THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 MARCH 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006015056
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 16, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
March 16, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category 5B01( 2),13)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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LO L '4 J._ 'Fi L
March 16, 1976
Table of Contents
Lebanon: Brigadier Ahdab's backers are divided
about what to do next. Syria is reportedly
trying to put together another political solu-
tion. (Page 1)
Africa: We present conclusions from a Special Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate: "Prospects for
and Implications of Conflict in the Horn of
Africa Over the Next Year or So." (Page 2)
Ireland:
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Notes: USSR-Egypt; India-Canada; France; Niger
(Pages 6 and 7)
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LEBANON
Brigadier Ahdab's backers are di-
vided about what to do next now that their
effort to oust President Franjiyah has
bogged down. Syria is reportedly trying
to put together another political solu-
tion.
Some of Ahdab's supporters want to try to dis-
lodge Franjiyah by force, but others, including the
mainline fedayeen and Palestine Liberation Army
forces, fear this would lead to a new round of heavy
fighting. Ahdab's followers also cannot agree on
whether to establish a new governing body, such as
the military command council promised last week.
According to a Beirut newspaper with good con-
tacts in Syria, Asad is attempting to put together
a package agreement that would provide for a general
amnesty, reconstruction of the Lebanese army under
the high command, and a new civilian government
without Franjiyah. If no political solution is
found, it is likely that the situation will deteri-
orate steadily toward civil war again. This almost
certainly would lead to an attempt by the Christians
to partition the country and possibly to direct mil-
itary intervention by Syria.
Israeli aircraft were active
on reconnaissance missions in the area yesterday.
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The Horn of Africa
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HORN OF AFRICA
We present below conclusions from a
Special National Intelligence Estimate
entitled "Prospects for and Implications
of Conflict in the Horn of Africa Over
the Next Year or So." The estimate was
issued yesterday after telephonic ap-
proval by the members of the US Intelli-
gence Board.
The odds are at least even that France will
decide within the next year or so to withdraw its
military forces from the French Territory of Afars
and Issas (FTAI). If that happens, open military
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is likely to
erupt soon thereafter.*
--Somalia alleges that it supports independence for
the FTAI, but in reality it is determined to pur-
sue its historical aim of annexing the territory.
(The Issas, who constitute about half of the pop-
ulation, are ethnic Somalis.)
--Ethiopia is equally determined to prevent Somalia
from dominating the FTAI and its main port of
Djibouti, the terminus of Ethiopia's only impor-
tant rail link to the sea.
There is only a slender chance that war could
be avoided through a diplomatic solution that in-
cluded: external restraints (from other Africans,
Arabs, and the superpowers); French revamping of
the FTAI government to make it acceptable to both
the Issas and Afars and to regional states with an
interest in the problem; and a continuing French
military presence.
*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Air Force, believes that this judgment
is too weak and that if the French withdraw within
the next year or so, open military conflict will
almost certainly erupt soon thereafter.
(continued)
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The Somalis in coming months will probably in-
stigate an expanded campaign of subversion and polit-
ical violence in the FTAI designed to weaken France's
will to keep a pro-French regime in power or to guar-
antee an independent state's territorial integrity.
--Rather than commit its troops against a sustained
insurgency, France is likely to accelerate its
withdrawal after attempting to devise a face-saving
arrangement.
--A French withdrawal, in turn, would encourage So-
malia to seize the territory by open force.
The USSR would like to avoid a war in the Horn.
It is probably counseling Somali President Siad
against precipitous military action, urging him in-
stead to rely on a combination of political pressure
and subversion to achieve Somali objectives. Never-
theless, we believe that Siad himself will favor a
more aggressive policy and that Moscow will feel com-
pelled to support him.
Ethiopia would undoubtedly go to war to block
Somalia's territorial ambitions. Such a war would
probably unfold as follows:
--A Somali attack would result in the capture of
Djibouti and some other parts of the FTAI in the
initial days of fighting.
--Ethiopian forces, though larger than those of
Somalia, are already stretched thin combating do-
mestic insurgencies and would have no more than
an even chance of dislodging the Somalis.
--Neither side would be able to end the war deci-
sively, and a military stalemate would result
after several weeks of fighting. There would be
pressure from the conservative Arabs and the OAU
for a cease-fire.
The Soviet Union (and Cuba) would probably pro-
vide new aid to Somalia in this situation, although
the decision to do so would not be an easy one.
Moscow would probably simultaneously seek to limit
the conflict and try to find a political solution
that would satisfy minimum Somali and Ethiopian re-
quirements.
(continued)
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The US would be faced with the problem of how
to respond to the Soviet move without appearing to
abandon a friendly country and to allow Moscow to
achieve a significant military and diplomatic advan-
tage in yet another part of Africa.
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IRELAND
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NOTES
The Soviet Union's initial response to Egypt's
abrogation of their friendship treaty, issueei yes-
terday by Tass, appeared to be a holding statement
until Moscow has studied the situation more fully.
The Tass release described President Sadat's
action as a new manifestation of an "unfriendly"
policy toward the USSR that the Egyptian leader has
been pursuing. Implying that Moscow may play down
the Egyptian move, Tass stated that the treaty had
not been functioning for some time and reiterated
that the USSR will continue to work for friendly
relations with Cairo and the Egyptian people.
An earlier Arabic broadcast from Moscow seemed
to appeal to the Egyptian military, asserting that
domestic forces were responsible for weaknesses in
Egypt's current military capability.
India and Canada initialed a nuclear aid agree-
ment on March 6, which will commit India not to test
within 15 months of the date of the treaty's ratifi-
cation.
The agreement calls for resumption of Canadian
assistance for the Rajasthan Nuclear Power Project.
The Indians have accepted Canada's safeguards re-
quirements and have given an oral assurance that
India does not intend to export explosive material
or technology.
India has been conducting site surveys in prep-
aration for a second nuclear test. New Delhi appar-
ently intends to test again and may well be in a
position to do so after the 15 months have elapsed,
or even earlier if the agreement should not be rati-
fied.
(continued)
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French South Pacific Test Center
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Niger President Kountche and his supporters
apparently remain concerned about the extent of
military support for dissidents following yester-
day's coup attempt.
Our embassy in Niamey reports that fighting
yesterday morning was heavy, suggesting that the
coup attempt had significant backing. President
Kountche said in a radio broadcast yesterday that
the coup leaders are under arrest.
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Top Secret
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