ministry, KGB,
and arms producers would continue
to have their interests represented
on that body. To seat the new
defense minister on the Politburo
either immediately or in the near
future, however, would seem to
confirm the right of the military
to Politburo representation--some-
thing the civilian leadership has
been reluctant to do in the past.
The new minister will probably be
announced in a week or so. In our
view the most likely choice is
General Viktor Kulikov, the first
deputy minister of defense, who is
also chief of the General Staff.
Kulikov, age 55, has held these
jobs since 1971 and is probably
sufficiently experienced to make
the move to the full ministerial
post with relative ease. He ap-
pears to be on good terms with
Brezhnev and with at least some
of the other Politburo members.
(continued)
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1-'/-1 Ti T T 1 T1 im
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TANZANIA-CUBA-RHODESIA:
His colleagues within the Soviet
military establishment reportedly
hold him in high esteem.
Another good possibility is Marshal
Ivan Yakubovsky, the first deputy
minister who commands the Warsaw
Pact forces. Yakubovsky, 64, was
the senior officer in the ministry
after Grechko, but he might be
unacceptable to the political
leadership.
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PORTUGAL: The indeci-
sive results of the
legislative election
on Sunday open many
options for the forma-
tion of the next gov-
ernment, and political
leaders are already
maneuvering for a role.
The Socialists will come under
heavy pressure from all sides in
the two months before the presiden-
tial election and the installation
of a new government. Their plural-
ity of 35 percent compared to 24
percent for their nearest rival,
the Popular Democrats, means that
a coalition would not be feasible
without the Socialists.
Popular Democratic Party Secretary
General Sa Carneiro and Social Dem-
ocratic Center leader Freitas do
Amaral have already called on So-
cialist leader Mario Soares to join
them in a government coalition.
Soares rejected their appeals, but
press reports say other influential
Socialist leaders believe a coali-
tion is inevitable.
Soares' stated objection is based
upon his belief that the country's
burdensome economic problems can
only be solved by a government
which is not divided over domestic
policy.
Although Soares has doggedly held
his ground on this point, he con-
firmed in a recent conversation
with US Ambassador Carlucci that
he would view an alliance with the
Popular Democrats much more favora-
bly if Sa Carneiro were replaced as
party chief by Minister of Internal
Commerce Magalhaes Mota.
A Socialist attempt to form an al-
liance with the Communists cannot
be ruled out, but Soares' heated
denial of such intentions during
the campaign, coupled with strong
opposition from both "operationals"
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(continued)
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LEBANON: The fighting
has subsided since Pres-
ident Franjiyah's deci-
sion over the weekend to
permit the election of
his successor, but the
problem persists of how
Lebanese authorities
can arrange adequate se-
curity to permit the
convocation of parlia-
ment before the Sunday
deadline set by the Mus-
lim left.
in the Portuguese military and Por-
tugal's NATO allies, would seem to
diminish considerably the chances
for such a combination.
The Communists' best hope of parti-
cipation would be in a "government
of national salvation" formed to
avert a serious political crisis--a
possibility Soares alluded to in an
interview on Sunday.
The present stalemate could con-
tinue until the presidential elec-
tion, a possibility that is likely
to put growing pressure on party
and military leaders to agree on a
joint candidate to avoid a divisive
campaign and minimize political in-
stability during the next two months.
The speaker of parliament believes
the session should be postponed for
at least a week. He is seeking the
advice of the Syrians and Palestin-
ians, whose forces will have pri-
mary responsibility for the safety
of the deputies.
The haphazard security arranged for
the brief parliamentary meeting
earlier this month provided little
real protection for the deputies.
It would be inadequate for this
session, especially if the princi-
pal parties have not agreed in ad-
vance on Franjiyah's successor.
Neither Raymond Edde nor Ilyas
Sarkis, the two leading contenders,
has made much headway in his cam-
paign.
President Franjiyah's determination
to block the election of Edde or
any other candidate sympathetic to
the leftists could break the dead-
lock in Sarkis' favor. Franjiyah
(continued)
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V unk v
is especially worried that Edde
would try to unearth evidence of
corruption during Franjiyah's ad-
ministration. The President re-
portedly has recently threatened
not to resign if he is not satis-
fied with his successor.
Meanwhile, one of the top generals
on the Israeli general staff has
warned that the threat of an attack
from across the Lebanese border will
increase no matter what the eventual
outcome is in Lebanon.
Major General Adam told a group of
military correspondents on Sunday
that Israel has already had to
reinforce its defensive positions
along the Lebanese border. He said
the border must now be considered
"a new frontier of confrontation,"
presumably like those with Syria,
Egypt, and Jordan.
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U..S. S. R.
MONGOLIA
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PEKING
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Panama is preparing to
seize US and other for-
eign fishing vessels
operatina off its coast
Apr? ,1, 26.
Two Chinese surface
ships, visually sighted
on April 25 by a US
navy patrol aircraft
north of the Fiji Is-
lands, may be sup-
porting the Han subma-
rine that we suspect is
in this area.
NOTES
chief of govern-
ment Torrijos discussed the possi25X1
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bility of seizing foreign fishing
boats and levying large fines
against them.
There may be several motives for
Panama's action. The canal treaty
negotiations with the US have
slowed, and action against US boats
would enable Torrijos to deflect
possible domestic criticism by
showing that he does not fear Wash-
ington. The tuna and shrimping
season is under way, and the Pana-
manians may be sensitive to en-
croachments on their fishing zones.
Panama claims a 200-mile terri-
torial sea but has not aggressively
pursued its claim. Torrijos may
feel that similar US legislation
will make it difficult for the US
to react farcefully. Finally, the
Panamanians are in a financial
squeeze and may hope to resolve a
number of problems through the use
of revenue from the fines.
The US aircraft also detected sev-
eral underwater explosions near
the surface ships, suggesting that
the Chinese were conducting hydro-
acoustic tests or were signaling
the submarine.
(continued)
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_ _ _ _ .
Japan
gyp
A Mozambican military
delegation has been in
the USSR since late
last week presumably
discussing economic and
military assistance.
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After years of insurgency against
the Portuguese, Mozambique is just
beginning to shape its guerrilla
fighters into a conventional force.
The military has little in the way
of heavy equipment and presumably
is looking to Moscow to help sat-
isfy its requirements. The dele-
gation may also be looking for
Soviet economic assistance; Mozam-
bique is sustaining substantial
money losses as a result of closing
its border with Rhodesia.
Mozambican commercial and informa-
tion officers visited Moscow ear-
lier. The USSR is increasingly
important as a source of trade and
arms to the Machel regime.
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Top Secret
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