THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015067
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 29, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 29, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of EO. 11652
exemption category. 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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March 29, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Syrian President Asad's meeting with left-
ist leader Kamal Jumblatt ended late Saturday
with no agreement on terms for a cease-fire in
Lebanon. (Page 1)
Jordan: Jordan is becoming a significant factor in
the Middle East power balance as a result of
its efforts to bolster its military capabili-
ties and to improve defense coordination with
Syria. (Page 3)
At Annex we present an assessment of the insurgency
situation in Rhodesia following the collapse
of talks between Joshua Nkomo and Prime Minis-
ter Smith.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Latakia
6-/
Tripoli
?Zagharta
Lebano
Beirut .Bikfayya
KI
a I( h a I
ims
Al Qutayfahl, Syria
Area of Se
3rd-4rtnvision
'Damascus
7;117nfantry Division
a Kiswah
Mediterranean Sea
1st Armored Division
Dara
Tel Aviv-Yafo
20 40 Statute Miles
20 40 Kilometers
559528. 3-76 CIA
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LEBANON
Syrian President Asad's meeting with
leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt ended late
Saturday with no agreement on terms for a
cease-fire.
JumbZatt's refusal to agree to an
immediate truce has prompted Syria to seek
"international guarantees" allowing it to
intervene in Lebanon with regular Syrian
troops.
Damascus, intends to
ask for assurances from a number of countries that
no other outside military force will interfere if
Syria decides to move into Lebanon. The Syrians
believe it would take only two days to enforce a
cease-fire if their troops were to enter Lebanon.
Syrian forces generally remain in a high state
of alert, according to the US defense attache in
Damascus. During his travels this weekend in and
around the city and the northern part of the Golan
Heights, he saw no indication of actual or impend-
ing military moves toward Lebanon by Syrian troops.
The attache believes, however, that the Syrian
1st Armored Division--based at Al Kiswah, ten miles
south of Damascus--has significantly increased its
state of readiness. The attache observed the di-
vision's military police in full combat gear,
armored vehicles uncovered and fully loaded, and
ammunition trucks heading toward Al Kiswah.
Throughout the area around Damascus, antiaircraft
units remain on alert.
(continued)
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Egypt yesterday called for joint Arab media-
tion of the Lebanese crisis and asked for the dis-
patch of "token joint Arab security forces" to
maintain peace while the mediation effort proceeds.
Cairo has asked the Arab League to contact all Arab
states urgently to obtain agreement on the Egyptian
initiative.
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JORDAN
Jordan is becoming a significant
factor in the Middle East power balance
as a result of efforts to bolster its
military capabilities and to improve de-
fense coordination with Syria. The Oc-
tober 1973 Arab-Israeli war made Jordan
especially aware of its own military weak-
nesses compared to Israel and Syria, and
Amman is concerned that it has been
steadily losing ground as a result of mas-
sive arms aid to its neighbors.
The Jordanian armed forces suffer in firepower
and mobility compared to the Israelis and have an
inadequate ground-based air defense system. The
air force is small, generally equipped with obsoles-
cent aircraft, and based at only two vulnerable air-
fields. There has been a chronic manpower shortage
in the armed forces, and logistical and maintenance
capabilities are relatively limited.
To overcome its weaknesses, Jordan has acceler-
ated its efforts to modernize and strengthen its
armed forces since the 1973 war. It has acquired
about 130 tanks and 320 armored personnel carriers
from the US since 1973, and plans to have nearly
750 tanks and 1,350 APCs in its inventory by the
end of the decade. Large numbers of TOW antitank
missiles and self-propelled artillery also are on
order. The air force is obtaining new F-5E fighter
aircraft, constructing additional air bases, and
operating improved radars. It has 75 combat air-
craft and should have over 100 within the next sev-
eral years. Amman now is also attempting to obtain
modern Vulcan and Hawk air defense systems from the
US, although the deal has run into difficulties be-
cause of Saudi funding limitations.
Despite the modernization program, Jordan re-
mains aware that it continues to be unable to sus-
tain military action effectively against Israel.
It will be several years before Jordan can build
up the logistical infrastructure and technical ex-
pertise to absorb and use all the new military
equipment it is receiving. Amman, therefore, has
turned to increased military cooperation with Syria
(continued)
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to improve its potential to participate more effec-
tively in any new hostilities. Such coordination
serves to improve Jordanian credentials as an Arab
confrontation state and increases its political and
military leverage against Israel.
Amman has become increasingly dissatisfied with
US military aid over the last few years as a result
of rising costs and long delays in delivery. The
government also is unhappy with the lower priority
apparently accorded Jordan compared to Israel, as
well as the political conditions being attached by
the US Congress. If the Hawk air defense sale with
the US falls through, Amman conceivably could turn
to the Soviets for arms, particularly air defense
missiles and strike aircraft. Such a move, however,
would risk disrupting the entire US aid effort and
the modernization program.
