THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 APRIL 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015071
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 2, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
April 2, 19 76
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B(I ).(2).(3)
declassified onlY on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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April 2, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Leftist leader Jumblatt has agreed to a
ten-day truce. The cease-fire is scheduled
to go into effect today. (Page 1)
USSR: Recent Soviet statements suggest that Mos-
cow may develop long-range cruise missiles if
such weapons are not limited by a new strate-
gic arms agreement. (Page 4)
Egypt-USSR:
UK-Rhodesia: London's latest initiative to get
the Rhodesian negotiations going again is not
likely to get very far. (Page 6)
Notes: China-Egypt; Italy (Page 7)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LEBANON
Leftist leader Xamal JumbZatt bowed
to Syrian and Palestinian pressure yes-
terday and agreed to a ten-day truce.
The cease-fire is scheduled to go into
effect today.
The ten-day limit was demanded by the leftists.
During this period parliament is expected to amend
the constitution and elect a new president, paving
the way for President Franjiyah's resignation.
Amending the constitution should be completed
quickly, but there will be intense haggling over
the timing of Franjiyah's departure and selection
of his successor. Both Christians and leftists
view Franjiyah's replacement as a key element in
future negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.
Ilyas Sarkis, governor of the central bank, is
one of the front-runners to replace Franjiyah. He
is favored by the Syrians and the Christian Pha-
langes Party, but the leftists consider him too
assertive. Another leading candidate is Raymond
Edde, son of Lebanon's first president and leader
of the third largest Christian political party.
He has a broad following in parliament and among
Muslim conservatives and some leftist groups. The
conservative Christians and Syrians consider him
an unpredictable maverick.
Jumblatt is a member of parliament but con-
trols few of its 99 votes. If a stand-off develops
between Sarkis and Edde, he might be able to deny
both the required majority and force the chamber
to select a weak, compromise candidate.
(continued)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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In recent days the Soviets have
weighed in more heavily in support of a
Lebanese cease-fire.
The Soviets are supporting the Syrian efforts
because they recognize the Lebanese situation could
touch off a larger Middle East conflict. Recent
appeals by Damascus to the West to acquiesce in a
Syrian intervention, as well as signs of deeper US
involvement in the crisis, may have also stimulated
the intensified Soviet activity.
In addition, Moscow does not want a setback to
Syrian President Asad's prestige, particularly at a
time when its problems with Sadat have intensified.
It may also be concerned that a Syrian failure could
lead to instability in Damascus, with uncertain con-
sequences for the Soviet position there.
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USSR
Recent Soviet statements suggest
that they may develop long-range cruise
missiles if such weapons are not lim-
ited by a new strategic arms agreement.
We have no clear evidence that they have started
working on long-range cruise missiles, but activity
at two test centers may be related to the develop-
ment of such weapons. Recent photography of the
Nenoksa naval missile test center suggests that the
Soviets started work on two structures that appear
to be cruise missile launchers in late 1974. A
separate program could be under way at the Vladimir-
ovka advanced weapons research center where a new
vehicle--apparently a cruise missile--was photo-
graphed on a launch pad in October and again in
January and February.
While this vehicle could be a long-range cruise
missile, it could also be a reconnaissance vehicle,
a drone, or a mock-up. Until a flight test is ob-
served, we cannot determine its character.
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EGYPT?USSR
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UK-RHODESIA
London's latest initiative to get
the Rhodesian negotiations going again
is not likely to get very far.
The proposal calls for expeditious negotiations
on the shape of a new Rhodesian government and a
transition period of no more than one or two years
leading to majority rule.
The African presidents who have been backing
the Rhodesian nationalists probably at least pri-
vately will welcome any new British initiative
that might avert a guerrilla war. It is doubtful,
however, that even they could organize the quar-
reling Rhodesian nationalists into a cohesive ne-
gotiating team capable of dealing with Prime Min-
ister Smith.
Smith, for his part, is almost certain to re-
ject the British package unless Prime Minister
Vorster states publicly that further South Afri-
can support for the Salisbury regime is contingent
on prompt resumption of negotiations. Vorster is
increasingly anxious to head off a liberation war
in Rhodesia that might lead to Soviet or Cuban in-
tervention. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that he
is prepared to try to force Smith to agree to sur-
render on the issue of white rule in Rhodesia.
London is probably not very optimistic about
the prospects for its initiative, but it feels a
legal and moral obligation to try to break the
deadlock while there is still time for a peaceful
settlement.
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NOTES
Differences over Italy's abortion law threaten
the stability of Prime Minister Moro's Christian
Democratic minority government.
Most legislators want to compromise, but their
efforts were dealt a severe blow yesterday when the
Christian Democrats forced through a provision op-
posed by all the major parties. The parliamentary
leader of the Social Democrats, whose votes Moro
needs, has already recommended that his party re-
consider its support for Moro; their defection
would topple the government. In view of the cur-
rent fragmented condition of Italian politics, an-
other government would be very difficult to patch
together. Under these circumstances President
Leone would be compelled to dissolve parliament
and schedule early elections.
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