If the current trend in Jordanian military co-
operation with Syria continues, as now appears
likely, the two countries could considerably enhance
their joint capabilities against Israel by the end
of the decade. Because of its modernization pro-
gram, Jordan could play a far more effective role
in any new fighting by then, even without concluding
a formal alliance with Syria.
The two countries are unlikely to be able to
match Israeli military strength for the foreseeable
future. Despite any quantitative edge they may
achieve in manpower or weapons, Israeli qualitative
superiority in such factors as leadership, technol-
ogy, tactical flexibility, technical proficiency,
and manpower utilization is likely to continue to
be decisive. Nevertheless, improved Jordanian de-
fense cooperation with Syria over the next several
years will increase both countries' ability to put
military pressure on Israel and make any action
against them more costly to Tel Aviv.
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Mocamed
Angola
Vile Serpa Pinto
Zambia
Lusaka*
Rhodesia
South-West Africa
(Namibia)
0
Walvis Bay
(S. Al.)
*Windhoek
Botswana
Gaborone
Luderitz
Atlantic
Ocean
559526 3-76
*Pretoria
Swazile
South
Les tho
Africa
East London
Cape To 0 MILES 500
Durban
ne
puts
Beira
que
Indian
Ocean
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RHODESIA
The collapse of talks between Joshua
Nkomo and Prime Minister Ian Smith leaves
Rhodesia's black nationalists with almost
no option but to use military means to
achieve majority rule.
Even before talks broke off, nationalist guer-
rilla forces based in neighboring Mozambique had
renewed the insurgency against the Smith regime
after a lull of more than a year. The guerrillas
now are getting greater support than before from
Rhodesia's black neighbors and from their long-
time communist sources of supply.
The Fighting
Beginning last fall, veteran insurgents moved
from camps in Tanzania and Zambia to bases along
Mozambique's border with Rhodesia. In late Jan-
uary, small, lightly armed units began infiltrating
Rhodesia again, staging hit-and-run attacks, mining
roads, and terrorizing local villagers. The guer-
rillas are now spread out in small groups in Mozam-
bican villages along most of the 700-mile border
with Rhodesia.
Thus far, Rhodesian defense forces--although
stretched thin--have been able to contain the incur-
sions to within a few miles of the border. The
Rhodesians have used their limited air power to
chase the guerrilla bands back into Mozambique.
Several recent air attacks, in fact, have inflicted
casualties on Mozambican regular forces and civil-
ians as well as the guerrillas.
The ability of the insurgents to expand their
activities beyond the current level depends in
large part on whether they have overcome serious
divisions within their ranks. The final plans for
the guerrilla campaign may have been set in a meet-
ing in Mozambique in early February, at which Zam-
bian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere,
and Mozambican President Machel met with guerrilla
leaders Muzorewa and Sithole and some of Nkomo's
representatives. Machel and Nyerere made a strong
(continued)
Al
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effort to put together a new guerrilla leadership,
but it remains to be seen if tribal, personal, and
factional rivalries will continue to jeopardize the
unity they have sought.
Insurgent Strength and Foreign Assistance
Estimates of the size of the guerrilla forces
vary widely. Some nationalist leaders have claimed
a strength of up to 20,000 guerrillas, but this
figure appears to be highly exaggerated. At pres-
ent, at least 500 guerrillas probably are in ac-
tion inside Rhodesia, with at least 2,000 more in
the Mozambican border area. We do not know how
many are in training in Tanzania, but there could
be as many as 500 in Zambia.
It is not clear what ties exist between the
insurgents and blacks inside Rhodesia, particularly
in the important urban areas. With the settlement
talks broken off and the fighting likely to increase,
the insurgents might try to stage terrorist attacks
in urban areas and promote political action against
the Smith government.
Nyerere and Kaunda want to avoid direct Cuban
and Soviet involvement such as occurred in Angola;
they fear that such a development would transform
an African problem into a US-Soviet confrontation.
Rhodesian Forces
The Rhodesians have about 7,000 active army
troops and an equal number of police to deploy
against the insurgents. Army reserves total about
10,000 and police reserves some 35,000 to 45,000.
About half of the army regulars and nearly three
fourths of the police are black, but all of the
(continued)
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army reserves and three fourths of the police re-
serves are white. These defense forces, including
the small air force, are fairly well equipped to
deal with the current level of insurgency, but
over the long term they will have considerable dif-
ficulty replacing equipment.
Outlook
Although the fighting seems certain to in-
crease in the coming months, it may be some time
before we are able to judge the effectiveness of
the insurgents. The onset of the dry season, which
begins shortly, will make them more vulnerable for
a time to Rhodesian counterinsurgency operations.
When the rains come next fall, they presumably will
try to take advantage of the lessened mobility of
the Rhodesian military.
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,
Top Secret
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